Committee on Security and Defence Ordinary meeting
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SEDE European Parliament
Follow its sittingsSpeaker 10
I think there are instruments available to us, but there is a lack of political will that has emerged clearly. So, we need to decide if we are really going to build a common defense or just talk about this in theoretical terms.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
So, first of all, thank you very much to the experts. You see, we are in the beginning, but I think it's very important to talk about it. Otherwise, we could not solve this problem. And colleagues, it's great to see you all. It's like in the morning, 08:30, when we have a remembrance for Ukraine; it was nearly packed like this.
So, thank you very much for being here. This was just yes; however. So now, maybe you could.
Speaker 7
Yes. Thank you very much, colleagues. Thank you very much to our distinguished experts. I think it was a good start. We had a debate.
That is also the reason why we are running out of time. Those colleagues from the AFCO committee, I would like you to go immediately to Room 4B001 for the voting. I thank you.
Speaker 9
And the hearing is closed. So, dear colleagues, please take your seats. So, dear colleagues, we will now vote on the opinion on guidelines for the 2027 budget, section three. This will be an electronic vote, so please have your voting cards ready. No.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
I wait. Take your time. No panic. Thank you very much. So first of all, we could test everything.
So, thank you very much. Please use your voting card, plus or minus whatever. So, we see that everything will be fine and that everybody looks good. It looks good. But a little faster, please.
Three are missing. Okay. There are three missing, and still one missing. Okay. Anyway, it is still missing.
So we have 24 plus. Wonderful. Thank you very much. So, I can see that we clearly have enough members to meet the quorum for a vote. And before we, yeah.
We just checked it. So now, everybody has a card. Yes. And now the test vote is... oh, okay. Let's now proceed to the vote.
So, first of all, thank you very much as rapporteur, and we will start. It's a draft opinion on general guidelines for the preparation of the 2027 budget. And who is it? It's a roll call board. Sorry. Yes, it is.
So, the vote is open. The vote is no. Normally, we have to be really okay. The vote is still missing one. Yeah.
It's not our problem. Okay. So it's adopted. So this is adopted. So, thank you very much.
So now we will vote on the opinion and interim report on the proposal for the multinational financial framework for 2028 to 2034. So, we start with a compromise. Who is in favor? Who is against it? Adopted.
Yes. Wonderful. Then amendment 44. It's a rookie call ball, and the vote is open. And the vote is closed.
It's rejected.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
It's rejected. So we cannot compromise too. Come to a compromise, too. And, yeah, it's "raise your hand." Yes.
So, who is in favor? Who is against it?
I think it's rejected. Do you want to?
Check?
Yes. I think we should check.
It. Okay.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
So, let's check it. The vote is open, and then the vote is closed. And it is rejected. It's rejected. And so, we come to the alternative.
To the alternative, second proposal of the EPP. And it's also rule. It's not. Oh, okay. It's a raise of hands.
So, who is in favor? Who's against it? It's adopted. It's adopted. Okay.
So, now the final vote. It's a draft text, amended. Yeah. It's a roll call vote, and the vote is open. And the vote is closed, and it is adopted.
Speaker 11
Thank you very much. Rockell, this is a word. So colleagues, please take your seat or leave the room, but we have to continue. Time is money. You know?
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
So, please, colleagues, take a seat or leave the room. Thank you very much. We will now have the presentation of a study commissioned by our committee on European defense projects of common interest by Doctor Steven Blochmans from the Center for European Policy Studies, who will intervene remotely. Thank you very much for still being here. And Professor Daniel Fjord from the Center for Security, Diplomacy, and Strategy at the Bristol School of Governance.
So, dear colleagues, the Defense Readiness Roadmap 2030 proposes the launch of flagship European defense projects of common interest. Member States have committed to developing four initial flagships, including the European Drone Defense Initiative and the Eastern Flank Watch. CD commissioned this study in order to identify priority capability areas, as well as to provide recommendations on the governance of those projects, particularly on how to select, finance, and implement them. We will now hear the results from the authors, starting with Doctor. Steven Blochmann, who is connected remotely.
We have the floor for 8 minutes.
Speaker 12
Thank you very much, Madam Chair, for the opportunity to present the study coauthored with Daniel Fjot. I will be focusing on a couple of slides on the rationale for European defense projects of common interest. The previous experience with such projects in other fields, then focus very briefly on the legal foundations and the financial instruments that one has to consider to make proper sense of the future governance and financial model of these European projects in defense. The rationale is perhaps that this is a good way to situate the discussion, which we have now, essentially just beyond the negative starting points of European integration. We're talking about the removal of national barriers and the start of the harmonization of EU policies.
So far, there are only a handful of truly European capability projects that have come to life, albeit with the familiar problems of cost and delivery overruns. Could you think of the Eurofighter project, the A400M transporter plane, and the multipurpose frigate, FREMM? The challenge more broadly is, of course, that very few EU member states have the capacity to develop military capabilities from the early stages of research and development all the way to development and operationalization. And in this respect, it is good to say that steps are underway to ensure that at least some of the additional defense spending in Europe will make its way into collaborative capability projects. The joint white paper from March 2025 describes a number of critical capability gaps in priority areas as a strategic necessity.
