Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs Ordinary meeting
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LIBE European Parliament
Follow its sittingsSpeaker 2
More specifically, we are, in fact, in the third phase of the progressive approach where member states need to register at least 35% of all border crossings in the respective member states, to be counted by member states, not by border crossing points. Now each member state has chosen its own path for how it wanted to take the progressive approach. We saw some member states that started to use the system in full at all border crossing points as of October 2025, but the majority have decided to do it gradually. We see where we are right now: a clear majority of member states are meeting the current threshold, which is 35% of all border crossings. So, we are, in that sense, on track.
Speaker 3
In terms of results so far, just a few numbers. We have now, as of mid-February, around 17,000,000 traveler files registered in the central system. About 70% of these files include biometric data. A total of around 30,000,000 border crossings have been registered so far, as of mid-February. This, of course, changes depending on the date of these numbers.
Speaker 2
So looking forward to the continuation of the progressive approach. So, we will move from the obligation to register currently at least 35% to member states being obliged to register at least 50% of all border crossings by March 10. The subsequent milestone will be by March, where member states will need to register 100% of all border crossings. So, once again, in line with the regulation on the progressive approach. Now, drawing more operational conclusions on the benefits that this major revolution of our border management will bring is still a little bit too early, but we do see a number of specific cases where member states have been able to identify cases of identity fraud, persons trying to enter or exit numerous times the Schengen area using different identities and different passports, which have been detected thanks to the ES, but also cases where, for example, a victim of trafficking was identified thanks to the system.
Speaker 3
So, the operational results are starting to become visible, but this is, of course, something that will happen gradually from now on. A little bit more in detail on the member states' compliance. So, again, we see member states largely in line with the progressive approach. They are using the flexibility that is available and possible. So, for example, you start to use the system at a certain BCP border crossing point.
You can also stop using the system for a few hours if you have issues with waiting times or the like. So, member states are making use of these partial suspensions possible. We do see a few member states that are quite a bit away from the current 35% threshold—three member states, to be more specific, where they are facing technical issues at the national level. So, how is the national system connected to the central system? We are following up on that very closely with them, and that is a bit of an issue of concern.
I would say that's our main concern at this stage of the rollout. We also see, but that's more on the details, some compliance issues in a few other member states, notably when it comes to the registration of biometrics, where, again, the equipment installed at border crossing points in the member states is not always up to standard or functioning properly. So that's something we count on member states to be able to solve quite soon. Then, as a third issue that we are keeping an eye on, is the issue of the waiting times. Some member states have reported challenges with this, notably during peak periods of the week with many travelers and many flights coming in at the same time.
A few member states struggle a bit with managing the border processes and the travel flows quickly enough, which has led to some queues at some major airports. That's something we are discussing closely with the member states. We are trying to share best practices between them to see how they can help each other. But we also see member states being quite successful in, let's say, using this progressive approach to fine-tune their processes, to speed up how they do the registration, so that the individual processing time is, in many places, going down. But that's an issue that we will keep monitoring, and also for member states to be prepared for the peak travel period over this summer.
Speaker 2
So we are looking forward to the fact that, as of April 10, we will see the full rollout and full use of the system at all our external borders or all border crossing points of the Schengen area. That also means that the parallel stamping of passports happening now during the progressive approach will cease. So, we will rely exclusively on the system to monitor compliance with the maximum period for short stays in the Schengen area. This will also be an automatic feature of the system. So, any overstayers will be automatically identified and notified to the member states.
As of April, we will also have an online tool available for travelers to check. So, for example, if you travel very frequently to the Schengen area, to easily check, how many days of your 90 per 180 days allowance have you used up? So, that will be an online service for travelers to use. And last, we will also relaunch the information campaigns that we made available to the public, to the member states, and to the carriers, which were launched when the system started. We will relaunch that around the time of the full rollout as we get there towards April.
But I think that's the summary I wanted to give. Of course, I am available to go deeper on any part or to reply to any questions, as always. Thank you.
Speaker 1
Thank you, Mr. Nielsen. And now, I would like to invite Mr. Thank you for your introductory remarks. Please, you have the floor.
Speaker 4
Yes. Thank you very much, and good afternoon from my side as well. To give you an update on the technical situation of EES, the system, as was mentioned already, went successfully live on Sunday, 12 October at 09:15. With a few exceptional delays, member states started the operations according to their national rollout plans. During the entry into operation, there were no critical or blocking incidents or issues at the central level or on the member state side.
Speaker 6
No security-related issues were raised, and therefore, no escalation process was launched. Overall, the entry into operation was very smooth and successful. At the central level, since the go-live, and now approaching 150 days of its operations, the system is in a normal, technically speaking, normal operational mode and is fully stabilized. Since the go-live, there were some punctual unavailability issues.
Which?
Speaker 5
They are normal for such a system at this scale. The last critical incident occurred in mid-December last year. And since then, the central system has been running smoothly and with high availability. Our teams identified, with the member states in due time, the root causes of the technical issues and implemented the corrective measures needed, when applicable, in collaboration with the concerned member states. Therefore, we think this has also been an example of successful cooperation between EULISSA and the member states on such an important issue.
Speaker 4
On data protection and security, EES was built using the privacy by design principle. In addition, security procedures have been defined together with the stakeholders. None of them have been triggered so far. At the national level, here again, my focus is on the technical aspects. The deployment of ES is accelerating at member states' level according to their national rollout plans.
The commission is closely monitoring the implementation according to the ES Progressive Start Regulation. From the EULISSA side, we are supporting member states to address technical issues affecting the national procedures or the central system. Some of the incidents notified at the national level have their root cause in technical issues at the national level, mainly related to callback network issues and the way those member states operate EES. The number of incidents so far reported by the member states is 191, and out of those, only 24 are still open. The agency is also providing technical support and guidance to member states, together with the Commission, to improve their national technical solutions.
Speaker 5
For example, EULISA has regular meetings with the Commission and member states to discuss how remedies can be applied to their national systems to address the concerns observed through the analysis of the statistics. As part of the day-to-day collaboration with member states and the commission, Eulisa also focuses on the measurement of data quality. This is aimed at improving the efficiency of the system, but also the efficiency across systems. I also want to mention the carrier's interface. An important milestone was reached on 01/09/1926 when it comes to carriers.
Speaker 4
The carrier's interface became available for travelers' checks on a voluntary basis. The checks will become mandatory as of April 10. So far, the current usage is limited, with about 125 carriers conducting verifications via the web interface and system-to-system connectivity out of 427 carriers ready for operation. However, the usage already improved in the first weeks when there were only 20 users using the interface. So, you see, there is development in the right direction.
Speaker 5
EULISA, together with the Commission, is continuing to organize regular meetings with the carriers' community, the carriers' working group, and to support their integration as needed. What are the next milestones on our side? EOLISA is preparing the next evolutive releases of the system in relation to screening rules, ATS, and IO in accordance with the IO roadmap agreed upon by the member states. The public man website has already been mentioned. The static content corresponds to the information for the public.
That content is created and maintained by the commission. The dynamic part is a module that allows third-country nationals to verify their remaining authorized stay as defined in the US regulation. Also, ES4 IO is planned for Q2 2027. To conclude, the current system performance is stable, with a normal operational mode similar to other systems managed by Eolisa. Eolisa, the agency will continue its fruitful cooperation with member states and the Commission to provide, as needed, guidance to member states on how to address possible operational as well as technical questions.
Thank you very much.
Speaker 1
Thank you, Mr. Keber. And now, we will continue with the question and answer session. I will give the floor to representatives of political groups. You have two minutes for your question or comment, and they will be directly answered by our guest speakers. And you will have two minutes to answer the questions, comments, or remarks.
So, I will start with EPP and Madam DuPont. Please, you have the floor.
Speaker 7
Thanks, Madam Chair, and thanks to both the panelists for their words and their assessment of the situation so far. I think, somehow, we all are aware of the importance of the entry system because it has repercussions for a lot of policies we are actually conducting at the European level. And given that, it still amazes me how Member States could technically not be up and running for the system, because they had time to prepare, especially when we look at standards. So, maybe just a few questions in more detail on that. When you said that Member States are also opting for the partial suspension, do we have an assessment of what the reasons for that are?
Speaker 8
How long do they do that for? And when do they go back to the full application again? I guess everyone has also heard about some complaints about queues at airports specifically, which is why it is good that we are talking to member states, but somehow somebody should also talk to airports as well. Maybe you can say a few words on that, specifically keeping in mind that the summer is about to come. A second question from my side, also looking a bit into the analytical data we have so far.
Speaker 7
I know it's not much, but as we can assess it so far, what are the grounds for refusal? And if they're connected to the time period of a visa, then maybe we can also draw some conclusions from that. I guess everyone has heard of the question of the lorry drivers coming from the Western Balkans, for example, where specifically the time period was of the essence. Third question. As we've seen, while we set up the system, there were numerous disinformation campaigns around the use, nonuse, or the exact purpose of the system.
Are you aware of any new attempts in that area? And if so, what are we going to do in terms of, let's say, counter-communication? And I guess I do have a lot of other questions as well, but I rest it for now. Thanks.
Speaker 2
Thank you. Very pertinent questions. On the partial suspension, it is a bit difficult to say in general, to be honest, because it really depends case by case on how member states make use of this. So in some situations, it might indeed be member states who face long waiting times, and they decide to stop registering in the system for maybe 3 or 4 hours, something like this, either completely or they just stop registering the biometrics but continue with the registration. So, they are able, let's say, to catch up with the waiting time issue.
Speaker 3
In other situations, the issues have been with member states' national systems, which are not functioning as they should, either because they have some kind of IT incident or because the national system is too slow in terms of the connection between national and central systems. So, this has also been a second reason for these partial suspensions. But again, I think it's, in a way, good that member states are making use of that because that's what the progressive approach is for. And we don't see, maybe with a few exceptions, that member states are, let's say, overexploiting this possibility. It's been used in a quite proportionate manner.
On the waiting times, indeed, it's tricky to assess because waiting times depend on so many factors. And it's not always obvious what the exact cause and effect are. E, what is caused by the ES? When we see member states that have been able to fine-tune their processes, the whole border check process, including using the ES and registering fingerprints, can be reduced to just over one minute. And that means, in fact, that it's not the ES, which is necessarily the main cause of the waiting time at airports.
There are many other reasons. Flight congestion: the infrastructure is simply too small. The way you channel passengers through the airport can also give rise to waiting times. But we are trying to, let's say, pinpoint a bit the causes and see where the actual EES process is too slow, as such contributing to waiting times, and in which member states those are. And we are indeed in very close contact also with airport operators, airline associations, and so on to get their feedback because they tell us a lot of, let's say, useful things from on the ground about how it's actually working in the big airports.
On the refusals, if I see correctly, our member states have in total registered around 16,000 refusals of entry. Around one-fourth of those would be due to overstays. So a bit more than 4,000 so far have been refused entry because they are overstaying, meaning they have used up more than their 90 out of 180 days of stay. But I would caution a little bit against drawing conclusions already, because these are nevertheless still early days. We are relying on the combination of stamping and registration to monitor the maximum time of stay during this progressive period.
So, this is something that we will need to analyze further when we get more data in the system. On the last question, sorry to be lengthy, it was more about miscommunication, I think, and kind of misinformation out there about the use of the system. I'm sorry. I didn't quite understand.
Speaker 7
Hear what? Sorry, chair. If I may, when we were speaking about the setting up of the system, we already saw that prior to the launch of the system, there was a quite remarkable disinformation campaign around the usage of that system, whom to apply to, who needs to register, and so on. And the question simply is, do we see that there is an ongoing attempt to discredit the system? And if so, what do we do against it? I
Speaker 3
I think, at least, that is only my impression because I'm not going to claim that I'm aware of all the information out there, but I have the impression that misinformation has gone down a bit. Bit. We saw quite a lot just before the launch, meaning September and October of the year. Now, it has gone down. I see we see less of that.
And then we see less, I would say, of the mix-up we saw last year between the Anthraxid system, ETIAS, and other systems— which one is which and what they do. So, I think it's a bit better. I'm not going to take credit for that because it is so complex. But I think we really made an effort last year to bring out as many facts as we can: exactly what the system is, what it does, what it does not do, and what its purpose is. So for me, that's maybe a very simplistic answer, but I think that's the only thing we can, on our side, keep trying to do: to make sure that the facts are out there and that they are readily available for anyone who wants to look.
Speaker 1
Thank you, Mr. Nielsen. I'd just like to remind you that it's two minutes for your combined answer. So, I don't want to interrupt you, but please try to be very to the point and very brief. Thank you.
