Northern Ireland Scrutiny Committee

17 September 2026

Northern Ireland Scrutiny Committee House of Lords

Follow its sittings
00:01 - 01:02
Speaker 3
The Northern Ireland Scrutiny Committee today is honored to be in the Senate Chamber of Parliament Buildings here in Stormont as part of our visit to Belfast.  We're now holding the seventh public evidence session of our inquiry on Article 2 of the Protocol Windsor Framework, the so-called non-diminution of rights provision.  And we will hold further sessions of this kind with Northern Ireland political parties throughout today.  We're pleased now to be joined by the leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, Jon Burrows MLA.  You are very welcome, Mr. Burrows, and we very much look forward to your evidence. 

We'd be grateful if you introduced yourself briefly the first time you speak.  Today's meeting is being broadcast and a verbatim transcript will be taken for subsequent publication, which will be sent to all witnesses for accuracy.  So can I ask you first of all to just introduce yourself if you'd like to briefly just for the record. 
01:02 - 01:06
Speaker 2
Yes, thank you, Chair.  Jon Burrows, I'm the leader of the Ulster Unionist Party. 
01:06 - 01:09
Speaker 1
And is there any preliminary comment or statement you'd like to make? 
01:09 - 02:06
Speaker 4
Just for a moment, Chair, I would say that the Ulster Unionist Party were the Unionist Party that negotiated the Belfast Agreement and at its heart was the protection of rights.  And we don't shy away from that.  I think actually the UK has given the world many of the rights that it now enjoys and led the way.  But unfortunately, Article 2 of the Protocol has actually become not a shield for protecting rights but a sword for cutting through rights in terms of the sovereignty of the United Kingdom and actually the fundamental premise of the Belfast Agreement that Northern Ireland remains part of the United Kingdom wholly unless the majority of people vote otherwise.  So I'll go into maybe more detail upon your questions, but that is my fundamental concern about Article 2 of the Protocol. 
02:06 - 02:28
Speaker 3
So arising from that, Mr. Burrows, in your view, why did the UK and the EU negotiate and include Article 2 in the Protocol and Windsor Framework?  And what is really its political significance as you see it as leader of the Ulster Unionists? 
02:28 - 04:33
Speaker 4
I don't know the good reason why the UK did it.  I mean, look, my view is this, that the Belfast Agreement is an internationally ratified agreement and it is right that the UK government uphold its obligations.  I'd say first of all, I think there is a tendency, and some will disagree with this, of the UK government when it comes to negotiations around Northern Ireland to take a supine view when it comes to a human rights lobby or the lobbying by Dublin in terms of how things should operate here.  I think the UK government, and I'll just call it as I see it, because this happened with the trade border too, still lives under a shadow of the threat of instability, disorder, even terrorism affecting its judgment in how it deals with matters in Northern Ireland. 

Now, the argument for Article 2 is that it would provide a standstill protection for rights as they were the day before we left the European Union.  And that may be defensible, even though I don't believe it is necessary because you have such strong guarantees in the Belfast Agreement, the Human Rights Act, which incorporated the ECHR into domestic law.  But it's totally indefensible once that protocol becomes a dynamic vehicle upon which you can disapply UK law in Northern Ireland.  So I think it is a lack of stomach by the UK government in order to actually just hold the line when it comes to negotiations in which Dublin are involved or nationalism.  And I don't mean that with any disrespect to Dublin, to nationalists. 

They should argue and advocate as hard as they can, but I think the UK government is just too supine when it deals with these matters. 
04:33 - 04:51
Speaker 3
And others have said to us that they feel that the government of the Republic does not really recognize and fulfill the intentions of Article 2, and particularly in relation to cross-border issues and certain investigations.  Is that something that concerns you and your party? 

04:51 - 05:43

Jon Burrows

Fundamentally so. I mean, first of all, I'll say there's an absolute audacity of the Irish government taking an interstate case against the UK on legacy when they have a record of refusing to extradite 97% of requests for terrorists during the Troubles who murdered our citizens here, Catholic and Protestant. Who still do not cooperate with the ICRIR, who are asking for information about live investigations into the murder of our citizens both here and in Great Britain. And the Irish government still refuse to give that information. So look, the Irish government are failing on legacy.

Unfortunately, the UK government is led by the nose by the Irish on that. And in many ways, it could be the UK taking an interstate case against Dublin, not the other way around.

05:43 - 05:44

Lord Dodds.

05:44 - 06:44

Nigel Dodds

Thanks, Lord Chair, and it's good to have your evidence here this morning, Jon. Thank you very much for coming. So you've been pretty strong in your criticism of the need for Article 2 of the Windsor Framework. And in terms of its relationship with the Belfast Agreement, the Good Friday Agreement, how do you think it sits with that agreement? I mean, many would argue that there is a real problem.

I remember the former leader, one of the negotiators of the Belfast Agreement, Lord Trimble, who castigated the protocol Windsor Framework in very trenchant terms as a breach of the Belfast Agreement, which he had helped to negotiate. So what's your view? How do you think Article 2 relates to the provisions of the Belfast Agreement itself with all that that entails?

06:44 - 07:36

Jon Burrows

I think it totally upends the Belfast Agreement because at its heart was a principle of consent that Northern Ireland remains part of the United Kingdom until a majority of people say otherwise. And that is not replicated now in legal constitutional reality. So not only do we have the separate issue of the trade border, we have a situation whereby laws and directives from the EU can apply in Northern Ireland, be disapplied in Great Britain, and that have no legislative basis or consent from the people of Northern Ireland or indeed Westminster.

So it undermines the sovereignty of Northern Ireland in the United Kingdom, which is the cornerstone of the Belfast Agreement. So I think it fundamentally undermines it.

07:36 - 08:02

Nigel Dodds

And would you say that's true of, I mean, the Windsor Framework in its entirety, the Protocol, but specifically in relation to Article 2, what do you think's the main challenge to UK integrity or sovereignty in that regard? Do you think that's as serious as the trade issues, or more serious, or how do you rate it in terms of Article 2?

08:02 - 09:42

Jon Burrows

I think it's potentially more serious because it goes to the heart of our constitutional position, our laws, where our judiciary take their lead from, and that is more serious. So the trade barrier is a serious issue because of course any nation should have frictionless trade. But it feels sometimes like it's a logistical problem, a very big one if you're a business. But this is a problem, Article 2 in terms of the Protocol, that is fundamental to the human rights landscape here, to the fact that our constitutional position, the sovereignty of Westminster, and even though the Dillon case in the Supreme Court clipped the wings, I think, of Article 2, it still has the capacity to disapply UK-wide laws in Northern Ireland. Let me put, actually answer your question directly.

And I can't speak for David Trimble, but I can speak for the Ulster Unionist Party corporately. If Article 2 as it's currently written and has effect was part of the Belfast Agreement, I don't think they would have signed it. It fundamentally changes the Belfast Agreement. And it is unacceptable. And I think it damages legitimacy of this place.

It'll damage the legitimacy and the sovereignty of UK law throughout. And these are grave matters.

09:42 - 09:44

Speaker 5

Thanks very much. Baroness Foster.

09:44 - 10:20

Arlene Isobel Foster

Thank you very much, Lord Chair. Thank you very much, Jon, for your evidence thus far. You briefly mentioned the Dillon case, and of course we have been looking at the Dillon case and what it means for Article 2. And it would be just very interesting to hear from you what your response is to the Dillon case, what your response is to the judgment, and how you think that will work through now, given as you've said it has narrowed the interpretation, shall we say, of Article 2 in so far as the Supreme Court is concerned.

10:20 - 11:51

Jon Burrows

Thank you for the question. Well look, I welcomed the Dillon case result by the Supreme Court. I think the Belfast court got it catastrophically wrong. So as a direction of travel, it is positive. But it does not rule out entirely that Article 2 can be used to disapply UK-wide laws in Northern Ireland.

Yes, the scope is much narrower. What the applicant has to show is much tighter. But the principle is still there. And that not only is a fundamental challenge in any democracy that actually should offend, frankly, every parliamentarian in the country, that even in dealing with exempt and reserved matters, that they could pass a law and go through all of the mechanics and the consultation and the debates and get Royal Assent and it could be disapplied. I mean, that should shock any of us.

So I welcome the fact that it's been narrowed in scope, but it still remains a sword that can cut through our sovereignty. It may have been reduced in size, but it's still there. And what is needed is the UK government, I think, to legislate so that Article 2 is completely neutered in terms of a way of disapplying UK-wide law.

11:51 - 12:04

Arlene Isobel Foster

And in that respect, just as a follow-up, I mean you've said it has severe implications for parliamentary sovereignty. Would you go so far as to say that Article 2 is anti-democratic?

12:04 - 12:22

Jon Burrows

Oh yes, it's anti-democratic. I think it's anti-rights. And I think it runs completely contrary to natural justice, to the Belfast Agreement, and to the delicate constitutional settlement that we have in this country that has given us peace.

12:22 - 12:25

Speaker 13

Okay, thank you very much. Thank you.

12:25 - 12:28

Speaker 11

Baroness Ludford.

12:28 - 13:03

Sarah Ludford

I do think that the, thank you very much by the way for your evidence, much appreciated. I mean, do you think, I've heard what you've said about Article 2 and just now on Dillon, but do you think that the Dillon case, or to what extent do you think the Dillon case brought clarity on Article 2 and the protection of rights? And if not, or to the extent you think yes or no, how could further clarity be provided?

13:03 - 14:43

Jon Burrows

Well, I mean Dillon through the Supreme Court has narrowed the grounds upon which UK law could be disapplied. You know, it's much more specific what you would have to cite. But it can still be disapplied. So you know, it's a bit like a slightly smaller problem, you know, it's still a problem. And it's a fundamental problem of constitutionality and democracy.

So in that way Dillon changed nothing. It narrowed the scope, but the scope remains and the principle remains. I think in terms of certainty, well we have no certainty in Northern Ireland because a law could be passed in Westminster that we believe applies to us and we could find out at a later date through litigation it doesn't. And that is not a democracy. And unfortunately people have taken a view on this in terms of almost whether they were in favour of remain, they just simply say well that's okay.

If they're Brexit they say it's terrible. If they're orange, and I hate to use the orange-green thing, but you know, generally speaking on the nationalist side they think it's nothing to worry about. The unionist side are saying it's horrendous. Anybody in any objective analysis of this, and our party backed remain because we foresaw problems, should say that it is a fundamental breach of sovereignty that a law that is passed by our sovereign parliament could be disapplied by a judge following a case brought by a citizen of our country.

14:43 - 15:21

Sarah Ludford

If I can ask a supplementary. I think you replied in to Arlene I think it was that you would ideally like the UK government to legislate to neuter Article 2. But sort of parking that for the moment because that's quite a high bar as it were, is there anything short of that that you think could clarify or put some constraints around how Article 2 would be applied or to what it could be applied, something to put some sort of boundaries around?

15:21 - 16:23

Jon Burrows

Well, open to you know always review if people come up with those practical solutions.

But the problem is with this fundamentally is, as it's currently set out, Article 2 has legal effect. So, you know, we can have all kinds of understandings and clarifications, but this is the most litigious part of the United Kingdom, perhaps the most litigious part of the EU. And whatever the government do to clarify it, someone will test it. And it needs a firewall, primary legislation firewall, to make sure that EU law cannot apply in Northern Ireland without it being either pre-existing from our exit from the EU or mandated by Westminster or Stormont. And I can't see personally, and I'm not an expert in this, but I can't see how that can be done through any other way than clear legislation.

16:23 - 16:48

Alex Alexander Carlile

Now, I'll act as devil's advocate for a moment, if you'll forgive me. Do you accept that some people at least were or maybe still are of the belief that Article 2 was a guarantee of rights in Northern Ireland, not a diminution of rights in Northern Ireland, and that what you're saying negates that view and is possibly a little exaggerated?

16:48 - 17:03

Jon Burrows

Well, no, I don't believe it's exaggerated, Chair, but you know, it's a fair question. It was to provide a standstill arrangement, but clearly there's a dynamism in it, which the Dillon judgment might have tempered but still exists.

17:03 - 17:26

Alex Alexander Carlile

Do you think the dynamism, and I understand the dynamism of the suggestion, don't you think that that was designed to ensure that people did not have a diminution of their rights as a result of the relationship with the European Union, but actually left the law open and the courts open to enforce the rights which existed before Article 2?

17:26 - 19:08

Jon Burrows

No, I don't, and I think there's a fundamental misunderstanding of those who proposed that, the role that the EU played in peace in Northern Ireland, the Belfast Agreement. I mean, the Belfast Agreement sets out a series of rights. The Human Rights Act was, well, the European Convention was incorporated into domestic law. If there's any suggestion that the UK has breached the Human Rights Act, there is a recourse there legally. We're also, we have more accountability bodies in Northern Ireland and equality bodies than anywhere else, who often do a very good job.

So I don't think there's any real risk of a diminution of rights because we left the EU. I think we have some of the most developed rights. And look, my old job was the police service. I mean, that is actually an example. I think rights protections and all of these commissions and all, it's a bit like cholesterol, good and bad.

