“25 Years Later: Evolutions in Federal, State, and Local Counterterrorism Efforts Since 9/11”
Legend
Transcript markers
- text Sentence being played
- text Search result
- text Intervention cited by the link you opened
Click a sentence to play the video from that moment. Select text to quote it with the speaker, timestamp and link.
More options
House Homeland Security U.S. House of Representatives
Follow its sittingsBennie Thompson
Unfortunately, the president has forgotten that lesson, and maybe he never learned it. Recently, after being told that he could not speak at the 25th anniversary ceremony in New York, he attended the Pentagon observance where he dozed off in a chair as the names of the victims were read. Even worse, as president, Trump has dismantled national security programs stood up in the wake of 9/11 and weaponized the Department of Homeland Security against the American people. He's also politicized counterterrorism grants to communities, withholding them from blue states to punish them for opposing his policies. His administration tried to slash by 86% Homeland Security grant program funding for New York, which remains the biggest terrorist target today.
Federal courts stepped in to restore that money, but DHS still owes New York $87 million meant to fund critical counterterrorism efforts. Last week, New York Department of Homeland Security and Emergency Services wrote to FEMA, which administers the grant, asking when the money will be restored, saying, and I quote, "This prolonged uncertainty impedes New York's ability to plan and allocate resources for critical counterterrorism efforts." Governor Hochul also weighed in on the safety threat, saying the president continuing to withhold the fund amounts to defunding the police, since the NYPD is slated to receive the lion's share of New York's allocation. On that, I agree with Governor Hochul. Without these funds, New York is more vulnerable to another terrorist attack.
President Trump is playing politics not just with New York's money, but with the security of our country. As the committee established after 9/11 to prevent another large-scale attack on our country, we have a unique responsibility to ensure that Americans never forget. That includes all Americans, even the president. Make no mistake, Democrats will hold the administration accountable for its actions, which dishonors the 9/11 victims and distracts from current threats facing the homeland.
This morning, we are absolutely honored to have with us leaders who were on duty the day of the attack, as well as those currently in those roles. I hope to discuss with them the counterterrorism efforts of the last 25 years, as well as what first responders need to prevent, prepare for, and respond to persistent security threats. Please know that we stand with you, the brave men and women you represent and your colleagues across the country. Thank you again for being here, for what you do every day to help our communities and protect our homeland. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Andrew Garbarino
The members of the committee are reminded that opening statements may be submitted for the record. Today's hearing will consist of two panels, with the first panel providing opening statements, sharing their experiences responding to the attacks on 9/11, as well as the efforts undertaken by the respective agencies to improve homeland security resilience before and after. The second panel will discuss how this work has continued over the last 25 years and will take questions from the committee. I would now like to formally introduce our witnesses for the first panel. Mr. Daniel Nigro is the former commissioner of the FDNY, serving in this role from 2014 to 2022.
Commissioner Nigro served as the FDNY's chief of operations during 9/11 and responded to the World Trade Center. Following the death of the chief of department, Peter Ganci, on 9/11, Commissioner Nigro was appointed chief of the department, where he oversaw the rescue and recovery operation at Ground Zero. Commissioner, very happy for you to be able to join us today and thank you very much for your service. Mr. James Schwartz is the former chief of the Arlington County Fire Department. On 9/11, Chief Schwartz led the unified command effort for the department's response to the Pentagon attack.
Chief Schwartz has previously served on the Advisory Council for the Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group and the Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team at the National Counterterrorism Center. As a member of the International Association of Fire Chiefs, Chief Schwartz also chaired the association's committee on terrorism and homeland security and was designated the lead for their DHS FEMA reform task force. I thank you, Chief, also for being here today and for your service on that day. Pursuant to committee rule 8C, I ask that the witnesses please rise and raise their right hand. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you will give before the Committee on Homeland Security of the United States House of Representatives will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Let the record reflect that the witnesses have answered in the affirmative, please be seated. I now recognize Commissioner Nigro for his statement.
Daniel Nigro
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I'd like to start by thanking you and the members of this committee for having this hearing and for your diligence in this very important task. Our members, the members past and present of the FDNY, appreciate it, as do their families. Terrorism, as defined by the Department of Homeland Security, is nothing new to the city of New York. From the 1864 attempt by eight Confederate operatives to burn a large area of the city, which ironically accelerated New York's establishment of a paid fire department, now the FDNY, to the Wall Street bombing of 1920, which killed 38, wounded more than a hundred, to the Mad Bomber of the 40s and 50s, anti-war bombings and the FALN of the 1960s and 70s, to the attacks on the World Trade Center in 1993 and 2001.
In the 25 years since 9/11, terrorist attacks in New York City, albeit on a smaller scale, have continued. Some involving groups, others involving individuals. The weapons used have varied from improvised explosive devices to firearms, knives, hatchets, and vehicles. What weapons will be used in possible, or should we say probable, future attacks? Drones, chemical, biological, cyberattacks, etc., must be constantly planned for.
The challenges are immense. While the Fire Department has always stood ready to protect life and property in New York City and has responded to acts of terrorism throughout its history, its focus on terrorism has been somewhat minimal prior to the attack on the World Trade Center in 1983. In February of that year, terrorists parked a van filled with explosive material in the garage under the towers. A long fuse was lit, allowing the perpetrators time to escape. The terrorists' intention was to bring down one tower into the other, causing the collapse of both and the death of thousands.
While this detonation caused considerable damage and numerous deaths and injuries, the towers survived. Following this attack and the extensive response and operations of the city's Fire and Police Departments, planning and preparations in our city increased. Efforts were undertaken to better prepare both agencies for future acts. In 1996, the Mayor's Office of Emergency Management, OEM, under the effective leadership of the late Jerome Hauer, was created. OEM was tasked with coordinating the response of city agencies to all forms of emergencies.
OEM planned interagency training and drills and helped improve coordination and communication. While OEM proved effective in improving the overall response and coordination at emergencies, in September of 2001, it was still a work in progress. The morning of September 11th, 2001, began much like today as a brilliantly clear and bright late summer day. In the hour between 8:00 and 9:00, FDNY members in firehouses throughout the city were in the midst of a shift change with members preparing to head home while others were relieving them. At headquarters, the work of the day began with the department's leadership engaged in the business of managing the busiest fire department in the world.
FDNY headquarters is located across the East River from the World Trade Center in the MetroTech complex of Brooklyn, between the Brooklyn and Manhattan bridges. I was Chief of Operations, second in command to Chief of Department Peter Ganci. Our offices on the seventh floor had windows facing the towers. Just before 8:47, I entered my office when I heard a loud noise and felt the building shake. At that instant, Chief Ganci shouted out, "Dan, look out your window, a plane just hit the World Trade Center."
We did not know what type of plane it was or why it had struck the building. We later learned it was American Airlines Flight 11, a large Boeing 767, recently taken off, bound for California, with its fuel tanks full of jet fuel. Chief Ganci and I responded together over a miraculously traffic-free Brooklyn Bridge. From the bridge, we had a clear view of the impact area, seeing what appeared to be 10 floors of intense fire, 1,000 feet up. I said two things to Chief Ganci, although I'm sure he was already thinking the same thing: "This will be the worst day of our lives, and we cannot put out that much fire on the upper floors of the building."
Chief Ganci immediately transmitted a fifth alarm bringing 250 department members to the scene. We arrived and established our command post on West Street at the foot of the North Tower. Units commanded by Battalion Chief Joe Pfeifer were already inside the tower. At 9:03, a loud noise caused me to look up just as United Airlines Flight 175, another 767 bound for California traveling at over 500 miles an hour, struck the South Tower, Two World Trade Center, floors 77 to 85. Now our somewhat impossible task had doubled in size.
The two tallest buildings in New York City had been attacked by terrorists or seriously damaged and burning out of control. A second fifth alarm was transmitted, eventually followed by a third fifth alarm. An unknown number of people were trapped at or above the damaged floors in both towers and many others below the stricken floors were having difficulty exiting the buildings. The impact of the hijacked airliners caused the elevators, all but two serving lower floors, to become damaged and inoperable. The standpipe systems designed to allow water for firefighting to be pumped to the upper floors had also been damaged and presumed to be inoperable as well.
Although as I stated earlier, I believed extinguishment at this point was beyond our capacity, that did not mean we would just stand by. 911 calls from occupants trapped in the towers answered at our dispatch center were unimaginably frantic and heart-wrenching. All our dispatchers could do was to tell the callers to hang on, we are coming for you, and we were. Without elevator service, reaching the upper floors was exceedingly difficult and time-consuming. But we would do our absolute best to climb to the impact area and try to reach those trapped.
In the South Tower, we know from members' communications captured by recording devices that our members had reached the impact area and were preparing to advance up one partially obstructed stairway when suddenly that communication ceased. At 9:58:59, the South Tower collapsed. Total collapse took only 11 seconds. While we were prepared for and expected localized collapses within the towers, this was not anticipated, certainly not at this stage in our operation. Chief Ganci issued the order for our members to remove themselves from the North Tower.
Many were able to get out while others were either too high up or assisting occupants. The North Tower later collapsed. Chief Ganci and First Deputy Commissioner William Feehan, while assisting in the rescue of members in the South Tower, were struck by debris and killed. We discovered their bodies later that afternoon. The collapse caused damage to and numerous fires in surrounding buildings and vehicles, damaged our water supply system.
Our surviving units and other units brought in were tasked with finding ways to deal with that as well as searching for survivors. As the afternoon wore on, World Trade Center 7, a 47-story building just across Vesey Street, began to worry us. We ordered our members out of the building and cleared a collapse zone and at 5:20 that afternoon, 7 World Trade collapsed. At some time that day, we learned that American Airlines Flight 77 had struck the Pentagon and United Airlines Flight 93 crashed near Shanksville, Pennsylvania. A total of 2,977 innocent people were killed on that day, 2,753 in New York.
That includes 343 members of the fire department, 37 from the Port Authority Police, and 23 from the New York City Police. 184 people died at the Pentagon and 40 in Shanksville. Books have been written about the day that followed, but I'll try to briefly sum it up. The entire area that was the World Trade Center looked otherworldly. Fires burned for 99 days beneath what remained.
While the first week to 10 days was referred to as a rescue operation, few people were rescued and none after September 12th. After the rescue effort became a recovery operation, work continued until May 30th of 2002. FDNY members, their counterparts in the NYPD and PAPD, as well as many others, remained on the scene searching for the victims' remains 24 hours a day, seven days a week, until that final day. To date, of the 2,753 victims at the World Trade Center, the remains of roughly 40% have not yet been identified. Were we prepared for the attack on the World Trade Center on September 11th?
As John Miller, a former deputy commissioner at the NYPD, is quoted as saying, using commercial airplanes as missiles being flown by trained pilots wasn't on anyone's frame of reference. That being said, all of us on the federal, state, and local level have made great progress in studying, planning, and thwarting current and future terrorist attacks. At the fire department, we've always reviewed our actions following fatal fires, complicated operations, and unusual responses. What did we do right? What mistakes were made?