Speaker 4
Okay. Thank you very much. Then, with regard to unavailability, I would just follow up that we had two major aspects here: memory saturation and the communication between two components. To give you a picture, the messages that were supposed to be shared between the two components were too large and couldn't be processed. So this was a technical challenge we faced at the end of last year. We managed to mitigate the risk.
The system is up and running. But maybe this is from a technical side, a complement to give you a little bit of a picture of the unavailability of the system. Thank you.
Speaker 10
Thank you. On behalf of S and T Group, I would like to invite Mr. Sippel, please take the floor.
Birgit Sippel
Thank you very much, and thank you to the speakers for giving us an overview of the current situation and the implementation of the entry-exit system. I would like to ask some concrete questions, maybe to DG Ho, sir. Nielsen. You mentioned at the beginning of your intervention that 70% of the entry-exit data also entails biometric data. I think we are mainly talking about fingerprints, or do we also talk about other things?
If you could go a little bit into it. You then mentioned that with all the data and the results, we could see so far. You mentioned cases of identity fraud and victims of trafficking who could be identified. Do you have some of the numbers? So, how many checks have taken place with the use of the entry-exit systems?
And how many cases of identity fraud and victims of trafficking did you or the member states find? Is there a link between victims of trafficking and identity fraud because they might have false passports? So, are some of the numbers doubled in the statistics? Regarding the waiting time, you mentioned that maybe it's not always the entry-exit system itself, but maybe the room and the spaces that are not good enough. But I think for the passengers, it doesn't matter if it's directly or only indirectly the entry-exit system.
So, obviously, not everything was well prepared. And I think we have to look into it. And I don't know if Ulisa has any information about the courses with long waiting times. Maybe you could also give some information if there are specific member states where this problem comes up, which could also give an idea. Regarding the change from having the stamps and the passport to having the electronic system, could you also indicate to what extent such data will be exchanged with third countries and on what basis this will then happen?
Thank you.
Speaker 2
You. On biometrics, first of all, the rule is that both fingerprints and facial images need to be recorded. Secondly, regarding the numbers related to identity fraud, we do not have them yet. That is something that we are assembling, and once again, it is early days in the system. But it is indeed a case of, for example, the same person trying to travel in and out of the Schengen area with two different passports, which in the past would rarely be detected, and now it is detected thanks to the ES.
But the exact numbers of this and how many the systems help to detect, we will need to wait a little bit to see. As just one example, I think we have, in terms of refusals of entry, registered 180 attempts to enter with false documents, just to give one example, but again, only over the course of a few months. Indeed, from the waiting times point of view, certainly for the passengers' experience, they obviously don't tell the difference; it is a bad experience if you need to wait, and that's it. What we just try to do from the side of DG Home is to see to what extent the EES is making the issue worse or causing the problem, and see if we can address that part of the problem to make sure that it's not the EES that adds to the waiting time or a bad passenger experience, whatever the underlying reason for that is. And lastly, no exchange of data from the ES with third countries is currently foreseen in the legislation.
So, no such exchange is happening right now.
Birgit Sippel
And on the question of which member states have bigger problems with the waiting lines?
Speaker 3
Also, something where today we actually asked to get input from the airport operators and the airlines to see which ones they find the most problematic. So, we will want to focus on the top issues in that regard. But again, it is too early for us to say exactly which those are. We are talking about maybe 6, 7, or 8 member states, but we are waiting for input from the stakeholders on the ground.
Thank you. And Mr. Keber ?
Speaker 4
Yes. Thank you very much. From a technical point of view, we do not see from the central system where our waiting times are occurring. So, we do not have any technical information that we could track in our system. However, we have certainly, in our governance structure, discussed this regularly: the whole performance of the system.
And here, I would say that this is more referring to business procedures on the member state side, which we try to accommodate and take into consideration so that our technology reflects or serves best the business procedures on the member states' side. So, this is our point of view, and we are continuously working on it with the member states as well.
Speaker 1
Thank you. And on behalf of the PFE, I would like to invite Mr. or Mrs. Ehlers to take the floor, please.
Dankeville for JT.
Speaker 14
Thank you very much, Chair, Mr. Nielsen, Mr. Kaber. Here we are in February 2026.
Thank you.
Speaker 14
You. It's February 2026. The NCHXIT system has gone live, and exactly what my group warned against is happening. We want to see stronger borders, but stronger borders need to apply to reality as well. And that reality is a tough one.
Talking about 70% waiting times, chaos in Lisbon where the system was out of action, and worries about summer around the corner. Ladies and gentlemen, Parliament needs to look at itself in the mirror. We can see where micromanagement in this Parliament is heading. Because before the rules were adopted, we were restricted; by introducing these rules, we have restricted officials' ability to deal with these issues. And this parliament claims that it knows better than the border guards themselves.
If we just write in the margin that the system is working, then it is working, but the professionals on the ground have to realize that they cannot do much about it. If we're seeing the 24-hour postponement of the introduction of the system, it's extremely problematic. Mister Nielsen, is it not an idea to come up with new legislation? If the commission acts quickly, we'll be able to repair this legislation before the summer. Are you prepared to increase the possibilities to postpone this longer and to make sure that we can cover the summer season, as my colleague, Mr. Bellamy, asked for last year, and that we can see European aviation have free rein rather than restricting their movements?
Speaker 15
And, Mr. Kaber, can you guarantee that your systems will be working and that the technical problems are not on your side? Thank you.
Speaker 2
Yeah. Thank you. Well, when it comes to the summer, note that as we get into the full operation of the system in April, there is an additional transition of 3 months where member states can decide not to take the biometrics. So, for an additional three months, meaning until July. Under some circumstances, these exceptions for not taking biometrics can also be extended to September.
Speaker 3
So we feel that, with those possible exceptions, Member States should be able to handle the travel peaks that may occur over the summer. We are not keen to further extend any kind of flexibility or suspensions because we do need, for the sake of ensuring strong border management of Europe, to move to the full use of the system, where every passenger is registered and we rely on the ES and not passport stamping to monitor stays. So, at this stage, we have no plans to propose any changes or extensions to the flexibility. To note, perhaps with the Member State that the Honorable Member mentioned, without the use of the EAS at that airport, there were still waiting times of maybe 6 to 8 hours over Christmas. And the border check process took a long time for every passenger without the use of the AS.
So, I think that was an example of that. There were other structural issues that need to be addressed, and we are also in contact with the authorities of that member state to discuss them.
Speaker 4
Yes. Thank you very much for the question. In our view, the entry into operation on October 12 was a big success. It is a highly complex system in a very complex environment. So this was a big success for all the stakeholders at the European level and at the member states level.
This gives us a lot of confidence concerning the future because we see that the system has become more and more stable. It's producing added value. And the cooperation with the member states is outstandingly good. So, to say that from a technical point of view, we see the system as a success, and we are very confident in a further successful operation in the near future. Thank you.
Speaker 10
Thank you. On behalf of ECR, I would like to invite Mrs. Konkov to take the floor, please.
Speaker 18
Thank you, Chair. And thank you also, Mr. Nielsen and Mr. Keber, for your presentations. As a reporter for the AES derogation regulation, I'm, of course, following the progressive introduction very closely. And yesterday, I had an American guest who told me that she had a very smooth airport experience when entering Europe on Saturday via Copenhagen. And I've heard similar topics and similar stories from other people as well.
Of course, I'm well aware that not everything has been smooth everywhere, but that is precisely why we have the progressive introduction for you. So, my questions for you today are the following. First, Mr. Keba, what can you tell us about the stability of the system? And as we are rapidly progressing towards 100% use of EES, including biometrics, can you assure us that the system will remain stable? And what can you tell us about the functioning of the troubleshooting part of your work?
And when there were issues, what were the response times? Were you always able to help the national authorities immediately? To Mr. Nielsen, what can you tell us about waiting times at the border crossing points, at airports, land borders, and seaports? What can you tell us about the local border traffic at external land borders? And have border guards use provisions from the Schengen area to deal with excessive waiting times?
And finally, the commission has always claimed that EES, together with the digitization of border procedures, will mean a shorter and more comfortable experience for travelers across the EU's external borders. So, what are the next steps regarding digitalization, and what more can you do to help member states set up e-gates and an online application to complete some steps in advance? And when you were speaking now, you also said, Mister Nielsen, that three member states with more serious problems, including connecting their national systems to EES. So, my question is: what are the timelines involved in ensuring the proper functioning of EES in those three member states? On the information aspects, how is the Commission ensuring that member states respect Article 50 regarding information rights with respect to travelers crossing external borders?
Speaker 19
Are all travelers informed of the purpose of data processing when their biometrics are taken? Thank you very much for your answers.
Speaker 4
Yes. Thank you very much for the question. I would start with maybe a little bit more elaboration on what we have seen so far since the entry into operation. And here, as I mentioned, in October and November, we saw a memory saturation of the task manager. We saw command process availability issues and two large messages we couldn't process in our system.
And then we saw, and this is why I'm mentioning this misuse—not intentionally, but a misuse by one member state in the way they use the central system. So what I'm trying to say, or give you a picture of, is that the root causes first need to be identified. Is it at the central level? Is it on the member states' level to get a real grip on where we are and how the problems have to be solved? All these issues have been solved in due time.
And the system was up and running again within a few days, depending on the incident we are talking about. So some of them are even quicker. So, we have a team, since you asked, with regard to troubleshooting. We have a 24/7 team in our agency available for the member states. So there is a direct communication path, always open, a direct communication channel to attach this, and this will be the case also in the further future so that we can approach these issues in due time.
Thank you. And Mr. Nielsen?
Speaker 2
Yes. Thank you. First of all, on the waiting times, I think we have had very few, if any, reports of longer waiting times at land or seaboard crossing points, but essentially at some of the major or bigger airports. And indeed, part of the answer to this is an increased use of self-service kiosks and automated gates. So, this is something that will have an impact with some delay because, to keep it simple, it's only upon the second entry to the Schengen area after the start of using the ES that the traveler can actually use the gates.
Speaker 3
So, there is a certain delay when we start to reap the benefits of those. But we also strongly encourage member states now to assess, let's say, their investments in light of experience, because member states made an estimate before starting to use the system. Maybe at this airport, I need six gates now, and in the coming months, it is the moment to make the assessment. So, are six gates enough? Or do I need to add more gates to maintain a good passenger flow?
And that's the kind of investment which also remains eligible under EU funds. For the three member states with delays, the timeline is simply as soon as possible. There is no time to lose for those three member states to get their national systems in order. So, that needs to happen ASAP. And the last point on the information for travelers.
Indeed, we have verified that basically all member states make available the informational material that we have also helped them to produce centrally. So that's available at all border crossing points for all travelers, which also includes the obligation to provide biometrics, and then what happens to the data, etc. So, that's available at all BCPs.
Speaker 23
Thank you very much. Always being French. Thank you to Mr. Nielsen and Mr. Tillman. We were lucky enough to be together in Strasbourg when your new site was inaugurated. And I'm delighted to see you here today to talk about a subject which is very dear to our hearts here in the committee.
Speaker 22
You've already answered a number of questions. I would like to turn to EU Lisa and touch on some more technical matters. You're responsible for implementing several IT systems. That's the first of a series of projects. There will be Eurodoak interoperability and a number of other files as well.
You talked about memory saturation. I think that we're worrying too much. Are you talking about the saturation of central databases or those in the member states, or is it to do with the transfer of information in the chain? Could you perhaps tell us a bit more about this idea of memory saturation? And you also mentioned new data, which is available for thousands of overstays.
Do you have any other data? I mean, of course, this will be partial at the moment because the system hasn't been implemented across the board. But do you have any other useful data for us that might allow us to have clearer ideas about what's going on? And, Mr. Nielsen, we're talking about a system which is being implemented at the moment, both by the EU, ESA, and the member states. Some of the member states are moving faster than others, depending on their size.
Some have more entry points than others. And then there's the whole physical nature of the way people move around as well. Do you have working groups? Do you share best practices? Do you look at bottlenecks?
I'd imagine you may already have seen some activity peaks before the summer comes. Are you going to look at how you are going to steer things at a general level? And then, on a more technical level, how are you going to approach things?
Speaker 4
Thank you very much for the question. Well, what I was talking about, the saturation of memory or memory saturation is purely, I can reassure you, on a central level. So, this is a component in our system which does not empty as fast as it should. So, we have to restart the system. This is the workaround that we have chosen in order to get things going at first.
And so now the fix has been implemented. And so, this is well taken care of. Additional data: well, we see what you have been asking for, or I would take it from this way. We're closely monitoring different aspects of the system. So, how fast are different components reacting? What is the response time?
