Legislative Hearing on Protecting Communications Networks and Improving Connectivity
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House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Communications and Technology U.S. House of Representatives
Ihren Sitzungen folgenDoris Matsui
A connection does little good when a family cannot afford service or lacks the device or skills to use it. That's why I co-lead the bipartisan bicameral Universal Service Fund working group with Chairman Hudson. We are working to preserve and modernize the programs that connect rural communities, schools, libraries, healthcare providers, and low-income families. It is also why I introduced the Digital Opportunity Foundation Act. This legislation will bring public and private partners together to expand digital skills, device access, and broadband adoption.
We must ensure the infrastructure we build actually improves lives and that every person has the skills and tools to make full use of it. We must also secure these networks. Communications networks connect Sacramento's hospitals, utilities, schools, and businesses. A cyberattack can interrupt medical care, classroom instruction, electricity, and emergency response. I've long worked to protect our communications networks from untrusted equipment and support more secure technology made here at home.
Redner 7
I've also pushed to strengthen cybersecurity protections for our schools and libraries. That effort helped build momentum for the FCC's $200 million cybersecurity pilot program. But our schools and libraries need sustained support to protect their networks and the people who depend on them. That's why I'll keep fighting to secure long-term funding, including through the Universal Service Fund. The bills before us also take important steps, such as studying how AI can help identify malware and cyber threats in real time.
But AI can also create new security risks. We need strong guardrails for both open-source and proprietary AI models, especially when they are used in our communications networks and other critical systems. That means rigorous testing, strong cybersecurity standards, transparency, and clear accountability when systems fail or are misused. Finally, we need stronger protection from scams. Last year, Americans lost $3.5 billion to imposter scams.
This includes scams that lure consumers through texts and phone. And AI now allows criminals to clone a loved one's voice, impersonate a government official, or create a convincing false emergency. The bills we're considering at this hearing take important steps toward protecting consumers from illegal robocalls, but we have more work to do. That is why I'm working on legislation to prohibit fraudulent AI impersonations and improve coordination among enforcement agencies. Scammers should not escape accountability because they are exploiting new technologies and targeting our most vulnerable communities.
I look forward to working with my colleagues to strengthen the bills before us today and keep every community connected and secure. And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Richard Hudson
Thank you. And before I recognize the chairman of the full committee, just for the record, during the ranking member's remarks, I received a robocall. And it said, hi, my name is Reginald and I'm giving you a call about your installment loan application. I want to reach out personally because you've been pre-approved for $45,000, blah, blah, blah. Just pretty timely.
The chair now recognizes the chairman of the full committee, Mr. Guthrie, for five minutes for your opening statement.
Brett Guthrie
Thank you. Thank you. You're pre-approved for 45,000, that's good. So, good afternoon and I thank Chairman Hudson. I appreciate you for holding this legislative hearing on these very important topics.
Securing our communications system from bad actors has been a long-standing and bipartisan priority for this committee. Ranking Member Pallone, then Chairman Walden, Representative Matsui and I led this committee's effort to rip and replace untrusted vendor equipment from our mobile networks by passing the Secure and Trusted Communications Network Act in 2019. Since then, this committee has worked to ban Chinese-manufactured drones by passing the Countering CCP Drones Act. Just last year we passed Representative Latta's ROUTERS Act to examine the threat of routers made in or by countries of concern including China. That said, we remain vigilant to threats posed by adversaries like China and are committed to protecting our critical infrastructure and safeguarding Americans' data.
Recent reports of a China-linked plot to cripple New York's communications networks serve as a stark reminder that these threats are real and ongoing and shows the lengths to which our adversaries will go to undermine our interests and then threaten our homeland. Given those risks, any legislation effort to amend the covered list administered by the FCC warrants careful consideration by the committee. That's why today we'll be considering the GUARD Act, legislation that would add humanoid and quadruped robots linked with certain CCP-linked robotics companies to the covered list. I appreciate the work of the sponsors of the bill and the opportunity to examine this threat today to better understand why Americans should be concerned about humanoid and quadruped robots from adversaries.
I don't know if yours is fraud, you might be able to afford a forty-five thousand dollar loan, I'm not sure. But attacking, but it's interesting that happened right as we're sitting here, didn't it? And finally legislation to ensure that federal broadband dollars are going to areas most in need. Yeah, I get the ones, Kentucky doesn't have a DMV. We call ours the transportation cabinet, so we just call it transportation, so I keep getting the Kentucky DMV needs you to call and give your money for tolls you haven't paid.
And one, we don't have hardly any toll roads, and second of all, we don't have a DMV. But anyway, hopefully whoever's sending me that doesn't figure out we don't have a DMV because I know it's wrong and I don't owe any tolls. So with, so that, we're all affected. And and we hear, I hear about this as much as anything from constituents back home. I went to visit a friend of mine who I knew from early days in politics who's now eighty-seven, and as we sat and talked for an hour, he has a home line, I bet he answered at least six or seven phone calls within an hour that were spam.
So we need to deal with this, and I yield back.
Redner 2
Thank you, and chair now recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey, the ranking member of the full committee, for five minutes for his opening statement.
Frank Pallone
Thank you, Chairman Hudson, and today we are examining legislation across a number of important areas within this subcommittee's jurisdiction. Network security continues to be a top priority for me and this subcommittee, and we must stay on top of new and emerging threats that use increasingly sophisticated capabilities to compromise critical infrastructure. We've watched closely as advancements in the tech space like AI-powered coding and other recent innovations have significantly reduced the time and labor costs for network engineering and coding tasks. The positive applications would be difficult to quantify, but it's clear that widely available AI tools are empowering individuals to build out application systems and even entire businesses virtually overnight without the need for huge upfront capital investments. And fewer barriers to entry for startups and small businesses could or should open the door to more competition and choice for consumers.
But using history as a guide, we know that each innovation or new capability that helps the good guys is also a tool that can be used by bad actors for nefarious purposes. Whether it's cybercriminals working alone or teams of military or civilian personnel supported by adversarial nations, our enemies can use the same capabilities to more efficiently breach and sabotage American networks, and we have to ensure that our network defenses stay ahead of the curve. With that in mind, I look forward to today's discussion of the AI for Secure Networks Act led by Representatives Menendez and Pfluger and to hear more about the ways we can proactively employ AI to better defend our communications networks from bad actors. I'm also interested to hear from witnesses about how the GUARD Act led by Representatives McClellan and Molinaro can apply the framework of my Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act to the rapidly growing market for humanoid and other robotics. Now is the time to act to prevent untrusted suppliers with ties to our adversaries from flooding the US market with robotics and other advanced technology and services.
There's also plenty of work to be done to address the incessant robocalls and phone scams that still plague consumers on a daily basis despite all of our work on this issue in the past. At best, robocalls and scams are a nuisance. At worst, if executed successfully, they can upend people's lives and cost thousands of dollars that are seldom recovered from bad actors who seek out and prey on seniors especially.
In spite of bipartisan efforts by Congress, the Federal Communications Commission and the Federal Trade Commission have both worked with carriers to weed out scam calls, but my constituents continue to raise this issue as one in need of our continued attention. And I hope today's discussion can shed light on what obstacles are still preventing regulators and law enforcement from stopping or reducing robocalls. And I look forward to hearing from our witnesses about how legislation like the QUIET Act and the Foreign Robocall Elimination Act can help in these efforts. We'll also consider two pieces of legislation that aim to build on the subcommittee's work to deploy broadband infrastructure across the country so that every American can access affordable and reliable high-speed internet service. In particular, I hope to hear our witnesses' perspectives on how the Plan for Broadband Act, led by Representatives Peters and Walberg, and the DATA Breach Act, led by Representatives Kelly, Soto, I mean Soto, and Hudson, can improve how we manage, track, and carry out federal broadband deployment initiatives as efficiently as possible.
So, lot to discuss, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance of my time.
Richard Hudson
I thank the gentleman. I was distracted because Reginald called again during your report. And apparently I've been approved for another $45,000 loan, so this is amazing. I mean, it's not that unusual, but I've gotten two robocalls since we've started this hearing. This is incredible.
Mr. Allen wants to know what the interest rate is. Listen, we've now concluded with member opening statements. The chair reminds members that pursuant to the committee rules, all members' opening statements will be made part of the record. We'd like to thank our witnesses for being here today to testify before this subcommittee. Our witnesses will have five minutes to provide an opening statement, which will be followed by a round of questions from our members.
The witnesses here before us today are Michael Robbins, President and CEO of the Association for Uncrewed Vehicle Systems International. Thank you. Kevin Ruane, partner with Wiley Rein. Thank you for being here. Andrew Von Ah, Director, Physical Infrastructure, Government Accountability Office.
Thank you. And Lindsey Gorman, former Senior Policy Advisor for Technology Strategy in the Biden White House. Thank you for being here with us. Mr. Robbins, you are recognized for five minutes for your opening statement.
Michael Robbins
Thank you, Chairman Hudson and Ranking Member Matsui and distinguished members of the committee. It is an honor to be with you today. I am Michael Robbins, President and CEO of AUVSI. We are the trade association for the autonomy, robotics, and drones industry. Our members are at the leading edge of transformation where artificial intelligence, robotics, and autonomy are converging to create a new frontier of cyber-physical systems.
Before I turn to the GUARD Act, a brief personal word because this hearing is very special for me. We are meeting in the John D. Dingell room. I went to work for the late John Dingell in 2002 when I was just 19 years old, and from 2006 through 2011, I had the privilege of serving as his chief of staff. He was my boss, my mentor, and my friend, and much of what I know about serving the public, including my commission in the United States Navy, I learned from him. With me today is my son, like this room, he is named in the Congressman's honor, referencing Chairman Dingell's family nickname of Jack.
Chairman Dingell used the jurisdiction of this committee to defend American workers and consumers and to keep our industrial strength equal to our security. And that is the argument I bring with you today. AUVSI stands in strong support of the GUARD Act, and our backing is informed by history and lessons from previous policy failures in the drone industry. Drone technology was invented in America. The scaling, however, took place in China.
Over a decade PRC manufacturers came to dominate American skies. The PRC, the People's Republic of China leveraged massive state subsidies, IP theft, and deliberate market dumping to drive many American drone manufacturers out of business or keeping their market share small by flooding the global market with artificially cheap systems. That was market share engineered in Beijing, not fairly earned in the market. And this also injected considerable national security risks into the United States. A Chinese drone is a flying sensor built by companies that the PRC can compel to share data that is collected back with the PRC.
