Subcommittee on Human Rights Workshop on Assessing the Human Rights and Democracy aspects of the Commission proposal for an EU’s Global Europe Instrument in the next Multiannual Financial Framework
Legend
Transcript markers
- text Sentence being played
- text Search result
- text Intervention cited by the link you opened
Click a sentence to play the video from that moment. Select text to quote it with the speaker, timestamp and link.
More options
DROI European Parliament
Follow its sittings
Speaker 3
We discovered that inside the EU, but also in external relations. We notably find this debate in the neighborhood policy, where countries shall be made resilient against foreign interference. Also, beyond this question of democracy support, the debate on EU foreign policy in general shows a clear shift towards supporting European sovereignty. The EU is increasingly acknowledging the geopolitical and geoeconomic competition. All EU foreign policy is increasingly valued based on its contribution to strengthening European sovereignty.
That does not mean, however, that the discourse on European values and the protection of the international order has completely vanished. However, the question of geopolitics and geoeconomics, as well as the promotion of European interests, takes much more space in the debate. Next slide. Coming to the next question, how the proposal for a new global instrument addresses democracy, the rule of law, and human rights, it defines four different approaches in the proposal. First of all, Article 21 prohibits any measures under the instrument that violate human rights.
Second, the newly proposed performance framework, which shall be adopted within the framework of the new module and annual financial framework, establishes the mainstreaming of gender equality as an obligation for all financial instruments listed in Annex 3 of the proposed regulations, including the new Global Europe instrument. The third, the general objective of the proposed new Global Europe instrument, refers to the EU values and also Article 21 of the Treaty on the European Union, which include democracy, the rule of law, and human rights. According to this, EU external actions shall be guided by the principles, and the EU shall seek to advance democracy, the rule of law, human rights, among other principles. Thus, their promotion is a general objective of the proposed Global Europe instrument. This can also be seen in the specific objectives of the geographic pillars, which all include democracy, the rule of law, and human rights.
Now comparing the previous or the current NDICI instrument to the new proposal. We clearly see that in the legislative act itself, the objectives of promoting human rights, the rule of law, and democracy are less detailed and are mostly moved to the annex. However, it is still quite clear that during the implementation of the new instrument, the EU is obliged to respect and promote democracy, the rule of law, and human rights, and has to mainstream gender equality due to the new framework regulation. However, the European Commission has the power to amend Annex II in the form of a delegated act. It thus has more discretion to change the objectives during the implementation of the regulation.
Next slide. Then, looking into the pillar structure, while the current Indike instruments have earmarked specific amounts for the thematic programs on human rights and democracy as well as civil society organizations, the gimmicks in the new proposal are just of a geographic nature, with these geographic pillars as well as a global pillar. So, in terms of ring-fencing, we currently find the provision that 90% of spending under the instrument shall be on order requirements. 30% of the spending under the new instrument shall be devoted to climate action and to reaching environmental objectives. And finally, there is a defined maximum amount of up to 3% of current financing for cross-border activities in the first two geographic pillars.
So far, we don't have any money earmarked for the funding on human rights under the current proposal of the commission. So, what could the European Parliament do to change this? First of all, it could expand the scope of the current instrument in Article 3 and add a component on democracy, the rule of law, and human rights to the geographic and global pillars. Second, it could establish a quota of the funding to be spent on democracy, the rule of law, and human rights, as a performance regulation intends to do for the environmental measures. And also, in the previous or the current indicate, we find a number of provisions that guarantee a minimum spending for certain objectives.
With regard to the time, if there are questions, maybe we can go into more detail here during the discussion. And the third option would be that the European Court of Auditors has recently recommended including an indicative financial breakdown in Annex 2, which would be a much more detailed approach to assigning certain amounts to specific targets. However, all these measures would reduce the Commission's flexibility in spending the funds, which is one of the main objectives of the new proposal. Next slide, please. Now, looking in the last minute at the role of the European Parliament, which mainly controls the Commission's work under the new proposed instrument, the proposed regulation foresees a number of information rights to enable the work of the Parliament and to establish the exchange of views between the Parliament and the Commission.
In general, this is a classic rule of parliaments in foreign policy. However, what is especially crucial is that the delegation of powers to the European Commission to amend the provisions in the form of delegated acts is more far-reaching than under the previous Indiki instrument, especially with regard to the specific objectives of Annex II. And so, in principle, the European Parliament and the Council have the opportunity to object to the delegated acts or even revoke the delegation powers. However, that's just an instrument of last resort. So changing the procedure of adopting delegated acts is not an option, and that would violate the interinstitutional agreement between the three institutions.