And so, the main rationale, I think, in a couple of points for these European defense projects of common interest would be, one, that there is a way to structure capability development efforts. Secondly, it provides an effort to prioritize among a large suite of capability priorities identified both in the context of the European Union and NATO. We now have, in the 2023 EU Capability Development Plan, 22 priority capability gaps in the CARD report of 2024. There were 18. In the joint white paper on defense readiness 2030, there are seven specific gaps mentioned, including air and missile defense, artillery systems, drone and counter-drone systems, military mobility, artificial intelligence, cyber, quantum, electronic warfare, and then strategic enablers and critical infrastructure protection.
Thirdly, I think EDPCIs would be the logical next step in moving from prioritization to investment, development, operationalization, and, in a way, an avenue for the rationalization of future defense spending within EU instruments such as SAFE and EDIP, and as such, help reshape the European defense markets by creating important value chains and increasing the competitiveness of the European Union in vital areas at the crossroads of defense industry research and development. Now, practice in areas adjacent to defense has shown that the success rate of development and implementation of what are called European projects of common or projects of common European interest has been rather mixed. We've seen them in cross-border energy infrastructure, batteries, and hydrogen. We've seen them in support of microelectronics development, communication technologies, and also next-generation cloud infrastructure. The challenges that have been found and are actually listed on pages 10 and 11 of our report, as identified also by the Strategic Forum on Important Common Projects of European Interest, are multiple.
They're both in the governance sphere, the level of commission involvement, which clearly shows that more involvement early on is actually beneficial for such projects. But I will refer you to that table to learn more about those challenges and foundations.
Legal.
Speaker 12
The legal picture, moving to the next slide, is varied, of course. We have, I think, it's good to mention that, unlike in any other industrial sector, a single market for defense equipment has not been developed, and member states have regularly used Article 346 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to exempt certain defense-related industries from internal market rules when they consider this necessary for the protection of their essential security interests. And it's that loophole, which is, of course, not benefiting more joint production in particular, whereas the European defense technology and industrial base, of course, requires such cooperation. The legal basis which has been used for a number of instruments which have already been adopted, I think of ASAP and Nidirpa and, of course, IDIP, is multiple. Article 114, paragraph 1, of the TFEU concerns the harmonization of laws.
Article 173, paragraph 3, on industrial policy. Article 212, paragraph two, on the economic, financial, and technical support for third countries, where Ukraine, of course, is prevalent; and article 320, paragraph 22, paragraph one, which allows the parliament, of course, to implement parts of the general budget. And the common denominator in decision making here is the OLP, the ordinary legislative procedure, which, of course, promotes the community model, which is, to my mind, far superior to the CSDP intergovernmental model that would otherwise be allowed under PESCO. And then, in a more detailed fashion, of course, you see European projects of common interest are only mentioned once in the treaty. That is in Article 107, paragraph three, where there is an exemption from state aid rules if indeed the single market would benefit from such additional funding to projects of common interest.
And that has been included also in the conceptualization of the European defense projects of common interest, which have now been spelled out in a little bit more detail in the IDIP regulation, as you know. So, as far as the legal landscape is concerned, I will move quickly to the selection criteria, which are also listed in the IDIP regulation and which blend with possibilities for financial instruments to be used to bankroll and to dynamize, of course, the development of these projects. The selection criteria which have been applied, for instance, in the field of energy infrastructure, included the involvement of at least two EU member states, and, of course, the ability to reduce bottlenecks in market integration and increase system flexibility to guarantee security of supply. Most of those basic conditions have been replicated for the European defense projects of common interest, but they are nevertheless a bit more specific. Article 15 of the EDP regulation gives you those conditions.
One is, of course, that the overall benefit of such projects must outweigh their costs. Secondly, it would involve at least four member states. Also, those projects ought to contribute to the defense capabilities critical for the security and defense interests of the European Union and its member states, and therefore be in the public interest. And finally, aim at developing capabilities, including those securing access to strategic domains and contested spaces, i.e., strategic enablers and appropriate systems there. And then those basic conditions are further specified in award criteria for the financial envelopes that are available to such projects, which prioritize the potential to increase production capacities, reduce lead times, eliminate bottlenecks, as I've mentioned, and increase interoperability and interchangeability.
Also, increase the timely availability and the supply to all locations around the European Union, strengthening, therefore, the security of supply in response to identified risks and fostering genuine armament cooperation between member states. And it's the wording of those selection criteria that, well, perhaps cynically, might exclude some of the capability areas listed in the joint white paper on defense readiness 2030 because the timelines are too long for the production of those projects. There, as noted, as the
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
Sorry. When I interrupt you, maybe you could come to an end.