And that is why CISA and the FBI have warned that Chinese drones put American critical infrastructure at risk. By the time Congress took action to address the risk and and the market imbalance, many American operators had built their operations around a single foreign supplier. And therefore every policy option was costly and often faced with fierce opposition from those who had become dependent on Chinese technology. Nevertheless, we appreciate the courage of this committee for moving forward. The cost of restricting an adversary's technology is a function of its installed base, and the installed base only grows as the PRC executes on its deliberate strategy to subsidize its companies and dump its products in the United States to create strategic dependence.
Accordingly, every year of delay on robotics turns an easier decision into an expensive and more complex one, because the same PRC playbook used for drones is now armed, now aimed at robotics. The humanoid and quadruped market is still relatively new, only a few tens of thousands of units shipped worldwide last year, but the capture dynamics are already visible. Chinese firms already account for roughly 90% of the global humanoid shipments. In our research universities, where American robots once led, labs have shifted to subsidized, artificially low-cost Chinese systems in just the last 12 to 18 months. In public safety, police departments are adopting Chinese robot dogs in the same pattern that entrenched Chinese drones over the last decade.
And like with drones, this is not merely an economic contest, it's also a national security one. A compromised laptop can expose data. A compromised robot can expose data and also move, survey, and act physically inside a factory or a hospital or a power plant or on a military base. And like with drones, under China's National Intelligence Law, the companies that build these systems can be compelled to serve state intelligence in secret. Every such system is therefore a Trojan horse on American soil.
The GUARD Act meets the moment because it is action while the installed base for robotics is still small. It protects our NATO and non-NATO allies, major non-NATO allies. It covers finished systems and their software, not the components American manufacturers source globally, and it pairs a security review with a deadline that has consequences. AUVSI supports the GUARD Act because it is important to note that AUVSI supports the GUARD Act, but it is important to note that it is just one half of a two-pronged strategy. It's the defense.
Restrictions buy time. They do not win the entire competition. The other half is offense. A national robotics strategy, like Congressman Obernolte has introduced, secure supply chains for critical inputs, like rare earth magnets, investment into US research and manufacturing, and federal demand for trusted systems. We must protect and we must promote.
Chairman Dingell spent his career getting ahead of problems so the families he represented would not pay for Washington's delay. When Chinese drones first arrived, no one warned this committee where it would end because it had not yet happened. This time with robotics we can see it coming and we can act while it's still inexpensive to do so. For my son's generation and for the American workers and companies who will build these machines, I hope we will. AUVSI urges you to advance the GUARD Act.
Thank you and I look forward to your questions.
Redner 9
Thank you. Mr. Roopy, you're recognized for five minutes for an opening statement.
Kevin Ruane
Chairman Hudson, Vice Chairman Allen, Ranking Member Matsui, Chairman Guthrie, Ranking Member Pallone, members of the subcommittee, thank you for giving me the opportunity to appear before you today. My name is Kevin Roopy and I am a partner in the telecommunications, media, and technology practice at Wiley Rein LLP, and I'm here today in my own personal capacity. All views expressed in this testimony are my own.
I have worked to combat illegal robocalls and fraud since 2012, including helping establish and oversee the Industry Traceback Group, which has been the FCC's designated traceback consortium since July 2020. I also serve on the board of the Communications Fraud Control Association and represent clients in efforts to combat illegal robocalls and brand impersonation scams. I share the subcommittee's concerns about illegal robocalls. Consumer fraud, including illegal robocall scams, is no longer dominated by opportunistic scam artists. Increasingly, it is carried out by sophisticated criminal enterprises, including transnational criminal organizations, drug cartels, and hostile foreign actors operating at industrial scale.
As such, this issue raises serious consumer protection and national security concerns, which is why the subcommittee is right to focus on it. I would like to make three points today. First, enforcement works, especially when it is powered by sophisticated tools including traceback. Federal, state, and private civil enforcement actions demonstrated real success in disrupting fraudulent scams. Building on these successes, the government should prioritize targeted and meaningful enforcement actions.
As scams become increasingly tied to sophisticated criminal enterprises, federal agencies should fully deploy their criminal enforcement authorities to combat this consumer protection and national security threat. According to a recent Gallup survey, Americans lost an estimated $68 billion to scams in 2025 alone across multiple channels, a level of consumer harm that demands an equally aggressive criminal enforcement response. Second, because fraud is highly dynamic, industry needs flexible frameworks to adapt to evolving threats and respond in real time. Fraud prevention is most effective when government and industry play to their strengths. Government sets the general rules of the road while industry responds quickly to emerging threats.
Accordingly, policy frameworks should preserve the flexibility necessary for industry to innovate and respond as threats evolve. To this end, I urge Congress not to look to complicated compliance frameworks like the TCPA as a solution to the illegal robocall problem. The TCPA is an incredibly complex statute already, and its core purpose is to establish compliance guidelines for legitimate callers. Additional compliance mandates will primarily burden legitimate callers, not the scammers who routinely disregard the rules. I encourage Congress to focus on legislation aimed directly at fraudsters and criminal enterprises rather than retrofitting a compliance statute that bad actors will simply ignore.
pressure on illegal robocallers, industry and government must strengthen collaboration and information sharing. Fraudsters regularly collaborate across sectors, defenders should too. This collaboration is already occurring on multiple fronts and is having meaningful results. Information sharing and coordinated action across telecom, financial, technology, and government sectors can accelerate threat detection, disrupt fraud, and better protect consumers from increasingly sophisticated fraud schemes. No single sector can combat fraud alone.
Staying ahead of evolving threats requires sustained information sharing and coordinated action. I look forward to discussing these issues with you today.
Richard Hudson
Thank you. Mr. Von Ah, you are recognized for five minutes for your opening statement.
Andrew Von Ah
Chairman Hudson, Vice Chairman Allen, Ranking Member Matsui, and members of the subcommittee, I'm pleased to be here today to discuss our work on federal broadband efforts as the committee considers potential legislation. Expanding and improving access to broadband across the country has been a vexing and time-consuming task. Questions about where to build, which technologies to support, and at what cost to the taxpayer and price point for the consumer have proven difficult to answer. Even then, other challenges have presented themselves, including difficulties in interagency coordination, collecting accurate data for mapping, and ensuring the viability of the networks we are investing in, among other things. In response to these many challenges, the Plan for Broadband Act being discussed today directs the development of a national broadband strategy that focuses on improving interagency coordination, reducing administrative barriers, and ensuring funding is used efficiently and responsibly.
In May of 2022, we recommended the Executive Office of the President develop and implement a national broadband strategy to help agencies manage existing fragmentation and overlap of the hundreds of broadband programs we identified, focus federal efforts on a common goal, and mitigate the risk of potentially wasteful duplicative efforts. At that time, Congress had created several new broadband programs and increased funding for others in response to the pandemic, which had underscored the importance of access to broadband. Ultimately, four agencies, FCC, NTIA, and the Departments of Agriculture and Treasury, administer the bulk of broadband funding and have been executing programs to deploy and support broadband. Fast forward today, and we are at a moment where NTIA's BEAD program, the largest broadband deployment program, is starting to roll out funding to states and territories with the aim of connecting every remaining location in the country. At the same time, the dozen or so other broadband deployment programs administered by these agencies are all in the middle of building out their projects as well.
The question for a national strategy today may be more about what comes next as we approach universal access over the next several years. With or without a strategy, having many overlapping programs creates the necessity for federal agencies to effectively collaborate to ensure they avoid unnecessary duplication and meet the needs of unserved and underserved communities. In April 2025, we reported that while the agencies have some processes in place, opportunities exist to improve their efforts. For example, clearly defining, agreeing upon, and documenting each agency's responsibilities related to sharing the deployment data and avoiding duplication would improve existing maps and better position the agencies to sustain their collaborative efforts, especially in the event of leadership or staff changes. Furthermore, we found that the agencies' collaborative efforts did not fully identify common outcomes or clearly establish agency roles and responsibilities, including leadership roles.
To that end, the strategy called for in the Plan for Broadband Act calls for agencies to establish those clear roles and responsibilities, as well as goals and measures for their efforts.
Ensuring funding is targeted to areas of greatest need also requires accurate data on where broadband is available and where it is lacking. The DATA Broadband Act being discussed today also directs FCC to further refine its maps to identify rural and geographically essential areas where broadband deployment may be prioritized. Our work has highlighted the importance of accurate maps in agency coordination efforts and in the targeting of federal funding. Challenges to FCC's data have frequently been successful, creating questions about the overall accuracy of these maps. While FCC takes steps to ensure the quality of its maps data, it has not assessed how well those efforts are working.
And in response to our audit work and recommendations, FCC has taken some steps to address issues related to data accuracy, although our recommendations remain open. To sum up, as broadband deployment programs are in full swing, our work suggests federal agencies must continue to effectively coordinate their efforts and improve the broadband availability data they rely on to mitigate the risks of overlap and duplication and risks that areas of the country remain underserved. This concludes my statement. I look forward to any questions.
Redner 11
Thank you. Ms. Gorman, you're recognized for five minutes for your opening statement. Make sure your mic's on there.
Jessica Gorman
Chairman Hudson, Ranking Member Matsui, Chairman Guthrie, Ranking Member Pallone, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. My name is Lindsay Gorman, and I come from a background as an AI and cybersecurity engineer with startup companies, as a builder with technology-focused venture firms, as a researcher of US-China technology and AI competition, and as a former White House advisor on technology. Two years ago, I had the honor to testify before this subcommittee on the future internet and the risks of cyber warfare from the People's Republic of China. I argued then that democratic allies needed trusted supply chains for a projected five hundred billion dollar internet of things market, and that applications such as in healthcare and connected vehicles introduce new risks around dependencies, building, espionage, and intellectual property theft.
Today, those risks have grown immeasurably, and they have also transformed in character with the rapid adoption and diffusion of generative artificial intelligence. Yet the US policy response has not kept pace. I focus my testimony on three dimensions of this challenge: the new cyber attack surface posed by AI models, agents, and applications; the competition with the PRC and consideration of open versus closed AI; and advances in 6G telecommunications networks as AI-native. First, AI is massively expanding the cyber attack surface and risks, tipping the offense-defense balance in favor of the attacker. AI systems are becoming increasingly capable hackers.