So, recommendations to the European Parliament to strengthen a rule would be, on the first floor, taking seriously its control function vis-à-vis the European Commission and codifying those aspects which are most important to the European Parliament in the legislative act itself. Next slide. Yes. Thank you very much. So far, from my side, and as I said, if you have more questions, I'm happy to go into more details.
Merci.
Speaker 5
7 minutes. Thank you very much, dear Chair, dear members of the European Parliament. I'm here representing the Human Rights and Democracy Network, which is a network of European organizations defending human rights, democracy, the rule of law, and EU policies. And we want to discuss seven points of attention, based on our analysis of the Global Europe instrument. Next slide, please.
Next one. Thank you. So the first point we want to address is that we actually welcome the total, you know, the overall budget and the envelope that is being discussed. We find that this is a positive and strong message of support for international cooperation in times when ODA is shrinking. So, we welcome that.
On a second point, while increasing funding commitments, it is very clear, as already mentioned by the previous speaker, that there is a shift in the paradigm, and indeed, European interests are being placed on equal footing with what is intended to be the main objective of ODA, which is poverty alleviation and sustainable development, and we believe this needs to be addressed. A little bit also, this probably leads to the third point, which is the watered-down language on human rights and democracy. We believe that indeed this new regulation, unlike in the ACI, mentions human rights much less and concepts like gender equality. Either they are mentioned less, or they have been moved to the annex, which, in our view, represents less political weight. And then, of course, the main concern that we have is related to the elimination of the thematic program for human rights and democracy.
We find this very regrettable because, throughout many years, even decades, the European Union had to uphold its human rights and democracy commitments with very clear budget allocations and also through different multi-annual multi-financial frameworks, and we believe that should be maintained. When we were analyzing the proposal, we understood that the human rights and democracy thematic programs had been removed. We would have hoped to see some sort of ring-fencing mechanism or some sort of protection for this budgeting, maybe in the form of thematic targets. But in fact, this regulation moves in the opposite direction, and it mostly eliminates all thematic targets that were already contained in the ICI. So, in that sense, for HRDN, it's very clear that without ring-fenced allocations for human rights and democracy, these risks to these political commitments risk becoming very discretionary and very shifting based on different priorities, geographical levels, or strategic or political factors.
We also want to say a word on the fact that the human rights and democracy programs were indeed, and have proven to be, a lifeline for many organizations working on human rights and democracy, sometimes in very restrictive environments. And we believe that eliminating the thematic program is going to hurt the possibility of accessing funding at a time when we all know that we're facing a backsliding on human rights and democratic values. Then, maybe to say also on the topic of flexibility, we find that the proposed legislation has two guiding principles: simplification and flexibility. And we believe that somehow they are being used to justify the elimination of the thematic programs. We believe that having an indicative budget allocation does not necessarily conflict with flexibility.
And indeed, as mentioned by the previous speaker in a recent opinion of the Court of Editors, they made the exact same argument and even suggested to the European Parliament to consider reinstating some of the thematic targets. And in that sense, we as HRDN are also requesting that thematic targets be included for human rights and democracy. In terms of engagement with civil society organizations, alongside the human rights and democracy program, the civil society organizations program has been eliminated as well, which was one of the standalone programs that actually acknowledged the key role that civil society plays in promoting and supporting sustainable development. This new legislation, on the other hand, acknowledges the role that we play in consultation and dialogue, and we perceive ourselves as one of the main allies that the European Union has to promote an international order based on values and law. This happens at the same time that the regulation proposes new mechanisms to provide direct awards to private entities, and both things combined make us wonder what kind of relationships the European Union is going to prioritize during the following seven years.
And finally, of course, to mention that the midterm evaluation was eliminated, and we believe that this indeed weakens accountability, transparency, and participation. And again, that should be addressed. So, in terms of our recommendations, we have a couple of statements that I think have been circulated, but otherwise, we can circulate them. And basically, we are suggesting for your consideration the first one: to maintain the indicative budget allocation that has been proposed to preserve the human rights, democracy, and civil society organizations thematic programs with ring-fenced allocations; also to insert thematic targets for human rights, democracy, and rule of law; and to strengthen democratic scrutiny, transparency, and accountability. This is in relation to the elimination of the evaluation as well.
