Snake Island Institute

DDefenseefenseTECH MONTHLYTECH MONTHLY in this editionin this edition Maritime Layer: First USV- Launched Drone Intercept 25,000 UGVs: Ukraine Doubles Its Procurement Ukraine's An-28 Evolves as Interceptor Carrier GAP Missile GAP Get in Line or Find an Alternative — Patriots Are Running Short Missile -- 1 of 24 -- Table of Contents Section I Section II Land Robots at the Front: The UGV Race in 2026 Tracked in Real Time: Ukraine Connects Its Railways to Military Airspace Control Air The Low-Cost Air-to-Air Missile: Ukraine's An-28 Evolves as Interceptor Carrier Hunting the Hunters: Russia Turns Shaheds on Ukraine's Mobile Fire Groups FPVs Grow Wings: Low-Cost Range Extension The “Epic” Mission: The $300M Rescue Inside Iran ”I'm not the one hitting — the willow is”: Ukraine's April Deep and Middle Strike Campaign Maritime Shahed Goes Splashing: Ukraine's First USV-Launched Counter-Drone Strike Space Spirit-030: Russia's Yet Another Battlefield Communication Solution EW Europe Is Covering the Bill: The Mobile Network Behind Russia's Shahed Campaign Cyber Digital Iron Curtain: Russia's April Internet Offensive Ukraine Cuts the Queue: Ukraine's New Procurement Model Section III The Interceptor Gap: In Search of Alternatives Sources 01 02 02 02 03 04 04 05 06 07 08 11 11 12 12 13 13 14 14 15 16 16 19 -- 2 of 24 -- Frontline Update Section i Northeast (Sumy-Vovchansk-Kupiansk-Yampil): Russia continues its aggression while losing approximately 30,000–35,000 personnel per month since the start of 2026. In April, at its current pace of advance, this translates into an estimated 200–250 soldiers lost for every km² gained. Enemy assaults continued near Vovchansk, with repeated attempts to enter Zybyne repelled. In the Kharkiv border area, Ukrainian forces conducted a successful clearance operation in forested terrain near Ambarne. In the Kupiansk direction, Russian forces intensified attacks, again attempting to use a large-diameter gas pipeline running beneath the Oskil riverbed as an axis of advance, while increasing pressure toward Petropavlivka and Pishchane. Yampil remains under Ukrainian control. In Sumy Oblast, Russian forces continued efforts to establish a border buffer zone, with confirmed enemy control and infiltration along the border reaching approximately 150 km². The Belarusian flank remains a latent threat; however, an independent Belarusian offensive is unlikely. A more probable scenario involves Russian forces staging from Belarusian territory or the integration of Belarusian personnel into Russian units. East (Kramatorsk-Kostiantynivka-Pokrovsk): Russian forces continued to intensify pressure along the Sloviansk axis. The capture of Sloviansk and Kramatorsk is assessed as a central objective of Moscow's summer 2026 offensive aimed at completing the occupation of Donetsk Oblast, of which approximately 20% remains under Ukrainian control. In Kostiantynivka, Russian forces are pushing large infantry concentrations into the city, with the heaviest infiltration attempts on the southeastern outskirts and active penetration on the eastern periphery near Novodmytrivka. Additional pressure is being applied from the Berestok and Illinivka directions. In the Pokrovsk–Myrnohrad agglomeration, Russian forces are consolidating control and reportedly relocating tube artillery into the city, leveraging Pokrovsk's elevated terrain to support further advances. Russian FPV drones maintain effective dominance over the area. Enemy forces continue efforts to establish footholds on the northern outskirts of Hryshyne, with advances extending toward Novooleksandrivka, Vasylivka, and Myrne. Rodynske is under sustained assault from guided aerial bombs and artillery as Russian forces attempt to advance toward Shevchenko. Near Rivne, continued enemy pressure is increasing the risk of encirclement for Ukrainian forces holding the pocket around Svitle. South (Oleksandrivsk-Huliaipole-Orikhiv): In the Oleksandrivsk direction, enemy attacks continued. Following last month’s clearance of Berezove, Ukrainian forces liberated Novoselivka in Dnipro Oblast. In the Huliaipole direction, assault activity has intensified, with advances recorded toward Novoselivka in Zaporizhzhia Oblast. This open terrain northeast of Orikhiv is assessed as favorable for a wider envelopment maneuver; Russian forces will likely attempt to exploit it in the spring and summer to create conditions for encircling Orikhiv from the northeast. Notably, the Easter ceasefire announced across the full line of contact, and violated by Russian forces more than 10,000 times, provided the enemy an opportunity to reinforce positions, resupply ammunition, and rotate units, improving Russian assault capacity in the weeks ahead. 01 -- 3 of 24 -- land Section ii Robots at the Front: The UGV Race in 2026 In the first half of 2026, Ukraine is set to contract 25,000 UGVs for frontline deployment, twice the total procured across all of 2025. The goal set is to take over 100% of frontline logistics, up from 50-80% currently (value depends on weather conditions and frontline sector). By early 2026, North Korea was shipping roughly 33,000 containers of ammunition and weapons to Russia, up from around 28,000 in mid-2025, when it already accounted for approximately 40% of all materiel used against Ukraine. Given the scale of Russian dependence on North Korean support, mounting the Type-75 on UGVs was a predictable step. Growth in the Use of UGVs. Source: Ukrainian Ministry of Defence The number of Ukrainian units operating UGVs grew from 67 in November 2025 to 167 by spring 2026, and strike and logistical missions nearly tripled over the same period, from around 3,000 to approximately 9,000. With separate units carrying out more than 100 strike UGV operations over the past few months, the overall growth trajectory of UGVs is expected to continue. The picture on the Russian side is different, partly shaped by ongoing communication challenges and the Starlink blockade. Where Ukraine is actively expanding UGV strike capabilities, Russia has largely confined its UGVs to second-echelon support roles, delivering supplies and experimenting with mounting artillery systems. Courier UGV Fitted With an 82mm Mortar and a Robotic Arm. Source: stormdron & texBPLA In early April, Russian sources also published footage of a Courier UGV fitted with an 82mm