Building a New Regional Security Architecture: The Next Phase of the Abraham Accords

22 July 2026

House Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa U.S. House of Representatives

Follow its sittings
03:31 - 06:29
Speaker 1
The subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa will come to order.  The purpose of this hearing is to examine the future of the Abraham Accords and opportunities to strengthen and expand regional cooperation among existing and prospective partners.  I now recognize myself for an opening statement.  Good afternoon and welcome to today's hearing on the future of the Abraham Accords.  And thank you to my colleagues and our esteemed witnesses for being here today as we examine one of the most transformative diplomatic initiatives in the Middle East. 

Nearly six years ago, the Abraham Accords fundamentally changed the trajectory of the Middle East.  They demonstrated that peace and cooperation are possible when countries choose shared interests over old divisions.  The agreements between Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain, followed by Morocco and Kazakhstan, opened the door to a new era of diplomatic engagement, economic integration, technological innovation, and security cooperation.  President Trump during his first administration was instrumental in making these agreements possible.  And while they were an afterthought to President Biden, Mr. Trump and his team have again brought them to the forefront of US policy in the Middle East. 

We will continue to play a central role in advancing similar agreements and ensuring the long-term success of those already in place.  The Middle East looks very different today than it did in 2020, prior to the Abraham Accords.  The region has faced unprecedented challenges, from Iran's aggression and the threat posed by its terrorist proxies to the rapid evolution of emerging technologies, economic competition, and shifting geopolitical dynamics.  At the same time, these challenges have reinforced an important lesson.  America's partners are stronger and our interests are better protected when the region works together. 

The Abraham Accords should not be viewed as a finished product.  They are a foundation upon which we can build a stronger regional security architecture, expand economic opportunity, encourage innovation, and create new pathways for peace, which is why today's hearing is so important.  We are not simply looking back at what the Accords have accomplished.  We are looking ahead.  How we can deepen security cooperation, how we can accelerate trade and investment, how we can expand cooperation on artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, energy, infrastructure, and emerging technologies. 

What role should and look forward to your testimony as we examine how the United States can build one of the most consequential diplomatic achievements in the modern Middle East.  And with that, I now recognize our ranking member for his opening statement. 
06:31 - 08:34
Speaker 2
Thank you.  I support the Abrahamic Accords, but those Accords are pretty much just normal relations with cooperation as normal countries do with Muslim-majority countries.  Israel has such relations with 23 Muslim-majority countries, only three of which are a result of the Abrahamic Accords efforts.  The chairman points out that the Middle East looks substantially different than it did in 2020.  This is true. 

This is because of our unsuccessful and disastrous unplanned war against Iran.  Our witnesses today who have served in the Trump administration spend much of their opening statements, at least as provided in advance to us, attacking the Biden administration for not adequately enforcing sanctions against Iran. 

But because we are in a losing position in this war, the President of the United States has signed this memorandum of understanding, which states that the United States undertakes to terminate all types of sanctions against the Islamic Republic, including the UN Security Council Resolution IAEA, all unilateral US sanctions, primary and secondary, and goes on to say that the United States is obligated to immediately waive all... to issue waivers for the export of Iranian crude oil, petroleum products, derivatives, etc.  For Israel...  It's amazing how much activity you can generate here in the Rayburn building if you're the Chinese Communist Party and you pay certain people to do this. 
08:39 - 08:44
Couldn't agree more.  Yes. 
08:45 - 09:46
Speaker 2
So, the most important part of an Abrahamic Accord's success would be relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia, the guardian of the holy places, and the Saudis have made it clear that there needs to be progress toward a Palestinian state for them to move forward on that.  There was some attempt to instead get the Saudis to ignore the Palestinians in return for a nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States.  Today, or last night, it was announced that there is an agreement with the Saudis on nuclear cooperation that does nothing for the Abraham Accords, but worse yet, poses a severe threat of nuclear proliferation.  Now, I have been doing this a long time.  I remember when the most powerful monarch in the Middle East was a friend of the United States, and that was the Shah. 

09:47 - 11:43

Brad Sherman

And every weapons system the Shah had in 1978 is in the hands of the mullahs starting in 1979. We cannot allow a Saudi nuclear program to go forward without the same... ...without the same safeguards that the UAE agreed to. Now, the UAE agreed to standards that are fully consistent with generating electricity. That's why 25% of the UAE's electricity today is generated with nuclear power, but nuclear power where the UAE has agreed to no enrichment, no reprocessing, and most importantly, has agreed to the additional protocol.

Iran agreed to the additional protocol in the JCPOA. The additional protocol does nothing to prevent anything that is of economic benefit to any of the parties. It simply provides for more IAEA inspections. The fact that Saudi Arabia would not only insist upon reprocessing, insist upon enrichment, things that we would never want to see Iran do... I think the Chinese Communist Party is getting its money's worth.

But for us to enter into, to greenlight a Saudi program that not only has enrichment and reprocessing, things we severely limited Iran on in the JCPOA, but also doesn't even have an additional protocol, doesn't even have inspections at that level, is outrageous, and it is not made better because Westinghouse stands to make a lot of money and they're a nice American company. I yield back.

11:47 - 12:43

Michael Lawler

Gentleman yields back. Other members of the committee are reminded that opening statements may be submitted for the record. We are pleased to have a distinguished panel of witnesses before us today on this important topic. The Honorable David Friedman, the former US Ambassador to Israel. Mr. Asher Fredman, the Executive Director of the Misgav Institute for National Security and Visiting Fellow at the Heritage Foundation.

And the Honorable Daniel B. Shapiro, the former US Ambassador to Israel and Distinguished Fellow for the Scowcroft Middle East Initiative at the Atlantic Council. This committee recognizes the importance of the issues before us and is grateful to have you here to speak with us today. Your full statements will be made part of the record and I'll ask each of you to keep your spoken remarks to five minutes in order to allow time for member questions. I now recognize Ambassador Friedman for an opening statement.

12:43 - 17:35

David Friedman

Thank you, Chairman Lawler, Ranking Member Sherman, distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you this afternoon and to speak on an issue very near and dear to my heart, the Abraham Accords. My written statement, as you pointed out, is on file. I'd like to incorporate that within my testimony, but in the short time that is allotted to me right now, I want to focus on one critical point, which is the diplomatic predicate for the advancement of the Abraham Accords. I think the committee was wise to invite my predecessor, Ambassador Daniel Shapiro, to submit a statement.

I had a chance to look at his statement earlier today. Dan is an American patriot, he's a believer in the strategic importance of the US-Israel relationship, and I think he loves Israel. He's offered an opinion with which I fundamentally disagree. I think he just happens to be wrong, well-intentioned but wrong. And I have no interest in picking on him, but I think if I can just put the differences that we share on the record, it will put in, I think, high relief one of the critical issues with regard to advancing the Abraham Accords.

My opinion is based on facts, it's based on personal experiences, it's not based on wishful thinking. I was one of the few people who negotiated the Abraham Accords, I know what goes into expanding them. And we've got to start by understanding what the Abraham Accords are. All the parties recognize that the key to the Abraham Accords, in a nutshell, they were a victory of the moderates over the extremists within the Middle East. We were able to get there in the first Trump administration by doing two things: by degrading the extremists and by standing shoulder to shoulder with Israel.

It's a simple, basic, and highly moral formula. How did we degrade the extremists? Well, President Trump restored backbreaking sanctions on the Islamic Republic of Iran, he brought their oil exports down to essentially zero. And he cut off all funding for UNRWA, which as we all know today, but which was knowable for the last two decades, I certainly knew about it for the last ten years, UNRWA provided financial, military, and propaganda support for Hamas terror. And how did we stand with Israel?

Frankly, like never before. Among other things, moving our embassy to Jerusalem and recognizing Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights. Now, in response to that strategy, many people on the left said that we were recklessly moving the region to war. The facts are otherwise. We were moving the region to peace.

By standing closely with Israel and standing strongly against Iran and Hamas, President Trump was pursuing a policy that was embraced, not challenged, but embraced by moderate Arab countries.

He also confirmed Israel's status as a regional superpower and a critical strategic partner in the region. It caused moderate Arab nations to want to partner with Israel. Now when the Biden administration came in, the table was set to expand the Abraham Accords, but he reversed all of President Trump's policies that drove the Accords in the first place, including restoring Iran to a wealthy adversary with extraordinary lax sanctions enforcement and providing UNRWA with over one billion dollars in cash. This put the extremists back in the lead. It was the antithesis of all the Abraham Accords were designed to avoid.

In addition, when the Biden administration took up the Accords, it added a condition that was not present in any of the other successful deals: a requirement of a Palestinian state. Such a condition was a guarantee of failure then, and it continues to guarantee failure today. Israel properly will not agree to it. The experiment has already been tried and failed in Gaza, and even Palestinians don't want this result either. Frankly, the United States should have no role, no role in putting its imprimatur on a corrupt Palestinian state which will have no recognition of human rights and it undoubtedly will fail, but not before wreaking havoc in the region and bringing Israel existential risk.