And, yeah, in the current state of the Global Europe instrument proposed regulation. We believe that it is more important than ever that we work closer with the Commission and with the AES, having the strongest action plan that we can on human rights and democracy. Thank you.
Speaker 6
Thank you very much for this opportunity. I think, as the chair mentioned at the beginning of this workshop, in this volatile global context, it is important indeed for the European Union to be able to continue to take decisive action to promote human rights, our values, and principles, but also to support sustainable development, rules, international order, and, of course, also to support our strategic interests. So, the partners suffer from the volatility too. They just want to recall that we have a 4,000,000,000,000 funding gap to reach the Sustainable Development Goals, and the European Union wants to maintain and provide predictability. At the same time, we also learn from the lessons of the past.
We are working on a seven-year cycle, so we also need the necessary flexibility to be able to cope with and respond to unpredictable shocks and crises. So indeed, the commission put forward a very ambitious proposal for the external dimension, the Global Europe instrument with a 200,000,000,000 budget, which is a nominal increase of 74% compared to the current budget. And it is done purposely because we need to strengthen the union's geopolitical standing in the world. We will also support, as you have seen in the proposal, Ukraine with an additional 100,000,000,000. At least, that's our proposal.
And coming to human rights and democracy, these issues remain very central to the Global Europe proposal. The global Europe will be implemented in line with what we call the embedded principle of geographicalization, which means that the bulk of our support should indeed be channeled through the geographic pillars, and this is already something that we have started with the NDICI. So, to give you two figures, for example, in 2023, 25.1% of new actions under programs, geographic programs supported human rights, democracy, and good governance, totaling 2,460,000,000 in one year. This amount is much higher than the overall seven-year allocation of the thematic program, Human Rights and Democracy, which was 1,500,000,000. Just to say, I think it's important that we also see the overall picture here.
And in addition, around half of the thematic program on human rights and democracies is already implemented by the delegation at the local level through country allocations. So, the move of the commission to geographize was to bring coherence, consistency, and action closer to the ground because, in the end, delegations are at the forefront of implementation. In addition to the geographic pillars, if you look at the next two of each and every geographic pillar, human rights, democracy, rule of law, and gender feature as specific thematic priorities. In addition to this, we put forward a global pillar to focus on sustaining precisely the multilateral, global action on human rights and democracy, and support global international civil society networks and platforms. So, when you mentioned the lifeline to human rights defenders, this would typically be an action at the global level that we could still support through the global pillar or our contribution to a CHR or the ACC, and what have you.
So, importantly, we paid attention to keeping the specificities that we have now and transposing them to global Europe. For instance, for human rights, democracy, and civil society actions, the provision allows us to act independently from the consent of the government. So the flexibility features that we had until now are also there. One article that was not mentioned by our expert is Article 9.4 of the proposal. For me, this is really important. It states that we must take a human rights-based approach in all the actions within the scope of Global Europe.
As you know, it is very broad. It goes from a large neighborhood to the rest. And this really means that we need to apply all human rights for all: nondiscrimination, the participation principle, etc., integrating them into the internal process of review as we have been doing until now. So that's also just, I think, a provision that is important to keep in mind. And, yeah, so to summarize, we don't see this proposal as a bad signal on human rights.
We see it more as a natural evolution of geographicalization, and it builds on the existing framework. Maybe one line on the targets. Just to say, indeed, the overall commission approach has flexibility and simplification. The performance regulation sets a target on the environment and climate, but also on gender mainstreaming across the board. There is a recital in the Global Euro proposal that refers to the principle and targets of the EU Gender Action Plan.
So that is also important because we set, as you know, 85% as a gender target in the gender action plan. The only exception that we managed to get for the global Europe in terms of specific targets is ODA: to have at least 90% as a minimum of the global Europe actions delivering on ODA. This is also to respond to your concern that we would depart from the objective of sustainable development, which is not what we want to do. Thanks.
Thank you.
Speaker 7
Thank you very much indeed. So, my comments are aimed at complementing what Chiara Adamo has just said. So, obviously, the EAS contributed to the MFF package proposal that the Commission published in July, notably with regard to the Global Europe instrument, which is what you're most interested in today. And I think, therefore, probably what we can bring to today's discussion is more related to the policy context for all the debate, which accompanies the budget proposal and is important to bear in mind. That is to carry on making sure that human rights and democracy are central to the EU's foreign policy, so that our work on partnerships, stability, and security is based on accountability, justice, and the rule of law, and not just on short-term interests. And I believe that the interest-values dichotomy was referred to, but really our values are our interests in this context, especially one where, you know, autocrats, broadly speaking around the world, are exploiting short-termism.