What could we have done better and what needs to be changed to make us even better? No response in our history had more fatalities and was more complicated and unusual than what I just summarized. We believed it would be helpful to ask an expert to help in our review and critique, so we contacted the consulting firm McKinsey & Company and they agreed to work with us. Some important suggestions contained in the final report of the review have made us a better department, more able to meet future challenges. One is rooted in the assistance we received from the US Forest Service immediately after the attack.
When I first heard that they were coming to assist us, I was quite skeptical. What do forest fire specialists have to do with our urban environment? The Forest Service manages events that may last for weeks and months. FDNY generally puts out the fire, returns the property to the owners or the NYPD, and gets ready for the next alarm. The operations at the World Trade Center site would be ongoing and the Forest Service taught us how best to manage a long-term incident.
Afterwards, we decided to form our own incident management team, the IMT, now consisting of over 300 trained members. When I returned to the department in 2014, I found the IMT to be one of the biggest improvements. They'd helped manage many events here and across the country. Our response to COVID crisis is a perfect example. They were invaluable.
It was suggested that we needed a more robust Hazmat capability. Five Haztech engine companies were created with highly trained members giving us the ability to respond to and mitigate multiple incidents. A new bureau was created to ensure we were prepared for the challenges of the ever-changing world.
The FDNY Center for Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness works with our federal, state, and city partners staying up to date with current threats and planning and conducting response scenarios and drills. Members of this unit have high-level security clearance, as do ranking department members who are regularly apprised of threat environments. Many other large and small adjustments were made to our department, such as the addition of two state-of-the-art fireboats, drones, robotics, improved communications, changes in our counseling program and family assistance, as well as a World Trade Center health program monitoring all members impacted by their response to the attacks and their work in the days after. We certainly have depended upon and continued to depend on federal funding that has made these improvements possible, and we certainly look forward to continued support. Thank you for all that you've done and for conducting today's hearing.
Andrew Garbarino
Thank you very much, Commissioner Nigro, for sharing that with us and for your statement. I now recognize Chief Schwartz for his opening statement.
James Schwartz
Chairman Garbarino, Ranking Member Thompson, thank you all very much for conducting this hearing today and listening to some of our thoughts about the events of 25 years ago. On September 11th, 2001, 184 people lost their lives at the Pentagon, 59 on the aircraft and 125 in the building. They ranged in age from 3 to 71, and as we reflect on that day 25 years ago, our first thought should be with those families who lost loved ones and recall that they don't need an anniversary to remember those lives cut tragically short. It's also useful to observe that but for the fact that the area where the airplane struck the building at the Pentagon that day was virtually empty, otherwise the losses at the Pentagon would have been significantly greater. We also cannot forget the heroes of the Pentagon that day, the military and civilian members alike who acted with great courage and resolve to save their coworkers, in some cases reentering the burning building multiple times to guide colleagues out through fire and smoke.
The 9/11 Commission in their landmark report observed about the response to the Pentagon that while no emergency response is flawless, the response to the terrorist attack on the Pentagon was mainly a success for three reasons. First, the strong professional relationships and trust established among the responders. Second, the adoption of the incident command system, and third, the pursuit of a regional approach to emergency response. None of what the Commission observed was the result of happenstance or luck. For decades before 9/11, public safety leaders from around the Washington metropolitan area, actively supported by elected officials through the Council of Governments, collaborated on issues that are often hindered by parochial approaches to government service.
Mutual aid agreements were struck with the knowledge and expectation that when events overwhelmed a locality, it could depend on neighboring jurisdictions to come to its aid. Regional plans for mass casualty events were developed and tested. The ability to communicate across public safety radio systems so that responders from different jurisdictions and professions could communicate with one another had been achieved by several jurisdictions and was well on its way to completion for the remainder of the National Capital Region. However incomplete the 9/11 Commission's observations about the Pentagon response, their framing provides an opportunity to consider important factors for both successes and shortcomings, but also a way that we have applied those lessons over the last two and a half decades and where we should concentrate our attention now. Relationships and trust.
The success of emergency service organizations is the result of many efforts, not all of which come from within the organization.
Public safety leaders today should recognize that the boundaries that separate professions or jurisdictions are useless during a novel crisis. The investment in developing such relationships can help to grease difficult operational challenges, especially when they present conflicting priorities. Developing trusted relationships and mutual understanding before the crisis will better aid the the system was created to serve. The attack on the Pentagon made clear that no one agency had all the resources, experience, or expertise to bring the event to a successful conclusion. Acknowledging the interdependence among dozens of agencies and professions was essential, and developing relationships to work on common understanding before the crisis is a major factor in successfully managing any complex incident.
One of the strongest and most valuable partnerships on 9/11 was between the FBI and the region's fire departments. 9/11 tested for the first time the 1995 presidential directive that places the FBI as the lead law enforcement agency for all acts of terrorism. How would that work in the face of a major disaster had not yet been tested. Fortunately, we in the NCR had established a strong relationship with the FBI's Washington Field Office and their National Capital Response Squad. The NCRS had participated in regional exercises as recently as three days before the attack, and on the morning of the attack were training with all of the fire department's heavy rescue squads from around the metropolitan area in preparations for large-scale demonstrations that we were anticipating later that fall.
The bureau's first agents arrived at the Pentagon minutes after the first fire department unit arrived, and collaborative decision-making through unified command was initiated immediately. Because of our investment in building a professional relationship and mutual understanding, there was no battle for turf. Both the bureau and the Arlington County Fire Department knew that success would only occur if we worked together and applied the knowledge and respect that we had gained from each other over the previous three years. Incident management. The 9/11 Commission observed that the use of of the incident command system was another positive factor at the Pentagon.
ICS was implemented by the first arriving unit four minutes after the airplane struck the building, and unified command including the Arlington County Fire and Police Departments and the FBI was established eight minutes later. This was before the federal government incorporated incident command as national doctrine through the National Incident Management System in 2004. Under NIMS, ICS is a standardized process for managing a crisis across jurisdictions and professional disciplines. It's hard to imagine a better framework that unifies response agencies under shared objectives, common terminology, and that is scalable to the size and complexity of an incident. Fire and EMS use ICS every day for every incident.
Unfortunately, NIMS has not gained universal acceptance as evidenced by too many after-action reviews in the last two and a half decades that have identified a lack of effective incident management as a leading cause for suboptimal outcomes. After more than 20 years as a national doctrine, it's time to assess where we are with NIMS, make improvements to the doctrine as necessary, assess how we teach it, and stop pretending that because we ask grant recipients to certify that they use NIMS, that we are any closer to a truly national approach to incident management than we were 25 years ago. Lastly, the 9/11 Commission observed the pursuit of a regional approach to response as an asset. That pursuit began long before the attack. Regionalism.
Prompted by the 1973 collapse of a high-rise apartment building that was under construction, fire chiefs in Arlington, Alexandria, and Fairfax began collaborating on automatic aid.
Last year, the NOVA agreement celebrated 50 years of continuous operation. The Northern Virginia localities are also members of the Washington Metropolitan Area Council of Governments. COG is used as a forum to collaborate on regional problems that are not confined by jurisdictional boundaries, and is overseen by a board of elected representatives from each of the 24 member jurisdictions, creating legitimacy at the policy level. The region's fire chiefs have long had a committee and several technical subcommittees at COG. Through NOVA and COG, the chiefs have recognized that they are building capacity that goes beyond routine emergencies, but that by using such a system every day builds strength, furthers collaboration and trust, and can be exploited when the big one comes.
Soon after the 9/11 tragedy, there was a discussion about developing a national system of response. This was in recognition that for some incidents, even a region as large as the NCR still need outside assistance. The International Association of Fire Chiefs developed a fire service mutual aid system to improve interstate mutual aid. The effort later transitioned to the National Mutual Aid System. Its purpose is to address some of the concerns with the Emergency Management Assistance Compact, where because of the bidding system, the closest available resources are often not deployed, thus delaying support during a crisis.
Additionally, local and fire EMS departments must wait years for financial reimbursement after deploying to a major incident. We urge Congress to examine the issue of interstate mutual aid to ensure that the closest resources are deployed efficiently during a disaster. I just want to take a moment to say that those of us in Arlington, in the National Capital Region, and dare I speak for the entirety of the American fire service, stand with our brothers and sisters, and have stood for 25 years, our brothers and sisters in New York for their tremendous losses on that day, and the losses that they have suffered as a result of occupational diseases since then, something that we too here in the National Capital Region are experiencing every day. I want to thank the committee for taking the time to hold this hearing, and I look forward to the continued conversation on these important topics. Thank you.
Andrew Garbarino
Thank you, Chief Schwartz. On behalf of the committee, I would like to thank you both for your service to the United States during 9/11 and the years after, and I appreciate your willingness to participate in today's hearing. The first panel has concluded, the committee will suspend while the second panel takes their seats.
Michael McCaul
Introduce our second panel. First, Mr. John Donnelly serves as the chief of the Washington, D.C. Fire and EMS Department, a role he has held since 2020. Chief Donnelly joined the department in 1992, served as a battalion chief, division commander of special operations, homeland security, and apparatus. He also served as a member of the command staff and head of the department's professional development bureau. Chief Donnelly is a member of the International Association of Fire Chiefs Terrorism and Homeland Security Committee and the Fire Chiefs Committee for the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments.
It's quite a resume. Thanks for being here. Second, we have Mr. Thomas Currao, serves as FDNY's chief of fire prevention. Prior to his current role, Chief Currao served as the FDNY's chief of training and chief of counterterrorism and emergency preparedness, as well as fire marshal, lieutenant, captain, and company commander, battalion chief, and deputy chief. And finally, we have Mr. Greg Ehrie, who serves as the chief secretary officer for the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, a role he's held since 2022.
Prior to joining the Port Authority, Mr. Ehrie served in the Air Force for eight years and is a veteran of Desert Storm, after which he joined the Federal Bureau of Investigation. During his 22-year FBI career, Mr. Ehrie served as special agent in charge of the bureau's New York and Newark field offices, which we all know is an incredibly busy office. And most recently, Mr. Ehrie served as vice president and chief security officer at the Anti-Defamation League. I want to thank all three of you for being here today in remembrance of that solemn day on 9/11. And with that, I'd like to start with Mr. Donnelly.
John Donnelly
Thank you, sir. Chairman Garbarino, Ranking Member Thompson, and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. As a new sergeant responding back into the city on September 11th, 2001, it is an honor today to represent Mayor Muriel Bowser, the government of the District of Columbia, the men and women of the District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services Department, as you assess our nation's preparedness 25 years after the attacks of that day. I also want to acknowledge leaders on the first panel, individuals who carried forward the response, recovery, and resilience missions and in the immediate aftermath, in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. Their work laid the foundation for the homeland security architecture we rely on today, and they were mentors to me.