And here, the situation is that since we are still in a very young system. We are still working on this to get more data and do it. But I can say at the moment that we are very much within the margins of what we have expected regarding how the system is performing. So, this is the data we have about the systems, which we are regularly monitoring in this regard. If you're referring to whether we have substantially more data, I would have to turn to the commission because this is something the member states report directly here.
We only see the system, the central system, and how it works. So, I couldn't comment on this here. You know? Thank you.
You. Mister Nielsen?
Speaker 3
Yeah. Thank you. Well, first of all, on the governance side, we have, on the one hand, been relying on the written reports from each member state, which, according to the regulation, need to be sent to us every month and are, I think, also shared with the other institutions. But more importantly, since the launch of the system, we have had weekly meetings at expert level through our so-called Smart Borders Committee, one of the comitology committees. But still, we kept the pace of weekly meetings up until around Christmas.
We are now slowing down a little bit to either biweekly or monthly meetings when it comes to bringing all member states together. But when we see member states where there are issues, we meet them bilaterally at least once a week. So we do try to ensure close follow-up to that. And then, in combination with that, there are, of course, the technical groups of EULISSA that look at the functioning of the system. And the issues are also raised in different council groups at regular intervals.
But again, from our side, in particular, regular meetings with all member states and focused bilateral meetings with the specific member states where we feel it is needed. On the exact data, I would say, in particular, we have more data on the reasons for refusal of entry, which needs to be put into the system. So we can come back in bilateral if you wish to share more about that. I don't know it by heart. But again, it's something that is kind of being built up now.
But that's one of the data points that we can already retrieve from the system per se. Likewise, regarding the share of border crossings and the share of files that contain biometrics, it's something that we can retrieve at this stage, reflecting the progressive approach.
Speaker 10
Thank you. We have time for one or two. Yes. And this will be just a one-minute remark. We'll take both of them, and then you will have the opportunity to answer together with the concluding remarks.
So, Mr. Lazieri, please.
Fabrice Leggeri
Thank you very much. Are we speaking French? One question for the commission is as follows: At the airports and border posts where there are significant delays and where the entry-exit system application has been suspended, to the best of your knowledge, are there any other problems that would lead these border posts not to check the Schengen Information System? And have I understood that if the entry-exit system is not applied, then the former checks will be used?
Stamps for entry and stamps for exit for passengers who couldn't be checked in the entry-exit system. Is that the way it works?
Thank you. And Mr. Oitian, please, you have the floor.
Speaker 27
Yes. Thank you. So, first, I would like to thank you for the report. I think it was a wise decision to do the gradual entry into force. So the three member states that were pushing for this at the end were right.
Speaker 26
My question is: are these the same three member states that are today lagging behind, or are these different member states? Maybe Mr. Nielsen can elaborate on this. Then, do you see any technical bottlenecks that may occur in the future when we gradually go to 5100%? And lastly, on the question of drivers from the Balkans, are there any technical solutions that the commission is foreseeing in order to address this problem?
Because the one thing is that the drivers are overstayers, but the other thing is that we need the drivers because they do important jobs in Europe. So, are you working with the Balkan countries to find solutions to this problem?
Speaker 1
Thank you. And, gentlemen, I will give you the floor for addressing the questions and also for concluding remarks. So, Mr. Nielsen, please, you have the floor.
Speaker 2
Thank you. On the first question, no, I wouldn't say that we see any, let's say, correlation between member states not fully using the AS and, on the other hand, not using the AS as they should. I wouldn't dare say that there is a link between the two. On the stamping, note that during this progressive approach, Member States are, in fact, obliged to do both. They need to stamp every traveler, and they need to do the registration in the ES.
Speaker 3
Because the ES is incomplete, you need to be able to fall back on the stamping. So, it's in April that we will stop with the stamping once and for all and only rely on the ES. On the other questions, well, actually, out of the three member states who insisted on delaying the launch of the system a little bit, one of them is currently experiencing quite some issues at the national level, and I'm happy to tell you that in bilateral. On the technical side, in terms of bottlenecks, I would not say so. It's maybe more a question for Tilman.
I would say not at the central level, perhaps at the national level, where the capacity of the member state system will need to be able to handle the 100% load. That's maybe a small question. And to be brief because I'm running out of time, indeed, we are in close dialogue with the truck associations and the governments of the Western Balkans to see if we can find any pragmatic solutions, but it is not an easy issue either because so far, member states are very strict on saying that they don't want to change the basic rule of the 90 per 180 days. As long as that is the case, and as long as the ES is very transparent about who complies with this rule or not, it will not be easy to find solutions. But we are ready to give it a try because it is important for our economy.
So that's a dialogue ongoing with the Western Balkan partners. Thank you.
Speaker 10
Thank you. Would you like to add something in conclusion, gentlemen? No, thank you. Mr. Kueber, please, you have the floor.
Speaker 4
Yes. Thank you very much. With regard to technical bottlenecks, at the moment, we don't see them at the central level. What we have calculated shows that we are in line, so there is enough capacity for how the system is performing. However, it must be said, the system is very successful, meaning there will be more and more valuable data in the system.
So down the road, and this is more if I take your question now in perspective, we have to see that here, I would like to point out, for example, our SPMS, our shared biometric matching service, that we maintain the necessary capacity to process the data in a legally compliant way, data protection-wise, so that we do it in a secure way, but this is down the road. So, for the future, what we are discussing at the moment regarding finishing the gradual approach, we do not see this at the central level. Would.
Would you like to add something in conclusion?
Speaker 4
What I would like to reiterate is that, for me, this is important. This has been a success, and this is my final comment.
Speaker 1
Mister Nielsen, Mister Geber, thank you so much for coming to the Libre Committee. Thank you for the fruitful discussion. I would also like to thank all our colleagues for contributing to today's discussion. That concludes this point on our agenda. And in a couple of minutes, we will continue with our next agenda item.
Speaker 30
Thank you. Dear colleagues, let us continue with our discussions. Dear colleagues, if you please just take your seats, then we can continue with our agenda. Thank you. Dear colleagues, on January 20, the European Commission issued its new anti-racism strategy covering the years from 2026 to 2030.
Speaker 1
The strategy follows the EU anti-racism action plan of 2020 to 2025 that was presented in 2020. On 09/25/2024, the commission also issued a report on the implementation of the EU anti-racism action plan. The new strategy aims at tackling structural racism, enforcing anti-discrimination legislation, stepping up protection against racial hatred, strengthening social equality and cohesion, fostering key partnerships, and leading by example. And today, we have the pleasure of hosting in Liba Miss Anna Carla Pereira, Director for Equality and Nondiscrimination of DG JUST of the European Commission, and she will present the new strategy. So to start with, I would like to give you the floor for seven or eight minutes for your introductory remarks.
Speaker 29
Thank you, Madam Chair, and good afternoon, everyone. I'm really happy, and it is an honor to come and present the new anti-racism strategy to this committee. As you know, as of 2023, almost two out of three Europeans perceived racial discrimination to be widespread in their member states, with 61% believing this is related to skin color. This troubling perception extends further to our Roma communities, where life expectancy remains 8 years shorter than the average European. Every second Roma child is educated in a segregated school where all or most pupils are Roma.
Furthermore, nearly half of the people of African descent in the EU find themselves overqualified for their jobs. Each of these realities reminds us of the systematic hurdles that racialized individuals endure. Racial discrimination costs the European Union an estimated €12,000,000,000 in lost gross domestic product annually, a figure that highlights the economic imperative of addressing inequality. So, addressing and combating racism is not only a good thing morally and in terms of human rights. It's also the smart thing to do because we are looking at the interest of social cohesion in the EU, but also at its future prosperity.
The new anti-racism strategy builds on the achievements of the 2020-2025 action plan and proposes a forward-looking framework designed to address the structural dimensions of racism, while underlining the importance of making sure that existing legal protections translate into lived rights. The strategy has several objectives, and Madam Chair already mentioned them. So, let me focus on three of them. Let me first start by strengthening enforcement. Despite a strong EU legal framework, many people continue to experience racial discrimination and racist violence, often without reporting incidents or being able to access legal redress.
Weak enforcement and inconsistent sanctions undermine trust in public institutions and limit the deterrent effect of the law. Our objective is to focus on enforcement and protection, ensuring that existing legal safeguards against discrimination, hate crimes, and hate speech are effective and accessible. We are also going to publish the fourth report analyzing the application of the racial equality directive, which will address the effectiveness of national sanction regimes. It will also look into emerging risks, such as algorithmic discrimination linked to artificial intelligence. In peril, we are working on standards for equality bodies by seeking to reinforce their independence and effectiveness, and enhance the response to hate crime and hate speech.
We do so through monitoring, training, and data collection in support of policy making. Our second objective in the strategy is to address racism in all walks of life, meaning employment, education, housing, and health care, because racism manifests itself in all these areas through invisible barriers—barriers that we must dismantle through concerted action. To this end, we will support inclusive education and teacher training via Erasmus Plus, ensuring equitable opportunities for all. We will forge partnerships with companies through the EU diversity charters to promote fair hiring and nurture inclusive workplaces. We will propose a council recommendation to combat housing exclusion and homelessness, seeking to create sustainable prospects for all communities.
A third objective of our strategy emphasizes partnerships and governance, recognizing that combating racism requires coordinated action across all levels of society. Racism is experienced locally and addressed first and foremost through national laws, policies, and institutions. Member states hold primary responsibility for enforcing anti-discrimination legislation, preventing and prosecuting hate crime, designing education systems, shaping labor markets, delivering health care and social services, and ensuring equal treatment by public authorities. And this is the reason why the strategy places strong emphasis on national ownership and accountability, encouraging member states to adopt national and regional action plans against racism and to appoint coordinators to oversee the implementation process. Alongside member states and local authorities, civil society organizations are vital partners in the fight against racism.
Our existing anti-racism civil society forum will be renewed and expanded, ensuring diverse perspectives are included in policymaking. We will also strengthen the role of the commission's coordinator on combating racism and establish a broader civil society platform to support the civic space. Under the citizens' equality rights and values, plus the trend of Agora EU, we are introducing simplified grants and cascading funding models to support grassroots initiatives. We proposed a budget of 3,600,000,000 for this program, something I believe this committee knows very well. And this aims at doubling the funding available under the current SERVE framework, under which, over the past five years, we have financed actions to prevent and fight racism, xenophobia, and discrimination with over €60,000,000.
Finally, our commitment to anti-racism within our own EU institutions is unwavering. We are dedicated to providing staff with equality training, implementing outreach strategies to attract candidates from all ethnic backgrounds, and enhancing the visibility of EU careers to underrepresented groups, thereby ensuring that diversity and inclusion flourish in our ranks. And with this, Chair, I conclude my initial remarks. Thank you.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you. Thank you, Mrs. Pereira, for your presentation. And now I'll give the floor to each group representative for a maximum of two minutes, which will be followed immediately by your answer, again for a two-minute reply. So, we start with the EPP. Missus Dipon has the floor.
Speaker 7
Thanks, Chair. And thanks to you, Madam Perrier, for being here in the committee and for representing the anti-racism strategy of the commission in a bit more detail. And I know it almost sounds a bit philosophical. I know that it's probably also not simple for you to answer, but I think when we look at the various strategies that have been set up at the European level for quite a while, it all boils down to the member states implementing them. Most of the points touched upon by the strategy are indeed in the hands of member states.
So how can we actually make sure that enforcement, as you mentioned, the first very important pillar of the strategy, is really followed up with concrete results? I'm also thinking about, for example, the Roma strategy. We have the antisemitism strategy. And all of them are kind of connected, but are not necessarily, well, successful is probably not the right word in that context. I think there are a few deficiencies still, which go back to member states not necessarily implementing what they should do. So how can we actually address that?
And are the regional or national plans actually the right tools for that? The second question concerns the role of the coordinator. You mentioned that it should be enforced. Maybe you can say a few words or provide details on that as well. And last point, I'd like you to also set AI as a very useful tool here, but it can also be very sensitive by recurring and copying biases that are implemented into AI.
Speaker 32
Thank you, Mrs. De Pont. Mrs. Pereira, Florent, it is your turn to reply in two minutes.
Speaker 29
Thank you, Chair and Madam Member. Well, it is clear that a lot of the issues that we have raised through the strategy are shared issues. And, of course, they cannot all be sorted by Brussels and through Brussels. But it's clear that we here, the Commission, but also this House, have a very important role in making sure that there is an incentive and the stimulus to act where the issues are occurring, which is at the national level. The national plans for us are a very important vehicle for that because, if they are presented, they will represent the political commitment of the member states in fighting racism.