So one of the key things is that we put center stage, as Gerais said, the EU's credibility in terms of being a stable and reliable long-term partner. And I think also increasingly in the geopolitical debate, which was referred to by the first presenter, that we very clearly make the case that human rights are absolutely foundational for peace, security, and also prevention, which is an important part of debates such as children and armed conflicts or the prevention of conflict. So, human rights are integral to our long-term security vision. And the way that we work with that under the current MFF cycle is with the action plan on human rights and democracy that Kara referred to. That isn't just a list of headings and principles.
It has actions associated with it. And so the whole point of it is that it's supposed to turn the treaty obligations and the many policy documents that we have into actions that we can then follow up with our partners, including the parliament and civil society. And so, we anticipate also running concurrently with the next MFF a further action plan on human rights and democracy that we'll be looking at: defending dignity in the face of rising repression, whether it's by supporting human rights defenders or combating digital authoritarianism, and work to counter the closure of civic space. I'm thinking of places like Belarus and Nicaragua. There would be many more examples where independent voices are often the first casualty of conflict and repression. We need to push back against the playbook of election interference, corruption, or weaponized migration.
And so, we look forward to an action plan, not unlike the current one, that would mobilize all of the instruments and tools, if you like, that the EU has at its disposal, whether they are political, financial, or diplomatic. So, looking at raising human rights through all of our high-level engagement, whether it's summits, political dialogues, or human rights dialogues, of which we have 40 or more a year, using targeted sanctions, as I mentioned in my last presentation, either under the territorial regimes or under the specific global human rights sanctions regime, and there are examples currently already in that area. And in the case of Russia, Myanmar, Nicaragua, and lately also Iran, looking at setting the topics that would then feed into the funding priorities that Kara mentioned. So I'm thinking of the kind of resources that go to local actors, independent media, grassroots women's networks who are often the first to draw attention to backsliding on democracy, but also I think the important normative work that goes on multilaterally at the UN, at the Council of Europe, and the OSCE, and elsewhere, where we would be looking at carrying on the work that we do in the General Assembly, the Human Rights Council, on making sure that we uphold the existing norms and develop them to counter new risks.
And I'm also thinking of some of the themes that we currently fund under the work done under the current action plan and the current MFF: the global consortium that we have on accountability and fighting impunity, working towards the abolition of the death penalty, and the fight against torture. So, we anticipate rolling out consultations on the next action plan during the course of this year. That would then be conceived as running concurrently with the next MFF. And the important thing to remember is that, as in the current MFF, where we do have a thematic program, the program is aligned with the policy like that. So, with the action plan on human rights and democracy, we would expect that approach to continue under the new, more flexible and simplified structure of the MFF.
Mounir Satouri
Thank you very much. Moving on now to questions and answers. Isabelle is the first member on behalf of the EPP. I'd like to start by thanking you all for your presentations. Thank you for the numerous details, which I think should feed into our work.
Isabel Wiseler-Lima
So, the next MFF, which should be up and running in 2028, has some questions about it given the state of the world. So, we find ourselves in a situation referring not so much to the European Union, but elsewhere in the world, the United States in particular, which used to provide enormous quantities of aid but stopped doing that. So the money has dried up for human rights and democracy. This means that many programs and measures will no longer be possible in the future. And I think it's unfortunately unthinkable that the European Union will be able to make up that shortfall.
So, my question is: we've heard lots of details this afternoon, and they are very useful. But I would like to ask you, if you were to put your finger on one critical issue, one essential action program that really would be missed if it couldn't be done, which would it be? And perhaps you could share with us any ideas you might have about what we could do to defend democracy, for example, by supporting independent journalism. So that's just one thing I wanted to refer to, but I'd like to hear what you think. What are the most critical issues for you?
Mounir Satouri
If we don't have enough money to cover everything, what should we focus on? And once again, let's wait to see where the world takes us in two years' time. Madam Gomez Lopez. Thank you, Miss Gomez Lopez, for the socialists. Thank you very much.
Sandra Gómez López
Thank you for your very interesting presentations on this. So far as my group is concerned, I must say that we are worried, and we share the concerns expressed by the first two speakers about the impact of this on the human rights instrument. The fact is, we have to make it clear to the commission that the concerns you voiced are shared here in the European Parliament by most groups. This week, we'll be voting on amendments to the MFF put forward by the Affect Committee, and they will be calling on the commission to reinstate funding for specific human rights lines. It's important that we speak with a single voice regarding the issues put forward by the commission.
