Countering Houthi Terrorism: Protecting U.S. Interests and Security in the Red Sea
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House Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa U.S. House of Representatives
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Jared Moskowitz
Over the past year, the Houthis, an Iranian-backed militant group in Yemen, have attacked dozens of commercial ships as well as Israel and Saudi Arabia with no signs of stopping. Throughout this past spring and summer, Houthi militants launched dozens of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones at Israel, accompanied by public speeches and pronouncements trumpeting their slogan: "God is the greatest, death to America, death to Israel, a curse upon the Jews, victory to Islam." On July 20th, Houthi leadership announced a naval blockade of Saudi Arabia, attacking Saudi oil tankers and expanding their threats to any vessels using Saudi Red Sea ports. In August, Houthi militants launched long-range drones and missiles against Saudi infrastructure, including the Aramco oil refinery, and have continued attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea. These attacks have elevated the Houthi regional role as a disruptor aligned with Iran while exploiting long-standing grievances against Saudi Arabia.
The immediate consequences have been heightened risks to commercial shipping and energy flows throughout maritime passage, on top of the already tenuous situation in the Strait of Hormuz, and threaten to plunge Yemen more deeply into the broader regional war with Iran. To fuel this campaign of terror, Houthis rely on a decentralized procurement and smuggling network to obtain weapons, military equipment, and ammunition from outside sources, Iran principal among them. While US and partner nation efforts have slowed and disrupted many of these flows, they continue to arm and equip Houthi militants and evade sanctions and interdiction efforts. Beyond weapons and ammunition, US government and outside investigations have identified illicit networks that also provide dual-use items like missile guidance equipment, UAV components, electronics, and other technology to the Houthis. US and international efforts must better curtail and restrict the trafficking of these items.
Meanwhile, Yemen continues to face one of the world's most severe and protracted humanitarian crises, driven by more than a decade of war and economic deterioration, displacement, and disease. According to the latest UN humanitarian needs and response plan, 22.3 million Yemenis, half of the country's population, require humanitarian assistance to survive. Food insecurity is particularly acute. Roughly 18.3 million people are experiencing acute food insecurity, while more than 2.2 million children under the age of five are acutely malnourished.
Speaker 8
Public health challenges also remain. UNICEF recorded 93,496 suspected cholera cases and almost 250 deaths in January of 2026 following a late 2025 outbreak that affected virtually the entire country. Houthi militants have exacerbated and significantly worsened the already dire humanitarian situation by consistently stealing humanitarian aid away from civilians and either hoarding it for themselves and reselling it for profit or diverting and redistributing it to Houthi supporters and political allies. In the face of the dire humanitarian needs, Yemen was among the countries hit particularly hard by the 2025 destruction of USAID and the elimination of thousands of USAID grants and contracts worth over 27 billion globally. U.S. assistance underpinned many of the most significant aid efforts in Yemen, including support for emergency food assistance, nutrition, health, and other life-saving services.
In July of 2025, WFP estimated that as a result of such funding cuts, decreased aid efforts could leave as many as 4.8 million Yemenis without life-saving food assistance, the largest country-level impact WFP reported during the year 2025. The Trump administration has shown no evidence of a plan or even even contribute with allies or partners to addressing the humanitarian crisis facing Yemen. It has failed to engage at all Yemen or put forward a strategy to address the terrorist threat the Houthis pose. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses about the persistent threat that the Houthis pose to U.S. allies and partners in the region as well as the critical international shipping. Thank you, and I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Michael Lawler
I thank the ranking member for his opening statement and look forward to working with him on these important issues as we move forward on the committee. Other members of the committee are reminded that opening statements may be submitted for the record. We are pleased to have a distinguished panel of witnesses before us today on this important topic. Ms. Nadwa Al-Dawsari, an associate fellow at the Middle East Institute, and Ms. Allison Minor, the director of Project for Middle East Integration at the Atlantic Council. This committee recognizes the importance of the issues before us and is grateful to have you here today to speak with us.
Your full statements will be made part of the record and I'll ask each of you to keep your spoken remarks to five minutes in order to allow time for member questions. I now recognize Ms. Al-Dawsari for an opening statement.
Nadwa Al-Dawsari
Chairman Lawler, Ranking Member Moskowitz, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you for inviting me, it's a great honor to be here. I was born in Yemen where I spent the first three decades of my life. I spent decades studying the country and the Houthis. I watched them evolve from a small insurgency in northern Yemen into the regional threat we face today.
I'd like to make four points. First, the Houthis did not become this dangerous overnight. Two main factors got us here: Iran's sustained investment in their capabilities and the United States and the international community consistently underestimating them. For years, we treated the Houthis as just another militia in another civil war.
We assumed their extreme rhetoric was just rhetoric and that the threat could be contained within Yemen through political engagement. Well, we were wrong. The Houthis used negotiations and ceasefires to buy time, consolidate power, and strengthen their military capabilities. And the threat could not be contained within Yemen. And instead of remaining contained within Yemen, the threat expanded beyond its borders.
By the time the United States responded militarily, the Houthis had already acquired capabilities to threaten the US forces and international shipping. Second, to understand the threat, we have to understand who the Houthis are. They are a radical offshoot of Zaidi Shia Islam. They believe they are on a divine mission that started in Yemen and that includes the destruction of Israel and liberation of Jerusalem. Their slogan, which includes "Death to America", tells us exactly how they see the United States.
For years, those ambitions exceeded their capabilities, but Iran helped close that gap. With sustained Iranian support, the Houthis developed sophisticated missiles and drones capable of striking ships and targets across the region. Since then, they have attacked and sunk commercial vessels, targeted US forces and allies, and forced major shipping companies to avoid the Red Sea. Third, the US military pressure has imposed real cost on the Houthis, but airstrikes alone will not eliminate the threat, and repeated interventions risk pulling the United States into a prolonged war of attrition. The Houthis, meanwhile, have shown that they can adapt, rebuild, and expand.
Their influence now reaches across the Horn of Africa, and they're collaborating with terrorist groups like Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. At home, the Houthis rule through extreme repression, targeting political opponents, tribes, women, minorities, and anyone who challenges their authority. They are militarizing society and recruiting and indoctrinating children and youth. They are not just recruiting fighters for today's wars, they are raising a generation to see America as the enemy. Finally, the United States needs a long-term strategy that builds real leverage on the Houthis, and the most important source of leverage is territory.
Territory gives the Houthis people to recruit, revenue to collect, ports and smuggling routes to exploit, and space to build and store weapons. The most sustainable way to reduce the threat, therefore, is to empower Yemenis to retake territory from the Houthis. This does not require US boots on the ground. It requires US leadership and for the US to work with allies to provide the Yemeni government with the political, military, and economic support it needs to restore state authority. Members of the subcommittee, we've already seen the cost of underestimating the Houthis.
We cannot afford to underestimate them again. Thank you.
Michael Lawler
Thank you, Ms. Al-Dosari. I now recognize Ms. Miner for an opening statement.
Allison Minor
Chairman Nadler, Ranking Member Moskowitz, and members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to testify today. The Houthi threat is not new, but it has expanded considerably over the past decade, threatening stability in Yemen and the Gulf as well as global commerce through the Red Sea. Now, with their latest Red Sea blockade, the Houthis are threatening to take roughly four million barrels of oil per day off the market at a time when global energy supplies are already strained.
The United States needs a sustained strategy for countering this threat. I have worked on Yemen for much of the past decade across the U.S. government, and I've drawn three important lessons from that experience. The first is that open-ended conflict ultimately advantages the Houthis. An aggressive Saudi-led ground and air campaign, U.S. airstrikes, and Israeli strikes all failed to eliminate Houthi capabilities or alter their strategy. By 2022, the Houthis had transformed from a local militia into a sophisticated military force capable of striking almost anywhere in the Middle East.