Ambassador Shapiro says in his testimony that America's war against Iran is, quote, "a strategic blunder on many counts." I don't think there's a single present or potential party to the Abraham Accords that agrees with that. And I hope that when the war ends successfully, victoriously for the United States, as we all hope, pray, and believe it will, the moderates will be back in the lead and the Abraham Accords will have a bright future. Thank you and I look forward to your questions.

17:35 - 22:40

Asher Fredman

Thank you, Ambassador Friedman. I now recognize Mr. Fredman for an opening statement.

Chairman Lawler, Ranking Member Sherman, honorable members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify today. My message is simple. The Abraham Accords can serve as the foundation of a new US-aligned regional architecture of mutual security, integrated economic development, cutting-edge innovation, and interfaith tolerance. If fully realized, it will strengthen American and regional prosperity and stability, create alternatives to Chinese-dominated frameworks, and help ensure America's preeminence in the global competition over critical technology. However, realizing this potential after nearly three years of multi-front war in the Middle East will require sustained and committed American leadership.

The historic Abraham Accords signed in 2020 under the auspices of President Trump led to a flourishing of ties in many fields: AI, cyber, health, water, agriculture, defense, and many other areas. Israel's cumulative trade with the Abraham Accords and Arab peace partners has grown every year since the Accords were signed. Despite regional tensions and disruptions, trade rose in 2024 as compared to 2023, in 2025 as compared to 2024, and it's up again in 2026 as compared to 2025. It's increased since 2021, it's increased approximately by 131 percent. But while the Accords have demonstrated remarkable resilience, we must not downplay the damage caused by the regional war which ensued following Hamas's October 7th attack.

Public support for normalization declined, people-to-people initiatives suffered, multilateral forums lost momentum, and normalization slowed. Restoring the Accords' momentum is vital to US national security interests.

I will now briefly present five ways Congress can contribute to achieving this goal, which are presented in greater detail in my written testimony. First, advance concrete steps to realize the vision of the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor, or IMEC. IMEC could become one of the most consequential infrastructure projects of this generation, shortening transit times between India and Europe by approximately 40%. Supporting strategic East-West natural gas and digital infrastructure, and creating a US-aligned zone of economic growth which serves as an alternative to the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative. Yet, there has been relatively little governmental analysis of IMEC's benefits, costs, and opportunities.

Such analysis is crucial vis-à-vis our partners in the region for overcoming geopolitical, financial, and bureaucratic hurdles. Congress should request US International Trade Commission and Department of Commerce-led studies to identify IMEC's impacts and develop an actionable roadmap, including bankable projects, investment opportunities, and steps to harmonize custom procedures so that goods can move smoothly from India to Europe. The United States should also convene an IMEC Leaders' Forum and establish a standing secretariat to enhance accountability. Second, Congress should help establish an Abraham Accords Critical Technology Partnership. Technological leadership and alliances will increasingly shape the global balance of power.

Legislation could build on the proposed US-Israel AI Center Act introduced by then-Senator Marco Rubio in 2021 and expand it to include additional Abraham Accords partners in additional areas such as quantum, biotech, and space. Third, strengthen regional defense integration. The United States should establish an Abraham Accords Comprehensive Security Integration and Prosperity Agreement, modeled on the agreement signed between the United States and the Kingdom of Bahrain in September 2023. Fourth, we must strengthen the foundations of people-to-people peace. This can be achieved by adapting existing US scientific, educational, and leadership programs to include dedicated Abraham Accords tracks, cohorts, and initiatives.

These can be created through the State Department's International Visitor Leadership Program, the Middle East Partnership Initiative, the Stevens Initiative for Virtual Exchange, the Middle East Regional Cooperation Program, and other existing programs. Fifth, appoint the congressionally mandated Special Envoy for the Abraham Accords and develop country-specific strategies for normalization with a broad range of countries. While Saudi-Israel normalization is certainly important, there are more than two dozen Arab and Muslim countries that lack formal relations with Israel. The Special Envoy should develop detailed roadmaps for multiple potential Abraham Accords countries based on the national priorities, goals, and shared interests with each. Honorable members, the Abraham Accords demonstrated how bold and innovative American leadership could produce outcomes many believed were impossible.

With continued American leadership, these agreements can shape a new regional reality of peace, prosperity, and partnership. Thank you very much and I look forward to your questions.

22:40 - 22:45

Michael Lawler

Thank you, Mr. Friedman. I now recognize Ambassador Shapiro for an opening statement.

22:45 - 29:24

Daniel Shapiro

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Sherman, distinguished members of the subcommittee. Appreciate the opportunity to testify today. As we approach the sixth anniversary of the Abraham Accords, they continue to stand as a laudable diplomatic achievement of the first Trump administration, which formalized the first Arab-Israeli relations in a generation, forged on the basis of mutual security, trust, and economic benefits. They also catalyzed a series of additional steps towards regional integration during the Biden administration, so they were far from an afterthought.

Support a range of projects to bring the benefits of integration to their populations. I led that as the senior advisor for Middle East regional integration. The I2U2 partnership between India, Israel, UAE, and the United States, the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, IMEC, unveiled at the 2023 G20 summit, and Israel's incorporation into the US Central Command area of responsibility in 2021, which has facilitated dramatic steps in Israeli-Arab military cooperation, progress toward an integrated Middle East defense architecture, and important successes against common enemies. I had the honor to work on those issues as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for the Middle East in 2024. Now, Hamas's brutal October 7th terrorist attacks and the war that followed have delayed many of the follow-on integration efforts, but they did not extinguish the Abraham Accords themselves.

Those bilateral relationships established between Israel and the UAE, Bahrain, and Morocco have withstood the enormous pressures of the last three years, and that gives us a solid base to build on. And it remains very much in the United States' interest to continue to expand regional integration. Our goal should be to entrench this process as an organic force to help stabilize the region through interdependence and partnership. With my remaining time, I'll highlight a few openings in the region today that merit optimism, point out potential obstacles and impediments, and offer some recommendations for the way forward. First, the openings.

New leadership in Lebanon and Syria present once-in-a-generation opportunities for productive cooperation with Israel. The framework agreement signed between Beirut and Jerusalem in late June is a promising step for which the administration and both parties deserve credit. President Aoun reiterated at the White House yesterday that Lebanon seeks peaceful coexistence with Israel. The focus now must be on implementation with broad regional and international support of the agreement's provisions to disarm Hezbollah, fully deploy the Lebanese Armed Forces, and enable full Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon. President Trump's recent decision to remove Syria's designation as a state sponsor of terrorism is an important sign of confidence in President al-Sharaa's administration.

While carefully verifying Syria's commitments, this decision can reanimate negotiations between Israel and Syria on security agreements incentivized by the prospect of Israel's withdrawal from the buffer zone it had established in Syrian territory. And although the war with Iran, about which I will say more, further complicates regional integration, the repeated closure of the Strait of Hormuz since March reinforces the value of alternative energy routes and expanded infrastructure, a core pillar of IMEC and similar efforts, and should energize near-term focus and investments on the infrastructure of that corridor. Now, the challenges. Having seen the devastation in Gaza and the suffering of Palestinian civilians, Arab publics have turned sharply negative toward normalization with Israel. The ceasefire and hostage release deal signed last October has provided some respite to Palestinians in Gaza, but the stalled implementation of President Trump's 20-point plan, caused by Hamas's refusal to disarm but also hampered by Israeli actions and sluggishness by Arab states, leaves the issue woefully unsettled and Palestinian civilian suffering continues in full view of the same publics that regional leaders must consider.

The Israeli public is understandably fearful of another October 7th-style attack and is more supportive, therefore, of proactive posture to countering security threats. Israel's increasingly forward-leaning defense posture, and also its aggressive settlement expansion and turning a blind eye toward terrorism by Jewish extremists against Palestinian civilians in the West Bank, and other measures intended to rule out any possible future establishment of a Palestinian state, add challenges to Arab leaders who want to make steps toward normalization palatable to their publics. The greatest impediment, however, is the Iran war, which has indeed been a strategic blunder on many counts. Despite impressive tactical successes by the US military, our political leadership has failed to translate this military precision into strategic success.

Going forward, CENTCOM's ability to serve as an integrator for practical Arab-Israeli military cooperation may face significant limits as Gulf states worry about such initiatives at a time when Israeli and US decisions in their view are contributing to regional instability. Very briefly, my written testimony I lay out a number of recommendations, I'll just briefly mention them. The first and most foundational of these is to bring the war with Iran to its earliest possible end, ensuring the Strait of Hormuz remains open. Second, pursuing active diplomacy on implementation of the President's 20-point plan for Gaza, prioritizing Hamas's disarmament but advancing other elements in parallel. Insisting on actions by Israel to lower tensions in the West Bank.

Resuming normalization discussions with Saudi Arabia, mindful of the Saudi insistence at every stage, and I've negotiated with them on this, that it include a credible pathway to a Palestinian statehood. Normalization between Israel and the Kingdom would be the single most transformative diplomatic breakthrough to reshape the region. Here I must confess to being concerned by President Trump's decision to provide Saudi Arabia with a civil nuclear energy deal without using it as an incentive for normalization. Finally, I'll just mention two others: resisting the temptation to see the Abraham Accords as the exclusive brand or vehicle for regional integration. Things like IMEC and Negev Forum and others are also valuable.