mortar and a robotic arm for feeding rounds — a concept that has been in development since early 2026, with testing likely underway by winter. With the mortar's working range of 3 to 4 km, any platform operating at that distance would be well within the kill zone and likely destroyed before completing a mission. The arm mechanism raises further practical questions: it is likely the weakest point in the design and the first component to fail under operational conditions. Dual loading is also poorly suited to automatic reloading, and the platform is probably too small to accommodate a breech-loading mechanism with a magazine feed. The underlying goal of automatic reloading still points in the right direction and remains an unsolved problem for Ukrainian manufacturers as well. Russian Courier and Impulse UGVs Fitted With Type-75 MLRS. Source: stormdron & Drone Wars For instance, in April, footage emerged of the Russian Courier and Impulse UGVs fitted with North Korean Type-75 107mm MLRS. The standard stationary configuration uses 12 launch rails; the UGV-mounted version was reduced to 8, with an effective range of approximately 8.5 kilometers. Courier UGV Towing a D-30 Howitzer. Source: stormdron Separately, another Courier UGV was filmed towing a D-30 howitzer weighing approximately 3.2 tonnes, well above its stated payload of 200 kg and tow rating of an additional 200 kg. While the footage was shot on flat, unobstructed terrain, the gap suggests improvement in the towing capacity, pointing to broader utility as a logistics vehicle and potentially an artillery tractor. 02 -- 4 of 24 -- land Section ii Tracked in Real Time: Ukraine Connects Its Railways to Military Airspace Control With 10% of all wartime hits on railway infrastructure recorded in Q1 2026 alone, Russia is targeting Ukraine's logistical backbone: disrupting military supply lines while reducing civilian passenger traffic to degrade defense capabilities and the broader economy. Coverage remains the central constraint: protecting trains would require extensive resources across multiple systems, and even that would not ensure reliable defense against every threat — fiber-optic drones with ranges now reaching 50 km and drones equipped with auto-lock terminal guidance being prime examples. Railway protection remains an open question, with Ukraine seeking a layered approach spanning early warning, electronic warfare, and air defense. In early April, in response to the escalating strikes, Ukrzaliznytsia, Ukraine's state railway operator, integrated its dispatch service with military airspace control systems. Railway operators now track enemy strike UAVs in real time and adjust train movements accordingly: rescheduling when threat levels permit, evacuating passengers when danger is real. Officials report that several trains have already avoided strikes as a result. 03 -- 5 of 24 -- AIR Section ii The Low-Cost Air-to-Air Missile: Ukraine's An-28 Evolves as Interceptor Carrier In late April, footage emerged of Ukraine's An-28 turboprop operating as an airborne interceptor carrier, carrying P1-SUN interceptors by Ukrainian SkyFall and American-made AS3 Merops drones on underwing hardpoints, with at least three mounting points per wing. Several other interceptor types were also evaluated during training flights. The An-28 is also fitted with an optical system to detect targets visually, enabling crews to locate incoming drones before launching interceptors. The interceptors serve as a low-cost alternative to traditional air-to-air missiles and as a step toward operations in zero-visibility conditions, where an airborne platform can sustain sensor coverage and command links that ground-based systems usually lose. The An-28 has retained its onboard miniguns as part of the new configuration. By the time the interceptor setup was unveiled, the aircraft had already downed 222 Russian drones using its gun armament, meaning both systems can potentially be employed simultaneously. The overall concept compounds the platform's existing advantages: STOL capability keeps it deployable from short, austere airstrips, extended loiter time supports standing patrols, and launching from altitude adds range and cuts interceptor response time. If scaled, the concept offers a low-cost, operationally flexible addition to Ukraine's counter-drone arsenal. Underwing Interceptor Drones (P1-SUN & Merops) on the An-28. Source: aero.tim 04 -- 6 of 24 -- AIR Section ii Hunting the Hunters: Russia Turns Shaheds on Ukraine's Mobile Fire Groups In April, Russia began systematically targeting Ukrainian mobile fire groups, the short-range air defense layer that emerged in 2022 as one of the key countermeasures against Shahed drones. Within Ukraine's layered air defense architecture, MFGs sit below long-range systems (like Patriot) and mid-range systems (like NASAMS), engaging Shahed-type drones with cheap direct fire along likely approach routes and preserving SAM missiles for higher-value threats. Published footage carries visual overlays suggesting automated target acquisition and machine vision guidance, but Ukrainian officials claim the markers are post- production graphics and control remains manual. Even so, given the cameras on board, crews are advised to mask vehicles and munitions with camouflage nets to "smooth the silhouette" of the vehicle. The deliberate targeting of MFGs, with reports suggesting Shahed operaрtors may be instructed to reprioritize targets mid-flight, shifting from the primary strike objective to the MFG upon detection, underscores their effectiveness as obstacles to strikes on Ukrainian rear areas, while also creating pressure to close the vulnerabilities this tactic exposes. Russia is now deliberately targeting MFG crews mid- engagement using a multi-drone tactic: one Shahed draws the group's fire while a second hunts the vehicle. The drones carry cameras and are guided via LTE modems, fiber-optic, or mesh network, with mesh modems reportedly vulnerable to Ukrainian EW suppression at 200 to 500 meters. Ukrainian MFG in the Aim of the Shahed Drone. Source: The_Wrong_Side 05 -- 7 of 24 -- AIR Section ii FPVs Grow Wings: Low-Cost Range Extension In April, a Russian Rubikon unit detected a Ukrainian FPV drone with an unusual configuration — a wing mounted above a standard copter frame — carrying a PG-7 series warhead. The underlying concept