U.S. and Israeli strikes also fueled Houthi recruitment inside of Yemen, elevated the group's standing within the Axis of Resistance, and contributed to new cooperation between the Houthis and Russia. The reality is that the Houthis thrive in a wartime environment, especially one characterized by foreign intervention. Military pressure can play a role in countering the Houthis, but only when it is grounded in credible objectives and part of a broader political strategy for resolving the conflict that is itself fueling the Houthis. The second lesson is that divisions within the anti-Houthi coalition have consistently jeopardized efforts to counter the Houthis. Finally, the third lesson is that the weakness of the Yemen government is among the Houthis' greatest sources of strength.
The United States can help address both vulnerabilities. We can help partners unify around a credible strategy for resolving the conflict and strengthening the Yemen government. This approach helped secure the 2022 UN truce, but that effort focused on pausing the conflict, not resolving it, and the Houthis' attacks against commercial shipping in 2023 underscored that a pause is not enough. In the absence of U.S. diplomatic engagement, instead, fissures within the anti-Houthi coalition are growing in ways that the Houthis are well-placed to exploit. Without a consensus around a credible end state to the conflict, those fissures will continue to grow.
Yemen is again on the brink of war. Now is the time for the United States to help its regional and Yemeni partners forge a coordinated, credible strategy for resolving the conflict. The goal should be a negotiated settlement that holds the Houthis accountable both to Yemenis and to their neighbors. It's not any settlement, it's a settlement that provides a viable structure for governing Yemen and imposes enforceable constraints on Houthi cross-border and maritime attacks. This will take time, but there are three steps the United States can take now to get back on track.
The first is to prevent another open-ended war in Yemen. This time such a war could prove even more disastrous, given entanglement between Yemen and other conflicts in the region. Military pressure from U.S. partners may be necessary to defend against Houthi attacks and create leverage for negotiations, but it should support a political strategy, not substitute for one. Second, the United States should resume humanitarian assistance and support to the Yemen government. The best way to counter the Houthis inside of Yemen is to demonstrate that there is an effective alternative to the Houthis' repressive rule.
In the past, low-cost U.S. capacity building has helped the government deliver services and economic stability, but that assistance was also severed with the elimination of USAID. U.S. support to the Yemen Coast Guard also contributed to one of our most effective approaches for constraining Houthi weapons flows. Yemeni forces have carried out four significant weapons interdictions in the past year alone. Separately, millions of people in Yemen government-controlled areas are in need of humanitarian assistance, but the UN appeal is only 20 percent funded, leaving many needs unmet. Finally, the United States should restore intensive U.S. diplomatic efforts on Yemen, including by appointing a Yemen special envoy.
Empowered envoy is best placed to provide. The war in Yemen is not the United States war and we should not make it ours. But its consequences will continue to reverberate across the region and beyond. Instead of vacillating between costly US military interventions and disengagement, we should pursue sustained strategic engagement with our regional and Yemeni partners to help them build a credible path toward resolving the conflict and containing Houthi threats. Thank you and I look forward to your questions.
Michael Lawler
Thank you, Ms. Miner. I now recognize myself for five minutes of questioning. The Houthis largely remained on the sidelines for the first five months of this year's war with Iran. And that changed in July when the group opened a new front against Saudi Arabia, declaring a blockade on Saudi-linked shipping and subsequently escalating attacks on Saudi energy infrastructure, vessels in the Red Sea, and Saudi-backed forces in Yemen. What does the Houthis' delayed entry tell us about Iran's future ability to use the group against the US and our partners?
And has the group developed more autonomy from Iran, basing its participation in conflicts on its own interests and calculations? Ms. Davari.
Nadwa Al-Dawsari
Thank you, sir. The Houthis did not intervene early on in the conflict between the United States and Iran because there was no strategic value in the Houthis' intervention that early. Iran has been able to impose cost on the US through the Strait of Hormuz. But Iran has been working to prepare the Houthis in case the war continues to put pressure on the United States. Iranian officials themselves said that they are preparing to the Red Sea to put pressure on the United States.
And over the past months, dozens of IRGC operatives and commanders came to Yemen to help the Houthis prepare for those attacks. So if the war with the United States continue and the pressure out of the Strait of Hormuz becomes less viable for Iran, we can expect the Houthis to escalate in the Red Sea.
Michael Lawler
To that end, obviously there's no question that folks back home are feeling some of the costs of Iran's blockades and the Houthi attacks at the pump and in their wallets. But what does the government need to do not just simply to reduce the number of Houthi attacks, but to restore commercial confidence in the Red Sea and bringing shipping and insurance markets back to normal?
I'm sorry?
Did you say the US government?
Yes.
Nadwa Al-Dawsari
Well, what the United States has been doing so far to counter the Houthis have been effective. Airstrikes have disrupted Houthi operations and also has disrupted the Houthis and undermined some of their capabilities. But the Houthis have proven that they are able to, like you said, they're able to regenerate some of these capabilities because of the vast smuggling network they have. So sanctions also have made it difficult for the Houthis to maintain a steady revenue stream, but they have also found ways to continue to generate revenues. The US Treasury said that the Houthis are able to generate two billion dollars a year from illicit oil despite the sanctions.
In my opinion, in order to secure the Red Sea and freedom of navigation, the United States need to do the one thing that it hasn't done yet is to support the Yemeni government to take territory from the Houthis.
Territory helps the Houthis expand, help the Houthis attack ships in the Red Sea. And if we take territory from the Houthis, if we help the Yemeni government take territory from the Houthis, we build the leverage that then help the political process or the peaceful negotiations.
Michael Lawler
So the Treasury Department has taken important steps to target Houthi financiers, facilitators, front companies, and procurement networks, including those enabling the group's access to weapons and revenue. But significant elements of the Houthis' international financial and procurement networks still remain operational. Which foreign companies, banks, shipping networks, and jurisdictions remain most important to Houthi procurement and financing? And what more can Congress and the administration do to meaningfully restrain their access to money and weapons?
I'm not the expert in terror financing, but most of the weapons smuggling to the Houthis come through Chinese companies. So the United States could use its diplomatic, could engage diplomatically with China to pressure the Chinese government to crack down on these companies or limit the Houthis' access to weapons through Chinese companies.
Michael Lawler
Okay. My time has expired. I now recognize the ranking member for five minutes.
Jared Moskowitz
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to follow up on the chairman's questioning because obviously there's vast agreement here on the committee about the Houthis and the threat that they pose. But you mentioned that, you know, we've done airstrikes and they work until they regroup. And then you mentioned that, you know, we do economic sanctions, but then they work around that. So if military interdiction isn't working or intervention isn't working and economic sanctions are not working, then what do you suggest?
Nadwa Al-Dawsari
I suggest, I think the United States should do is working with US allies, particularly Saudi Arabia, to support Yemeni government forces to retake territory from the Houthis, to deny the Houthis access to the Red Sea. If the Houthis lose territory, they will lose a lot of the advantage they have now to smuggle, to position forces and weapons to attack ships in the Red Sea and US forces as well. So that's what the United States should do: work with allies, support Yemeni government to take territory from the Houthis, and that will build the necessary leverage to engage in a political process that then can end the Yemen conflict, as my colleague here said, and then end the threat.
Speaker 8
So are you suggesting, you're suggesting a diplomatic approach with our allies, or are you suggesting that the United States should arm Saudi Arabia to go and prosecute the war in Yemen?
The United States should consider arming, training Yemeni forces in collaboration with Saudi Arabia, but also should consider collaboration in terms of mentoring and intelligence sharing.
Jared Moskowitz
Okay. How many people have perished over a decade now in the war in Yemen? And I would include people either directly from the war or from famine, from humanitarian crises that were created. What is the death count there?
Nadwa Al-Dawsari
I don't have the exact number on hand, but in my opinion it exceeds 100,000 people at least.
