Implementing an America First Approach in the East Asia and Pacific Region
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House Foreign Affairs East Asia and Pacific Subcommittee U.S. House of Representatives
Follow its sittingsAmi Bera
We still see tensions in the South China Sea and aggressive PRC gray zone. I'm going to call them a navy, but they may not call them a navy. They may call them fishermen that act quite like a navy. That becomes a hot point. I think we appreciate the Japanese Prime Minister, you know, and the position that she's taken in maintaining peace and stability in East Asia and certainly have seen some of the economic coercive measures that have retaliated against Japan.
We appreciate Chairman Mast, Ranking Member Meeks, and the entire committee for passing our trilateral legislation. I know Chairwoman Kim has worked on this a lot for a US-Japan-ROK trilateral cooperation at the legislative level as we look to maintain a peaceful, prosperous 21st century. Was recently in Korea meeting with the new Korean President, again talking about our commitments to the peninsula, making sure they don't have to worry about our commitment to be the nuclear deterrent. There's no reason for them to pursue any nuclear technology. Also will be interested in hearing a little bit about President Trump's conversations with President Lee about nuclear-powered submarine commitments that they're very interested in.
And then further south, hosted a breakfast as the founding co-chair of the Quad Caucus. The importance of the Quad, good reports out from Secretary Rubio's recent visit at the ministerial level. When he was here in committee, he did say there would be a leaders' level, whether it would be a direct meeting or a one-off of a prior meeting. I think that would be incredibly important at the leaders' level. Interested in, I know President Trump had, while India's not your jurisdiction, India plays a critical role in this region through the Quad through Australia.
And then also will be interested, we recently hosted a hearing on fentanyl trafficking and a lot of conversations and as I talk to the Pacific Island ambassadors, a lot of transiting of illegal narcotics that are having a real big impact on the islands there, methamphetamine and fentanyl and so forth. And I think we had a pretty productive hearing talking about how to disrupt some of those flows with our partners in Australia and New Zealand. And then more recently last year was in New Zealand or in Australia and New Zealand on a CODEL and we saw the PRC Navy while we were there circumnavigate Australia. So we're seeing a much more aggressive PRC Navy in the region. So we'll want to get some updates on that and obviously an update on AUKUS, which seems to be going well.
So lots to cover, vibrant region, one that is incredibly important to our national security and economic success in the 21st century.
Young Kim
Thank you. Other members of the committee are reminded that opening statements may be submitted for the record. We are pleased to have Senior Bureau Official for the Bureau of Human Resources at the U.S. State Department, Assistant Secretary Desombre, before us today. Your full statements will be made part of the record and I'll ask you to keep your spoken remarks to five minutes to allow our members to ask questions. So let me now recognize you, Assistant Secretary Desombre, for your opening statement.
Michael DeSombre
Chairman Kim, Ranking Member Bera, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today on implementing an America First approach in the East Asia and Pacific region. The region is of vital strategic importance to the United States, and our commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific is unwavering. As Secretary Rubio has emphasized, the United States must carefully balance our global defense priorities, ensuring that we maintain robust alliances and a credible deterrent in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific. While we cannot deploy identical resources to every region, we are steadfast in our support for our Indo-Pacific allies and partners as part of our enduring commitment to the region that is the world's largest and most dynamic, economically and in many other respects.
Our approach is rooted in strengthening alliances and deepening relations with the Quad and trilateral cooperation with Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the Philippines, and through our key partnerships such as AUKUS. We continue to advance economic collaboration, promote regional prosperity, and reinforce security partnerships with countries across the region, including growing cooperation with Fiji, Vietnam, and Papua New Guinea. Our longstanding policy on Taiwan has not changed, which is guided by the Taiwan Relations Act, the three joint communiqués, and the six assurances. We remain committed to preserving peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and oppose any unilateral change to the status quo. The Department of State, in coordination with our interagency partners, is investing maritime law enforcement and regional security initiatives.
These efforts are designed to uphold international law, safeguard freedom of navigation, and support the sovereignty of Indo-Pacific nations. We're also leveraging our new approach to foreign assistance to help partners build resilient economies, address urgent humanitarian needs, and enhance our shared interests in a range of areas. Our targeted assistance supports infrastructural, commercial cooperation, health, and education, while also fostering good governance and transparency and ensuring that every dollar spent advances American interests. A key priority is securing critical mineral supply chains. We are working with allies and partners to diversify sources of critical minerals essential to advancing manufacturing, reducing dependence on China, and ensuring the security of our industrial base.
Maintaining U.S. market leadership on AI and the digital economy in the fast-growing markets outside of China is another focus. Our Pac-Silicon initiative is building the coalition necessary to fortify our supply chains, while our embassies are working with commerce colleagues to promote AI and related exports. Through APEC and ASEAN, we are mainstreaming American regulatory approaches to minimize red tape and promote innovation. Additionally, we are encouraging countries and partners to increase investment into the United States, supporting American innovation and job creation, and our new reciprocal trade agreements are promoting fair and open markets in the region, which enable U.S. businesses to compete and thrive, while advancing high standards for labor, the environment, and digital trade.
We are working closely with our developed country treaty allies, Australia, Japan, and Korea, to meet the security challenges of the future and increase resourcing and defense cooperation to share the burden of maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific. We are also working closely with our Southeast Asia treaty allies, the Philippines and Thailand, to ensure interoperability and preparedness. We share a clear-eyed assessment with our allies that a region dominated by a hegemon would undermine the foundations of stability and prosperity for all. Together with US interagency partners, EAP supports US engagement to combat transnational crime across the Indo-Pacific, targeting the fentanyl supply chain, pressing China and other countries to take concrete law enforcement actions, and working to dismantle transnational criminal organizations running online scam operations that defrauded Americans of more than 12.5 billion in 2025. We are closely working in parallel with DOJ, which has restrained more than 15 billion in cryptocurrency from scam centers since October 2025, and advancing targeted sanctions and diplomatic pressure to hold governments accountable for enforcement.
I would like to highlight two recent developments that underscore our ongoing engagement in the region. First, the President's recent trip to China provided an important opportunity for leader-to-leader engagement, reaffirming our commitment to open lines of communication and establishing a relationship based upon fairness and reciprocity. The President's meeting with Xi Jinping addressed critical economic and regional security issues, ranging from ongoing concerns with bilateral trade to Iran and the Straits of Hormuz. Second, the United States is advancing significant new cooperation within the Quad partnership, comprised of the United States, Japan, Australia, India. We are implementing the vision Secretary Rubio and his Quad counterparts laid out last month in New Delhi through a concrete plan that is expanding our work together on critical minerals, maritime security, infrastructure development, energy security, and emerging technologies.