follows a similar logic to the Russian “Knyaz Volodymyr Svyatoslavich” ring-wing fiber-optic FPV, which is assessed to achieve comparable ranges. The construction, however, differs significantly. While the KVS uses a fixed ring wing, the Ukrainian design features a wing that freely swivels to maintain its optimal angle of attack as the drone pitches during flight. Available footage also suggests the wings may be jettisoned mid- flight, restoring FPV’s maneuverability. Ukrainian "Wing-Over-Copter" FPV Drone. Source: GrandpaRoy2 The “wing-over-copter” concept uses the additional lift generated by the wing to reduce the energy the drone expends, reportedly extending flight distances from 10 km to 30-50 km on the same battery and enabling strikes deeper into the enemy rear. Wing Mount Construction on an FPV Drone. Source: VIUKSIDV While the design offers a low-cost range extension, it introduces trade-offs: added structural complexity reduces reliability, the larger wing surface increases radar cross- section, making the drone more detectable, and whether the platform retains the abrupt-stop maneuverability of a standard FPV remains unclear. The effectiveness and scaling of this solution on either side remain to be determined. 06 -- 8 of 24 -- AIR Section ii The “Epic” Mission: The $300M Rescue Inside Iran On April 3, a U.S. F-15E Strike Eagle was hit by a shoulder-fired heat-seeking missile over southwestern Iran, marking the first confirmed loss of a crewed American aircraft to Iranian fire since Operation Epic Fury began. Both crew members ejected and landed miles apart in hostile territory. Moreover, during the mission, two MC-130J Commando II aircraft became stuck in soft sand after landing and could not take off, forcing a contingency extraction using three smaller, faster aircraft. The disabled planes were destroyed on the ground to prevent sensitive equipment from being captured. Both crew members were successfully recovered. Losses and damage during the rescue: Asset Status Estimated Unit Cost MH-6M Little Bird 2–4 lost ~$2–4M MC-130J Commando II 2 destroyed (deliberately destroyed by U.S. forces) ~$100–120M HH-60 Pave Hawk 2 damaged; crew injuries reported ~$40M A-10C Thunderbolt II Shot down; crashed over the Persian Gulf; pilot recovered ~$20M While the F-15E itself costs approximately $100M to replace, the rescue operation mounted to bring its crew home cost an estimated $300M or more in assets alone, before munitions expenditure and operational costs are factored in. Approximate Location of the Mission Conducted. Source: BBC The pilot was located and recovered within hours, while rescuing the weapons systems officer required a significantly larger effort. The U.S. mounted a rescue operation roughly 400 km deep into hostile territory and according to officials involved 155 aircraft: four bombers, 64 fighters, 48 refueling tankers, 13 rescue aircraft, and additional support assets. 07 -- 9 of 24 -- AIR Section ii ”I'm not the one hitting — the willow is”: Ukraine's April Deep and Middle Strike Campaign With 76 Russian industrial targets struck in March, Ukraine has maintained its deep strike tempo in April against military, defense-industrial, and infrastructure facilities on Russian territory and is likely to escalate that tempo in May. Monthly UAV Activity Over Ukraine and Russia, January 2024 – April 2026 (Red – over Russia, Blue - over Ukraine). Source: Oboronka Over the past two years, the volume of Ukrainian long- range drone launches has grown steadily, from approximately 110 UAVs in January 2024 to 7,500 in March 2026, the highest monthly figure recorded to date and the first time in a while that Ukraine surpassed Russia in drone launches. Late April figures — approximately 4,000 Ukrainian drones reported downed by Russian air defense, and approximately 6,300 Russian strike assets recorded by the Air Forces of Ukraine — reflect different counting approaches but are sufficient to assess the general activity level for the month: a slight decrease in attacks from the Ukrainian side. Launch volumes are expected to recover in May, driven by the expansion of deep and medium- strike operations across four additional Unmanned Systems Forces units and continued allied investment in Ukrainian defense production. As the number of simultaneous targets increases, an already depleted and overstretched Russian air defense is forced into increasingly selective prioritization, leaving previously unexplored gaps that Ukrainian drones continue to exploit. In April, for instance, the geographic reach of Ukrainian strikes expanded to Sverdlovsk and Chelyabinsk oblasts, both around 1,700 km from Ukrainian-controlled territory. Russian Regions Reached by Ukrainian UAVs: January 2024 to March 2026. Source: Oboronka Sverdlovsk and Chelyabinsk Oblasts: Distance to Ukraine- Controlled Territory. Source: Google Maps 08 -- 10 of 24 -- AIR April strikes covered the full spectrum of Russia's war- sustaining infrastructure: oil processing, chemical production, defense industry, and naval assets. Beyond physical destruction, the campaign targeted Russia's ability to generate revenue, maintain supply chains, and plan further offensive operations. Confirmed targets include, but are not limited to: Oil Refinery — 6 Oil Export Terminal — 4 Pipeline Infrastructure — 6 Oil Extraction — 2 Energy Facility — 3 Chemical Industry — 6 Defense Industry / UAV Base — 8 Naval Target — 3 Logistics — 1 Fire at Tuapse Oil Refinery Following the April 20 Strike. Source: exilenova_plus Section ii Publicly Available Deep Strike Hits in April 2026. Source: DniproOfficial, exilenova_plus, oko_gora With the U.S. having temporarily eased restrictions on Russian oil exports amid the conflict in Iran and rising global fuel prices, Russia received an opportunity to increase revenue through expanded export capacity. Ukrainian strikes were aimed at preventing that; a substantial portion of April's effort focused on Russia's oil infrastructure. In April 16, Ukraine struck the Tuapse Oil Refinery, Russia's only Black Sea coastal refinery with 2 million tons of oil per year capacity. With repeated strikes on April 20 and April 28, the refinery caught fire in at least ten places and halted production entirely; the smoke plume reached Stavropol 300 km away, with locals reporting "oil rain." Of the refinery's 46 storage tanks, 24 were