So the perspective of the National Capital Region: the 9/11 Commission Report found that although command and control challenges occurred during the Pentagon attack, the overall response was effective because the National Capital Region had already embraced a formal incident command system, an emphasis that increased after the 1982 Air Florida crash.
The 9/11 attacks accelerated regionalization, fundamentally transforming how public safety agencies coordinate, train, communicate, and share intelligence. Over the past 25 years, DC Fire and EMS has applied those lessons to every major category of incident we face, from mass casualty events, transit and transportation accidents, large-scale responses at federal facilities, maritime and waterway emergencies, even complex aviation incidents such as the mid-air collision over the Potomac, each of these reinforcing the value of unified command, interagency planning, and seamless information sharing. As a result, the department has evolved from a primarily operational response agency into an integrated partner in the regional homeland security planning complex, designed to meet and scale the complexity of the National Capital Region. We work closely with district, regional, and federal partners to maintain a shared operating picture and unified response framework. As a non-law enforcement agency in this process, we often serve as the community's voice as security and event plans are developed, reflecting the sustained collaboration across jurisdictions that recognize terrorism and other threats that do not respect borders.
Our current preparedness: today's threat environment is broader and more complex than ever, and our preparedness rests on several pillars. First, interagency coordination and regional planning: we participate in large-scale planning through the District Preparedness System and the Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments. Second, intelligence and information sharing: Fire and EMS relies on the Washington Regional Threat Analysis Center, the Metropolitan Police Department, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation for shared intelligence. Programs like the United States Fire Administration-led Fire Service Intelligence Exchange and DHS suspicious activity reporting have strengthened that integration. Third, operational readiness: our members train continuously, and they respond to conventional and unconventional threats, including complex coordinated attacks.
In addition to daily refresher training in our firehouses, our operational employees log tens of thousands of hours of continuing education each year. Fourth, technology and communications: investments in modern communications platforms, including emergency alerting systems that strengthen situational awareness across the NCR. Secure interoperability of radio and data systems through investments in land mobile radios, radio caches, and FirstNet support rapid information sharing among responders, partners, and the public. So where could we use federal support? While the last 25 years have brought enormous progress, there are several areas that remain critically dependent on our federal partnership.
Following the events of 9/11, Congress recognized the critical need for robust intelligence and information sharing systems, not only at the federal level, but also among first responders who are the earliest on the scene when disaster strikes. To fulfill this vision, resources are urgently needed to rebuild the Fire and EMS intelligence capability that was lost with the shuttering of the Fire Service Intelligence Exchange. Whether by reestablishing federal mechanisms that support the FSIE or funding local participation in something like the Joint Counterterrorism Assessment Team, these actions will ensure that local authorities have the intelligence support they need to plan for the hazards we will face. We need a commitment from Congress on bandwidth, satellite, and data transfer standards.
Our operations are reliant on technology. We need to preserve terrestrial bandwidth for our first responders and plan for the future use of satellite communications through our regulatory process. And we need stable and flexible grant support. The Urban Area Security Initiative and similar grant funding is essential to the fire service's ability to adopt new technologies and practices. This funding also provides training against national hazards.
It funds exercises, cybersecurity readiness, and regional interoperability that cannot be funded locally. Proposed changes to 2 CFR 200 and the recent threats to major fire service grants and the National Fire Academy introduce instability and undermines our ability to plan for the long term. And finally, the National Incident Management System, as it was envisioned by Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5, has not emerged as we had hoped. The existing system needs a review and update to see where it can be improved. Finally, I want to acknowledge Mayor Bowser's support for the DC Air Safety Act.
Nearly 25 million passengers travel through Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport every year, and the 2025 collision over the Potomac made clear that our airspace is operating beyond safe limits. Chairman, 25 years after 9/11, protecting our communities from terrorism remains a no-fail responsibility. Our success at DC Fire and EMS is a result of working with federal, state, and local partners to ensure our responders have the tools needed to meet evolving threats. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today, and I look forward to your questions.
Thomas Currao
Good morning. My name is Tom Correo, Assistant Chief for the New York City Fire Department. Thank you for the honor and privilege of providing testimony today. 25 years since the horrific events of September 11th, the greatest and most meaningful way by which we can respect the memories of those we have lost is by analyzing the lessons of this tragedy and applying our best solutions so that we may preserve life and property as part of our life-saving mission. September 11th, 2001, should have been a special day for my family as we were looking forward to seeing my oldest son, Brian, off to his first day of preschool.
I was off duty that day, and as I became aware of the terrible events unfolding, the anticipation of this happy event quickly transferred to disbelief and the need to get to my command to assist in any way possible. In the 25 years since September 11th, 2001, the fire service has evolved in our analysis of threats as well as developing preparedness strategies. One of the main themes is the adoption of an all-hazards focus and improving core tools such as situational awareness, developing a common operating picture, and interagency coordination that apply to all emergency events. This has become particularly meaningful as funding allocations have decreased and made the efficient analysis of risk even more vital. Comprehensive risk analysis is predicated on the fire service continuing to have a seat at the intelligence enterprise table, not only as a consumer, but also playing a vital role in the development of threat assessments.
to build strong intelligence sharing relationships with the New York City Police Department as well as the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force. This supports the FDNY's counterterrorism efforts, particularly our very own Center for Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness. The center regularly develops intelligence products that are transmitted across the entire nation to share insights as well as lessons learned. We thank the Congress for the many years of grant funding that support and have led to the creation and improvement of many FDNY response resources, such as the Fire Department's Operations Center, Marine Firefighting Regional Assets, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle and Robotics Program, and Incident Management Teams. These comprehensive capabilities have proven their tremendous value at fires and emergencies over the last 25 years, as well as most recently within the context of the 250th anniversary and the FIFA World Cup.
It is these types of occasions that the first responder resources that you all have supported come together in a synergistic homeland security enterprise. This homeland security enterprise is vital today to attain comprehensive preparedness. It provides the base to address both traditional threats, such as the use of improvised explosives and fire and smoke as a weapon, but also dynamic cybersecurity threats, digital tools that can undermine public safety messaging by nefarious actors, and potential negative impacts related to artificial intelligence. So what are our highest priorities for the future and what recommendations can we offer today? Commit to continued dialogue with the first responder community so that we can jointly support the vital need for homeland security funding.
Continue to build upon intelligence sharing mechanisms between law enforcement and the first responder communities. Advocate for increased investment in homeland security education to fully prepare the next generation of professionals. Establish multidisciplinary working groups to study the homeland security preparedness and continuity of operations impact of artificial intelligence as well as opportunities. Establish a multi-agency working group to study the effectiveness of the National Incident Management System and the Incident Command System with regard to unified fire service and law enforcement operations. As you can see, in the 25 years since September 11, 2001, there has been much progress within the fire service in regard to homeland security and emergency preparedness, but also much to accomplish.
Our commitment to our communities to continually build partnerships and tirelessly work toward achieving the highest state of preparedness has never been stronger. That is our unwavering commitment to you. Thank you very much for the honor and privilege to address you today.
Andrew Garbarino
Thank you, Chief Currao. And by the way, I just, Commissioner Nigro just said, FDNY couldn't have a better person testifying here today, so I thought that was a pretty good compliment I wanted to share with you. I now recognize Mr. Iri for five minutes to summarize his opening statement.
Greg Erie
Good morning, Chairman Garbarino and members of the committee. My name is Greg Iri and I am the Chief Security Officer at the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. Thank you for the opportunity to come here to talk a little bit about the Port Authority's preparedness and security operations. Port Authority facilities have the unfortunate distinction of being targeted multiple times by terrorists. In 1993, a truck bomb exploded beneath the North Tower, killing six people and injuring more than 1,000.
On September 11, 2001, the Port Authority lost 84 people, 37 of which were Port Authority police officers. That remains the worst single-day loss of life of any police department in the United States. Since then, we have lost numerous officers to 9/11-related illnesses and there are many more who are still in the fight. This tragic legacy has shaped the Port Authority's unwavering commitment to safety and security. This is evident as security accounts for roughly a quarter of both the agency's personnel and its operating budgets.
Furthermore, since 9/11, $1.8 billion has been invested in capital projects to harden and strengthen our transportation facilities. 25 years later, the transportation sector continues to be an attractive target for terrorists. This threat is particularly acute for the Port Authority given the scale and significance of the critical transportation infrastructure we operate, including the nation's largest airport system, the busiest bus terminal, and the most traveled bridge in the world.
Since 9/11, the Port Authority has built a risk-based, multi-layered security program designed to protect its employees, customers, and transportation assets from asymmetric threats. This approach includes risk and intelligence-informed assessments to identify threats, prioritize vulnerabilities, and guide capital security investments. Capital hardening and protective design programs including tunnel hardening, bridge and structural strengthening, bollards, and other vehicle threat mitigations. Security technology including an extensive CCTV system with enhanced analytics, access control systems, perimeter intrusion detection, license plate readers, CBRN detection capabilities, drone detection, interoperable radio communications, and continuing evaluation of cutting-edge technologies. 24/7 security operations centers and trained contract security officers who provide an additional layer of observation, behavioral recognition, access control, and incident reporting.
And I'd be remiss if I did not mention our very highly trained police department of more than 2,100 officers with high-visibility counterterrorism teams, emergency service unit capabilities, explosive detection K9 teams. PAPD also participates in numerous federal, state, and local law enforcement task forces, including the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Forces in both New York and New Jersey. We also have a dedicated Office of Emergency Management that leads incident coordination, training, and full-scale exercises with regional first responders using the incident command system and the unified command principles. We have a robust cybersecurity program including a 24/7 cybersecurity operations center, recognizing that physical and cybersecurity are increasingly inseparable in modern transportation. We utilize the Department of Homeland Security's SAFETY Act program as an independent third-party validation of security programs and technology.
Port Authority facilities and programs that have received these SAFETY Act recognitions include the World Trade Center complex itself, the George Washington Bridge, LaGuardia Airport, and our PATH train servicing New York and New Jersey. This year served as an extraordinary real-world stress test for our security protocols, driven by a series of concurrent major events across the New York and New Jersey region. The simultaneous hosting of the FIFA World Cup, the Sail Fourth operation, and the America 250 celebrations successfully drew an influx of over 1.2 million additional visitors to the area. Last week, we gathered to honor and commemorate the 25th anniversary of 9/11. This high-profile event was attended by the Vice President of the United States, the governors of New York and New Jersey, and all former living presidents and first ladies, along with many other dignitaries.
Flawless interagency coordination and unparalleled security measures ensured this historic event was among the most protected and successful on record. Success of these security operations demonstrates what 25 years of investment and partnership have produced: a security enterprise that is integrated, intelligence-driven, technologically advanced, and operationalized across jurisdictional boundaries. Congress has been an essential partner in building and sustaining our security capabilities. We respectfully ask that Congress continue to maintain its support in several key areas. Increased federal funding of homeland security grant programs.