The Quad's renewed commitments will help ensure a free and open Indo-Pacific and demonstrate the power of like-minded democracies working together to address shared challenges. Through these efforts, the State Department is making America safer, stronger, and more prosperous. By advancing our interests abroad, we are protecting our citizens at home, strengthening our economy, and upholding the values that define us as a nation. Above all, our Indo-Pacific strategy is guided by the aspirations of the region's people and our shared commitment to peace, stability, and prosperity. We remain engaged, present, and responsive to the needs of our allies and partners, and we look forward to working with Congress to advance these objectives.
Thank you.
Young Kim
Thank you. Let me now recognize myself for five minutes of questioning, and I want to start with South China Sea. You know, recently Japan and the Philippines formally started the maritime boundary negotiation for their overlapping exclusive economic zones, but in direct response to that, Chinese Coast Guard has significantly ramped up patrols east of Taiwan. That is all while Beijing continues its campaign to turn the South China Sea into a Chinese Communist lake by turning small island features into Chinese military bases and expanding its legal claim to waters belonging to other nations through artificial island construction. So, can you talk about what the Trump administration's message is, and for what message is Trump administration giving to China when it considers reclamation activity in the South China Sea?
Robert de Sombre
Chairman, thank you very much for that question. Obviously, the activities of China in the South China Sea, whether they're in reaction to the Japan-Taiwan negotiation or otherwise, obviously are of utmost concern to us and something we pay attention to quite closely.
As you mentioned in the Scarborough Shoal, we've been working quite closely with the Philippines recently in relation to Chinese activity there that has caused some issues. And so it's an area where we are very focused on and really focusing with our allies and partners in line with the National Security Strategy to ensure that we have deterrence along the first island chain and really ensuring that we have the capacity to ensure that we maintain peace and stability in the Pacific.
Young Kim
Could you be a little specific about what State Department is doing for that deterrence factor, especially in the open sea lanes, resilient supply chains, and freedom of navigation in South China Sea area?
Robert de Sombre
Sure. I mean, freedom of navigation, we engage in our freedom of navigation operations quite frequently in and around Taiwan along with our allies and partners. We also have assets around, actually recently have relocated some Coast Guard ships to the Philippines, for example, from CENTCOM, and there's been additional Coast Guard ships added to Guam as well. And obviously INDOPACOM is uniquely focused on ensuring that we have sufficient resources in the Pacific to address those challenges.
Young Kim
Thank you. You know, as you know, Philippines is our vital mutual defense treaty ally and ASEAN chair this year, but it's subject to constant gray zone coercion from the Chinese Coast Guard. So how can the US and Southeast Asian partners work more closely to ensure South China Sea remains free and open?
Robert de Sombre
That's a very good question, Chairwoman, and is an area that we spend a lot of time focusing on. I was just in Manila a week and a half or so ago meeting on the sidelines of an ASEAN meeting, meeting with the Philippine national security individuals as well. And one of the prime ways that we're seeing a lot of great cooperation is between Japan and the Philippines and Japan, Australia, and the Philippines and other multilateral groupings that we're working together with to help support the Philippines in these efforts. You're absolutely right, they are the recipients of significant pressure from China. It is an area that they're focused on and we're focused on supporting them and we're focused on working with our other allies and partners to support them as well.
Young Kim
You know, South China or Southeast Asia holds significant potential for diversifying our critical mineral supply chains away from CCP dominance. So we're looking at Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. They're already members of the US-led critical minerals ministerial. But another Southeast Asian country, Vietnam, which we talked about, it possesses the sixth largest rare earth reserves globally, but is not currently a member of the critical mineral ministerial. So can you talk about the engagement with Vietnam in the critical mineral space and are there any challenges to expanding our cooperation with them?
Robert de Sombre
No, that's a very good question. Thank you. Vietnam is an area that we are focused on in the critical minerals. I was in Vietnam a few months ago and spoke to them specifically about this. And you know, they have great mineral resources, but they're currently unmapped.
They don't know where lots of them are. And that's an area where we are hoping to cooperate with them using US foreign assistance and other of the tools at our disposal to try to help them understand where their critical minerals are and ensure that they can be part of a supply chain that doesn't run through China.
Young Kim
Just staying on Vietnam quickly, I represent a large Vietnamese-American community in Southern California, but they care deeply about human rights while they also care about opening up our trade and economic relations with them. So how is State Department balancing that human rights with our security and economic goals with Vietnam and how does EAP have to ensure the Vietnamese government address that human rights violation? Is there something a leverage factor here?
Robert de Sombre
These are all areas of our focus: the economic, the security, the human rights.
Obviously, we detail very clearly in the human rights reports, you know, issues that we have, and I can assure you that we privately raise with Vietnam those issues related to human rights and other aspects of corporate governance, at the same time that we are working to really help develop the economic resilience and economic growth of Vietnam. I think we've found historically that economic growth is one of the best providers of freedom in the long term, and so really helping Vietnam see the benefits of the private sector, see the benefits that engagement with the world can bring, will also help bring about a much better Vietnam.
Young Kim
Great. Well, thank you, my time's up. I now recognize Ranking Member Bera for five minutes.
Ami Bera
Thank you, Chairwoman Kim. Um, recently I was in Korea with Congressman Zinke, talking about a host of things, but also appreciate the National Assembly the week prior to our visit had passed their commitment to the $350 billion investment in the United States, including $100 billion in shipbuilding. One area that did come up, following the embarrassing raid that took place in Georgia that I don't think the president was aware of, I think the Koreans handled it fairly well. I know Chairwoman Kim has her Partner with Korea Act, and I'd love for us to address the visa issue legislatively, but in the interim, one topic that did come up at the National Assembly as well as with President Yoon is as they're making these investments, I think we understand that they would like to bring some of their engineers to help build some of these factories. If we're shipbuilding, some of, we do have to train up a workforce to build the ships here in the United States.