And sometimes actually in Northern Ireland we're actually crippled with trying to get things done in what is a minefield. And actually, to give you a very brief example, we have a police service recently where the Chief Constable said, and this is a bit tangential but I think it goes to the heart, that police officers in Northern Ireland are more likely to let themselves be assaulted before they use force than anywhere else in the United Kingdom because we're such a litigious society. We've so many accountability bodies. There is such scrutiny that actually it almost jammed up a police officer's operational decision-making. This is one of the most human rights scrutinized places on earth, certainly in the Western world.

And we did not need Article 2 to protect us.

19:08 - 19:53

Nigel Dodds

Just to follow up on what the Chair was saying there. So your argument, John, would be basically in this issue of Article 2 guaranteeing no diminution, that the reality is in fact the existence of Article 2 represents a diminution in the sense that people get laws applied to them in Northern Ireland that they've never voted for and that they have no representation on, and that's a diminution of everybody's rights.

So this argument that this guarantees no diminution actually in itself is a diminution of everybody's rights.

19:54 - 19:55

Right, thank you.

19:55 - 19:57

Speaker 8

Lady Ritchie.

19:57 - 20:43

Margaret Ritchie

And thank you, John, you're very welcome. Obviously from the evidence that you have already given, what would you see, how would you see those rights being protected as per the Belfast Good Friday Agreement? And I suppose you've already answered some of this. What is your overall assessment as to the success of Article 2 Windsor Framework in ensuring the protection of rights following the UK's exit from the European Union, bearing in mind the section that's in the Belfast Good Friday Agreement that deals with rights and safeguards and equality provisions?

20:43 - 21:01

Jon Burrows

Yes, and there is a section which is internationally binding on the United Kingdom, and I don't believe required Article 2 to make it thus. So I don't think it's been successful. I think it's actually undermined the Belfast Agreement. I'm sorry, give me the first part of your question again.

21:01 - 21:17

Margaret Ritchie

Bearing in mind, I suppose, your position, how do you think rights would be protected in Northern Ireland, bearing in mind that rights section of the Belfast Good Friday Agreement?

21:17 - 21:31

Jon Burrows

Well look, you have a very developed and sophisticated architecture for enforcing human rights throughout the United Kingdom, but in particular in Northern Ireland.

21:31 - 21:33

Speaker 9

Through the Human Rights Act?

21:33 - 22:06

Jon Burrows

Through the Human Rights Act. You've a plethora of bodies that will actually police compliance with that: Equality Commission, Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, we've commissioners for all kinds of different things. So we have ultimately the European Convention which was incorporated into domestic law. Now there could be an argument for a supplementary Bill of Rights. That was in the Belfast Agreement and those things are all possible.

But you know, ultimately the ECHR is in domestic law.

22:06 - 22:13

Margaret Ritchie

Therefore you mentioned the Bill of Rights. Would you see a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland as replacing Article 2?

22:13 - 24:04

Jon Burrows

I think it's something you could consider as a UK-wide Bill of Rights. I've always thought that the UK has given the world actually, and I'm a great advocate for what the United Kingdom has done through Magna Carta and its common law. We give the world a lot of its language and laws that it now relies upon. So we should be proud of that. So I think the Bill of Rights is one particular option.

But I go back to my original assertion that I think the human rights framework developed under the Belfast Agreement is gold standard, if you like. It doesn't require any supplement and actually Article 2 has undermined it. And has undermined the principle of consent. I mean, look, unionism was split down the middle with the Belfast Agreement, probably 50-50 if you crunch the numbers. But if you'd have told unionists at the time and you'd have had an asterisk beside the principle of consent and you says, well you know there's going to be a future Article 2 which says even if Westminster pass a law, sovereign law, it might be disapplied because you're in Northern Ireland and you're not really in the rest of the United Kingdom, 90% of unionists would have rejected it.

This is a fundamental issue of democracy, of our constitutional settlement, and of the rule of law and sovereignty in Northern Ireland. And that should be seen that way regardless of your views on Brexit or your future aspirations around United Kingdom or United Ireland. This is simply an issue of a democratic deficit. We used to talk about democratic deficit in Northern Ireland because we didn't have direct rule. This is direct deficit, democratic deficit supercharged.

24:04 - 24:05

Lady Sanderson.

24:05 - 24:37

Elizabeth Sanderson

Thank you, Chair. Nice to meet you, interesting listening to you today. So you obviously have a very clear view on what Article 2 is and does, but do you think more generally the public, do you think they understand what Article 2 is? Do they have a view on it? And if they don't relate that specifically in terms of Article 2, do you think there is a sense within the public of a concern about their rights or whether they've been diminished in any way?

24:37 - 26:33

Jon Burrows

It's a very good question. I mean, look, I would imagine if you spoke to Cullybackey's in my constituency, if you asked 100 people in Cullybackey about Article 2 of the Protocol, they would look at you, probably not really know what you meant. They probably would think you're talking about, if they did, Article 2 of the European Convention of Human Rights and right to life. But they would have a sense of unease within unionists anyway about, and they mightn't know all the minutiae of the terms, but of the overall position that we're in, of an Irish Sea border, of a rights border, of cases like Dillon. And there is a deep unease.

So they mightn't know the terminology, but unionism is very uneasy about the situation we're in. I do worry in the long term it will be used in a way to undermine our institutions. I mean, look, no Irish Sea border, for example, and it's a simple slogan that the TUV have, it's very effective. They want to pull down Stormont. That would bring us back into direct rule.

That would be a disaster for the UK, for Northern Ireland, because Sinn Féin would say we're a failed statelet. Probably the UK government, and I'm sorry they have been supine in many ways with the deal with Northern Ireland, would give Dublin a greater say to try and counterweight the fact that we didn't have a Northern Ireland Assembly. That would be disastrous. It would be disastrous for everything in Northern Ireland if these institutions collapsed. And I think if we do not deal with the Protocol and the Irish Sea border, it will give more succour to those people who want to pull this place down.

And once this place is down, it may never be back up again. So the man in Cullybackey mightn't know exactly what Article 2 means, but they're deeply uneasy about this whole situation that we're in, and it's causing a real problem in unionism.

26:33 - 26:55

Alex Alexander Carlile

Would your views be different if, as some are suggesting, the United Kingdom was to leave the Council of Europe and therefore the Convention? Would Article 2 then be actually clearly a guarantor of human rights in Northern Ireland because that other guarantee had been removed?

26:55 - 27:06

Jon Burrows

Yeah, potentially, but I'm always very, very wary about this withdrawal from the European Convention of Human Rights. I mean, I did my Master's in Law and Human Rights Law.

27:06 - 27:07

I noticed that.

27:07 - 27:34

Jon Burrows

And I'll answer your question indirectly at the beginning. I think the problem with actually European Convention of Human Rights is not what's in it, it's actually how it's applied and interpreted, daftly by sometimes judges. And I think the interpretation of ECHR is a big issue, which mightn't actually be remedied if we left because you'll still have other rights that the UK judges will have to interpret.

I also think it would be an absolute disaster for Northern Ireland because you will open up another front.

27:34 - 27:59

Alex Alexander Carlile

Isn't there a contradiction between your enthusiasm for the European Convention on Human Rights and the fact that the European Court of Human Rights, much criticised for the relatively low quality of its judges some would say, is a foreign court in inverted commas which is guaranteeing rights in Northern Ireland and the rest of the United Kingdom?

27:59 - 29:04

Jon Burrows

Yes, but the sovereign Parliament has decided that we're in the ECHR and has ratified it. If a majority of parliamentarians decided otherwise, then we would leave, but that is with the express consent of the majority of people here in Westminster. That is different from the workings out of the protocol where you could have the majority of people, MPs in the House of Commons and the Lords, pass a law that it's taken out of their hands and disapplied. That's an entirely different situation. I just happen to think that actually leaving European Convention of Human Rights, even if the same rights could be enforced just through a domestic Human Rights Act, the reality for Northern Ireland is it just opens up a can of worms.

And I would see the government again coming to some arrangement where there'd be another rights border in the Irish Sea.

29:04 - 29:30

Alex Alexander Carlile

Just to play devil's advocate, isn't that a flawed analysis because it's not just legislation that decides what the UK government does? It's also debate and the Good Friday Agreement and all the Northern Ireland legislation we're talking about has been extensively and fully debated in the British Parliament in London and approved, hasn't it?

29:30 - 30:26

Jon Burrows

Well, it has, but it doesn't change the fact that under the protocol and even after the Supreme Court treatment of it in Dillon, can still change without any democratic vote a law in Northern Ireland that was passed by Westminster. That is a fundamental breach of sovereignty. My views on the ECHR are somewhat tempered by realpolitik that Northern Ireland or the UK leaving the ECHR would simply open up another front in which we're going to have endless litigation and battles over people saying that the Belfast Agreement's been fundamentally broken. It would cause tensions in this place. So I think we need to deal with Article 2.

Dillon doesn't do that fully and I think the government need to legislate for that.

30:26 - 30:28

Speaker 14

Lord Elliott.

30:28 - 31:01

Tom Elliott

Lord Chair, thank you and thanks John for your attendance. I think you've answered part of the question, so I'm going to rephrase it slightly. In light of the Dillon judgment, how would you interpret and how would you recommend that any new legislation meets the principles of that Windsor Framework or Article 2 of the Windsor Framework? In principle, how would new legislation meet that, whether that's in Westminster or in Stormont here?

31:01 - 31:26

Jon Burrows

Well, I think all legislation goes through that equality screening. That is for me the key to making sure that it is compliant with our obligations under the European Convention of Human Rights. So, you know, that is inherent in the way we do legislation in this country and I think that is the solution to that.

31:26 - 31:30

Speaker 16

And do you believe that the Dillon judgment makes any difference to that?

31:30 - 32:19

Jon Burrows

Well, it does, yes, because as Dillon, even though circumscribed in terms of the Supreme Court judgment, still has the capacity to change our laws despite it going through that screening.

And of course, there seems to be a future-facing element to this. I mean, are we there are future directives or EU laws that could still be applied? So, you know, at the end of the day, we have a very settled and developed democracy here in the United Kingdom. And I think the way we make laws is consistent with our obligations under the Human Rights Act and ECHR. I don't think it needs Article 2 of the Windsor Framework.

32:19 - 32:55

Alex Alexander Carlile

Whenever a bill is presented to the Houses of Parliament, the relevant Secretary of State has to certify and it goes on the front of the bill whether the bill does or does not comply with the UK's obligations under the ECHR. We've had it suggested to us that something similar should be added to each bill to ensure that it is certified as to whether or not that bill applies properly Article 2 and human rights requirements in Northern Ireland. Do you think that would be helpful?

32:55 - 33:17

Jon Burrows

It's an option. I would certainly take that away to consider that. I think there is scope for those practical things if it retains the so if if our sovereign Parliament has made that judgment and voted on that, that it cannot be reopened. I think there is merit in considering that, yes.

33:17 - 33:47

Margaret Ritchie

Thank you, Chair. John, could you just clarify for us again how those rights in the RESO chapter of the Good Friday Agreement will be protected if there wasn't an Article 2 of the Windsor Framework? Considering that some of those rights, as some have suggested to us in evidence, find their origins in European Union laws.

33:47 - 34:12

Jon Burrows

Well, people can still litigate without Article 2. I mean, they still have all their rights under our Human Rights Act, under our our signatories to the ECHR to take action. So I I do not see that Article 2 guarantees that at all. I don't think it's necessary.

34:12 - 34:24

Margaret Ritchie

And how do you view the dedicated mechanism from that is undertaken or implemented by the Equality Commission and the Human Rights Commission?

34:24 - 34:51

Jon Burrows

Well, they they do their their job, but I don't see that their job relies upon Article 2. And they're both extremely vocal bodies. And look, the other thing is we are in a society where people do have recourse to the court. I just I just do not see the basis upon which Article 2 actually protects or augments rights here. I don't think it's necessary.

34:51 - 35:43

Alex Alexander Carlile

Can I go back to something you've just said and have said earlier about the courts? Like you, as a young lawyer, I took a great interest and still do in the separation of powers. And you seem to be implying earlier that Article 2 has compromised the separation of powers by forcing judges in Northern Ireland to make what I think you would describe as political decisions. Yet, if you look at the number of judicial review cases taken in Northern Ireland, proportionately, they're much smaller in number than those taken in Great Britain. There's far less appetite for judicial review.

And I met with lawyers in Belfast, senior lawyers in Belfast, and they were surprised that there are so many judicial review cases in GB.

Do you have any comments about the separation of powers consequences beyond what you've already said?

35:43 - 35:58

Jon Burrows

No other than you know that division between the legislator the executive and our judiciary is fundamental and I think this article 2 drives a coach and horses through that.

35:58 - 36:35

Alex Alexander Carlile

Is that just trying to understand this partly because you may well be right is that because article 2 is a constitutional provision whereas normally judicial review is of legislative provisions and therefore you're saying that it drags the judiciary into constitutional issues which normally they would not deal with though occasionally they have had to for example with the Boris Johnson prorogation legislation.