And, hopefully, they will bring not only the aspirations at the national level, but also the means that the governments want to put into the fight against racism. Aside from the national plans, of course, there are the directives that we have at the European level, like the racial equality directive, which require a much more forceful implementation at the national level. Wherever there are infringements, the Commission has been acting and taking those issues to court. For example, when we are discussing segregation in schools, we have put forward some points to the European Court of Justice. But, of course, it's also up to the national authorities to enforce the directives.
And in this respect, what I mentioned regarding the quality bodies is extremely important because they will be fundamental actors at the national level to pinpoint where the EUA key is not being observed. And then finally, I will talk about the platforms we have for dialogue, maybe in another intervention, because my time has expired, but I took note.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you. Thank you, Mrs. Pereira. Then, we move on to the S and D groups. Missus Insir, Missus Irene Insir, the floor is yours.
Evin Incir
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, and thanks to Madam Pereira for being here with us. This issue is a very personal issue for me, and I think many people in our union share my own background. Back in 2006, when I was running for the first time for an elected position, I used to get a lot of letters that said, "You are not Swedish," "Swedish children first," "Go back to your home country," etc. Until last year, 2025, I still got some letters, not as many as previously. Back in the day, it was to my home address.
Last year, at the beginning of the year, I even got it to the parliament address, and it basically says the same thing. And it's even worse on social media platforms. So, something has happened. And though hatred has been normalized, racism has been normalized in our union. And I don't really see any progress.
I see rather a backlash. But when receiving the information you are giving and when reading the documents we have got, it is portrayed as if there is progress taking place. It says that 11 out of 27 of our members have adopted national action plans. Hungary is one of them. I don't think that there are so many people in here who believe that Orban is actively, for real, working to combat racism.
So, my question is: what concrete progress have you seen until now? Where do you see the biggest lack of enforcement? And are you following up on the digital tools that are being used by EU agencies to ensure that biased tools are not used and that there are safeguards connected to it? Thank you.
Thank you, Missus Sincer. Mrs. Pereira.
Speaker 29
Yes. Well, I concur with you that when it comes to the figures and the lived experiences of people, racism still persists in Europe. And I think we all need to acknowledge that in order to move forward. But we do believe that, through the action plan that was put forward a few years back, we engaged for the first time at the European level in a conversation about anti-racism, and that is in itself progress. And by triggering this dialogue with the member states, we are engaging in a much more aware dialogue than existed before.
Is it sufficient? Not yet. Not enough, and that's why we are proposing this new strategy to continue this engagement. Now, I must say that when it comes to hate speech, particularly online, the commission is really committed to looking into this because in all walks of life, we do see that people, especially racialized people, are victims of hate speech, especially if you are a public figure. So this is something that we are particularly looking at in the context, for example, of the discussions on hate speech as an EU crime, and these discussions are ongoing in the Council.
Let me also say that, when it comes to the use of digital tools, this is indeed a worrying area because there is a risk of using algorithms to perpetuate bias against racialized people and communities. And so, this is one of the areas where we are looking specifically, and we want to work with different partners, member states, but also civil society, to really tackle this in more detail. And this is going to be one of the focuses in the implementation of the strategy. And, hopefully, I will also answer one of the questions posed by your colleague earlier. Thank you.
Thank you.
Fabrice Leggeri
You, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Miss Pereira. In June 2025, the European Commissioner said to the national that the strategic plan would combat all forms of racism. But I'd like to highlight here that the commissioner has not kept this promise. The commission has provoked risk racism, or rather, it has focused on some forms of racism over others and doesn't focus, for instance, on anti-white or anti-Christian bias.
Brussels wants to promote certain ideologies. It talks about structural racism and promotes ideologically driven education against racism. This anti-racism strategy should respond to what the European people have said and stated through their votes. In other words, looking at migration as one of the problems. The NRNGO, which has clear links to the Muslim Brotherhood, has organized events.
And the Muslim Brotherhood, in particular, has instrumentalized the ideology of openness that is promoted by the European Union. And so the EU should change its strategy to respond to these issues.
Speaker 29
Thank you, sir. I think that the strategy is clear when we affirm and underline that all forms of racism are unacceptable, regardless of who is targeted. The aim of the strategy is to tackle all forms of racism. I think we leave no doubt in the strategy, and we have always been clear. There is no place for hate in our union.
And I just want to recall the framework decision on combating racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law, which also criminalizes hate offenses based on religion. Let me, nonetheless, mention that the figures, when we look at them, and which I quoted at the beginning of my intervention, are also very clear. Most respondents to the last survey on anti-racism, 61% of them, think that racial discrimination is related to skin color. Thank you.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you, Madam Perida. And now I give the floor to Mr. Vasik from ECR. The floor is yours, Mister Vasik.
Speaker 38
Ladies and gentlemen, the first EU plan against racism was adopted for the years 2022-2025. As I understand from the research on the strategy, it shows that this action was not successful enough. And the number of people who think that there is discrimination in the EU because of skin color or other issues such as religion or ideas has grown. So I would like to ask you, where do you see the causes of such an attitude? Maybe it's the wrong approach of the EU countries, especially regarding the phenomenon of illegal migration; maybe this is the cause.
Speaker 39
So, this is the first thing. Secondly, I read the document, and I was surprised to notice that in the strategy, you don't say a word. You don't diagnose. There is nothing about the phenomena that we can read about in many reports from NGOs in Europe. So, persecutions occur because of being a Christian.
Speaker 38
In the EU, recently, we have seen many new negative phenomena, including murders, profanations, burning of churches, and disruptions of Christian religious services. Why does the European Commission not see or perceive this problem? And how would you like to finally see it, and what would you like to do to counteract it? Thank you.
Speaker 29
Thank you, Chair. I think, on the first question, what is the cause for higher numbers of perceptions of racist acts in the EU. Among them is certainly the sense of economic instability and social exclusion that might exist in some countries and some communities, leading people to look at others who are probably in the same situation as them or even worse, to think that this is the cause of their own troubles. So, certainly, the economic and socioeconomic situation in a country, in a region, is a part of it. And, of course, those frustrations are then expressed very often online through hate speech, through verbal violence online, which then allows these antiequality narratives to propagate.
So in that respect, it is clear that looking at the causes of this unrest at a social level is important. Looking at employment, access to health care, access to education, access to housing, and making sure that everyone benefits from that will certainly alleviate the causes of racism. And on the second point, I think I have already mentioned that our strategy does underline that all forms of racism are unacceptable in the EU.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you, Mrs. Pereira. Now I give the floor to Madam Keller. Madam Keller, the floor is yours.
Speaker 22
Thank you very much. Mister Chair, thank you, Miss Pereira. Thank you for being here today in the committee. Thank you for this plan from the commission that was announced on January 20. It's very clear that you want to fight racism in whichever form, whether it has to do with race, religion, sexual orientation, or the color of skin.
And the fact that the commission has a new report really underlines this willingness to fight racism. But now, of course, we do have to take into account the realities of racist acts. Acts of discrimination have only increased, as our report indicates. It's been quite regular, unfortunately. We're not the only ones trying to combat these acts.
National stakeholders are doing their part as well. And I'd like to ask you how we can measure the actions compared with general attitudes, which are quite negative? Are there any tools for measuring these, maybe cooperation efforts with member states and national stakeholders? And then you also spoke about the digital aspect. What are you doing together with your colleagues regarding the DSA, the Digital Services Act, which takes into account banning online what is currently banned in the public space?
So discrimination, violent speech, and discriminatory speech. What can you tell us about that aspect? Thank you very much.
Speaker 29
Thank you, madam, for your questions. Since the action plan, the Commission, together with the member states and in cooperation with the OECD, has developed guidelines on how to construct a strategic approach to anti-racism. This set of indicators allows member states to have a compass. Now, are we satisfied with just that elaboration? Maybe not.
And this is the reason why, with the strategy, our proposal is to make sure that these guidelines are used more everywhere and in a much more efficient way, and that we, together with the member states, identify a few key factors that will guide the implementation and our dialogue with the member states. I must say that finding data on racial discrimination is extremely difficult and extremely sensitive. So it is not an area that can yield results without a lot of dialogue with the national authorities, and this is where we want to concentrate. When it comes to AI and the use of online hate, it is clear that the Digital Services Act is a very important instrument for the EU in addressing those issues. There is a code of conduct to fight against hate speech, and this code of conduct was agreed upon last year with the platforms.
So, of course, this is one of the mechanisms we have to address it. But more broadly, I would say that the DSA has a very big set of enforcement tools when we see that there is a malfunctioning and misuse of the online space. So it is possible for the commission to actually intervene and put forward actions. It is a bit parallel to this conversation, but let me just give you the example of Grok, which is also hate through online speech. In this particular case against women, not necessarily related to race, the commission has taken the platforms promoting rock and is investigating what is going on.
So, we will not hesitate to do the same in other areas where human rights are questioned.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you, Miss Vera. Well, I have no speaker from the Greens on my list. And, if that is the case, I give the floor to Isabel Serra, senior Serra. Sorry.
Speaker 40
Thank you, Chair. Thank you, Miss Barrera. It seems like a joke that the commission is presenting a plan against racism considering the far right is involved. Could you please speak a bit slower, ask the chair? Because the far right is provoking feelings of discrimination against people who are migrants. For instance, people who have darker skin might try to rent an apartment, and they'll be denied solely because of their skin color.
There's also Islamophobia, social exclusion of Arab people, including women, people who are scared of speaking out because they're worried about being deported, people who walk on the street and who are racially profiled by the police simply because of their skin color, or people who face exploitation and are essentially used as slave labor because they do not have papers. This is a reality. This is what many racialized people in the EU experience. But the commission, with its migration policy, only spurs more racism against people because they are centers that detain people who have not committed any crimes. So this is what has happened with Maloney's government, or even Donald Trump's speech, which has just generated more racism.
So an anti-racism plan that doesn't have any kind of juridic or legal force is really just empty and hollow when the policies just spur on more racism. This is what is happening, and this is the war that Europe wages against people, migrants, and the Global South. So, what I want to understand is, if we want to stop racism, we shouldn't be creating policies against these migrants. We should be finding ways to legalize these people, regularize them, and value their rights. Miss Pereira.
Speaker 29
I don't think I'm the most appropriate person to answer this question exactly because I'm not dealing directly with migration policy. But let me, nonetheless, underline that everyone who enters the EU territory is a person whose rights deserve to be protected and enacted. So when we are talking about migrants in the EU, wherever they are from and whatever skin color they have, they should be protected by our human rights acquis. Thank you.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you, Mrs. Pereira. I have no speaker from the ASN group on the list. So, I give the floor, as a non-attached member, to Madam Sorel. Madam Sorel Floresios. Sorry?
No. The second round.
Speaker 44
Thank you very much. But I think we agree that the phenomena you're describing do exist. We can't deny that, sir. Impossible. You said that in certain socioeconomic situations which show tensions, they are looking for scapegoats.
Speaker 43
And we know that this is not working in the EU. So, do you think continuing mass immigration is going to help the situation? You mentioned the problem of housing, specifically supply and demand, didn't you? I mean, I don't need to dwell on this. I think you understand what I'm driving at.
You're talking about €12,000,000,000 of GDP that has been lost. I'd like to know how you worked that out and how you calculated that. And something that's extremely important for me: last July, I was a victim of this form of racism. Something that was being done within the parliament against me, a photo that was sent to the media, and that gave rise to a racist wave on social media. The security services have carried out an investigation, but the parliament is doing nothing.
Speaker 42
So, I'm calling on the commission now to help me with this particular point. Thank you.
Merci, madame Florell.
Thank you.
Madam Perilla.
Speaker 29
Chair, on this last point, I take note, but I presume this is for this house to address those points. Let me just underline again that when it comes to migration and asylum, our pact on migration and asylum strengthens guarantees for vulnerable applicants, and their vulnerability might be related to sexual, gender, racial, or religious backgrounds, and they are often subject to violence because of this. Of course, it is imperative that the member states take into account the individual circumstances of everyone and the special needs of vulnerable persons. Now it is clear that in a context, as I mentioned, of socioeconomic tension, and to use the French expression that, madam, you have used, people might be part of the tensions that are elsewhere in society. And that is why, for us, looking at structural racism, looking at the different causes of racism that are spread across the different walks of life, is so important so that it is possible for us as the EU and the member states to work towards a more inclusive society.
On the numbers I mentioned in relation to the GDP, this is a study that the commission commissioned to the OECD, and we are happy to share the particular details of that study with the secretariat of this committee. I'm not able today to give you the intrinsic cases of the methodology that are provided in that study, but we are happy to give the details to the secretary so that this is shared with you. Thank you.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you, Missus Perdida. We have a few minutes for the second round, starting with Mr. Lopez Aguilar. Senior Lopez Aguilar. Senior Mister Lopez Aguilar.