In April, the UK's AI Security Institute assessed that Claude's Mithos preview was capable of autonomous intrusions. Just yesterday, OpenAI announced that during a benchmark cyber test, its models escaped their test environment, exploited a vulnerability to access the internet, and breached fellow AI company Hugging Face to steal the test results. Models and agents also create new cyber access points for intruders, such as through prompt injection and data poisoning attacks. AI shows promise in defending against cyber intrusions, but the barriers to closing vulnerabilities are often less technical and more organizational. Moreover, as AI development moves from chatbots into the real world, this attack surface will only grow.
One movement in AI community is the development of world models.
Just as with large language models, enormous quantities of real-world data will be required to train these world models, such as videos of janitors cleaning office buildings, soldiers conducting reconnaissance missions, factory workers assessing assembling complex machinery, or basketball players shooting free throws. Once developed and deployed, these systems will collect data continuously on their environments to refine their models. A cybersecurity framework addressing covered adversarial providers must contemplate this future. Second, the United States and its allies can benefit from leading open-source AI infrastructure, but today it is the PRC driving this approach. Historically, the United States has enjoyed the benefits of open-source leadership.
When software engineers the world over today write code, for example, they do so in English. The US holds a small lead in frontier AI, but its infrastructural foundations are unfolding behind closed doors. By contrast, PRC players are releasing open-weight models that are free to use but harder to spot bugs. While analysts assess that this approach carries is a short-term strategy while China lags behind the US, it carries long-term risks that third countries adopt PRC AI systems now due to cost. Some US companies already are.
The US needs lower-cost alternatives for export and a vibrant open-source AI ecosystem at home. Finally, 6G telecom networks will merge computing and communications in an AI-native architecture. The US must lead a coalition of democratic allies to deploy secure 6G as foundational to secure global AI. In my written testimony, I provide recommendations to Congress to modernize US cybersecurity oversight for the AI era, secure AI models and applications against foreign adversarial suppliers, accelerate 6G adoption and security, secure and compete on open-source AI, and rebuild tech trust with allies and partners. The AI landscape is changing day by day and week by week.
Protecting our networks and our leadership is vital for America's future.
Richard Hudson
Thank you. We'll now begin questioning, and I'll recognize myself for five minutes. Mr. Roope, I'm tired of receiving illegal robocalls. I got two while we were sitting here. My constituents are sick of getting these calls.
Many of these calls come from abroad. So what can we do to find these perpetrators and how can we stop these calls from entering our network in the first place?
Kevin Ruane
Chairman Hudson, I share your frustration. I understand it is a huge issue. And, you know, I think based on what I discussed in my testimony, I do believe we need more enforcement, and in particular criminal enforcement. We need to find the bad actors behind this and put them in jail. And the fact of the matter is we can do that.
We have powerful tools that thanks to the TRACED Act developed things like the Industry Traceback Group, the Traceback Consortium, STIR/SHAKEN call authentication. So what I think we should be focusing on is directing our efforts at identifying these bad actors and putting them in jail, especially given the changing nature of this fraud. It's no longer people operating boiler rooms.
It's drug cartels, transnational corporations, and the numbers are just staggering. It's a national security issue and criminal enforcement warrants it.
Richard Hudson
I agree. So you mentioned in your testimony about some of the consequences of if we get the regulation wrong on this and imposing too many burdens on legitimate companies. Can you expand on that a little bit more and what is the harm that we want to avoid by doing that?
Kevin Ruane
Absolutely, Chairman Hudson. I, like, the way I think about this is where can we get the most bang for the buck? And when I look at the TCPA in particular, it has a role to play, right? It sets compliance frameworks for legitimate callers who are trying to communicate with consumers. But at the end of the day, organizations like the Jalisco drug cartel and the Sinaloa drug cartel, they're not going to play by those rules.
And the fact of the matter is, the Jalisco drug cartel was engaging in telemarketing. So I think, you know, what we would be doing instead of using a compliance statute to address this problem, this is a criminal national security problem and we need to use existing criminal statutes to address it.
Richard Hudson
Thank you for that. Mr. Von Ah, it's been a few years since GAO released its report on the need for broadband strategy to improve the coordination of federal broadband programs. Have things improved over the last four years?
Andrew Von Ah
Yes, I think things have improved. We've seen programs get on track and begin putting money out into to provide to carriers and others to build infrastructure. So we have seen that. We've seen improvements in agency coordination as well, better ability to sort of deduplicate or avoid duplication of effort where they have overlapping service areas and things of that nature. So yes, absolutely.
Richard Hudson
That's good news. With the BEAD program finally connecting homes, do we still need 130 different government programs doing broadband? Did we ever need that many?
Andrew Von Ah
Well, that's the question that we're asking today with a strategy. I would say that we probably don't need 130 programs. And BEAD's goal is ultimately to connect every location that's in the map. So what happens going forward, I think, is sort of the next question for what we think of as a national broadband strategy. What are the existing needs in a post-BEAD world?
Richard Hudson
Yeah, well, I agree with you on that. Mr. Rupie, we've talked about how AI can be used to secure our communications networks from bad actors. How are providers using AI to combat illegal robocalls?
Kevin Ruane
Thank you, Chairman Hudson. Basically, think of it as an ecosystem. So we have voice providers, we have partnering analytics providers, and then obviously we have the bad actors. What I'm seeing in the industry right now is that these analytics providers are using AI. They're using AI to make those algorithms that they use to identify these calls more accurate.
They're using AI to identify AI-generated calls. And, you know, at the end of the day, this is a bit of an arms race. I mean, the good guys are using AI and the bad guys are using AI. But at the end, you know, basically industry is leveraging these tools because they're essential, particularly in this space.
Richard Hudson
Well, I appreciate that. And that's just one more reason we've got to win the race to develop AI. We've got to be the ones with the best systems.
Thank you for that testimony. My time has expired. I now recognize the ranking member, gentlelady from California, for five minutes to ask her questions.
Doris Matsui
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Cyberattacks are increasing in frequency and severity, and AI models have increased the capacity for bad actors to attack critical infrastructure. We need a clear strategy to protect the communication systems that Americans rely on every single day. Ms. Gorman, many critical infrastructure providers rely on complex networks with software from multiple vendors. How could a trusted software catalog, automated patching, and continuous monitoring help them close security gaps?
Jessica Gorman
Thanks for the question. As I mentioned in my testimony, AI is also creating this incredible threat surface, but also can provide some defensive tools, some of which you've mentioned in automated threat detection, vulnerability patching. What I would urge Congress to do is we really need to have some minimum security standards. When we're rolling out networks, when we're using AI within our networks, we need to be sure that they are not subject to adversarial incursion and that they can be leveraged for these benefits.
Redner 7
Okay, can you suggest other tools that Congress should support to help critical infrastructure providers find and fix vulnerabilities faster?
Jessica Gorman
I think ultimately some of these things just have to be required. We can let the private sector and collaborate with the private sector do some of this on its own, but when it comes to critical infrastructure, if AI systems are going to be discovering vulnerabilities for the attacker, I think we need to require that they're also going to be discovering vulnerabilities for the defenders.
Doris Matsui
Okay, open source AI supports innovation, competition, and lower costs. However, they could carry with them, we know, significant risk if adopted without a clear understanding of their origins or security limitations. Ms. Gorman, how can Congress protect against unsafe AI models while still allowing open source researchers and companies to innovate?
Jessica Gorman
There are two dimensions of the risk here. One is models coming from adversarial actors, such as the People's Republic of China, which tend to be open weight. And two is this question of can you audit the source code, can you understand what a model is doing? Right now those two questions are kind of aligned because the PRC is putting forward these open weight models which, unlike open source software traditionally where you can inspect the source code, you can see, understand if there are bugs in there, with open weight models that's not really the case. So what the United States needs to do is, one, come up with competitors to these low-cost models that the PRC is putting forward, and two, support a vibrant open source, not just open weight, but open source ecosystem for AI infrastructure.
Things like the National AI Research Resource could be codified in statute, tools to develop the infrastructure behind AI so that researchers across the country can build on open source architectures for their own models.
Doris Matsui
Okay, now Ms. Gorman, we know China's making advanced AI models cheaper and easier to adopt. What investments does the United States need to ensure that secure American and allied alternatives remain affordable and competitive?
Jessica Gorman
Well, one way we could do this is right now we have an American AI exports program where consortia of AI providers and industry are coming together and the idea is they'll receive preferential financing, maybe some tax credits, investments, and also promotion from the State Department around the world.
We need to make sure that there is a cost-competitive track of that, potentially open source, potentially even open weight, so that our systems can also be in the global marketplaces competing directly with the PRC. Not not only do we need to make the the best frontier models, which the United States is still doing, but we also need to be providing some lower-cost alternatives to meet the world I think where it is.
Okay. All right. Well, thank you very much, Ms. Gorman. I yield back.
Redner 14
Thank you. The chair now recognizes the chairman of the full committee, Mr. Guthrie, for five minutes for your questions.
Brett Guthrie
Thank thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm going to focus on the humanoid robotics industry. So Mr. Robbins, who currently has the competitive edge in the humanoid quadruped robotics industry, the US or China?
Michael Robbins
I would say the US is leading in innovation and China is leading in actual deployment.
Brett Guthrie
Okay. Can you speak more about why you think Congress needs to act swiftly?
Michael Robbins
Yeah. The Congress needs to act swiftly because we've seen the exact playbook that China is using right now with humanoid and quadruped robotics and robotics broadly work very effectively in other industries like like drones, for example, which is an industry we also represent. And the longer we wait, the more the installed base grows in the United States and the more difficult it is then to make a policy change later, the more costly that policy decision is to people who have installed the the Chinese robots and built that base. We saw that with drones when this committee passed the Protecting from CCP Drone Act. There was a lot of opposition from people who had made significant investments in Chinese drones thinking that was okay.
They didn't understand the national security risk.
Brett Guthrie
So what do you think are the concerns with having these robots from China?
Michael Robbins
Yeah, there's a couple of big concerns. First, data exfiltration. The the connected systems are are, you know, known to be directing data directly back to the PRC. So when research is being done, that research in American institution is also being shared with Chinese institutions. So all of that leakage is occurring.
Further, there's the these are mapping and surveying and audio sensors on all of these robots. So whatever operation there is in, whether it's a factory or a hospital or a military base, they're creating 3D models of the world around them. They're listening to the world around them. And again, all that data can be leaked back to China. And in the scariest version is through a data update, a remote sensing remote access, they could actually be used to physically disrupt the environment that they're in as well.