36:35 - 36:51

Jon Burrows

Yes absolutely they're arbitrating on constitutional issues as opposed to just legislative issues or or administrative reviews of decisions whether they're reasonable or not. So yes it's fundamentally different and it puts our courts in a position I don't think constitutionally they should be in.

36:51 - 37:31

Nigel Dodds

Right. Thank you Lord Chair just to come back to the issue that Margaret raised about the dedicated mechanism human rights commission in Northern Ireland and the equality commission. We heard evidence yesterday and we've heard this previously about the way in which these bodies are viewed across the community generally and I just wonder what's your thinking in terms of the effectiveness of both of those bodies or taken together and how they in terms of confidence of the community across the board.

37:31 - 39:01

Jon Burrows

Well I suppose there's my view and then I can give you the sort of the temperature check from unionism and unionism and I hate us ever being presented as anti rights and human rights and checks and balances and all of those things unionism is deeply skeptical of a lot of those institutions and bodies. They feel that there is an inherent bias probably towards and I'm calling it as the unionist community sees it as towards nationalism as towards left wing issues. I think there's a challenge there for unionists in making sure that they are properly represented. I think young people now and this is just a calling it who are attracted into the law tends to be now disproportionality in terms of Catholic Protestant. I don't like to get into the religion please so we have a lot of commentary about the police service is 70% Protestant 30% Catholic but journalism and the law seems to have attracted on a on a different scale.

So we do have to recognize there is a sense that the equality bodies there's a much warmer relationship I think within the nationalist community than the unionist community. There's a skepticism. That's not me criticizing the body necessarily but that is the perception.

39:01 - 39:37

Sarah Ludford

Indeed it is. Thank you very much Chairman if I can come back to some things you said. You've said I mean you you would rather not have article 2 at all but you did make a comment saying a standstill may be defensible but your real problem is is with the dynamism the dynamic alignment.

Are there particular areas of EU law which you would identify as ones that would particularly worry you if they come in through that sort of dynamic alignment channel?

39:37 - 41:34

Jon Burrows

I think they all worry me, frankly. Because I think they all worry me because it's a constitutional issue. So we could specify specific areas, but the bottom line is that it shouldn't be dynamic at all. It wasn't sold as dynamic. It was sold as a line in the sand, this far and no further.

And clearly that's not the case. And I think the dynamism needs to be drawn from it. Because look, I believe in rights. You know, this country, people died for the rights that we have today. And to uphold the right to life from those who wanted to take it from us.

Northern Ireland's a very different place than it used to be. And I don't want to sound when I'm skeptical about and giving firm testimony here today. You know, there were things that weren't right in Northern Ireland. We didn't always get things right. There was a need for fair employment laws.

There was a need to get things changed. But the landscape we're in now is completely different from what it was fifty years ago. And for most people in Northern Ireland, they just want to get on with their life. They actually believe the state is fair. But things like Article 2 are driving a coach and horse through our democracy.

And I do believe that the unionist feeling on this will gather and mount. We're coming up to election time. And it'll become louder. And I do worry, because if this place ever collapses, people think it'll never come back up again. And then the central plank of the Belfast Agreement is gone.

And one of the undermining factors to this place is the Protocol and the Irish Sea border.

41:34 - 41:36

Speaker 19

Baroness Foster.

41:36 - 42:13

Arlene Isobel Foster

Yes, and thank you very much, Lord Chair. And Jon, you made some comments about the ECHR, and there are a number of national parties now on record to say that if they are in a position of government after the next general election, that they would leave the ECHR. If that is a decision taken by our national government in London, what do you think your position would be on that? If it's your position that you believe in parliamentary sovereignty, you believe that that is what must be protected, if that is the decision of our national parliament, what then will be your position on the ECHR?

42:13 - 43:31

Jon Burrows

Well, if that's the decision of the national parliament, it's the decision of the national parliament. A bit like our position on Brexit. We said with our head, don't leave, with our heart, many of us wanted to leave, but we accepted the decision because the majority of people in the United Kingdom made that decision. But of course we didn't leave. Northern Ireland didn't leave.

And that's why I would raise my concerns about the European Convention of Human Rights. Not that I don't believe that domestically we can guarantee all those rights, I believe we can. The but is what happens in Northern Ireland. I just do not have trust, and I have heard politicians from when I was this high say Northern Ireland is as British as Finchley. And when it comes to it, suddenly the no, no, no becomes okay, we'll do a deal.

And so Nigel Farage might say he'll take every inch of the United Kingdom out of the ECHR, but when it comes to it, I just worry that Northern Ireland will be left in a quagmire. Because I've never seen the, whatever the rights and wrongs of it are, I've never seen the UK government simply saying, sorry, Northern Ireland's part of the United Kingdom.

43:31 - 44:02

Alex Alexander Carlile

Given your view of the ECHR, and it's a very interestingly nuanced view, and given that we do have devolution to Northern Ireland, if the United Kingdom were, as Baroness Foster has suggested, to leave the ECHR, would you expect this parliament to possibly try and create its own bill of rights to replace the rights that are underpinned by the ECHR in GB?

44:02 - 44:11

Jon Burrows

First of all, I'm not expert on whether they'd have the jurisdiction to do that.

44:11 - 44:13

Speaker 20

Let's assume that there was the jurisdiction.

44:13 - 45:34

Jon Burrows

If there was a jurisdiction, some would. First of all, I'll sound a warning that there are politicians who would love to walk away from this place and have something to blame for it. Sinn Féin particularly at the moment. I think they're losing support in the polls. I think that would be a perhaps something that they might want to cling onto to say, oh sorry, the Belfast Agreement's fundamentally breached, we're walking.

Wouldn't be the right thing to do, but could they do it? I think they could do it. So you ask a sort of hypothetical question. It would certainly be debated. There would be those who would say let's do it.

If they could do it, I cannot see this place having difficulty passing any legislation sometimes whatsoever, and when it does it's horrendously bad at times, passing a bill of rights. I just I can see petition of concern all over it. I just don't think it's reality. It's just so contested. And and how it would be drafted by some people on one side would be entirely different from what it would look like for people on the other side.

But I think it would be destabilising for Northern Ireland. And I say that with head versus heart, a bit like I do for Brexit.

45:34 - 45:56

Margaret Ritchie

Thank you, Lord Chair. Because we live in a divided society, John, in Northern Ireland, how would the rights of all of the people, unionist, nationalist, and other, be protected if there wasn't an ECHR or if there wasn't a bill of rights or if there wasn't an Article 2? And I realise that's a supposition territory.

45:56 - 47:13

Jon Burrows

Yes. But I do believe all people are created equal and have absolute equality of rights and should have equality of opportunity and fairly treated. So I just make that absolutely clear. I frankly don't care for someone's religion. I go to my own church and and we all, you know, Catholics and Protestants worship the same God as far as I'm concerned.

The I think the question you ask is more one of perspective than legal reality because if if we had, for example, and leave aside any political protestations about it, if you had a a workable bill of rights that replicated, for example, much of what's in the ECHR, it would be accessible no matter what your religion is or what your constitutional position is. The fact that it it originates as as an ECHR or some domestic bill of rights, it would be the content that would would make the difference. You know, you would still have equal access to to take a case. The laws would still be equally applying to you. So it's really a political perspective as to whether that should be best done through an ECHR or domestic bill of rights.

I don't think actually it changes the rights that any individual would have.

47:13 - 47:41

Alex Alexander Carlile

Thank you. Well, we've run out of time now, but thank you very, very much indeed for an extremely interesting three quarters of an hour or so on some very important subjects. You've been clear and have made your and your party's views very evident to us. So I'm now going to draw this part of our session to a close, reminding you that there will be a verbatim transcript sent to you for correction and thanking you for your evidence.

47:41 - 47:42

Thank you, Chair. Thank you.

57:46 - 58:32

Alex Alexander Carlile

Good morning and welcome to this evidence session of our inquiry on Article 2 of the Protocol/Windsor Framework, the so-called non-diminution of rights provision, and we will hold further sessions with Northern Ireland political parties during the day. We're joined now by Matthew O'Toole, the SDLP's leader of the opposition here at the Northern Ireland Assembly. Mr. O'Toole, you're very welcome and we very much look forward to your evidence. We'd be grateful if you can introduce yourself briefly the first time you speak. Today's meeting is being broadcast and a verbatim transcript will be taken for subsequent publication, which will be sent to you for to check for accuracy.

So would you like to introduce yourself?

58:32 - 58:49

Matthew O'Toole

Yes, please. Thank you, Lord Carlile, and thank you to the members of the committee for having me. My name is Matthew O'Toole, MLA. I am the leader of the opposition at the Northern Ireland Assembly, which is a relatively new role. I'm also the SDLP MLA for Belfast South.

58:49 - 59:10

Alex Alexander Carlile

Thank you. In your view, just looking at the background, why did the UK and the EU negotiate and include Article 2 in the Protocol/Windsor Framework, and what has its political significance been since it was created?

59:10 - 59:48

Matthew O'Toole

Well, thank you first of all, Lord Carlile and members of the committee for having me. I first of all just want to say before I answer the question, a note of gratitude to this committee for their continued engagement on these matters and on Northern Ireland issues more generally. I think the quality of the scrutiny on a cross-party basis has been very notable. I would also say just as a note of coincidence, I was sitting in your chair, Lord Carlile, yesterday as chair of the Finance Committee and we were dealing with correspondence that came from your committee about Windsor Framework related matters and we are grateful for that correspondence and it's most helpful.

So I just wanted to put that on the record on behalf of my committee.

59:48 - 01:00:00

Alex Alexander Carlile

Thank you very much for that. We sometimes think that we may over-correspond a little, but we want to keep up our activity at a level which worries government from time to time.

01:00:00 - 01:03:41

Matthew O'Toole

The correspondence, obviously it's the clerks and the committee who are the most burdened with the correspondence, so they probably can talk about us after we're gone, how much correspondence committees generate, but I think it is useful and I think it gives clarity to proceedings. In relation to your question, first of all I should say my observations, I won't claim to be a jurist or human rights specialist. I was talking with Lord Elliott outside, the nature of my job is often that I have to try and appear to be an expert on everything. I'm not an expert on this, but I can give you a view from myself and my party in terms of the broad political context of human rights in Northern Ireland pre- and post-Brexit. I suppose it was a part of the Windsor Framework, originally the protocol, because the purpose of the negotiation was to preserve, certainly initially from the perspective of the EU and I think then the stated position of the UK government, I should say in parenthesis I was at that time a UK government civil servant, was to protect and preserve the Good Friday Agreement.

Clearly that then led to a negotiation about in a sense what the meaning of the Good Friday Agreement was in various ways. There was one set of very, I suppose, complicated and yes, controversial negotiations and that continues to be a degree of controversy around that, I think it's fair to say, around the border in relation to the island of Ireland and how that would be kept open for the movement of goods. But there was a separate question related about the rights, safeguards, equality provisions in the Good Friday Belfast Agreement and how they would be protected. That actually, from my memory, was much less controversial back in 2017, 18, 19, 20. There was an early agreement from the UK government that there would be no diminution of rights and the EU was keen to underpin that.

Clearly the rights outlined in the agreement are broad and aspirational, but they were interacting with a series of other human rights provisions including European Convention rights and then the domestic writing of those rights into law by the UK government, the Human Rights Act. Certain rights which are underpinned by the European Court of Justice and those are the ones I suppose that where there was a specific concern that certain rights which may be justiciable via, as it were, EU routes might be lost or diminished after the UK left the EU. So that is the broad context, but my observation would be at that time it was deemed to be relatively, if not uncontroversial, then less controversial than some of the other Good Friday Agreement related negotiations. And it was a positive thing that no diminution of rights was included in the protocol, latterly the Windsor Framework. I guess the question is how justiciable and enforceable are those rights?

01:04:01 - 01:04:34

Nigel Dodds

And secondly the whole issue of the democratic deficit in that you at Stormont as leader of the opposition or the executive or anyone has no say whatsoever in the making of these laws that are imposed on us across large parts of the economy and indeed at Westminster as well. So how do you address the point that actually this there's a deep irony in saying that Article 2 protects the agreement when many people in Northern Ireland, including some of those who negotiated the Belfast Agreement, say the exact opposite?

01:04:34 - 01:05:53

Matthew O'Toole

Well, I would say first of all, and without wanting to relitigate, no pun intended, all of that, the process of the UK leaving the EU was fundamentally destabilising for the entire edifice of the Good Friday Agreement and it obviously changed the constitutional context because it meant the UK, I mean the legal, one major legal and diplomatic and trade underpinning of the UK-Irish bilateral relationship was gone, that was the common membership of the European Union. That meant that there was going to have to be a way of protecting relationships in so far as that was possible, in so far as that was possible. I recognise that is deeply complex, it's part of the reason my party didn't want Brexit in the first place, but I and I acknowledge there is a there are tensions in in respect of how you balance rights going forward. And I suppose Article 2 is part of that. If the point you're making is that the rights of people who are unionist and British in Northern Ireland to have their, if I was depicting it, you can correct me if I'm depicting this wrongly, right to live in the UK as per the Good Friday, so no, I'm not, am I missing something?