The vast majority of groups are in favor of restating and reinstating funding for that pillar and for the specific lines, not only for human rights but also for humanitarian aid, where funding is also being diluted. There have been calls for greater flexibility, and this is an opinion which has been voiced in many committees in many areas of the European Union's work. However, the fact is that this has also been extended to human rights protection. So there are courses on flexibility, but what are they for? We have certain flexibility when it comes to funds for competitiveness or industry.
How can you have flexibility when it comes to human rights? So the fact is that certain programs and resources for human rights protection might, in effect, disappear, and there is a lack of transparency. The various political groups have agreed that there is an objective lack of transparency with the new regulation. So we demand, first of all, that the Commission respects the fact that the Parliament is also an arm of the budget authority and that the Commission keeps us better informed about what it intends to do with the new instrument. There's also a philosophical question, which the first speaker raised, that I think is also important.
Protection of human rights is not something that can be secondary in relation to our strategic or economic interests. That's something else that we have to talk about. We need a public debate where we make it clear that the European Union can't step back in certain regions of the world. The European Union should be a beacon when it comes to human rights. And the fact is, the rapporteur seems to be calling for more pragmatism when it comes to the choices we make.
So, for the first two speakers in particular, I'd like to ask you about that. What we are suggesting is that we try to reinstate certain budgetary lines, specific lines for human rights and humanitarian protection. I would like to ask you what you think about that. So, what do you think about reinstating those lines as they were in the previous MMFF, or should we have a geographical approach? And I'd also like to hear what the commission representative has to say about this.
And I think that most groups in the parliament agree with what I have just suggested. That's it. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman. So I'd like to share a few ideas with our guests and, of course, with the other members.
Bernard Guetta
There's one question in particular that I've been wondering about and on which I haven't really formed a conclusive opinion. I've been a member of the European Parliament for 6 years now. And over that time, it has become increasingly clear to me to what extent our action to defend human rights has become almost worthless. We refer to human rights in our agreements with third countries. We set very precise requirements in terms of human rights.
That's important. It's a good thing. But in reality, we practically never respect those obligations. This is something that many of our colleagues have frequently pointed out regarding Israel. They're quite right in what they say, but Israel is just one example among many others.
I could say 50 or 120 other examples. I don't know exactly how many, but there are many of them. There was one issue I was particularly involved in personally. I remember when we disregarded the absolute disregard shown by Vietnam regarding human rights obligations in our agreement with that country. Two or three days before the ratification of that agreement, and to my enormous outrage, we did ratify it.
Vietnam basically made a gesture of defiance to the European Union by throwing some of its most renowned human rights defenders into prison. In my view, we can no longer simply bandy around these statements. It's simply not working. What's the alternative? I've been thinking a lot about this.
One idea I've had is that we could work with the other major democracies around the world who are resisting recent trends in the United States, Russia, and, of course, China, without referring to other countries.
Bernard Guetta
Do you think that we should try to establish a joint strategy with those countries when it comes to the defense of human rights? Would that be more efficient? Would such an approach be realistic? As I said, I've been thinking about that myself, and I'd like to take this opportunity to ask you what you think about it. Thank you.
With.
Catarina Vieira
All the shortcomings of our human rights policy, where we've continued to put our money where our mouth is, have been in this kind of financing systems and structures that we see here, and that's why I'm so concerned about the new plans that are being unveiled for Global Europe. Because even if sometimes we fail on all fronts like trade, I feel like the impact of the EU continues to be extremely strong on human rights when it comes to our financial instruments, and now I see great reason for concern. So I'd like to start by, first of all, thanking our panelists, but then to show my concern with the direction that the commission seems to be taking with this project: removing the thematic spending targets, allowing 90% of the ODA benchmark to be modified by delegated act, which would completely weaken our role as parliament and the binding nature of the commitments. I understand the need for flexibility, but key issues like democracy, rule of law, media freedom, and civil society must be structurally safeguarded, and that requires clear spending benchmarks and multi-annual funding, which is currently, in my view, missing.
So, to our panelists, I have a set of questions. First of all, on these programs and safeguards, how can we guarantee that human rights, the rule of law, and democracy promotion will be systemically embedded in the funding decisions across regions and sectors if we don't have the thematic focus that we used to have? How can we make sure that these things are supported and not weakened by the increased flexibility? And in the absence of such thematic programs, how can we ensure that civil society organizations will continue to have access to predictable and protected funding? And in that, a sub-question I would like to ask is particularly about our protection mechanism for human rights defenders.