And appointing and confirming, as was mentioned, a special envoy for the Abraham Accords, the product of the Lawler-Torres legislation incorporated into the FY 2024 NDAA, which would buttress US diplomatic initiatives at a time when the officials charged with that responsibility have far too much on their plate and are spread far too thin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, looking forward to your questions.

29:25 - 30:42

Michael Lawler

Thank you, Ambassador Shapiro. I just ask all the witnesses to sit a little further back from the mics or push the mic back a little bit, the audio is not necessarily as clear just if you're right in it. So, and I'll recognize myself for five minutes of questioning. Recent reporting shows some officials are proposing to remove Israel from existing plans to develop an India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, known as IMEC. This network would connect the regions through new rails, ports, and shipping lanes, linking economies and providing greater integration.

Israel has been a critical piece of the puzzle connecting Saudi Arabia and Greece. Unfortunately, reporting came out recently that anonymous Saudi officials were considering connecting these two countries through Syria instead. And just the other day it came out that Ambassador Barak out in Turkey was also supporting this. In my mind, that is unacceptable and I recently sent a letter to Secretary Rubio urging him to ensure Israel's inclusion in IMEC. Ambassador Friedman, can you speak to how IMEC and similar infrastructure projects could help further develop Israel's relationships with Arab nations in the Middle East?

30:43 - 31:43

David Friedman

Sure, thank you for the question. I think that and other projects are integral to a more peaceful and cooperative Middle East. I would be very skeptical about financing a pipeline that ran through Syria, notwithstanding the advancements that they've made in the past. But forgetting about the diplomatic aspects of it, I don't think I want a pipeline of that significance running through Syria until 20 years have gone by and we see a real stable nation there, as opposed to putting it through Israel, ideally putting it inside of Judea and Samaria and creating job opportunities for the tens of thousands of Palestinians. I think it's, these are important steps where I think Congress, as the keeper of the purse, I think has a real role to play.

And I would encourage Congress to always be looking for ways to create better economic opportunities. That is, of course, in most cases how peace is born.

31:44 - 32:43

Michael Lawler

I have said repeatedly that I think Jordan has been not only ours, but in many respects Israel's greatest ally in the Middle East. And we have certainly seen Jordan maintain diplomatic relations with Israel since 1994, but one could argue that Israel's relationship with newer Abraham Accords partners like UAE and Bahrain are significantly stronger than the relationship with Jordan. Jordan has been an instrumental partner for the US, especially in support of our military and in defense against Iranian attack. All the while, the country is facing growing poverty, an influx of refugees, and water scarcity. Ambassador Friedman, what can we in the US and the Israeli government do to bolster Israel's relationship with Jordan and show the King and the Jordanian people how much we value their partnership?

32:44 - 34:15

David Friedman

Well, Jordan is Israel's longest border is alongside of Jordan. It's been a quiet border, thank God, for quite a long time, since probably the 1970s. But it is a poor and an unstable country. The King's grandfather was assassinated by radical Palestinians. Most of Jordan is a Palestinian society.

I would say that Jordan is Palestine, but we don't need to go there right now. But the way to bolster Jordan, I think, is to... the King needs to have better economic opportunities for his people. And I think that there needs to be a resolution of that very, very hostile land in between the Green Line and Jordan that works. And I'll say something that I don't think the King would say publicly, but I think the last thing he wants is a Palestinian state between Israel and Jordan. I think that would pose an enormous risk to Jordan.

So I would say, again, it's a similar answer to your prior question. They need jobs, they need a better economy. It's not a country with oil natural resources. It's a country which, you know, is autocratic, there's no democracy there. It's got lots of issues.

We should bolster them as much as we can. That border, if that border fails, we're talking about something far worse for Israel and the world than what we saw in October 7th.

34:16 - 34:48

Michael Lawler

Appreciate it. During the Biden administration, no countries joined the Abraham Accords, and just last week, over 100 members of the Democratic Party voted to defund all State Department funding for Israel. This includes cross-cultural programs that have improved people-to-people relationships in the Middle East. Ambassador Shapiro, in your view, is there still broad support within the Democratic Party for continuing to expand the Accords, or has the party given up on improving Israel's relationships within the Middle East?

34:48 - 35:27

Daniel Shapiro

I can mostly speak for myself, Mr. Chairman, thank you for the question, but I do believe there remains a strong base of support to continue to try to strengthen the relationships not just between Israel and its Arab neighbors, but as a kind of coalition of US partners of moderate nations aligned to deal with the what's called the Axis of Resistance, Iran and its terrorist proxies. And that should remain, certainly I'll be an advocate for it to remain, a focal point of US policy. I think that fundamentally serves US interests and fundamentally serves the interests of Israelis, Palestinians, Arabs, and all our partners in the region.

35:27 - 35:39

Michael Lawler

Were you disappointed by that vote last week with over 100 of your party's members of Congress voting to strip all aid and support to Israel?

35:39 - 35:44

Speaker 3

I would not have, had I been a member of Congress, would not have voted in support of that amendment.

35:44 - 35:57

Speaker 5

Okay. Thank you. I now recognize the ranking member for five minutes of questioning.

I now recognize Mr. Keating for five minutes of questioning.

36:01 - 38:24

William Keating

Thank Mr. Sherman. I have a meeting with the EU delegation at the same time. So thank you for giving me the opportunity to ask some questions. And I just want to reflect and really talk about a couple of comments that our witnesses mentioned in their opening testimony. And I thank you all for being here.

Prior to October 7th and the horrific attack that occurred in Israel, there were talks that were going on. I was privy to a lot of those talks. The nature of them were such that we were given that information in a classified setting, so I can't get into the details. But I can speak as Ambassador Shapiro did in broad terms, and maybe you can put more detail. But the discussions at that point for regional approach at normalization was something I had only dreamt about.

The scope of it, the expansiveness of it, the way it was both economically and security-based, would have been a real breakthrough. And all the information I got at that time was that this was very real and it could be very close. So I'm concerned with the Saudi civil nuclear deal because we're losing our leverage, I think, with Saudi Arabia too. Take normalization with Israel and use that leverage to push them. And I think if they do, there'll be other Arab states that would follow forward.

If you could, you mentioned it quickly in your testimony, but if you can expand on that. That's a real concern I had because I think I still have hope that we can bring this regional approach together. In fact, with private conversations I've had with high representatives from the Gulf and Arab states in the region, they still privately hold hope that they could get back to some of that. And in fact, we're here talking about the Abraham Accords. I would call it the Abraham Accord on steroids.

So if you could address, you mentioned that and didn't have a lot of time to expand on it.

38:24 - 40:45

Daniel Shapiro

Sure. Thank you, Mr. Keating, for the question. Indeed, right up until October 7th, negotiations were deep underway for the possibility of a breakthrough agreement that would move toward Saudi normalization of Israel. Indeed, there was always going to be a Palestinian component of that. That was something the Saudis made clear at every stage, that they wanted to see something that would be defined maybe as a credible pathway to a Palestinian state.

By the way, that's language incorporated into President Trump's 2020 plan for Gaza. As well as US security commitments for Saudi Arabia, certain Saudi security commitments to the United States, and a civil nuclear agreement, which has now been just announced. So that occurred until October 7th. For understandable reasons, it was disrupted then. But actually, those negotiations continued all the way well into 2024, and I took part in them from the Department of Defense.

And that same structure of a deal was one we hoped we'd be able to advance if we had gotten to a hostage release and a ceasefire arrangement.

Of course those didn't happen and so we ran out of time to do that. So what I still hope and I think you're absolutely right, many in the region hope that that breakthrough can still happen because it will be transformative. I don't think there's any change in the Saudi determination to see that there be a Palestinian component that they would define as, I don't want to speak for them, but something in the lines of a credible pathway to a Palestinian state. That's always been their position. Now of course the structure of the deal would probably look different.

For one thing, this important point of leverage, the civil nuclear agreement seems to have been provided without tying it to normalization. I think that may have been a mistake. There may be details behind the scenes of this diplomacy we don't know, but we've lost that card or played that card, I should say. But also in light of the Iran war, a war that many of our Gulf partners urged us not to engage in and now feel somewhat dragged into a very destructive war that's harming their economies, that's harming their stability and are worried about what it means for long-term US commitments, whether the same kind of security arrangements that were originally going to be part of that package are still relevant. So I do think we do need to deepen a conversation with the Saudis about what a package for normalization with Israel looks like.

It may not be the same kind of package we were working on in the Biden administration, but it will probably still be a package and I have no doubt they will continue to insist it have that Palestinian component.

40:45 - 40:55

William Keating

Yeah, I feel nothing would have isolated Iran more than that. And with 13 seconds left I can't do that and I'm not going to abuse the courtesy that I was given to take out of turn, so I yield back.