01:05:53 - 01:06:14

Nigel Dodds

The point I'm making is that the rights to make laws is the right, it isn't a unionist issue, it's an issue for everybody in the assembly and the people who elect people who are Sinn Féin or SDLP or unionist or TUV or whatever, all have the right to have laws made for them by their representatives and that's denied, so it's not a unionist-nationalist thing, it's a general thing.

01:06:14 - 01:09:49

Matthew O'Toole

I mean, I'm not sure I would characterise that as a as a diminution of of human rights, but but I would say, but I would say this, it is clear that we Northern Ireland comes from a past of frankly, I think it's important to look at the kind of the historic context for Northern Ireland when it comes to rights. I don't want to relitigate all of history because I'm not sure it's productive, but clearly there was a sense, particularly among people from a nationalist from the nationalist tradition, that this the institution that was housed in this building, the old Northern Ireland Parliament, to put it mildly, did not respect their rights and they were not included and that's why there was a civil rights movement and then there was all the difficult history after that and the conflict. As I say, I don't want to relitigate all of that except to say that that previous history and then an appalling violent conflict which led to deep injustice and murder and loss of life and serious injury meant that we are in a context where rights are there is a more complex rights environment than there would be in other places. So therefore people need to be confident that their rights are going to be protected.

That's why I think the Article 2 provisions of the Windsor Framework were so important. But to come to your point about lawmaking and about who makes the law, I suppose I would acknowledge that there is a a a differential position for Northern Ireland in a pure sense that we are um um some laws or some regulations that we follow in relation to our economy are made in in the European Union. That's true. That's part of the provisions of of of the protocol. I mean I suppose I would say that um I don't necessarily see that as a more egregious loss of a right than some of the other loss of rights that have um um that have followed Brexit.

Um I would also say there are now following the negotiation of the Windsor Framework there are safeguards. Um the safeguards were put in place after detailed negotiation specifically between your party and the UK government. They include what's called the Stormont Brake, the existence of a democratic scrutiny committee here. I appreciate that lots of people think those are imperfect and they're not good enough, but I think it's not true to say that they are um it's not true to say that that they don't exist at all. Um I would also say, now this is a more political point rather than than a legal point, lots of the laws that are passed at Westminster are passed without um people in Northern Ireland having having a say.

Now I I respect the point a unionist would make is that Northern Ireland is a remains part of the United Kingdom. I I do respect that. I'm not I'm not trying to diminish that. But I would say one of the pieces of law which ultimately led to the litigation around Article 2, i.e. the Dillon case, related to the Legacy Act in 20 the previous the Tory government's Legacy Act. Well that had no democratic support whatsoever in Northern Ireland so far as I'm aware from any political party, yet it was still passed.

So I think it's important to take a take a view of these how these rights are enforced in the round and understand that we are in a very particular set of circumstances in Northern Ireland where there's no there are rights that have to be balanced and protected, but they're not it's not straightforward. I'm not trying to give you an evasive answer. I'm just trying to answer you in the round.

01:09:49 - 01:10:05

Speaker 25

No, and to your point on the Legacy Act, is it your view that it would be useful to have a certification on bills going before the Westminster Parliament similar to the certification of compliance or otherwise with the ECHR to cover compliance with Article 2?

01:10:05 - 01:10:18

Matthew O'Toole

Uh I think I'd rather I'd like to in general, yes, I think it would be helpful to have a clarity around whether these things are compliant. But I do rather than give you a detailed view on that I might write to we might write to you as a party and give you a kind of because I don't want to commit myself to a specific provision or policy prescription that I might where I might be contradicting a colleague.

01:10:18 - 01:10:20

Speaker 24

We might go over to Baroness Foster.

01:10:20 - 01:10:55

Arlene Isobel Foster

Thank you very much. Thank you, Matthew. I think the last time I was here I was giving evidence to you, so we're changing roles today. So thank you. Um you've mentioned the Dillon case and obviously we have been looking at the judgment from the Dillon case and we have received various views on the outcome of the Dillon case and and the judgment and what it means for the interpretation of Article 2 of the Windsor Framework.

So we would be very interested to hear from you what the SDLP's view is on the decision of the Dillon case.

01:10:55 - 01:15:13

Matthew O'Toole

Well I think first of all um we acknowledge the the court case. We're not um you know challenging the right of the Supreme Court to have handed down the judgment. I think there are very real concerns though and we expressed real concerns um at the time about the Dillon judgment. And I think it I mean a couple of points. Number one, um I think it's important to say that the people who brought the Dillon case are people who have been as victims.

And I know I mean this is something yourself have obviously done a lot of work on through your career and have very deep experience of. Um I think it is fair to say that victims in our society here from as it were all sides, and they don't like that term, have been failed by our politics. And there are many people who live with real pain and trauma and and and and there's never been any judicial process around the loss of their loved one or the serious injury of themselves or their loved one.

And that is just a deep injustice. And those are the people who were, who were involved in the Dillon case. And the Legacy Act was about removing any meaningful route to, um, to justice for them. And that's why our view was that it was immoral. The, so we were deeply disappointed that the interpretation of the High Court and then the Court of Appeal in Belfast was, as it were, diminished by the Supreme Court because our view was that those people deserved better than they were getting from the British government in relation to, um, the specific concerns.

I'm aware that people who know much more about this than me, such as the Human Rights Commission, have been concerned about particular, a particular phrase in that judgment, one of which is that the, as it were, the human rights provisions and perhaps specifically Article 2 were about, or I think more specifically they were talking about the agreement as in the original '98 agreement was about, the rights provisions were there for the purposes of, and I don't want to misquote them, quote, ending sectarian conflict. And that has been a, I think, a bone of contention, it's fair to say, because it's rather a simplistic interpretation of the rights provisions in the, in the Good Friday Agreement for a start. It wasn't simply about ending sectarian conflict. And sectarian conflict, that's a, I think, a problematic way to describe it by itself. Clearly there is sectarian division in Northern Ireland, there was in the past, there sadly there still is now, albeit diminished and, and for the large part thankfully no longer violent.

But the rights provisions are there for a whole range of reasons. They protect the pluralism of our society. They protect people who, um, who, I mean, this is a contested space. People have different national allegiances, they have different forms of cultural expression. We have a rights frame, we have, we have, we have recourse to, um, justice and rights provisions and, and, and the courts in part because, um, we do live in that contested space.

So I think it was simplistic to simply call it about sectarian conflict. So yes, there are, we are, there are concerns about the Dillon judgment and some of the, the language in it. We think it would be helpful, um, and obviously, um, the, particularly the Human Rights Commission have outlined those. We would like to see, um, more clarity on what, in a sense, the UK government believes that, I mean, the UK government has talked about it being itself being committed to non-diminution of rights, but consistently its approach, as far as I'm aware, in the courts has been to, um, if, either roll back or resile from a more expansive interpretation of those rights. Indeed, I think I'm right in saying, happy to be corrected, that one of their submissions to the court during the Dillon case was that they either disowned or disclaimed their own document, their own explanatory document back in 2021.

I don't think that does a lot to engender confidence, particularly for people, so there'd be different groups who will want to go to the courts to enforce rights here. And of course, part of the reason people have to go to the courts in Northern Ireland often is because we've such consistent political dysfunction and failure here and we have a very complicated past. So, um, if the UK government is kind of disclaiming or disowning its own guidance around its non-diminution of rights pledge, that doesn't fill those people with confidence. So we are concerned about it in that regard.

01:15:13 - 01:15:50

Arlene Isobel Foster

No, I think you will accept that if a government changes in Westminster, they have their own right to interpret what Article 2 means. And we have taken a lot of evidence on this issue of the explainer document and the fact that it has now been taken back. And we have asked questions about whether there's going to be another explainer document and we haven't got clarity on that, I think it's fair to say, around all of that. But I think you would accept that if a government changes in Westminster, they have their own right to explain what they understand the Article 2 means.

01:15:45 - 01:15:48

Speaker 26

Or do you think it's set in time as to when?

01:15:48 - 01:17:36

Matthew O'Toole

Yes and no Baroness Foster, let me put it this way to you. So the phrase non-diminution of rights is clearly not a is not ultra-specific. There are a list of specific, am I right in saying directive or specific things that are protected that are very, very specific and and the Dillon judgment you know draws a distinction between those and and rights which are derived elsewhere or which are slightly less clear in the text of the Article 2 of the Protocol Windsor Framework although obviously they take the both Belfast courts took a different view on that. But in relation to your point about one government and another, well obviously I mean principle in a parliamentary system is that one government doesn't bind the hands of another. But in a sense the reason for international treaties and international law and them being justiciable in a court is that citizens and indeed other international actors, other states are entitled to say well you might be of a different party but you you signed up to this.

And one example would be the Good Friday Agreement. I mean you would not accept nor should you accept the idea of, now this has been in the news recently and I'm certainly not opening this up for discussion now, but a UK government saying well actually we have decided now that the principle of consent in relation to Northern Ireland has changed. We've just decided we have a different interpretation in relation to what that means for example. Now that's a specific thing. A UK government could say well well we think now consent in relation to, I'm not trying to open up the constitutional debate honestly but I'm just giving an example, we now think it should be the threshold should be 25% want a United Ireland or 75% want a United Ireland.

In both of those cases unionists or nationalists would say actually I don't care if it's a Labour government now or a Tory government now, that's ridiculous.

01:17:36 - 01:18:05

Alex Alexander Carlile

You're making a very, very interesting point and I want to slightly refine it if I may. Do I understand you to be saying that, you know, as Baroness Foster has said, a new government has a perfect right to re-interpret legislation or to change it if it can get a majority in Parliament. But I think you're saying that there is a second level of documentation, an international treaty, which may have require a slightly higher level of approval before it can be changed.

01:18:05 - 01:20:30

Matthew O'Toole

Well I would say that if it relates to fundamental rights. But yes I think that is right. But I would also say this in relation to Northern Ireland and the complex set of kind of arrangements we have, the the deep injustice of the past and the complexity we're going to have to navigate in the future. It is going to words do have to mean something and they can't simply be like like washed away by the next political cycle. Like the Good Friday Agreement, there was a reason why the Good Friday Agreement would not have been viable if the different parties to it or indeed subsequent agreements if the different parties to it felt any future government, Labour or Conservative or Reform, and this is well and the Reform point may well become pertinent in the future, could just abjure this because it's a change in government policy.

This isn't like government policy in relation to I would draw a distinction here yes in in Northern Ireland terms to government policy in relation to education and clearly there's a difference in emphasis between the Labour and Tories in education policy. That's not the same as I personally don't think we can say well that's grand then your commitments in relation to human rights and the constitution and indeed legacy to the people of Northern Ireland can simply we can accept that they simply change with the government of the day.

I suppose they are legally able to, but they have to accept that there's a profound consequence. And I think you're seeing the consequence in our society with part of what you've seen is that trust in successive UK governments has diminished. For people who are unionist, nationalist, neither, has diminished. I think your former party, Sinn Féin, my party, the Alliance Party, there has been a basically since Brexit in particular, maybe some people would say it happened before then. I think there's some argument that there were some things that the previous Conservative government did that weren't ideal, but certainly since Brexit and the ways in which that warped, in my view, British politics, the new pressures it put on British governments to take, in my view, ever more extreme or sudden positions, the legal difficulties it got itself into that gradually reduced its ability to have some kind of broad base of trust here.

Not that people, look, Republicans and nationalists were never highly trustworthy of the UK government, but there is a vague sense that we can understand that there's a vague consistency between what they post-1998 anyway. I think that has been undermined. And so that's the point I would make, that we aren't the same, it's not the same as just any other domestic policy.

01:20:30 - 01:21:06

Arlene Isobel Foster

I want to come back just very briefly. I don't want to get into trust in politics in general because we could talk about that for a long, long time. We have heard evidence this morning that if the Ulster Unionist Party had known that Article 2 was coming along, they would not have signed the Belfast Agreement and supported it. Now, that's quite strong evidence that we've received this morning, Matthew, and I just want to put that to you, that they are saying if they had known that Article 2 was going to be in place 10 years later, that they would not have signed up to the Belfast Agreement.

01:21:06 - 01:22:00

Matthew O'Toole

As so, as in, like, are we saying that they, that in 1998, it's an odd historical counterfactual that David Trimble and other people in your then party, or now Lord Kilclooney, all these people would have, well, in 20 years, 18 years, the UK government is going to leave the EU and they are going to sign a non-diminution of rights agreement which, I think that probably highlights how destabilizing Brexit was because it throws up all sorts of, there are all sorts of different things that were going to be thrown up. I think people, other people might say, well, if we had thought the UK government was going to sign a, was going to pass into law an amnesty for people who had killed people, whether those are state actors or paramilitaries, then we wouldn't have trusted the British government on a whole range of other things, including Article 2.