And again, Congressman Zinke and I have talked about, through executive actions perhaps, as those investments are coming in, to have an allocation of visas that would also allow those workers to come in. That's not a question, but I would just put that out there, and I think that's a place where Congress, while we're working on Chairwoman Kim's legislation, getting that across the finish line, perhaps in the interim we could work on a way to speed up those investments coming in, but also to allow some of those workers to come in as well. Assistant Secretary, you talked a little bit about the online scam operations. A few years ago, I led a CODEL to Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos to look along the Mekong River, and was not aware of how prevalent some of these exclusive economic zones, which really are these Chinese gang-operated areas along the Mekong, where they are doing a lot of these online scams, and in some ways indenturing some of the civilians in these companies. I recently met with the Cambodian ambassador to talk about whether they were addressing this.
You see drugs moving through these areas as well. I'd be curious if you could give us an update on your perspective. They gave me reassurances that they were trying to address and crack down on this. I'm not quite sure if it's moving fast enough.
Robert de Sombre
No, thank you, Congressman, it's a very important area. Stopping the online scams, as I mentioned in my testimony, we estimate that they defrauded Americans out of 12.5 billion in 2025, which is actually a 25% increase from 2024, so the problem is not getting better, it's still getting worse. We are very focused on that in implementing, the president has an executive order implementing a whole-of-government effort to crack down on these online scams, really focusing on enforcement and intelligence to make sure that we can go after the transnational criminal organizational leaders, arrest them, take their money, put them in jail, and stop them from defrauding Americans. And we are seeing, interestingly, some positive developments out of Cambodia and others in terms of cracking down on the scams. Prime Minister Hun Manet has definitely made it a priority for his government, and we have seen positive movements in that regard.
Interestingly, what that has resulted in is a lot of the scams moving to other countries in Southeast Asia. And so we now see scam centers cropping up in Malaysia, Indonesia, even Timor-Leste and other places, which is not good, but has actually the beneficial aspect that it's gotten us much greater cooperation amongst all these other countries that now are seeing the detrimental impacts of having those in their countries. And so I have recently organized a contact group amongst some of our allies and partners, including many of the Southeast Asian nations, to really coordinate and see if we can get coordination on enforcement and intelligence. And really, as I said, the goal is not to just shut down the scam centers, which had been sort of Cambodia's goal. The goal is to make sure we arrest the bad guys and make sure they don't ever do it again.
Ami Bera
Right, let me ask another question. We have the ongoing civil war in Burma that now has gone on for multiple years. If you could give us a quick update on your perspective of where that's at. We have allowed the ASEAN nations to try to take a primary responsibility in bringing an end to this civil war, but obviously it's continued.
Robert de Sombre
Yeah, I think we've seen in the last five years that the civil war has continued and our policies have not unfortunately stopped the killing and stopped the human rights violations. So I mean, we continue to evaluate based upon changes on the ground of exactly the best way forward, but we will pursue engagements with all groups in Burma that directly benefit US interests, including in combating transnational crime, scam centers, expanding commercial access, and advancing a free and open Indo-Pacific.
Thank you. Let me now recognize the gentlelady from American Samoa, Ms. Radewagen, for your five minutes of questioning.
Aumua Amata Radewagen
Thank you, Chairwoman. Talofa lava and good morning, Secretary deSambre. Thank you for being here today and it's great to see you again. As you know, the Pacific Island nations are important strategic partners of the United States as they sit between the United States and the Indo-Pacific, but China continues to expand its footprint in the region, including new debt burdens from infrastructure investment in Fiji, Tonga, the Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu. Can you please update us about State Department efforts to resist growing PRC influence in the Pacific Islands region, and what steps can Pacific Islands with intense debt exposure to China take to reduce their strategic dependence?
Robert de Sombre
Great, thank you very much for that question. This is an area that is receiving tremendous focus from the State Department. I can assure you of that. Both for myself and the Deputy Secretary have spent a lot of time in and around the islands, including Deputy Secretary's coordination and hosting with INDOPACOM Commander Admiral Paparo a Honolulu Pacific Investment Summit in earlier this year. And that really goes to the two ways that we're really focusing on dealing with the challenges that you present.
The first one is trying to build up economic resilience. And so really working with the Pacific Islands to figure out ways that we can get more American or other Western allied investments into these countries to help build up the economic resilience. And we're definitely seeing great strides in that regard. As part of that, we're also really deploying large amounts of foreign assistance to help with various infrastructure and communication, subsea cables being a great example, working together with Australia and Japan and others to really help ensure that all of the Pacific Islands are connected by safe subsea cables to provide them the connectivity to the internet in a way that also doesn't rely upon our adversaries' involvement in those cables. So that's a very big area.
But then secondly, we're obviously emphasizing to them by presence.
I've traveled out to the region, Deputy Secretary's traveled out to the region, making sure they know that the Pacific is of vast importance to us. We are, after all, a Pacific nation, and we want to ensure that we are part of the Pacific and that they know that we're part of the Pacific. And we've been seeing some positive results. We saw the most recent election of Prime Minister Wale in the Solomon Islands, for example, which has indicated that he's reevaluating the relationship that they've developed with China before and looking to work with traditional security partners, as he describes. So we're definitely seeing some fruits of our labor, and it's an area where we will be continuing to focus.
The Pacific Island Forum is coming up in another couple months, and we will be well attended at that and will ensure that we're deeply involved in the Pacific Islands.
Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I yield back the balance of my time.
Aumua Amata Radewagen
Thank you. Let me now recognize the gentleman from Maryland, Mr. Orcheski, for your five minutes of questioning.
Johnny Olszewski
Thank you, Chair Kim, Ranking Member Bera, and thank you, Assistant Secretary Desombre, for being here today. I appreciate your service and your time. I wanted to just get absolute clarification on part of your testimony this morning, where you said that policy toward Taiwan has not changed, including the six assurances. I want to just affirm that that is absolutely your, the department's, and the administration's position.
Yes.
Speaker 10
Okay. So maybe you can help me clarify. I know that the President recently on Air Force One, when he was at the recent summit in China, he told reporters that he had discussed US arms sales to Taiwan with President Xi in quote, great detail. He went on to a Fox interview later to say that he was holding a major package of arms sales to Taiwan in abeyance and suggested that whether he notified Congress on his approval quote, depended on China. I'm just trying to square those comments, which are a pretty alarming and blatant violation of those six assurances, with your testimony this morning.
So if you could help clarify, I certainly would appreciate that.
Robert de Sombre
Sure, thank you. I think we can assure you that whenever we meet with China, they raise the questions of Taiwan and Taiwan arms sales. So it is a part of almost every discussion that we have with them. So it's something that is always discussed with them, but that is not in any way a deviation from the six assurances.