40:55 - 41:00

Speaker 12

I'll give you a little bit. Go. You want to, I'm okay with it.

41:00 - 41:02

Is everyone else okay? I just wanted to follow up.

41:02 - 41:23

Speaker 16

Hey, I'm chair. All right. Before you do that, I need to recognize probably one of the best friends I have in this world, it's my buddy Bruce Pearl sitting right there. I didn't see Bruce sitting right there. I was at his wedding.

He has been with me when I've had some tough times and some good times and he's always been my buddy. I just want to recognize him.

41:23 - 41:25

Do you happen to know where Mr. Pearl went to high school?

41:25 - 41:30

Speaker 10

I don't really care, probably up north where you all speak with a funny accent. I don't know where.

41:31 - 41:34

William Keating

He graduated from the same high school I did, Sharon High School. Eagles.

41:34 - 41:37

Speaker 9

All right, let me tell you a quick Bruce Pearl story.

41:37 - 41:39

Does this include our time?

41:39 - 42:04

Speaker 17

No, I'll give you some more time. But when he was coach at UT, I always remembered this. I was sitting down close with some friends, Ray and Lucy, and they were kind enough to let us sit down there. And one of the kids, the ball boys, got hurt. A kid ran out, one of the ball players.

And I remember coach was still coaching. The kid was down here and he hollered at his trainer. He said, get over there and take care of that kid. And you know, he didn't miss a beat. Then took care of the kid and I thought, nobody's looking, that's the real deal.

So anyway, sorry coach. Didn't mean to embarrass you brother. You're recognized sir.

42:04 - 42:12

Speaker 13

I've got an entire EU delegation sitting in my office, so I am going to yield back. Thank you. And thanks for recognizing my high school soulmate. Thanks.

42:12 - 42:19

Speaker 11

All right brother. I'll recognize myself. Ambassador Friedman, thank you brother. And I was, I believe I visited you one time in Israel one time.

42:19 - 42:19

Yes you did.

42:19 - 42:28

Speaker 15

And I actually, I took an orange dreidel off your counter. I thought that.

42:28 - 42:30

You're the one.

42:30 - 42:41

Speaker 14

I am the one. Well I'm from Tennessee, so I thought it was a gift, but I guess it wasn't. But anyway, what do you think it'd take for Saudi Arabia to join the Abraham Accords?

42:41 - 44:32

David Friedman

Well, I would make this general observation and then focus it on Saudi. What is made, what is said publicly in the Arab world and what is discussed privately are not necessarily the same thing. And a lot of positions are taken by the Saudis, other countries as well, that in private discussions are not necessarily the case. None of these countries are democracies. None of them have the kind of transparency that you would have in Israel or you would have in the United States.

Every one of the Abraham Accords, if you think about it, is a triangle with the United States at the apex of the triangle, Israel and an Arab country at the base. And every one of them is seeking the same goal, but usually for different reasons and different terms. So it depends. It depends what they want, what they need, what their perceptions are. On this point that was raised about a nuclear deal with Saudi Arabia without the Abraham Accords being rolled in.

And every one of them is seeking the same goal, but usually for different reasons and different terms. So it depends. It depends what they want, what they need, what their perceptions are. On this point that was raised about a nuclear deal with Saudi Arabia without the Abraham Accords being rolled in, without, I'm sure someone would mention the fact that there aren't the kind of typical guardrails that exist in other... I don't know that that's...

I just heard about it today. I don't know if that's the way this will end, what this will be. There's a lot of stagecraft. There's a lot of negotiations about how this will be surfaced to the public. And so I would say it's a function of very close-knit discussions.

Look, the Abraham Accords were, we talked about it for a year and a half. Nobody knew about it. We announced it on August 15th. It was a shock to the whole world. That's the way...

44:33 - 44:50

Speaker 17

It really was. I was, when they did the signing at the White House, I always remember that and the historical significance of it. All I could think was they had this incredibly good lemonade and they had these napkins with the presidential seal. And some buddies of mine, the Jewish faith back in Knoxville, I took them all a napkin because that's all I could think of.

44:50 - 45:52

David Friedman

But I would say this to finish. I would say on the issue of Saudi Arabia, their primary concern is their own national security. They're in a very tough neighborhood. They're getting, they're taking incoming right now from their kind of natural sworn enemy, both geopolitically and religiously their enemy. And that's what they're going to be concerned about.

That's what they want. And there are ways to solve that problem. They tend not to be discussed publicly. But I do believe it's doable. And I would say, look, I've said this before, but this idea, I think Israel would love to normalize with Saudi Arabia.

They're not going to commit suicide to do so. And I think they truly believe at this point that creating a Palestinian state, I think that most of them felt this way before October 7th, but post-October 7th, this is a country that believes they have no margin of error. And they're not going to do experiments or diplomatic experiments just to get the Saudis on board. And I think people need to realize that.

45:52 - 45:53

What do you think we've learned from the first five years of this thing?

45:53 - 47:10

David Friedman

I think what we've learned is that none of the countries, you know, read Theodor Herzl's Zionist idea and suddenly decided to become Zionists. That's not what this is about. These are really hard-bargained practical national security relations. None of these countries are poor. You know, they're not doing it for the money.

Israel, by the way, is the farthest thing from poor. No one is poor. No one needs the money. They need to be safe and they're in a very tough neighborhood. If you can solve people's national security issues, you can expand the Abraham Accords.

If you can't, they're not going anywhere. And one last thing. America needs to decide where it stands on these issues. We have a country right now where Israel has become such a political football and you've got, you know, on the extreme right and the extreme left. I mean, this is not, I'm not, you know, limiting this criticism to my friends on the left.

It's everywhere. And these countries are watching this every single day. And they're writing about it every single day. Until we know who we are, where we stand as a country with regard to Israel, none of these countries, no one's going to take a gamble. No one's going to say, well, you know what, we'll make a deal with Trump for two years and then, you know, we don't know what's going to be, we'll have to relitigate everything all over again.

We have to take this issue and make it a bipartisan, predictable issue and that I think will bring a lot of good, a lot of good outcomes.

47:10 - 47:26

Speaker 19

Real quick, Mr. Fredman, the war, the conflict with Iran has affected the relationship between the countries in the Abraham Accords. Would you say that's a fair statement?

47:20 - 47:50

Asher Fredman

It's a fair statement. We're seeing the Israel deploy sensitive systems like the Iron Dome, like others that it developed with the United States, to defend the UAE. So a US-Israel system defending an Arab country. I think that's pretty remarkable. We saw CENTCOM announce in January the establishment of a Middle East air defense cell in their headquarters in the region, and we saw just a month later how important that cooperation was.

So it's had, I think, largely positive effects in terms of the ability to cooperate.

47:50 - 47:57

Speaker 18

All right. Thank you. I've used up my allotted time. I will yield to my buddy Mr. Sherman.

47:57 - 51:25

Brad Sherman

Thank you. After I ask questions, I'm going to need to go to the Asia Subcommittee, which I'm also a member of, and my colleague from Illinois will take over as ranking member for a while. Mr. Friedman, you allude to legislation carried by Senator Rubio. My favorite piece of legislation of Senator Rubio, and I wish he was related to Secretary Rubio, was the No Nuclear Weapons for Saudi Arabia Act, which he and I introduced in 2018, which required the gold standards of control to have, including of course the additional protocol, in order for us to have a nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia. So I'm hoping that Senator Rubio will come back to us and support that effort.

Mr. Friedman, you point out that the Abrahamic Accords represent a victory of the moderates over the extremists. But those victories were completed in 2020. We haven't seen any further. And I think the reason for that is we've seen the moderates lose to the extremists in Israel, which now has a government with Ben-Gvir and Smotrich, the apostles of settler violence. I think it's highly unlikely that we're going to see any progress with Israel's Arabs neighbors so long as we see the continuation of settler violence and until we see progress toward a two-state solution.

And I would point out that statehood does not require that you have weapons. Costa Rica does not have an army. It is a state. I think that the country, Mr. Friedman, you say that the countries that might enter in the Abrahamic Accords don't regard the war as a disaster. Right now, no country is interested in joining the Abrahamic Accords because of the extremists in the Israeli government.

But we've heard from the Gulf Cooperation Council again and again that they regard this war as a disaster. What they're saying even more privately, I don't know. So Ambassador Shapiro, we've heard that talk of a Palestinian state in the halls of Congress is widely out of touch with realities on the ground. But is an Israel that renounces a Palestinian state as even a possibility wildly out of touch with political realities in the Arab world? If Crown Prince bin Salman were to normalize relations and enter into the positive relationship that the Abraham Accords call for without any movement toward a two-state solution, without even any punishment of those guilty of settler violence, would that pose a threat to him continuing to serve as the leader of Saudi Arabia?

51:25 - 52:40

Daniel Shapiro

Thank you, Mr. Sherman.