Some people say a quarter million. But also 4 million people are displaced and a lot more people are suffering from hunger. The question is, the Houthis continue to escalate. They have not engaged in the peace negotiations in good faith. And even when everybody else gave concessions, the Houthis used that time to rebuild, recruit, and prepare for the next war.
From Yemen to the Red Sea to Israel, and now they have a, you know, an open-ended conflict with Saudi Arabia and the US as well.
Speaker 8
Is it your assessment in the region that obviously Hamas has been degraded, Hezbollah has been degraded, but that the Houthis have not been degraded?
Yes, the Houthis have not been degraded. The Houthis need to be contained militarily, and the only entity that can contain them long-term, sustainably, is the Yemeni government. And so far, the Yemeni government has not been given the support it needs from the United States to do that.
Speaker 5
So you're saying the Trump administration has not supported the Yemeni government? Is that what you're saying?
Jared Moskowitz
So you're saying the Trump administration has not supported the Yemeni government in its fight against the Houthis? Right, but the Biden administration was two years ago. Is that your testimony?
Nadwa Al-Dawsari
My testimony is that US administrations, Republicans and Democrats, have not supported Yemeni government, have not provided the support it needs.
But who's in charge now?
Speaker 8
The current administration, his name is Trump, we could say it, he puts his name on everything, is not, your testimony is that the current administration, the Trump administration, is not supporting the Yemeni government in its fight against one of the largest terrorist militant groups in the Middle East. That's your testimony?
I think the current administration, the Trump administration, should consider supporting the Yemeni government, and yes, it hasn't done that yet.
Joe Wilson
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to welcome Ranking Member Jared Moskowitz. We're so grateful for his service, and I'm really grateful that there'll be a good team for America with Carlos Moskowitz with Chairman Mike Lawler. With that in mind, it's clear that with the regime in Tehran, there's a terrorist puppets across the Middle East in Iraq, Gaza, Lebanon, and Yemen, and they're playing the long game. The Houthis have ideologically driven expansionist objectives that extend beyond Yemen.
To achieve these murderous ends, the Houthis continue building networks with terrorist groups and nation-state adversaries of the United States, such as war criminal Putin and the Chinese Communist Party. Self-declared enemies of America and democracies worldwide work together, driven by a common goal of undermining American interests, regional destabilization, and weakening free governments for their own malign objectives. We're in a war, I believe, that we didn't choose, and that is of dictators with rule of gun invading democracies with rule of law. It began with war criminal Putin invading Ukraine on February 24, 2022, and the Iranian puppets invading Israel on October 7, 2023. With that in mind, Ms. Al-Dawsari, how has war criminal Putin with the Chinese Communist Party helped the Houthis attack American assets and partners in the region, and what examples of the Houthis directly being aided by the Chinese Communist Party and Putin?
Nadwa Al-Dawsari
Thank you, sir. Um, there's there's been some evidence that the Houthis are building ties with Russia and China. There's been reports that as early as 2024, Russian operatives were in Sana'a aiding the Houthis targeting ships in the Red Sea with data and and in some technical support. Um, also the Chinese, a Chinese satellite company, and this is all according to US officials, a Chinese company linked to the Chinese army has helped the Houthis target US warships and Red Sea shipping in the past. These also very important and and US Treasury documented that procurement of weapons, including parts, dual components and parts that are used to build drones and missiles, have been procured from China and Russia to the Houthis.
And also the two countries have supported the Houthis diplomatically at the UN. Both countries abstained from condemning Houthi Red Sea attacks. So there is a relationship and it's evolving and as you said, sir, this relationship is for the purpose of increasing Russia and China's influence in the region at the expense of the United States.
Joe Wilson
And and I particularly very sophisticated underwater sea drones that the Houthis could not have developed themselves. Also in the past couple of months, I'm very grateful that we've been able to see Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia unify the pro-government Yemeni forces into a cohesive force, which is the first time and may provide opportunity for extending ground victory against Iran-backed Houthis forces. Saudi Arabia, we should always appreciate, was successful helping President Al-Shara of Syria remove the Assad dictatorship, where Assad fled to Moscow after a 54-year Ba'athist socialist dictatorship. With that in mind, Ms. Al-Dasari, in your testimony, you mentioned the train and equip of Yemeni forces. How can the United States assist Saudi Arabia to help train?
Nadwa Al-Dawsari
Yes, absolutely, sir. We do need to work with Saudi Arabia because it is Yemen's main security partner and the country with with more influence on all the forces on the ground. And there has been, my colleague here mentioned that the government has been forces have been divided and that's true. But over the past eight months, there's been a noticeable improvement in coordination among these forces and also a more unified command structure. So we have to acknowledge that.
And so working with Saudi Arabia is very important because it's on the ground, it's working with the Yemeni government. It it is also in the best position to help unify these forces using its leverage, but also beyond that, Saudi Arabia is in the best position to help reconstruct Yemen after the war.
Joe Wilson
And and this is so mutually beneficial to Saudi Arabia, to Yemen, and the United States. Thank you very much for your I yield back.
Speaker 12
Thank you. I now recognize Representative Schneider from Illinois for five minutes.
Bradley Schneider
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank the witnesses for joining us and sharing your perspectives. As we've heard, the Houthis have a complex and long-embedded insurgency in Yemen that the United States, with support of our allies, have failed to rein in. I appreciate our witnesses' perspective that this is not our war. I also appreciate that the war in Yemen and its consequences have profound effect on US allies and US interests in the region as well as here at home. Over the last 10 years, the Houthis have continued to target and attack civilians and align themselves with other terrorist proxies like Hamas and Hezbollah.
The Houthis' support for Hamas throughout the war in Gaza and direct strikes on Israel and Israeli shipping vessels has raised the group's profile as a violent, dangerous group that will continue to commit atrocities until they are stopped.
The United States and our allies must continue to take action by using enhanced defensive capabilities, economic sanctions, and diplomacy to deter the Houthis' malign activities and de-escalate threats to civilians and the regional and global economies. It is also important that the Trump administration maintain the foreign terrorist organization designation and to engage Congress as required by the War Powers Resolution and other statutes with respect to current and future authorities, actions, and goals. I remain deeply concerned with this administration's decision to go to war with Iran without consulting Congress and, apparently, without a coherent set of goals or strategy, and its failure to share critical and timely information about the administration's plans for civilians in the region. The Houthis' capabilities and their threats, from closing the shipping lanes at Bab-el-Mandeb to supporting proxies in the region and even around the world, are something we have to take seriously. What strikes me as I'm listening to the two of you is this concern of how do we close in on the Houthis' capacities without ending up with an open-ended war, and that is the challenge.
And I think what we need to achieve are common goals with our allies and understanding what the threats are and how we address them and end them, a unified strategy to achieve those goals, and a sustained commitment that will allow us to work with our allies to close the assets and resources the Houthis have. Among these are territory, money, people, weapons, and know-how. So my question for the two of you is how do we balance not having an open-ended war, as Ms. Miner, you clearly stated, with, as you said, Ms. Al-Dasari, making sure that the Houthis can't continue to expand their reach, their capacities, their capabilities, and consequently the threat they pose to the US and our allies?
Allison Minor
Thank you very much, Representative Schneider. I couldn't agree more on the need for sustained engagement and a unifying strategy, and those are unfortunately things that we have not seen throughout the decade of this conflict. I think we made some progress in 2021, 2022 towards this goal, and it resulted in the UN truce. But I think the US and the Saudi approach to that truce can be rightfully criticized as focusing on pausing the conflict, not on resolving the conflict. So I think we need to take that unified strategy and try to craft a durable political resolution to the conflict.
Again, this is not simply conceding to Houthi demands; it is providing a viable negotiated settlement that can contain Houthi threats while addressing the governance issues that have been fueling this Houthi threat for over a decade. And I think that in terms of avoiding an open-ended conflict, it is active US engagement. It is not outsourcing our policy on Yemen to regional partners. It is making sure that those partners have a credible strategy. Military tools may play a part in that, but they need to be grounded in credible objectives and they need to be part of this broader suite of economic and diplomatic tools.