Speaker 11
I'm sorry, I'm just having a hard time. So we're not consulting with China, despite what the President said. China's constantly talking to us about their desire for us not to sell arms sales to Taiwan.
Speaker 13
Okay. So whether or not he consults, whether or not he notifies Congress does not depend on China.
Speaker 10
Correct. Okay. The President, I would welcome if the President wants to clarify that as well, I'd appreciate it. Speaking on one more issue on China, if I may, and I appreciate that clarification. On July 1st, China passed a new ethnic unity and progress law.
It's set to take effect. In short, this law codifies and expands the Chinese Communist Party's campaign of forced assimilation between Tibetans, Uyghurs, and other ethnic and religious minorities in China. I just wanted to sort of get your take on it and say that I really want to urge the State Department to engage with China. This is a very concerning law. We know that human rights has been a central component of high-level US-China dialogue across administrations and just want to make sure that we're not taking this critical issue off the agenda and handing Beijing a major win.
Robert de Sombre
I can assure you we are not taking that critical issue off the agenda. We're tracking that issue and many of the recent challenging decrees coming out of China quite seriously.
Speaker 10
Okay. I appreciate that. And I guess I'll just end on the Uyghurs. We know that in his meetings with President Xi last month, did the President raise Beijing's human rights abuses against the Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities in Xinjiang?
Robert de Sombre
We know that he raised various different issues with persons in China. I'm unsure, I was not in the meeting, I'm unsure exactly whether that was raised.
Speaker 14
Okay, sure. And then just as I conclude my time, going back to the arms package, do you have a timeline for when the administration plans to notice that arms package?
Robert de Sombre
As Secretary Rubio has indicated, the 14 billion is currently under review by the President, and the President will determine when that happens.
Young Kim
Okay. Madam Chair, I really appreciate the opportunity to ask these questions and I yield back the balance of my time.
Speaker 20
Thank you. Let me now recognize the gentleman from Kentucky, Representative Andy Barr, for your five minutes questioning.
Andy Barr
Assistant Secretary, thank you for being here and thank you to the administration for the unambiguous commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific. And I want to follow up from my colleague from Maryland's questions about the administration's commitment to Taiwan and deterrence in the Taiwan Strait. I think context is important with respect to this 14 billion dollar package proposal that is under review. Can you just for the record describe the 11 billion dollar package of arms sales that is a record commitment to Taiwan that the administration has approved?
Robert de Sombre
Thank you for mentioning that. Obviously the 11 billion is more than the entire amount that was approved under the prior administration. It represents a real sea change in what we're providing to Taiwan. I apologize, I don't have the details in front of me of what are the equipment as part of that, but I can assure you it's some very important equipment.
Andy Barr
Well, can I reclaim my time and clarify that it included HIMARS rocket systems, ATACMS missiles, howitzers, drones. So this concern that the administration has not yet approved an additional 14 billion dollars needs to be put in its proper context, that there has never been an administration that has demonstrated the commitment to Taiwan that this administration has demonstrated already with an 11 billion dollar record commitment of arms sales. Now, we still have questions about how we can help, the Congress can help the administration in addressing the backlog. So let me actually address that question to you. What can we do in Congress to help deal with the more than 32 billion dollars, including this 11 billion dollar commitment, the 32 billion dollars in arms that are awaiting delivery to Taiwan?
Obviously we have defense industrial base challenges, we have needs to backfill from Epic Fury. What can Congress do to help expedite the deliveries of these arms sales?
Robert de Sombre
No, that's a very good question and I appreciate that you had the details on the 11 billion, which clearly do demonstrate what we're providing to Taiwan. I think as part of, I think you raised a good point on the defense industrial base, and that's an area where we're really working to try to bring more investment into the US. So trying to do whatever we can to facilitate those investments, along with obviously facilitating any appropriations for defense that are requested by the administration as well, I think are probably the two most important areas.
Speaker 23
Let me ask you this. My colleague Rob Wittman, a fellow colleague on the China Select Committee, has introduced the Porcupine Act that would categorize Taiwan as a NATO Plus ally with the goal of expediting arms sales. Would this legislation be embraced by the administration in helping clearing the backlog in military sales?
Robert de Sombre
We obviously are very supportive of Taiwan and our obligations under the Taiwan Relations Act. Whether that specific bill, what it would do, I haven't had a chance to review it, so I can't specifically comment upon it, but we appreciate the support obviously.
Andy Barr
Let me ask a fairly blunt question. Can you assess the impact that Operation Midnight Hammer and Epic Fury has had in terms of deterrence in the Taiwan Strait?
Robert de Sombre
Yes, I think that our adversaries have looked at the capability of our US military and seen things that they did not expect and seen things that they don't have. And I think that has made them think quite seriously.
Andy Barr
Well, I appreciate the bipartisan interest in deterrence in the Taiwan Strait, but there is nothing that I think has reinforced that deterrence than the President's demonstrated the will to use kinetic force in advancing American interests. And that certainly was not present in the previous administration. Secretary Desombre, let me ask you about the Philippines really quickly. Clearly, investing in development of Subic Bay as a shipyard has been important, and getting the US Navy back into Subic would be an additional demonstration of deterrence. What next steps does the State Department see for not only new development in Subic Bay, but also to support the players that are already there?
Robert de Sombre
No, thank you, Congressman, very good question. As I mentioned earlier, we are already seeing some Coast Guard ships in Subic Bay at the moment that have relocated from CENTCOM to Subic Bay, which is a great addition to our capacity there. Obviously, we are working significantly from a foreign assistance standpoint to make sure that the infrastructure within Subic Bay and the whole Luzon Economic Corridor will support both economic activity and other defense-related activity there as well. So we are using the various tools at our capacity to make that happen, and I know that INDOPACOM is very focused on ensuring that we have the right resources in and around the Philippines.
Speaker 31
Well, thank you, my time has expired. Congress stands ready to help the administration with those arms sales to Taiwan. Thank you for your leadership. Yield back.
Speaker 30
Thank you. I now recognize the gentleman from Rhode Island, Mr. Amo, for your five minutes questioning.