I don't think it's really a possibility he's going to do it, so I don't think it poses a threat in that sense. It is true, of course, as you stated, that the idea of a Palestinian state being created is not immediately on the agenda, not something most Israelis feel ready to take a risk on. Any change toward that goal, which I repeat is part of point 19 of President Trump's 20-point plan, the credible pathway to that Palestinian state, requires reform of the Palestinian Authority, obviously requires removal of Hamas from power in Gaza. But it is necessary to be on the table and there to be directionality toward that if we do hope to see further expansion of these accords. And particularly the Saudis have been very clear, I'll just mention that the person who probably spent more time than anybody devoted to this effort to Saudi-Israeli normalization was the late Senator Lindsey Graham, who we're all remembering and honoring this time.

And he said very, very clearly there was no way, based on his private conversations with the Crown Prince, and I can attest to those as well, that this would be a possibility for him to take forward without that credible pathway to a Palestinian state also being part of it.

52:40 - 53:04

Brad Sherman

And the UAE agreed to the Abraham Accords and received a promise that the West Bank would not be annexed. What happens to the UAE's participation in the Abrahamic Accords if there's continued discussion at the highest levels in the Israeli government of violating that agreement?

53:05 - 53:09

Speaker 28

Congressman, that wasn't the deal.

53:09 - 53:15

Speaker 20

Well, it's the deal that I've heard from them, if not from you.

53:15 - 53:16

I'm happy to share with you the deal.

53:16 - 53:30

Brad Sherman

So, in any case, would any other country be interested in the Abraham Accords if they see Israel at least appear to renounce annexation and then continue to move forward?

53:30 - 54:22

Daniel Shapiro

Sure. What was announced at the time of the Abraham Accords was a moratorium on progress towards annexation, something like four years, there were different reports on it, Ambassador Friedman obviously was deeply involved in it. But it was definitely an element in the UAE's decision to go forward with those accords that was laid out publicly by the UAE ambassador to Israel to Washington in an op-ed in an Israeli newspaper. So it's not, wouldn't be a violation of that agreement if it had a time limit on it. However, the UAE has spoken out very forcefully against moves towards annexation, against settler violence.

And again, I think in the atmosphere created by the extremists within the Israeli government you mentioned and some of those activities that seem to close all doors to a future Palestinian state and seem to raise tensions in the West Bank and expand settlements and permit settler violence, I don't think it's an atmosphere in which other countries will come forward.

54:22 - 54:22

Thank you.

54:22 - 54:41

Speaker 27

Representative Latimer.

54:42 - 54:47

Speaker 21

Mr. Chairman, I'll defer at this time.

54:47 - 54:49

Thank you. Representative Schneider.

54:49 - 59:26

Bradley Schneider

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the witnesses for being here. I consider one of my most important roles in Congress, one of the things I'm most proud of, is being a co-founder and co-chair of the bipartisan, bicameral Abraham Accords Caucus, joined by my colleague Debbie Wasserman Schultz, Craig Goldman, and Ann Wagner in the House. Just one example of the caucus working together, we introduced the DEFEND Act in 2022 to develop a strategy for Abraham Accords countries and others to combat Iranian aggression with a unified air defense. We're seeing the benefits and fruits of that today, that law signed into, or that bill signed into law in December of 2022.

So at the risk of coming off pedantic, I want to start with an observation. As long as some of our most important leaders, ambassadors, ambassador, continue to play petty domestic politics when we stand united, committed to a strong US-Israel relationship, Israel's security as a Jewish democratic state, and peace for the region that benefits and includes Israel integrated into the entire Middle East, it's the modern equivalent of Hillel and Shammai, which most won't understand, but I know you do. We risk squandering the opportunity to help lead a region, lead the region of the Middle East, critical to the United States. We risk squandering the opportunity to lead them to a more stable, secure, prosperous, and ultimately more peaceful future. We have to be united in our commitment to that vision of regional integration.

The vision of a safe and secure Jewish democratic state of Israel living collectively integrated with the 21 Arab states of the Arab League and the Palestinians and their aspirations to self-determination and peace with Israel. That's what we're fighting for, and as long as we're fighting with each other, we're not helping those who are moving towards peace. So I am sorry for lecturing, but I felt it was important to say. I often talk about how I lose sleep thinking about Iran as a nuclear country. Scares me to death.

But I say I've been able to go back to sleep because of the Abraham Accords. And Ambassador, thank you for your leadership in helping achieve them. The agreements were the first peace agreement between Israel and an Arab country since 1994. I remember the handshake on the lawn in September of 1993, and I got to be there in September of 2000 to celebrate a peace agreement between Israel and an Arab country. Unfortunately, Hamas did not share the optimism that we all held that day.

As documents found in their tunnel network attest, the Iran-backed terrorists saw normalization as an existential threat to their cause of spreading terror and chaos across the region, of defeating Israel and eliminating any Jewish presence in the Middle East. And they countered the progress towards peace that was coming so close to normalization with the Saudis. They countered that with a barbaric invasion, massacres, rapes, kidnap. They invaded Israel with genocidal intent. Since that attack, things have gone from bad to worse for Israelis, Palestinians, residents of the Gulf, and the Iranian people, in fact, and of course, a dent to our power and prestige.

There remain a few bright spots, as were noted. Syria is no longer ruled by Assad. The trilateral framework between Lebanon, Israel, led by the United States, offers hope and potentially a model that will lift up the entire region. And we've seen how the Abraham Accords have held up better than imagined. Ambassador Friedman, as you noted, through three years of war, those accords have held fast, and I believe continue to be strong.

Gas is flowing between Israel, Jordan, and Egypt, and our partners have demonstrated incredible interoperability repelling Iran's drone and missile attack. Mr. Friedman, the five points you laid out, I think are things we all need to hold on to. I have the Mideast Mediterranean Gate, Eastern Mediterranean Gateway, promoting IMEC. We need to connect and continue the people-to-people programs that bring people face-to-face so they can know each other before they're willing to make the sacrifices to live together in peace. Ambassador Shapiro, you led on the Abraham Accords, and thank you for all your leadership and been a great partner.

59:27 - 59:35

Speaker 25

What can Congress do to support the Accords in the 12 seconds we have left? So maybe I'll stop there.

59:36 - 59:37

No, I'll give you if that's okay.

59:38 - 59:42

Speaker 22

What can Congress do and maybe just one sentence from each of the three of you, what do we need to do?

59:42 - 01:00:35

Daniel Shapiro

Well, thank you, Mr. Schneider. I was going to mention earlier, ran out of time, that the bipartisan Congressional Abraham Accords Caucus is a critical element. Its very existence is to demonstrate that there is a widespread and broad-based bipartisan commitment to this. That's a crucial message to countries already in the Accords and countries considering joining it. There's a wide range, we could discuss it at length, of people-to-people programs, of economic programs, of security-related programs.

You've already highlighted several of them that the I hope an even more active Congressional Caucus can engage in and do so in partnership with private sector and nonprofit organizations that are also deeply committed to this. At the Atlantic Council, we are we have been doing such convenings and leading on promoting Middle East regional integration since 2021 and intend to continue to do so. So I'll be happy to speak with you and your team later about a long list of opportunities.

01:00:35 - 01:00:45

Bradley Schneider

And Mr. Fredman, let me ask you one thing and Ambassador Friedman one thing that we need to focus on.

01:00:45 - 01:01:07

Asher Fredman

In my remarks, I noted five different areas. I would say turning the IMEC vision into a reality, moving from rhetoric to reality, and then the people-to-people component. Because business people, economic interests will find a way together. Security defense is always easier. The most difficult thing following three years of war, I think, is the people-to-people aspect, and Congress can play a major role in helping bring entrepreneurs, youth, innovators, researchers, scientists together.

01:01:08 - 01:01:39

David Friedman

Well, I'm not directing this at you or anybody who's sitting here, but I would say Congress, support Israel. 104, 103 votes, 103 Democrats, one misguided Republican against Israel is spoke volumes and was heard loud and clear by every one of our Arab friends. If Arab countries think that Israel is losing American support, throw the Abraham Accords out the window, you'll never get another one.

01:01:39 - 01:01:43

Speaker 23

So let's work together to bring that support back. It has to be bipartisan and it has to be ironclad. I yield back.

01:01:43 - 01:01:48

Speaker 24

Thank you. I yield to my good friend Ms. Wasserman Schultz.

01:01:48 - 01:04:58

Debbie Wasserman Schultz

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is good to see you, Ambassador Friedman and Ambassador Shapiro, Mr. Fredman. I had the privilege of leading trips to Israel with members of Congress in a bipartisan way when you were both ambassadors and appreciate the opportunity to talk with you today about the Abraham Accords. As my co-chair Mr. Schneider mentioned, I am also a co-chair of the bipartisan Abraham Accords Caucus and it really is a critical vehicle for us to be able to continue dialogue with these countries and and with Israel. I want to take you back to 2023 when I was part of a bipartisan congressional delegation to the Middle East focused on the state of the Abraham Accords and our goal in part was to advance normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia.