Brett Guthrie
Yeah, I this committee worked on the ban for Chinese cars and that's the same same issues with cars as well. So so also, Mr. Robbins, so prior to the GUARD Act's introduction, we worked with sponsors to add in a rule of construction to carve out partner and ally countries from being included in any addition to the cover list. Can you talk more about the importance of collaborating with like-minded partners, specifically in the robotics industry? And if we didn't have outside help, I mean outside connections, not help, but connections.
Michael Robbins
Yeah, the robotics industry is a very global industry and we have a very strong partnership in the United States with many democratic ally countries, Korea, Japan, Taiwan, throughout Europe, Israel, Australia. And we are much stronger when working together taking on China's authoritarian scale than when any single democratic nation trying to take on China's authoritarian scale alone.
Brett Guthrie
Okay. So also, Mr. Robbins, the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act referenced earlier, we call rip and replace, was signed into law in 2020. Since then, foreign-made this is the Routers Act, foreign-made routers and drones have been added to the cover list. Okay, I guessed that wrong. So since then, the foreign-made routers and drones have been added to the cover.
Are there any lessons learned that we should be considering as the GUARD Act goes through the legislative process? And for example, how should we think about balancing naming specific entities of concern versus entire categories of products and services?
Michael Robbins
Yeah, great question, sir. Um, so when the FCC took action on drones, they did both. They named an entire category of products of drones, but they also named two particular companies, DJI and Autel Robotics, as particular entities and companies of concern due to national security findings. So both work. In this case, in the robotics space, the leading Chinese robotics company, Unitree Robotics, has already had a national security finding from the Department of War.
They've been placed on the 1260H list, which is the People's Republic of China PLA military-linked companies. So I think doing both would make sense in this case as well. I think another lesson learned from drones that I would is a cautionary tale is with drones, the focus was on all drones, not just on adversarial platforms. The GUARD Act is written in a way that targets verified national security risk with adversarial and does not sweep in our trusted NATO and major non-NATO allies. Additionally, the GUARD Act also does not cover components.
It instead has a study on components for potential future FCC action, allowing there to be more of a transition time for US industry.
Brett Guthrie
Okay, my time's about to expire. Know all of my questions, I yield back, appreciate it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Redner 2
Thank you, Chairman. Chair now recognize the ranking member of the full committee, Mr. Pallone, for five minutes for questions.
Frank Pallone
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I believe my Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act provided a helpful framework for how the FCC should work with our national security agencies to determine if certain communications equipment or services pose a threat to society. And under that framework, the FCC must place the equipment or services that have been deemed a national security threat on its covered list, which effectively removes them from our country's supply chains. But given these stakes, it's important for this committee to have oversight over the way the FCC is implementing the framework and ensure the FCC's decisions are the result of a rigorous and detailed national security analysis. So I have three questions of Ms. Gorman, and then I'm going to go to one of Mr. Ruppy.
So Ms. Gorman, is it important for the FCC to work with our national security agencies to evaluate the security threats posed by communications equipment and services?
Redner 18
Very. The FCC doesn't have a full picture on its own of national security threats.
Frank Pallone
Okay. And should we build upon this framework to ensure that the FCC provides more transparency to this committee before placing equipment or services on the covered list, and if so, why?
I believe we should. We need a well-articulated strategy, which the FCC should work with this committee, with Congress, to develop, so that the full spectrum of US national security risks as well as economic objectives are considered in these decisions and that the biggest risk can be mitigated with broad bipartisan support so that ultimately they stick.
Frank Pallone
Okay. And then my third question is also, how else can we improve the secure and trusted framework, especially given increasing capabilities of drones, of robots, and AI?
Jessica Gorman
I think we need to really clearly spell out what risks we actually want to guard against when it comes to securing our networks. We're about to be confronted with a huge panoply of PRC-made devices, robots, AI models, the systems using AI models. And we need to make decisions about what risk, is it espionage, is it dependence building, is it intellectual property theft, is it the pure cybersecurity risk that we want to guard against with these kinds of devices, and spell that out in a clear framework that looks to the future, that builds in both the network security and also the applications that are sitting on top of these networks.
We're going to be using AI within the networks themselves. We're going to be training AI models on the network. So it's not enough to think about the applications and the networks as two separate pieces, but if we're going to be using AI to monitor network traffic for vulnerabilities, for malicious behavior, what are the guardrails we want to put on those systems? I think that's what an updated framework should get at.
Frank Pallone
All right, thank you. I wanted to go to Mr. Ruppy. We all know dangerous and unwanted calls and texts continue to bombard Americans. The TRACED Act, which I authored, required, among other things, the creation of the Industry Traceback Group, ITG, public-private partnership to trace and stop illegal calls. And while the ITG has helped to reduce the amount of unwanted robocalls, there's a lot more work for Congress and the industry to do here.
So let me ask you first, thank you for your past efforts to stand up the ITG. And with your experience, how else should the federal government and industry collaborate to further protect consumers from dangerous robocalls and robotexts, if you will?
Kevin Ruane
Thank you for that question, Ranking Member Pallone, and I applaud your leadership on the passage of the TRACED Act. When I think about the TRACED Act and I remember the run-up and the passage of it, that's exactly the type of legislation that we need to be thinking about and how to approach this. You know, one of the big things that has changed since, you know, just prior to the TRACED Act and now is this involvement with criminal elements, national security threats, like it really has morphed in recent years from my perspective. But I think, you know, to your point, the TRACED Act established the Traceback Consortium, the ITG, and the FCC, other federal and state agencies have used that data. ITG data fuels enforcement.
And as an example, there was a case, the FCC Sumco Panama, where once the FCC acted based on traceback data, those calls fell off a cliff. And I think what's what's missing is the individuals behind those calls, we need to bring criminal enforcement to this problem. I mean, the numbers are just staggering, particularly in terms of financial loss. So I think that's a key element and collaboration is happening and it works.
Redner 16
The ranking member yields and now ask my questions here for the next five minutes. I want to thank Chairman Hudson for holding this important hearing and I want to thank the witnesses for being here to testify. And we keep talking about robocalls. I've had my experience with those. And in fact, this one call I got, I mean, I told the guy, I says, you know, I'm a member of Congress and I'm going to have the FBI investigate you.
And he kept trying to get me to go buy this card and I finally said, did you hear what I said? And you know, so I don't know. But like I say, it sounds like a game of whack-a-mole as far as these harassing calls and they remain a nationwide problem and they're getting really more serious and more serious. And I don't know where they come up with all these ideas. But obviously we talked about some of the things that are working.
But you know, and we talked about the TRACE legislation where we can so we can trace these calls. We have the ability to trace these calls back to the originator?
Kevin Ruane
That's correct. And one thing I want to emphasize about that is prior to traceback, it would take months, like six, seven, eight months for law enforcement to do that. It can be done now in 24 hours, sometimes less.
Redner 16
So as far as convicting these people, where is the hold up? Is it in the court system or is law enforcement able to do what they need to do? Or is DOJ involved? How does that, the court system work and the fines and things like that?
Kevin Ruane
So I think it's a resource issue. I think it's a resource and prioritization issue. And you know, in my opinion, I think what often happens, whether it's a US Attorney's office, the DOJ, whomever, they see robocalls and they think, you know, this isn't a big deal. It's just robocalls. But given the changing nature of this fraud and who is involved, I think there needs to be a prioritization on criminal enforcement.
Civil enforcement works, it disrupts, it knocks them off their game, but I believe we need to put people behind bars.
Redner 17
How about the carriers and the equipment suppliers? What are they doing to try to eliminate this problem?
Kevin Ruane
So there are various things that are happening both, you know, on the handset side, on the carrier side. Carriers work very closely with various vendors that are providing more and more powerful tools to consumers to identify these calls. Traditionally, these calls were being labeled with scam likely, spam likely. But as the fraud evolves, the tools evolve. And so now we're moving to solutions like branded calling solutions that, you know, will literally show verified number and logo on the device.
And carriers also work closely with the ITG in identifying these folks.
Redner 16
And so I'm listening to you, the federal government needs to do more to deal with this, obviously, and in identifying these, particularly these, enforcing the laws outside your jurisdiction. Because I'm pretty sure this robocall I got was from some other country. I could barely understand the person. So, well thank you for your work on behalf of that problem. Mr. Von Ah, in my district, many communities don't care which federal program builds broadband, they simply want reliable service.
How can we make the federal process easier for local providers, from electric cooperatives to local telephone companies in our communities that are just simply trying to get connected? GAO found that more than 130 broadband programs spread across, and I think the chairman mentioned this, 15-something agencies. From your perspective, what is the single biggest coordination problem that Congress should be focused on fixing and getting this done?
Andrew Von Ah
So I think from our work, Vice Chairman Allen, I would say that it's making sure that the roles and responsibilities amongst the agencies are clear. We have seen a lot of positive things from coordination. We've seen them focus on avoiding duplication and being largely successful in doing so. Less so are they sort of considering more strategic kinds of issues, whether that service is going to be sustainable over the long term, whether that's going to have the kind of subscribership that's going to sustain that going forward. And so we would like to see sort of what happens next with federal agency coordination in those areas.
Darren Soto
Thank you. Well, I am out of time. I'm over time, actually. Okay, I'll now call on Representative Soto for his five minutes of questioning.
Thank you, Chairman. Technology's moving at an incredibly rapid pace, and this committee needs to keep up to help boost jobs, to lower costs, and protect our constituents. And so we have a wonderful hearing today on a whole range of issues from technology and telecommunications. First, continuing the battle against annoying and sometimes fraudulent robocalls. I feel like this is like the umpteenth chapter of that, but this time foreign calls and AI-generated voice calls are now on the menu finally as well.
Secondly, AI can be used to help as well in improving security and resiliency in our telecom network. I've seen that even in our local roads back home, so I'm interested to see those efficiencies. And then stopping the flood of Chinese robotics. We know from our rip and replace issues with telecom from Huawei that Chinese companies have spied on us. They've used communist principles to help corner markets.
We need to boost domestic production and make sure that these are trustworthy machines. Everybody wants better cell phone service and internet connections, and so I know that when we're dealing with the AI Telecom Network bill, that's going to be important. I'm particularly excited about the DATA Bridge Act, adding agriculture areas to national broadband maps. Proud to represent cattle and citrus country. They are using precision agriculture, they're tracking livestock, receiving and analyzing large amounts of data to improve yields, and so that connectivity is so important.
