Committee on Legal Affairs Joint JURI-DROI
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JURI European Parliament
Follow its sittings
Ilhan Kyuchyuk
Rejected. Amendment 69: open the vote. Close the vote. Rejected. Amendment 70, open the vote.
Close the vote. Amendment 71 was rejected. Open the vote. Close the vote. Amendment 72 was rejected.
Open the vote. Close the vote. Amendment 75 rejected. Open the vote. 75.
Yes. Open the vote. Close the vote. Amendment 10 rejected. Open the vote.
Close the vote. Adopt it. Amendment 78. Open the vote. Close the vote.
Adopted amendment 79. Open the vote. Close the vote. Reject it. And the final vote is going to be a roll call.
Open the vote. Close the vote. 18 in favor. Six votes against. No abstentions.
Congratulations, Mr. Lagodinsky. The last vote is under rule 107, but a draft recommendation or draft council decision on the conclusion on behalf of the European Union. Bear with me just a minute. One more vote, and the rapporteur is Mr. Diepenwen. Mister Diepenwen, would you like to take the floor?
That is not the case. Let's vote. Open the vote. Close the vote. And this was adopted.
Congratulations, Mr. Aporteur. 22. In favor, no abstentions, no votes against.
We have to take the hearing now.
If I should.
Yes. Yes.
I think so, too.
Ilhan Kyuchyuk
Colleagues, please take your seats. Dear colleagues of the Committee on Legal Affairs and the Subcommittee on Human Rights, I'm glad to preside over this joint hearing with my colleague, the Chair, Satturi. Our meeting today continues the tradition of close cooperation between committees on the defense of international law and justice. And thank you for the common work, dear Munir. We'll focus on the important question of the immunity of officials of the United Nations and of the International Criminal Court.
This topic relates to the very foundations of international accountability and the effective functioning of international organizations. This discussion constitutes a timely opportunity to deepen our understanding of these issues, which have direct relevance for the interpretation and application of international law, as far as the European Union is concerned, but also for the functioning of the international legal order and accountability mechanisms that the European Union supports. Understanding how the principles and practices apply in these areas is essential for addressing emerging challenges to the international legal order. We are honored to welcome three distinguished experts who will share their insights, offering perspectives that will help us understand the current doctrine and practice. This discussion will contribute to our broader reflection on how the European Union can support the rule of law globally while navigating the complex realities of international governance.
Dear Munir, the floor is yours for your opening remarks and the introduction of our distinguished speakers.
Speaker 4
Now, I speak French. Mister Chairman, dear Elon, like you, I'm very happy that this hearing is a manifestation of the deep cooperation between our two committees. All of the forces in Parliament need to be mobilized on the issue at hand of international law. The last annual report on the situation of human rights and democracy in the world was adopted in plenary on January 21. Discrediting and attacking multilateral organizations has serious consequences and fosters a culture of impunity.
International institutions, their officials, and entities that cooperate with them are increasingly the targets of attacks and threats. The international community, including the European Union, has a duty to defend international law and the rules-based order by making sure that the rules are respected by all, including their partners. This is a difficult time for international justice, and it's regrettable that the EU's blocking statute has not yet been activated to protect the ICC from the extraterritorial effects of sanctions. To give you an example, we have two academics, two university professors in Europe. One has declined an invitation because they hold an American passport.
So, this has limitations on academic freedom and freedom of expression. I would like to thank Cedric Ringgard, who will talk to us about the legal framework for immunity in the United Nations and the International Criminal Court, along with his recommendations. We also have Betty Hauler, a judge on the International Criminal Court. Miss Horler is a judge who is continuing her work despite the US sanctions, and I thank her for participating in our work. Your immunity deserves to be protected by the state's party to the Rome Statute.
I also want to welcome the presence of DG FISMA, from whom we'll be hearing about the blocking statute. We know that this is a sensitive matter, and we appreciate that we will hear from you about the technical aspects of the blocking statute. And we look forward to hearing from the commissioner at a later date. Let me start by inviting Professor Ringer to speak to us for 7 minutes.
Speaker 5
Thank you. I hope you hear me well. Thank you for the kind introduction, Mr. Chairman. So, I've been asked to provide an overview of the international law regime on the immunity of UN staff and experts on the one hand, and ICC staff and the ICC on the other hand.
