Estimating Wartime Damage to US Military Bases in the Middle East as Part of Operation Epic Fury

70 structures. 11 US military bases overseas. Seven countries. $5 billion in damage. The damage inflicted by Iranian forces on American and allied bases in the Middle East during the opening weeks of Operation Epic Fury will reap financial consequences. Not only will America’s now-degraded forward troop presence change as a result, but the deliberations over what to rebuild will be time-consuming and consequential. After rebuilding and repairs, US military force posture across Qatar, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Jordan, and Iraq is likely to shift locations, and shrink in the Gulf overall. The remaining open question for allies and partners is if US bases are still a net benefit to their security if America’s munitions stockpiles are shallow and its air defenses limited. The implications for force planning and modernization could see disruptions depending on how the US and Gulf governments answer this question. Estimated Damage to US Bases by Iran Country Base Estimated Damage Bahrain 5th Fleet Headquarters 2 SATCOM terminals, 2 radomes, and 3 large warehouses Iraq Erbil Military Base 1 storage building Jordan Muwaffaq Salti Air Base 1 general administrative building Kuwait Ali Al Salem Air Base 3 hangars, parts of the runway, 15 small warehouses, 1 maintenance shed Kuwait Camp Arifjan 6 radomes, 4 small and large warehouses, 1 general administrative building, 1 maintenance shed Kuwait Camp Buehring 1 SATCOM terminal, 1 hanger, 4 small and large warehouses Kuwait Shuaiba Port 1 general administrative building Qatar Al Udeid Air Base Parts of the runway Saudi Arabia Prince Sultan Air Base 1 small warehouse, 1 radome UAE Al Dhafra Air Base 2 general administrative buildings, 2 small hangars, 1 medical clinic, 6 fuel storages, 1 barracks UAE Al Ruwais Military Base 5 small warehouses, 2 general administrative buildings Source: Author’s analysis. Damages to infrastructure that have been inflicted on US bases in the Middle East have been largely under-examined in Washington. The estimated rough costs total an estimated $5 billion and include rebuilding outright, repairing select assets, changing facilities makeup, or abandoning buildings or locations. Arriving at this estimate goes beyond the sum costs per building and includes several multipliers to project hidden costs that typically arise in the complex work of replacing battle-damaged facilities. Many key US systems or locations that were hit are assessed to be beyond simple repair. For that reason, most are estimated at higher costs for infrastructure that is unsalvageable. In our calculation, we exclusively identify fixed, large, and permanent structures on US bases. For example, SATCOM terminals that were destroyed at the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet headquarters are counted as they are a permanent and significant structure crucial to base operability. On the other hand, billions of dollars in radar destruction, such as THAAD, are not included because they are not structurally fortified nor are they fixed in location and placement. This represents the distinctions made between infrastructure and weapons or military equipment. Further, our research accounts for several indirect cost drivers that are often underestimated or uncounted in infrastructure estimates. These include overhead for design, engineering, construction management, debris removal, unexploded ordnance handling and removal, as well as country-specific conversion factors for foreign construction, which accounts for differences in labor and purchasing power. We also account for building complexity using multipliers based on asset type, considering the key distinctions between building hardened structures, communications equipment, and standard buildings. In the AEI estimate, we adjusted for the unique challenges the military faces in rebuilding from Operation Epic Fury. An additional 30 percent cost contingency factor is included given challenging logistics and scarcity of select materials in some cases due to the war. This includes continued blockage of the Strait of Hormuz and increased fuel costs, seaport closure and inoperability, as well as destruction of some energy and data infrastructure across the region. This estimate is comfortably within range of the historical context of expanding financial scope once ground realities become clearer. During the height of the War on Terror from 2007–2011, the US spent $1 to $4.3 billion per year on associated overseas military construction costs alone. This is not adjusted for inflation to gain a standardized measure of expenditure versus total economy size. The significance of these historical expenditures is that they exceeded what was originally requested in the Pentagon’s annual budgets. The US military is no stranger to cost overruns or expanding project scope over time. Systems built in stable, controlled, domestic environments routinely jump above original construction estimates. The struggles the military already faces—supply chain chokepoints, rising materiel costs, and sub-par factories—will not vanish when doing the same thing abroad. Rebuilding American military bases after the Iran war will be costly. The final price tag will require large investments shaped by evolving conditions and continued logistical challenges. Pentagon leaders should seek a supplemental spending bill to cover the cost of bases and equipment that will need to be replaced and made better or modernized once rebuilding begins. The post Estimating Wartime Damage to US Military Bases in the Middle East as Part of Operation Epic Fury appeared first on American Enterprise Institute - AEI .