Speaker 12
Yeah. I just wanted to end on this: the European Court of Auditors, in its special report on the EDIP proposal, of course, mentioned that the time horizon for carrying out such projects is likely to legally exceed the EDIP's two-year implementation period. And this is an important point, as long-term financing commitments should not rely on raising national debt. Final point is that you see on the slides this entire spectrum of financial instruments. It would be good, of course, if this were streamlined for the application of these European defense projects of common interest.
Thank you for your attention. Thank you.
Speaker 16
Thank you. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. And let me thank the parliament as well for inviting Stephen and myself, firstly, to write the study, and also to come here today and present some of the conclusions. I think Steven has given a really excellent overview of the legal and financial dimensions of our debates. I would like, in the few minutes that I have, to cover more of the capability dimensions because I think that's at the core of our discussions.
Speaker 17
Maybe before going into the fine details of the projects, we could start off with our intellectual departure point. And in fact, one of the major questions that we were trying to deal with in the report was that we have four proposals from the European Commission of capabilities. Our first task was to critically analyze whether those capabilities were really meeting the needs of European defense. And, again, in the report, I think, quite a useful table early on, we get into a discussion about some of the key ingredients in making these projects worthwhile, including, and I think that's rather important to highlight, the common European good in defense. So, we started off with the assumption of how we could critically analyze the handful of projects that were tabled.
And then, secondly, the task was to think about some other capability domains and projects that could also be developed. Now that's an important point because we're faced with, I think, a very dynamic geopolitical and military context, of course. When we started the report reflecting on the four areas of flagships that have been proposed, such as the drone initiative, the Eastern Flank Watch, the European Airshield, and the European Space Shield, we felt relatively comfortable in assessing them and coming up with the conclusion that, in a general sense, they did meet the short-term needs of European defense. And that, of course, is very much centered on the war in Ukraine and the military needs that derive from it. But actually, the question that we were then faced with is the shifting nature of, let's call it, the transatlantic relationship or partnership, however we define it, was also putting on European shoulders much more burdens and questions about the type of capabilities that we need to develop.
Sure. Sure.
It's easier to understand if you see.
Yeah.
Do we need to wait?
Or can.
We come.
Speaker 17
Yes. Thank you. So if we could go to the next slide, just to give you an overview of the four projects that we were dealing with, these were the proposals by the European Commission. As you see them there: the Drone Defense Initiative, the Eastern Flank Watch, the European Air Shield, and the European Space Shield. We have individual slides for each of these projects, but I think, in the interest of time, I will try to give a condensed analysis.
Because in our critique of these, I think what was important was first to recognize, on the one hand, that certain technologies, such as drones, were technologies that could be developed in a relatively short time frame and that could have quite a large and important military impact, especially for the defense and deterrence of Europe. Now, that is a direct lesson learned from the events on the battlefield in Ukraine, where the Ukrainians themselves are mobilizing funds and innovation to develop drones in a very rapid manner and to get them on the battlefield as quickly as possible. So this was quite a logical way of developing a common project. The same is true of the European air shield. I don't need to tell anyone in the room about the attacks that Ukraine is facing on a regular basis.
So they have their own air defense needs themselves, but this also extends to the EU and NATO as well because air defense has been, I think, rightfully recognized as one of the core capability needs. Now, on the space shield idea, we found in the report that, as a basic idea, this was quite a good one because it also built upon European capabilities and successful common projects, such as Galileo, Copernicus, and also looking to the future, Iris Duh. So there is a way in which we can build upon Europe's already, I would say, technological and cutting-edge excellence in space to develop a space shield. One of the critiques we made, I think, is on the fourth project, which is the Eastern Flank Watch, which lacks, we think, some kind of coherence. Because when you start to dig deep into it, you understand that we are talking about ground forces, naval forces, air forces, and it pretty much contains everything.
The concern we had is that when you have projects that contain everything, they contain nothing. And, of course, that was one of our major observations: really inviting colleagues to reflect upon what that would mean in practice on the eastern flank watch. Also, we came up with some technological barriers and military concerns that we needed to think about. We found that the description of the need for an air defense shield and the drone initiative, or as it was originally called, a drone shield, made it sound like these capabilities were foolproof and would protect the European homeland 100% of the time. In reality, there are many case studies that show these technologies, while costly and beneficial for our industry and skills base, are never 100% fail-safe when it comes to defense.
So this was, I guess, in general terms, what our main reflection on these four proposals put forward was. Now, if I can ask kind colleagues to fast forward, I think, 4 slides, if I'm not mistaken.
We will share your slides afterward.
Speaker 17
And exactly. The slides will be shared. Right? Yes. I think it's the next one, actually.
Yeah. So I said at the beginning that one of the things that stimulated us in the study was looking at the geopolitical context of Europe, and it's certainly the case that the four projects put forward have relevance for European defense. But one of the main driving aspects of our concern was what would happen in case of a major deterioration in the transatlantic and NATO alliances. And by that, we mean what would have happened in the context where the US decided very abruptly to leave Europeans to their own devices when it came to defense. Now, from that starting point, we then worked backwards and said, would the four projects that were proposed make much of a difference in the case of a US absence?