I remember our delegation met with Crown Prince bin Salman and we all left that meeting, which was very late at night by the time it wrapped up, with optimism, brimming with optimism that we were on the verge of a breakthrough. That meeting was the night of October 6th. So since then, the Accords have borne as much pressure as they could possibly bear. I I have trouble even, you know, getting through this without getting choked up with the horrors of October 7th, the tragedy in Gaza, and now the unauthorized strategic disaster of a war with Iran. Gaza needs to be freed from Hamas.

I mean, that is very clear.

I want to just make sure that it is clear where I stand. They need to disarm, they need to commit to normalization and a real process to rebuild, and that can't happen if they are still weaponized. What I've heard from Gulf Arab leaders since this war started is that they don't see the unity of purpose with the Trump administration or with the Netanyahu government, and they don't see enough progress toward a political horizon, as you mentioned, Ambassador Shapiro, for the Palestinians. And that is clearly an essential component of being able to advance normalization with other countries and bring other agreements forward. It's clear we're further away from that likelihood than we were on October 6th from seeing this vision through.

And I believe strongly in the Abraham Accords, and I believe in their expansion, but we can't do that at the expense of forgetting about the countries that have already bought in. Progress in the countries that we've already made progress in and that we already have agreements is critical. So if we invest in expanding the Abraham Accords rather than seeing through integration and improvement with current members, are we abandoning the core mission? And what are the risks of shifting our focus elsewhere when Gulf nations are losing faith in our credibility? And I'd love both ambassadors to answer that question.

Ambassador Shapiro?

01:04:58 - 01:06:46

Daniel Shapiro

Thank you, Congresswoman. You're right that we are further away from those breakthroughs than we were on October 6th. We even had opportunities even during the war as negotiations persisted with the Saudis for a breakthrough that would be connected to an end of war, a hostage deal, a ceasefire, and so forth. Candidly, I was not optimistic that the current Israeli government was going to be able to meet its part of finding the language to express that Palestinian horizon that you mentioned. If it had been possible, it might have required a change of coalition in Israel or even an election.

But there is no question, I hear it all the time from Gulf partners and from other Arab partners in the region, a belief that there's something still possible in the region and that they want to be part of that coalition of US-aligned moderate nations building a better future through interdependence, through economic cooperation, through security cooperation. The Iran war has thrown a major curveball into this undertaking because every country is now focused on its primary security requirements. Every country has to ask the question: can they count on US security guarantees given that we essentially dragged them into a conflict they did not want to be part of? There are questions about whether Israel is a destabilizing actor, again, something one hears from Gulf nations all the time. So I don't think this is a moment when those breakthroughs are likely, but if and when this war ends, and it needs to end as soon as possible, it should never have been undertaken, that's the work that needs to be resumed.

A special envoy focused exclusively on expanding these agreements, I think, would be a very important tool to do so.

01:06:46 - 01:06:46

Thank you. Ambassador?

01:06:46 - 01:08:23

David Friedman

Thank you, Congresswoman. There's no question that this is a difficult time to be thinking about expanding it. What I would suggest, though, is that, and I know, Congress, you've got 75 other things on your plate, maybe I'm understating it, so I don't mean to suggest that there's more work to do on this. But in hearing, for example, Congressman Sherman speaking about settler violence as if it's this thing that exists out there which is dragging everybody down.

You know, we're being flooded by a tidal wave of anti-Israel media. Maybe it comes from China, maybe it comes from Qatar, maybe it's homegrown. But there's a lot of news out there which isn't right. And just on that one point, you know, we talk about a dog bites man story and a man bites dog story. Nobody reports about a dog biting a man because it's not interesting, it happens all the time.

When a man bites a dog, that's a story, right? And settler violence is man bites dog because it doesn't happen that often, but it's so prone with emotion and anger that it gets the headlines. I'm there all the time. I live this issue. We have to stop settler violence, of course we do.

But let's try to stop the violence that causes the settler violence, which is on a magnitude of ten times. So I think, you know, it's important just to get our arms around the facts and not be driven by the tidal wave of anti-Semitic, anti-Israel, incorrect media, which is just making it very, very hard to make good decisions.

01:08:23 - 01:10:46

Debbie Wasserman Schultz

Okay, I'm going to reclaim my time because we're getting a little far afield of the question I asked, and the chairman's going to indulge me for another question, but I appreciate your feedback. Ambassador Shapiro, another concern that I have is that the current scope of the Abraham Accords is far too focused on the grass tops, on the elites, senior officials, major businesses, tech investors, weapons sales, and not nearly enough on the grassroots, the rank-and-file people on the ground. And when I have talked with each of the Abraham Accord country leaders and asked them, you know, and even for example, we would obviously all have preferred more robust statements following October 7th from Abraham Accord-led countries. And when I asked many of those leaders why, even though they obviously did condemn the attacks by Hamas, they said that there is not the buy-in, the same kind of buy-in on the ground in those Abraham Accord countries as there is among the elites. Ordinary people in the region, these Accords have not permeated.

So the Trump administration, just for example, has drained the bipartisan Nita Lowey Middle East Partnership for Peace Act, the MEPPA Act. That made those kinds of investments in Israeli and Palestinian civil society possible, including collaborative projects that brought Israelis and Palestinians together. And there's so much more that we need to do to push down that interaction and engagement so that there's buy-in that frees up those leaders to integrate their societies even more. And the Trump administration also made substantial cuts to efforts to modernize education in the Middle East and North Africa, not only to remove anti-Semitism from curricula, but to add in Holocaust education. So Ambassador Shapiro, is it possible for the Abraham Accords to live up to their intended goals without those investments in building mutual understanding and normalization at the grassroots level, and what can we do to advance that goal?

01:10:46 - 01:12:31

Daniel Shapiro

Thank you, Congresswoman. You're correct that the initial agreements were between governments. There's been a tremendous amount of progress in integration between security professionals, militaries, intelligence, I've been part of that, but not nearly enough penetration to the people-to-people level. Now, this is a difficult environment to do that. I highlighted in my testimony before you arrived that Arab publics are affected by what they've seen in terms of devastation in Gaza and the suffering of Palestinian civilians.

We need time to move past that. That's going to help those leaders who want to bring their publics along to do that. We need a better situation in Gaza to move past that. That means implementation of the 20-point plan. But as far as the initiatives go, this was something we were very focused on in the Biden administration with the Negev Forum.

And I'm sorry to say that the Negev Forum seems to have fallen off the table. It should have, I think, survived the change of administrations both in this country and in Israel.

We at the Atlantic Council at the time were supporting that effort with conferences that we were convening as well with the same cross-section of all those societies. And you could see in those 2022, 2023 period, those roots starting to take, those connections starting to take root and giving more ballast to the leaders to go even further on deepening these relationships, also to make this a club other countries wanted to join, other societies wanted to join. So that's why that regional aspect of it, rather than a series of bipartisan agreements and kind of a hub-and-spoke model, really is important. The Negev Forum gave us that. I hope we will resume some of that work again as this war winds down and as we get Gaza on the path toward recovery from the terrible war it's been through.

01:12:31 - 01:13:01

Speaker 30

Thank you. We just have to double down on the agreements we have so that we can really make sure that they're long-lasting. Thank you. Yield back the time I don't have.

01:13:01 - 01:13:02

That's all right. Representative Kiley, you're recognized.

01:13:02 - 01:14:05

Kevin Kiley

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to our distinguished witnesses for being here today. The Abraham Accords have already demonstrated their diplomatic and their security value, but their long-term success will ultimately depend on whether they deliver tangible economic benefits for citizens of the region and create new opportunities for cooperation. As Congress considers on how to build on the Accords, it's important to examine what role the United States can play in advancing trade, investment, connectivity, and shared prosperity among participating countries. Ambassador Friedman, as Congress considers on how to build on the Accords, it's important to examine what role the United States can play in advancing trade, investment, connectivity, and shared prosperity among participating countries.

Can you discuss how the U.S. government is currently promoting trade and investment, regional economic integration among the Abraham Accord countries, and what, how should we measure whether those efforts are being successful or not?

01:14:05 - 01:15:37

David Friedman

Well, I think the efforts are demonstrably not successful because we see the, we see a world there that's aflame and doesn't look anything like what we would, we would like it to look like. I would suggest, Congressman, that we do have an overblown sense of our ability to change the facts on the ground. When the United States enters or wealthy Western countries enter this region, most of the money usually gets spent in ways that are unaccounted for, that don't go to the right people. Sometimes we're looked at like a turkey on Thanksgiving, you know, someone just going to, we'll take your money and then we'll... There needs to be an adult in the room in that area.

I would suggest that the only real adult in the room, the only country that has a track record of empowering an Arab minority is the State of Israel. The Christian Arabs in Israel have the highest standard of living in Israel, even more so than the Jews. The Arabs in Israel have the highest standard of living in the Middle East. If we're going to let somebody own this, it should be a real country, it should be an adult country, it should be a democracy. And that's a path where the money will be spent, every penny will be accounted for, and we can see the results of our efforts.

I've spent a lot of time with USAID, you know, they're good people, they mean well. I've seen a lot of what happened with the efforts to mitigate the tragedy in Gaza. Without Israel, which is the only country on the ground that we can rely upon, it's not going to be successful.