Let me start with the UN, the United Nations. Now there is a convention, the 1946 Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. And UN member states, including the United States, are all parties to this convention. Now, this convention applies to the UN itself, UN staff members, and also to UN experts on missions. So, we are aware of sanctions; the chair has referred to them, as well as threats of sanctions directed at UN special rapporteurs on human rights.
Also, ICC judges and prosecutors—I will discuss that in a minute. Now, Special Rapporteurs of the United Nations qualify as UN experts on mission, even if they are not formally staff members of the UN. This has actually been clear since the 1989 advisory opinion given by the International Court of Justice. Now, rapporteurs are entitled to immunity. UN staff are entitled to immunities, meaning that they are protected from any form of legal process, whether it is judicial or administrative, initiated by a member state.
Now, sanctions qualify as administrative legal constraints. They interfere with the independent performance of the rapporteur's functions during their mission. Now, some member states—I'm not going to name names—may argue that a rapporteur acted outside their functions and is accordingly not entitled to immunity. But I would like to point out that member states cannot decide this unilaterally. Such a determination, acting outside the scope of one's functions, should be made by the UN itself, by the UN Secretary-General in the first place.
Now, if a dispute persists, the UN General Assembly, acting with a majority, may request an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice. And under the UN Convention, such an opinion may actually be binding. Of course, it may take some time before the court gives its opinion, and there is no guarantee that the sanctioning member state will comply with the court's ruling. Let me now turn, secondly, to the International Criminal Court, the ICC. There is an article in the Rome Statute of the ICC, Article 48, which provides for the privileges and immunities of the ICC judges, the prosecutor, the deputy prosecutors, and the registrar.
This protection is on a par with that of heads of diplomatic missions, so basically ambassadors, meaning that immunity is nearly absolute. For that matter, other staff members of the ICC also enjoy immunities, but they are called functional immunities, which are necessary for the performance of their functions. Again, immunity here means that ICC staff cannot be subjected to any form of legal process, which logically includes sanctions and criminal convictions. Now, the problem here is that some states have never joined the ICC. That's different for the United Nations.
So, think of the United States; think about the Russian Federation. For these countries, the ICC statutes in fact impose no obligations. So, they may argue that this article I just discussed, Article 48 on immunities, is not binding on them. Now, it could be argued that the article is part of unwritten customary international law, meaning that it is also binding on non-parties given the universal aspirations of the ICC. Yes, so some kind of objective legal regime would be established that needs to be respected also by non-member states.
But it is not clear whether, legally speaking, such an argument is fully convincing. Now that said, Article 48 may entail that states parties, including The Netherlands, which is the host state of the ICC. I'm currently based in The Netherlands, and other EU countries have what we call a positive obligation to protect the immunity of ICC staff, which means that even if they themselves don't interfere with the immunity of ICC staff, they must nevertheless take steps to prevent others, states that are not parties, from interfering. Such steps could be taken collectively, notably by the European Union, which, for that matter, has also entered into a cooperation agreement with the ICC that entered into force in 2006. I would be happy to expand during the questions and answers on the steps the EU should take.
Finally, and this is the last leg of my presentation, I would like to draw your attention to another article in the ICC statute, which is Article 70, dealing with contempt of court or offences against the administration of ICC justice. Now, under that article, the ICC can convict a person, not a state, to imprisonment or a fine if that person has retaliated against an official of the court, for instance, a judge, on account of duties performed by that official or another official of the ICC, and sanctions can be considered here as a form of retaliation. Now, of course, non-parties can claim that they are not bound by Article 7, and a conviction will be hard to enforce anyway. But I think that the symbolic value of a conviction for contempt of court should not be underestimated. I thank you for your attention, and I look forward to the discussion.
Speaker 6
Thank you very much. And now, I give the floor to Betty Hoeller, who is in the room.
Speaker 8
Honorable chairs, honorable members of the European Parliament, ladies and gentlemen, thank you for organizing this discussion on this important topic and for the invitation to join you. I want to address two points with you today. First, the consequences of US sanctions against me and my fellow judges. Second, the importance of giving effect to the privileges and immunities of international officials for their official acts, and the value of institutional resilience. I was among the first 4 ICC judges sanctioned by the United States on June 5.
These unilateral sanctions are based on President Trump's executive order 14203, titled "Imposing Sanctions on the International Criminal Court." The consequences of sanctions were immediate. The sanctions have had, and they continue to have, a real impact on my life. As sanctioned persons, we and our family members are banned from traveling to the United States. My colleagues with assets in the US have seen those assets frozen.