01:22:00 - 01:22:08

Arlene Isobel Foster

I'm only putting it to you because we've just received that evidence this morning. I thought I'd run quite a lot of dramatic questions we could ask with the benefit of hindsight, I think.

01:22:08 - 01:23:14

Matthew O'Toole

Yeah, I just think it's a strange counterfactual. And I also think that some of the outworkings of Article 2, so there, we don't know yet. I mean, this is still relatively live. The provisions came into force five years ago, nearly six. And as I said, we have as a party, are concerned about the outworking of the Dillon judgment.

We feel particularly for those families who still await justice. Obviously, my colleagues at Westminster, as I'm sure people in this room will be working to get the legacy legislation to a place that does right by those families, doesn't give what is the intention of certain people to give the state the right to simply sweep things under the carpet. But I would say in relation to past counterfactuals, I think it would be impossible to say. I think, I mean, I suppose what that highlights, Baroness Foster's actually a point that has been made on numerous occasions, the Good Friday Agreement's completely was at that time utterly contingent, even though it was totally implicit because it was taken for granted, on the UK and Ireland both being members of the European Union, so it wouldn't have come up.

01:23:14 - 01:23:56

Sarah Ludford

Lady Ludford.

Thank you. Thank you very much. Thank you, Matthew.

To what extent can you see any clarity about Article 2 from the Dillon judgment? And I mean, you know, people have said it's left it unclear. Do you see any parameters of clarity about what where Article 2 sort of still applies in the light of the Dillon judgment? And how would you consider that further clarity could be brought?

01:23:56 - 01:26:41

Matthew O'Toole

Well, I'm going to return to my point that I'm not a jurist and nobody I think looking at my remarks would be fooled if I was claiming to be. So I'm not going to get into detailed commentary on case law or any of that because simply I would be bluffing. But I would say that in relation to the Dillon judgment, obviously it didn't cover, it didn't give definitive answers on lots of aspects of how Article 2 is justiciable. And it's pretty, it's clear that it isn't giving clarity on lots of it. I've talked about the specific concern around this general sense that the Good Friday Agreement rights provisions and therefore Article 2 of the Protocol is about ending sectarian conflict.

That is a, I think, a problematic phrase. One thing that I hope is that, and it's one of the other questions that came up in your pre-brief, is around individuals and groups here seeing the Article 2 protections as being there to enable them to seek recourse. I hope many people do actually seek recourse because I think there's a whole range of areas post-Brexit where potentially there are diminution of rights. I think for example of frontier workers. Now I don't know and I wouldn't claim, I'm not going to go out and offer free legal advice to groups representing frontier workers.

But I can give you one example that, you know, the Good Friday Agreement is designed to offer some degree of, well, first of all it offers the right for people to identify as British, Irish, both, but also certain protections around social and economic rights. It's harder to be a frontier worker in actually on both sides of the border now because financial services, it's something I've done a lot in the committee in this room, financial services is harder to obtain on a cross-border basis. There are fewer mortgages in, so there are people who are paid in Euro, like in County Cavan, but live in County Fermanagh, and their mortgage has to be paid in Sterling. That's harder now than it was ten years ago because there are fewer financial services products because the UK does not have passporting. I don't know, and I'm not, maybe I shouldn't be speculating.

I think there are interesting rights like that which I would like to see these protections at least tested to see whether they offer some protection.

01:26:41 - 01:27:32

Alex Alexander Carlile

Going back to the fundamentals of Lord Leicester's question. On the one hand, one could say that the Supreme Court was accurate and wise in saying we are not legislators, we have a framework, we will interpret that framework in the way in which it was meant to deal with the troubles and things flowing from the troubles. And if people want to try and establish their individual rights, then they can go to their trade union, for example, and the trade union will bring a judicial review action in the High Court in Belfast. On the other hand, you might say it's really unhelpful because they've been very prescriptive about the way in which they interpret the breadth of Article 2. And it means that people are not able readily to go to that trade union official and find out what their rights are and they're forced to go to court, which is slow and expensive.

Now, there's an argument, a strong argument on both sides of those propositions, I think. Where do you stand?

01:27:32 - 01:27:44

Matthew O'Toole

Well, I think you would always expect our party to be on the side which believes in greater breadth of rights arising originally from the Good Friday Agreement, and that is a concern, as I said.

01:27:44 - 01:27:52

Alex Alexander Carlile

Well, I would. On the other hand, I'd expect your party to be very keen on the separation of powers and not giving judges too much discretion.

01:27:52 - 01:30:40

Matthew O'Toole

But here's the... but here's the... but I guess here's part of the challenge with that, Lord Carlile. We... part of the... so you could think about the why rights... a rights framework and having recourse to the courts ultimately matters in Northern Ireland maybe more... I mean, in a human sense, obviously it never matters more for the human in a free society. This is ultimately about individual citizens. But in the political context we operate here, talk about the historic context: exclusion of one particular community for half a century, violent conflict with massive loss of life and injustice for thirty years, then a peace agreement which sought to create rights which had to respond to both of that... to some of that pre-history, i.e., you know, injustice around the way the place was run and the injustice of conflict. So that's a particular historic reason for us to have particular recourse.

But you then have two other subsequent factors which make it very particularly important here. Number one, the fact that we have political dysfunction in Northern Ireland very often. So if the alternative is, "Well..." and obviously it's always a point for... the judges will make, "This is for legislators to legislate, we cannot come up with the law, people who are elected have to create these... ultimately have to create the law." Part of the challenge is our politics has failed to create rights via law even where there's consensus. For example, around equal marriage was a notorious example here for a very long time.

Our Assembly failed to create the right for gay people to marry despite it happening elsewhere. I mean, before this institution existed, while we were still in conflict, it took a decade and a half for homosexuality to be decriminalized in Northern Ireland, a decade and a half later than England and Wales. So, like, we do operate in a very particular environment. So the answer to the question is, "Well, shouldn't we get politicians to do that?" I say, as Leader of the Opposition, great if we could, great if our legislature was more functional and the public were able to see rights...

Now, one answer to that might be, and perhaps members of certain parties might say this, "Well, we... they use some of the provisions, the rights provisions, in a political sense to prevent certain things passing." And they would see that as a legitimate use of the rights that are set out in the Good Friday Agreement to prevent... I would see it as preventing progress, they would see it as protecting the prerogative of their community or the people who elected them. I've just illustrated the tension and in a sense why having recourse to the courts and having an expansive interpretation of some of those rights might be more important in Northern Ireland than it is in other jurisdictions with slightly more functional politics.

01:30:40 - 01:30:41

Sarah, did you...?

01:30:41 - 01:31:39

Sarah Ludford

I had a supplementary. No, no, it's just fine. The... one of you put to us is that the particular problem with Article 2 that creates one of the factors of destabilization is the dynamic, the dynamism in it, the dynamic alignment, that had it been a standstill about rights, that would have been one thing, even from those who didn't want Article 2 at all. But standstill's one thing, the sort of perpetual threat, if I can call it that, of the dynamic alignment makes it a lot worse.

Do you feel, I mean, you know, could it be in some theoretical, if not real world, that Article 2 would be confined, would be sort of brought back to a standstill and not have, you know, a pipeline of new stuff coming in that nobody really knows what it might be?

01:31:39 - 01:32:27

Matthew O'Toole

If the counterfactual, I suppose, is a standstill in terms of the rights that existed on December 31st, 2020, or June 22nd, 2016, or even whatever. Well, I suppose I would go back to my previous answer, which is that might be a more defensible position if our, from my perspective, now this isn't, I'm not making a legal argument, I'm making a political argument here, but since this is about politicians and how they interact with the law, I'll give, make a political argument. I'm perfectly happy with a more dynamic alignment in the cont, or in the context of a politics where we often don't keep track of what are, you know, sometimes organic, or maybe not organic, but changes in the rights framework, even in other parts of the UK.

01:32:27 - 01:32:38

Speaker 33

The rights framework does evolve. That's a truism. The rights framework evolves. Evolves. It's a truism.

You referred to gay rights. I mean, those have evolved in the lifetimes of many of us.

01:32:38 - 01:32:51

Matthew O'Toole

They didn't evolve, but they didn't evolve in Northern, but they didn't evolve, our politics, they didn't, our political system did not evolve to legalize them. People had to go to court. And by the way, the UK government could have legislated for that when it want, and while probably...

01:32:51 - 01:33:00

Speaker 32

Human rights evolve, but you certainly do have to go to court to turn that evolution into rights that you can enforce.

01:33:00 - 01:33:40

Matthew O'Toole

But a legislature can, it is also possible for legislatures to legislate for those things. Your former party colleague, obviously David Steel, legalized abortion via a private member's act in 1967, 68. That, whereas in Northern Ireland, people have very strong views about that subject, I recognize that, but I'm giving it as an example. That was a private member's act of the UK Parliament in 1967. In Northern Ireland, it was legalized because there were successive legal actions and then ultimately the UK government legalized it in 19, or 2020, 19, 20.

I recognize that as a subject of some controversy, but I'm giving you an example of how we don't really keep track of rights changes.

01:33:40 - 01:33:42

Alex Alexander Carlile

I'm going to move on. I'm going to move on to Lady Ritchie.

01:33:42 - 01:34:07

Margaret Ritchie

Thank you, Lord Chair. Matthew, obviously my question leads from all the other stuff that has been said by yourself this morning and by the other questions. So what do you think is the SDLP's overall assessment of the success of Article 2 Windsor Framework in ensuring the rights, the protection of rights for the people here following the UK's exit from the European Union?

01:34:07 - 01:37:04

Matthew O'Toole

Well, I would say two things. One, we're still strong supporters of the existence of Article 2, but it's probably too early to give a definitive view. The Dillon case, obviously, as I said, is a concern. Wouldn't want to overstate that and say, well now it's so narrow so people shouldn't be using it. I, as I say, note the concerns that the Human Rights Commission have offered in their submission to you.

I would restate, I suppose, our broad point that we need to have robust human rights protections via Article 2 in this case until there is some other mechanism that replaces it, for example, in some future constitutional scenario. And those are, will be particularly important because rights were fundamental to the Good Friday Agreement, which remains the, you know, the key touchstone of our settlement society, complex, dysfunctional arrangements such as they are, but it still remains essential. And the rights framework is essential. And I would say, if you look at some of the other things that have happened, obviously the legacy legislation, which is hopefully being unwound by the current government, but it's an example of why you need a rights framework if the idea is just, well, you are either, people should just trust in the legislature, there should be a functional politics in which people elect their legislators and they do what most people want. The Northern Ireland context, I mean, obviously that just doesn't work in so many ways in the Northern Ireland context, I'm afraid to say.

That's not to say that politicians aren't important, although I'm afraid sometimes we do seem to want to make ourselves seem irrelevant here. But think about the context of, you know, low trust in our institutions, repeated failure to deliver rights by the devolved institutions, the fact that we have limited traction in terms of issues in the UK Parliament, notwithstanding the work done by members of this committee, the fact that very often UK governments candidly when it suits them will do things which are deemed to be violations of rights of people in Northern Ireland, most egregiously the Legacy Act. But also, I mean Unionist parties have remain furious about the Protocol itself, and in one sense that is an example of how simply trusting a UK government or indeed the Northern Ireland Assembly to be able to deliver and protect rights isn't good enough for people in Northern Ireland, I'm afraid. And there's a whole range of other reasons why, I mean in terms of language rights, which the Irish language community here are still having to litigate around delivering an Irish language strategy, there's a whole range of reasons why we need robust protections more so than elsewhere.

01:37:04 - 01:37:14

Margaret Ritchie

And obviously what you're saying is that you believe in the importance of the dedicated mechanism that is overseen by statute in relation to the Human Rights Commission and the Equality Commission.

01:37:14 - 01:38:17

Matthew O'Toole

Very much so, yes, and I welcome the fact that they have been given those responsibilities. I think it would be helpful if, I mean in one sense the debate about Article 2 was not a major political story here because the debate was about the Protocol and the movement of goods and customs regulations and SPS rules, and that obviously is still a live subject for some, although from my perspective I think it's proven, and just in parenthesis, most recent economic statistics illustrate Northern Ireland is growing faster than the UK as a whole. But to go back to the point about human rights and Article 2, yes, it is essential and we do want to see, and we welcome the fact that the Equality Commission and Human Rights Commission have been given those rights, but I would want to see in a sense probably a bit more awareness of some of these issues among not just the public at large but interested parties who might want to litigate.

01:38:17 - 01:38:23

Alex Alexander Carlile

Okay, you've got to the point, exactly the next point we were coming to. Baroness Anderson, please.

01:38:23 - 01:38:25

Elizabeth Anderson

Thank you, Lord Chair. Nice to see you, Matthew.

01:38:25 - 01:38:26

Nice to see you.

01:38:26 - 01:38:27

A good long while.

01:38:27 - 01:38:28

Yes, absolutely.