Gabe Amo
Unfortunately, this administration's America First policy has meant America facing important issues alone. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you, Assistant Secretary, for being here to discuss your America First approach to East Asia and the Pacific region. To me, if you want to put the security and the economic future of the American people and our interests first, that means working with our allies, being a reliable partner, and showing consistency in our foreign assistance programs. Our foreign assistance programs put America first by supporting American jobs, businesses, our goals, and security. And a great example of how we can invest in the security of the Pacific, coordinate with our allies, and support our domestic industries is no better example, I think, right now than the continued implementation of the Australia-United Kingdom-United States security pact known as AUKUS.
AUKUS works to promote free trade and security in the Indo-Pacific by coordinating with our partners in Australia while also supporting good-paying jobs and manufacturing here in the United States and in my home state of Rhode Island. So, Assistant Secretary Desombre, I have limited time, so if you could answer yes or no, do you agree that a program like AUKUS is a good example of putting Americans and America first in East Asia and the Pacific?
Robert de Sombre
AUKUS is a great example, and the President has indicated that we're full steam ahead on AUKUS.
Gabe Amo
Great, and I agree, and I'm glad that we agree, but I'm concerned that on other issues, your America First is false advertising and doesn't actually put America first, support the role of our allies in our shared futures, and doesn't strengthen the relationships between East Asian and Pacific nations and the United States. Thanks to President Trump's executive orders, the United States is leaving international organizations focused on Pacific nations like the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, creating a vacuum that China will fill.
The administration also closed Radio Free Asia for months, leaving no news organization to counter China's propaganda. The administration withdrew from the World Health Organization and cancelled global health programs, leaving our citizens at greater risk of tropical diseases. The administration cancelled food aid programs, leading to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of children and greater regional instability. The administration delayed assistance to Taiwan. In fact, in your testimony that lays out how you are implementing your approach to East Asia and the Pacific, you know, mentioned Taiwan once.
The administration tried to close the National Endowment for Democracy, whose programs cracked down on scam centers, scam centers in Southeast Asia that are stealing billions from Americans every day, the same people purported to be taken care of under an America First policy. Unfortunately, China is filling the gap caused by your foreign aid cuts, the closure of USAID, and the abandonment of our allies. They're using our absence as proof to the region that we're not a trustworthy or reliable partner. So I just don't think that's putting America first. Those decisions make America weaker and less secure.
So, Assistant Secretary, what are you doing to mitigate the impact of the loss of our soft power and the weakening of our regional relationships in East Asia and the Pacific?
Robert de Sombre
Thank you, Congressman, for that question. And I guess I would strongly dispute that we have lost our soft power or had weakening of our relations with our allies. Focusing first on the allies, the relationship with Japan, for example, is the strongest it's ever been. And we are in a new golden age of our relationship with Japan. We have a Prime Minister and our President that have a very great relationship, and our work with them on defense, on economics, on security, on supply chains, on everything is at a level like it's never been before.
So the relationship with Japan is...
Michael DeSombre
Korea. Korea is also an amazing country. We've got great, you know, cooperation with them, not only bilaterally with Korea, but trilaterally with the Japan, Korea, and the US. And we're working very closely together, cooperating on maritime security and others, and each of those countries has agreed to invest billions of dollars into America to help reindustrialize America, to really ensure that we bring jobs back to America, we bring shipbuilding back to America, we bring all the industrialization back to...
What about the Pacific Island nations?
Michael DeSombre
Wonderful example. I think we've just spent 330 million dollars along with Australia, New Zealand, Japan, we've committed for undersea cables to connect 13 Pacific Islands together with undersea cables.
Speaker 25
But you do also know the State Department cut over half the budget to help Pacific Island nations counter China and slashed development funding to the region.
Michael DeSombre
Actually, our assistance for Asia, including the Pacific, has gone up dramatically. And in the State Department appropriations last year, we had 1.8 billion dedicated to Indo-Pacific, and I can guarantee you we are going to be spending...
Gabe Amo
Well, I'd like you to follow up with me on that because that is counter to the facts that I have.
I would disagree with the facts that you have.
Gabe Amo
Okay, well, please follow up, I'll submit that in writing. So here's the thing, my time is ending. I think you have to know that China isn't using the cuts that we have that you will ultimately share with me to send a message that the United States isn't reliable. And so we have to do better. Our nation's security and safety depends on it, and our standing in the world.
And so that's what the State Department's meant to do, and I hope that you commit to that mission. With that, I yield back.
James Moylan
Thank you, Madam Chairman. Under Secretary, thank you. I suppose you've been to Guam.
I have.
Speaker 27
Yes, exactly right. And I really appreciate your position that you're in now with all the experience that you had coming from being the ambassador and all the knowledge, and I understand you speak several languages. So thank you for that. Maybe you can teach me Chamorro one day if you don't know that one.
But Under Secretary, you know, last Congress I secured a provision in appropriations to double the presence of the US Coast Guard fast response cutters, which you mentioned in the Indo-Pacific. Now these Coast Guard plays an important role in diplomacy and building law enforcement capability capacity in the Pacific Island nations and countering transnational crime. So, as you mentioned, for example, Palau is one situation there that we have our area so large. I also like, in addition to these fast response cutters, for you to consider the C-130 capabilities, having fixed wing in Guam for our freely associated states, for INDOPACOM area to combat a whole lot bunch of illegal stuff that the CCP is doing. So I also want to ask you, how can we better leverage ship repair, shiprider agreements and US Coast Guard presence in the Pacific Islands to advance national security interests and deter the CCP influence?
Robert de Sombre
No, and we really appreciate the support for the Coast Guards, and I do believe, I'm unsure whether it's response to the bill, but my understanding is that we are moving from two to four Coast Guards in Guam, which is great. And you're exactly right, the shiprider arrangements we have with the Pacific Islands are immensely valuable because it allows us to help them to police their EEZs for both illegal unregulated fishing, but also drug trafficking, which is becoming an increasing issue in the Pacific Islands. And so we have more of the islands now interested in signing up for shiprider agreements. We're actually looking to also have a Coast Guard based in Australia potentially as well, and to have another cutter there. As I mentioned, we've recently gotten two cutters into Subic Bay as well.
And so we're really seeing an increase in the Coast Guard cutters, and they are an amazing force projection asset that really helps us in the Pacific.
Speaker 26
I appreciate that. And as we deter our aggressors with our strong defense, we would also like to ensure that our economy continues to grow with our allies. And one way that we can do that, and I'm the sponsor of Pacific Island Flight Alternative Act, PIFA, which would waive air cabotage rules for Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands. So this legislation is critical in lowering the airfare cost for residents, and it's been a top request for years, supported by the local government and a number of members of Congress. Senator Mike Lee also expressed support for the idea just last week.