As a sanctioned person, I no longer have access to American products and services, even in Europe. My Apple ID, iCloud, Amazon, Airbnb, PayPal, and other accounts have all been blocked or canceled. These cancellations happen overnight, without advance warning. The most serious consequences of sanctions are felt in two areas: banking and the use of information technology. For example, all my credit cards were canceled immediately after being sanctioned.
Because there is no non-US credit card alternative, it is impossible for a sanctioned individual to have a credit card. This makes it difficult, and sometimes impossible, to do everyday things like making a reservation, buying a plane ticket, or subscribing to an online news outlet. For me, as a European citizen with no ties to the United States, living in Europe and working for an international organization based in Europe, the impact of these unilateral sanctions here in Europe has been especially concerning. In particular, the compliance of European financial operators is important. A European bank, whose client I was for decades, announced that it was closing my bank account a day after I was sanctioned.
My account was then closed within a few days. I have experienced disruptions in paying bills and transferring funds within Europe. Although a transaction may be between two European banks in euros, without any US nexus, it may still be rejected. This is because a bank will automatically reject payments to and from a sanctioned individual. The effects of sanctions are not limited to us, the sanctioned persons.
They also have consequences for our family members. My colleagues with children have reported visas for their children being revoked and their education and employment opportunities disrupted. Living with US sanctions means living in constant uncertainty. A bank card that works today may not work tomorrow. An insurance company that insures your house today may terminate the contract tomorrow.
We are discovering new obstacles every week. The US sanctions have also caused us to adjust working protocols within the court to ensure that, as judges and as sanctioned individuals, we can continue to perform our functions unhindered. The individual sanctions against ICC officials have also impacted the court as an institution. Commercial operators, including European ones, have terminated their contracts with the ICC because of fear or confusion over the sanctions. At the same time, the threat of additional sanctions, including those against the organization as a whole, remains very real.
This brings me to my second point: the role of privileges and immunities, and the issue of institutional resilience. The reason for US sanctions against me and my judicial colleagues is our judicial work. Judicial voting and legal reasoning are core judicial acts. Treating them as sanctionable conduct threatens not only the ICC but also challenges the international justice system as such. As the UN special rapporteur on the independence of justice recently stated, directly targeting individual ICC judges with sanctions just for their judicial decisions amounts to an attempt to influence or punish them for their work.
At the same time, US sanctions are not the only measures faced by the ICC. In December, the Russian Federation convicted eight current and former ICC judges in absentia and sentenced them to prison for their judicial decisions in the Ukraine situation. Among them, three are EU nationals. All 125 ICC states parties, which include all EU states, have recently reaffirmed that the consequences of different coercive measures against the court are incompatible with their obligations under the Rome Statute, the agreement on the privileges and immunities of the court, and the headquarters agreement. In today's world, giving effect to the privileges and immunities of ICC officials is not just a legal obligation for ICC States Parties, but a practical necessity.
A practical necessity that guarantees the court and its officials can continue to perform their functions and deliver on the court's mandate. My fellow judges and I continue to perform our judicial duties as we always have: independently, impartially, with integrity, and courage. This is the personal resilience that we promised in our judicial oath. Then, there is institutional resilience, which is also key for ensuring the independent functioning of the courts. Courts are strongest when independence is built into their structures and operational capabilities.
For the ICC, this means building greater financial and technological autonomy. It means reducing dependence on service providers and financial institutions of any one state. Building this autonomy and showing the way forward based on the lessons learned could also assist other international organizations if and when they come under attack from any direction. In this regard, the EU's efforts to develop and provide European-based tools have real value. Finally, I note that in the agreement between the EU and the ICC, the European Union has committed to the obligation of cooperation and assistance and to provide, on the request of the court and subject to availability, facilities and services as may be required.
Honorable chairs, members of the parliament, the EU was built and has historically championed an independent judiciary, the rule of law, and international justice. It must, I submit, continue to do so. On 5 June 2025, the US administration sanctioned four ICC judges. In less than a year, that number has doubled. Today, 8 out of 18 ICC judges are subjected to US sanctions, among them 2 EU nationals.
In total, on the basis of its executive order, the US administration has now sanctioned 11 ICC officials, one UN official, and several civil society organizations. While the ICC is the first international court targeted in this way, it may not be the last. Could other international and regional judges be next if and when they issue an unwelcome decision? The US administration has already, as you know, also imposed measures against a former EU commissioner. As an international judge and as an EU citizen, I am here today to call on the European Union to protect its citizens who have spent their lives upholding international law and are now being treated like terrorists.