The Transit Security Grant Program, Urban Area Security Initiative, Port Security Grant Program, and other federal funding have supported the Port Authority counterterrorism programs, police training and equipment, emergency preparedness exercises, cybersecurity, access control systems, facility hardening, and all our other critical security initiatives.
These investments allow state and local partners and transportation agencies to maintain capabilities that protect nationally significant infrastructure. Empower states to work with federal partners to perform advanced mitigation against malicious drones. Transportation agencies need timely solutions to support the appropriate response to unauthorized drones impeding transportation. And continue to support the DHS Safety Act program. Independent validation helps organizations measure security programs against best practices and promotes the adoption of effective anti-terrorism technologies and services.
Protect and strengthen intelligence sharing and joint task force capabilities. The ability to move timely actionable information across federal, state, local, and transportation partners remains one of the most consequential reforms of the post-9/11 era. Since 9/11, the Port Authority has achieved significant measurable progress across every layer of our security enterprise. Our facilities are more resilient, our law enforcement capabilities are highly specialized, and our intelligence moves faster. Technology provides tools that did not exist a generation ago.
Most importantly, federal, state, and local agencies collaborate in ways that have become routine rather than the exception. On behalf of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, I want to thank the committee and our congressional delegation for their continued support of the programs and partnerships that help us protect our employees, customers, infrastructure, and the region we serve. Thank you.
Andrew Garbarino
Thank you, Mr. Erie. Members will be recognized by order of seniority for their five minutes of questions. Now I'm going to start recognizing the former chairman of this committee, gentleman from Texas, Mr. McCaul, for five minutes.
Michael McCaul
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate you doing that. I, you know, vividly remember that day as we all do, horrific day. I think for us it's living history, for many now it's textbook history in schools. And after 9/11, I became the chief of counterterrorism and national security in the Western District of Texas and I became a student of counterterrorism, then became chairman of this committee, worked very closely with NYPD and the New York Fire Department as well. And I remember, you know, 1993, you know, we had a pre-warning, Ramzi Yousef trying to bring down the World Trade Center.
And it was originally a plot to hit 12 synagogues simultaneously, symbolizing the 12 tribes of Israel. He modified his plan to take down the symbol of economic power, the World Trade Center, one pillar, one building toppling over the other. As you all know, he came actually relatively close to achieving that goal if the bomb had gone off closer to one of the pillar beams. But then he escapes, meets with his uncle Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, he develops the Bojinka plot. I knew the Diplomatic Security Corps officer who arrested him, and eerily they found baby dolls in his apartment stuffed with chemical explosives to take these baby dolls onto airplanes to blow them up.
The Bojinka plot also being 12 airliners symbolic of the 12 tribes of Israel. He conspires with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed on 9/11. The idea that planes could be turned into suicide missions was something that was not imaginable, and it was a failure of imagination. We saw planes hijacked but not turned into cruise missiles targeted at buildings, in this case three symbols of power: economic, military, and what in Arabic called the building of laws, which was the United States Capitol. The threat was aviation then, I believe it's also aviation today.
I chaired the special events task force on the FIFA games and the number one focus were drones and the impact that drones could have.
I just got back from Ukraine, saw the amazing drone capabilities they've developed in this war against Russia, this conflict. But the modern aviation threat 25 years later is my question for the three of you. We worked very hard and the chairman passed the Safer Skies Act to help federal, state, and local to protect these events. But I'd like for the three of you to comment now on what I consider to be an old threat being aviation, but in a more modern capacity, and that is the threat of drones. Perhaps I could start with Chief Donoghue and work my way through.
John Donnelly
Drones bring a new threat to us, and we don't clearly understand it, meaning the evolution of drones and what their capabilities really are and really aren't leaves us in a spot where it's hard to prepare. We are preparing that these weapons can do things in our community that could be delivered by a car or by some other method. So we prepare on that. I think the second part of the challenge is awareness of drones. As you know, here in the District of Columbia, the airspace is extremely restricted, and the ability, any drone that's up should be official, but sometimes there's so many different agencies with them up, it takes a while to sort out whether or not it's an official one.
And that isn't a local thing. That's a federal thing. That's all the different federal agencies putting them up. So here in the district, I think we need, we are working with our partners in the Secret Service, with the Capitol Police, with the Metropolitan Police Department.
Michael McCaul
We have a lot of federal buildings, including the United States Capitol. I know the federal agencies assigned to that, but I do think coordination, like with the Safer Skies Act, the intent behind that should apply.
John Donnelly
Yeah, and that's where we want to be, is we want to be coordinated so that when a drone's up, we know if it's good or bad. I'm confident that we can respond to the threats that they bring, but the coordination, the awareness of what their real capabilities are would be helpful.
Thomas Currao
Thank you very much for the question. First of all, thank you for the support of grant funding that allowed the FDNY to really build a very robust drone and robotics program. It is a program that's come to quite significant fruition. We use it a lot in our fire and rescue operations, on a marine environment, and we have actually been a leader working with a lot of our counterparts to actually develop policy. I think from our perspective, our biggest concern is the threat of even just a drone over a special event, over a large area, mass panic.
We readily identify, you mentioned Ukraine, that these drones can be weaponized, and we're concerned about chemicals, biologicals, other dispersion methods. And I agree with Chief Donoghue, we're still trying to understand like what is the real threat factor, right, how effective would it be. But in many ways, I'm very concerned about the fact that we could have a mass panic situation at something like the New York City Marathon, any of those particular areas.
So I think on a couple levels...
The Boston Marathon, that was a close one.
Boston Marathon, all these different, absolutely.
Speaker 12
I know my time's easy. I know the time's up, but I do want to let Mr. Erie, because you have the airports and everything, also answer this.
Michael McCaul
Yeah, and thank you for that. And by the way, Firehouse 10 is the most dramatic experience and seeing the flag that flew on 9/11 just always blows me away when I see it. But I guess Mr. Erie.
Greg Erie
No, sir, I agree with your assessment. We, like my colleagues, were watching this and the technology is outstripping our ability to identify and mitigate the technology. And certainly what we're seeing over in Ukraine is the perfection of drone warfare. And that can be extended out across the full spectrum of threats we're going to face, everywhere from criminal delivery system all the way up to a catastrophic counterterrorism attack. And as you well know from your work with FIFA, it was our biggest fear that there was going to be something that came out in a drone that we could not either identify, and we certainly have a very limited capacity to mitigate that threat if we did identify it.
As the chairman asked, we are extremely near aviation industry, see this over the airports. It was years ago in Scotland that a drone basically parked itself over the airfield, didn't do anything, but it stopped all transportation, the airport had to shut down. That threat is still existent today. We would not have a way to take that drone down unless it was a kinetic piece. So we're working very closely, if there's something this committee could do, especially on the federal level, a regulation they could put out there, but we need to identify the right technologies to counter this threat.
Very helpful. Thank you. I yield back. The gentleman yields back and I recognize the ranking member, the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Thompson.
Bennie Thompson
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me say to the witnesses, for some of you, glad to see you again. But I think there are some things that concern me and I'll try to hit the list as fast as I can. Right now, DHS is cutting resources to communities. That include the State Homeland Security Grant Program and the Urban Area Security Initiative.
How would cutting these programs hurt your agencies and the communities you serve? Chief Donnelly, we'll start with you and go down the line.
John Donnelly
I think cuts to these grant programs can be catastrophic to our ability to adapt to new threats and adapt new technology. Just like everybody else, right, our budgets are tight. Our local budgets, our local budgets cover the day-to-day operations we do. But for new threats, like terrorism, that are national in scope or come from outside of our areas, it's very hard for us to invest enough to understand if we're doing something right. So for instance, interoperable communications and how we integrate broadband and the land mobile radio and satellite, that's a lot of investment and we use grant funds to invest in things like that, new protective gear, same thing.
Thomas Currao
So the cuts to grant funding, it has the ability to really turn back all the progress that we've made across the whole national preparedness initiative from prevention to protection, response, mitigation, recovery, incident management teams, Center for Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness, our maritime response capabilities, all these are predicated and have been built significantly based on grant funding as well as addressing the threats that are coming down the line potentially such as continuing cybersecurity as well as artificial intelligence. So the grant dollars, we use them to the fullest extent possible and we use them not only locally but regionally and nationally. So they're very important.
Thank you. Mr. Hewitt.
Greg Erie
I'll echo what both my colleagues said. We're watching the situation very closely. It's sort of a good news, bad news at the port. We do receive these grants. We've seen it slightly go down, some of the amounts.
We haven't seen our '26 amounts yet, but we can balance that out with our budget and what we use to make sure we're covering our critical infrastructure. However, we do look at our colleagues in the FDNY and NYPD, as I mentioned in my opening statement. We absolutely depend on them to be that outer shell for us and to work cooperatively to make sure we can maintain these levels of preparedness.
Bennie Thompson
Thank you. FEMA has cut its workforce by 5,000 employees. How does that FEMA cut impact your department?
John Donnelly
For the District of Columbia, we've had a very busy summer and it's been a little bit of an odd summer in terms of the amount of federal involvement. But in terms of FEMA's cuts, we also have the National Capital Office of Coordination. So we've had extra resources dumped into the region to help us plan for 4th of July, the Indy race, the things on the Mall. What we haven't had is a large-scale disaster where we would rely on FEMA's expertise and that. So I don't know the effect of the cuts yet.
I know this summer we had additional resources. I'm sure they came from somewhere else and we were okay, but I'm worried about what a disaster looks like.
Chief.
Thomas Currao
Yes, so I'd echo Chief Donnelly's comments. We got tremendous support during FIFA 250, the Naval Review. But I am concerned with our disaster preparedness and response if we should have a major incident in New York City or the tri-state area. So that would be my major concern.
Mr. Hewitt.
Greg Erie
Yes, sir, I agree with both my colleagues. We deal with FEMA on a daily basis, the nature of our transportation business, especially with weather events that come in. We've been fortunate enough in our region, New York and New Jersey, that we haven't had a major large-scale event that has come up, but we are watching the restructuring and the cuts and depend on FEMA.
Bennie Thompson
Thank you. Each one of you all talked about information sharing and the need for all individuals to be able to have access to that information in a timely manner. DHS is proposing to disband the Fire Service Intelligence Exchange and Emergency Management and Response Information Sharing and Analysis Center, which is critical to information sharing. Does the administration terminating these information sharing mechanisms concern you?
John Donnelly
Absolutely. The Fire Service Intelligence Exchange is the only way for fusion centers and fire service leaders to meet across the nation to share intelligence about upcoming evolving threats. It's where we would get a lot of our information about drones, for instance, to the earlier question.
Chief.