01:38:28 - 01:39:01

Elizabeth Sanderson

Um, what you're saying brings me exactly onto the question, which is you say the debate wasn't about Article 2, and to what extent do you think people do understand or have any knowledge of Article 2 itself, what it does, how they might be able to use it? And you've asked for more awareness and you've talked about obviously the complex rights landscape here, which is different. So if they don't relate it to Article 2, do you think there is a sense more generally without knowing?

01:39:01 - 01:39:04

Alex Alexander Carlile

And if they do relate it to Article 2, do they know which Article 2 they're relating it to?

01:39:04 - 01:40:52

Matthew O'Toole

No indeed, yes, that's exactly because as we've heard that is a bit of a, do we know, no he doesn't, yes, there are obviously two Article 2s, two Articles 2. So, um, which yes, is, um, can complicate things. One of the things about politics obviously people in this room will know is that members of the general public have very busy lives and they are not expected to be, nor should they be expected to be, au fait with lots of different, with you know the minutiae of legislation or indeed the legal backdrop to their rights.

I think lots of people do know that the Good Friday Agreement created a rights framework and that people have a set of rights here that are derived in part from that agreement or at least specified in that agreement but underpinned by other arrangements, the European Convention, previously membership of the EU and the extent to which EU law written into domestic law underpinned that, and other domestic provisions including the Human Rights Act, though not, it should be said, a devolved local Bill of Rights which was, has been, and to go back to my other, the point I've made before about the failure to devolve level to provide these things, the fact that we've never been able to provide a Bill of Rights almost underlines even more why you need Article 2 and you need other sources of it. So I suppose it's important that people are aware of it. The example of trade unions was given earlier on, the fact that there is a dedicated mechanism with both the Human Rights and Equality Commissions. I think often people only even become aware of these provisions when there's a specific bit of litigation that's in the news.

01:40:52 - 01:41:12

Elizabeth Sanderson

And to that point, do you think, as you say, there's a sort of general awareness that the rights were contained within the Good Friday Agreement, but do you get any sense from your constituents or just more generally that there is, we've heard it as an unease, that there's a growing concern that those rights might be under threat or a chance that they may be?

01:41:12 - 01:43:44

Matthew O'Toole

Well, I think, I think, I think people do sense that there is a, I think there's a general sense that there has been a sliding, you might call it backsliding, away from the fulsome commitment to rights which people perceived post-agreement or at least felt was there. And that's manifested itself in a number of ways, obviously the legacy legislation. I think even through the Brexit process, I mean the British government's initial no diminution of rights early commitment and then a gradual, well actually what we meant by no diminution was sort of, actually we didn't mean those rights and we, you know, it's much narrower than all of that. I think people do kind of get a general sense of that and they get a general sense that actually underpinning the complexity of rights that are required in Northern Ireland is something that is gradually becoming politically, either particular individuals they simply want to, for example, say, no, we're just going to remove our, we're going to pass a blanket sweeping amnesty because the politics at the minute says that our party is demanding and certain newspapers are demanding we give an amnesty to our troops, therefore we are creating a blanket amnesty for everybody, it doesn't matter whether your loved one was shot in the back by a soldier, murdered by the IRA, murdered by a loyalist gang, we're just going to give a blanket amnesty to everybody. People do get that and they don't really understand necessarily how different human rights frameworks or courts interact.

I mean, I said earlier on, I'm not, I can't claim to be a perfect expert on all of these things and I'm a legislator, individual members of the public don't, but they get the general sense that there's a, I think an unwinding of, of, of the rights framework. At a local level they will also see some of the local litigation that happens around language, for example, more recent litigation, we've seen there's been litigation on the Parades Commission which is slightly, slightly separate but it's in the broad, you know, people, it's people litigating about their right for one thing or another, whether you, whether you are sympathetic to that right or not. So I think people do get a sense that this stuff is out there and either, and I think it's part of a general sense that the set of arrangements that we had post-98 to balance and protect rights and perspectives, at a UK level certainly, there's either less interest or less ability to uphold it. And I think that's, I think that's unarguable and I think that has frankly that's been the perspective of many unionists as well.

01:43:44 - 01:44:23

Tom Elliott

Thank you, Lord Chair, and thank you, Matthew, for coming, good to hear from you.

Just in light of the Dillon judgment, how do you think or what's required from the UK government and indeed the Northern Ireland Executive to meet their commitments under Article 2 of the Windsor Framework? And just a wee supplementary, do you see any way to help give those people more rights that have a loved one's murder, mainly by terrorists, who see that there's a differential of rights between their loved ones being murdered and those who were killed by security forces?

01:44:23 - 01:46:20

Matthew O'Toole

Well, I mean, I think, I mean, in relation to people who've lost loved ones, I mean, all I can say is that the where things are now is continuing to press for the repeal of the provisions of the Legacy Act, which are abhorrent and, you know, and completely and all parties in Northern Ireland from all perspectives said that. I think there is a need to rebuild confidence among victims, and that includes victims of course of paramilitaries and as well as all other victims. It is right to say that there is a particular challenge around getting justice for victims of paramilitaries. I would say that's not made easier when if there's a political desire to simply say no member of the security forces must ever face any legal, must ever face any legal consequence for killing people. I don't think that's, I don't think that ultimately is in the interests of people whose loved ones were murdered by paramilitaries.

So I think where the focus has to be now is ensuring that that legacy legislation is human rights compliant, fit for purpose, is compliant with all international and legal obligations, and finally does right by individual, you know, when you think of, I won't go through the list of people who've been, who've been utterly failed, but victims of all, you know, of all stripes, I hate to use that word, but you know what I mean, have been, have been utterly failed. Then to go back to the other question about, it was about what does the UK government need to do now on...

01:46:20 - 01:46:26

Tom Elliott

What the UK government needs to do, both His Majesty's government and Northern Ireland Executive.

01:46:26 - 01:48:06

Matthew O'Toole

Right, okay. I mean, well, I suppose on the Northern Ireland Executive first, it would be helpful for the Northern Ireland Executive to be willing to legislate in areas where there is, there is agreed that there is a potential or clear deficiency of rights. I mean, I think, for example, of the, you know, the absence of progress on, on matters relating to racial equality, particularly in the absence, you know, after a summer of, like in my constituency, in my constituency office, I had families, Indian families shelter in my constituency because they were, because they were burnt out basically around the corner. We had riots on the, on the streets of Belfast. Like, I think what you need to have is a local executive which is showing leadership and using where it's appropriate legislative vehicles to uphold rights.

And sadly, it has proven unable or unwilling to make progress on that, certainly the current composition or the composition of the leadership of the executive for the last two decades. I mean, in relation to the UK government, I suppose what it needs to do is in word and deed, and I'm not being too specific about this, I'm not trying to be general, but is illustrate that it is actually committed to Article 2 and non-diminution of rights and be clear about that.

I would worry about future UK governments. I mean when you have a UK government, a potential UK government on a Nigel Farage basis basically threatening to leave the European Convention on Human Rights, you have basically a fundamental, you know, a fundamental jeopardy to the Good Friday Agreement and the broader framework that we exist in.

01:48:06 - 01:48:15

Alex Alexander Carlile

Right, we've run out of time. So thank you very much for your contribution. It's been extremely interesting and it's very nice to meet you again.

01:48:15 - 01:48:16

Nice to see you all, yes.

01:48:16 - 01:48:33

Alex Alexander Carlile

And I should just deal with the formal side of this, which is that my Lords, the public element of this meeting is now about to be concluded, but I'll remind you that you'll receive a verbatim transcript of your evidence for correction. Thank you very much for giving evidence.

02:13:41 - 02:14:35

Alex Alexander Carlile

We're now holding the ninth public evidence session of our inquiry on Article 2 of the Protocol/Windsor Framework, the so-called non-diminution of rights provision. And we will be holding a further such session during the day. We're joined now by Jim Allister, the leader of the Traditional Unionist Voice, the TUV. You are very welcome, and we very much look forward to your evidence. We'd be grateful if you would introduce yourself very briefly before the first time you speak.

Today's meeting is being broadcast, and a verbatim transcript will be taken for subsequent publication. It'll be sent to you to check for accuracy. So I'm going to turn now to the questions, but no, I'm not. I'm going to say to you, please introduce yourself for the record, and if you have a short introductory statement, then please feel free to make it.

02:14:35 - 02:14:40

Jim Allister

Well, thank you, thank you very much. In terms of accuracy, the name is Allister, not McAllister.

02:14:40 - 02:14:47

Alex Alexander Carlile

So sorry, that is my fault. I do apologize. I even underlined it. My apologies, Mr. Allister.

02:14:47 - 02:18:38

Jim Allister

I'm Jim Allister, Member of Parliament for North Antrim, leader, as you said, of Traditional Unionist Voice, and I'm pleased to be with you this morning to talk about an issue that is very important to me and my constituents because Article 2 is an intrinsic and inseparable part of the Protocol, or as we now profess to call it, the Windsor Framework. And being such an intrinsic part, it is inseparable from the overall undemocratic aspect of the Windsor Framework because it, like subsequent articles up to Article 10, denude Northern Ireland of the right to have a say in many legislative issues.

There probably has been most focus on the fact that under particularly Article 5, there's 300 areas of law where we're subject to laws we don't make and can't change. But the same arises by virtue of the same route of dynamic alignment in respect of Article 2. And that is a constitutional insult and a constitutional absurdity that any rules and regulations, laws which govern any people should be not those they make themselves, but indeed those through dynamic alignment which are the laws of others enforced upon them. So there's a fundamental democratic objection which informs the approach to Article 2 as much as it does the rest of the protocol impositions. Article 2, of course, is also somewhat something of an insult in the sense that you would have thought reading it that without the Belfast Agreement and without the EU, we had no rights in Northern Ireland.

But of course, we have had the Fair Employment Act from 1976, we have the Equal Pay Act from 1970, we have legislation on the incitement to hatred since 1981, we've had the Disability Discrimination Act from 1995, the Race Relations Order from 1977, Sex Discrimination Order from 76, the Equality Act Sexual Orientation Regulations from 2006, and so it goes on. And as I say, you would think though reading Article 2 that we were devoid of all those. So we will come no doubt in the questions to the full import of Article 2, but for me, it has an overwhelming political and constitutional significance in that through the democratic alignment it involves the removal of local and national sovereignty on these issues and to that extent has the capacity to add to the Irish Sea trade border an Irish Sea rights border, because you can end up with a situation where people in this part of the United Kingdom have different rights, rights they can't change, than would prevail elsewhere in the United Kingdom. And I suppose it all just comes down, boils down to the fact that it's an unacceptable imposition of EU colonial rule.

02:18:38 - 02:18:46

Alex Alexander Carlile

So given your view, which is, and you're not the only person who's expressed that view to us today.

02:18:46 - 02:18:47

Glad to hear it.

02:18:47 - 02:19:18

Alex Alexander Carlile

Given that view, why do you think that the UK and EU negotiated and included Article 2 in the face of the sorts of objections from senior figures, including a senior lawyer like yourself, lawyers like yourself, and what is the real political significance of that? Is it all negative, or was there, were they trying to achieve something positive in terms of guarantees of rights for the people of Northern Ireland?

02:19:18 - 02:21:45

Jim Allister

I think it all came about because of the desperation of Boris Johnson to get a deal, any deal, and he was prepared to sacrifice sovereignty in respect of my part of the United Kingdom in order to get that deal.

And detecting and exploiting his desperation, the EU, as part of their overarching strategy to ultimately thwart Brexit by keeping hold of a part of the United Kingdom, saw this as another opportunity within the protocol to build upon the suppression of sovereignty and the colonial rule that it introduced through articles 3 to 10, to build upon that on the issue of rights. And I think Article 2 was built into that as part of their continuing, in perpetuity, control. And one of the significant things about Article 2 is it doesn't even have a democratic veneer. The articles, the other articles in the first 10 articles are supposed to be subject to a facade of democratic consent in that there is a vote every four years. There's no such vote on Article 2.

It's a permanent feature, a permanent fixture of EU dynamic alignment for Northern Ireland, a part of the United Kingdom. Whatever else happens about rights in the rest of the United Kingdom, we are tethered with no pretence of democratic oversight in respect of Article 2. So from my perspective, the EU definitely saw Northern Ireland as the opportunity, in the words of some of them, to make it the price of Brexit. But they also saw the opportunity to make it the connection that would never really let the United Kingdom take back full control, most demonstrably not here. So I think it on one side was a careless indifference to a fundamental aspect of sovereignty, and then the other side it was an aggressive assertion of political advantage.

02:21:45 - 02:22:03

Alex Alexander Carlile

Why should this committee look at what happened as a diminution of rights? After all, all those rights you referred to in your very accurate list earlier were rights that existed before Article 2 and have continued to exist since Article 2. So what was lost in terms of rights by Article 2?

02:22:03 - 02:23:04

Jim Allister

Well what was lost, where did all those rights come from? They came from the democratic expression through legislation of those who were elected by the people of Northern Ireland, either at Westminster or in Stormont. So they were the creation of and the product of the democratic process. The rights we're now talking about, be they good or bad, that's not the issue. The issue is not the merit of the rights.