And the answer we came back with in the report was no. So, whatever project areas could we develop or, let's say, start to think about that would really support European defense in case of an abrupt US departure from NATO and European defense more generally. And we came up with 4 projects. At least one of them is no surprise to anyone because it's a continuum with the past, and that's military mobility, which is utterly at the core, I would say, of Europe's logistical and military transport needs. But you can see that we've also developed other projects.
The cyber defense shield idea, I think, was also already present under the previous Commission. We question in the report why that has disappeared because we think cyber defense is a critical function of air defense, drone defense, and space defense. When you start to connect all of these areas, cyber defense becomes an utterly critical component of the security of these systems and how they communicate with each other. As a consequence, we also think that it would be worthwhile to invest in a European combat cloud. And again, this is really based on the idea that if the Americans were to leave us to our own devices, we would have severe weaknesses in ISR capabilities and other communication, informatics, and security systems as well.
So, we would need our own cloud brain, as it were, to handle data within a European context militarily. One final point before I end: command and control. One of the critical features in the report that we point to is that the risk of all these projects is that they are seen as standalone areas when, in fact, you cannot develop any one of them without connecting it with other domains. And that is actually fundamentally where our weakness as Europeans really lies: in connecting technologically all of these different domains together. That's why I would really stress in the report the critical function of C2, of command and control.
And this, of course, I don't need to tell you in the room, is not just a technological or industrial question. It is a political question. Because if you do not have two control systems, you cannot plan, you cannot execute, and you cannot conduct yourself independently if the context arises militarily. We can go to the last slide. That's not the last slide.
Again, the slides will be shared with you so you can dig in a bit more detail. And I will conclude, if I can, Madam Chair, very briefly, following on also with what Steven was talking about earlier, about the decisive opportunity that we have with the EDIP, with the discussions about the next financial framework, also with new tools such as SAFE, where there is much more money in the system, as it were, but that puts much greater pressure on everyone to invest that money much more wisely and to ensure that all of the categories that we were pointing to in the report—about common public good, about cost effectiveness, about military effectiveness, and also about this question of the role of command and control of European, more European independence in decision making—these projects would allow us to do that if they were financed and governed in the correct way. One final point as well. One of the risks that I think every analyst looking at defense, and I guess everyone in the room is also fully aware of, is that we have developed a lot of financial tools, a lot of new tools.
The question now is how do they all fit together, actually? One of the other questions that we deal with in the report is the financial scale that you need to be able to finance these projects over a long time. And, of course, if you have a lot of money, then that potentially allows you to invest in many more of these projects. If you don't have the money available for pan-European projects, then you will have to prioritize. And that prioritization is where it gets extremely risky, and that's also why, in the report, and that's the final word, we think investment should be placed much more in the worst-case scenario of where Europeans are really forced to act alone.
And in that case, we would need much more robust C2 infrastructures and all that implies, technologically and politically. Thank you.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
Thank you very much. And now we give the floor to the members for a first round of questions, starting with the coordinators for two minutes for EPP. Christophe, the floor is yours.
Speaker 19
Yes. Thank you, Madam Chair. I.
I prefer to speak French. I thank both of you. First of all, the single market for defense. I think there is no such thing, or it's a bit deceptive because weapons aren't products like any others. And so, arms and weapons are still within each member state's remit.
And then, there's a second issue of what's necessary for the EU. So, I think what you are suggesting today seems out of reach or very costly. You know, you've just put forward these recommendations, so let's look at space capacity. You know, we need to have space capacity. Otherwise, we won't be able to have antidrone shields or cyber defense shields because we need to have an early alarm, which we need through space.
And then, command and control. If we're going to have command and control, well, that is a necessity for the EU. Because if we don't have command and control, and we no longer have the US backing, then what will happen to us? You know, we can defend ourselves if we've got a clear communication channel, and that means a cloud, including intelligence and the right software. And without that, it will be impossible.
We will not be able to engage in warfare. Now we can talk about the European army or other European tools or other European defense. We need, first of all, to have command and control, but that has to be underpinned by cloud and also spatial capacity, which will allow us to defend our satellites.
Anti Lucia?
Speaker 20
Thank you very much for your speech. I think it's encouraging, after all, that we share so much in this room, based on what you just said. And I think also it's important that you put the right question. What will happen? I think we should be more careful when talking about these things because we have in front of us two types of very difficult situations.
One, Russia moves on. Second is Trump moving out. So that is the right question, and I appreciate the fact that we started to talk aside. But then, I have a question. So, when you say, "What if we don't have money?"
And you know that this is a rhetorical question because I don't think anybody in this building will have enough money for what we want to do, so what do you prioritize? Of course, the new structure, the command and control, seems to be at the very beginning. And after, if we are in dire straits, where do we go?
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
Thank you very much, Lucia. And, Alexander, you are for the ECR.
Speaker 22
Well, thank you very much. So, I read yesterday evening this study, and there is an interesting part at the beginning assessing the experience with the important projects of common European interest. And when you were presenting this today, you also expressed some reservations that the results are mixed at best. And it reminds me of just one example, and that's hydrogen. You know?