I am here to call on the Union to protect the judicial independence of the ICC, a court that its member states created and belong to, a court that this Parliament itself described as an indispensable cornerstone of the international justice system. Europe should speak with one voice, loudly, clearly, and collectively, to send the message that it will not accommodate pressure on judicial independence, regardless of its source. The European Parliament has already called for action, and I thank you for that. I would now encourage the European Commission and other institutions to do the same and to find workable solutions. History will record how Europe responded at this moment.
This is the right moment to be on the right side of history. I thank you, and I too look forward to the discussion.
Speaker 9
I'll now give the floor to the Head of the Sanctions Unit of FISMA at the European Commission. Go ahead.
Speaker 10
Ladies and gentlemen, thank you very much for the invitation to speak today before the Committee on Legal Affairs and the Subcommittee on Human Rights. The discussion takes place at a time when the use of sanctions has become an increasingly prominent tool of foreign policy, raising complex legal and practical questions. Let me state upfront that the European Commission deeply regrets the recourse by the United States to sanctions and acknowledges the very difficult situation that individual judges have been put in, especially you. We, as Commission services, have been, over the past months, in direct contact with the ICC and individual member states. We have attempted a solution of diplomatic outreach and finding practical solutions, and we will continue on this path with the aim to keep the ICC operational and to lend the Commission's operational support. But I've been asked to speak today about the blocking statute as the head of the Commission's sanctions unit.
And so, I will give you an overview of the procedural aspects of this important tool, which in no way prejudges whether it would be activated in this case or not. I will briefly structure my remarks into three points. First, the purpose and the main provisions of the regulation. Second, how it operates in practice, including the case law; and third, the way the regulation can be updated. Let me begin with the purpose and the main provisions of the regulation.
The EU's blocking statute is Council Regulation number 2271/96. Its purpose is to protect EU operators from the extraterritorial application of certain third-country laws that are included in its annex. The blocking statute achieves its purpose through four core provisions. First, it prohibits EU persons from complying with those extraterritorial measures unless exceptionally authorized by the Commission. Second, it nullifies, within the EU, the effect of any foreign decision, judgment of the court, or administered decision outside the Union based on those measures.
Third, it entitles EU persons to recover in court any damages or losses from the persons who caused those damages by applying the listed extraterritorial measures. And fourth, it requires EU operators whose economic or financial interests are affected by those measures to inform the Commission. Let me now turn to how the regulation operates in practice. In practical terms, the blocking statute means that EU operators cannot comply with listed third-country extraterritorial sanctions when these are not recognized by the Union. The Bank Meli case, case C-124/20, confirmed that EU operators cannot terminate commercial dealings where the termination is intended to comply with listed third-country extraterritorial sanctions.
At the same time, Article 5 of the Blocking Statute provides for an authorization mechanism. Persons covered by the regulation may request the Commission's authorization to comply fully or partially with the listed third country's laws, but only when non-compliance would seriously damage their interests or those of the Union. In practice, this means that the commission looks at whether the company would face very serious consequences, for example, major economic losses that would risk its status quo, a real risk to its business operations, or significant negative effects for the union before granting such an authorization. If persons covered by the regulation comply with listed third countries' laws without having obtained an authorization under Article 5, they may be subject to penalties established by the member states. In addition, they may face civil action for damages brought by persons who suffered harm as a result of that compliance.
Finally, let me briefly address how the regulation can be updated. The scope of the blocking statute can be expanded to cover additional third-country laws with extraterritorial effects by amending the annex. This is done through a commission delegated act. The delegated act enters into force unless the European Parliament, by simple majority, or the Council, by qualified majority, objects within two months of notification. That period may be extended by a further 2 months at the initiative of either institution.
The Parliament or the Council may also inform the Commission earlier that they will not object. This mechanism ensures that the regulation remains adaptable to new circumstances. Thank you for your attention.
Ilhan Kyuchyuk
Thanks very much. Now it's time for members to intervene. And the first one will be Axel Voss for the EPP.
Thank you.
Axel Voss
You, chair. I'll be speaking in German. And thank you very much for the striking presentation of your situation. I think none of us would like to find ourselves in such a situation overnight. The extent of the impact that you are confronted with all of a sudden is something that is very difficult to imagine for someone living a steady life.