So limited air cabotage expansions like the proposal would deepen our economic ties between the US and our allied nations in the Pacific while delivering affordability to Americans in the territories. And for this, what are your feelings on the limited cabotage exemption?
Michael DeSombre
No, thank you for that question. I had my own personal experience with the logistical challenges when I was, I went to the Marshall Islands and Micronesia, and I wanted to continue on my travel to Palau. So yes, the travel logistics are challenged, and one of the issues I discussed in Micronesia with some of the business owners, a person was developing a hydroponic growth agriculture in Micronesia, but complained because of the logistics he couldn't get his stuff to market anywhere outside of Micronesia because it would all be wilted by the time it got anywhere. But the way to get to Palau from Micronesia, at least on that day, would have required I think three different countries and 30 hours of travel. So I agree completely that logistics, not just airfare but also sea travel for goods, are incredibly important to develop the economic resilience of the Pacific Islands.
Speaker 26
Speaking again on Palau's waters, do cover one of the world's most expansive EEZs and have seen the rising instances of unauthorized intrusions from unauthorized Chinese research vessels and fishing operations deploying illegal fishing aggregating devices. So what more can we do to assist Pacific Island nations like Palau with IUU enforcement?
Robert de Sombre
I think really the addition of the Coast Guard cutters and the increased ability to have more of them at sea at once engaging in the shiprider operations, that's probably one of the most important aspects. We are also looking at other technological support that we can provide for monitoring and domain awareness in the Pacific to ensure that they can have better visibility on all the ships that are around them, some of which might be engaged in nefarious activities including illegal fishing.
Michael DeSombre
Thank you so much. And final word for the importance of Guam in the Pacific, would you mind?
Robert de Sombre
Oh sure. I mean Guam is an important gateway to the Pacific and obviously our resources there and our personnel there and the island itself is incredibly important as part of our... we are a Pacific nation and Guam is part of us being a Pacific nation.
Thank you sir. Thank you Madam Chair.
Thank you. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Castro, is now recognized.
Joaquin Castro
Thank you. China's used its control over the global processing of rare earth minerals, rare earth elements, to pressure countries that criticize its actions, as you know. It's imposed rare earth and other export control restrictions on Japan since November of 2025 in response to a comment by Prime Minister of Japan that PRC military aggression against Taiwan could potentially pose a threat to Japan's survival. And so my question to you is, has the administration communicated its concern to the PRC over its coercive economic action against Japan and other allies in the region? And given recent and past PRC coercion against US allies in the region, are there any trilateral or quad plans underway to build resilience against and respond to that PRC coercion?
Robert de Sombre
Congressman, thank you very much for that question. This is an area that we are acutely focused on, I can assure you, and it is a whole-of-government effort to ensure that we remove ourselves from the dependencies that we have. The whole world woke up last October when China put restrictions on the export of critical minerals to how dependent we all are. Japan actually had experienced this once before about ten years ago and had been a little bit further down the road in sort of understanding the challenges, but now they're experiencing it quite severely. We are working through all mechanisms, bilaterally, in the Quad we definitely have focused on critical minerals as an area that was discussed in New Delhi at the Foreign Ministers' Quad meeting and we are moving out.
We are in the process, led by USTR, of negotiating a plurilateral agreement on the trade in critical minerals that will provide the mechanism to resist the predatory pricing that China has used to essentially take away the processing capabilities from the rest of the world by undercutting all the processing when they start to then essentially run them out of business. So we need to deal with those efforts. But we are actually seeing a lot of good fruit coming from the effort so far, whether it's in the Lynas facilities in Malaysia or Mountain Pass in the United States, seeing increased processing and increased production of rare earths, and we are focused on this laser focus on ensuring that we remove that dependency as quickly as possible from us and our allies.
Joaquin Castro
The second question I have for you is on ASEAN engagement. Earlier this year you traveled to several places in Southeast Asia: Singapore, Hanoi, Jakarta, Manila, and Bangkok, among others. In-person and consistent engagements with the region and interlocutors there is paramount, of course, to socializing our views and gaining traction on our own priorities. That's precisely why many of us were perplexed when the Office of Multilateral Affairs in the East Asia Pacific Bureau was shuttered by the State Department last year. The FY26 NDAA reauthorized an Office of Multilateral Affairs in the EAP Bureau.
So what's the status of reconstituting this office and how does the department plan to bring back expertise that was lost in the reorganization?
Robert de Sombre
Thank you for that question. In this regard, the reorganization did not lose any expertise. That office was folded into our office of Southeast Asian Affairs, led by one of my deputy assistant secretaries. I can assure you that we have sufficient expertise and have been deploying it. I also completely agree with the desire or need for in-person engagement.
I can tell you that I've now been to nine of the eleven ASEAN countries personally within the last eight months, and it's an area where I anticipate significant continued engagement.
Yes, within the Southeast Asia office.
Joaquin Castro
And what is that going to look like? Well, because you said you didn't lose any expertise, so what's the reconstitution going to add then?
Robert de Sombre
I'm not sure it adds much. It's just a different name for it. We have the expertise within the Southeast Asia Bureau office already.
Joaquin Castro
That's a waste of money? Did Congress waste that money or did we waste policy on this reauthorization?
Robert de Sombre
I'll defer to Congress on that, but I do believe we have sufficient expertise within our office.
Joaquin Castro
Well, I mean, I guess, you know, our job is oversight and figuring out what tools to offer and to provide to the State Department. And you're telling me that the reorganization didn't take away any expertise, didn't hurt the function, and then Congress reauthorizes to go back to something else. So, so what's the deal?
Robert de Sombre
I think in general, the capability of the personnel, and I'm coming from the private sector, you know, not having served all my life in government, I've been incredibly impressed by the capability of the people that we have. And whether or not you have an office called by a separate name or a designation doesn't really matter that much. It's fundamentally the capability of the individuals, and I can assure you that we've got the capability there.
Speaker 19
All right. My last question is, does President Trump plan to attend the ASEAN summit this fall?
Robert de Sombre
You've seen President Trump very engaged in Asia. He's obviously been to Korea, to Japan, to China most recently as well. We will definitely ensure that we have high-level engagement at the ASEAN summit.
I know, but do you know whether he's going to attend or not?