The EU protects defenders; it seems like the budget line where it used to be has been erased. So, will this continue? Secondly, on humanitarian aid, again, I am concerned that the lack of legal and budgetary safeguards could deprioritize life-saving assistance in favor of political or geopolitical objectives. Therefore, my group and I call for the establishment of a ring-fenced budget line with a minimum allocation of 25,000,000,000 for humanitarian aid, which is already committed in the proposal, but this should be accompanied by a dedicated flexibility envelope similar to what is foreseen in other pillars to ensure predictability, rapid crisis response, and the preservation of needs-based humanitarian action. Maybe the panelists could comment on this proposal.
And last but not least, I would like to speak about conditionality and readmission. Article 12 introduces strict conditionality on readmission and return cooperation. This is a big shift from how we used to do things. And I think it's very important for us to remember, when we talk about sending migrants back and putting things on hold, whether that is accepted or not, that it is punishing an entire population rather than the government in charge of these decisions. And this can be absolutely brutal.
We have very little means to control this. So, how can we justify using it in development and external action? What will be decided to count as a serious shortcoming? How will we ensure fairness and transparency? And how can we prevent this mechanism from contributing to a coercive approach that prioritizes migration control over human rights, development objectives, and trust between partners?
I have to excuse myself because I need to be in another meeting, but my team will be taking notes, and I appreciate your time. Thanks.
Thank you.
Mounir Satouri
You, Miss Fira. Before handing back to our panelists in the same order as before, I would like to ask a question myself. Isabelle just sketched out the background of what we're talking about, and Miss Vieira voiced similar concerns. We are seeing a clear erosion of democracy, a narrowing of civic spaces, and an intensification of strategic instability. So, what appears to be emerging from the new global instrument, the Global Europe Instrument, is the dilution of human rights measures.
Specific pro programs have disappeared. There are no specific figures now regarding spending on democracy and human rights. What mechanisms have been provided to ensure that programs focusing on human rights and democracy are actually implemented in reality in every geographical zone? And what measures have been provided to ensure that their impact can be measured? That's very important.
So if you could clarify that and reassure us, we'd be delighted. So I'd like to hand back once again in the same order, starting with Mr. Plotka for 5 minutes.
Speaker 3
Thank you very much for the questions. I have to admit some of them, I think, go a little bit beyond the scope of the studies. So I hope it's okay to answer a little bit more in my general capacity with regard to the research I'm doing, and not so specifically from what will be covered in the study, as I would just have to skip a few of those questions. Maybe to start with one easy point, there was a question regarding a coordinated approach with like-minded countries. And I think that is true in general.
That's going beyond the question of what can be done with the EU financial instrument. But here, I think the coordination of support for human rights, democracy, and the rule of law in general is always useful, and I would like to underline that it's not just a question of like-minded countries in the sense of sub-countries, but also the question of coordinating the support among the member states, as EU or European support for human rights, democracy, and the rule of law not only comes from the EU level itself, but also from the member states. And in the debate, it has been criticized over the years that even the member states are not supporting these objectives in a coherent way, as also the European Union does. So I would add to your proposal a coordinated approach with third countries, also including a coordinated approach with the member states, even acknowledging that in the past, progress has been made here, but still more coordination with member states and also with international donors is probably useful. Then what has been mentioned is the €25,000,000,000, which is mentioned in the proposal but not in the legal act for humanitarian aid.
And indeed, it's written in the proposal that the commission proposes to earmark €25,000,000,000 for humanitarian aid, but said that this should be adopted in the upcoming annual budgets. So, since there seems to be a wide range of content, this money should probably be earmarked for humanitarian aid. That could probably be something which could also be included in the regulation. Then there was a big question of reinstating separate budget lines for humanitarian aid, for the support of human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. And here, I want to emphasize an aspect that had already been mentioned on the panel before.
If we look at the current Indiki instrument and the semantic program for human rights, which is currently €1,136,200,000 for the whole seven years, this semantic program is just 1.71% of the whole instrument. So currently, the funding for human rights and democracy in the semantic program is rather limited and has a specific focus. But it has been mentioned that this is not the old funding under the current Indiki program, nor the current geographic programs, which have a much bigger financial volume. Looking here, currently, the geographic programs have more than €60,000,000,000, while all thematic programs together have just more than €6,000,000,000, seeing that the specific budget line for human rights and democracy is rather small within the current regulation. So, maybe looking at the different proposals on how to secure funding for human rights, democracy, and the rule of law, a spending target across the geographic pillars would be a more compromised solution between the different positions. On the one hand, the spending targets across the geographic pillars give the European Commission the flexibility to spend the funding over the next years.