Ms. Al-Dasari?
Nadwa Al-Dawsari
Yes. So what we need to do, again, same, keep the FTO designation, sanctions, protect Red Sea shipping, but as my colleague said before, this is not the United States' war and it shouldn't be, which is why the United States need to help its regional allies and its ally, which is the Yemeni government, to take on this threat. But they do need our support. We need to work with the Yemeni government, we need to provide them with the necessary military and economic and political support in order to be able to take on the Houthis on their own, long-term. That's the only way to do it.
There is no other substitute.
Bradley Schneider
And my last question with the 20 seconds I have remaining: who within the administration has the understanding, the appreciation, and the voice to speak of what we need to do? Ms. Miner?
Allison Minor
Unfortunately, the Trump administration made the decision to get rid of their Yemen special envoy, who I think would have been best placed to be leading on this file.
I agree.
Speaker 23
Sadly, I knew the answer before I asked the question, but we need that voice and we need that expertise in the administration, and we need it now. I yield back.
Thomas Kean
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to our distinguished witnesses for being here today. As we remember the 25th anniversary of 9/11 this month, I want to take a moment to honor the victims of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. September 11th, 2001, is a day etched into our memory, a day that forever changed the nation and the world. We will never forget. Through our grief, we are reminded of the courage and the resilience that defines us as Americans.
We remember the brave first responders who rushed towards danger, the firefighters, the police officers, and the EMTs who selflessly put their lives on the line to save others. As Congress remembers this senseless act of terror, we must also act to ensure that terrorism never again reaches our shores or impacts American safety at home and abroad. Houthi terrorism in the Middle East represents one of the ongoing terrorist threats in the Middle East and must be addressed. Ms. Al-Dawsari, as the Houthis continue to consolidate power, their position as a regional influence continues to grow beyond their existing ties to Iran. How can the Abraham Accords and other U.S. alliances in the region serve as a check on the expansion of Houthi power?
How can the Abraham Accords and other U.S. alliances in the region serve as a check on the expansion of Houthi power?
Nadwa Al-Dawsari
I cannot speak to the Abraham Accords in that context, but I can speak to U.S. allies.
Thomas Kean
And so if then I'll ask it in this way. As the Houthi capabilities expand, what are the primary areas that Congress should focus on to counter Houthi influence in the region?
The Congress should focus on supporting Yemeni government, working with allies to support the Yemeni government militarily, politically, and economically. I would like to see, for example, humanitarian assistance resumed to Yemen because humanitarian crisis, hunger, makes people more vulnerable to Houthi recruitment. So as an immediate measure, we could do that, but at the same time, we need to think long term. We need to work with our allies to contain the Houthi threat within Yemen.
Thomas Kean
Thank you. Ms. Miner, the Houthis have long been a source of instability in the Middle East, particularly as you noted in your testimony, they have been a threat to shipping corridors in the region. Can you please discuss the impact of current Houthi efforts to impact shipping corridors entering the Red Sea?
Allison Minor
I think it's important to look back at Houthi efforts starting in 2023 against Red Sea shipping, and really this served as a playbook that Iran has now used in its with its actions in the Strait of Hormuz. So we can take the Houthi actions in 2023 as a precedent that could have consequences far outside of the Middle East and on maritime choke points globally.
We have seen about a 50 to 60 percent reduction in Red Sea traffic consistently since the Houthis' 2023 campaign that never resumed, precisely because even if the attacks paused, commercial companies and insurance vendors were not confident that the attacks would not resume, which bore fruit with their latest blockade announced in July. I think until we have a durable resolution to this threat, we will continue to see a disruption to commerce that has immediate impacts on global energy markets and long-term consequences for freedom of navigation globally.
Speaker 32
And what steps can Congress take as a follow-up to protect the American shipping against terrorist disruptions in the region?
Allison Minor
Again, I think until we get a durable settlement to the conflict that contains the Houthis, that threat will remain. So I would call on Congress to call on the administration to articulate its strategy with regional allies for providing a durable resolution to the Yemen conflict. I would call on the administration to reappoint a Yemen special envoy, and I would encourage the resumption of humanitarian assistance to Yemen government-controlled areas. Title II US food assistance alone could go far in meeting many of the needs, only half of which are being currently met in government-controlled areas, and while doing so also benefit US farmers.
Thank you. I yield back.
William Keating
I now recognize Representative Keating for five minutes.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Miner, just following up on what you said in terms of the Red Sea and the impact on global energy and gas prices here at home, is it not the case that the closure and the limitation on the Strait of Hormuz has given the Houthis even more leverage than before? Is that the case?
It is.
William Keating
So they, as a result of that, would you say inherent in that question was that the Strait of Hormuz is now open and operating and it's in extremely good shape? Is that a fair statement?
Unfortunately, it's not.
Do you know who made that statement?
I believe President Trump.
William Keating
President Trump made that statement. That's correct. So President Trump, through his actions and the war of his choice, has acted so that the Strait of Hormuz, which was open before then and is now effectively closed, has given the Houthis more leverage and more influence as a result of his actions. Is that correct?
That's correct.
William Keating
Is it also correct that in our engagement with the Houthis militarily, the UK assisted in some of those actions and participated?
It is.
So it's not true that our European allies have not done anything to help the US in this endeavor. Is that a fact?
That's fair.
William Keating
I believe you're correct with that as well. I want to get into the follow-up on another issue as well, and that's an important one that was just touched upon. So what is the current state of the US diplomatic corps in Yemen and in the region?
Unfortunately, the United States does not have an ambassador appointed to Yemen, to Saudi Arabia, or to the UAE, the countries that are most important to resolving the conflict.
So who's home?
Speaker 34
We have career diplomats in place as chargés d'affaires, but unfortunately it's not sufficient for the kind of sustained high-level engagement.
Speaker 33
Right, who's making those kinds of, who's filling that void or trying to fill that void?
I think you have caretaker career diplomatic staff in place.
Is it Jared Kushner?
Allison Minor
I think there are a handful of envoys this administration has appointed for a series of global conflicts. I don't think they have the bandwidth currently for Yemen.
William Keating
But who's directly involved in negotiations in the region?
They don't have the bandwidth, so indeed they're not effective in that area. And that's a huge void, and that's hurting us as well because I can't agree more that, you know, the solution in this region will have to be done diplomatically. How about some of our other leverage that we had in terms of USAID and some of the pullbacks in that area and the cuts in that area? How has that helped our leverage or hurt our leverage in this region?
The closure of USAID in Yemen has only hurt Yemeni civilians, including those in government-controlled areas, and hurt the Yemen government.
And who made that decision to do that?
That was President Trump.
William Keating
That was President Trump as well. So when we look at what's happening here and we're having this hearing on the threat of the Houthis, which we all agree is one that is becoming greater and greater and greater, and we look at the effect on our other partners in the Gulf and what that does to them, and we look at what partners that we've had in Europe and other countries, especially UK, and the way they've been rebuffed by the US even though they were engaged before, there's to me one person that's solely responsible for such a downturn in our economy, upturn in gas prices and retail prices and cost of living prices. Our projection of power in the region has now been reduced, and that was the person that you answered to all those questions. None other than President Donald Trump is responsible for this mess. I yield back.
I now recognize Representative Burchett for five minutes.
Tim Burchett
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Chairman Moskowitz and Chairman Kwasi Mfume. He's technically not a chairman, but I like him better than you two, so I'm just going to recognize him just as well. Ms. Al-Dawsari, how have recent Houthi attacks on American ships affected our economy? If you don't know, that's fine.
Nadwa Al-Dawsari
Yes, I don't have the figures on me, but I know it came at a great cost to the international economy, not just the US.