destroyed (52%), 4 were damaged (9%), and 18 remained intact (39%), leaving 61% of total storage capacity non- operational in the near term. Tuapse Oil Products Tank Farm: Damage Assessment After April Strikes. Source: oko_gora Unlike most Russian refineries, which primarily serve the domestic market, the Tuapse facility is almost entirely export-oriented: oil products processed here are loaded directly onto shadow tankers for export. The timing of the strikes compounded the damage. Following the April 6 attack on the Sheskharis oil terminal in Novorossiysk — which handles roughly 14% of Russia's crude exports — Russia had redirected supply flows to Tuapse just days before the attack, with throughput expected to rise from the usual 500,000–600,000 tons per month to nearly 800,000 tons. The cumulative effect on Russia's export revenues is significant. Oil revenue losses from long-range attacks in March alone are estimated at no less than $2.3 billion, April losses are expected to exceed that figure. According to some estimates, Russian oil output may have declined by approximately 300,000–400,000 barrels per day in April, down from an average of 8.80 million barrels per day recorded in early 2026, marking the largest single-month drop in six years. 09 -- 11 of 24 -- AIR Section ii Middle Strike While deep strikes hit Russia's strategic and economic depth, middle strikes clear the path that makes them possible, systematically dismantling the air defense coverage, logistics chains, and forward infrastructure that would otherwise stand in the way of deep strike drones. By late April, publicly available reporting from the Unmanned Systems Forces, Security Service of Ukraine, Defence Intelligence of Ukraine, Naval Forces, and National Guard of Ukraine confirmed at least 30 hits on various air defense systems. The systematic destruction of air defense nodes across occupied territory has left Russia's coverage increasingly thin and concentrated around a shrinking set of priority areas, among them Moscow, the Alabuga industrial complex, Black Sea and Baltic port corridors, and presidential facilities. With missile stocks for surface-to- air systems reportedly running low, Russian forces are shifting toward improvised hybrid air defense solutions, including heavily relying on mobile fire groups. Confirmed targets include, but are not limited to: SRBM Bases — 2 HQ / Command Posts — 15 Airfield Infrastructure — 7 Ammunition Depots — 10 UAV Depots / Forward Staging Areas — 7 Fuel and Oil Depots — 13 Russian R-77-1 Air-to-Air Missiles Adapted for Ground Launch on Ural-4320 Chassis. Source: mag_vodogray Naval Targets — 9 Defense Industry — 1 Logistics — 25 The situation mirrors Ukraine's in 2022, when cost- effective solutions to counter mass drone attacks were largely absent. For Russia, the same pressure will likely produce the same outcome: an accelerated push to develop dedicated drone interceptor systems, a capability to watch for in the near future. Other — 11 10 -- 12 of 24 -- MARITIME Section ii Shahed Goes Splashing: Ukraine's First USV-Launched Counter-Drone Strike In April 2026, the 412th "Nemesis" Brigade conducted the first recorded interception of a Russian Shahed drone by an interceptor launched from an unmanned surface vessel, marking a new level of integration between naval and aerial unmanned capabilities. Equipment of the USV with Sting Interceptors. Source: Oboronka The development of such technology required more than a year and involved solving four technical and operational problems: Detection. Small radars can track both interceptor and target simultaneously, but limited range makes maritime fire control significantly more complex than over land, requiring an integrated network of larger radars and sensors. Platform design. Unlike expendable kamikaze USVs, an interceptor carrier must sustain repeated use and extended patrol cycles. The vessel incorporates launch containers, EW-protected communications systems, and a machine gun turret for self-defense within compact dimensions. Interceptor. The Sting interceptor employed in the mission is a next-generation platform with an advanced communications suite and remote launch capability. Logistics. Each deployment requires covert transit and route variation, with Russian forces actively monitoring the coastline and able to strike identified launch sites. Russia's standard tactic involves saturating Ukrainian air defenses through simultaneous mass drone launches. Launch constraints prevent dispatching the full group at once; drones are instead released in sequential batches and accumulate over the Black Sea, circling beyond the range of Ukrainian air defenses until the complete group consolidates and advances toward the target. The new approach enables interception over water, disrupting drone concentrations before an attack forms while eliminating the risk of debris falling on populated areas. It also extends engagement capability to reconnaissance UAVs that provide real-time targeting correction for Russian ballistic missile strikes. The capability remains at an experimental stage. If scaled, it would establish a new maritime interception layer capable of engaging drones coming from temporarily occupied Crimea before they reach Ukrainian coast. The approach may also interest Ukrainian allies seeking cost- efficient solutions to the same Shahed problem in the Strait of Hormuz. 11 -- 13 of 24 -- Space Section ii Spirit-030: Russia's Yet Another Battlefield Communication Solution In April, Ukrainian drone operators from the 414th Brigade destroyed the first confirmed Spirit-030 satellite terminal on the front line. While less noticeable and more portable than previous alternatives, the terminal is not a like-for-like Starlink replacement. Where Starlink delivers 20-60 Mbps, the Spirit-030 operates at 2-4 Mbps, due to the satellite's significantly greater orbital distance: 36,000 km for geostationary orbit versus Starlink's 550 km. The Spirit-030 also requires manual alignment with a fixed point in the sky, unlike Starlink, making it less convenient to deploy and reposition. Russia had been observed using the Spirit-030 during exercises in Russia and Belarus roughly a year ago, but large-scale Starlink availability at the front meant there was no operational need to deploy it. Sources now confirm the terminal is appearing at the front with