Speaker 45
You. As usual in this format, and considering that this is the second round, I'll refrain from speeches and make two straight questions. First, as to the call by this European Parliament to the Commission to bring about a legislative initiative on online hate speech leading to hate crime, considering that the problem has become massive to European ideas of democracy and democracy in 27 member states, as well as democratic principles in European architecture altogether. The second question goes to the assessment of the EU anti-racism coordinator, considering that racism, race-based crime, racist violence, and discrimination are all on the rise everywhere. What's going wrong with the idea of the EU anti-racism strategy and the anti-racism coordinator?
Thank you.
Speaker 29
Thank you. On your first question, it is important for us to be reminded that we have a racial equality directive and a framework decision on combating racism and xenophobia, which both address racial discrimination and hate crimes. So, for us, the focus is really on effective implementation. We believe those instruments remain valid, but we do agree, and this is one of the points we underline in the strategy, that the implementation and enforcement of this legal base need to be strengthened. On your point related to the coordinator, I will also answer one of the very first questions I received and did not manage to answer.
I'm not certain what you mean by "what is wrong." What is clear is that the commission has strengthened the role of the anti-racism coordinator. It is giving, in this case, her because she is a woman, the role and the mandate to fully work on the implementation of this strategy, to report and work in tandem with Commissioner Labib, and also to work with international partners, whether it's the UN, the OECD, or other bodies, to make sure that our action at the European level is concerted with the action that is happening or foreseen by other international actors. So I'm not certain I fully understand the spirit of the question, but I would say there is nothing wrong. On the contrary, we are reinforcing the role of the coordinator.
Thank you.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you, Miss Pereira. Well, I think that's it on this item of the agenda, but I would like to...
The floor, Mister Tarlim.
I'm sorry, Mr. Tarlim. Yes?
Britaliano.
Speaker 46
I'll speak Italian. Thank you, Chair. Miss Pereira, thank you very much because there are many positive points included in the strategy. So, I think, for example, the explicit recognition of the existence of structural issues of racism in our society in the European Union. These are very powerful forces that can be mobilized because of this, and they may help to relativize the problem we're facing.
Now, I think it's very important to look at the engagement existing in this strategy and the recommendations of standards that should be enforced. On the link between migration and racism, you said you're not competent, but I would like to request that we have answers here because many of the people who are coming to the EU are persecuted in their home countries. You know, they can be Christians because there are people here complaining about us not looking at that, but also because they have a different skin color than those in the countries of origin, and this is a serious issue.
Speaker 29
Chair, I don't think there was a specific question on this intervention, but it seems to me that we have the legal instruments that help us address racism. We need to be more forceful in implementing them. I think that's a very important point. But as you said, aside from the legal aspects, there is, in our view, really an issue around socioeconomic policies that need to be addressed in different areas, as I've mentioned before. And if these policies do not look into discrimination and do not address the problems related to racial discrimination, it is obvious that we will never address structural racism because the instruments we have are about criminalization of a certain behavior, but they do not necessarily go through the underlying causes of racism.
And so it is this double approach that we need to pursue in order to combat racism at European level. Thank you.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you, Mrs. Pereira. We have then concluded this point, this item on our agenda. We thank you for your presentation and for your replies to the questions from the members. And then, we are already done with this important item that we have been discussing. Thank you.
Speaker 48
Thank you very much, Mrs. Pereira. And now, move to item number seven regarding the consideration of the draft report and the amendments on the amended regulation 2021/1232, as regards the extension of its period of application. This regulation, so-called interim regulation, lays down temporary and strictly limited rules derogating from certain obligations laid down in the private and privacy directive, with the aim of providing a temporary solution to tackle the dissemination of child sexual abuse material online, pending the adoption of a long-term legal framework. The proposal to create a permanent and long-term legal framework was submitted by the Commission on 05/11/2022. And while the European Parliament managed to adopt our negotiating mandate already in November 2023, the discussion in the Council remained in the same state for more than three years.
Javier Zarzalejos
And for this reason, and in order to avoid a legislative gap, the interim regulation initially set to expire on 08/03/2024 was extended the first time until 04/03/2026. It was only last November that the council eventually managed to overcome its internal difficulties and adopt a negotiating mandate on the permanent legal framework. The inter-institutional negotiations could therefore start in December 2025. But despite the important progress that has been made so far, it is still uncertain how much time we need to conclude these negotiations. This is why, on 12/19/2025, the commission submitted a new legislative proposal to extend the interim regulation for a second time, for two more years, until 04/03/2028.
In order to avoid this legislative gap I have referred to and to allow combating child sexual abuse online effectively and lawfully without interruptions, work on the procedure has been finalized by March so that the regulation enters into force before 04/03/2026. So, given the little time available, the rapporteur, Miss Sippel, agreed to follow an accelerated standard legislative procedure internally. And for this reason, the deadline to table amendments was already announced and lapsed prior to this meeting. So I will now give the floor to the rapporteur, Miss Birkett Sipel, to present the draft report and her views on the amendments table and the possible compromises in view of the adoption of a negotiating mandate. So, Missus Sippel, the floor is yours for up to 10 minutes.
Birgit Sippel
Thank you, Chair. I'm a little bit surprised because the notes say I have 8 minutes, so I might take a little more than 2 minutes for the presentation.
Birgit Sippel
Okay. Yes. Sorry. Thank you, Chair. And, as you already indicated, the interim derogation was understood as a strictly temporary and exceptional instrument.
And its sole purpose was to create a narrowly defined legal bridge, allowing voluntary measures by providers while giving the co-legislators sufficient time to design, negotiate, and adopt a comprehensive and permanent legal framework to prevent and combat online child sexual abuse in full compliance with fundamental rights. It was never intended to become a long-lasting substitute for a proper legislative solution, and now it's already the fourth year of this. The first extension, therefore, already violated that commitment. Since 2023, as you mentioned, Chair, the European Parliament has been ready to enter into negotiations on a permanent framework to reach an agreement as swiftly as possible. Despite our political readiness, the council has failed to use the available time effectively.
As a result, we now find ourselves in the very problematic situation where restrictions on core fundamental rights under the ePrivacy Directive risk remaining in force far longer than originally envisaged. This prolonged reliance on an exceptional measure undermines legal certainty and erodes trust in the Union's commitment to proportionality and necessity. In light of the two implementation reports published by the European Commission, and taking into account the incomplete and often inaccurate data provided by member states and service providers, it's essential to draw the right conclusions. The commission was unable to distinguish between reports based on voluntary measures and reports purely by NECMAC, NGOs, hotlines, and user reports. The evidence base remains insufficient to justify a broad scope of application.
Any further continuation of the interim derogation must, therefore, be strictly limited to what is demonstrably proportionate and necessary. In particular, activities that risk constituting general monitoring obligations must be excluded. This includes the detection of grooming and the detection of new child sexual abuse material, where the lack of reliable data and clear safeguards raises serious concerns regarding compliance with fundamental rights. The amendments tabled by almost all political groups in the European Parliament reflect a broad and cross-party consensus on these concerns. They highlight the overwhelming support for safeguarding end-to-end encryption and clearly limiting the scope of any prolongation to the detection of previously identified and hashed child sexual abuse material.
The amendments further stress that a meaningful and comprehensive additional implementation report is indispensable to provide real insights into the current situation. Importantly, major providers such as Meta, Google, and Microsoft have self-reported that they do not deploy technologies to detect unknown child sexual abuse material or solicitation. The commission's aggregated figures do not sufficiently reflect this reality and, therefore, present an inaccurate picture of the current state of play. There also appears to be broad agreement that a short and strictly limited extension is necessary to enable smooth and focused negotiations on the permanent legal instrument. The EDPS, in its opinion, highlighted that problem as well and calls for a clear legal basis, specific and effective safeguards, in particular against general and indiscriminate monitoring, and to limit which data categories may be processed.
At the time, the experience with the interim derogation exposed a significant enforcement gap. Providers currently dictate the practical terms under which processing takes place, while the Commission, as the designated enforcer, lacks effective tools to ensure compliance. Reporting obligations and transparency requirements remain largely unenforced, leaving policymakers without the reliable information needed to assess effectiveness, proportionality, and necessity. To address this imbalance, it seemed necessary to equip the commission with appropriate enforcement instruments, including an effective system of fines. Without credible sanctions, obligations remain largely declaratory, and accountability is weakened.
Given the explicit commitment to avoid any further extensions of the interim derogation, and relying on the political will to deliver a permanent framework, I'm prepared to support a strictly limited extension under clear conditions. Such an extension should be confined exclusively to the detection of known hash child sexual abuse material and be limited to a maximum duration of 12 months. Any broader scope would contradict both the temporary nature of the instrument and the conclusions that must be drawn from the available evidence. In parallel, the Commission must make full use of all tools at its disposal and prepare an additional implementation report to support the work on and with the permanent instrument. Thank you very much.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you, Mrs. Sippel. It happens that I'm the rapporteur on the EPP, so I will try to state our position. Well, first, we share the criticism expressed by the rapporteur and other groups on the poor management by the commission of this proposal and the time constraints that have been imposed. And certainly, there is something that gives us a situation where we probably should avoid the consideration of the way the commission has presented its case and its proposal, and focus on the real issue which is at stake here. First, we need to avoid a legislative gap, and that means this is a very time-sensitive file.
Second, following our previous discussion of the interim regulation and the first extension, we now have a process of inter-institutional negotiations going on regarding the permanent framework. Third, there is a mandate of the parliament, and we think that the discussion on the interim regulation should not clash with the content of this mandate. It is important to remain consistent in our own position with regard to our negotiations with the council. That's why we thought that it made little sense to engage in a discussion on substantive issues when what we were facing was to decide on the length of the extension. And not because we ignored or disregarded the importance of these substantive issues, but because we discussed that at length when we discussed the interim regulation under the reportorship of our colleague Birkett Siebel.
So issues such as the provision of any general monitoring of the web, the protection of encryption, the principle of minimum intervention, and the intervention of the EDPS in previous consultation procedures before the rollout of new technologies were extensively and thoroughly, and I think satisfactorily, addressed in our discussion and the decision made by the Parliament at the time when we first discussed this file. So, we do think that we need to keep the three instances of CSOM within the scope of the regulation. Obviously, with the need for human review both in the detection and the categorization of new CISM and grooming, again, for reasons of consistency with our mandate on the permanent framework. So, we should limit the discussion to the length of the extension. I insist, bearing in mind that all these issues are being discussed and will be discussed thoroughly, not in the framework of voluntary legislation, but in the framework of mandatory regulation imposing specific obligations on companies.
That is our position. Now I will move to the PFE Group. Mister Rogerio.
Fabrice Leggeri
Thank you very much, Chairman. I'll be speaking on behalf of Mr. Tanja Koryo, who is our shadow rapporteur. I'd like to begin by thanking Missus Sepele for her report. My group finds some aspects of it quite positive, and I'll explain what our strategy would be on this. First of all, our shadow rapporteur is going to table amendments to reaffirm the temporary and strictly voluntary nature of what is going to be done.
This will be for a limited duration, and there will be no creation of any new legal obligations. We'd also like to point out that we think we should not impose generalized filters or screening. The principles of need and proportionality have to be observed, as does the confidentiality of communications and data protection. We will also point out in our amendments that police powers should remain with the police and should not be transferred or outsourced to private figures or bodies. And our strategy, when it comes to the amendments, is to try to make sure that the encrypted nature of information is conserved.
Speaker 49
Here, we're talking about digital formats, which are covered by this regulation. Thank you. Merci, Monsieur Legerie. Thank you very much, Mr. Legerie. And now, Missus Vizhneska.
Javier Zarzalejos
In the room, no one is taking the floor on her behalf. Then, if that is not the case, I will give the floor to the renew reporter, Miss Irene Ajoveva.
Speaker 50
Thank you very much, Chair, and thank you very much, colleague, for presenting the draft report to us. I can tell you that, generally, I tend to follow your line. We agree on mostly everything, maybe just to emphasize that we could or should focus on really the crucial elements of this proposal. So I would say that the most important thing for us, for Renew, would be to secure, of course, the end-to-end encryption because we have to keep in mind that technology companies have quite a large spectrum in how they conduct mass surveillance on the Internet. And, of course, we would want to balance it from the mental rights perspective, also from the right to privacy perspective, and also, of course, from the aspects of catching the bad guys who are abusing the social channels to reach our kids and share illegal child sexual material online.