Speaker 17
Okay, do you think it's possible for the US to stop the flow of weapons to the Houthis?
It can help with that, yes.
Speaker 19
What can United States do differently to ensure our ships can take the safest routes through the Red Sea?
As I said before, sir, the United States has to work with its allies in the region, in particular Saudi Arabia, to empower the Yemeni government militarily and economically in order to take on the Houthi threat and take territory away from the Houthis in order to create room for serious diplomatic efforts to end the conflict.
Tim Burchett
Okay, how can the US petition countries in the region to invest more military resources in combating the Houthis? And do you think it needs to be militarily or do you think it needs to be economically or a combination thereof?
How can we, I guess, force our friends to help us in this endeavor?
Yes, ma'am.
Friends as in regional allies?
Well, Saudi Arabia is already working with the Yemeni government. So work with Saudi Arabia to support the process now of uniting the forces and arming and equipping and training them in order to take territory from the Houthis.
Speaker 16
What do you feel like our long-term strategy would be to deal with this issue?
Long-term strategy should be containing the Houthis, take territory, help the government take territory from the Houthis, and then, as my colleague said, that should be part of a roadmap that involves ending the conflict in Yemen and then reconstruction beyond that.
Okay, thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, and now recognize Representative Sherman for five minutes.
Yemen is not a great information environment. The Houthis claim they have around a million troops. I think maybe half of that or a third of that. And the Yemen government, I think, is several hundred thousand troops is what they claim.
Allison Minor
The government troops have been trained and equipped by the Saudi-led coalition for years. There have been recent improvements in governance, but unfortunately, the Yemen government has not proven capable of significantly retaking territory from the Houthis for some time.
Speaker 31
In spite of the fact that they could control the air, either the Saudi Air Force or ourselves, they still haven't been able to take territory, correct?
There have been some battlefield wins, but nothing significant since 2018.
Speaker 29
So how many troops did the Southern Transition Council have before they faded away?
Allison Minor
So I've heard that there are roughly 80,000 troops affiliated with the Southern Transitional Council and their partners, but I will say that the Southern Transitional Council has not faded away. They were officially dissolved, but their supporters still remain inside Southern Yemen.
Speaker 29
Has the Yemeni government, legal government, entered into negotiations with them, and are they willing to provide the South with the kind of autonomy that would lead to an understanding between these two anti-Houthi forces?
There was supposed to be a Southern dialogue sponsored by Saudi Arabia, but I understand that it's currently on pause.
Speaker 29
That isn't helpful. We know of the food insecurity of the Yemeni people. What doesn't get near enough attention is what the Houthis have done to all of the poorest countries in the Indian Ocean area. Russia and Ukraine are both major exporters of grain. That grain needs to go through the Suez Canal, but instead it can't.
It's going around South Africa, as reported recently by the New York Times. And the UN released a statement stating that Houthi attacks on shipping are having an effect on global food prices, squeezing the global food system especially hard, higher prices deepening hunger. It's not as acute. We don't see starvation. What we see is people who are very poor, who used to be able to afford three meals a day, are now living on two meals a day, thanks to the Houthi.
What can we do to make the Houthi responsible in the eyes of the world for hungry people and increased disease in the poorest countries in the Indian Ocean area?
Allison Minor
I think it's a tough question. I think that the Houthis are not going to become more responsible without clear, enforceable measures to contain the threat that they pose to Yemenis and globally. I think as we talk about food insecurity, it's also important that we acknowledge the Houthis are currently detaining 73 UN staff, 10 current US staff.
Speaker 29
And then blaming the United States for the fact their people aren't fed while stealing money and imprisoning people who are trying to feed them. Are ships allowed to go from Iran to the Houthi-controlled areas without US inspection?
Allison Minor
They're technically not allowed to, but it's still happening. And this is the problem.
These are big waterways, and the shadow fleet use a series of practices, turning off their identification systems, transshipment at major ports like Djibouti.
Speaker 26
Have we blockaded the Houthi ports to make sure that no ship goes in that we don't approve?
There's been a Saudi-enforced embargo of Houthi-controlled ports for over a decade.
Speaker 49
It's a very long coastline in an area where smugglers have been operating for centuries.
I yield back.
I now recognize Representative Zinke for five minutes.
Ryan Zinke
Well, first, I've heard many times a war of choice. This is not a war of choice for the United States. This is a war of choice for Iran. I've talked to almost every ambassador in the region and we all are unified on these fronts. No nuclear weapons for Iran.
No nuclear material. No arsenal of destruction and the straits and Red Sea have to be open. Another comment that the President Trump made is Europe hasn't done anything. So how many warships does NATO currently employ and deploy in the Red Sea or the Gulf?
Allison Minor
I'm not sure of the current number in the Red Sea. I can say that when we have multiple battles that we're fighting simultaneously, it leaves far fewer.
Speaker 47
Well, how many NATO, how many European ships, warships are in the Persian Gulf and Yemen? My esteemed colleague mentioned that perhaps there is frequent traffic between Iran and Yemen and yet we don't have any help from European allies whatsoever. But they did say they would deploy their ships once the shooting stopped. So I think President Trump is in fact correct. Shifting gears, let's talk about the Houthis and the chain of command.
And thank you for your service and you have a distinguished career and thanks. It seems to me that Iran has a distributed chain of command now in the Republican Guard. It's very difficult to target when there doesn't seem to be one head. What's the, what's the chain of command and the structure of the Houthis, both militarily and politically? Do we know who's in charge?
We have some understanding. Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, the Houthi leader, is the ultimate decision-maker. Underneath him sits a broad military and intelligence apparatus. I would say that Iran has major influence within the Houthis, but the Houthis, I would argue, are even more dangerous than an Iranian proxy. They have their own grand ambitions and sometimes have proven more reckless in pursuing those ambitions than even we would expect from Iran.
Speaker 46
But who's in charge? I mean, is there a name involved? Is there, and who is that both politically and militarily? On the military side, what's the balance of power? Is it politically more, is it that he's calling the shots or is it their military or both?
Allison Minor
Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, the Houthi leader, is calling the shots. I would say the military and intelligence components of the Houthi apparatus are far more powerful than the political components.
The military ultimately, again, military decisions are made by Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, but there are senior members of his family and of his network who retain senior positions.
Israel did target much of the Houthi leadership and they did kill some senior Houthi military leaders, but the Houthis have proven, again, they grew up in an environment of war and including an aggressive Saudi air campaign. So they have employed extensive measures to make their leadership resilient against the kind of strikes that the US, Israel, or other partners can conduct.
Allison Minor
There have been targets killing senior Houthi political figures from the Saudi-led coalition in the past, yes.
Speaker 51
On the maritime interdiction side, very difficult because many vessels look very deceptive, small vessels can carry. So is there an analysis of what it would take as far as a blockade of merit, what that construct or what that configuration would look like?
Allison Minor
Again, there has been a complex embargo backed by a UN monitoring mechanism and Saudi warships for over a decade that has not proven effective at containing Houthi weapons flows. It was during that period that they transformed from a local militia to a sophisticated military force capable of striking the whole region. The best solution are the Yemeni officials on the ground that are best adapted to these various smuggling routes as the Houthis shift their tactics to get weapons flows in. And I think we've seen real results from those officials with four major interdictions in the past year, including one, one of the largest interdictions in Yemen's history with 750 tons of weapons material. So I think we need to be increasing our support to the Yemeni Coast Guard and other relevant bodies to crack down on the interdictions at the source.
Speaker 48
So you would concentrate on the maritime interdiction side by giving coastal patrols intelligence to the Yemen officials.
Speaker 52
Yes, and focusing on Yemeni territory itself. We've seen the Houthis shift when the maritime routes are blocked off, they shift to overland. So again, this is a very adaptable group. We can't deploy an old playbook to a group that is always three steps ahead of us.