increasing frequency, and Russian domestic production capacity means scaling could be rapid. Still, Russian forces continue attempting to access Starlink through other channels: terminals advertised on Telegram, registered by Ukrainian citizens and forwarded through third countries, or stripped from drones captured on the battlefield and repurposed for Russian UAVs. Most such attempts have failed, and those involved have faced criminal prosecution. Spirit-030 in the Camera of Ukrainian Drone / Spirit-030 at the Rubikon Center's Training Ground. Source: serhii_flash & Anna News The shift to geostationary terminals follows directly from the Starlink blockade. Russia's previous satellite systems relied on antennas up to 90 cm in diameter, making them a noticeable target for Ukrainian drones. The Spirit-030 cuts that figure by two-thirds: it is a portable satellite internet terminal with a 30–35 cm foldable dish, likely connecting through the Ekspress and possibly Yamal satellite series, which makes detection significantly harder. These workarounds remain fragmented, and current Russian alternatives to Starlink are limited in capability and early in deployment. But communications infrastructure is one of the most critical constraints on the battlefield, and the pressure to find workable substitutes is only growing. Both tracking emerging Russian solutions and developing national layered communication remain priorities worth accelerating. 12 -- 14 of 24 -- EW Section ii Europe Is Covering the Bill: The Mobile Network Behind Russia's Shahed Campaign In April, reporting emerged on the role of Russian mobile operator T2 (formerly Tele2) in the Shahed campaign. Every Shahed carries a T2 SIM card, supplied to drone manufacturers through dedicated operator orders, enabling remote control, telemetry transmission, and real- time video feed back to operators. Allied nations should terminate roaming agreements and international interconnect contracts with T2, reducing the operator to a purely domestic Russian network. As long as these agreements remain in place, European mobile networks risk enabling Russian drone operations. Ukraine has blocked T2 roaming on its networks; however, drones are circumventing these restrictions by flying along border areas, where they connect to Belarusian coverage in the north and switch to Polish or Romanian networks in the west and southwest. According to sources, the same SIM-based infrastructure may also account for the unidentified drone sightings periodically reported across European airspace. 13 -- 15 of 24 -- CYBER Section ii Digital Iron Curtain: Russia's April Internet Offensive In April, Russia's digital crackdown expanded significantly. The Ministry of Digital Development set an April 15 deadline for over 20 major platforms, including Yandex, Sberbank, VK, Wildberries, and Ozon, to block users detected using VPNs, with non-compliance threatening IT accreditation. Each company received a list of banned VPN services and is now required to report any newly identified tools to the regulator, Roskomnadzor. The pressure extended to telecoms operators: from April 1, topping up Apple ID balances via phone billing was blocked across all major operators, closing a common route for purchasing VPN apps. Operators were also pushed to cap VPN-routed traffic at 15 gigabytes per month, with surcharges applying beyond that threshold. By mid-April, Telegram availability without a VPN had dropped to a record low of 5%. Frontline units relying on the platform for coordination lost a key communication tool, while pro-regime channels shed around 40% of their views against 17% for opposition channels, whose audiences were already more likely to use VPNs. To identify VPN users, companies deployed scoring systems cross-referencing IP reputation data and browser signals. The approach has a structural flaw: platforms cannot technically distinguish VPN traffic from ordinary foreign connections, meaning Russians abroad face identical blocks regardless of how they connect, losing access to banking apps, state portals, and booking services. With frontline personnel losses outpacing recruitment and September parliamentary elections approaching, information control has become a strategic priority for Russia, and the sovereign internet a tool to enforce it — regardless of the collateral damage to business and operational communications alike. 14 -- 16 of 24 -- CYBER Section ii Ukraine Cuts the Queue: Ukraine's New Procurement Model In April, Ukraine's Cabinet of Ministers approved a resolution creating a formal fast-track procurement path for defence innovation. The Ministry of Defence can now purchase innovative products, software, and technologies under a simplified procedure specifically for battlefield testing, without requiring them to first meet full procurement standards. Units evaluate solutions under combat conditions, and that assessment determines whether a product enters the formal supply chain. The change addresses a structural gap. Previously, Ukraine's centralised procurement system had no category for experimental acquisition, meaning innovative solutions from startups and private developers had no legal entry point regardless of battlefield relevance. New technology reached units sporadically, with no institutionalised feedback loop and no guaranteed path to scale. A licensing mechanism introduced in October 2025 had already begun moving battlefield-developed technologies into manufacturing, with 30 licenses issued by January 2026. The April resolution extends that logic to externally developed solutions, replacing committee approval with combat validation as the deciding factor. Ukraine is steadily replacing informal, case-by-case structures with standardised systems designed to reduce human error, limit external pressure, and scale what works faster than any manual process could. A New Procurement Model for Defence Innovations. Source: Ukrainian Ministry of Defence 15 -- 17 of 24 -- Section iii The Interceptor Gap: In Search of Alternatives Ballistic missiles are among the most difficult threats to intercept. Their terminal phase is hypersonic, and the window to respond is measured in seconds. Against this threat, the Patriot system has become the “benchmark” of air defense, reliably intercepting ballistic and aeroballistic missiles including Iskander, KN-23, and the