So I think we need to work through Israel, not around Israel.

01:15:38 - 01:16:14

Kevin Kiley

Okay. Thank you. And Mr. Friedman, recent Iranian aggression in the Strait of Hormuz has underscored the importance of secure, resilient trade and connectivity corridors that promote regional stability and shared prosperity. With growing interest in the Middle East-East Europe Economic Corridor, IMEC, as a means of diversifying global supply chains and reducing reliance on vulnerable choke points, how can the U.S. ensure that IMEC develops an inclusive, multi-route initiative anchored in the partnerships forged through the Abraham Accords?

01:16:15 - 01:17:26

Asher Fredman

Thank you, Congressman, and I'd also like to acknowledge the role of the Abraham Accords Caucus, the bipartisan caucus, it's been incredibly important and positive in terms of promoting the Accords. If we look at how we make IMEC into a reality, there are geopolitical challenges. For example, even today, Saudi Arabia will not allow Israel goods destined for Israel or originating in Israel to cross its territory, even in trucks, even if you don't have a railroad. Now, in July 2022, when Saudi Arabia allowed Israeli overflights in its territory, it didn't say it's because we want to normalize with Israel. It said we want to be a global logistics hub and the Chicago Convention, etc.

I think we could get to a point, even as has been discussed, where Saudi Arabia is not where the conditions may not be right for full normalization, but to for Saudi Arabia for its own interest, it wants to be a global logistics and transportation hub, to allow goods destined for Haifa, coming from Haifa port through its territory. Jordan as well, there are currently no plans or no no practical plans for a rail line connecting Saudi Arabia on one side and Israel on the other side. And I think the United States, perhaps through the DFC, other mechanisms, can help create that infrastructure, would be good for American companies, for American technologies, and would be good for making IMEC a reality.

01:17:26 - 01:17:45

Kevin Kiley

Okay. And then what other alternatives do you think we can have to make sure that Israel is is essential rather than sidelined? What other things can Congress do?

01:17:45 - 01:18:24

Asher Fredman

I think that Israel needs to be the the most successful cooperation on the scientific level, innovation, has been three-way cooperation. So between Israeli, American, and Emirati entrepreneurs, between Israeli, Bahraini, and German youth, as an example. At the Misgav Institute, which I direct, we've hosted numerous Moroccan delegations, we've been brought together with American counterparts. So creating those three-way cooperation, I think, would be essential because, you know, the the media in the region is largely negative towards Israel. And decades of negative of education, which is starting to change but is still far from changing, has created a baseline of negative views.

And I think America and Congress can be critical in that evolution towards accepting Israel as a authentic part of the region and a potential partner for all these countries.

01:18:24 - 01:18:45

Speaker 33

Wonderful. Thank you to the panel for your your insights. Appreciate that, your time, and take care. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I yield back.

01:18:45 - 01:18:52

Speaker 32

Thank you, Kiley. I guess we'll start over again if it's okay if I go next. He's already Chairman Meeks, let me recognize you and then I'll we'll start again. Is that all right with is that acceptable? I don't see any other wait, no, I'm sorry, Meeks.

Sorry, Chairman.

01:18:52 - 01:21:42

Gregory Meeks

Thank you. And thank you to the witnesses for being here. And I wanted to make sure that I was here because really what I've been focusing on is to have a change in the Middle East, to have a peace in the Middle East where Israel could live side by side with its neighbors, the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank and the Arab states. And that's where I saw up to October the 7th that real possible real change was taking place. Because one of the things that I've seen, you know, post what the UN when it created the Jewish state of Israel, that it was many of these Arab states that were trying to take the property that had been designated as a Jewish state of Israel.

And so there was fights and wars that were going on between that because it was trying to say that Israel did not have the right to exist. In fact, when I first visited Israel back in the early 90s and I would talk to some of the Arab states, they said Israel did not have the right to exist. And so therefore you cannot have peace if one side is trying to negotiate peace and the other side says you don't have the right to exist, there can't be any peace. The major change for me came though when we start talking about when I start seeing some of the Arab countries saying Israel had the right to exist and we wanted to live with our neighbors and we want to make sure that we, you know, exchange diplomatic personnel and try to figure out how to do the best of both things. And Saudi Arabia was talking about moving forward before October the 7th, etc.

One of the things that Saudi Arabia was indicating was though they wanted to make sure that it was indeed a two-state solution, that there was a Palestinian state that was going to be created and that the Palestinians were treated with respect and move forward so that we can, you know, get certain things done. So that, you know, I think changed the paradigm of what where we needed to go. And so I believe that a successful normalization requires prospective partners to believe that also Israel will act as a stable and reliable regional partner. Israel expects the same from its perspective, so it's got to be from both sides as I see that. And at the same time, now we have the war in Iran and continuing developments in Gaza and the West Bank have intensified concerns across the region about Israel's broader strategic direction.

So it brings me to the question of, you know, how have post-October 7 events in Gaza, the West Bank, and Iran impacted Israel's credibility with Arab and Muslim countries considering closer diplomatic or security ties? I guess I'll go to you, Ambassador Shapiro.

01:21:42 - 01:23:20

Daniel Shapiro

Thank you, Ranking Member Meeks. I was present with numerous conversations with Arab states post-October 7. They raised serious concerns about civilian casualties in Gaza, of course. They raised concerns as they continue to raise today about various Israeli conduct on the West Bank as well. But nearly uniformly, especially among Gulf partners, they all said that they wanted to get past this war and get back on the road toward expanding regional integration.

They put on the table proposals, not perfect proposals, but proposals that would help end the war and move smartly out in that direction. They see that still as their strategic interest and they see that as a strategic interest because it includes them in a coalition of US-aligned partners focused on common adversaries and building interdependence and security and prosperity together. However, they have also raised concerns, for example, the Israeli strike on Hamas leaders in Doha, Qatar, and of course this current war that most Gulf states counseled against but saw the United States and Israel undertake and raise the question about whether they are dealing with Israel and with the United States, frankly, that is also a destabilizing actor. That shakes the foundations of that belief that they had told us they are committed to and I believe they do still want to be part of that there's a coalition of Israeli, Arab, and American partners, obviously with progress toward an Israeli-Palestinian resolution as well, that they want to be part of.

01:23:20 - 01:23:49

Gregory Meeks

So how does this help with reference to, you know, I've heard in fact in some meeting that I've had with Prime Minister Netanyahu when he says basically he doesn't believe in a two-state solution. So how can further normalization proceed when you have regional leaders believe that Israel is unwilling to pursue a viable two-state solution or restrain its actions that deeply destabilize the whole situation?

01:23:49 - 01:23:50

How does that work?

01:23:51 - 01:25:08

Daniel Shapiro

It's a divide, of course, it's a divide not just with the Prime Minister, the current Prime Minister, it's broadly felt across Israeli society, still traumatized by the events of October 7th, that a Palestinian state would be very risky. But it is part of the President's 20-point plan for Gaza, that there should be a credible pathway to a Palestinian state. As I quoted Senator Graham, the late Senator Graham, a few minutes ago, he reminded us last fall, there really is no future for Israel as both a Jewish and a democratic state without some agreed and negotiated separation between Israelis and Palestinians in which both sides can have self-determination and peace living alongside each other. And it is definitely a factor. There's probably no chance, and the Saudis have been clear on this publicly, but they've also been clear on this privately, that they could get as far as full normalization with Israel, which I believe the Crown Prince has made clear he still views as the best course for his country and for the region as a whole, unless there is a component for the Palestinians that includes a credible pathway.

Is that going to take time? It definitely is. Is it going to take reform of the Palestinian Authority? For sure. Is it going to take removal of Hamas from power in Gaza?

Absolutely. But that is a critical element if we want to see the full realization of this enterprise.

01:25:08 - 01:25:20

Gregory Meeks

I mean, this will be my last question. So what diplomatic structure and personnel would actually be required to convert any post-war opening into a durable normalization agreement?

01:25:20 - 01:27:35

Daniel Shapiro

Ambassador Romich, other members of this panel and I have agreed that the special envoy for Abraham Accords that was passed by the Lawler-Torres legislation and included in the 2024 NDAA is an important and still unfilled position to provide a very senior official authority and broad focus on a range of countries that could be part of this expansion of regional integration. It has not yet been appointed, not in the Biden administration, not in the Trump administration. I think it's overdue. I think the officials tasked with much of our Middle East diplomacy, particularly Mr. Wyckoff and Mr. Kushner, are spread far too thin. They have far too much on their plate with all the various responsibilities they've been given to give this the kind of focus they need.

I'd add, I believe we are lacking ambassadors in many of the Middle East capitals, certainly in Riyadh, in Abu Dhabi, in Doha, and a number of other key Middle East capitals, as well as we've degraded our broader diplomatic infrastructure by the removal, the reductions in force at the State Department that have removed many serious regional experts from their jobs as well. So we need active diplomats. We need senior diplomats. We need ambassadors in country. We need a special envoy.