And how is our friends and allied Omanis? Are we supplying them with what they need because they seem to share a very long border with Yemen?
Speaker 50
So the Omanis have served as a mediator in negotiations. They host the Houthi spokesperson who has been their lead negotiator in the past. They also have their own incentives to keep the border with Yemen secure. I think that they certainly could be doing more in that front, but their primary role in the past has been one of a mediator.
Kweisi Mfume
The gentleman's time has expired. I now recognize Representative Mfume for five minutes.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Ardosari and Ms. Manner, thank you both for being here. I want to appreciate and publicly thank you for your testimony, but more importantly the work that both of you do, which does not get heralded often enough in my opinion. I want to ask a couple of questions and I'd like very much to put forth a couple of suggestions and then I'd like to end up with talking about the balance of power between the Houthis and the Republic of Yemen and how the United States might be able to more effectively cooperate with the Republic to be able to bolster their military capacity, but most importantly to strengthen them against the Houthis. I'm going to, as I said before, bring up this subject of food insecurity.
As you know, the United States has effectively ended all Title II Food for Peace assistance to Yemen. 22 million people are affected by that morning, noon, and night. 5 million are internally displaced and another 18 million face acute food security, meaning they're dying as we speak. And they are not all adults, many are children, and it seems to me that with all that we've been talking about, this is a tragedy that the world is not paying attention to. And it calls, I think, upon the United States to figure out the best way to go forward instead of doing what we have been doing and not really succeeding.
We should be, I think, trying to gain influence in the area. Would you agree with that?
I would.
Speaker 43
And would you agree that that influence ought to be economic and political support for the people and the government that is pushing back against the Houthis?
Speaker 43
And would you agree that it was not the best thing in the world to fire the special envoy from the United States?
Speaker 43
Okay. In an increasingly multipolar world, our adversaries continue to exploit every opportunity, like the ones I just mentioned, to be able to sow chaos and to do that by reducing US influence. Instead of withdrawing from the world stage and withdrawing by destroying federal assistance programs, would you agree that the administration should thoughtfully and carefully engage with our partners and allies in the region to protect our national and economic security?
I fully agree.
Speaker 43
In your testimony, you reference several incidents in which China and Russia have directly or in some instances indirectly helped the Houthis by shutting down shipping in the Red Sea. These have included Russian logistical support for Houthi operations and Chinese companies allowing the Houthis to use their satellite imagery to target commercial ships. Would you agree that it is clearly the design and the goal of both of those nations to gain more influence in that area and in Yemen?
It is.
Speaker 42
And would you agree that their efforts further not only destabilize the region but put in some instances our military at risk?
I agree.
Speaker 43
Okay. I think for me at least, the economic aspect of this is just unbelievable. I can't speak for my colleagues here, but my constituents that I represent cannot continue to find themselves suffering under skyrocketing inflation rates since the beginning of the war in Iran and certainly don't need another war here in Yemen. And they can't afford another Middle East conflict that drives prices even further up. So the question becomes, is there a way out of this?
And if so, I think the first part of that question has to be, who has the upper hand? What is the current balance of power, if you will, between the Houthis and the Republic of Yemen?
Nadwa Al-Dawsari
Well, the Houthis have much more capabilities because they spent the entire decade building those capabilities, particularly after the 2022 truce. The 2022 truce was supposed to go to a roadmap, political settlement, but the Houthis did not engage in that process and instead they continued to rebuild their capabilities. They struck government ports, depriving the government of 70% of its revenues, and then they escalated in the Red Sea. So the solution for this, because we don't want to be plunged into endless war in the Middle East, but we do need to help our allies on the ground to take on this threat long-term. And we can do that by working with our allies, particularly Saudi Arabia and the Yemeni government, to contain the Houthi threat.
We need to provide the...
Speaker 39
Saudi Arabia ought to do more in my opinion. They've got the power, they've got the influence, and they don't have 30 million of their people starving today.
Nadwa Al-Dawsari
Absolutely, I completely agree with you, but they need our support. It doesn't have to be financial. They need our military, the Yemeni government need our military support, they need our guidance, they need intelligence, they need training, they need mentoring, all of the above.
Thank you. My time has expired.
Speaker 55
Gentleman's time has expired. I now recognize Representative Issa for five minutes.
Darrell Issa
Thank you, Chairman. I'm going to follow up on the gentleman from Maryland and sort of ask the first question. We don't need another war, he said. Aren't we at a war when in fact missiles are being fired, people are dying, and international trade is being interrupted by the Houthis? So, just like Iran, was there a war?
Just like Ukraine, was there a war? I'm going to ask both of you a question is, have we been at war in that region, including the Houthis, the Iranians, and I'll skip over Ukraine, going back anywhere from 1979 to 2014, take your pick? Are those valid questions that in fact there may be a difference in the escalation, de-escalation, the techniques, but do either of you disagree with the premise that we have been at a war, call it a slow-burn war, but a war in all of those regions?
I agree, and I think what we need to do is reflect on why we are at war. I can talk about the Houthis, why we're at war with the Houthis.
Darrell Issa
Okay, and I'll get back to that. I've had the luxury of visiting Yemen back when it was under a dictator that kept it stable, Jews in Yemen were businesspeople, it was a different era. But and I'd love to get back to that at longer. Let me follow up with this question. Presuming that we have been in conflict in these areas, and I'll take particularly the last statement that came out between you and my colleague from Maryland.
2022, prior to that time, the Jordanians and others in assistance with the Saudis leading were fighting the Houthis. Wasn't there in fact an effort to bring the Houthis' activity in that region to an end prior to the United States telling Saudi Arabia to back off? Is that a fair statement historically?
Sir, so the Yemeni government was forced to remain on the offensive since the Stockholm Agreement in 2018 when the Yemeni government tried to retake Hodeidah seaport from the Houthis and then thank you to pressure from the international community and the United States, well, that operation was halted and the Houthis kept the port and that's five years later they threatened international shipping. And that's why we're at war with the Houthis.
Darrell Issa
Right, and so picking up on that, we have a problem with Iran that is similar to the Houthis or Houthis similar to Iran and I'll take Hezbollah and throw them in. These are Shia entities who want to dominate control of their country and the region. They have historically gotten their money from Iranian oil. Iran is shifting if it can to revenue from essentially tolling international waterways. Yemen is trying to toll international waterways.
Hezbollah is finding additional including drug sale ways to find revenues. As we look at this problem as the Foreign Affairs Committee, isn't it really a situation in which yes, kinetic power probably needs to continue to be used in all areas, yes, we need to unleash Saudi Arabia and this time assure them that we're not going to bow to international pressure if in fact they are diminishing the Houthis' military capability, but whether it's one strait, another strait, you know, up towards the Sinai obviously the Suez Canal, or the China straits as is known where China is trying to take over that waterway and effectively toll it, isn't one of the things this committee has to look for above the fray of each of these conflicts?
Isn't that something that we have to focus on, that in fact each of these conflicts, including probably kinetically and in other ways defeating the Houthis, but isn't the real goal to make sure that no country and no region thinks that they can apply a toll to international waterways?
Yes, sir.
I haven't let you answer a question yet, so please.
Allison Minor
I would agree. We do need to protect the freedom of navigation. I think that's why the US needs to mount this sort of sustained, credible US strategy with allies in the region to end the Yemen conflict.
Darrell Issa
Thank you. Mr. Chairman, thank you for allowing me to make the point that I hope this committee will take into the future, that since Thomas Jefferson, this committee and our government has looked at international right of waterways as an essential part of our international policy, and I yield back.
Michael Lawler
Thank you to the representative from California. I now recognize Representative Wasserman Schultz for five minutes.