The issue is the genesis of the rights. And the genesis of the rights is through democratic, through dynamic alignment, rights, be they good or be they bad, are imposed on an ongoing basis without anyone in this building or anyone in Westminster having right, having any right to object. So they are laws made without our consent and without our input. And that's preposterous.

02:23:04 - 02:23:07

Alex Alexander Carlile

But passed in a referendum by the British public.

02:23:07 - 02:24:01

Jim Allister

Sorry, the referendum of the British public was that the United Kingdom should leave the EU. That was the question on my ballot paper and on everyone else's. We didn't, that isn't what happened because of surrenders like that over Article 2 and Article 5 etc.

Northern Ireland was left behind subject to the EU's customs union within the EU single market hence the Irish Sea border and subject to the EU jurisprudence on rights. So none of this is what anyone voted for in the referendum. It was supposed to be about taking back control. This is the very antithesis of taking back control. This is leaving and handing control to a foreign polity and that's the fundamental objection to it.

02:24:01 - 02:24:36

Nigel Dodds

It does. Thank you Lord Chair. Just a just a quick factual point just following on from this discussion then I'll come on to my main question which is you mentioned that this Article 2 isn't subject to the consent vote. Is are the Article 2 provisions the dynamic alignment Article the six directives EU directives or areas of directives are they subject to the scrutiny and any possible Stormont Brake or or that kind of are they separated out from that as well?

02:24:36 - 02:24:44

Jim Allister

I believe they are yes. I certainly haven't picked up anything of them ever being examined in that context.

02:24:44 - 02:25:31

Nigel Dodds

Yes no it's yes that's an interesting point yes and why they should have been left out.

Yeah. Yeah.

Um so coming on to the main question then which is on the you've described the offense against democracy sovereignty. What about the Belfast Agreement itself which this was designed to protect? What what what do you say about this being necessary to ensure that the Belfast Agreement was protected and safeguarded? We've heard evidence this morning that in fact the very existence of Article 2 and the rest of the protocol is actually a breach of the Belfast Agreement and I presume you would share that view so how could you elaborate on why you think that is the case?

02:25:31 - 02:28:58

Jim Allister

Well I think it's absolute nonsense to say that the Belfast Agreement needed the crutch of Article 2 because the Belfast Agreement is in in international law is a binding agreement. So it is free standing in its own imposition. So it did not need the crutch of Article 2 to give it effect. So that legally is the first and important point that there you know there's so much nonsense spread abroad about the protocol being about protecting the Belfast Agreement. And the truth is that the protocol dismantled key components of the Belfast Agreement.

We've referred to one of them the democratic facade of every four years giving control to decide in the assembly whether to continue or not with those clauses. But to get to that point they had to dismantle a fundamental tenet of the Belfast Agreement which was cross-community support under section 42 of the 1998 Act the Constitution Act. There is the provision that any matter of a controversial nature requires a cross-community vote. Well there's nothing more controversial than saying to a community you will be disenfranchised for another four years in making the laws that you might want in respect of goods and and everything else. We're going to take that right away from you.

That is inherently controversial. So how did they get round that? On the EU's insistence they got round that by removing by exempting the four-yearly vote from the cross-community protection. So that was a fundamental of the Belfast Agreement that was dismantled within this. But if we're talking about the Belfast Agreement you know let's not forget that in its section on human rights it speaks of the right to pursue democratically national and political aspirations.

These proposals, these realities in Article 2 and the rest of the protocol deny that. If I have a political aspiration to be able to elect those who make my laws, then these proposals deny that. Something as supposedly guaranteed in the Belfast Agreement has been swept away by the protocol because they extract 300 areas of law to deal with our economy and all the laws propped up by Article 2 to deal with our rights and put them beyond the reach of any elector in Northern Ireland to elect anyone to determine and decide those laws. So it is a massive exercise in disenfranchisement which the protocol or Windsor Framework has indulged in. So far from protecting the Belfast Agreement, it has undermined it in those two fundamental ways.

So I do get a little tired when I hear people saying, oh, this is all about protecting the Belfast Agreement. This for me was about dismantling two fundamental protections in the Belfast Agreement and not a word I hear about it, certainly not from the government.

02:28:58 - 02:29:00

Speaker 37

Baroness Foster.

02:29:00 - 02:29:34

Arlene Isobel Foster

Thanks very much and thank you for coming, Jim, today and for your evidence thus far. We've spent a bit of time obviously looking at the Dillon case, which brought forward its judgment a couple of months ago and very fundamental to how the Article 2 is interpreted in terms of the Supreme Court handing down that judgment. I just wanted to ask you for your view on the Dillon case and whether you think it narrows the grounds in relation to Article 2 or what is your interpretation of Dillon as it stands?

02:29:34 - 02:31:45

Jim Allister

I think it undoubtedly does narrow the scope of when Article 2 can be prayed in aid in respect of these matters because I think it did in itself make a reference to the Demerel test of clear, precise and unconditional obligations. Because previously we had a lot of propaganda, not least from the Equality Commission and the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, about how Article 2 could be prayed in aid on all sorts of issues. Indeed, the ambition of some was to undermine the other Supreme Court ruling on the Scottish women case and indeed they were set to do that. I think the Dillon judgment makes clear that there is a much narrower scope and that it has to be Annex 1 specific and if it's not, then Article 2 is of no relevance. But of course the Dillon was also very clear that through the conduit of Section 7A of the 2018 Act, there is direct effect for Article 2(1) and that really sets up a parallel very akin to the Section 2 of the European Communities Act way back in 1972 where you had direct compelling impact and the same through Section 7A creates the same for 2(1) of the protocol.

So that concerns me from a constitutional point of view about this direct dynamic imposition. But I think I do welcome the aspect of Dillon which certainly put the reins on the growth and impact of Article 2(1). I think that was to be good.

And if it does stymie foolish challenges like trying to distinguish and overturn the For Women Scotland case in its application in Northern Ireland, then that will be to the good.

02:31:45 - 02:31:47

Speaker 39

Baroness Ludford.

02:31:47 - 02:32:53

Sarah Ludford

Thank you very much, Mr. Allister. Do you see other routes to bringing further clarity to what the effect is of the Dylan case on Article 2? You've said that you believe that it does narrow the impact of Article 2, and you've also mentioned the For Women Scotland judgment as an example of an area where Dylan might have perhaps put an obstacle in the way of undermining the application of that judgment in Northern Ireland. What processes or routes do you see to further clarifying exactly what limits might be put around Article 2 through the Dylan judgment? How is the clarification going to emerge?

02:32:53 - 02:33:58

Jim Allister

Well, I think insofar as it's needed, there undoubtedly will be further JR challenges, I think. And we could be set upon quite a protracted legal route through our High Court, Court of Appeal, and indeed Supreme Court again, because I think there are those who are not happy with the constraints that have been placed on Article 2 and therefore are going to try and contrive and bring challenge. So I think it's most primarily going to be through the routes of legal challenge that we're probably likely to see that. Another potential route would be for declaratory legislation on the issue, but I don't see why the government would rush to do that since the proper legal interpretation, I believe, of Dylan does put limitations on it.

02:33:58 - 02:34:46

Alex Alexander Carlile

But hasn't Dylan made it clear that if people wish to challenge for or against asserted rights in Northern Ireland, the right course for them is to do it through the courts, probably by judicial review, which is much commoner in England and Wales than in Northern Ireland proportionally, exponentially more common? There are very few judicial review cases of this kind in Northern Ireland. So what's the problem about Dylan effectively challenging people and saying, well, you can go by judicial review to enforce your purported rights? That's the normal way of doing things, and it keeps judges in their right position vis-à-vis the separation of powers.

02:34:46 - 02:35:41

Jim Allister

No, I'm not disputing that that's likely to be the route followed and indeed the appropriate route. It does not detract from my fundamental point that Article 2.1 should not be an imposition, it should never have been there in the first place as a direct imposition through dynamic alignment on a part of the United Kingdom. But leaving aside that argument, you're right, I agree that the proper and appropriate course or route for challenge is through judicial review. And I've no doubt with our very generous legal aid system and our very proactive politically inspired Equality Commission, I'm sure that there will be multiple challenges.

02:35:40 - 02:35:57

Alex Alexander Carlile

Yeah, I'd like you to just say a word about the commissions, the two commissions which are named in Article 2 or in relation to Article 2. What is your view and your party's view about the role that they play currently?

02:35:57 - 02:37:34

Jim Allister

I think you judge them by their actions. And I think in their actions we see them as excessively proactive in terms of being interested in suppressing the democratic rights of the people of Northern Ireland. You know, it strikes me as bizarre that if you have a Human Rights Commission and an Equality Commission and you have a Belfast Agreement that says that you have the right to pursue democratic national and political aspirations, and you have a Protocol which says, but you can't do that in terms of having the right to elect anyone to make those laws in that sphere. It strikes me as incredible that those two bodies with those supposed parameters of operation have never picked up the cudgels and said, right, we're going to challenge why it is that people in Northern Ireland do not, according to the Belfast Agreement, have the right to democratically pursue political aspirations such as rather fundamental aspiration of wanting to elect those who make their laws. So by virtue of their silence and looking the other way on that issue, and instead embracing every challenge that comes along to expand the EU's influence in Northern Ireland and to indeed to the very point of wanting to undermine Supreme Court rulings such as in the for Women Scotland, then I think by their actions you can see that they are a body discredited in terms of the breadth of approach that they take.

They're very partisan.

02:37:34 - 02:38:08

Alex Alexander Carlile

I've got one more supplementary question related to Baroness Ludford's question, which is about dynamic alignment. Where a treaty is made between one country and another, there's always going to be what we now fashionably call dynamic alignment. There are going to have to be legal adjustments whatever that treaty is. For example, the NATO treaty has a lot of dynamic alignment in it that allows people to do things, lawful things, which might not otherwise have been lawful.

02:38:08 - 02:38:18

Jim Allister

But there's very few treaties with respect that prohibit a people from electing those who make laws about a subject matter.

02:38:18 - 02:38:41

Alex Alexander Carlile

Well, the point I was going to make is dynamic alignment when treaties take place always depends upon the will of the United Kingdom Parliament. No government can make a treaty that is not approved by the United Kingdom Parliament. So isn't that democratic approbation of the highest sort in favor of that process?

02:38:41 - 02:39:48

Jim Allister

Of the highest sort of the lowest assault upon democratic rights. Because yes, Section 7A was passed by the United Kingdom Parliament. That doesn't mean that it did anything other than disenfranchise my constituents, because it clearly did. Because what it has done is created this conduit of laws in over 300 areas where my constituents have no say on what those laws are, can't elect anyone who can propose any amendment to any of those laws or bring forward any laws. That is disenfranchising us.

Now, that flows from the will of the UK Parliament through Section 7A, all the more reason why democratically one should be able to campaign for the reversal of that and hope that one day we will have a government that will have the strength and the courage and the conviction to reassert sovereignty over its own territory.

02:39:46 - 02:40:39

Margaret Ritchie

Thank you, Lord Chair. And thank you, Jim, for your evidence thus far. I suppose notwithstanding our positions in relation to this particular issue, I'm sure that you would accept that Northern Ireland is a divided society and hence there are different views in relation to the Windsor Framework, there are different views in relation to Article 2 of the Windsor Framework. And would you agree that a consequence of all the things that have happened is a result of Brexit? Whilst it was a UK vote, the people of Northern Ireland voted to remain within the European Union.

Would you agree with that?

02:40:39 - 02:41:35

Jim Allister

So did the people of London and so did the people of Scotland. But I don't see any legislation which creates dynamic alignment for Scotland or London. So the fallacy of that is that it wasn't a vote for Northern Ireland or a vote for Scotland or a vote for London. It was a vote for the United Kingdom and therefore the outcome should be a United Kingdom outcome. The problem is we didn't get a United Kingdom outcome.

We got a GB outcome and a Northern Ireland outcome. And therein is the travesty that having voted that the United Kingdom as a whole should leave, that part of it was left behind. On the point of a divided society, yes, sadly. But surely there's no division, or is there, on whether people should have the right of being enfranchised to elect those who make their laws? Why would anyone not want to have that right?

02:41:35 - 02:41:45

Margaret Ritchie

Surely enfranchisement would have continued if we all had remained within the European Union.

02:41:45 - 02:42:14

Jim Allister

But that then flags a rejection of the biggest democratic vote in the nation's history. You don't have that luxury. The vote was made and the mandate of that vote was for the United Kingdom to take back control and to leave the EU. It was the failure to deliver that mandate by the Boris Johnson government and all governments since which has created this dichotomy.

02:42:14 - 02:42:21

Alex Alexander Carlile

But aren't you politically asking to have your cake and eat it? Because you are in favor of the United Kingdom, right?

02:42:21 - 02:42:25

Alex Alexander Carlile

You're a strong supporter of Northern Ireland being part of the United Kingdom.