First, Mr. Von Ah, in relation to the DATA Bridge Act, I've got to ask, why were ag areas not included in the original national broadband map? Do you happen to know?
Redner 22
I mean, they were included in the sense that if there's a broadband-serviceable location, it would be included in the map. So for example, if there was a farmhouse, that would be a broadband-serviceable location, but it wouldn't necessarily show the entire area that might need broadband coverage.
Darren Soto
Sure, and when a lot of these farms and ranches, they're so vast that they're going to need different stations for both internet connections and for Wi-Fi. On the BEAD program, we finally got testimony that two states, after a year and a half into this administration, finally are getting broadband. Do you see, is the speed picking up finally again on some of these BEAD, because I know Floridians, especially in these rural areas, are really waiting on this?
Redner 22
From all indications, it looks like funding is starting to go out. Nearly all of the state plans have been approved, and as you mentioned, there's funding going out the door to various states, and they're beginning to execute their plans.
Redner 21
So I guess my question is, would we be ready to meet the need or at least get close to meeting the need on day one? Mr. Robbins, I know under the GUARD Act, we would help boost domestic production and also with our allies. Thank you so much.
What would that look like as far as having the means of production to be able to meet the demand for all these robotics that are needed for our daily lives?
Michael Robbins
Yeah, thank you for that question, Congressman. American robotics companies are actively working to scale manufacturing in the US now and working with partners from allied nations as well. The challenge at the moment is it's hard to scale when you don't have consistent demand and it's hard to raise money when investors look at the marketplace and look at other markets where China has come in and dumped subsidized products into the market and drove American companies out of business. So right now investors are standing on the sidelines more than we'd like them to. Private capital has sort of learned lessons from the drone industry and solar panels and others and said, until the US actually does something about this Chinese dumping, this might not be a safe bet.
So addressing this now with the GUARD Act would certainly help spur US manufacturing as we're seeing now in the drone industry where there are literally hundreds of millions of square feet of drone manufacturing production under construction in America today.
Darren Soto
So we saw with telecommunications, we had to rip and replace because it was already in there, right? It was already too late and we had to pull all this Huawei equipment back. Is there any other sort of economic development aspects we could help you with to boost production beyond sort of stopping the dumping of Chinese robotics and drones?
Michael Robbins
Yeah, that's a great question, Congressman, and you're absolutely right. The GUARD Act is a defensive mechanism and we need some offense as well. What China does really well is they both support the companies that are manufacturing the robots, but they also support the companies that are acquiring the robots domestically in China. They create demand. So the federal government can be a better customer first and foremost in national labs, on military bases, and other places, but also can create incentives for US manufacturing to purchase American-made robots and install them in the factories.
We have about over 500,000 manufacturing jobs shortfall in America right now and American robotics can help enhance American manufacturing efficiency and US GDP by helping to enhance manufacturing efficiency.
Thank you, and I yield back.
Redner 24
Thank you, sir. Thank you, Chair, now recognize the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Latta, for five.
Robert Latta
Well, thanks, Mr. Chairman, and thanks for our witnesses for being with us today. This hearing is very, very important. And if I could start with you, Mr. Van Noort, just I've been on this subcommittee for a good number of years and chaired it. But you know, when we talk about having 130 broadband programs across 15 different departments and agencies, and we've the question always comes up, how many do we really need? We don't need that many, I know we don't.
And the question I guess is GAO done a report as to the cost of having that many different programs across that many departments and agencies?
Andrew Von Ah
We haven't delved into the cost in terms of whether there's sort of like a duplicative effort across the agencies. We haven't honed in on the exact cost of that, but certainly there's overhead in each agency to execute those programs. So you've got sort of repetitive and duplicative overhead in each.
Robert Latta
Well, let me ask, is that something then this committee, the subcommittee could ask of you and GAO to do a cost estimate on that?
Robert Latta
Okay, well thank you. Ms. Gorman, if I could ask a quick question for you because so short on time when we only have five minutes on so many questions. In the last bullet point in your testimony, you have rebuild tech trust with US allies and partners. And you talk about, you know, about the US leadership that's been out there and that we need to be back out in front. But it's also been talked about Huawei and ZTE.
You know, we did a $4.8 billion rip and replace in this country because they're not a trusted network. And we know that a lot of countries out there get it because quote unquote cheap, but you know, you sometimes end up selling your soul to get what Huawei and ZTE is giving. How do we regain that trust when everybody knows this is not trusted equipment that the Chinese are putting out there?
Jessica Gorman
I very much agree. And in fact, I think we for our allies and partners, we should be continuously pointing out the risks, not just to us, not just to someone else, but actually to them of using these these vendors. The intellectual property theft, the displacement of their own industries that are that are at risk. I think some countries, you know, also and some parts particularly in Europe look at the US and say, well, we want to move towards our own sovereign approaches. And I think that would be that would be much more difficult than if we come up with an allied an allied strategic approach where we can use trusted vendors across our allies and partners.
And so that's the kind of trust in the United States, in our ecosystem of allies and partners that I think is critical to ensuring that we don't make choices in this country and in our closest allies and partners about using some of these untrusted vendors like Huawei and ZTE.
Robert Latta
Thank you. Mr. Robbins, you know, you've talked about the in especially in your your testimony that 96% of the uncrewed aircraft in the United States is coming from one source from the PRC. And that's that's truly unacceptable. And I know we've been trying to get something done about that. But we all know the absolute risk of having these drones flying around the United States collecting information on us.
Law enforcement has said, oh, we we really like the technology. And we've how how do we say that, you know, folks, it might be time to turn those things off, put them in the closet and leave them there? Has there been a lot of discussion out there to tell people they better not be using because I know when I'm out and I'm asked, I said don't use them.
Michael Robbins
Yeah, I appreciate that, Congressman. And I think the conversation has evolved a lot. The the education work done by Congress, by agencies like CISA and the FBI, have really put out a lot of good information on the risk of using Chinese drones and the national security implications of that. But we also have to recognize that, you know, local law enforcement, public safety agencies, they typically have very, very tight budgets. And they've made in some cases very significant investments in their Chinese drone fleets.
And it's not an easy switch for them to just turn those off and go back to not having drones because they're they are a life-saving tool. And it's also not easy for them to to go out and into the market and and find new dollars to to buy replacement drones. Congress did have a rip and replace program, as we talked about, for the telecommunications network when there was a clear national security risk with ZTE and Huawei. We would very much like to see a similar rip and replace program for drones. There are a few grant programs out there now that are helping communities, DOJ grants, DHS grants, FEMA grants, acquire non-Chinese drone technology as the Chinese drone technology is being phased out through because of the FCC rule ruling.
But it's not a lot of money right now. And that's certainly an opportunity for Congress to to step in and help local public safety agencies make this transition faster.
Redner 30
Well, thank you very much. My time's expired. I'll submit questions that I didn't have time to ask to the witnesses.
Scott Peters
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for calling this important hearing. We've discussed many times on this subcommittee just how critical broadband connectivity is in our increasingly online world. In an age of technology, it's more important than ever for my constituents in San Diego and Americans across the country to get connected as quickly as possible so they can access employment opportunities, education, telehealth care, and more. In 2022, the Government Accountability Office, or GAO, released a broadband study on the "national strategy needed to guide federal efforts to reduce the digital divide."
In this study, GAO identified the over 130 federal programs to expand broadband access administered by 15 different federal agencies. The amount of investment shows that the federal government surely understands the importance of connectivity. However, the study found that this vast number of programs spread across so many agencies has led to a fragmented, confusing, overlapping patchwork of funding. I'm concerned that the communities with the most limited resources may be the most affected by this fragmentation. Following the publication of the GAO report, I introduced the Plan for Broadband Act with my colleague Representative Walberg.
The Plan for Broadband Act directly mirrors GAO recommendation in this study to synchronize federal efforts with a national broadband strategy. Mr. Von Ah, what is at stake with regards to this federal program fragmentation, and which communities do you think are being harmed most?
Andrew Von Ah
Thank you for the question, Representative Peters. So going forward, right now there's, you know, all these programs are underway in terms of trying to build out their broadband projects. And so what's key now is sort of what areas might be missed after those projects are completed. Will we get all of the areas covered that we want to have covered? Will there be sufficient coverage?
Are there going to be those some carriers who drop out of these programs or default on their requirements or what they have promised to do in these programs? And then it's sort of what do we do at that point? And that's kind of where we are at this point. So in terms of the 130 programs, it's really boiled down to about a dozen programs or so that are focused on broadband deployment currently, and they are all underway.
Scott Peters
So you're not particularly concerned about the fragmentation, or is there something you recommend we do about that?
Andrew Von Ah
I'm still concerned about the fragmentation, of course, and what we've recommended to agencies is the importance of interagency collaboration on knowing what each agency is doing, where they're deploying broadband, whether they're trying to leverage those resources to basically bring communities up to speed.
Scott Peters
Okay. Well, I'm happy to see the Plan for Broadband Act included in today's hearing after it was reported out of the Senate Commerce Committee last spring, and hope this bipartisan proposal we can see it through the committee to the floor soon. Today we're also discussing legislation to crack down on robocalls. There's been a lot of discussion about that. I consistently hear from my constituents about the harm robocalls cause, and just recently heard from a senior citizen who resorted to changing his phone number to stop the approximately 20 scam calls he receives every single day.
For many people, phone calls are the only way to stay in touch with loved ones or to receive important medical information, but thanks to the constant flood of scam robocalls, answering the phone can feel like taking a gamble, as if the scammers have taken over the whole system. So, Mr. Ruppy, can you talk about how AI is changing the landscape for robocall scammers and how we as Congress can best protect our constituents from the scams that are becoming increasingly convincing?
Kevin Ruane
Thank you, Congressman. And yes, it is an evolving landscape, and AI is certainly a tool that the scammers are using to make their fraud schemes seem more authentic, make them more convincing. And at the same time, like, those same tools are being used by industry to counteract those.
There are challenges at times with, you know, in the example you gave, you know, certain networks, IP networks versus TDM networks may be more capable of handling some of these tools. But at the end of the day, you know, industry is doing everything they can to deploy these tools, deploy AI to counteract these, but it's an ongoing process and I do believe that, you know, a criminal enforcement element is needed.