I don't have his schedule.
Thank you.
Sheri Biggs
Gentleman yields. Okay. Let me now recognize gentlelady from South Carolina, Ms. Biggs, for your questioning.
Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you, Secretary Desombre, for testifying before our committee today. As a lieutenant colonel in the Air National Guard and someone who has seen firsthand how readiness gaps affect mission outcomes, I want to raise something that I think represents one of the best examples of American industry stepping up for our national security priorities. Lockheed Martin in Greenville, South Carolina, their facility is the only active F-16 production line in the world. Hundreds of my constituents, skilled tradespeople, veterans, and engineers, they work there on the campus that spans over 275 acres and contribute over 1.3 billion, and yes, I said billion with a B, annually to our state's economy. And they are genuinely proud of what they're building, and I am too.
And what they're building is strategic deterrence. Taiwan contracted 66 F-16 Block 70 and 72 jets, and those planes are being assembled in upstate South Carolina with the Greenville team already running two shifts, 20 hours a day. That is an American industry responding to the call, and it deserves our full support. I also want to recognize the strong foundation this administration has built. Taiwan's passage of a 25 billion dollar supplemental defense budget reflects a partner that is serious about its own security.
Further, the administration's announcement of three presidential drawdown authority packages is exactly the kind of decisive action that reinforces that confidence, and I want to commend the work that has gone into making those authorities available.
My question to you is how we can continue to build on that momentum. Some deliveries have faced timeline adjustments due to global security chain constraints, which is understandable given the complexity of these systems. But my question is, what tools or authorities does the State Department need from Congress to help smooth the FMS process and support our defense industrial base in meeting these commitments?
Robert de Sombre
Well, Congressman, first of all, thank you for your service, and I thank you for the question. And obviously, the development of our defense industrial base is a prime focus of this administration, and that's through both supporting our arms sales abroad and also supporting investments into the US to help develop, whether it's in shipbuilding or other areas. And so ensuring that we can, you know, facilitate, you know, rapid foreign military sales abroad is definitely something that is benefiting our defense industrial base, and your examples in South Carolina are obviously quite, quite acute. I think similarly trying to ensure that we can rebuild our shipbuilding industry, which is another big defense area that we unfortunately have ceded to our adversaries, is critically important. So being able to facilitate those investments and ensuring that they can develop them quickly.
Well, thank you so much. I'm going to shift gears just a little bit. Our alliance with Japan is probably the most important one in the world. So the United States and Japan agreed last year to jointly develop critical mineral projects. What are the State Department's goals in aligning US and Japanese critical mineral efforts?
Robert de Sombre
That's a very easy question to answer. The goal is to remove dependencies on our adversaries in our critical mineral supply chain. And we are working very heavily with all of our allies and partners around the world to do that, bilaterally, multilaterally, plurilaterally, in every way. And really some of that involves developing in the United States, whether it's what's happening in Mountain Pass, some of it is working with our allies and partners around the world to ensure that we have secure supply chains in Australia or in Malaysia or in Japan or other places to ensure that they are not subject to being choked off by our adversaries.
Sheri Biggs
Okay, the US and Japan are set to renegotiate our mutual host nation support agreement before its March 2027 expiration. Have those discussions begun?
Those negotiations have yet to begin, but we anticipate them beginning shortly.
Michael DeSombre
So what kind of changes, if any, does the US want to see through?
I haven't had a chance yet to get up to speed on what we're planning on negotiating, so I'll have to get back to you, Congresswoman.
Speaker 22
Okay, great. I look forward to having further discussions with you and talking about the great manufacturing that's going on in South Carolina. And my time is up, so I will yield back. Thank you.
Young Kim
I apologize. I thought your time was up, but you have a few more seconds if you wanted. Sorry. Great. We want to do a quick second round of questioning, and I know if Ms. Biggs wants to stay and ask for the questions, you are more than welcome.
I just wanted to revisit the conversation that we've had, my colleagues asking you a question about Taiwan's arms sales. And we, it was just discussed that Taiwan's Legislative Yuan approved $25 billion defense package they passed just last month. I know it shows an important step in its commitment to their deterrence and our commitment to provide them with what they want through the FMS. But that budget did not include important spending on important capabilities like drones, and our American companies like Anduril and others are trying to build drones directly in Taiwan. But without the full $40 billion that we thought they should pass and only coming short of that, what is the State Department doing to encourage Taiwan to spend the funds on drones that did not make it into that defense package they passed last week?
Thank you for that question. We are indeed encouraging Taiwan to pass additional budgetary support for those weapon purchases and there are various different bills under consideration currently by the Legislative Yuan in Taiwan.
You know, the one of priorities for the current Lee Jae-myung administration is to facilitate the OPCON transfer as early as next year or into 2028. But I believe the US Forces Korea projects that transfer conditions will be met in 2029. Okay. Let me also talk about South Korea. So whether it's 27, 28 timeline, is that realistic?
If not, what are the challenges and do you see any progress that South Korea has made towards meeting that transfer conditions?
Robert de Sombre
Yeah, as you indicated, the agreement on the transfer operational control is a conditions-based agreement. So various conditions need to be met in order for us to both be comfortable that when they assume operational control, we will maintain the deterrence that we need in Korea. And so there's ongoing discussions of exactly the timing of that. We understand the desire from the administration to do it as quickly as possible and we're focused on ensuring that the necessary conditions are in place as soon as possible.
Young Kim
Thank you. And staying on South Korea, building on the very strong 73 years of US-ROK alliance, we need to make sure that we are best positioned to deter North Korean aggression that is fueled by its defense treaty with Russia. So on that note, I also want to ask you about the progress that is being made in addressing some of the concerns regarding the treatment of some of our American companies in South Korea, namely Coupang. And there is also the non-tariff barrier concerns relating to South Korea. Can you address those issues?
Robert de Sombre
Sure. In the joint fact sheet that was agreed after the discussions in Korea, there are provisions related to both of those. First of all, there's an agreement for them to not discriminate against US companies in any of their regulatory actions. And Coupang obviously has been a topic that we have talked significantly with Korea about and really helped them understand that we are not happy with the treatment that Coupang has been getting and that we expect them to treat Coupang in the same light that they would any other Korean company. So this is something that we continue to focus with them.