I remember that in my country, there was enthusiasm in the beginning. A lot of countries boarded this in the beginning. But then later on, when they recognize that they are chained by those, you know, green regulations on the production of hydrogen, and the regional conclusion is so expensive, they simply said it doesn't make any sense for us. And just a week ago, we had a tour with the military industry, and there was a common voice from those people in the industry about how they have a problem with our environmental policies. And the military industry is not the same as a standard industry.
And my question to you is whether you were trying to make some kind of research and recommendation to this house to help wake up a little bit to reality. Because, frankly, there was a historic appearance earlier today promoting the QMVs. And then it was from the same guy who developed this reporting system with the environmental standard on the global arena, which is, for Europe, like a chain. The other Americans are departing from this, and it helped to kill a lot of the military industries. In Europe, with their inability to get the banking financing and so on.
Speaker 23
Yes. Thank you to our guest speakers for their insights. Very briefly, I will go to Daniel Fjord and ask him first about the Eastern Flank priority. You already answered the question I wanted to ask. How can we put together so many priorities under just one umbrella?
Speaker 24
And if it's too much for one priority, how is it possible to redesign this priority to make sure that at least something concrete comes out of it? And my second question is on C2. It's been years that we have known that we need a command and control effort in the EU. It's been years that we've been talking about secure communications, for instance. We all know this.
The diagnosis had been made a long time ago. So, why is it still discussed among experts and not implemented? What are the obstacles? Are they political? Can you elaborate on this?
And how can we ensure that this obvious priority is finally addressed? Thank you.
Thank you.
Speaker 27
Yes. Thank you to both speakers. And I have to say that I was also a little bit confused about what you, Mr. Fjord said this about the Eastern Flank Watch. You said too many priorities; it's a little bit vague, or the scope is too broad.
Speaker 25
But I think Eastern Flank Watch is to strengthen Europe's eastern border. And I think we know what kind of border we are talking about. It's a border with Russia and Belarus, and we know where the threats come from. Why are you so confused about this project? Thank you.
Speaker 16
Yeah. Excellent questions. I'm not sure many were addressed to Steven online, but I would jump right in, actually. And then, if Steven wants to add his voice, he can. Thanks for the excellent questions.
Speaker 17
Let me try to group them. On the eastern flank watch, I think, politically, it's obvious why it was put as a project. That's very clear. But I think there's a big difference between making it a political priority and coming up with a capability dimension that addresses it. You know, the problem, and I think I understand a bit the problems that the proposals faced, which is that the eastern flank is so vast geographically that they are forced by their very nature to think of different capability suites.
That's why we get a combination of ground forces with naval forces, for example. I think it would have been probably better, and that would answer the question on prioritization a bit more. Why were there not two different kinds of projects? One for ground forces, which I think would have been actually very coherent in thinking about MBTs, land vehicles, etc., and then also one that would focus much more on the maritime dimension. Right?
So you would have two projects that would, of course, feed into the geopolitical context of the East. It's a physical border, but I think there was a better way to streamline the concept behind it. Because, as it stands, it's quite difficult, I think, to still operationalize it. Let me also address the point about space, which I think is really critical here. I must say that one of the dimensions that we were slightly confused about is that, actually, previous to the proposal for the four projects, and especially the space shield, the EU had done quite a lot of good work, I mean, conceptually speaking, about how it should approach the question of space from a security and defense perspective.
In fact, we have a strategy dedicated to it. In that strategy, we have a lot of new concepts that have been put on the table, such as multi-domain operations or multi-space operations, which are, I think, interesting concepts. But what we were waiting for in the project proposals was how you will actually operationalize those concepts in concrete terms. And we know that in space, actually, Europeans should be, I think, quite proud in some respects about our space capabilities. But it's also the case that we're currently underfunded in many areas, such as launching, for example.
And also this question of space security, which is absolutely critical. The point that you made about needing space to enable other domains is absolutely critical here as well. Now, on the C2 question, I actually think that comes to the question also of early warning, which a few of you have mentioned as well. In a direct answer, I don't think that the problem for CO2 in Europe is necessarily the financial aspect or the technological aspect. We have the firms.
We have the expertise. What we don't have is the political will and consensus to do it. And that is always the problem. And actually, it keeps people like me very busy because I can write lots of papers about it. But actually, the reality is that we do need to get past that political blockage.
It is a core fundamental issue. Now, this worries me even more, I would say, because it comes to the point you mentioned or you put it as dire straits, which is a very good way of putting it, in extremis, I would say. Let's imagine a context where the Europeans are left alone, and we're suddenly faced with a situation where one of our member states invokes Article 42.7, the mutual defense clause. This is precisely the type of political action that cannot be effectively responded to at the European level without coherent command and control structures. And I want to also say something: C2 is not just about the technology.
It's not about the people you have in uniforms working in the correct places. It's a culture. It's psychology. It's the underlying fundamental for defense, which we in Europe have never had at the European level. At the national level, we have some.