My question, on the other hand, is, of course, that we're all very much willing and ready to protect our European citizens and our judges. But my only question is the names of the terrorists in the U. S. It seems to be a purely arbitrary measure. And how does one approach that?
How can immunity help if it is not respected by the state taking such action? Now, obviously, you can provide that protection, but will it stop a name from being put on a list? And even if actions are taken against the right to protection, what recourse is there? Is there some kind of international definition for a terrorist, or is it up to each individual state to define it themselves? And with support from the European Parliament or whichever institution, is it not necessary to actually seek recourse in the U.S.?
S. And also seek removal from this list through due process in the U.S. S. Now, obviously, we can make decisions as an institution, and it might help in some small way. If we think about a protection program to be able to get one's everyday life up and running again, some kind of transitional emergency measure.
But I think that everything will depend on an understanding of how things have changed, given that the certainties we have now have been undermined, and what we can actually do to respond and perhaps change that. So, I'm sure we can take measures, but what do we do if those measures are flouted?
Speaker 12
Mister Repassi. Thank you, Chair, and especially thank you to all the experts for their presence here. And thanks, Missus Hola, for your clear account of what has happened. And I believe we should all listen very carefully because it starts with the judges of the International Court who render their judgments that are not in line with what the emperor in the White House thinks how things should be, and it will soon also be for members of this parliament. We have seen this happening with our colleagues from other countries.
And therefore, we should pay a lot of attention to what was said here. And we should pay attention to what we can do. And honestly, our duty is not to hold nice speeches, knowing the limitations that we have, but to do what we can. Mister Stelzer explained very clearly what we can do. The blocking statute is probably one of the strongest instruments that we have to protect institutions on our territory and citizens living within the European Union.
And, as was rightly explained, we are speaking about a commission delegated act. It is within the European Commission's political discretion to activate these mechanisms. And I am wondering why the European Commission has not done so. I can understand that Mr. Stelzer cannot give a reply to that. He is not the commissioner, and I deplore that the commission is not present.
And therefore, I urge today this house and all colleagues from political groups that in March, we have a plenary debate in the presence of the European Commission on that matter, so that the European Commission has to answer why they haven't activated it. And I urge them to activate a blocking statue as quickly as possible. Moreover, I would like to hear from the experts, and Mr. Ingaard invited us to ask the question: what else can we do? Because we know from past experience, and maybe Mr. Stelzer could enlighten us here as well, we have applied the blocking statute in the past, and its effectiveness was, let's call it, average. What were the reasons that, despite activating the blocking statute, compliance could still have been improved and that we still had situations where Miss Hola was involved, although the blocking statute was activated?
Moreover, it shows that we talk a lot about sovereignty here, but we actually don't have it, in particular digital sovereignty and payment sovereignty. So, where are the elements next to establishing those that we can now quickly fix one or the other element in order to allow citizens on this continent who do their job to conduct their life freely and in the way we want to protect them? Thank you.
Thank you.
Speaker 13
You. I'll be speaking French, and I'd like to begin by thanking Berthier Ola, the judge who has spoken to us today, as she is experiencing huge problems. Nicola Guyu is a judge at the International Criminal Court ruling on Palestine. So, we continue to condemn the sanctions issued by the US against these judges. As the judge has said, these are sanctions which are new, normally reserved for terrorists and criminals.
Now, the White House is using them against international judges, but also national judges, to intimidate them and threaten their independence. It's been a year and a half now that we have called on the commission to defend the independence of the ICC and to protect it by activating the blocking statute. And we've already called on the European Commission in plenary, and the Commission replied that they would do everything to protect the ICC, including activating the blocking statute, but nothing has been done. So the question remains: what can be done to justify the fact that nothing is happening, whereas when it falls within the powers of the commission to activate this blocking statute, this inertia is an act of complicity with the U.? S.
Administration attacks against the judge. And it runs counter to international law. We have Mr. Stelzer is with us, who is responsible for INFISMA. So, I'm going to ask what is going to be done to allow judges who are under sanction to continue a normal life and to be able to use payment systems.
When will we have European means of payment so that we have sovereignty in this area and are not taken hostage by such inimical measures from the US? Thank you.
Ilhan Kyuchyuk
Okay. For ECR, it will be Mario Mantovani. No? That is not the case. And then, for the Green Group, Kineke Strik?
Thank you.