Debbie Wasserman Schultz
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And first, I want to wish a hearty mazel tov to my colleague and friend from Florida, my next-door neighbor Jared Moskowitz, on his assumption of the role of ranking member, well-deserved, and I look forward to the great job that you're going to continue to do. It is important for Americans to understand the scale of the crisis in Yemen, and we've gotten a chance to really scratch the surface here this morning, and also how this administration's policy choices have made it even worse. Yemen is not a tiny country. It has a population bigger than California, nearly 42 million people, the majority of whom live in crushing poverty under the grip of terrorist rulers.
This is on top of being following a civil war. And the number of people in emergency need of humanitarian assistance is equal to Florida's population, which is half the country, 21, 22 million people and growing rapidly. This is an unparalleled humanitarian disaster, and since coming into office, President Trump has only made it worse. Trump's devastating assault on foreign assistance has cut food aid to Yemen by more than 60 percent, more than doubling the number of starving women and children going without help. The elimination of USAID wiped out more than 450 health clinics while Yemen experiences large-scale outbreaks of cholera, measles, dengue, and polio.
In the meantime, the State Department has withheld billions in congressionally authorized funds for vaccines and medications that cost pennies per life saved and could have prevented these diseases from taking hold. Ms. Miner, Secretary Rubio insisted that the destruction and dismantling of USAID would not impact, quote, life-saving assistance. Has that been true in the case of Yemen, yes or no?
Debbie Wasserman Schultz
And are people who are desperate for food, medicine, and any form of income more or less likely to join up with the Houthis or one of the other dangerous organizations in Yemen?
Debbie Wasserman Schultz
These cruel cuts to desperately needed humanitarian aid certainly cost Yemeni lives, and they may well cost American lives too.
Instead of saving Yemeni lives, Trump spent that money killing no less than 153 civilians, including at least 80 in a single bombing on a civilian fuel storage facility. Ms. Weiner, I believe these aid cuts have only empowered Houthi terrorist rule and further undermined the legitimate government of Yemen. And now the Houthis are emboldened by Trump's strategic failure in Iran and loss of the Strait of Hormuz. How will their threats to shut down shipping through the Bab-el-Mandeb impact the price of gas and other costs for Americans?
I think you're right about the impacts of US aid emboldening the Houthis. And I think that we are seeing with the escalation in Yemen and the Houthis' actions further ripple effects of the war in Iran that we're only beginning to understand, and that will continue to drive up prices for Americans at the gas pump and more broadly.
Debbie Wasserman Schultz
In a moment when America's cost of living crisis is spinning out of control as Trump's quote short-term excursion turns into a months-long quagmire, my constituents, our constituents cannot afford another strategic disaster. We certainly don't want to see an expansion of this war in the Middle East. So what's the solution? How can we clean up the mess that Trump and Hegseth have made in the Gulf region, stop the economic damage, and engage productively to mitigate the Houthi threat? And I'll give you the rest of the time to respond.
Thank you, Ms. Weiner.
Allison Minor
I think it starts with stop vacillating between costly military engagement and disengagement in Yemen. We need the kind of sustained US strategy with our regional partners to actually bring the conflict to a durable resolution. I want to go back to the humanitarian crisis in Yemen briefly and stress that we don't even know how bad the crisis is in Houthi-controlled parts of Yemen because of the Houthis' detention of UN and US staff. Most aid workers have had to stop operations, including data collection. So there could be famine in northern Yemen right now and we just would not know it.
I think the detention of that UN staff also has consequences for the international order, for the UN's ability to operate in difficult environments, and that's something that the US needs to care about. And we need to be speaking about those detained staff and making sure that it's a priority as we seek a durable resolution to the conflict.
Debbie Wasserman Schultz
Mr. Chairman, I think Yemen is an example of where the withdrawal of our soft power that we express as a country with instead the imposition of hard power that has done nothing but make things worse is an example of what a tragic mistake the shutting down of USAID was and that we are absolutely going to have to make sure we reassert our soft power to help make a difference to protect our national security. Thank you both for your service and I yield back.
And I now recognize Representative Jackson for five minutes.
Ronny Jackson
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to our witnesses for being here today. As we've been discussing, the Red Sea remains a vital artery for global commerce and a critical passage for energy and goods and an important part of the international maritime system. When terrorists like the Iranian-backed Houthis threaten this important waterway, they threaten American economic and national security interests. Thankfully, President Trump has made it clear that attacks on American personnel, American ships, and American economic interests will be met with major, significant military consequences. The Houthi terrorist organization has made it clear that they're willing to use missiles, drones, and other weapons to attack commercial shipping and threaten American forces.
But they haven't stopped at the Bab-el-Mandeb. Ms. Al-Dosari, excuse me, as you mentioned, the Houthis are building human networks across the Horn of Africa. From recruiting African migrants to collaborating with Al-Shabaab in Somalia, the Houthis' growing collaboration to Al-Qaeda affiliates extends far beyond the Red Sea and the current conflict. I personally believe that one of the most disturbing things that's happening right now in the environment or the community of violent extremist organizations, VEOs, is the collaboration between the Houthis and Al-Shabaab and the potential to export that terror throughout the continent of Africa to other Al-Shabaab, I'm sorry, other Al-Qaeda affiliates. Can you tell me what you think about this evolving threat?
Is it as serious as I'm stating? And can you tell me what you think we should be doing to prevent this collaboration between Al-Shabaab and the Houthis and in, which extends a little bit beyond the Houthis per se, but what should we be doing in Somalia right now to stop that as well?
Nadwa Al-Dawsari
Yes, this threat is evolving and it's serious and we should see it as such. The Houthis have been collaborating with Al-Shabaab. They've provided the terrorist group with training, including on drone adaptation, weapons maintenance, and manufacturing of IEDs. At least 400 Al-Shabaab members have come to Yemen where they were trained by the Houthis in ideology, but also military training. Houthi operatives have traveled to Somalia and trained there as well.
And the Houthis are trying also to establish operational presence in Somalia. They're now present in Puntland and Somaliland and Jilib, which is the, the command center of, of Al-Shabaab. Both organizations have discussed collaboration against the US, but also international shipping and Gulf allies as well. So again, this relationship is evolving. And we have seen some evidence that these two organizations are also working together to disrupt Red Sea shipping.
There's also been reporting that the two groups have agreed, well, the Houthis have agreed with Al-Shabaab that Al-Shabaab would work with Somali pirates.
Speaker 67
Right, because the, obviously the Houthis would like to get, continue that relationship with Al-Shabaab, then they control both sides of the strait to some extent, correct?
Yes, so yes, so the, you know, big picture strategically what the Houthis are looking at, now they, they can launch attacks across the Bab-el-Mandeb and the Red Sea, but with Al-Shabaab they can also disrupt the Indian Ocean. And what we need to do in order to contain that threat is work with governments in those countries to help counter these threats from Al-Shabaab, but also from the Houthis.
Ronny Jackson
So you think that we need to, we need to pick up our support for the Somali government as well in their fight against Al-Shabaab because it will ultimately help us in this fight against the Houthis?
Yes, we do, but we do need, but the Houthis are the main actor. So according to the UN, the Houthis are now the main actor, they're in control of smuggling networks along with Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. The Houthis are the actor in charge, okay, of this relationship. So what we need to do is deny the Houthis access to Somalia. And we can deny the Houthis access to Somalia by supporting the Yemeni government to push the Houthis.
Ronny Jackson
And if, if we, if we continue our, our efforts against Iran, then it's going to be very difficult for the Houthis to maintain the resources that they need without Iranian support to, to work with Al-Shabaab and to export this terror into other areas of Africa, would you agree?
To some extent, yes, but the Houthis have developed their own sources, their own network. Now they can...
Speaker 64
But they are still getting some significant support from Iran, correct? Weapon systems, missiles, things of that nature?
Speaker 61
Yes, yes they do. They also have military expertise on the ground helping them with, with expansion across the Horn of Africa, Red Sea attacks, and also against the United States, yes.
Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Jim Costa
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. How many ambassadorships within the Gulf states have we filled in terms of posts today to this time, two years into this administration?