Scott Peters
Mentioned that that's something obviously we could add here. Thank you all for your testimony. Glad to see the committee responding to these threats. And Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Richard Hudson
Thank you. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Griffith, for five minutes for your testimony.
H. Griffith
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate and Mr. Rubia, appreciate your testimony and I have gotten one, I'm not as popular as the chairman, I've only gotten one spam call while we've been sitting here. And I am curious though, because my constituents get these all the time too, but they, a lot of them in my district and the complaints I get are people calling up on Medicare, Medicare Advantage type programs. But like the chairman, I don't get those. Now he's too young to get them, but I don't get those.
I get the ones that want to lend me money. So how do they, what algorithm are they using to decide to call based on lending money or Medicare Advantage?
Kevin Ruane
Often times, and thank you for that question, Congressman, often these scams, they obviously vary, they come in different flavors, but often times the scammers will gain access to what are called lead lists, where, you know, because of something, whether it's a cyber hack where that information was obtained, where they can find identifiable information about that particular consumer, you know, they're on Medicare, they're on Medicaid, they need to borrow money. You know, that gets sold on the internet as a full package lead list and they'll start making those calls. And it can fluctuate. I used to get a lot of robocalls and even though I answer them, fewer now it seems to me. But to your point, it's a very dynamic space and there is access to information that enables them to target individuals.
H. Griffith
And then I love the ones, and I don't know whether anybody else has gotten these, but I love the ones where it says I'm calling myself. I get a call from me.
Where your phone number is calling you.
Redner 26
It's my phone number that's calling me to tell me about whatever it is they want to sell me.
H. Griffith
Right. And I know that has happened to constituents because they've told me that. So we're hearing all these complaints and I'm glad we're holding the hearing today to talk about H.R. 6152, which I am a co-sponsor of. But it seems to me that you got these organized scam rings that are operating overseas to do this and isn't that what the FCC's robocall mitigation database is supposed to block? And how come it isn't working and how is it supposed to work?
Kevin Ruane
So I will say this, I think the FCC's robocall mitigation database plays a very important role. And, you know, at a very high level, the way it functions, if you're not in the database, no provider can accept your traffic. Right?
So if a provider tries to go to say Verizon or AT&T and Verizon and AT&T sees they're not in the database, they can't send or originate calls. I think the biggest challenge with the FCC's RMD is the quality of many of the entries. There are just fraudulent organizations, VoIP providers that are registered in the database, and the FCC to its credit has done a lot to throw these providers out. They removed about 1400 providers last year from the RMD. But I think, you know, the big issue is we need to catch them on the front end before they get in the database, because once they're in the database, they can make phone calls.
H. Griffith
And does the Foreign Robocall Elimination Act incentivize tracking down the bad actors?
Kevin Ruane
I believe it does, Congressman. And, you know, I think there's a lot of good things in the bill. Among other things, the task force that is formed, I'm a big believer that, you know, good data informs good policy, and the task force strives to do that. On the traceback front, I think it is a great idea that we're moving that renewal process from one year to three, because all that is is a paperwork exercise for FCC Enforcement Bureau staff and the traceback consortium. So let's reduce the paperwork so they can focus on enforcement and traceback.
And I do acknowledge that, you know, the RMD has a lot of issues. And, you know, that's something that just today the FCC adopted a rulemaking on, they've initiated a rulemaking proceeding to see how best to tighten up the RMD.
Redner 34
All right, I appreciate it. I yield back, Mr. Chairman, probably have questions for the record. Thank you.
Robin Kelly
Thank you. The Chair will now recognize the Representative from Illinois, Representative Kelly, for five minutes for your questions.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member, for holding today's hearing, and thank you to our witnesses for being here. Reliable broadband is essential infrastructure. It connects families to healthcare, students to educational opportunities, and small businesses to customers around the world. It is critical to the success of American farmers and rural communities who increasingly rely on precision agriculture and other connected technologies to remain competitive. As the proud Democratic co-lead of the bipartisan DATA Bridge Act, I believe one of the most important steps we can take to ensure that we are making decisions based on accurate, complete data.
If our maps fail to identify agricultural areas, we risk overlooking farmers who depend on reliable connectivity to support food production and drive innovation. This legislation simply gives policymakers better information by incorporating USDA cultivated land maps into broadband maps so that broadband investments can be targeted where they are needed most. Improvements to the national broadband map will lead to better decisions, better stewardship of taxpayer dollars, and ultimately better outcomes for rural America. Mr. Von Ah, can you explain why incorporating agricultural land into FCC's broadband maps would improve federal broadband planning and deployment decisions?
Redner 35
Absolutely, thank you for the question, Representative Kelly. Our work over the last several years has continuously shown that the better, accurate, more accurate data we have in maps, the better we can target our investments. That's been true going back to when FCC used census blocks to sort of identify where broadband was or wasn't.
Redner 31
The more refined and more accurate data that we can get, the better we can target those investments.
Thank you. And as farms increasingly rely on precision agriculture, connected equipment, and real-time data, what are the potential consequences to federal broadband funding if these agricultural areas continue to be underrepresented in our mapping efforts?
Redner 35
I think the answer is fairly simple, that they may not get the investment necessary to support those kinds of activities.
Robin Kelly
And that affects our farmers and economic development. My district is urban, suburban, and rural, and I have 4,500 farms in my district, so they are definitely very interested in this. Well, thank you, and we must ensure greater access to broadband for all Americans, and that includes our farmers in rural communities who feel left out far too often. Thank you, and I yield back.
Redner 36
Thank you. The chair now recognizes the representative from Texas, Representative Pfluger, for five minutes for your questions.
August Pfluger
Thank you, Chairman. Thanks for holding this hearing, and to our witnesses, we appreciate your testimony as we look through these issues. Every phone call, every text, and transaction that Americans make travel across networks that are under a growing attack, and I think y'all have mentioned that today. But recent reporting showed millions of attacks launched against US telecom providers in a single year, and those obviously have a cost that's associated with it, billions of dollars, in fact. And AI has given our adversaries a powerful new tool to launch these attacks at a scale that we have not seen, maybe ever.
And it should also be one of our best tools to stop them. AI should be that tool that we can help leverage and stop them. And I think that's important, and that's why Congressman Menendez and I introduced the bipartisan AI for Secure Networks Act, which directs the Department of Commerce to examine how AI can be responsibly used to strengthen the security and resilience of telecommunications networks. So, Ms. Gorman, I'll start with you. You've said that AI risks tipping the offense-defense balance in the attacker's favor, even as it shows real promise for automated threat detection.
Can you maybe expand a little bit on where is AI-based network defense mature enough to deploy right now, and then on the other side of that coin, where does it still need to grow?
Jessica Gorman
Yeah, thank you, Congressman, for the question. And I think this is the offense-defense battle balance is evolving. These technologies are evolving so rapidly that every week there's a new development. But I agree, and I agree with the premise of the AI for Secure Networks Act, that we need to be leveraging these technologies for defense. Where I think these technologies are increasingly mature is in finding vulnerabilities that we might not be able to find with other means.
That's incredibly powerful for both attackers and, of course, also for defenders. Where I think there's still work to be done is exactly in this question of what kinds of models and what cybersecurity standards of the models themselves are we going to allow into our networks to monitor the traffic on networks, to find vulnerabilities, to monitor for suspicious behavior? Right now, we don't have any requirements on cybersecurity standards of the models themselves. They're subject to data poisoning, they're subject to prompt injection attacks, it could be using adversarial models. So I think that's really the biggest barrier to fully integrating these AI models into network defense.
August Pfluger
Thank you. Mr. Robbins, you've made the case that the connected sensor-rich devices pose a risk, whether they're robots or network equipment or otherwise, and I agree with that. Does the same logic apply to how we think about deploying AI-enabled monitoring tools across telecom networks?
Michael Robbins
Yes, thank you for that question, Congressman. We see robots as the physical manifestation of AI. It is embodied AI. So yes, that logic absolutely is sound.
August Pfluger
I want to talk robocalls, and I know that this has been discussed, but it's obviously one of the top complaints that we hear, and assuming that most of my colleagues are also getting the same. But according to the FCC, illegal and spoof robocalls remain its top consumer protection priority, and a large share of that traffic is originating in foreign locations with foreign-based robocallers. It's a huge problem and a challenge. The TRACED Act, signed into law in 2019, directed the FCC to designate a single consortium to run private-led traceback efforts, and they've redesignated the Industry Traceback Group every year since 2020. Mr. Roopee, you helped build the ITG from scratch, and how would extending that consortium's designation from one year to three years, say, affect its ability to actually go after robocallers and have a higher effective rate?
Kevin Ruane
Thank you, Congressman. I think that extension makes great sense. And you know, the main reasons are, I think it's prudent that the TRACED Act established a review period for the designated traceback consortium, but it's sort of a Goldilocks scenario, right? Like, one year is a little too short, three years is an ideal period because each and every year, the FCC has to go through an administrative process. If a competing application is filed, the traceback consortium has to respond.
So in my mind, it's a more efficient process that enables both the Enforcement Bureau and the traceback consortium to do what they do best, which is find bad guys and target them.
Redner 37
Thank you. Five minutes is hard to get everything solved, but I appreciate that. Yield back, Chairman.
Nanette Barragán
Thank you. The chair now recognizes Representative from California, Representative Barragán, for five minutes for her questions.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Last year, seniors lost $7.7 billion to scammers, up 59% from the year before. And part of that came from what the FBI calls distress scams, where AI voice cloning tools mimic a grandchild's voice to fake an emergency. Mr. Roopee, these scams are already happening today. In addition to the QUIET Act, what else can Congress do to stop that call before it ever reaches someone?
Kevin Ruane
Thank you, Congresswoman. And you know, I don't want to sound like a broken record, but I do believe that, you know, in my mind, we can find the individuals originating these calls. We can find them, we can locate them, and we can find the organizations that are, you know, managing that process. And that is a heartbreaking scam. It's terrible.
My own 90-year-old mother received a call like that. But that is why I really think we need to start focusing on criminal enforcement. I think too often people think about robocalls as a nuisance, a bother. It's no longer that. This is, you know, as I noted in my opening testimony, it's not only a major consumer harm issue, it's national security.
Is there anything in the current law now that would stop the call before it connects?
I think the closest thing that would stop a call before it connects is removal from the FCC's Robocall Mitigation Database. In other words, you know, whoever that provider is that is originating those calls, once they are taken out of the database, they can't do that anymore. And the FCC has done that. They've, you know, removed 1,400 last year from the RMD.