Thomas Currao
Agreed, the Fire Service Intelligence Enterprise is a great platform, particularly for unclassified official use only information, but it's still vital for our preparedness. And the best part about it is we're able to collaborate, we're sharing what is the so what, how do we build capabilities off that.
Greg Erie
And while I certainly tilt towards my two colleagues from the fire service, I can say from my expertise, any degradation in intelligence sharing is harmful. We learned that lesson in 9/11. It has to be open, collaborative, and at the highest speed we can share it.
Speaker 15
Thank you. You yield back. Gentleman yields back and I recognize gentleman from New York, Mr. LaLota, for five minutes of questions.
Nick LaLota
Thank you, Chairman. Thank you for hosting this important hearing. And thank you to our witnesses for your service, your experience, your testimony on how to conduct counterterrorism in the right way 25 years after 9/11. I remember that morning quite vividly. I was a 23-year-old young naval officer just returned home from a deployment.
I was aboard my ship pier side in San Diego. I, like many Americans, watched on TV that horror. But I thought about it as a New Yorker. I thought about it about the firemen, the cops, the EMTs, the civilians who rushed towards the buildings to help people. In the coming days, we grieved the 2,977 lives lost.
But we were grateful for the first responders' efforts to save 17,000 people. In the months afterwards, our military sought justice for America and brought many people in Al-Qaeda to that justice. And then we as the government started to get to work as to what went wrong that day and how we could prevent another 9/11. I want to ask a couple different questions about you all. And I think the one of the things is a failure of imagination that day.
In the military, we were trained for a USS Cole-like incident. We were training for something that might come out of the water and attack us from that way. And I think that we should acknowledge as a government we failed to have the imagination required that day to anticipate, as former Chairman McCaul said, civilian airliners being used as cruise missiles to attack the core of our country and to attack our people. So the fundamental question I think before us today is have we built the right system to imagine, identify, and confront the threats today before they become the tragedies of tomorrow? And you all have some great experience and we're going to benefit from your testimony here today as we consider policies and budgets and whatnot to protect the next 9/11.
Mr. Irea, I want to expand upon that word imagine, but before I do so, you were the special agent in charge of intelligence at the New York field office?
Yes, sir.
Nick LaLota
And before 9/11, our government had pieces of the plot, but failed to put them together. So my question, sir, is today, 25 years later, whose responsibility is it to anticipate and imagine the next attack and how can that person or people ensure that their analysis gets to the right people in power to act?
Greg Erie
It's a great question, sir, and thank you for your service and your continued service. It's probably something that we look at every day. And I can say it's not new. We are in a better place because I agree with you, I was serving at the time, we did not think outside the box. We have taken steps to fight that complacency.
And I'm talking about our intelligence agencies at both the local, state, and federal levels and try to continue doing that. It's an exercise that's not easy because once you think, oh, we've achieved it and we've thought of everything, there's something else you have to push forward to. But as to who's responsible for that individually, I think it's all of us. I think it's anybody in the professional security business, in the intelligence business, this is your number one priority.
And I was just in an event surrounding 9/11 where your very question was the topic of conversation amongst a couple hundred of my colleagues. How do we not be complacent? How do we keep pressing forward? But I think the oversight that committees like this one provide, and the leadership and the guidance and the funding, will ensure that we can continue to look forward.
Nick LaLota
I think that's the right answer, sir, and your colleagues to the right of you are nodding their heads up and down, so I take it they agree with us as well. Let's move on to identify. So we have to imagine first, and then we have to identify what that threat is. And a modern-day threat may be an American who radicalizes, who doesn't do so, doesn't communicate outwardly, doesn't, can't find him on his phone, we can't find him on a website. What's the modern-day equivalent of a name on a watch list, and what's the tripwire for somebody like that who may never actually cross that tripwire?
Greg Erie
And that's again a solid question going forward. It's difficult, and it's gotten more difficult because the more we have, we rely on technology, some of our traditional methods of identifying people we slowly let degrade to that point. And there are folks right now that actively study how do I stay off that radar. Plus, you combine that with the speed. We used to call that the flash-to-bang, where the intercession from the FBI or other security forces while that planning process was happening.
If you look at the classic, the 9/11 plotting, months and years, it gave us opportunity, sometimes failed opportunity, to identify and put the plot together and mitigate it before it happened. Now we're talking with the advent of AI technology and others, whatever turns that switch in an individual and decides they're going to do something, and you've heard about some of the attacks from previous testimony, it's a matter of minutes. And how do you intercede in that and identify that person? It's an incredibly challenging piece of the puzzle. The intelligence, especially at the federal level, is providing that piece, but it's something that net gets more and more porous as the technology expands.
Nick LaLota
Thanks. And in a future round, Chief, I hope that you get to, Chief Craio, tell us a little about your experience with your shop that you have for the Center for Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness and how you use people in that flash-to-bang analogy, how people are integral into that process, whether it's firemen or cops or somebody seeing something on the ground, how that helps inform policymakers to imagine differently and to react differently as well. I'm out of my time, so I want to give back to the chairman, I just want to plant that seed for you to think about it later, sir.
Speaker 18
I'll let him use some of my time to answer that, but I now recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. Correa, for five minutes of questions.
Lou Correa
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I first want to thank our witnesses for being here today. And like Mr. LaLota said, all of us can remember where we were on that horrible day, dastardly attack on our country. And I was in the State Senate and soon became very aware of terrorist attacks, trying to prevent them, trying to protect our communities. And like Mr. LaLota said, you know, before the attack, I think different federal agencies had information, they just didn't put together the picture.
Could it possibly have been prevented? That's why Homeland Security was created, to get rid of the silos, to make sure that everybody shared the data to get that picture. I'm from Orange County, California, target-rich environment. Disneyland, Anaheim Angels, Anaheim Ducks, very densely populated. We have big events, a lot of attractions, big crowds.
This is something we worry about, concern us on a daily basis. Since 9/11, Homeland's done a really good job of making sure they don't score on us.
But one area that we still have to work on is domestic terrorism. We've lost a lot of lives domestically from self-inspired lone wolves, individuals that just decide to go after our population, American citizens. Like Mr. Lalota said, having a clear picture, all the information, this is the issue that concerns me because right now as this administration cuts Homeland Security preparedness grants, local grants, fusion centers, that's where a lot of the local information is being processed and filtered to 9/11, to Homeland, to make sure we can play defense effectively. But gentlemen, I'm going to ask you, do you feel like you have enough support from the feds? Do you feel like you have communication?
A lot of my locals say that it's a one-way street when it comes to sharing information and communicating. Chief Donnelly, are you getting enough information from the feds when it comes to this kind of preparedness?
John Donnelly
So, that's a really good question. I have two answers for it. One of them is I don't feel like the policy is in place to support the information sharing that we need. But that on an individual agent level with our partners, that we have workarounds. And I fear workarounds because when something, something can be missed if there's not a good solid process for it.
Something may not be shared because it's something really scary when that's probably the most important thing to share. So being...
John Donnelly
I'm sorry, I didn't mean to imply that. No, our day-to-day interactions at the levels of my chiefs that plan with the FBI and the Secret Service and the Capitol Police and MPD every day, one-to-one during events or during planning, I think we get absolutely the information we need. But we don't know strategically what we're missing because I don't believe the systems are in place to share it in a meaningful way with the fire service and emergency managers in particular, maybe our other critical infrastructure partners, because there's no understanding on the security intel side, or little understanding, of those sectors.
Lou Correa
This is a major concern, of course, and these are scary words that are coming out of you because we can't afford another 9/11. And we're cutting cyber, Homeland Security cyber team is being decimated. This is just not good, especially when we've got conflicts around the world and people are very motivated around the world to come after us. So I would ask you to work with the committee to come up with some concrete suggestions how we strengthen the defense of Americans in this country. Chief Carro?
Thomas Currao
I thank you for the question. In New York, we are very fortunate. We have permanent members of the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force. We have weekly meetings, so we do have unprecedented access that we normally, we certainly didn't have before September 11th. However, I think what occurs sometimes because things become investigative, that that has limits in terms of sharing that information with the fire service.
And I think the one thing that we're always concerned about is we're worried about consequence management. We don't need sources, methods, any of that. So I agree with Chief Donnelly. I think the mechanisms have to be in place to be able to share the information that we need to be able to respond effectively, protect our members, protect the public, as well as providing more security clearances for members of the non-law enforcement agencies.
Speaker 23
Chairman, can I have another minute for Mr. Atherley to answer that question? Thank you.
Greg Erie
And I'll be very quick as I do agree. And it's something when you see, and sir, you mentioned domestic terrorism, international terrorism, on a federal level, DHS, FBI, all the intelligence agencies, the threats are not lessening. They're increasing. And their bandwidth is a bit of a concern. Now, we have at the local and state level picked up some of that load and we provide them some information, that back and forth.
But when you talk about cuts, it's not that the threats are going away and who is going to address that from that federal level.
Speaker 21
Gentleman yields back. I now recognize the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Crane, for five minutes of questions.
Elijah Crane
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing today on what we've done and what we continue to do 25 years after 9/11. I also want to thank the witnesses for being here today and I really do appreciate your service. This committee is very good at remembering September 11th and we're good at discussing technology, the workforce, and the funding needed to defend this country. We remember the firemen walking up the stairs. We remember the passengers of Flight 93.
We remember nearly 3,000 innocent Americans who went to work that morning and never came home. I remember it in my bones. The week after those attacks, I enlisted. I spent 13 years in the Navy and I went to war against men who believed they had a religious duty to kill us. What this committee and this country are not good at remembering is why those men did it.
They did not fly those planes into the Twin Towers and the Pentagon because they were poor. They did not do it because America needed another fusion center briefing or a better TSA line. They did it because they believed they were obeying God. That is a very uncomfortable sentence in this town. I am not under any illusion that most people in this room or in this country will heed a warning from me or from anyone else willing to say it out loud.
We live in a nation that can no longer tell what a woman is and that still treats communism and socialism as sophisticated ideas instead of the graveyards they produced. If we cannot get those basics right, I do not expect a sudden appetite for an honest conversation about the motivation of the attackers. But I will say it anyway because the dead deserve more than a moment of silence and a press release. The men who murdered our people were not improvising. They were reading.
Quran 9:5: "When the sacred months have passed, kill the polytheists wherever you find them, capture them, besiege them, and sit in wait for them at every place of ambush." Quran 9:29: "Fight those who do not believe in Allah or the last days, nor consider unlawful what Allah and His Messenger have made unlawful, nor adopt the religion of truth from those who were given the scripture until they pay the jizya with willing submission and feel themselves subdued." Quran 8:12: "I will cast terror into the hearts of those who disbelieve, so strike them upon the necks and strike from them every fingertip." Quran 8:39: "Fight them until there is no more fitna and the religion is entirely for Allah." Quran 47:4: "When you meet those who disbelieve, strike their necks until, when you have inflicted slaughter upon them, then secure their bonds."