Allison Minor
I believe we currently have an ambassador serving in Oman who was appointed during the Biden administration. I don't believe...
That's correct.
Jim Costa
Well, you know, it tells me a lot about what this administration's trying to do in terms of this war in Iran that still to this time has not proven to be any of the successes that the president has claimed over the last six months in terms of the competing goals. Would you say that Yemen today is among the list of countries in that part of the world that we could characterize as a failed state?
I think it is certainly verging on that definition.
Jim Costa
Along with Syria and you could go on to Libya and sadly... So how capable are the Houthis in replicating in this failed state of Yemen a Strait of Hormuz fiasco that was an open international waterway until we decided to engage in this war in Iran?
Allison Minor
I think the Houthis set the model for what Iran has done in the Strait of Hormuz. It's not a matter of replicating it, but they are certainly expanding it.
Jim Costa
Notwithstanding our previous attacks there among the Houthis, what weapons do they now have and are capable of coordinating with other Islamic Revolutionary Guard since the war in Iran's begun?
Allison Minor
The Houthis have an arsenal rivaling many states. They have ballistic and cruise missiles that are capable of going over 2,000 kilometers, drones that can go even further than that, anti-ship ballistic missiles.
They are.
Jim Costa
And so depending upon what Saudi Arabia decides to take in military action against the Houthis, what role do you see us, depending upon what actions take place with the Saudis?
Allison Minor
I think our role is supporting the Yemen government through technical assistance and capacity building.
Allison Minor
I said it's verging on that definition. I think that there's important nuance here. You mentioned Syria. Syria is a case where we are actually seeing the central government take important steps towards stabilizing that country, and I think we've seen the Yemen government make important strides in that regard.
Jim Costa
Do you think we have a red line there in terms of the Red Sea with regards to US military action against the Houthis?
I'm sorry, what was the question?
Jim Costa
Do you think we have established a clear red line based on military action against the Houthis?
Allison Minor
No, the Houthis continued their attacks on commercial shipping after the Trump administration declared a ceasefire with them in May 2025.
Jim Costa
How capable are the Yemen governments, going back to your point, in addressing this threat from the Houthis?
I think that they can be made more capable, but this is ultimately why we need a diplomatic solution to the conflict.
They have a significant arsenal. Again, they've been receiving significant military support from the Saudis and the Emiratis for over a decade now and extensive training, and they have made some military gains on the ground. They are a force that is capable of countering the Houthis. It's just they're not capable of delivering a military defeat to the Houthis, and neither are we and neither are the Saudis.
Jim Costa
Well, and we've tried, and I mean, unless there was some sort of a significant effort placed with ourselves, the Saudis, and perhaps some other partners.
I mean, the massive attempt that we've had with Iran has, after destroying, as the President likes to say, their navy, their air force, and everything else, they still are in for the long haul, clearly, and capable of limiting access through the Strait of Hormuz, would you not say?
Allison Minor
I would. I think we've seen an evolution in the nature of military technology and how it benefits these sorts of groups. And unless we're willing to put US troops on the ground for a ground invasion like...
Jim Costa
Correct. And we're not willing to do that. And we don't have the political support. Let me make one other final point. And, you know, I think General Powell a long time ago had it right.
You have to have overwhelming support of the American public. We don't have that. You have to have an exit strategy that's clear. We don't have an exit strategy. You go in with overwhelming force.
Well, we've done that and we saw what what work products come. The criticism of our allies not joining us, I think, is is really fraught with a lot of contradictions. I mean, we didn't bring them into it in the first place. We didn't brief them as previous administrations briefed them, get them to buy in. And then now after we're in this prolonged stalemate for six months, we say, oh, by the way, would you please come and join us?
I mean, friends don't treat friends like that. And and it runs contrary to the alliance and the the efforts that we have engaged in for decades. So this finger-pointing and blaming someone else, frankly, I think, does not respond to the American public and why this war is not popular. I've exceeded my time. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Michael Lawler
Gentleman's time has expired. I now recognize Representative Baumgartner for five minutes.
Michael Baumgartner
Thank you, Mr. Chair, and congratulations to the ranking member. Well, Yemen is one of the few countries in the Middle East I've not been to. I've actually wanted to go a couple times. My my wife has been there several times, quite enjoyed Sana'a and is it Socotra is the island off the coast?
Socotra.
Michael Baumgartner
Yeah. And we were actually wanted to go for our honeymoon, but my wife is from England and we'd gotten the fiancé visa waiting for the green card, so she couldn't travel out of the country. So we went to the Oregon coast, which I guess for our purposes is the Yemen of America. But in any event, I'm just in your thoughts on building regional coalitions. It seems to me that we can't get much good done in in Yemen without getting Saudi Arabia and the UAE on the same page.
And I know Egypt is largely a basket case economy, but nobody has suffered more from the closure of the straits Red Sea from Egypt. There has to be something we can get out of Egypt for solving this. So could you I guess and to start this, I'd like you to address those two issues, how we get UAE and Saudi on the same page. And then if I completely disagree with with this idea that came from some of our Democratic colleagues that this is an issue of of international aid. Certainly aid plays an important role.
Look, I studied international development. This was was my background. But I had the opportunity to look at counterterrorism operations in that part of the world last year. And actually our direct action versus the Houthis last year was significant in improving the situation. So this is not a a an international aid issue.
But to begin with, if we had to look back, was it was it the wrong policy to to pull the Emiratis off of their offensive military actions in the previous administration, in the first Trump administration?
Yes, that was a in my opinion, that was a fatal mistake and that's what enabled the Houthis to keep the port and then threaten international shipping.
I'm sorry?
And it's caused a worse situation today.
Absolutely.
Speaker 62
And Allison, what do you think about 2018? Was that the wrong call to to pull the Emiratis out?
Allison Minor
I think at the time, I had my own reservations about the military viability of the strategy of both taking and holding Hodeidah. Okay, but in hindsight. I'm sorry? Not at the time, in hindsight, was it a mistake? In hindsight, I think if it had been part of a coherent political strategy, it could have been an effective tactic in that strategy, but that strategy did not exist.
At that time, the coalition still had maximalist expectations of completely militarily defeating the Houthis that were unrealistic. And what do we do today to get the Emiratis and the Saudis on the same page on this issue? I think it goes, you have to have a serious conversation with them about the desired end state. That's what's been missing since the coalition campaign began in 2015. I agree that the Yemen government has been stronger since the Saudis have increased support and reforms within the government, but until you address that underlying issue within the coalition and within the Yemen government, you're going to continue to see these fissures grow.
And only the United States can provide that kind of leadership and convening power to bring our regional partners together. And what is the difference in, if you want to take a shipment of oil from the Gulf, presuming you can get through, through the Red Sea or around Africa, what is the difference in cost and time of those two pathways? I believe it adds additional two weeks, and then the costs are enormous in fuel and then also opportunity costs and availability of ships, and especially at a time when we're seeing this proliferation of alternative routes. Do you want to say anything about the Saudis and the Emiratis? Yeah.
I agree with what Allison said. I think we need US leadership here and for the US to talk with its allies and also the Yemeni government to sort differences and see what we can do together to address the Houthi threat. And what are reasonable expectations for the US to place on Egypt, given our financial assistance to Egypt and other involvement with them with this problem? I think as you mentioned, the stakes are high for Egypt. It definitely suffered a lot, and I think Egypt should be also part of that conversation.
Anything more than having a conversation with the Egyptians? I don't know. Thank you, Mr. Chair, I yield back.
Michael Lawler
Thank you. I thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony and the members for their questions. The members of the subcommittee may have some additional questions for the witnesses, and we will ask you to respond to these in writing. Pursuant to committee rules, all members may have five days to submit statements, questions, and extraneous materials for the record, subject to the length limitations. Without objection, the committee stands adjourned.