At the European level, we do not. So, I think that we are faced with a problem. It really should not cost too much of a barrier to develop these types of capabilities, especially if we can do it technologically and industrially. You know? It's a public good because, ultimately, if the US does leave us and one of our member states is threatened militarily, what response do we have as the EU?
That's a very sensitive, I know, but very difficult question to answer as well. In the interest of time, I will see if Steven wants to say something.
Speaker 12
Yes. Thank you. Just one reflection, really, and that relates to the financial ceiling which has been set for European defense projects of common interest under the EDIP, which may constrain the ability to fund multiple high-end flagship programs simultaneously, leading back to the question of prioritization. But what we do in the report is to at least speculate a little bit what would happen with the commission's proposal to allocate €131,000,000,000 for the area of defense and space under its European competitiveness fund, and see how much then would trickle down to the European defense projects of common interest. And if you apply 25% or, as we learned in interviews, a 30% ceiling within IDIP for the financing of these European defense projects of common interest, and you assume that it might get €20,000,000,000 from the total of €131,000,000,000, you are really talking about €6,000,000,000, which would have to be divided between the four flagship projects and spread out over seven years.
That's obviously not a lot of money, especially for the more costly projects. That's just one addition I wanted to make.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
So, are there any questions? No. Thank you very much. Sorry. You wanted to come back?
No. No.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
Without saying that it's a political problem because we know what you are talking about.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
Are you interested in more? So, thank you very much. And yes, we have to continue, and your advice was very clear to all the politicians: do their work and don't just talk, but act. And I think if you compare our job two years ago and now that we have, that we talk about it, I hope not only talk, then you can see that really a lot of things have changed. So, thank you very much for your time.
And also, Doctor Blachmans, thank you very much for joining our meeting. And we have a 15-minute break if possible; it's necessary. Yes. Have guests. Yes.
Okay. Otherwise, I would continue. Okay. Fifteen-minute break. Thank you very much.
Dear colleagues, we will now have a debrief on the recent meeting of NATO defense ministers with NATO's Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Defense Policy and Planning, François-Marie Roujon. We understand the minister had their usual point on further strengthening deterrence and defense capabilities and increasing defense spending. An important outcome of the ministers' meeting was the launch of the Arctic Sentry Initiative, which brings together allied activities in the region under a single command. There was also a session on the NATO-Ukraine Council with the participation of the Ukraine Defense Minister and the EU High Representative, Kaya Kalas. A lot was said in the media about the level of participation of the US and the Undersecretary of War.
Eldridge called his lecture on NATO's needs to focus on its original mandate, where Europe must assume primary responsibility for its own conventional defense. In this direction, the US is putting pressure on NATO to reduce its international commitments, including the operations in Iraq and Kosovo. And this, together with the most recent US decisions to hand over NATO joint force command at Naples and Norfolk to European officers, indicates that the US is preparing to reduce its commitment to NATO and European security. It is, of course, positive that Europe is taking greater responsibility for European defense, but we must be clear-eyed about the speed of this change while we are also stepping up to support Ukraine in its defense against Russian aggression. So, Mr. Guzhong, I would be grateful if you could debrief our members about the outcome and main conclusions of this ministerial meeting.
The floor is yours for 15 minutes if it's enough time.
Speaker 34
There's more than enough time. Thank you very much, Madam Chair, and thank you for this opportunity. It's a real pleasure for me to be here with you this afternoon and to brief you on the main outcomes of our last defense ministerial meeting. So, allied defense ministers met on 12th February and had very fruitful discussions around NATO's priorities, which are, as you recall, strengthening NATO's deterrence and defense posture, ramping up our defense industrial production, and stepping up our support to Ukraine while peace efforts are underway. It's clear that we are making good progress on all fronts, but more—and I would say a lot more—still needs to be done.
Speaker 33
Ministers, we confirm that European allies in Canada are stepping up and taking greater responsibility for their conventional defense. At the same time, the United States reconfirmed its commitment to NATO's deterrence and defense. In this context, the Secretary General also publicly welcomed that, with Europe taking on a bigger role, this will only strengthen NATO further. As far as our deterrence and defense posture is concerned, we are seeing significant increases in allied defense spending and clear progress towards investing 5% of GDP in defense, as agreed at the Hague Summit last year. This is a real mindset change, and all allies understand the sense of urgency and ownership.
Defense ministers also discussed integrated air and missile defense, strengthening alchemy and control, improving our force readiness, as well as our ability to deploy and sustain allied forces through the necessary host-nation support. Ministers also exchanged ideas on how we, as an alliance and as individual allies, can constrain, contest, and counter Russia's malign activities. Another crucial element of the discussion was the need to boost our industrial production and innovation across the alliance. Not only must we ensure that our defense investment delivers as fast as possible the capabilities needed to keep our people safe and to defend every inch of allied territory. But we must also harness our technologies and develop industries and production lines on both sides of the Atlantic.
I want to deliver on NATO's capability targets. We absolutely must leverage innovation at scale, as Russia's military is also transforming itself. A new generation of companies is producing incredible technologies, and we're seeing evidence of this every day. And we need to harness these developments. Going forward, we will be looking at how to mass-produce innovation in order to modernize our arsenals, and this means looking into contracting, financing, and manufacturing.