Speaker 51
So, our crucial points would be to limit the technology to known material and not expand it too widely. I understand and share the view that it's a very tight framework, and we appreciate the work done. However, just to reiterate that it's not the parliament's fault that it squeezed the timeline, and I think that we may allow ourselves to do our institutional role rightly and propose some really good and balanced amendments to the original regulation until we find a long-term solution. And I also support the strictly limited regulation here, under clear conditions, of course. Thank you.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you, Missus Joviva. Now, for the group of the Greens, the report is by Missus Marquetta Agreborova.
Speaker 52
Thank you, Chair, and thank you, Rapporteur, for your work. Your remarks and amendments are clearly pointing out the elephant in the room, which is: where is the proof? The commission hasn't shown any evidence to back up their claim about why this regulation is necessary and proportionate, which it is not. All they seem to have are isolated incidents of misuse by a very narrow minority of users, which isn't enough to justify blanket measures. And they proposed to extend the regulation by an additional two years, a regulation that was meant to be temporary. I don't think we need to lead philosophical debates about what is temporary.
If it has been 5 years and we now discuss prolongation for 2 more years, that's not the definition of temporary. Then, about the proportionality itself, the proposed regulation remains too intrusive and disproportionate. Voluntary or not, indiscriminate scanning remains mass surveillance. It creates a world where everyone is a potential suspect before being proven innocent, a world where the postman opens your letters before sending them. Our rapporteur has put forward some amendments that address certain aspects of these issues.
They want to ensure encryption stays secure and remove problematic scanning for unknown CSAM and grooming from the regulation's scope. But let's be clear: even with these adjustments, we are still grappling with a fundamental issue. Indiscriminate scanning is illegal under current laws. We cannot accept giving in to a false sense of urgency, which is not our fault, to extend an already illegal regime without tackling the core of the issue. Thank you.
Speaker 40
Thank you very much, gentlemen. I'd like to begin by thanking Mrs. Sipo for her efforts in the negotiations. In terms of the substance, we would share what's just been said or agree with it. When combating this kind of scourge, we are looking at adopting a kind of Big Brother system. And I wonder about that, particularly given that this kind of sexual violence affects many people and is very structural.
We're seeing world elites meeting on islands to carry out sexual violence against children. This is something which is structural, and therefore, measures which are going to undermine the rule of law and put an end to our privacy. Privacy is not something that is going to combat this, but it is going to set a terrible precedent for situations that we will have to tackle in the future. When it comes to the friends of Donald Trump or the owners of large-scale platforms, it's clear that they have the capacity to carry out this kind of screening. This could lead to the end of privacy.
And I think that what we really need is a proper piece of legislation to tackle what is going on in this area online. It should be effective, though. We feel that there should be publicly owned social networks to guarantee algorithm transparency. It should be public bodies that manage this and have access to the data, rather than private operators. I think that, once again, because of the structural nature of this, it's what's important here: when it comes to tackling sexual violence against children, we need to move away from discourses which promote patriarchy and discriminate against women and children.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you, colleagues. And now, I give the floor back to our rapporteur. Thank you for your work on this file. Please provide your final remarks. Just a couple of minutes, visible.
Birgit Sippel
Thank you very much, and thank you also to the team working behind the scenes. I would also like to thank the chair for mentioning the Parliament's mandate on child sexual abuse on the Internet, and the Parliament's report clearly says targeted detection. And if I compare this with the reports that we received from the implementation reports from the commission, this really matches because this report shows that many of the information that led to reports about child sexual abuse were made by individual users, by NGOs, by helplines, and hotlines, so they were not based on what we were thinking: the possibility of doing indiscriminate permanent control of users on the Internet. So, I think the implementation reports from the commission only underline the mandate of the parliament to do some targeted detection. Nevertheless, I do see a gap in legislation, but the gap is not that we do not yet have legal legislation, which is very sad.
Everybody is saying it's such a crucial crime, such a brutal crime, and then the council takes more than 5 years to come to an agreement. That's unbelievable. And I see another gap because normally, if you know that something criminal is happening, we expect every citizen to report this to someone. And we know that material of child sexual abuse is shown on the Internet. So, why do we need explicit legislation?
Shouldn't the providers do their best to handle this? And here I see a real gap: the Commission and member states are not strongly enough enforcing what is on the table. Starting with GDPR and ePrivacy, continuing with DSA, AI Act, and other legislations, we don't have control. We are not sure. We don't take a strong enough position to say that you have your obligation.
You have to follow. And now, we are fighting over this. Having said this, I would once again like to thank the shadows for their work. I hope we can get a good result in the vote to say yes. We have to fight this, but we have to fight child sex abuse everywhere: online and offline.
We have to do it while protecting the fundamental rights of all of us, including children who also have their rights in the online world, and we should put some pressure on the Council when it comes to the mandate. And I would also like to thank the chair for mentioning the mandate of the Parliament, because the mandate of the Council, the way I read it, is simply to prolong the interim for eternity. This isn't something we should vote for; therefore, I hope we will have a positive result in the vote, which will happen next week, on Monday. Thank you.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you, Miss Sippel. Now, before moving to our next item, I would like to remind you that the vote on the negotiating mandate and the decision to enter into inter-institutional negotiations with the Council is scheduled for the LIBE meeting on Monday, 2 March 2026. And depending on the outcome of the vote in Liebe, it will be announced in plenary on March 9. So, once we have concluded this item, we will move to item number eight, which is a conclusion on behalf of the European Union of the agreement between the European Union and the Kingdom of Norway on the transfer of passenger name record (PNR) data to prevent, detect, investigate, and prosecute terrorist offenses and serious crime. And we will deal together with item number nine, which is a conclusion on behalf of the European Union of the agreement between the European Union and Iceland on the transfer of passenger name record (PNR) data to prevent, detect, investigate, and prosecute terrorist offenses and serious crime.
The rapporteur is Mr. Jaroslav Bych, and I give you the floor for five minutes. Mister Vios, Florisios.
Jaroslav Bžoch
Thank you, Chair. Dear colleagues, I'm presenting to you today these reports, which aim to conclude an agreement between the European Union and the Kingdom of Norway, as well as Iceland, on the transfer of passenger name record, so-called PNR data, for the prevention, detection, investigation, and prosecution of terrorist offenses and serious crime. This marks a significant step forward in strengthening international cooperation against terrorism and serious cross-border crime. It is a vital tool in our collective defense against terrorism and organized crime. The PNR agreements with Iceland and also with the Kingdom of Norway will make it possible to transfer passenger information collected by airlines to national authorities for security purposes. This is particularly important because such data can provide valuable insight to help authorities identify suspicious terror patterns and uncover links between criminals and terrorists, including individuals not previously known to law enforcement.
In addition to facilitating the detection of terrorism and other serious crimes such as drug trafficking, human trafficking, and the sexual exploitation of children, it also supports efforts to prevent these offenses. The use of PNR data has proven to be an effective means of enhancing security within the Schengen area, contributing to crime detection and external border control, and enabling member states to adopt a risk-based, data-driven approach internally. At the same time, it is important to emphasize that the agreement strikes a careful balance between security objectives and the protection of individual privacy.
Excuse me, Mister Biot.
Slowly. Yes.
I understand slowly. Yes. Thank you.
Jaroslav Bžoch
I'll do that. It lays down clear rules governing the processing, storage, use, and retention of P and R data. Robust safeguards ensure that the data is used exclusively for clearly defined purposes, kept only for limited periods, and protected against misuse or unauthorized access. Oversight mechanisms and avenues for individual redress further strengthened transparency and accountability. This assessment has been confirmed by the European Data Protection Supervisor, who issued a favorable opinion stating that the agreement contains the necessary safeguards to ensure compatibility with the EU's data protection framework.
I'm convinced that the PNR agreement with Iceland and Norway reflects the shared understanding that contemporary security challenges require connected, cross-border responses. By combining enhanced information sharing with strong data protection guarantees, the agreement contributes to safer international travel while respecting the rule of law and fundamental rights. Strengthening international law enforcement cooperation, particularly through timely and effective information exchange, is essential to address the complex and evolving threats posed by tourism and serious transnational crime, and to enhance the safety and security of our citizens. For these reasons, I'm recommending that the European Parliament grant its consent to allow the Council to conclude these agreements. I'm looking forward to hearing your views and cooperating with you on this issue.
Thank you, Chair.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you, Mr. Rapporter. Now we give the floor to the shadow reporters. The EPP reporter is Missus Tildrescu, but it will be Missus Epon who speaks on her behalf. For issues.
Speaker 7
Thanks a lot, Chair, and thanks a lot to the rapporteur. I'm indeed speaking on behalf of our shadow rapporteur, who unfortunately cannot be here today, and I apologize for that. But she would like to emphasize that she expressed her strong support, not only hers but ours as well, for these important agreements, which reinforce the Schengen security framework and contribute to the protection of our citizens. And it applies to both agreements that they are integral partners of our Schengen area, and the exchange of passenger name records data is a key instrument in addressing cross-border crime and security threats. This agreement strikes a careful balance between security needs and the protection of fundamental rights in line with EU law, and our shadow rapporteur is looking forward to constructive negotiations with a view to approving the PNR agreement with both countries as soon as possible.
Thanks.
Krzysztof Śmiszek
Yes. Thank you, sir. On behalf of the Socialist and Democrats group, we would like to express our support for both agreements between the European Union and Iceland, and between the European Union and the Kingdom of Norway, regarding the transfer of passenger name record data. Both countries are close partners of Schengen as well as part of the EEA, and this implies that they both apply the GDPR. They are not bound by the EU PNR Directive.
Therefore, these dedicated agreements are necessary to provide a proper legal basis and clear safeguards for PNR transfers. What is important for our group, the European Data Protection Supervisor concluded that the agreements contain the necessary safeguards to be compatible with the EU data protection law and the Charter of Fundamental Rights. That is why we support both agreements, and we are looking forward to constructive dialogue. Thank you so much.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you, Mr. Smisek. For the ECR group, the rapporteur is Mr. Vasik. I don't see him. Are you taking the okay? Then we move to the group of renewables.
Are you speaking on behalf of Mr. Vasik? Yes, please, Mr. Gavinsky. Floor issues.
Speaker 57
Ladies and gentlemen, yes, I am the reporter for the agreement with Iceland, but I will also speak on behalf of the other reporter who dealt with Norway. I wanted to say that this PNR directive is an extremely important directive for those who take care of the security of Europe and the security of flights. It is extremely important to fight terrorism. And here, there is a huge merit to this directive. I think it has already been implemented; it has increased the safety of the flights and the safety and security of our passengers.
So, it is important. It is not controversial. It's very useful for those who are responsible for our security. Both these agreements that we are proceeding with now raise no doubts when it comes to their aim. And what might be surprising is the fact that we are not negotiating something relatively simple and non-controversial, but it still takes so much time.
It's been several years. So we want to support them, and we will vote for them. Sometimes we hear voices concerning the fact that collecting PNR data can be used for passenger invigilation, but we treat this as a rather childish problem and a lack of trust towards security services in Europe, not a real voice in this discussion. So now, this is not something controversial. We will vote to ratify that as soon as possible.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you, Mr. Kaminsky. Now, for renewal, I give the floor to Madam Fabian Keller.
Speaker 22
Dear Chair, dear reporter, our lead-based shadow reporter, Anna-Maja Henriksson, is unfortunately not able to attend this meeting, but I will read her short speaking points today. And I must say it's identical for both, so maybe I say it once, and it applies to the two files. Thank you for the presentation of the recommendation for renewal. Protecting our fundamental rights and ensuring a high level of data protection has always been a high priority. Also, in the context of other PNR agreements. At the same time, improving the prevention and detection of serious crime and terrorism at the external borders is crucial.
Therefore, as my colleague from the Socialist group, it is very important for me that the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) has given a positive opinion on this agreement. The answers received from the commission representatives during the shadow meeting were sufficient. In conclusion, says Anna Maja Henriksen, I am pleased that this PNR agreement contains the necessary safeguards for it to be compatible with the EU legal framework on data protection. I look forward to the European Parliament giving its consent to the conclusion of the agreement. Thank you.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you, Madam Keller. Now, for the group of the Greens, I understand that Miss Bigmont... Are you taking both agreements? Okay. The floor is yours.
Speaker 58
Thank you very much indeed. My colleague, Shadow On, Norway, could not make it, so I'm speaking on his behalf. And I'm also shadowing the Iceland agreement. Thank you for the introductory words. We have problems speaking today.