However, it is ensured that a certain amount of funding has to go to human rights, the rule of law, and democracy. And as I said, these spending targets, expressed as a percentage of the overall spending under the instrument, are nothing new. We find a number of these spending targets. Some have already been mentioned in the discussion, also in the current indicator instrument. As I and others presented here on the panel, we also have a few spending targets in the current Commission proposal.
So, probably, this kind of percentage or relative spending target might be a compromise between flexibility and guaranteeing minimum funding for human rights, democracy, and the rule of law. Then there was, I've noted down, a more general question on how we can defend democracy. I think that's a big question. If I had an answer, I would be happy to provide it. But the question was also on what to focus on.
And maybe just this idea of focusing is also an important point. The European Union wants to have relations with all countries in the world. That is also in the strategic interest of the European Union. However, specifically focusing on certain countries and trying to maximize the impact could also be a solution, focusing the spending on specific flagship projects. But, as I said, that's beyond the scope of the study.
Five minutes as well for you, Adam.
Speaker 5
Thank you so much. Yes. Maybe I'll pick from the ones I managed to pick up and that I think were more addressed to us. Just to say, on the idea of picking one topic, human rights is also a very difficult question. And if I had that answer, yes.
But just to say that, in general, human rights are indivisible. At this stage, I think the most important element for us is to guarantee that the budgetary allocation is there. And then, as I mentioned in my intervention, I think that we are definitely going to keep working together on having the strongest action plan on the specific topics. I wanted to also highlight that the defense we are doing with the human rights and democracy thematic program is also an acknowledgement, I think, of the good work that has been done so far by the commission and the ES. And for instance, these numbers that were mentioned about 25% on the geographic programs, yeah, it's amazing.
We are great, we are very happy with this, and it's exactly what we don't want to lose. And this is the defense that we're doing on the actual structure that is at the current moment. Then, on the question, La Senora Gomez, what we have proposed is that there is a reinsertion or a rescue of the thematic program. We had not had the conversation about whether it should be at the global or the geographic level. But I guess it will make sense globally because it was a little bit more their place before if we try to compare both instruments, but they're very different.
And what we said is that it will be good to also rescue a thematic target like the one that was previously implemented within the ICI, which was not part of the regulation. But what we are suggesting is to include both approaches. Then, yes, indeed, the regulation in several points mentions, for instance, the human rights approach and, I guess, the gender mainstreaming. But with these kinds of topics, it is always important that alongside mainstreaming and the general human rights approach, there are, of course, specific actions and specific programs. So those two elements need to be together.
Missus Adamo, next please.
Speaker 6
So maybe starting with the reassurance that we don't see human rights as secondary to economic interests. And as I mentioned, we consider that they need to remain front and center of what we do, be it geographical or global pillars. And we think this is reflected in the way the annexes to each of these pillars are worded. It's not that human rights and democracy are in the annex and the other policies are in the provision. All the domestic priorities are in the annexes.
In terms of geographicalization or not, when you mentioned 25%, we don't want to lose it. I mean, the 25% figure I mentioned is a geographic figure that we have right now in a year outside the thematic program. Regarding the one thing we cannot lose, my humble opinion is that in the current context, what we must not lose is the support for the multilateral rules-based order, the human rights architecture, our support to the International Criminal Court, and the functioning of the Human Rights Council through the offices of the AI Commission on Human Rights. I think that the institutional architecture is really under threat right now. And indeed, I also agree with the MEP that we cannot do it alone.
I mean, this preservation, at least, of the basic foundations of the multilateral rules-based order and human rights architecture requires strong alliances. And I'm sure Alice will talk to this because we do see partners from different regions of the world actually approaching the EU more than it was in the past, precisely because we are in a crisis in that sense. I was asked what we really do. Will we lose the human rights protection mechanism for human rights defenders? No.
I mean, this is typically an action of a global nature, so we would find that we would take the funds from the global pillar under the human rights priority of the global pillar. But if you ask me, okay, how will you finance support for the rights of LGBTI? I don't know. In the future, it will be more about having calls for proposals at the country or regional levels where the action must be taken. So that is what would really change. And the global pillar in the proposal is €12,700,000,000.