As we look towards the summit in Ankara, we will also be considering, in a broader sense, how the alliance engages with industry and its role in our defense industrial preparedness. This includes ensuring the right foundations are in place, particularly access to critical raw materials, and reducing our vulnerabilities. In addition, and in the wake of Russia's increased military activity and China's growing assertiveness and interest in the Arctic and the High North, Allies agree that it is important that we step up as an alliance to ensure security in the region. This is why NATO has launched the Arctic Century. This multi-domain activity will further strengthen NATO's posture in the Arctic and the High North over time, as we expect a persistent NATO presence in the region to grow.
Ministers also had fruitful discussions about our continued support for Ukraine, including through NATO's prioritized Ukraine requirements list initiative. It is essential to ensure that US equipment, paid for by allies and partners, is delivered to Ukraine. Once again, the NATO-Ukraine Council was an essential mechanism for political consultation. Ukraine's Defense Minister Fedorov updated on the situation on the battlefield and highlighted Ukraine's urgent needs, including defense. The Secretary General made it clear that NATO support, including through the Pearl, would not waver.
But we are reminded that in 2026, Ukraine will need $60 billion for its defense from its partners. And here, fair burden sharing will be key. And the European Union obviously plays an extremely important role in this regard. So overall, this DMM defense ministers' meeting provided important guidance to continue our work ahead of the NATO summit in Ankara. And with this, I now stand ready to take any questions you may have.
Thank you very much.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
Thank you very much. I now give the floor to our colleague, Dimelo. And you could add:
Please. Thank you.
Speaker 8
Thank you, Madam Chair. And thank you, Mr. Guzhon. As the chair of the European Parliament delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, I wish you a very warm welcome here and thank you for having accepted our invitation to update us regarding the meeting of Defense Ministers of NATO. On February 12, that meeting was held at a very significant juncture. I think I understood that the Secretary of Defense of the United States was not present, and that absence can be interpreted by public opinion as the latest sign of weakness in American security commitments to Europe.
But I welcome the fact that, thanks to NATO, primarily the greening crisis has been overcome. And you can confirm that work is ongoing on security guarantees in the Arctic. In the difficult geopolitical context, I wanted to highlight the importance of building a European security architecture, strengthening the transatlantic links, and promoting stability in the eastern and southern parts of Europe. Continued support from Ukraine and the presence of NATO in the East are also important. A just and lasting peace in Ukraine is a prerequisite for security in Europe.
On Ukraine, unfortunately, Russia is still striking the strategic infrastructure of Ukraine, and Ukraine appears to need air defense systems more than ever. Could you tell us how NATO is coordinating aid from allies and Ukraine's partners? And particularly with regard to the air defense capacity, have new support packages been agreed upon on February 12 and then at the NATO-Ukraine Council? Secretary General Ruta talked about a change in mentality with regard to increased European defense spending. Could you also clarify what the Secretary General actually means in terms of this change, and explain in which areas the Europeans are stepping up their efforts and where there is still a lack or delay?
With regard to the Naples and Norfolk commands, which have been under U.S. S. Control up until now, could you give us some idea regarding the motivation for the changes? And could you tell us if this is the beginning of the construction of a real European pillar within the transatlantic alliance? Thank you very much for your availability.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
Now, I give the floor to the members of the first round. So, Christophe, from EPP.
Speaker 19
Thank you, François-Marie, for your introductory remarks. I have a number of questions about the meeting of defense ministers. The 5% target: some countries have almost achieved it. Others will never get there. Do the ministers really believe in this, or is this just lip service and fine words?
Another question about regional commands. The US has abandoned some positions, but the U. S. The generals are still there. Is there a date soon when we will see them passed on to European command?
What is the U? S. Mindset? Do you see them willing to pass the reins to the Europeans for strengthening the Eastern Front against the Russian threat and European troops in Romania, Lithuania, and Latvia? What is your feeling about a US presence?
Speaker 36
If we had a coalition of the willing, do you really think that the Americans would be involved? Thank you.
Martins?
Speaker 25
Yeah. Thank you. Well, we are all aware of the political tensions we have with one member state here in Europe. I mean Victor Orban.
Speaker 25
Hungary, as well as Roberto Fitto in Slovakia. But how is it in those meetings where our defense ministers are together? Do you also feel any tensions over there? Regarding the NATO issues, is everyone pretty united? Thank you.
Speaker 33
All right. Well, thank you very much. For those questions, quite a number of them are revolving around the same question. So I will first address what our US ally has shared and the implications for the flag to post, or the changes in the flag to post distribution of rules and responsibilities. Let me start with this.
I think what the Secretary General was saying, when he mentioned that there was a clear mindset shift, is that we've heard consistently from our US ally. That was not just under Secretary Colby as the defense minister meeting, but it has been a consistent line by US interlocutors, including Secretary Hecces, in past ministerial meetings. The expectation is absolutely clear that Europeans need to take a more prominent role in the conventional defense of Europe. That has been absolutely clear. So, I don't think the fact that Secretary Colby was there rather than the Secretary of War actually meant anything because the message was absolutely clear and repeated. And I think his invention was also made public on the Internet.