Whoo! But, in spite of the indications of both rapporteurs and also the explanations coming from the European Commission, my group still believes that this agreement is not in line with the European Court of Justice case law on data retention. For instance, a data retention period of five years without a specific motive does not apply proportionally to the proportionality and necessity principles. In addition, we also have serious concerns about profiling risks, the sharing of data with Eurojust and Europol, as well as doubts about the depersonalization of data. I would really like to recall that we are in favor of sharing data among law enforcement authorities, but we also strongly insist that this should be done in full respect of data retention rules and fundamental rights safeguards.
Principles of proportionality, necessity, and legality should be paramount. And contrary to what I hear from the other colleagues, those conditions are obviously not met here once again. And despite our endless calls to comply with the ECG case law, accordingly, my group will vote against both agreements. Thank you.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you, Mrs. Prigmond. The reporter on the left is Oslem Demileld. I don't see her in the room. Is there anyone from the left speaking on her behalf? If that is not the case, then I will give the floor now to the representative of the Commission, the Commission's Director General for Migration and Home Affairs, for some brief remarks.
Yeah.
Speaker 59
No. Good afternoon, and thank you very much to the rapporteur for his positive recommendation. We also, of course, were very happy that this agreement was signed on October 14 because we indeed believe that the agreement enhances security in the common Schengen area. And not only that, it also provides strict data protection safeguards, which were also recognized by the EDPS. And this, of course, also includes very strict data retention requirements in the agreement, which limit how long that P and R data may be stored.
And that is not for all data, just for five years, to be clear, but it has requirements for regular review to ensure retention remains necessary and proportionate. So, maybe also to inform that we just received the council authorization for the signature of a similar agreement with Switzerland, and this agreement, we expect to be soon sent for consent to the parliament there after the signature. So thank you again very much, and the rapporteur for his support. Thank you.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you. Thank you very much. And now, Mister Violet, do you have any further remark, any closer remark? If that is the case, I give you the floor back.
Jaroslav Bžoch
To you. Thank you very much. I'll be very brief. I would like to thank all the shareholders for the cooperation, for the commission, for the shareholder meetings, and the involvement in it. Thank you.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you, Mr. Bjorchen. Now, dear colleagues, please note that the deadline for amendments for both files is set for Friday, February 27, at noon. The vote in committee is scheduled to take place during the Libbey meeting in March. And let me remind you that in accordance with rule 107, paragraph one of the rules of procedure, amendments will only be admissible if they aim to reverse the recommendation of the rapporteur. Now, we are doing incredibly well in terms of our schedule.
No. Mister.
Lopez Arilar?
Javier Zarzalejos
You have been mentioned here. I was just saying that we are not doing it.
Javier Zarzalejos
In terms of our number. I was saying that we are doing incredibly well in terms of schedule. So we take a break until 5:45 to start with our next point. Okay? Thank you.
Well, dear friends, I hope you have had a nice break before we start item number 10. This is our last point on today's meeting agenda before the vote, and we will start an exchange of views on countering foreign interference and defending the EU's critical infrastructure. Coordinators decided to look into a decision by the Spanish government to award contracts to Huawei for the storage and management of judicial wiretap data, which prompted discussions at the EU level regarding possible security risks. While national authorities retain competence over internal security decisions, this case raises wider considerations regarding risk management and dependencies in critical and sensitive sectors. I will now give the floor to Mrs. Espinosano, Deputy Director General at the Directorate General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology, for about 7 minutes to present to us the Commission's perspective on this matter.
And after that, I will open a round of Q and A for the representative of each political group. And if time allows, I will open the last round of questions based on "Catch the Eye." So, we welcome Miss Spano. We thank her in advance for the information and her presentation on this very sensitive and important issue. And I invite her to take the floor for 7 minutes.
Speaker 64
Thank you, honorable Chair, honorable members. Thank you very much for inviting the European Commission to this discussion. I see our role here as the European Commission mostly to share with you what we do in our proposals because this is our role, especially when it comes to the security of our communications. What we do in our proposal is safeguard security in the European Union. Because I must admit that in Europe, we have championed for years the legislation on cybersecurity, which is about the security of our information systems and our communications.
Speaker 63
We are trying to strengthen this ecosystem as much as we can, as the geopolitical context currently requires us to do. In the European Union, we have very robust legislation when it comes to critical infrastructure, and the notion of critical infrastructure is quite large in the European Union as defined in the Network and Information Systems Directive, which has recently been updated and is under implementation by our member states. What do we do in Europe? We basically require critical infrastructure to meet the highest possible cybersecurity standards, and operators of critical infrastructure to report cybersecurity incidents, including data breaches or traditional denials of service, or what have you, as cybersecurity incidents to report to the authorities. This is the only legislation in the world at that level.
And we recently updated that directive, the Network and Information Systems Directive, to extend its scope. So, beyond traditional infrastructure, meaning transport, energy, banking, health, and the usual critical infrastructure as defined in previous legislation. We now have included manufacturing, pharmaceuticals, medical devices, but also public administration because we, as public administrations, have to be the first to protect our systems that maintain all the wealth of knowledge and data about our citizens. So, we have this large scope of operators in the European Union, not just our banks, but also our hospitals, our research institutions, and our water systems that have to meet very high standards. The problem that we face in the European Union is that, to meet these high standards, we need to have the equipment.
We need hardware and software on which our information systems are based. In a recent proposal for the second Cybersecurity Act in the European Union, we have finally proposed something that was very necessary in the current geopolitical context: how to maintain the security of our ICT supply chain. This proposal is currently in front of you, honorable members, the council, and the European Parliament. The rapporteur has recently been appointed. And it basically embodies something that came as a very clear message from the Draghi report: the fact that dependencies in our ICT supply chain systems can become a strategic risk in the European Union.
Because when you have dependencies, especially on what has been identified as high-risk suppliers, it is very difficult to protect your systems in times of geopolitical, not just crisis, but geopolitical challenges. So our system, as proposed in the Cybersecurity Act, would first require identifying sectors via risk assessments where we have such critical dependencies, and then identifying whether there are countries that pose cybersecurity concerns. Once such countries have been identified and listed, we would list all entities that stem from these countries. These would be the defined high-risk suppliers from which, when we have critical assets where such dependencies via risk assessments have been identified, we would need to de-risk our supply chain. This is an answer that we have proposed to the problem of having critical dependencies in some systems. And to make it even more concrete, in the same proposal for this cybersecurity act, we have proposed derisking from high-risk suppliers as identified in the 5G toolbox that was proposed by the European Commission in 2020 and that has now been put in place in many member states.
Some have already carried out the necessary infrastructure work to de-risk these high-risk suppliers. These high-risk suppliers in the toolbox were identified as Huawei and ZTE. So, we have many member states that have done the necessary to remove these high-risk suppliers from their critical infrastructure or from 5G networks. But we also have member states that have not proceeded yet. So, in the proposal for the Cybersecurity Act, we have proposed that this should now become mandatory with a transition period of 36 months, or three years.
This is a signal that we are offering a tool for the European Union to go step by step into a derisking approach from these dependencies, where we identify that there are possibly high-risk suppliers. And this is a proposal that is, of course, under negotiation by the co-legislator. And, until it is in place, we will see to it that the 5G toolbox we have in place is being implemented and how we can assist member states in this work. So, the overall tendency right now in the European Union is to have a much more critical approach to our ICT supply chain, to look at whether we have high-risk suppliers and whether we have dependencies. This was also the course of action recommended by the European Commission in a recent communication on economic security in the EU, where, again, this need for derisking from high-risk suppliers was identified as an important way forward.
So this is, dear chair, the way we are providing the tools to member states to deal with these ICT supply chain issues, and I hope that this has been useful for your debate.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you, Mrs. Pano. I'm sure that in the course of our Q&A session, you will be able to further comment on this issue of interest for the members. Now, we start the round of political groups with the EPP. I understand that Mr. Juan Ignacio Soido will take the floor. Thank you.
Speaker 65
Thank you very much, Ms. Español. As a Spanish MEP, I'd like to thank you for speaking so frankly about this policy for de-risking these matters in the EU. Especially with the case in Spain and with the Spanish government, particularly concerning our security and cybersecurity. The contracts of the Spanish government with Huawei seem to be going against what Spain and Brussels have been saying, and it seems to put Spain at risk, but not only Spain, the entire European Union.
Speaker 66
The European Union should be reducing its dependency on third countries, and yet Spain is doing the exact opposite. When it comes to wiretaps, it seems strange that Huawei is being prioritized above European companies that could do the same and provide the same services. The companies in China must send information to the government. So what kind of guarantee are we going to have that the wiretap data will be kept confidential? It's very important that this topic is looked into because it could be very serious for cybersecurity.
Speaker 65
So, I have a few questions. In general terms, when it comes to police wiretaps, if this is sent to Huawei, could this not affect the integrity of these police investigations? And then, how is Spain implementing some measures when it comes to 5G networks to ensure security? Miss Banner, you have two minutes.
Speaker 63
Oh, thank you very much. I don't know if I can answer all your questions because some questions, of course, are about the way that a member state decides to contract its security services, and, of course, that is their prerogative. What I can confirm to you is that, yes, we took note of this particular news on the contract, and there have been many questions from honorable members to which the commission has already replied. We are committed to avoiding exposure, in general, in Europe to high-risk suppliers. I mentioned the 5G toolbox, and the approach we have now proposed in the Cybersecurity Act is exactly about bringing a level playing field because, indeed, some member states have implemented the 5G toolbox, and they have therefore de-risked from high-risk suppliers, at least the core parts of the 5G network.
That is not the case with all member states. And we hope that with the Cybersecurity Act, if the colleges later maintain it, and that's what I would kindly ask the honorable members to help us achieve, if we maintain the proposal we have made. All member states would be obliged to remove high-risk suppliers from their ICT supply chains.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you. Now I give the floor to Mister Lopez Aguilar, for S and D. Senior López Aguilar.
Speaker 67
Thank you, Chair and Commission. The controls in the parliament. We have two chambers in the Parliament of Spain. And the Ministry of the Interior has explained that no contract has been granted to Huawei for these wiretaps. This is under article 311-22 or decree, rather.
And this has been explained very clearly in Parliament. It's explained that Huawei will not keep this information. It's about data processing, and it will not be accessible to Huawei or any other company aside from the police. These wiretaps will be completely secure. The security instructions will be clearly outlined by a national entity.
There will be safeguards, and all of these will be in accordance with the laws of Spain. And especially regarding tenders, public tenders with specific laws that enforce and guarantee confidentiality when it comes to wiretaps. So, there is no risk of security here. There's no risk to ICT sovereignty. This has been very clearly explained in the national parliament, so we are once again having to explain it here.
I'm fed up with having to bring it up here. There's no objective justification for bringing it up here. It has been explained. It has been explained here in the committee and in the committee of petitions. It has been explained at length in this European Parliament.
And this is a national affair, and it should be brought up in the national parliament. Thank you very much, Mr. Lopez, Alec, Miss Panu.
Speaker 63
Again, I must admit that we have replied repeatedly to questions in this regard. What we have said in the replies to these questions to a number of honorable members of the parliament is that we are trying, from our side, to provide the tools to member states to be able to avoid dependencies in critical infrastructure on high-risk suppliers, and we hope that now, with the proposal, we'll do it. I understand the explanations of the honorable member. And, again, this is a matter of national contracts on security. What would be important is that such contracts do not potentially, as we have said in our answers to the honorable member's questions, create a dependency on a high-risk supplier in a critical and sensitive sector.
So, this is the line we have been following. This is also in the economic security communication of the European Commission, and this is what we are proposing a number of tools for in the Cybersecurity Act too. That is before the legislature.
Speaker 68
Thank you, Missus Panu. For the Patriots, senior Brooks Ade. Thank you.
Speaker 69
Thank you very much, Joe. These kinds of political juggling acts are always quite interesting when the Spanish government tries to use the European Parliament to tackle or attack governments like the government of Hungary. There have been times when we have raised this issue regarding the contract being awarded to Hawaii. This contract, which deals with managing and storing wiretaps, is a direct risk to national security and an indirect risk to other bodies involved, such as NATO or the European Union. This is because of the way that the information has to be used or transferred.
Speaker 70
There is a genuine risk, and this has been set out by the EU's cybercrime security strategy. This is the result of machinations between the Socialist Party, Sanchez, and those involved. Huawei provided contracts to the daughters of Jose Luis Rodriguez Sabatero in the past and also provided support to Antonio Hernando through the consulting body. It also managed to protect some of those involved in the government as a result of, or in the context of, judicial cases involving Sanchez's wife. Sanchez is a risk for Europe.
Speaker 69
This is something I will never tire of repeating. We cannot endanger the police and intelligence services in Europe because of the whims of some people in Spain trying to make money out of this. I think the important thing here is that we remember that the Spanish people know that the European Commission is going to do nothing here. Mrs. Spano.