And from the most trusted collection of the Prophet's saying, Sahih al-Bukhari 25 and 2946: "I have been ordered to fight the people until they testify that none has the right to be worshipped but Allah and that Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah.
If they do that they have saved their lives and property from me except for the rights of Islam and their reckoning is with Allah. Those are not internet memes. They are canon. Millions of Muslims reject that reading and want no part of a political project to put Sharia over civil law. That distinction matters, and I will continue to say it.
The attackers of 9/11, Boko Haram, ISIS, and the networks that still inspire lone actors in this country do not reject that reading. They treat it as a command. Pretending otherwise is not compassion, it is malpractice. While we argue about tone, the doctrine is not theoretical. Britain now has estimated 30 to 80 Sharia councils judging marriage, divorce, and the status of women.
They have no formal standing under British law, they do not need it, a parallel system is already there. In Nigeria more than 22,000 Christian civilians were killed between late 2019 and 2025. That is not a farmer-herder clash. It is jihad with a body count. Here at home we see more candidates running for public office who support these beliefs.
We can keep talking about fusion centers, we can talk about TSA lines and border security, all of that matters. I've spent years on this committee fighting for it and will continue to do so. But until this body is willing to have an open conversation about the root cause, the Islamic teachings that still instruct violence against the unbeliever, we will keep disrupting plots after the ideology has already done its work. We will write another after-action report. We will hold another moment of silence.
We will congratulate ourselves for remembering the buildings, and we will not keep the American people safe. Thank you, I yield back.
Speaker 25
Gentleman yields back, I now recognize the gentleman from New York and represents the site of the World Trade Center, Mr. Goldman, for five minutes.
Daniel Goldman
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank you to our witnesses for being here, it was good to see you last week as well as the chairman at the 25th commemoration of that dreadful day. I was less than a mile from the World Trade Center, and I think everybody has a story, but it has left an indelible mark on so many and was the cause, the sort of derivation of this committee and the Department of Homeland Security. And so keeping our country safe, keeping New York City safe, is absolutely paramount. And I'm very happy that in the last 25 years we've not had anything like that, and that's a testament to the great work of so many in law enforcement and in our intelligence services. The importance of New York City to the counterterrorism effort should not be minimized.
And I don't say that just because I represent New York City and I know the chairman also represents suburbs of New York City. It is the number one target for terrorism. We know that. It is also the hub of so much of our commerce, our transportation, our livelihood, our economy.
And so it's not a parochial thing, parochial reason why the federal government has committed over those 25 years to a significant amount of money in grants to fund so much of the work that you do, that the Joint Terrorism Task Force does. And I want to just emphasize that that money, that expertise is not just applied to New York City. And in fact, the FDNY, Port Authority Police, NYPD use that expertise to help train law enforcement all over the country and help protect other cities when we get information in. And so this is what leads me to a point of concern that I have. And I want to just note that the chairman has been a terrific leader in ensuring that we not only remember 9/11, but that we take care of those who were there, who were first responders, who were survivors, victims' families.
And I was very proud to join with him in ensuring that the World Trade Center Health Program will be fully funded indefinitely so that everyone suffering from 9/11-related illnesses, and there are now three times as many people who have died from 9/11-related illnesses as died that day, can ensure that they get healthcare. But Mr. Chairman, I'm going to ask you to work together on one more thing, because this administration has not provided and transferred the full amount of grant money for the counterterrorism fund to New York City. In September of 2025, unfortunately, the Trump administration tried to cut 86% of the funding for federal counterterrorism and homeland security grants with no explanation. Through opposition of many, including the chairman, some of that money was restored. It did also require a lawsuit.
But the administration has only provided about 100 million of the 187 million dollars that they have promised. And so I'm going to ask the chairman and I'm going to ask my colleagues on the other side of the aisle to continue our bipartisan work to make sure that our homeland can remain safe. And in my last minute, I would love Chief Currao to ask you how, why are those funds so important? How are they used and why is it essential that you and the rest of our counterterrorism services and enforcement get that money?
Thomas Currao
Thank you very much for the question. I think it's because the work that we do in the FDNY in New York City is, it impacts in a very real way our marine units. They are regional asset. They've gone as far as Baltimore, as far as Stamford. They are a regional asset, fire, rescue, counterterrorism, special events.
The other one I'd like to highlight is the Center for Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness. Again, a weekly intelligence product that goes to across the entire nation. We have a very collaborative relationship with the West Point Military Academy. We train their cadets in a very realistic scenario where they would be leading a National Guard element doing a disaster. That's very realistic.
We do that every single year, and that's based on our ability to develop a functional exercise for those cadets. So those are two, just two examples.
So we, everything we do is from a collaborative nature. We try to make sure that whatever expertise or capabilities we develop, not only can it support local preparedness, but also regional and in some ways really national preparedness.
Daniel Goldman
Yeah. And I think this money is essential and I know my time is up. That there's no doubt that this money, in fact the Governor of New York has stated that over the last three years New York has used these funds for at least 145 major arrest disruptions and leads across 10 different states. And so I would like to introduce by unanimous consent a letter from the Homeland Security and Emergency Services Commissioner of New York to the FEMA administrator asking for information as to why the 87 million dollars has not been distributed and guidance as to when it will be. And Mr. Chairman, I hope that we can work together to advocate for this money.
Without objection.
And I yield back.
Andrew Garbarino
Gentleman yields back and I think when the Secretary, former Secretary announced that the cuts were going to go down to 30 million dollars is one of the reasons she is now the former Secretary. And I'm happy that that the 30 million did not did not take place. So with that, I want to now recognize the gentlelady from South Carolina, Ms. Biggs for five minutes questions.
Sheri Biggs
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to our witnesses for your testimony here this morning. I represent South Carolina's third congressional district, a district defined by small rural towns, the foothills of the Blue Ridge, and a fire service that is overwhelmingly volunteer-based. My district also happens to host critical infrastructure that makes fire service situational awareness a homeland security issue. The Oconee Nuclear Station sits in Oconee County.
We border the Savannah River corridor near Edgefield and McCormick, and I-85 and I-26 run heavy freight and hazmat traffic straight through the heart of the district. When something goes wrong on the corridor, it is very likely a volunteer fire department that arrives first. While there is little doubt of the value of properly integrating the fire service into fusion centers in dense urban areas, given the makeup of my district, I am also interested in whether a volunteer chief in, say, Westminster or Abbeville is able to get and contribute threat information that keeps their community safe and this country safe. Chief Donnelly, you have worked throughout your career to enhance the integration of fire services personnel into federal, state, and local intelligence sharing networks. As you note in your written testimony, fire and EMS personnel play an increasingly important role in identifying pre-operational terrorist activity.
I believe this is no less true in the volunteer and rural context. In the years since 9/11 that you have spent working in fusion centers, to what degree have small rural and volunteer departments in districts like mine been embedded in the fusion center network and can you speak to the value of integrating non-urban area fire services personnel?
John Donnelly
Absolutely, thank you for the question and the opportunity to talk about that. It's, I think it's really important. I started my career as a volunteer firefighter. They are absolute members of the community that matter and I think as we've talked about, it's not only urban areas.
The plot could come from a rural, suburban area. They need to be included. The inclusion is uneven. And what that means is that in some jurisdictions, Maryland has a very active fusion center that reaches across its state and to the volunteer fire councils, for instance, in each county and develops information sharing practices with them. I think that that model's great.
The challenge is that if there's ever a budget cut, that's one of the first things that goes. And it isn't across the country that the fusion centers have funding dedicated to supporting the fire services, right? The, there are a lot of career departments across the country, but you're absolutely right that they're centered in urban areas. And that information, the threat information about what explosives are, about biologicals, about the threats, are equally as important to our responders that are volunteers across their communities across the whole country. So funding specifically inside fusion centers for fire service outreach would solve the problem you're talking about.
Sheri Biggs
Thank you very much, and thank you for your service. Given that a department protecting a nuclear facility or a rural highway hazmat corridor needs additional different threat information pertinent to those subjects, has the fusion center model adapted its outreach to reflect that, or is it a one-size-fits-all? I'll open that to any, either of you.
Thomas Currao
So we don't act, we don't have a fusion center in the New York City area. The Center for Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness is the fusion center. We do, however, work closely with the New York State Department of Homeland Security and Emergency Services with a very unique program, and that is the Intelligence Liaison Officer program. And it reaches a fire and EMS representative from every county in New York State. Obviously, most are volunteer, including the county that I live in.
So that becomes a point of contact to share information, to take feedback from them. What are their concerns in their particular district? What is the, you know, what is the current threat intelligence? And many times, even though it's at an unclassified or for official use only level, it's still enough to help them prepare or to address, like, what is their current capability, what is the capability gap, what is what they want to get to. In the volunteer service, and I, like Chief Donnelly, started as a volunteer in Rockland County, it's how I got my love of the fire service.
Um, it is, it's very unique. It's very innovative in terms of, like, they have to share resources. They may have to be on a county level, such as a county hazmat unit, who really has to be able to address many, many threats that are out there, but with limited resources. So I think we need to build on that. We have a very collaborative relationship, the FDNY with Nassau County and Suffolk County, both are volunteer.
We actually have a robust mutual aid program with them. We train with them on an annual basis. So we try to support our volunteer brothers and sisters because they're all part of the same preparedness effort.
Speaker 29
Well, thank you for your service, and my time's expired, so I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Delia Ramirez
Gentlelady yields back, and I recognize the gentlelady from Illinois, Ms. Ramirez, for five minutes of questions.
I really appreciate that we're holding today's hearing. Thank you, Chairman, Ranking Member. And to our witnesses for joining us, thank you for being here and thank you for your service. As we've heard from a number of our colleagues today, we remember the 2,977 people who lost their lives at the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and in Somerset County, Pennsylvania. The thousands of people that were injured and all those whose lives were changed forever.
I want to start by expressing my deep gratitude to the first responders who literally saved countless lives that day and in the days that followed. There is no doubt we owe a debt to those who served their country and our communities that dark day. As I think about that day, I also want to thank the thousands of ground zero cleanup crews. Many crews were staffed by immigrant women, including up to 6,000 undocumented New Yorkers. Lucelly is an undocumented Colombian immigrant who cleaned up ground zero out of a sense of duty to the city that had welcomed her and she loves.
Today, like so many survivors, responders, and community members, Lucelly is actually battling breast cancer and respiratory disease. She's among the tens of thousands whose health was severely compromised by the exposure to the tons of toxic debris the towers' collapse released into the air. Lucelly was just recently quoted in a recent NPR article. In it, she commented that the current DHS immigration enforcement campaign is a new pain on top of an old one. You see, history is easy to forget.
It's easy to lose sight of context. But both history and context are necessary for us to prevent creating new pains on top of old ones. I wish that I could say that from the history of 9/11, the way that we saw New Yorkers and Americans come together in each other's aid, to take care of one another, to keep each other safe, have taught us something about how to prevent creating new pain on top of old ones. But today, the reality is that Lucelly is living in fear. And she's not alone.