02:42:25 - 02:42:58

Alex Alexander Carlile

So when a vote takes place, although you're absolutely right to say that you have every right to campaign, as you put it, on behalf of your constituents, certainly on behalf of those who agree with you, nevertheless, aren't you enfranchised to act within the constitution of the United Kingdom? And therefore if there is a United Kingdom vote that takes us out of the European Union, like it or not, and personally I did not, but like it or not, you're stuck with it unless you can campaign to a change in the future.

02:42:58 - 02:43:43

Jim Allister

Yes, but the difference for you, Lord Carlisle, is that there is no area of law whereby, well, as a peer you don't actually have a vote in most cases, but there's no area of law where you cannot elect someone who then has a say on how those laws are made, except in Northern Ireland. That is unique to us, that in 300 areas of law and in this rights area, we are not allowed to elect people to shape, pass, vote upon, propose amendments to those laws. That's the fundamental undemocratic aspect.

02:43:42 - 02:43:50

Alex Alexander Carlile

Just remind you as a peer, ironically, I was entitled to vote in European elections but not in British elections.

02:43:50 - 02:43:53

Speaker 45

Yes, I'm aware of that. And indeed Lady Ludford.

02:43:53 - 02:44:55

Sarah Ludford

Could I be, Lord Chairman earlier was devil's advocate, so could I be to ask you a question? I mean, I'm also a remainer. Completely respect your position on Brexit, but was it not foreseeable that with Brexit carried baggage with it in terms of what would happen in Northern Ireland? I mean, was it not foreseeable that there would be these difficulties of how that Northern Ireland would not be in the same position as GB because of the weight of history, because of the because of the Belfast Good Friday Agreement, because of the complications of the border and so on, that you that by voting for Brexit, you kind of ignored the possible consequences.

02:44:55 - 02:44:57

Speaker 44

So then we punish the people for voting for Brexit.

02:44:57 - 02:45:05

Speaker 48

No, not punish, but to say that you couldn't foresee some of the complications that would come.

02:45:05 - 02:46:40

Jim Allister

I couldn't foresee, I couldn't foresee the fantasies which are built around the Belfast Agreement. I have read and heard so many times, oh, you couldn't you had to have the border in the Irish Sea because of the Belfast Agreement. Where in the Belfast Agreement does it say that you cannot have a customs border, that you cannot have the necessary things that go with it at the international frontier? It doesn't. The only thing the Belfast Agreement says about the border is that the security posts should be removed.

It says nothing about impinging trade across between Great Britain and Northern Ireland. It says nothing about preventing such border as the EU might think it was necessary to have on the island of Ireland. And it would have been their choice. United Kingdom was making it very plain, we don't need a border. If the EU wanted a border, then that was a matter for them.

But instead, the United Kingdom foolishly rolled over and said, oh well, we will simply partition our own country. We will put the border down the Irish Sea. We will impose upon the citizens of Northern Ireland and the businesses of Northern Ireland the obligation for all the raw materials to pass through an international customs border, an SPS border. We will have checks, we will have customs declarations, we will have all that goes with an international border. None of that was as a product of what the Belfast Agreement required.

None of it. And yet it was imposed.

02:46:40 - 02:46:41

Lady Ritchie.

02:46:41 - 02:46:44

Jim Allister

Thank you for tolerating my provocative question.

02:46:44 - 02:46:50

Speaker 46

Lady Ludford, I remember your provocative questions from the European Parliament a quarter of a century ago.

02:46:50 - 02:46:53

Speaker 43

Let's move on. A supplementary from Lady Ritchie.

02:46:53 - 02:47:04

Speaker 47

It's just a supplementary, just in view of your position and in view of what you have already said, how do you see rights being protected for all of the community in Northern Ireland?

02:47:04 - 02:47:34

Jim Allister

By the sovereign parliament of the United Kingdom. Remember, most of these rights issues, well some are transferred, some are accepted, for example membership of the European Convention of Human Rights is an accepted matter. But I ask for nothing more than what my fellow citizens have in the rest of the United Kingdom, that their rights are the rights as prescribed by the sovereign parliament of United Kingdom.

02:47:40 - 02:47:45

Margaret Ritchie

So you agree with the necessity for the ECHR to underpin rights?

02:47:45 - 02:47:53

Jim Allister

No, I don't. Left to myself, I think, and I recited to you much of the legislation we've long had.

02:47:53 - 02:47:56

Speaker 50

You come back to the issue of national sovereignty.

02:47:57 - 02:47:59

Speaker 49

You're coming back to the issue of national sovereignty.

02:47:59 - 02:49:18

Jim Allister

Yes, yes. Now, I recognize that Dylan, for example, would create a challenge to a British government to extract the whole United Kingdom from the ECHR. So you'd have to have a government of sufficient conviction and strength to be determined to override the Windsor Framework. And to do that, but that's a legitimate political aspiration. But you know, we have the Human Rights Act, we have the European Convention on Human Rights.

My constituents as much as anyone else's have the rights that those provide. And the objection is that then we are going to layer that with rights that we don't make, that we don't vote for, to shape all of that. Meanwhile, if the rest of the United Kingdom chose to tread a different path, and at the moment there's not a great deal of difference, but if they did propose to tread a different path, then you'd have a border on rights as well. Well, one of the essence of being a United Kingdom is you pay the same taxes and you enjoy the same rights. And I think that's pretty fundamental.

02:49:18 - 02:49:55

Elizabeth Sanderson

Bring us back down to earth for a moment, Mr. Allister, nice to meet you. What level of understanding do you think your constituents have of Article 2 in terms of where, I know your view on it, but where their rights are placed, be it that long list of domestic legislation you gave us, Article 2? You know, do they have an understanding in that way? And more generally, if they don't, how do you think your constituents feel about their personal rights and do they feel that they are under threat?

02:49:55 - 02:50:56

Jim Allister

I don't think any ordinary constituent, if I can use that phrase, would have a working knowledge of the rights or maybe even where they come from until they wish to avail. So, but I don't think that cuts across the question which I as a legislator and you as legislators should be contemplating as to the bona fides of rights being prescribed by others rather than by ourselves. So I'm not saying that my constituents in Ballymena or Ballymoney are out on the streets protesting about their rights. But I think most of them would say, well, if I'm part of the United Kingdom, then I want the rights of the United Kingdom, not the rights of someone else. And that's the fundamental problem.

02:50:56 - 02:51:04

Elizabeth Sanderson

Do you feel, I mean, yes, they wouldn't go on to such a granular level, but do you feel that there is a sense of dissatisfaction, unease?

02:51:04 - 02:51:51

Jim Allister

I think there's great, I think there's great unease, particularly in the unionist community, at the whole edifice of the Windsor Framework. The fact that it puts us under a customs code that decrees GB to be a third or foreign country. The fact that it subjects us in 300 areas of law to single market rules which aren't made by us, but incidentally, and not so incidentally, are exactly the same laws as govern the Irish Republic.

And I think there is an aversion to the thought that they can't elect anyone to change any of that because it's beyond their reach. So I think all that does come back to the fundamental democratic deficit or undermining that's implicit in the Windsor Framework.

02:51:51 - 02:52:21

Alex Alexander Carlile

If I can drag you back to your very creditable career as a barrister, you know, applying the cab rank rule to who turns up for your advice. If somebody turns up for a barrister's advice in the Bar Library in Belfast today, are they, is that barrister really going to have any difficulty deciding which route they should follow to enforce the purported rights under discussion?

02:52:21 - 02:52:26

Jim Allister

Well, the route is going to be a court route.

02:52:26 - 02:52:29

Speaker 53

The legislative background I'm talking about.

02:52:29 - 02:53:06

Jim Allister

Well, the legislative background in pursuing a right, whether it extends as argued or doesn't extend as argued, is a strict legal question which will be determined on the basis of what it says, just as the Supreme, as the Dillon case looked at what Article 2 said and interpreted it. It wasn't charged, and the court wouldn't be charged with saying, well, how do we get here? Is this the right, should we be here? Should we not be here? The courts would be looking strictly at where we are in terms of what the legislation says.

02:53:06 - 02:53:17

Alex Alexander Carlile

In terms of Baroness Sanderson's question, the potential claimant will still be able to establish their rights if they exist, if they're found by the court to exist.

02:53:17 - 02:53:27

Jim Allister

Well, except they couldn't, they couldn't establish the right to pursue democratic national political aspirations if their aspiration was to elect the people who make their laws.

02:53:27 - 02:53:29

Alex Alexander Carlile

That's a very big question.

02:53:29 - 02:53:31

Speaker 52

Well, it's a very fundamental question.

02:53:31 - 02:53:36

Speaker 51

Okay. Interesting. Right, Lord Elliott.

02:53:36 - 02:54:14

Tom Elliott

Thank you, Lord Chair, thanks Jim for your attendance. Following Dillon judgment, if you were by some means asked by the UK government or indeed by the Northern Ireland Executive to provide advice on how they would meet their rights obligations and in particular some of those that were ruled in the Dillon case, how would you be advising them to take that forward?

02:54:14 - 02:55:33

Jim Allister

Well, I suppose I would take it back to basics, that if we're talking about rights, and I'm sorry I'm going to repeat myself, there is a right to make your own laws as a citizen, to elect those who make your laws. So I would be advising government that they should rectify that deficiency. And if they corrected that deficiency, then we wouldn't be in this situation because those we elected would be making our laws, whether we liked them or not, just as I didn't like Section 7A, but it was made, whether with a gun to the head or not, but it was made by parliamentarians. So I think the fundamental starting point is, it really is at the end of the day an issue of sovereignty, whether or not a people in a country should be able to make their own laws or whether they should slavishly follow laws made by some other entity.

And in principle, I'm assuming that means going back to scrap the protocol in its entirety as opposed to just Article 2?

02:55:33 - 02:55:43

Speaker 54

Oh, absolutely, like Article 2 is an integral part of the offense of the protocol, but it's not the only offending part. Of course not.

02:55:43 - 02:57:14

Alex Alexander Carlile

Okay, thanks.

Jim, can we just go back to this issue of sovereignty? It's a very interesting debate you've started here.

At the last general election, 239 constituencies elected members who are not in the government. 411 are, at that time at least, members of the government. So doesn't that mean that 239 constituencies and the many thousands of constituencies involved elected somebody to make representations, but no more, MPs being representatives, not delegates? And part of our constitution there, and part of your views as a UK supporter, would be to accept that you can't always have your own way, even for your own region. And therefore, you may never achieve the aspirations to have regional control that you're talking about.

You know, it's taken Wales decades to have their first Plaid Cymru government, and they're very tentative in the way they approach all this. So aren't you oversimplifying this and being self-contradictory in your description of sovereignty, because you're assuming that Northern Ireland can have a sovereignty that doesn't necessarily exist at all?

02:57:14 - 02:57:54

Jim Allister

No, far from it. United Kingdom Parliament has 650 members. There are 632 of them who can bring forward any bill they wish about the rights of their constituents. There are 18 of them who can't do that in respect of over 300 areas of law because of the protocol. So their constituents have been disenfranchised by virtue of the fact they cannot elect representatives who control the laws that control their lives.

That's the fundamental assault.

02:57:54 - 02:59:27

Nigel Dodds

I suppose this issue boils down to the age-old argument about the sovereignty of Parliament and all the rest of it, which is that the British constitution is not a written constitution. So a lot of this is convention. So for instance, if the British Parliament decided tomorrow with a 400 Labour MPs, a massive majority, mainly from the north, perhaps in the regions, anti-London, say, we're going to give Manchester residents two votes and people in leafy Surrey, we're going to give them a half a vote. He hasn't thought of that, go on. No, he hasn't, but you know, somebody comes up with this idea to balance the power and get away from this London-centric drag on the country.

That would be something the British Parliament could pass, and it would be the law. But like the issue of Section 7A, would it be democratic? Would it be acceptable? Would it be people saying in Surrey, oh well, that's okay, it's been a democratic vote, so we're quite happy? I mean, it's the way the British government, the British constitution works.

And it's exactly the same principle, presumably you would agree, Jim. Yes, the British Parliament has passed it, but it's so offensive to everyday democracy, to devolution, to the Belfast Agreement, everything else, that it's something that's untenable.

That's the basic principle behind all of this.

02:59:27 - 03:00:04

Jim Allister

Yeah. Yeah. It fails the fundamental democratic test. And indeed it's interesting that in respect of Article 2, the 1998 Act had to be amended, Section 6(2), to insert the prohibition on this Assembly doing anything that infringed Article 2(1) of the Protocol. So it has circumscribed the legislative functions of this place already in law.

03:00:04 - 03:00:31

Alex Alexander Carlile

Right, well we've run out of time. I thank you very, very much, Mr. Allister, and forgive my mistake at the beginning, for coming and giving evidence to us. It's been an interesting and provocative meeting. I suspect that in years to come somebody may write a PhD about this particular meeting and the discussion we've had here. So we're very grateful to you and look forward to meeting you again.

03:00:31 - 03:00:31

Thank you very much.