Fertility Continues to Decline 

The National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) recently released provisional data on fertility in the US for 2025. It reported a significant decline in the total fertility rate to 1.57 children per woman, down from 1.63 in the prior year. As shown in Figure 1 for 2000 through 2025, the recent reading continues a series of steady declines from the high of 2.12 in 2007, just above the replacement rate of 2.1, at which births replace deaths and the population holds steady in the long run without net immigration. Although the secular decline began with the onset of the Great Recession, it has continued unabated through the ups and downs of the economy, Presidential Administrations of different political parties, and, in 2025, despite a relatively strong economy and low unemployment.    Figure 1  Figure 2 shows that the decline in fertility occurred across almost all age groups of women, especially the young, with only the oldest groups showing a slight increase. For example, among women aged 20 to 24, the number of births per thousand fell by more than half, from 106.3 in 2007 to 52.2 in 2025, and among those aged 25 to 29, the birth rate fell from 117.5 in 2007 to 85.6 in 2025. There was only a slight increase, from 47.5 to 55.1, among women aged 35 to 39.    Figure 2   Notwithstanding these obvious trends, some project that the decline in birth rates is temporary and represents merely a delay in childbearing choices, reflective of the education, work, and marriage preferences of contemporary women and the advent of technologies that assist fertility at older ages. Indeed, as shown in Figure 3, the Social Security Trustees project that the total fertility rate will rebound to 1.9. By contrast, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects some further small decline followed by a flat rate going into the future. This difference is consequential to the long-term finances of social insurance programs and the federal budget. According to the 2025 Social Security Trustees’ Report, under the assumption of a 1.9 ultimate fertility rate, the 75-year actuarial balance of the program is -3.82 percent of taxable payroll. If the ultimate fertility rate were instead assumed to be 1.6, the actuarial balance would be -4.49 percent of taxable payroll, a significantly worse view of the program’s finances.    Figure 3   There is survey evidence supporting the CBO. Figure 4 shows the lifetime birth expectations of US women by age group from the 2006 to 2010 and 2022 to 2023 National Survey of Family Growth. Around 2007, women of all ages expected about 2.3 children over their lifetimes. Women aged 20 to 24 expected to have 2.37 children during their lives and had 0.47 children on average. By 2023, however, the expectation and the reality had dropped dramatically for this youngest group, to 1.51 and 0.23, respectively. The decline in expectations was nearly as large among 25- to 29-year-olds, from 2.35 to 1.87. Although not as severe, the drop in birth expectations and realizations occurs across all age groups. For example, among the older group of 35- to 39-year-old women, birth expectations fell from 2.35 to 2.08. Moreover, because expectations are often optimistic, perhaps owing to cultural influences, it is clear from this survey evidence that a birth rebound caused by future cohorts of older women having two or more children later in life is an unreasonable assumption upon which to base long-run budget and economic projections.    Figure 4   Combined with lower net immigration, this new fertility picture should prompt the US to revisit basic expectations underlying its policies, social insurance programs, fiscal situation, defense, economy and culture.    The post Fertility Continues to Decline appeared first on American Enterprise Institute - AEI .