Of course, human rights compete with other very important priorities, such as global health, etc. But as our expert mentioned, I mean, human rights already now, in relative and absolute terms, it is not a lot of money. I mean, so I am, it's not like humanitarian aid or global aid. I mean, we are talking of figures that we should, then we must be able to continue to provide. And we have a policy framework, which is the action parameter for rights and democracy.
Migration, I need to read out ours so that I don't miss it. So it will allow the migration provision. It will allow the commission to adjust the volumes of funds to be allocated to partner countries based on a comprehensive assessment. So, the commission could decide to suspend its cooperation with the partner country if it assesses that there are serious shortcomings in the concerned partner country to readmit its own nationals from member states. And how do you assess the serious shortcomings? We would use the current regulation, essentially the visa code and the visa regulation, and the assessment would consider the union of our relations with the country.
Any proportionality and suspension decision would be taken only following consultation and dialogue with the country in question. And if the reason justifying the suspension ceased to exist, the suspension would be lifted. Any suspension would not affect humanitarian aid. So, I mean, it's beyond my... but here you go.
Speaker 7
Thank you very much, and thank you for the very good questions. I think the central issue that was touched upon in all of those questions is a situation which is, globally speaking, very challenging for human rights and democracy. There's therefore more demand to do more, but you're also in a squeeze in terms of resources, as ever, because the demand is greater. How do you handle that? Well, from the perspective of the work that we do in the years, I think one of the absolutely key things is that our conceptual framework for human rights policy needs to remain broad in scope so that we are addressing not only civil and political rights, which are very important, but also economic, social, and cultural rights, which are part of sustainable development.
And that then speaks to the point that was made about setting up global alliances. This is effectively what we do. All the work that we do in the UN can only go through with the necessary majorities if we work with combinations of countries from Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Asia. And there's inevitably, depending on the issue, different emphases from the country's concern, but it's really important, especially in examples we've given about the reluctance of the European Union to use economic or other coercion. That makes it all the more imperative that we work with those countries that do actually want to change and that we're able to support that change. So that would be my first point.
My second point would be to echo what Kara Adamo said, which is that we must do all we can to preserve the international structure. So, to uphold international law and international humanitarian law, and to uphold the UN system, that means the Office of the High Commissioner. There are proposals to give that a bigger mainstreaming role under the UN reforms, the special procedures, the treaty bodies, and the instances of international justice, notably the ICC. Because even if we're currently in what could be characterized as a global democratic and human rights recession, it's not written in stone that things will always get worse. Things may get better, and we need to preserve those institutions with the money that Kara talked about, which we put directly into supporting them. So, just having said all of that, in a more flexible, simplified structure, it's a question of mainstreaming across the geographical and the global pillar.
The key is then obviously on the programming, which Kara referred to. And as I said, the action plan would be a key guidepost in all of that. And so, to attempt to answer the question about what you think is most important, what you think are the biggest concerns, I, without pretending that one can pick any one issue that will solve all other issues, will try to respond. But I do think that in the next edition of the action plan, we will need to look at things that have changed since it was conceived in 2020. So, I'm thinking of protecting human rights defenders, bringing in the aspect of tackling transnational repression, the key issues around keeping open the civil society space, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, independent media, and then a very important set of issues around upholding human rights in the digital and artificial intelligence domain.
So I would just say that those are some of the things I think probably do need to be updated in terms of the policy framework that we work under. And I'll leave it at that. Thank you very much.
Mounir Satouri
We've got about 10 minutes left. Would anyone like to take the floor, or should I conclude? No one seems to be asking for the floor, so I'd like to thank the speakers this afternoon and our guests. I'm convinced that the workshop was very useful for us as part of this process in which the parliament's mandate needs to be drafted. I must say to the commission representative that I am still rather concerned.
I really don't know how you are going to be able to resist this challenge. We have limited public funds. The world is becoming increasingly complex. There is going to be more pressure to put money into bilateral relations, defense, and economic development. I don't know how aid for democracy and human rights will be able to withstand that pressure.
I've heard that the commission may be prepared to introduce some conditionality. I am convinced that we will need to go down that path because that's what I've heard, including here in this house. But I don't know how such conditionality would be able to be achieved. So I'd like to wish you bon courage, and I hope that you will pay attention to the European Parliament's mandate for this multiannual program. Thank you.
Ask anything about this video — I analyse its transcript to answer.