hypersonic Kinzhal. A Patriot is not a single launcher. It is a full battery that functions as an integrated system: radar, engagement control station, multiple launchers, interceptor missiles, communications, and power support. The PAC-3 MSE is the current operational standard for terminal-phase ballistic defense. Unlike older systems such as the PAC-2 GEM-T, which detonate near a target and rely on blast fragmentation to destroy it, the PAC-3 MSE is a hit-to-kill interceptor: it physically collides with the incoming missile and destroys it through direct impact. A dedicated radar seeker and a ring of small attitude control motors allow it to make precise last-second corrections, giving it the maneuverability needed to intercept fast, evasive ballistic targets that older interceptors cannot reliably engage. Ukraine fields approximately eight Patriot batteries, received from the United States, Germany, the Netherlands, and Romania since 2023, far below the 20–25 assessed as necessary to maintain a reasonably resilient defense against ballistic threats. Against Russia's estimated production of around 1,000 ballistic missiles per year, including approximately 60 Iskander missiles per month, Ukraine has received slightly over 600 PAC-3 interceptors across four years of full-scale war. The performance ceiling of the PAC-3 MSE is not the limiting factor. The number of missiles available to fire is. The operational consequences are visible. Ukraine has reportedly reduced standard engagement practice from two to four interceptors per target to single-missile engagements, driven by stockpile pressure. The contrast with U.S. forces operating in the Persian Gulf, where three interceptors per target has been the reported standard, illustrates the difference in available inventory between the two theaters. Earlier in 2026, Pentagon officials announced a target to more than triple annual production, from approximately 650 to as many as 2,000 interceptors per year. With each missile costing at least $4 million, a $4.7 billion contract signed in April 2026 is intended to support that expansion, with Lockheed Martin committing to significantly increase manufacturing capacity and the Boeing agreement addressing the seeker head bottleneck. Yet reaching 2,000 units annually will take several years. For now, buyers must contract 29 months in advance before manufacturing even begins; both timelines far outpace the immediate operational need. In the interim, the U.S. has withdrawn Patriot batteries from South Korea, delayed deliveries to Switzerland, and requested that Poland transfer interceptors from its own inventory to the Middle East, a request Poland declined. Switzerland's 2022 order, expected by 2027, now faces a delay of four to five years. The U.S. military's fiscal year 2027 budget request includes 405 PAC-3 MSE interceptors earmarked for naval integration, with missiles developed for ground-based Patriot batteries being drawn into ship-based roles, further compressing available supply for allied forces. The interceptors consumed against Iran are the same ones required for deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, where U.S. stockpiles have consistently fallen short of what a high- intensity conflict with China would demand. Replenishment takes years, and global demand is not slowing down. The Patriot supply crisis has accelerated a procurement realignment in allied air defense that was already underway, pushing countries toward a two-tier structure: systems capable of engaging ballistic missiles, and systems that fill adjacent layers more affordably. The conflict in Iran brought those constraints into sharp relief at the global level. The U.S. and its allies used an estimated 1,060–1,430 missiles for the Patriot system out of a pre-war supply of 2,330, producing a cost- exchange ratio heavily in Iran's favor. Before the Iran conflict, global PAC-3 MSE production stood at approximately 650 interceptors per year, with both U.S. and Japanese manufacturing lines constrained by a single bottleneck: Boeing-produced seeker heads. 16 -- 18 of 24 -- Section iii System Patriot Country USA Missile Cost ~$4–5M Key Characteristics Ballistic missile intercept; 120° radar aperture; hit-to-kill Availability Limited; 29-month lead time; ~600/yr production scaling to 2,000 Source: Calibre Defence SAMP/T NG France / Italy ~$1.5–3M Ballistic capable; 360° AESA radar; range up to 150 km Limited; 80–100 Aster interceptors/yr, scaling to ~300 by 2027 Source: MBDA David's Sling Israel ~$1M Ballistic capable; 250 km range; Stunner interceptor Constrained; Israeli stockpiles significantly drawn down Source: Defence Blog IRIS-T Source: Suprotyv NASAMS Germany Norway / USA SLM: $275,000– $615,000 SLM/X: undisclosed ~$1.4–4M SLM: 30–50 km range; no ballistic intercept role SLM/X: extended range to 100 km; altitude to 30 km; no ballistic intercept role 30–50 km envelope; uses AMRAAM stocks SLM: active exports; backbone of Ukraine's medium-layer defense SLM/X: not yet in production; Diehl targeting 2,000 interceptors/yr by end of decade Widely available; AMRAAM stocks more plentiful than dedicated SAMs Source: Defense Feeds Iron Beam Israel ~$2,000–3,000 per shot Laser system; short- range threats only; no ballistic intercept role Not yet at full operational scale Source: Israel Ministry of Defense 17 -- 19 of 24 -- Section iii No alternative fully replaces Patriot in the ballistic intercept role at comparable readiness and production scale. Each represents a trade-off between cost, availability, and capability. Still, Europe cannot rely on the United States to supply sufficient quantities of air-defense missiles, and is increasingly turning to local alternatives: Denmark selected SAMP/T NG over Patriot , citing delivery timelines and Ukraine's operational experience with the system as key reasons; up to eight divisions are expected, with deliveries beginning in 2028, making Denmark the third operator after France and Italy. Turkey is negotiating a SAMP/T NG purchase and co- production arrangement following NATO interceptions of Iranian missiles that entered Turkish airspace in March 2026. Finland chose David's Sling after joining NATO, becoming the system's first export customer. Sweden, which received Patriot batteries in 2022, is separately procuring IRIS-T SLS to address its medium-layer gap. The Netherlands