Similarly, the removal of the non-tariff barriers, particularly in automotive and agriculture, are areas that were covered in the joint fact sheet. And I can tell you that I have instructed my embassies, and actually embassies all around EAP, to ensure that whenever we have trade agreements or agreements related to removing non-tariff barriers or other regulatory access issues, that our team on the ground are laser-focused on pushing to make sure that those agreements are implemented.
Young Kim
Thank you. One area, I want to come back and revisit the discussion that you had with Ranking Member Bera on Burma issues. You know, for nearly five years, Tatmadaw has terrorized Burmese civilians through violence, aggression, and fear. And you know, I see Burmese military junta as an illegitimate foreign military that terrorize its own citizens and holds sham elections. They serve as a proxy for China and Russia.
That is why I'm so deeply concerned about the safety of Burmese refugees, many of them in my district in Southern California, and they will face grave danger if they return to Burma.
So can you talk about State Department's current priorities related to Burma and how the administration is pressing junta to end the violence and release political prisoners and hopefully allow genuine democratic progress while protecting vulnerable Burmese in the United States?
Robert de Sombre
Yeah, we're very focused on trying to help resolve the ongoing conflict and helping to address the country's acute humanitarian crisis, which continues to fuel mass displacements and transnational crime that threaten the safety and security of the United States and our regional partners. And you know, we're open to engaging with all stakeholders to figure out the way to do that. I think we've seen in the last five years that our policies have not resulted in a solving of the humanitarian crisis. So we need to figure out a way forward.
Look forward to continuing to have that conversation and working with you. Let me now recognize ranking member.
Ami Bera
Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. Um, ask a couple quick questions, and you just kind of following up on the critical minerals conversation. Yeah, had the pleasure of working with Chairwoman Kim and our staffs on the Dominance Act, which you know, I raised with Secretary Rubio, aligns very closely with some of the administration's priorities in this, you know, taking the the Minerals Security Partnership, now called Forge, and creating those that partnership with our allied nations, nations that share our values, looking at Pac-Silica and so forth, training up a workforce that you know, can invest in this. And again, broadly bipartisan, we've passed it out of the House of Representatives unanimously. Portions of it are getting marked up in a bipartisan way with Senator Coons and Senator Ricketts on the Senate side.
And again, I think this would be a bright spot where Congress and the administration are in alignment. So I'd ask, um, yeah, I mentioned to Secretary Rubio, but I'd also mention to have you guys take a look at the Dominance Act, because I do think it would be one that does align with the administration. As you're thinking about, you know, US engagement in the East Asia-Pacific region through Pac-Silica and Forge, and thinking about refining capacity, processing capacity, you talked about helping Vietnam identify where their critical minerals are. Are there specific countries that you're focused on? And I think particularly in, you know, we know the processing, refining choke point that you know, we do have great mining capabilities, but we're still sending a large amount of this to China for the processing and refining.
And if there are places where we could work in Congress to open up opportunities, particularly in East Asia and the Pacific, countries like Malaysia.
Robert de Sombre
No, thank you. And the countries we've initially focused on are the ones that we have critical mineral agreements with. So we have it with Australia, with Cook Islands, with Japan, with Malaysia, with Mongolia, with the Philippines, with Thailand, and with Vietnam. We're looking at also New Zealand, because actually the South Island of New Zealand has amazing mineral resources and the current government there really is focused on actually taking advantage of its natural resources in a way that that prior governments had not. And so this is an area where we really are very focused and trying to work with as many of the countries as possible.
And the real challenge of both getting access to the mines, and Australia has huge resources in that regard, I think New Zealand does as well, perhaps not as well developed. But I mean, so far Malaysia's been the most advanced in terms of the processing, because you have the Australian-owned Lynas facility there already, which is now being expanded. But we're looking for other places where it makes sense to do that processing. Some in the United States, the Mountain Pass facility as well. But there's additional, you know, areas in Malaysia, Vietnam, and others that I think, and Thailand, that could be good for processing.
And so we're definitely exploring those opportunities as well.
Ami Bera
Great. And this past March, State Department also announced its intent to work with Congress to allocate 250 million in foreign assistance funding for PACTS-ILICA. Could you give us an update on the status of that collaboration, any additional information on what types of projects and partners it may be, the ones that you just touched on? And then, obviously, working with Congress, what we could do to support allocation of that funding.
Robert de Sombre
No, this is great, and PACTS-ILICA is obviously a big part of our, you know, securing the semiconductor and supply chain for AI and runs not just critical minerals, but goes beyond critical minerals. So it involves, it involves both of them, and there's some overlap. I mean, just today, there actually is a two-day conference for PACTS-ILICA at the State Department, which unfortunately I can't be at because I'm here with you today, but chaired by Under Secretary Hellberg, who's really running the PACTS-ILICA initiative and is bringing together a large number of countries, including new ones signing on as observers that are trying to expand the group of countries that we're working with. So it's moving quite well, and there's combinations of different supply chain initiatives, different potentials for economic zones that will allow us to have greater, you know, focus on investment in those locations and really allow us to, again, do anything to remove the dependencies we have upon the supply chains running through China.
Ami Bera
Great. And I'll just make one last plug. I think I would urge the administration to take a look at the DOMINANCE Act. Again, not partisan, bipartisan, good for our national security, good for our supply chains. I think lines up very well with the goals of the administration.
And, you know, again, I think it would be a bright spot that would be a good bill to send to the President's desk. And with that, I'll yield back.
Young Kim
Thank you. To that end, I know I have to concur that this administration has made great strides with great initiatives like PACTS-ILICA, Project VOLT. What we're trying to do through our DOMINANCE Act is to codify it so that we can ensure our allies and partners that there is a durability going forward. Included in the DOMINANCE Act is also the Economic Security Pact. We're focusing on mining, the, you know, educational forest so that we can increase the mining workforce area.
And so I do agree with my ranking member in our request for the administration to take a look at this and give us the support on that. But, you know, it's passed the House, it's in the Senate, and we're also trying to include that in the FY27 NDAA. So I know we are very optimistic, right, it will get signed into law. With that, I want to thank Assistant Secretary de Sombre for the valuable testimony and answering all of our questions from our members. And the members of the committee may have some additional questions who didn't participate in the second round of questioning session.
So if Assistant Secretary de Sombre will be so kind, if you do get those additional questions, that you would respond in writing, and we will share that with the members. So pursuant to committee rules, all members may have five days to submit statements, questions, extraneous materials for the record, and subject to the length limitations. So without objection, the committee stands adjourned. Thank you.
Thank you.