And we need to sustain a focus on the kinds of diplomatic and assistance programs that Congresswoman Wasserman Schultz was referencing, those that do people-to-people as well as security ties, those that promote business, those that promote economic connections like IMEC, those that promote people-to-people even between Israelis and Palestinians, such as the MEPA program, which is still awaiting obligation under the fiscal year 26 funding that Congress passed. So there's many, many tools available and they're not all being used, to be honest. Now, we still have to focus on the immediate diplomacy needs, end the war as soon as possible, get Gaza on a path towards fulfilling and implementing the 20-point plan, but all those other tools should be being activated even now while we wait to get to that moment.

01:27:35 - 01:27:54

Gregory Meeks

Thank you. And I'm going I'm yielding back. I want to put something into the record, but I also hope that we get into Mr. Chairman, you know, because recently and I would love to hear if it comes up between all three, how do you square reports that the United States may permit Saudi Arabia to enrich uranium domestically? How about this?

01:27:54 - 01:27:58

Speaker 35

We're going to have to adjourn and I want you to get your summation.

01:27:58 - 01:28:25

Gregory Meeks

I want to submit for the record though, because I'm concerned about what's taking place on the West Bank. And here's an article that took place that says that the UAE warns the White House that Israel annexations could unravel the Abraham Accords. So there's real concerns by those that are part of the Abraham Accords now that if something is not done or changed in the West Bank, it could in fact unravel the conversations that's taking place in regard to.

01:28:25 - 01:28:40

Speaker 17

Chair will allow it. We're going to have to adjourn, but you want to ask a question. Why don't we allow each will maybe can you do it in two minutes apiece, you think? I know it's tough for diplomats to do that. But why don't we just you had that question.

Can we want to start Mr. Friedman?

01:28:41 - 01:28:43

Yeah, go ahead, brother.

01:28:43 - 01:29:04

David Friedman

Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Look, I don't think this is about Netanyahu. I mean, there'll be an election in three months. The Israelis will elect whoever they want to elect.

But I would urge the members of Congress to put themselves in the shoes of a typical Israeli. I was in Israel the entire war.

01:29:04 - 01:29:07

Speaker 37

But the question was about Saudi Arabia.

01:29:07 - 01:29:10

David Friedman

I was asked to give a two-minute summation.

01:29:13 - 01:29:15

Oh, summation, that's what you're doing?

01:29:15 - 01:29:16

Yeah, he's everybody gets two.

01:29:16 - 01:29:17

Summation, okay.

01:29:17 - 01:31:18

David Friedman

So I would ask people to put themselves in the shoes of a typical Israeli. Netanyahu is a politician. He has to answer to the will of the Israeli population. This is not about him. This is about the people of Israel.

And having lived through the entire war, the 40-day war between Israel and Iran, having watched every night parents take their children in the middle of the night at 3:00 AM. I was blessed with having my own shelter in my house. But most people don't. So you wake up your kids at 3:00 in the morning, you run down the street, you try to find a shelter. Sometimes they're already filled.

You run down to the next shelter. You have 90 seconds to get to a shelter or else you're risking your life and your children's lives. And you know, people in Congress would like to say, well, you know, you should really get over all that and just, you know, make peace with the Palestinians who've been shooting rockets at you for 20 years and ignore all that stuff, even though the Palestinians acted on October 7th, cheered October 7th. On the West Bank, they were cheering October 7th. The Palestinian Authority continues to have the pay-for-slay program where they pay terrorists to kill Jews.

Just ignore all that stuff and just, you know, kumbaya, live in peace. And at the same time, give up every single part of your country that makes you a Jewish state. Give up Hebron, give up Shechem, give up Bethlehem, give up Jerusalem. Give up all these places. Okay, so you know, everything that makes you Jewish is in the land the Palestinians want because by the way, they want to destroy every connection the Jewish people have to this land.

So just do it. And now you blame Netanyahu for not agreeing to it? I got to tell you, whoever wins this election is going to be exactly of the same view. So we need a realistic view about the state of Israel. And if it means you can't support Israel, you won't support Israel.

But Israel will survive this as best it can. It's not going to commit suicide for the benefit of a piece of paper. Mr. Friedman.

01:31:12 - 01:32:20

Asher Fredman

I live in Jerusalem with my four children, about 20 minutes from Ramallah. Thank you.

You know, we're welcomed warmly in Dubai or in Marrakesh or even in Khartoum when I visited there before the civil war to have these exchanges with their Palestinian neighbors. After October 7th, Ambassador Shapiro referred to it as trauma. I don't think it's trauma. It's really looking reality straight in the face. And according to the best Palestinian polling that's available, 53% of Palestinians think that Hamas's decision to launch the October 7th attack was a good idea.

And Hamas is far more popular than other factions in the West Bank, again, according to Palestinian polling. So I think, do we want to get to a peaceful solution with the Palestinians? I think we do. Do we have to look at reality, the fact that Hamas still fully controls Gaza, the fact that there is no other force other than the IDF that will actually go and do the difficult and dangerous work of disarming Hamas? And that if we pull back, Hamas will be able to easily shoot into Israeli communities once again.

I think we have to recognize the realities and look to expand peace both with the Palestinians and in the region while looking reality straight in the face.

01:32:20 - 01:32:25

Speaker 38

Thank you, brother. They're calling votes, but you go ahead.

01:32:25 - 01:34:32

Daniel Shapiro

Sure. I had my say earlier, Mr. Meeks, so I'll just try to address your brief question on the Saudi nuclear deal. Of course, there's much we don't know. It's only been announced in the last several hours. It does undertake a joint study between the United States and Saudi Arabia, after which Saudi Arabia could be allowed to enrich uranium on its soil.

Exactly what the safeguards would be for that is not entirely clear. It does not appear to include Saudi Arabia signing the additional protocol of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. So if there are other safeguards involved, I think that's something Congress should give very close attention to. There is danger, of course, if Saudi Arabia gets that capability, that there is a kind of race to the bottom as other countries, Turkey, Egypt, seek to match a Saudi capability. And of course, we know we are holding to a position that Iran, quite reasonably given its history, should not have any enrichment on its soil.

But maybe that position will be somewhat undercut, at least in terms of international support, by this deal. So there's a lot that's not known and needs to be studied carefully about it. I do think there's a question mark about why the President felt he should move forward with this deal now. In previous negotiations, this idea of a civil nuclear cooperation agreement between the United States and Saudi Arabia, which was something President Biden was working on and might have even allowed at some point a US-supervised or even controlled enrichment capability on Saudi soil. But why it's being moved forward as kind of a standalone deal?

Again, maybe there are things we don't know, but it is not connected to, as it was in the Biden time, a clear decision by Saudi Arabia to normalize their relations with Israel, have the Palestinian component be built into that, have other US and Saudi security commitments made to one another. And so I'm concerned that it has removed a card of leverage and an important incentive from our hands to try to bring the Saudis along to where we want them to get to ultimately, which is full normalization with Israel.

01:34:32 - 01:34:36

Speaker 39

Thank you. Mr. Schneider, I recognize you for one quick comment.

01:34:36 - 01:35:47

Bradley Schneider

Real quick. To submit an article for the record, it is from the Times of Israel, I'll get you a printout, March 19th, 2026. I'll read the first paragraph. IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi on Wednesday issued sharp condemnation of settler violence, calling attacks against Palestinian civilians and soldiers in the West Bank, quote, "morally and ethically unacceptable," end quote, and a major strategic impediment. But Ambassador, I think you make an important point.

It's too broad to call it settler violence. The vast majority of settlers are not involved in these attacks, but the many people that are involved, and they're not all settlers, are a threat to Israel's security and the prospects for peace. We need to work together, and I understand the concerns of Israelis, Ambassador, the memory for many, all Israelis who were there on October 7th, is as if it was yesterday.

And the prospects for peace seem far across the horizon. I think our responsibility as Congress is to continue to harbor the hopes and possibilities of peace and to lay down the path that both Israelis and Palestinians, the people of the region, can find a path together to live in security, prosperity, and ultimately peace. I yield back.

01:35:47 - 01:35:54

Speaker 36

The gentleman, I recognize Representative Sherman quickly so we can get to votes.

01:35:54 - 01:36:47

Brad Sherman

Quickly. The IDF says settler violence is up 27%. The Times of London, the Times of Israel says that severe attacks are up 50%. These attacks would not happen if supporters of ethnic cleansing did not have strong support, at least some significant support in the Israeli cabinet. There are two ways for Israel to commit suicide.

One of those is to allow a Saudi and ultimately Egyptian, Turkish nuclear program. And the other is to annex the West Bank and Gaza, which ultimately will turn, will lead as it to the enfranchisement of the Arab population, or the real crazies will take over in Israel and they will attempt physical ethnic cleansing. A two-state solution is where we've got to go, and I yield back.

01:36:47 - 01:37:09

Speaker 17

Thank you. I want to thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony, members for their questions. The members of the subcommittee may have some additional questions for the witnesses, and we'll ask you to respond to those in writing. Pursuant to committee rules, all members have five days to submit statements, questions, extraneous materials for the record, subject to the length limitations. Without objection, the committee stands adjourned.