Javier Zarzalejos
And now, I give the floor to the ECR representative, Mr. Kominski.
Speaker 57
I will speak Polish. Ladies.
And gentlemen, we find out that the Spanish government has entrusted the Chinese company Huawei to store the data from surveillance collected by intelligence and law enforcement services. It's difficult to see more sensitive data. This is a very irresponsible decision, and it shows that the Spanish government ignores basic rules of security. Didn't they hear about Chinese hackers, about data theft by Chinese intelligence services, about stealing technologies and patents? Are they not bothered by the authoritarian character of the Chinese state? Did they not hear about the activities of Chinese companies that are used by the Chinese regime?
This is as if we were in a situation where a bank robber is put in charge of the bank's security. It is not surprising that the American Congress is appealing to stop the exchange of data with Spain. We have to be clear. Spain, under the government of the Socialists, is not a credible partner when it comes to security. And I would like to ask the commission very concretely, and I would like to see a clear answer.
Do you think that Huawei is a high-risk secure service provider?
Speaker 63
Yes. Thank you, honorable member. I mentioned it earlier, I believe, but maybe it was not clear. So, back in 2020, we adopted a communication consisting of a toolbox that would help member states de-risk, basically, the 5G networks, mobile networks, from high-risk suppliers. And in that communication, which may have been even the first occasion, we identified Huawei and ZD as high-risk suppliers for the purposes of the 5G toolbox.
So, this is already in a commission document, and I hope that answers your question.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you, Missus Pano. Now the speaker from the Renew Group is Rakel Garcia Hermida Vanderbijl. Thank you.
Speaker 71
Thank you very much, gentlemen. Since the debate is taking place in Spain and is almost about Spain, I'll continue in Spanish. I'd like to thank the commission for the answers that they've given, as well as this initiative about trying to avoid these high-risk service suppliers. Here, I think what we're seeing is the case of major data transfers from tech giants in the United States, for example, to the US authorities. And there really isn't much clarity about whether these transfers contain personal data of EU citizens, which is being transferred without taking into account the rules that exist on this when we're talking about national security and privacy.
Here, we're talking about wiretaps, which, of course, have to do with our privacy and our fundamental rights. On behalf of my group, Renew, I would like to call upon us to evaluate the different contracts that we have, or rather, what's actually going on when it comes to the United States and China. And I would call all of the members to be very much aware of the slippage that's going on here. The fact that, when it comes to defending European sovereignty on our technological independence, we should be careful.
Missus Panu, any remarks?
Speaker 63
Just to reiterate, because you spoke of assessments, in our proposal for Cybersecurity Act 2, we have proposed a methodology, a framework for identifying high-risk suppliers and then identifying measures that would protect from dependencies on such high-risk suppliers, including possibly prohibitions but also other restrictive measures. So, this is going to be based on risk assessments for specific markets where we see that there may be such dependencies and where the risks may also be high. For instance, connected and automated vehicles, medical devices, or drones. These are also identified in our proposal for a cybersecurity act. So the idea is that you do risk assessments, then you see in which assets you may have such dependencies.
If these suppliers come from countries identified as possibly posing cybersecurity concerns, then these suppliers can be listed so that relevant measures can be taken.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you, Missus Panu. Now, for the groups of the queens, it will be Mrs. Crevorova.
Speaker 52
Yes. Absolutely. Sorry for not giving a chance to my Spanish colleagues, but, you know, I will talk about the systemic approach rather than the national one. But we need to, of course, acknowledge the specific case because the Spanish government defends this contract by stating that the servers are watertight, isolated from external networks, and certified by the National Cryptologic Center. But while we respect national security assessments, independent security audits routinely demonstrate that firmware layers and remote maintenance protocols can harbor latent vulnerabilities.
And we cannot operate in a union where one member state actively strips high-risk lenders from its networks while another entrusts them with the crown jewels of its law enforcement. Lawful intercept systems like SITL are not peripheral. They are the core of counterterrorism, organized crime, and counter-espionage operations. And when you introduce a high-risk vendor at the storage layer of this architecture, we do not just risk a localized data breach. We risk poisoning the well of European intelligence sharing.
And if our partners in Europol and NATO cannot trust the hardware housing Spanish intelligence, the operational trust that underpins our collective security is severely compromised. So, two specific questions, Miss Despina, if I may. What immediate and specific technical measures is the Commission recommending to ring-fence European intelligence-sharing mechanisms from potential compromises originating within the CTell system? And how does DG Connect plan to address the enforcement gap where member states bypass EU risk assessments by categorizing highly sensitive infrastructure and applying purely national cost-driven procurement rules? Thank you.
Speaker 63
Thank you, honorable member, and I am very happy to see you here. And we look forward to working with you in your role as rapporteur for the Cybersecurity Act, where I think we will need to address some of the questions you asked. The truth of the matter is that, when it comes to national security, the member states have the right to take the measures they find appropriate to protect their national security. Now, on the immediate steps, I should mention that whatever work we have done, including the 5G toolbox, has been based on risk assessments that we carry out with all the member states. In groups of experts, we have the NICE cooperation group, but also other expert groups, and we carry out risk assessments so that the outcomes are collective.
Just a few days ago, we published three such risk assessments: one on the ICT supply chain, another on connected and automated vehicles, and the third on detection equipment, basically scanners as they are known. So these are carried out collectively by the member states, and our idea is that, of course, the member states must champion what they have included in these risk assessments as possible mitigating measures. And this is what we have embodied in the 5G toolbox, where we basically carried out such an assessment together with member states, and we proposed specific mitigating measures. Now, five years later, we have approximately 13 member states that have implemented the toolbox, and we have resorted to a proposal for a mandatory derisking of 5G, mobile, and fixed networks because we need to bring a level playing field, as that is the risk when you do not have measures embodied in the law. The risk is that some may apply, some may not, and then you do not have a level playing field.
And then the vulnerability in the security of one member state becomes the vulnerability of another because our systems are interconnected. So, you're very right that this is something we need to address; hence, our proposal for the ICT supply chain method and framework in the Cybersecurity Act. On the enforcement gap, you are right. And I hope that the European Parliament can help us with our resources because we see certain challenges coming about. We need to equip ourselves with better enforcement powers.
You're absolutely right. Because right now, there is an unequal, even transposition of European legislation in the member states. We see that with the 992, that has proven a challenge for member states. And, of course, unequal enforcement in this respect. So I hope that, again, through the cybersecurity act, we will be equipped with the relevant resources to have better enforcement powers.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you, Miss Panu. I have no speaker from the group on the left. Is anyone taking the floor on behalf of the group of the left? No? Okay.
And I don't have any speakers from the ESN group either. Okay. Well, if that is not the case, I give the floor back to our speaker for your final, closing remarks on this topic.
Speaker 63
Thank you, honorable Chair. I will take the opportunity of this discussion, which is about a very specific issue that also touches upon national competencies. I will take this opportunity to say that we are at a critical juncture in the European Union of taking some determined steps to identify high-risk suppliers and de-risk our supply chain or take mitigating measures. This needs very careful steps because, in some markets, our dependencies are so high that they can reach up to 90%, making derisking not so obvious. So, we will need to take these measures with very careful consideration so that we do not have the opposite effect on the internal market.
So the method we have proposed in the Cybersecurity Act seeks to ensure that, and we hope to have the support of this house, so that this can be adopted and become law as soon as possible because there is an urgency. So, we hope that we will advance with the negotiations as soon as possible because right now, we do not have the tools to do that at the European level. Thank you very much for giving us the opportunity to address exactly this point in the context of this debate.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thanks to you, Mister Hispano, for your presentation and for your answers to the members' questions. Then we conclude this point, which is the last one in today's session, and we will move on to the vote in a few minutes. Thank you. Well, good evening, dear colleagues. Let's start with a boat.
I can see from the number of members present that we have quorum. But before we proceed to the vote, I would like to inform you of the following non-Liberal members who will participate in today's vote. There are quite a few. For the EPP group, Andrei Beulah will replace Magdalena Adamovich. Borja Jimenez Laraf will replace Katarina Kinichi.
Reinhold Loparca will replace Lucas Mandel. Paolo Donacimento Cabral will replace Paulo Cunha. Sergio Humberto will replace Emil Radev. Gabriel Mato will replace Alice Theorescu Mabe. Sabine Berhayen will replace Thomas Tchaikovsky.
Miroslava Nikhil will replace Christoph Brescia. Nikhos Papandreou will replace S and D. Nicolas Papandreou will replace Muriel Laurent. Is that okay?
Javier Zarzalejos
And this is still in the S and D group. Hmm. Okay. Yeah. For the Patriots, Elizabeth Deringer will replace Petra Steger.
No replacement of ECR, renew, or greens that we are aware of. And in the group on the left, Katarina Martins will replace Fernando Varrena. Sebastian Eberding will replace Steya Galan. And as far as the same group is concerned, Mr. Norbuch will replace Eva Sayakovska, and Mr. Frelich will replace Mr. Khan. Any other replacements that we are not aware of?
Mike, please.
Javier Zarzalejos
Okay. Noted. No further replacements. Then, we start the vote. The first file is a draft report on the proposal for the appointment of the European Chief Prosecutor.
Javier Zarzalejos
It is adopted. So, the Parliament appoints the European Chief Prosecutor. A second vote is on the draft recommendation on the draft Council decision on the conclusion of the agreement between the European Union, of the one part, and the Republic of Ecuador, on the other part, on cooperation between the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation, Europol, and the Ecuadorian authorities competent for combating serious crime and terrorism. So, we vote on the file. The vote is open.
It is now closed, and it has been adopted. And then we move to our third vote on the situation of fundamental rights in the European Union in 2024 and 2025. We start the vote with the compromise amendment block. We vote on all compromise amendments except compromise amendment 16, compromise amendment 17, compromise amendment 20a, compromise amendment 42b, compromise amendment 43b, compromise amendment 45b, and compromise amendment 46a. So, it's a roll call vote.
Oh no. No. I'm sorry. This is not a roll-call vote. The vote is open.
Sorry. Yes. It's not a roll call vote, so I have to ask you who is in favor. And then, who is against it? I think we should check.
I think we should check. So the vote is open. We check it. The vote is closed, and it is adopted. So, we move to compromise amendment 17.
Yes. Yeah. And this is a roll-call vote. Yes. So, we vote on compromise amendment 17.
It's a roll-call vote. 17 1 7. Again, it's a roll call vote, and I open the vote. The boat is open. It is closed, and it has been adopted.
Then, we move to compromise amendment 20a. It's again a roll-call vote. The boat is open. The boat is closed, and it is adopted. We then move to compromise amendment 42b.
It's a local vote as well. The boat is open. Closed, and it is adopted. We now vote on compromise amendment 43b, protocol vote. We opened the vote.
We closed the vote, and the compromise amendment has been rejected. Yeah. So we now have to vote on amendment 11158a. The vote is open. The vote is closed, and it is rejected.
We now move on to compromise amendment 45b. 45 by roll call vote. The vote is open. The vote is closed, and it is adopted. Now, we vote on compromise amendment 46a.
It's a roll call vote as well. The vote is open. The boat is closed, and it is adopted. And then we vote on the final vote on the tax as amended. The vote is open.
It is now closed, and it has been adopted. So we end the vote decision by Mrs. Yes, Mrs. Ehlers.
Speaker 74
Yes. Thank you, Chair. We have a minority opinion on this report. We've informed the secretariat. Can I read it out?
It is limited. Yes.
Go ahead, please.
Speaker 75
Thank you. The protection of fundamental rights is a cornerstone of European civilization, rooted in our shared heritage. However, we cannot support this report in its current form, as it represents a continued departure from the reality of the treaties toward a politicized and ideologically driven agenda. Fundamental rights are best protected at the national level, where they are grounded in the specific legal frameworks of each member state. We reject the increasing tendency of the European Union to use fundamental rights as a tool for legal activism to interfere in exclusive national competences such as health care, education, and the organization of the judiciary.
The principle of subsidiarity is not a suggestion. It is a treaty-based obligation, and this report consistently overlooks it. On the other hand, the report fails to even consider the situation of traditional national minorities across the EU. The commission continues to dismiss the rights of national minorities despite the citizens' initiative, Minority Safe Pack. Furthermore, we express our grave concern regarding the weaponization of fundamental rights to curtail freedom of expression.
Under the guise of combating disinformation and hate speech, the union is constructing a centralized censorship apparatus. Thank you.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you. Thank you, Mr. and Mrs. Aders. Well, the session is concluded tomorrow morning. We resume the session at 9, please.
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