expedited a Patriot order in March 2026 specifically to hold its production slot, facing a 2033 delivery date otherwise. Ukraine is pursuing a parallel path: reducing structural dependence on foreign interceptor supply by developing a domestic anti-ballistic capability. In April 2026, President Zelensky announced a target to intercept a ballistic missile with a domestically produced system by the end of 2027, at an estimated engagement cost of $500,000– 1,000,000 per interception, more than four times cheaper than a PAC-3 MSE engagement. Development is proceeding under a Germany-Ukraine strategic partnership signed in April 2026. On April 15, Ukraine's firm Fire Point and Germany's Diehl Defence confirmed active negotiations over joint development; two days later, Defence Minister Fedorov met Diehl Defence CEO Helmut Rauch to advance the talks. Germany is separately financing a €3.2 billion Raytheon contract for several hundred PAC-2 GEM-T missiles for Ukraine's existing Patriot batteries, alongside 36 additional IRIS-T launchers distributed across 18 divisions. The Patriot crisis is not a supply disruption that production increases will resolve in the near term. It is the visible result of a mismatch between procurement doctrine, optimized for quality and limited quantities, and the consumption rates of sustained high-intensity warfare. The strategic question, though, is whether alternatives can be produced and delivered fast enough to cover the gap that opened. 18 -- 20 of 24 -- SOURCES Al Jazeera. "Russian Oil Exports Slump as Ukraine Hammers Ports and Refineries". Al Jazeera, 2026. Link Anna-News. "Станции 'Спирит-030' используют в центре 'Рубикон'". Anna-News, 2026. Link Military Watch Magazine. " Footage Shows U.S.-Supplied Patriot Air Defences Repeatedly Fail to Shoot Down Iranian Missiles Over Key Emirati Oil Facilities". Military Watch Magazine, 2026. Link ArmyInform. "DeepStrike і MiddleStrike масштабують: СБС нарощують удари в глибині території рф". ArmyInform, 2026. Link Military Watch Magazine. "U.S. Withdrawing Patriot Air Defence Systems From South Korea to Redeploy for War Effort Against Iran". Military Watch Magazine, 2026. Link BBC. "How rescue of US airman in remote part of Iran unfolded". BBC, 2026. Link Calibre Defence. "PAC-3 MSE: Lockheed and Diehl Sign MoU to Expand Production". Calibre Defence, 2025. Link Ministry of Defence of Ukraine. "Hundreds of Patriot Missiles, €300 Million for Deep Strike Capabilities, and Thousands of Mid-Strike Drones: Ukraine and Germany Sign a Package of Defence Agreements". Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, 2026. Link Censor.NET. "Russia Is Stepping Up Its Ballistic Missile Strikes, While Ukraine Lacks Patriot Systems". Censor.NET, 2026. Link Defence Blog. "Israel Used for First Time Newest David's Sling Missile Defense Systems". Defence Blog, 2018. Link Defence Express. "U.S. Na vy Orders 405 MSE Missiles for Patriot Systems, Leaving Fewer for Export". Defence Express, 2026. Link Ministry of Defence of Ukraine. "Manufacturers Ha ve Already Been Granted 30 Licenses to Use Ministry of Defence Technologies Developed by the Military". Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, 2026. Link Ministry of Defence of Ukraine. "O ver 9,000 Frontline Missions in March: the Defence Forces Continue to Expand the Use of Ground Robotic Systems". Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, 2026. Link Defence-UA. " Як рашисти 'вигадали велосипед' з 82-мм роботом-мінометом 'Багульник 82' та чим насправді цікава ця розробка". Defence-UA, 2026. Link Defensefeeds. "NASAMS Air Defense: The Shield Behind NATO’s Missile Strategy". Defensefeeds. Link Defense News. "Netherlands Plans $1.1 Billion Rush Order for Extra Patriot System". Defense News, 2026. Link Diehl Defence. "Sweden procures further IRIS-T SLS systems". Diehl Defence, 2026. Link Ministry of Defence of Ukraine. " Масштабуємо оборонні інновації: уряд запустив нову модель закупівель, яка скорочує шлях від розробки до застосування". Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, 2026. Link News.d.ua. " Шахеди атакують мобільні вогневі групи: експерт роз'яснив, чи має до цього відношення штучний інтелект". News.d.ua, 2026. Link N V. "Frontline Situation: Russian Forces Advancing Almost Everywhere Due to Favorable Weather — Syrskyi". NV, 2026. Link Ekonomichna Pra vda. "Укрзалізниця отримала доступ до військових систем моніторингу повітряного простору". Ekonomichna Pravda, 2026. Link Euromaidan Press. " Zelenskyy Puts March Price Tag on Russian Oil Hits: $2.3bn in One Month". Euromaidan Press, 2026. Link N V. "Zelenskyy wants Ukraine to build European anti-ballistic system in one year". NV, 2026. Link Oboronka. "Black Sea Interceptors. How 412 Nemesis Started Shooting Down Shaheds from Unmanned Boats and Why It Matters". Oboronka, 2026. Link G overnment of Israel. "Development of Iron Beam High Power Laser System Completed". Government of Israel, 2025. Link Hmarochos. " Укрзалізниця змінила правила безпеки і пояснює, чому краще евакуюватися з поїздів у поле". Hmarochos, 2026. Link House of Saud. "PAC-3 MSE Replenishment Gap: 2028 Delivery, 2026 Crisis". House of Saud, 2026. Link K yiv Independent. "War in Iran Has Used Up Half of US Patriot and THAAD Missile Stockpiles". Kyiv Independent, 2026. Link K yiv Post. "Ukraine to Receive New Batch of Patriot Missiles from European Partners". Kyiv Post, 2026. Link Lowy Institute. "In Ukraine, Ground Robots Are Increasingly Going on the Offensive". Lowy Institute, 2026. Link MBDA. "Denmark Chooses European SAMP /T NG to Protect Its Sky". MBDA, 2025. Link Militarnyi. "T ürkiye Seeks Joint Production of SAMP-T Air Defense Systems with Italy". Militarnyi, 2026. Link Military Times. "The Rescue Mission That Brought 2 F-15E Strike Eagle Crew Members Home". Military Times, 2026. Link Oboronka. " Дрони кожного дня. Як Україна наздогнала Росію в кількості далекобійних безпілотників". Oboronka, 2026. Link Office of the President of Ukraine. "Declaration on a strategic partnership between Germany and Ukraine". Office of the President of Ukraine, 2026. Link OSW. "Russia Blocks Telegram and Cracks Down on VPNs". OSW, 2026. Link Pikabu. " Появилось видео буксировки 122-мм гаубицы Д-30 при помощи НРТК "Курьер"". Pikabu, 2026. Link RBC Ukraine. "Росі я продовжує використовувати Starlink на фронті, попри блокування, - ЗМІ". RBC Ukraine, 2026. Link Reuters. " Fire After Ukrainian Attack at Russia's Tuapse Refinery Hits Air Quality". Reuters, 2026. Link Reuters. "Russia's Rosneft Diverts Oil to Tuapse Refinery From Drone-Hit Novorossiysk Port, Sources Say". Reuters, 2026. Link Rossiyskaya Gazeta. "Прицеп позволил 'Курьеру' перевозить до 400 кг груза". Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 2026. Link Snake Island Institute. "Defense Tech Monthly: March 2026". Snake Island Institute, 2026. Link 19 -- 21 of 24 -- SOURCES Snake Island Institute. "Holding Back the Sky: Ukraine's Air Defense Campaign, 2022–2025". Snake Island Institute, 2026. Link Suprotyv. "Системи протиповітряної оборони IRIS-T SLM – характеристики, для чого потрібні". Suprotyv, 2025. Link Telegram @soniah _hub. "А от і ОК знищених "Геркулесів"". Telegram, 2026. Link Telegram @stormdron. "НРТК «Курьер» осуществляет буксировку 122-мм гаубицы Д-30 массой свыше 3 тонн в районе линии боевого соприкосновения". Telegram, 2026. Link TASS. "Связисты Западной группировки начали применять станции связи "Спирит-030"". TASS, 2026. Link Telegram @aero.tim. [Post title needed]. Instagram, 2026. Link Telegram @stormdron. "Эксклюзивное видео полигонных испытаний модуля минометного вооружения "Багульник-82" на шасси НРТК "Курьер"". Telegram, 2026. Link Telegram @DIUkraine. "Головне управління розвідки МО України". Telegram, 2026. Link Telegram @stormdron. " Эксклюзивное видео стрельб из 107- мм РСЗО Тип 75 северокорейского производства на шасси НРТК "Курьер"". Telegram, 2026. Link Telegram @DniproOfficial. "Dnipro Osint ⟨ Гарбуз ⟩". Telegram, 2026. Link Telegram @dron bomber. "Українські зенітники збивають балістичні цілі однією ракетою Patriot замість двох- чотирьох". Telegram, 2026. Link Telegram @Drone _Wars_. "Russian forces reportedly continue experimenting with the NRTK “Kurier”". X, 2026. Link Telegram @e xilenova_plus. "Exilenova+". Telegram, 2026. Link Telegram @te xBPLA. "В России разрабатывают роботизированный миномет на шасси «Курьер», разработка ООО «НРТК Капс»". Telegram, 2026. Link Telegram @The _Wrong_Side. "На кадрах поражение "Геранью" очередной МОГ ВСУ в районе Полтавы". Telegram, 2026. Link Telegram @ukrainian _navy. "Військово-Морські Сили ЗС України | UA Navy". Telegram, 2026. Link Telegram @e xilenova_plus. "Сили Оборони запалили у Туапсе Вулкан 2.0 так має горіти кожен порт/НПЗ, який спонсорує терористичні дії московської влади". Telegram, 2026. Link Telegram @kps zsu. "Повітряні Сили ЗС України / Air Force of the Armed Forces of Ukraine". Telegram, 2026. Link Telegram @mag _vodogray. "Нещодавні фото з ерзац-ЗРК з російським ракетами класу «повітря-повітря» Р-77-1 з АР ГСН на шасі Урал-4320". Telegram, 2026. Link Telegram @ VIUKSIDV. "Подсмотрено на "обратной стороне"". Telegram, 2026. Link Telegram @ zedigital. "Прискорюємо постачання НРК для фронту". Telegram, 2026. Link The Atlantic. "Read The Atlantic ’s Interview With Volodymyr Zelensky". The Atlantic, 2026. Link The Defense Post. "Denmark Selects SAMP /T NG Air Defense System Over US-Made Patriot". The Defense Post, 2026. Link Telegram @mod _russia. "Официальный канал Минобороны России". Telegram, 2026. Link The Defense Post. "N. Korea Increased Military Supply Shipments to Russia: Intelligence". The Defense Post, 2026. Link Telegram @nemesis _412. "Вперше у світі СБС збили «Шахед» дроном-перехоплювачем із надводної платформи". Telegram, 2026. Link The Independent. "Ukraine ’s land robots are revolutionising the shapeshifting war with Russia". The Independent, 2026. Link Telegram @ngu _war_for_peace. "Національна гвардія України | НГУ". Telegram, 2026. Link The War Zone. "Ukraine's Drone-Hunting An-28 Turboprop Is Now Launching Interceptor Drones". The War Zone, 2026. Link Telegram @oko _gora. "Итоги атаки БПЛА по туапсинскому резервуарному парку в Краснодарском Крае". Telegram, 2026. Link Telegram @oko _gora. "Око Гора. Новости и аналитика". Telegram, 2026. Link Telegram @ro bert_magyar. "Офіційний канал Командувача СБС ЗСУ". Telegram, 2026. Link Telegram @SBUkr. "Слу жба безпеки України". Telegram, 2026. Link Telegram @serhii _flash. "Противник демонструє, як він атакує екіпаж МВГ під Полтавою за допомогою керованого шахеда". Telegram, 2026. Link Times of Israel. " Finland to Purchase Israel's David's Sling Anti- Missile System". Times of Israel, 2026. Link UA. News. "Flash Explained the Challenges of Protecting Trains Using Electronic Warfare Systems". UA.News, 2026. Link UA. News. "Strike on Tuapse: How the Ukrainian Armed Forces' Attack Is Hitting Russian Oil Exports". UA.News, 2026. Link UATV/Freedom. "Pro-Government Z-Channels Lose More Than 40% of Their Views in Russia — CCD". UATV/Freedom, 2026. Link U NN. "'Flash': Russia Is Reportedly 'Hunting' Mobile Fire Groups with Guided Shaheds". UNN, 2026. Link U NN. "Poland Refused to Transfer Patriot Systems to the Middle East After a US Request". UNN, 2026. Link Telegram @serhii _flash. "Після того, як ми позбавили ворога «Старлінка», питання супутникового зв’язку стало для росіян надзвичайно актуальним". Telegram, 2026. Link X @GrandpaRoy2. "Another Ukrainian variant of a winged FPP, this time recorded by the Russians on a mission armed with a PG-7 series warhead". X, 2026. Link Telegram @serhii _flash. "У росії є кілька операторів мобільного зв’язку, але є один, який наш противник максимально використовує для терору в Україні". Telegram, 2026. Link Y ahoo News/Kyiv Independent. "War in Iran Has Used Up Half of US Patriot and THAAD Missile Stockpiles". Yahoo News, 2026. Link 20 -- 22 of 24 -- Snake Island Institute The Snake Island Instituteis an independent defense analytics and coordination center established to strengthen the strategic partnership between Ukraine and its western allies in the security sector through: Analytics: International partnerships: Defense Tech: Advancing understanding of modern warfare and doctrine Enabling integration of critical technologies into combat operations Aligning Ukrainian, U.S., and international decision-makers You can find more on our website. snakeisland.org Editorial & Design Team Viktoriia Honcharuk – Director, Defense Tech at Snake Island Institute Oleksandra Balabukha – Defense Tech Analyst at Snake Island Institute C atarina Buchatskiy – Visual Design, Director of Analytics at Snake Island Institute Oleksandra On opriienko – Layout Design -- 23 of 24 -- -- 24 of 24 --