Nanette Barragán
Thank you. One more on this is a lot of my constituents speak Spanish or another language at home first, and scam operations already run calls in multiple languages. Does a disclosure rule like the QUIET Act protect someone if the scam isn't happening in English, or are non-English speakers more exposed unless protected than anyone, than everyone else?
Kevin Ruane
Thank you, Congresswoman. In my opinion, I don't, I don't think that imposing compliance mandates will lower the prevalence of those calls or reduce those calls because at the end of the day, the bad actors behind those calls, they don't, they don't care about compliance. They don't observe do-not-call mandates, they do not disclose their actual identities and, you know, it's not going to have the downward pressure on illegal robocalls that we all want, in my opinion.
Nanette Barragán
Is there any kind of tracking of whether these scams are disproportionately target non-English speakers, or is that data we don't have?
Kevin Ruane
There are, there are certainly vendors out there and, you know, potentially some carriers that have that information. They, they can see where these scams are occurring geographically. So companies like YouMail, Nomorobo and others, they, they can see that data.
Nanette Barragán
Great, thanks. Mr. Von Ah, a 2023 report that you authored found that nearly a third of families without broadband said the reason was cost, and a quarter of families who already had it struggled to afford it. Now, those same families are paying up to $30 a more, $30 month more, which is almost $350 a year since the Affordable Connectivity Program ended. Does GAO still consider the single biggest barrier between families, does, does GAO still consider cost the single biggest barrier between families and affordable broadband?
Andrew Von Ah
Uh, if it's certainly one of the, the key issues, if not the most critical one, yes.
Nanette Barragán
No, it certainly, certainly is one of the most critical, yes.
Oh, it is one of the most critical. Because I saw a report that GAO had and it mentioned a number of programs that were important and that the Affordable Connectivity Program was one of them. Do you think that helped people afford access to broadband?
Andrew Von Ah
While that program was going on, it, there were some 24, 23 million subscribers to that program that benefited from that particular program. After it was, after it ran out of money, I think the, there were sort of estimates that some 5 million or so subscribers discontinued their service and some 8 million more perhaps, you know, would either downgraded their service or went to try to find some lower cost options.
Nanette Barragán
So millions of people lost access to broadband when that program went away.
Redner 45
They, some, some did lose access to broadband and then what we understand more recently is that they're trying to find ways to get broadband back, so they're trying to find, you know, cheaper, lower cost options.
Troy Carter
The chair recognizes the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Carter, for five minutes for your questions.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank the witnesses for being here. We appreciate your time and expertise. Broadband is the critical infrastructure that connects our communities and enables people to fully participate in the modern economy. It powers nearly every sector of our society and as artificial intelligence continues to evolve, reliable high-speed connectivity will not only become more essential, but will be more needed in areas than ever before if the United States wants to remain a global leader in innovation and compete with other nations. We cannot afford to leave people behind because the lack of reliable connectivity.
That's why the Broadband Equity Access and Deployment, or BEAD, program is so important. This historic investment was intended to fully, to finally connect rural and underserved communities to high-speed internet. Unnecessary deployment delays only widen the digital divide and postpone economic opportunity. We know that broadband is the backbone of telehealth, allows patients, especially in rural areas, to access quality healthcare without traveling long distances. But without reliable infrastructure, broadband infrastructure, telehealth simply is not an option for those who need it most.
And our technology continues to evolve, we must continue investing in communication technology and networks to connect everyone regardless of their zip code. Mr. Gorman, why is resilient broadband infrastructure an essential component for consumers to fully leverage artificial intelligence?
Jessica Gorman
Thanks for the question. I think a few reasons. First, that throughout, we're in a global competition to develop AI, to deploy AI, and we need the best and brightest from this country to be part of that race and that contest. And right now, if students around the country are unable to access artificial intelligence, are unable to build their own tools because of lack of access to broadband, we may not get the best and the brightest as part of this geopolitical competition. Additionally, you mentioned the rural and underserved communities, telehealth.
I actually think some of the most innovative applications of artificial intelligence are exactly in these fields. Taking a global example, in India, AI helped farmers massively increase yields, productivity, decrease the amount of pests in crops. I think we can do the same thing in many farming communities across the United States. And similarly, telehealth is an area where throughout the country, I think we've all had the experience of being plagued by wait times, high costs, and where there's real room for AI disruption and innovation. And I agree that that's only possible with connectivity and broadband throughout.
Thank you. Mr. Menon, how can communities be harmed when high-speed reliable internet isn't available, especially when it comes to healthcare outcomes?
Andrew Von Ah
Well, thank you for the question, Representative Carter. I mean, in general, they forego the benefits of being able to participate in the internet economy, right, which could mean things like job opportunities or business opportunities.
Troy Carter
When healthcare clinics are closing down because of drastic cuts to Medicaid, and we're seeing clinics and critical care units going away, and in some cases, rural hospitals, the only access they have will be through telehealth.
Andrew Von Ah
Right, and so they would also forego the benefits of opportunities or information available on their on from in the healthcare setting, for sure.
Troy Carter
Mr. Roope, you indicated that we know where the bad actors are, those who are perpetuating these erroneous phone calls that are scamming, telling the chairman that he's got $45,000 waiting to just pick up, or calling to say we'd like to buy a property that you own, or calling to say that I'm stuck in on some foreign island and I lost my credentials and I need $1,000 just to get home. These happen all the time. Our aged communities are finding themselves more and more vulnerable to these bad actors who call with what appear to be legitimate phone calls with people with distress. You indicated that we can find them. How successful are we in actually finding them and bringing them to justice?
Kevin Ruane
Well, I think we're very successful at identifying these parties. I mean, the way traceback works, the traceback goes from the point of termination to who made the call. I think the challenge we have here is, you know, the will to go to that next step to pursue meaningful enforcement actions. You know, the FCC and the FTC and state AGs have undertaken a number of civil enforcement actions, but again, I think, you know, in that instance you're talking about, I believe that we need criminal enforcement actions.
Redner 44
Got a ton of more questions, but time is exhausted, so Mr. Chairman, I yield.
Richard Hudson
Thanks to the gentleman. The chair now recognizes the representative from Indiana, Representative Houchin.
Erin Houchin
Sorry, Mr. Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Matsui, for holding this hearing, and thank you to the witnesses. Two things on today's agenda matter a great deal to the people back home in Indiana: getting reliable internet service to the places that still don't have it, and stopping a flood of scam calls from hitting their phones. On scam calls, this is one of the biggest issues I hear about from constituents. They're getting them every day, sometimes all day every day, and the people running these are increasingly organized criminal operations overseas.
I appreciate the work that my colleagues have done on the Foreign Robocall Elimination Act as well as the QUIET Act, and I look forward to seeing more activity on this topic. Lord knows we could all use quieter phones, less scam texts, and less scam calls. But on broadband, I'm pleased to see H.R. 4950, the Data Bridge Act, is included in today's hearing. I want to thank my colleague Ms. Kelly for co-leading the bill with me, and Mr. Soto and Mr. Landsman for their support as co-sponsors. The FCC keeps a national broadband map that shows where internet service is available, and the federal government uses it to decide where to send broadband funding.
But the map is built around homes and businesses. It does not show farmland. That's a problem because farming today runs on connectivity out in the field, on guidance systems, sensors, monitors, and equipment that has to talk to a network. A farm can be counted as covered on the traditional broadband map at the farmhouse, while the acres where the actual work happens have no service. The Data Bridge Act aims to solve that problem by directing the FCC to place data that the USDA already collects onto the broadband map.
Right now, the FCC has a map showing where service is available. There's a separate federal map showing where agencies are funding deployment. Mr. Von Ah, is it fair to say that improving the broadband maps is one of the highest-return, lowest-cost things Congress could do to address broadband deployment?
Andrew Von Ah
Thank you for the question. It's certainly improving the accuracy of the maps goes a long way to better targeting federal investment.
Redner 46
And it helps prevent us from overbuilding. It might also help us in these dead zones. According to the map, it looks like they are covered, but they're actually dead zones, might help us spur some federal investment to finally get those what we consider the final miles covered with access. Is that correct?
That's correct.
Erin Houchin
Are the USDA, the NTIA, and Treasury sitting on their own data, or are they submitting that data to the FCC for maps?
Andrew Von Ah
So, the agencies have some agreements in place on the data they share about their deployments. We have made some recommendations about them agreeing to the timeframes and the kinds of data that they send to those maps, because we see certainly a lag in those maps when a deployment has been made and whether it shows up on the map or when it shows up on a map.
Redner 46
So should the FCC's broadband map be the unified source of truth for federal broadband decisions on these dollars?
Andrew Von Ah
At this point, it's our best option, although there are, and I think the agencies do refer to other sources when they're coordinating to avoid duplicative effort.
Redner 46
Thank you. A principle that runs through the GAO's work is that agencies should use the data that the government is already collecting before devising anything new. Is putting an existing federal data set onto an existing federal map exactly that principle in practice?
Andrew Von Ah
Yeah, our work would suggest that we want to make sure that the data that we add would be accurate, right? So, we did notice in the legislation this notion that it would be developed in concert with agriculture data, existing data, and so that certainly is an important piece of it.
Redner 46
We don't have to reinvent the wheel. Do you see other opportunities where the data the federal government already holds could be useful in making the map more accurate?
Andrew Von Ah
We have recommendations again for the agencies to sort of continue to feed data to the map and to do it in a more uniform and timely manner, and so that's what we would like to see, yeah.
Redner 46
Well, whether it's stopping scam calls or closing this digital divide, the through line today with this hearing is clear: the federal government works best when it's coordinated and working from good information. The Data Bridge Act delivers on that by providing a more complete broadband map built from the data the government already collects at no new cost. I urge my colleagues to support H.R. 4950 as it moves through the committee process. I thank the witnesses, thank you Mr. Vonah, and I yield back.
Redner 58
Thank you, the chair now recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Menendez, for your questions.
Robert Menendez
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Our district sits at the heart of America's critical infrastructure. The corridor between Newark Airport and the Port of Elizabeth has been called the most dangerous two miles in America because of the particular risk to our transportation, energy, communications, and commercial infrastructure. A disruption here wouldn't just affect New Jersey, it would have cascading consequences for communities and businesses across the country. For our community, secure and reliable communications networks are essential.