It can be found on the internet. So I think the message is, first of all, extremely consistent in terms of expectations for Europeans. Now, to answer your concern over the sincerity or the sustainability of defense investment, I think the main reason why we came up with the figure of 3.5% is not because we were asked by one ally to go to that level, but just because the defense planning that we are responsible for, and therefore the capabilities that we assess, need to be resourced to the plan and to be able to fight the plan. Especially after three decades of underinvestment, those capability targets are grounded in operational plans. So those were not just produced or plucked from thin air just because we thought they were useful or just because we had to figure out a number. It was the exact translation, in terms of capabilities, of the operational plans that our heads of state collectively agreed on back in Vilnius three years ago.
Heads of state having approved operational plans, the capabilities needed for those plans were distributed amongst allies. Therefore, the average assessment was that it would cost, give or take, 3.5% of GDP, not only for the new capability targets but also to make up for three decades of underinvestment. And so, the reason why I think I'm quite confident that the Allies will continue on that path towards 3.5 is not because we are being asked to do it. It's because it is necessary to fight the plans, and the plans are indispensable for our own security. So, I think also if we compare to the situation we were in back in the Cold War, 03/2005 is probably where we were back in the eighties. So it's not unfeasible in technical and political terms.
Granted, I mean, it was a different situation back then, but I think, technically, it's feasible. So, when we speak about the mindset shifts, coming to your question regarding the distribution or redistribution of roles and responsibilities within the command structure. I think it's quite telling that now you've got Europeans as the heads of the three joint force commands. And the three joint force commands are the operational commands in charge of large chunks of Europe's or Euro-Atlantic theater. So they are the battlespace owners, if I use military terms, and they are the ones responsible for issuing orders and employing the forces that allies would put under their responsibility.
So I would slightly differ with the view that the US is remaining in control. It is Europe; it will be Europeans in control of the joint force command. And underneath them, the US will be—well, they used to be already in AIRCOM and Lancome, but they are now shifting from JFC Naples to MARCOM, which absolutely makes sense because, anyway, it's a question of dual-hatting of US generals in the US chain of command. The US Army in Europe is also dual-hatted as COMLANDCOM for land forces. Come, US forces in Europe are dual-hatted as COME AIRCOM for air command.
And now we have come, sorry, US Naval Forces Europe, dual-headed as MARCOM. So I wouldn't downplay it, but I also wouldn't overplay it. It is to me a rebalancing more than a complete revolution. But I think it also sends the clear signal that Europeans, especially in the center, in the region center, are ready to resume command and responsibility for defense and deterrence. In regard to the question of shape, I don't think shape has been seriously discussed so far.
And I think there's one very good reason for this. It is that, in the end, somebody has to be responsible for escalation management all the way up to the nuclear threshold, and somebody has to be responsible also for decisions pertaining to NATO nuclear operations, which, as you know, are US weapons operated by some of the European allies. So, therefore, it makes sense at some point to have somebody who has visibility over the entire scale of escalation, including up to the employment of nuclear weapons by Europeans. When it comes to the US presence on the Eastern flank, I think it's a very good question. But so far, all the indications that we've had are that we have not seen any huge drawdown or reduction in The U.
S. Force posture on the Eastern Flank. And we're still waiting to see whether they would change this. But so far, it has been quite limited, and we have not received or seen any indication that this will change. So, again, we are waiting for our US colleagues to express their views.
When it comes to atmospherics at the defense minister's meeting, I think it was absolutely clear from all Europeans around the table that they were getting the message loud and clear from our USRI on the one hand, and that they were absolutely convinced that they needed to collectively deter and defend. So, deterrence and defense are matters of collective action and collective signaling. I think that was the atmosphere in the room. Have I covered all the questions? Yes.
Oh, yes, sorry, to the first question. So NSATU, the command that we now have under NATO that coordinates the delivery and the planning for the delivery of capabilities, is now in full swing. So we are happy with the way NSATO works and has taken over some of the responsibilities from the US-led command. At the same time, all the decisions that were made were not made in the defense minister's meeting format, but in the UDCG. So, in terms of decisions that were made, I would refer you to what the UDCG has decided because it's not in NATO format.
It was not a DMM per se.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
Are there any more questions? Thank you very much. Really interesting, and thank you for your open words. And I think the message is really noisy and unclear, but it was interesting to hear. And we know what we have to do.
And I think NATO has to know what they want, and the European partners of the countries, and we have to go to our governments. And if they have no idea what they should do, we could help. Okay. Thank you very much. Thank you.
Thank you very much, Bartia.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
And in case we call you again, sure. If it's possible. Any time. Okay. So, dear colleagues, the dates of the next meeting are on the 25th of February in Brazil and from the 18th to the 19th of March in Brazil.
That's it. Thank you very much, and see you.
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