Millions of our neighbors, undocumented immigrants, Muslims, foreigners, activists, live in fear that the US government will target them, will detain them, and make them the enemy. 25 years later, I think we can see that if we had learned that true safety is rooted in community, in coming together, we would have built something that safeguards our human rights and our dignity, encourages collective care and mutual aid, recognizes that our safety is interconnected and it's also interdependent on the safety of our neighbors, we would have created true security and safety. But instead, we created what feels like a weapon: the Department of Homeland Security. So today, I want to remind us that we can stop creating new pains on top of old ones. We can do that.
It's not too late for us to reimagine what a department that really dignifies humanity looks like. That another world is possible. We can see that world in the James Zadroga 9/11 Health and Compensation Act, in the 170,000 pages released by Mayor Mamdani, and in the 9/11 Immigrant Worker Freedom Act introduced by Congresswoman Ocasio-Cortez. We can choose now to affirm our commitment to every single person that's been impacted by 9/11 by choosing community over fear, care over anxiety, and love over hate. Today, I think we're at a crossroads as we think about the last 25 years and who we were on that day.
We can honor our shared pain, our shared humanity, our shared safety by healing old pain and creating new possibilities, a possibility of security and safety for all of us where we center humanity in everything we do. That is the world in the future that I hope that this committee works towards. With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Andrew Garbarino
The gentlelady yields back. I'd now recognize myself for five minutes of questions. Gentlemen, thank you all again for being here. And I do want to just follow up on some of the things that were brought up by my colleagues. We do, the New York JTTF, Joint Terrorism Task Force, has done amazing work.
And it has, it's not just about New York. It has, we know for a fact it has stopped crimes and terrorist attacks from major to just sole actors across the country. So the work that is being done there and what has been built there has saved countless lives across the country and across the world, just because of the information sharing that has been developed. And I don't think anything, the New York JTTF should be the gold standard for everyone, for what it has done. We've talked about the cuts to the Homeland Security grants that occurred.
They're not as extreme as what was proposed after the NOFOs, but they were still cuts. And I know in both Suffolk and Nassau County, which I represent, their police departments took hits. We're, and I'm very happy that the fiscal year '26 numbers are higher than what was in '25. And we're going to, in a bipartisan way, I think we're going to continue to push to make sure those numbers keep going up because this money does go directly to FDNY, NYPD, Port Authority, DC police. And I know DC was also hit with those cuts.
The top five cities were probably the top five that were proposed cuts to, were probably the top five that have the most terrorist threats. So we're going to do our best because we don't, the goal of this committee, my goal in Congress, is to make sure another 9/11 doesn't happen. So if those cuts continue, that's not good. But it's not just about the cuts. The irregularities, and Mr. Erie, you brought this up, you know, with the budgeting that you all deal with, that you can probably make it up somewhere else, you know, if you have to, but you need to be able to budget.
The NOFOs last year were a disaster. They came out too late and gave no time. This year we're hoping it'll be better, and next year, and just from, can you all explain what we could do to make things, make your lives easier? Because once, you don't get the money direct from us, we give it to the states and they have to hand it out to you and they do their own formulas. So how could Congress run this program better?
What could we do to help you all use this money in the ways that is needed to keep our community safe? Mr. Erie, we'll start with you on that one.
Greg Erie
Thank you, sir. And I think you already have the solution to that. The earlier we can see that budget, the more continuity that is within that budget. As you said, we can make up for things and we are like many organizations right now at the Port Authority in the middle of planning our '27 budget cycle. And we just don't know what's going to come in.
So it makes it very complex. So again, some consistency would be great, or if it can't be consistent, let us know as early as possible what it will be so we can make those plans and work with our partner agencies. It's not just about the Port Authority, having them having the same kind of, hey, we know what's coming our way, gives us that ability to collaborate and cover those gaps.
Mr. Craio?
Thomas Currao
Yeah, I totally agree. Consistency, clarity, anything that's dynamic, it's going to be hard for us to plan to continue, especially in such a dynamic threat environment.
So those parameters are very important, and that would be the biggest asset that we could ask of you to please help us to ensure that for our planning and our preparedness.
John Donnelly
I agree with them, the clarity and regularity. But one observation from the beginning of these grants to now is there is a lot of direction and there is a lot of cut-out spending. And sometimes it's really hard to come up with projects that fit into the categories at the expense of other projects that would be great.
Andrew Garbarino
So that was my next question. I was going to ask, things change. I mean, we talked about drones and AI today. You have to prepare for future attacks, not what happened 25 years ago. So are there limitations in these grant programs now that don't allow you to spend this money on things you need now?
And we're back 25 years ago and it's limited to that. Are there things that you all need that you can't get access to because of limitations in this grant? And what is that?
John Donnelly
So I believe, and drones are a good example. We have a lot of money cut into drones, and we have a lot of money cut into cybersecurity. Those are interesting categories when you look at them from money going into an emergency management environment that's law enforcement and responder-centric. We have to build relationships across multiple cyber groups, for instance, to come up with what a regional plan for cyber looks like. And it's sometimes hard to vision and explain.
So I think a little less direction would allow us to focus more on it. I think we need to know the focus areas, but coming today to spend a lot of money on drones when we're anti-drone systems, when even the regulations around who can do anti-drone things are not clear. What am I spending money on? And that's really the question.
Speaker 34
Anything from Chief Graffio? Do you have anything to add? Either one of you, you're both going to have the chance to answer, so whoever wants to go first.
Thomas Currao
I'd like to pick up on that and specifically UAVs. The policy is that's hugely important, right? That's our biggest issue is not being able to mitigate it or the limits of our mitigation. I know that's primarily law enforcement, but we need those capabilities. I firmly believe that we do have the subject matter expertise that with the funding we can implement and address our threats of tomorrow, today and tomorrow.
I think one of our biggest concerns is a complex coordinated attack where we have something that maybe starts out looking at as a cyber incident that maybe takes down our traffic management system and then a terror incident that happens at the same time. We've already red-teamed that, we've built that out, but the funding helps us actually build the resources and preparedness to actually get ready for that type of event.
Speaker 37
And I'll be very quick, sir, because I want to touch on what Chief Donnelly said. I know it's a scary word sometimes, but the flexibility to be able to do that because the constraints sometimes we may not be able to do what we need to do with that, but our partner is doing it so we could direct that somewhere else. It's not a one-size-fits-all, and I know that's difficult with the grants who are looking across the country where they go, but more flexibility would absolutely increase our capability.
Andrew Garbarino
Thank you very much. And again, I want to thank you all for being here today and thank you for your testimony. And just let you know, I know that cities are growing, other cities become targets, but any terrorist, no matter what language they speak, they know New York City, they know Washington, D.C. And those are the two top targets, I would think. And you all do a great job keeping us safe, and you have my commitment that we're going to do whatever we can, this committee, to make sure you all get what you need to keep your residents safe.
So with that, I yield back and I recognize the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Wittman, for five minutes of questions.
Robert Wittman
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you and the ranking member for convening today's hearing.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you and the ranking member for convening today's hearing. And thank you, Mr. Chairman, for leading us in our visit to the commemoration ceremony in New York. I was a freshman at New York University on September 11th, 2001, and I was a couple miles away, but I remember seeing the rigs headed down Broadway toward the World Trade Center and the courage of the first responders and community members that day. But also on 9/11, first responders from across our National Capital Region rushed toward the Pentagon, and they included brave members of the Fairfax County Fire and Rescue Department and Virginia Task Force 1.
I want to share stories of two of those firefighters. Captain Scott Kraut was assigned to Fire Station 9 on the C shift. He was off duty that morning. He lived about a mile from his station, and while he was drinking his morning coffee, he saw the reports of the attacks on TV. Like so many firefighters and police officers who were off duty that day in New York and the National Capital Region, he went to his station, grabbed his gear, and volunteered to respond.
At the Pentagon, he helped to search hallways and conference rooms, saw the devastation. The heat by then had melted the glass. The fires were still burning. What they hoped would be a search and rescue mission pretty quickly became a recovery operation. Despite the trauma of the day, Captain Kraut recently said he was incredibly grateful for the opportunity to serve in that way.
Captain Kraut was a veteran, but the response that day included firefighters at the very beginning of their careers. Captain Katja Lancing was one month out of recruit school on September 11th. She was assigned to Station 30 in Merrifield, Virginia, and she remembers that day starting off kind of like any other. She was doing her morning chores in the station before she got called into the lounge where she and her colleagues watched the attacks in New York unfold. Ten minutes later, her crew was dispatched to cover an Arlington County fire station, and a few hours after that, they were assigned to go to the Pentagon.
She remembers before leaving, she called her boyfriend at the time, now her husband, scared and anxious about what she would encounter. The plane had just struck the Pentagon. We didn't know whether there would be another attack or what would be waiting for them when they got there. When her engine reached the Pentagon, she and her crew went inside. They set up a hose line to try to put out spot fires.
It was her very first fire as a professional firefighter. She saw parts of the aircraft inside the Pentagon, the chaos, the hundreds of first responders trying to help. She was there for 10 hours, relieved at 3:00 a.m. She had worked at the Pentagon before she entered recruit school, so it was particularly poignant for her. 25 years later, today, Captain Lancing continues to serve with the Fairfax County Fire and Rescue Department.
Captains Kraut and Captain Lancing were at different points in their career on September 11th, but they shared the same commitment to service. When their community and their country needed them, they answered their call.
And and that's representative of the courage of the thousands of first responders in the National Capital Region and in the New York region on September 11th who went toward the danger. And we're here 25 years later. I think we all agree honoring that service is more than just remembering it, although remembering it is important. We have to ensure that our first responders today have the training, the personnel, the equipment, and the resources they need when God forbid the next call comes. Chief Donnelly, first thank you for your commitment to partnership in our region.
I know Chief Butler deeply appreciates your friendship and and partnership. And in your testimony you mentioned the challenges in securing and affording apparatus. And I know that in the district recently there have been challenges, perhaps recently days where there was not a spare ladder truck, not a spare rescue squad, very few spare engines available. Can you talk us through what you're trying to do to address that and what we in Congress can do to help your department and others across the country with this apparatus crisis that I think we're going through?
John Donnelly
Thank you for the question, sir. The apparatus problem in the fire service is a national problem. It was already tight, meaning pre-COVID, the delivery times were predictable in just around a year from order placement. During COVID, there we developed a backlog of probably 1,000 to 1,200 fire trucks alone, and the industry's been trying to catch up. What I think is important to understand about the fire trucks is there's not assembly lines for these.
They they come into a metal barn, they're built by hand all the way along. So they're they're non-standard. There may be some benefits of standardization if there's a way to figure that out. I think that what the country really needs is another factory, another fire serve another fire apparatus manufacturer. So if there's a way to incentivize that, that would help in Congress.