They link families to emergency services, banks, hospitals, and schools and ensure a quick, effective response in the event of an attack against our infrastructure. As cyber threats grow more sophisticated, we need the strongest tools available to defend these networks. AI can help providers protect our communities from disrupted communications networks. Used responsibly, AI can help identify vulnerabilities and respond to threats more quickly, but used maliciously, it can make cyberattacks more damaging and harder to stop. Congress has a responsibility to address both realities.
That is why Congressman Pfluger and I introduced the bipartisan AI for Secure Networks Act. Our bill would promote the responsible use of AI to strengthen the cybersecurity of America's communications networks while confronting the risks posed by its misuse. We cannot afford to stand by as threats to the networks American families rely on every day continue to grow in scale, sophistication, and severity. As cyberattacks become more frequent and sophisticated, Congress must act to protect these systems and the communities they serve. Ms. Gorman, just briefly, given the concentration of critical infrastructure in and around New Jersey, would you agree that a cyberattack on our networks could have far-reaching consequences for both our communities and the nation?
Redner 54
I agree. Mr. Ruppee, just briefly, how does AI-powered threat detection and response help prevent these attacks and protect the families, hospitals, first responders, and airports that depend on reliable communications networks? That was for you, Mr. Ruppee.
Kevin Ruane
I think, thank you, Congressman. I think, you know, communications companies are leveraging AI to protect the networks because, as you noted, adversaries are likewise deploying it. So it's a bit of an arms race.
Robert Menendez
Yeah, it's on both the offensive and defensive capabilities, and so being prepared for both. While AI offers opportunities for innovation and security, we also know that bad actors are also using this technology to exploit our vulnerabilities and improve cyberattack capabilities. Ms. Gorman, as bad actors increasingly use AI to launch more advanced attacks, how could the AI for Secure Networks Act help network providers and federal agencies better understand and keep pace with these evolving risks?
Jessica Gorman
Thank you, Congressman, for the question. Generally, when such a breach happens, one of three things has occurred. Either a known vulnerability that was unpatched gets exploited, an unknown vulnerability gets exploited, or there was some kind of a human error. Someone clicked on a phishing link, someone had an insecure password. AI can be helpful with all three of these tools, and that, and all three of these types of exploits: finding vulnerabilities that we don't know about, automatically patching vulnerabilities that we should know about, and also flagging potential phishing attacks for the humans so we don't make those errors.
That's why I think this Secure Networks, AI for Secure Networks bill can be so vital to figure out which are the threats that are actually coming from AI into our networks, which are causing us the most harm, and what can we actually be deploying to combat that. And this technology is moving so quickly that this needs to be more than just a one-time, more than just a one-time thing. We need continuously updating our understanding, and I think this act is a great start to provide this information across the federal government.
Robert Menendez
I appreciate that. Because American families should not have to worry that a cyberattack could cut them off from emergency services or the people they love. Our networks are too important and the stakes are simply too high for Congress not to act. I am proud that this committee is advancing bipartisan solutions to strengthen these systems, protect families, and keep communities across the country connected. Thank you, Chairman, and I yield back.
Redner 16
Gentleman yields. Now call on Representative McClellan for your five minutes of questions.
Jennifer McClellan
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. US households have on average 21 devices connected to the internet. And I expect this is only going to grow as AI, robotics, and other smart Internet of Things devices become more integrated into our daily lives. This makes reliable and secure communication networks more important than ever. And at the same time, we have seen what happens when we do not act fast enough to address the growing cyber and national security threats early.
We must learn from the past to inform the future. The stakes are too high to do otherwise. And that's why I am proud to work with Chairman Moolenaar on the bipartisan GUARD Act, which takes a proactive approach to evaluating the national security risks posed by connected robotics before those technologies become deeply embedded in our economy and critical infrastructure.
And with that I want to start with you Mr. Robbins. I think we can all agree that we should not repeat the mistakes that left the United States scrambling to remove Huawei and ZTE equipment only after it had already been become embedded in our communications networks and posed a significant national security risk. In your view, what makes the covered list an effective national security tool and are there other tools or authorities that Congress should consider to ensure that the US maintains pace with China's rapid deployment of robotics?
Michael Robbins
Yeah, thank you for that question Congresswoman and thank you for your leadership on the Guard Act. It is very much sincerely appreciated. So first of all, the covered list is a a good source of of action what the Guard Guard Act directs the FCC to take action because the FCC has the authority to take care of this proactively. They can as they've done with drones and internet routers restricted the import of future models which doesn't necessarily impact the models that are already here. That ensures that there's a cutoff point.
It gives investors certainty that the market's not going to continue to be flooded with subsidized Chinese robots or drones and further injecting national security risk into the United States. The FCC also has a lot of agility in their ability to act. So when a company takes an action like sets up a fake subsidiary, a white label company to then continue to try and do operations in the United States, the FCC has the agility to quickly take action and ban that subsidiary. And in fact they just did so this week with nine or ten fake companies that were operating as a white label subsidiaries of a Chinese drone company DJI.
Redner 56
And and what is the worst case scenario if we wait too long to confront the potential threats posed by Chinese-made communications equipment, technology, and services and advanced robotics?
Michael Robbins
Yeah, the the risk is that they become embedded in society like Chinese drones did and then the cost of rolling that back is is significantly greater to to the American people while we're also exporting the data that the robots are collecting right back to China, powering their innovation, powering their research. You know, research labs, universities that are doing research today primarily on artificial intelligence with Chinese robots, all that data is going right back to China. We're we're handing this a gift to them. So you know, their their flooding the US market with subsidized robots is strategic.
Redner 59
And so you'd agree it's important that Congress act now to ensure that American companies compete on a level playing field and that the United States remains a global leader in these critical technologies.
Absolutely, Congress should act now.
Redner 57
Okay, and I may not have time to get a answer to this so I'll ask you all to respond in on the record. But you know, Ms. Gorman, you've seen and I'm sure we've talked about already the news that during the testing phase of OpenAI's GPT-5.6 and more powerful unreleased models, their ability to to you know, break out and go rogue. This isn't an unprecedented event in which AI acts outside of its directives and could become more commonplace. So what safeguards should we be looking at so that the very technology that we're using to protect our critical infrastructure works for us and not against us?
Redner 55
Happy to happy to answer more fully, but essentially this is the question of model alignment and making sure that we assess models for alignment before deploying them in critical infrastructure is vital.
Thank you, I yield back.
Jennifer McClellan
The gentlelady yields and now call on Dr. Joyce for your five minutes of questioning.
Redner 60
Thank you Mr. Chairman for allowing me to join in this important hearing. Bridging the digital divide and improving connectivity is a top priority for my constituents representing rural south central Pennsylvania.
Redner 61
The gentlelady yields and now I call on Dr. Joyce for your five minutes of questioning.
John Joyce
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to join in this important hearing. Bridging the digital divide and improving connectivity is a top priority for my constituents. Representing rural south-central and southwestern Pennsylvania, I am keenly aware of the unique challenges that rural agricultural communities face when it comes to getting connected. Rural communities consistently fall behind the rest of the country, seeing technology continue to advance. While many state and federal programs exist to help bridge this gap, that divide is still very wide.
These communities are strong, they're hardworking, they contribute to our nation, and without them, we wouldn't have food on our tables tonight for dinner. They deserve our unwavering support. The subcommittee has done extensive work in examining the unique roles and needs of our rural communities and diligently worked to solve these problems. But there's still work to be done and there's still broadband to deploy. Having reliable data to drive that deployment is necessary as we seek to ensure universal broadband availability for each and every American.
Accurate broadband mapping is critical to the efficient use of taxpayer dollars for the administration of federal broadband programs that aim to deliver necessary telecommunications infrastructure to rural communities. Mr. Vonau, current data can sometimes be unreliable. I think we can agree on that. Can you speak about your recommendations for improving the FCC's mapping strategy and how this can be achieved in a way that improves specifically broadband deployment in the underserved rural areas?
Andrew Von Ah
Thank you for that question, Representative Joyce. Our recommendations have been around getting federal agencies to be more uniform in their reporting of their deployment data to the maps so that we understand where there are federal obligations for a build-out and where there still is lack service lacking. So we have those open recommendations, we're working with the agencies to close them and to get sort of agreement amongst them all, but that's where our recommendations are.
John Joyce
Led by Congresswoman Houchin, who just spoke to you, H.R. 4950, the Data Bridge Act, seeks to improve the FCC's existing national broadband map to include a layer specifically for agricultural areas. Representing rural Pennsylvania, I am grateful to Congresswoman Houchin for leading this legislative effort and I'm proud to join in and co-sponsor that legislation. Mr. Vonau, in your opinion, how would this mapping addition create the opportunity for more federal grant dollars to reach these areas that the coverage is needed in so desperately?
I think our work has shown, again, more specific and more accurate data in the maps will help spur investment into those areas that are of greatest need.
Andrew Von Ah
Do you have, Mr. Vonau, do you have any other suggestions for this subcommittee as we continue to work towards closing that digital divide completely?
John Joyce
Well, I think what's important going forward is once these programs that are all actively deploying broadband infrastructure sort of get to an end point, how are those networks going to be sustained over time and maintained over time? And I think that's sort of the question going forward for what a national broadband strategy would look like in the future.
And those next steps need to be addressed right now. So thank you for bringing that into the discussion.
Their way of life must be preserved and supported by the modern technology that is available to so many Americans. And as we continue to seek ways to provide this infrastructure to every corner of our great country, I'm proud to support Congresswoman Houchin's DATA BRIDGE Act. It makes a strong step forward on the path to finally bridging the digital divide and ensuring that universal broadband availability reaches each and every corner of America. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to participate in this, and I yield back the remainder of my time.
Redner 49
The gentleman yields. I believe we have one more member on the way. We just got a notification. He's on his way in. Okay.
All right. Well, I'm sorry, Mr. Obernolte is not going to be able to... He helps me a lot with all these kinds of things. He's really good with this. But seeing there are no further members wishing to be recognized, I'd like to thank our witnesses for being here today.
You pointed out a lot of things we got to get done. We got to get to work on. And I thank you for sharing that with us and in helping us to deal with these many issues that we have with technology and communications and everything else. I ask unanimous consent to insert in the record the documents included on the staff hearing documents list. Without objection, so ordered.
I remind members they have 10 business days to submit questions for the record, and I ask the witnesses to respond to those questions promptly. Members should submit their questions by the close of business on August 5th, 2026. And without objection, the subcommittee is adjourned. Thank you.