What we are trying to do is diversify our base. We traditionally bought fire trucks from one or two manufacturers thinking that that helped us with standardization and things like that. We're expanding our base, so that's helping. It hasn't produced any results yet, but we're hopeful that it will over the next few years. But we're still looking at four-year lead times on certain types of apparatus.
Speaker 39
Gentleman yields back. I now recognize the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Green, for five minutes of questions.
Al Green
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the ranking member. I thank the witnesses for appearing. And I would associate myself with the comments of Ms. Ramirez and would ask Chief Schwartz, are you still here? Is the Chief still here?
He left. Well, in his absence, would someone kindly let him know that his commentary about the need to be reminded really struck a chord with me? He said that the people who are suffering, the family members, they don't need an anniversary to remind them. They're reminded every day. And it seems to me that many of the people who are suffering have latent injuries.
You don't know it on the day of the event, a month after the event, a year after the event. Latent injuries, cancer. This report indicates that people are suffering with cancer, prostate cancer even. So these latent injuries have to be addressed too. And I'm very much concerned about this and how we approach not only preventing the incident and dealing with the immediate response thereafter, but this long-term help that people need.
That really came to mind when he said this. What are we going to do to help these people like the lady Ms. Ramirez talked about? The lady, she's a clean-up person, goes into the area. Perhaps if we had had better intelligence about the atmosphere and the particulate matter that's in the air, then they wouldn't have gone in. I mean, at some point you have to not only concern yourself with what happens immediately.
And by the way, I commend all of you. I thank you for your jobs and what you've done. And I thank all of the people who rushed in, the fire persons and the police persons and protection. But I want to just talk about this lady who's a, you know, she's a clean-up person. We have to help them too.
They have to be on our minds. So these grant programs, I know about the 9/11 grant program that we established here in Congress, and I think that's a great thing. We want to make sure we continue with it. But I just want to make sure that everybody benefits from it. Everybody.
Doesn't matter to me how you got in this country. If you are suffering from that event, we have a responsibility to help you. And I want to make sure that everybody benefits. Unfortunately, we have some people, I could say a particular person, but I won't. But they're more concerned about having their name put on a building than these people who are suffering.
At some point, at some point, we have to realize that we truly have to put people above politics. And these people, many of them are suffering as a result of the politics. I looked at that 25-year report that was just produced. A lot of those people who were injured, their names should not be in that report. I mean, their illnesses shouldn't be in that report because it could have been prevented if we had the immediate response team that would look for things that could be hazardous to health in the long term.
In the long term. So we've got to somehow find a way to put together that response team too. It's a great response team that you have for immediate action, but we need someone to go in there, a team of people, and say, "Hey, this is not safe for the cleaning crew." Or if they're going to come in, they have to have on some sort of uniforms or gear to protect them so that they don't become a part of this, these persons with latent injuries. So my question is simply this.
I'd just ask each of you to address the latent injuries and the people who may be suffering from these injuries and the lack of our being prepared to prevent these kinds of injuries as we are prepared to do other things and we're doing them efficaciously, but this is important too. So Chief Donnelly, would you be so kind as to start?
John Donnelly
So there's a lot there in what you're saying and asking for. And I agree with you that people that need healthcare need healthcare. And where it's coming from isn't, I can't speak to figuring out how everybody gets it from the 9/11 fund versus the people that we see every day that need healthcare, that need help, that need compassion. So we're always out there helping people and providing that healthcare. And I think that's important.
But moving on to the protection of people, I think this is an important area that functions from a strong incident command system. What you're asking for is things we should be doing, and they're tied into our presumptive acts for protecting firefighters, say, and making sure that they don't get cancer. You should be monitoring the environment on every incident to make sure it's safe for not having protective equipment on. So I think as part of a strong incident command system, it is part of the things that all of us use our grant money for, to make sure we have hazmat teams that can do that, and that it's done and communicated, and a strong incident commander takes care of that.
Thomas Currao
Thank you. I would like to bridge off that. The incident commander, when they arrive on the scene, they're addressing the immediate life safety hazard, but as that unfolds, particularly if there's a hazardous atmosphere, that's built in and that's part of that unity of effort, that unified command, where you start to bring in, like say, the Department of Health, the Department of Environmental Protection, to start to be able to say, okay, what areas are, you know, do we need to immediately evacuate, what areas do we need to shelter, so that we can try to mitigate and minimize as much as possible the exposure to the community. That's really baked into not only the very short-term response, but over the long term, particularly for say like a hazardous material incident. So that's really part of, and that's why I think we've talked all the way this morning about continually to build on a national incident management system and incident command system training, incorporating, you know, more entities into that system.
Greg Erie
Thank you. And very simply, sir, agreeing with my colleagues, the hard lessons we've learned, and you're right, we continue to see that injury and that body count keep going up from 9/11, but we've now as first responders incorporated that into that response, making sure that the first people in always have or we give them the best prepared equipment to that. But it goes beyond into what you're looking for, is we clear out everybody else before we would allow anybody else in. If they can examine that environment, and the fire department does this for us very well, is it safe, can we, do we have to keep people away until we can make it safe, is now a best practice, and that national incident command system is just going to be so critical as we continue forward with that.
Bennie Thompson
Gentleman yields back. I now recognize the ranking member for UC.
Let me again thank our witnesses. Look, your testimony is a testament to your training and ability. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I thank you so much for it. In the South, they say you're doing the Lord's work, but it is absolutely fundamental that we give you the resources necessary to do the best job you can.
So, Mr. Chairman, you're a New Yorker, I don't see any other way for us to not be as robust as we can to provide those resources. And God forbid if tragedy occurs, as Mr. Green just indicated, we have an obligation to protect those individuals who are impacted for as long as that situation exists. And we're a better country when we do that, and we're not a good country when we don't do it.
So I look forward to us resolving any outstanding health-related issues. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to enter into the record six documents including five court cases related to FEMA and the preparedness grant, a GAO report, and an article entitled "FEMA wanted to fill 2,700 vacancies and DHS said no." So we still have some disconnect within our shops.
Speaker 36
Without objection. Thank you. Now recognize the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Evans, for five minutes of questions.
Gabe Evans
Thank you, Chairman, Ranking Member, for having this today. And of course, thank you so much to the witnesses for coming and having this conversation and for putting your guys' lives on the line for what you do as first responders. I remember September 11th, 25 years ago, very clearly. I was a high school student and it stuck with me. It stuck with me, it was a defining experience in my life.
And it's why I joined the United States Army. I served for 12 years in the US Army and the Colorado Army National Guard, deployed overseas as part of the Global War on Terror in 2012 and 2013. And then I did another 10 years as a first responder myself as a police officer in the Denver metro area. And so through both my federal service, my deployed service, and then working in my local community as a first responder, I saw how September 11th changed how first responders, law enforcement, the national security apparatus, how it all works together. And one of the core principles of the 9/11 Commission was to foster clear and consistent communication between federal, state, and local partners.
That's why we have fusion centers to literally fuse information together to form intelligence to be able to stop threats and terrorist attacks before they happen. Colorado, we have a fusion center. I got data and information and briefings from them on a daily basis as a police officer. And it worked to help save lives. Unfortunately, in my state, and we're seeing it in other states as well, Democrats are implementing policies that handcuff local law enforcement from being able to share information with their federal counterparts.
In my state, cops are being reprimanded, sued, fined, and fired for sharing information with federal law enforcement partners. And these policy choices are detrimental for public safety, officers' well-being, and at the end of the day, community and national safety. So, Mr. Erie, first question to you. I've introduced a few bills to ease information sharing between DHS and local partners. And as we look forward to the next 25 years, it's important that we make sure that we're equipping cops, first responders, and everybody else that keeps us safe with the information that they need to be able to go out and do their jobs.
So the question to you is, how have you seen the flow of information evolve between federal agencies and state and local partners?
Greg Erie
And thank you for your service, Congressman. We, at least from the Port Authority standpoint, and I speak for many of our colleagues in law enforcement, it's that absolute, you mentioned, it's critical. It's a lesson learned that information is sometimes life. The quicker we can get it to people. And we can no longer do the days of silos or calling or waiting.
And the fusion centers play that absolute, you know, critical role in letting us share that. Again, from our experience, we are members of not only the Joint Terrorism Task Force, but task forces throughout both states, New York and New Jersey. And we haven't had that problem. We share our information. We certainly do it appropriately.
We don't get involved in federal operational issues, but the intelligence does flow very freely between all levels, especially in New York and New Jersey.
Speaker 32
I'm glad to hear that. You talked about silos, you talked about how this truly is a matter of life and death, and so can you just expound upon how critically important that is to be able to have that information flow and how best you think that we can continue to break down these silos to be able to maintain that full operational picture?
Greg Erie
Yes, sir. And again, you know, the mechanisms are in place. We are sharing as many of the folks up here, my colleagues with me have said, and I would be worried about any laws that would be passed that would impede that. We've seen that happen in the past and it's a recipe for disaster. Again, every agency, including the federal agencies, local and state, have their own operations, but the intelligence is the piece that has to go back and forth.
And we've seen this most recently where we formed for FIFA a very large multiple fusion centers where the speed of being able to reach over and tell somebody what's happening allowed us to conduct that operation, that security operation flawlessly.
Gabe Evans
Thank you. We know there's people that sit around all day dreaming how to hurt and kill Americans. As a cop, we had a case in Colorado of somebody trying to go join ISIS. Just last year, we had an attack on a Jewish community in Boulder, Colorado, carried out by a terrorist who was living here illegally and who had made violent social posts on social media. So in our last like 20 seconds or so, is there anything, you said we have the mechanisms in place, is there anything else you think we need to do to tackle emerging threats and being able to improve information sharing?
Greg Erie
I think looking for that national level, the guidance, you know, from bodies like this and the federal government and the federal agencies, we're used to having them push that down and lead us through that. And that's something that we need to continue on. Again, we discussed earlier in one of the questions, if that bandwidth gets stretched too hard or too far, we lose some, we degrade that intelligence a little bit.
Andrew Garbarino
Gentleman yields back, and I just want to thank you all again for coming, for your service, for, you know, Chief Carreyo and Mr. Iri, you know, what your departments, what your agencies went through 25 years ago, and Chief Donnelly, what but for those brave souls on United 93, what would have happened here in DC. So thank you all for what you do, for what you have done and what you'll continue to do to keep New York and the Washington DC metro area safe and the residents safe. And you gave us a lot of great information here today, and we're going to take that back and make sure that we act on it. So just to follow up, the members of the committee, some who did not make it here today because they were also doing bills on the floor, they may have some additional questions for you all, and we would ask that the witnesses respond to these in writing. Pursuant to committee rule 7E, the hearing record will be held open for 10 days, and without objection, this committee stands adjourned.