Tineke Strik
Thank you so much for organizing this and also for your great witnessing of the consequences of these sanctions directly upon your work and upon your daily life. I think it's very clear, and you call upon us, sorry. I don't see you, but you call upon all of us to uphold international law and also to protect our independent instances and courts to do their job in order to uphold international law. And I think it's very legitimate, and we should respond and provide you with support and satisfactory responses. And we are very much depending, of course, on what the European Commission and the Council's member states are prepared to do.
So my call would also be about activating the blocking statute. I count already three resolutions that the European Parliament adopted in which we urgently called for the activation of the blocking statute. So, there's a clear majority in the European Parliament wanting the European Commission to do so. I just heard the explanation that the institutions can already let the commission know that they would not object. I think these resolutions are a clear signal that we don't object and that we want action.
So, my main question is actually also what needs to be done in order for the Commission to start with a delegated act. I don't know what else we should do, and let's see then if the council would object or not. But why has that not happened yet? Because the ICC has a seat in the EU. We always say we want to and need to support and protect the ICC.
So, please, I would like to get an answer from you. And I would also like to know from Missus Hohler, because you have a seat in The Hague. And I also come from the Netherlands. So, what is the Netherlands doing for you? Do you see any possibility for The Netherlands to do more in a protective way and maybe also to speak out in the council in order to have this activation of the court?
And I would also remind you, it's not about judges, but as you also say, it's about a lot of high UN officials, including rapporteurs, and about other actors collecting evidence in cooperation with the ICC. So it is really undermining fact-finding, investigating, and coming up with rulings that are in compliance with our international law. So that's actually the most important thing to Missus Stelze: what can we do, and what can we expect from the commission? And maybe also with Mr. Rheingard, are there any other things that we could do in order to make progress on this?
Speaker 6
Thank you, Mr. Zalemas. And please respect the two minutes speaking time because many of you wish to.
Dainius Žalimas
Thank you, Chair. Indeed, first of all, I would like to thank all the speakers, Professor Ehringer, for a very exhaustive and detailed report made also on the basis of well-standing case law of the International Court of Justice. And I fully agree with the conclusions, which actually apply even to third parties in respect of their own statute or state, which are not state parties. They should respect all the immunities due to the simple, pure norm of customary international law. But the problem here is much wider: the Trump administration is openly challenging international law and trying to replace it with a might-makes-right approach, and actually even to replace the United Nations with this crazy creation called the Board of Peace.
I would also like to fully thank the judge of the International Criminal Court for the presentation of his situation. Unfortunately, sympathy alone is not enough here. The situation is really deplorable. And, therefore, I have several questions, including to Mr. Michael Stelzer regarding the blocking statute and other measures. If I am right, the EU has previously tried to shield European actors from US territorial sanctions.
However, the experience during the Iran sanctions showed serious weaknesses. Enforcement was minimal. Many companies withdrew and preferred not to risk U.S. penalties. The deep financial integration with the US market made European protection measures largely ineffective. Given these lessons, how could we strengthen our existing protection framework so that we can genuinely defend the UN and ICC officials?
Specifically, would it be feasible to introduce clear, not penalties by member states, but EU-wide minimum penalties to ensure that member states enforce the rules? Should we also push for stronger central oversight at the EU level to prevent uneven and symbolic enforcement? And should an EU compensation or insurance mechanism be created to support entities that suffer financial losses? Thank you.
Madam Viral.
Speaker 17
Thank you very much, Chair. I'd like to start by thanking the speakers who addressed us today, and particularly Judge Holler for her personal testimony. It couldn't be clearer from your words how heavily this weighs on your life, on your personal life, on that of your colleagues, and how huge the impact is. But it's also very clear from what you say that this is much bigger than personal and individual consequences. This is jeopardizing the functioning and independence of an entire multilateral system, something that we, as the European Union, have been standing for decades.
Any extraterritorial measures that affect officials risk undermining international law, human rights protection, and accountability mechanisms—things that were very hard to build and to which we are not powerless. We can do something. We can act, and yet it seems that we are stuck in a loop of asking for it and not receiving it. And also not receiving clear answers because, let's be honest, it's not clear to me why this has not been activated yet, and it's not clear to me why, after numerous resolutions, numerous letters, and a hearing of two committees, we still cannot get—and apologies to Mister Sessler because he is doing his job—but we cannot get the commission to come here seriously and tell us what is the political reason behind this lack of action. We have a responsibility to protect our nationals and the institutions that we host, and we have the blocking statute.
And it's about time that we enforce it. To Mr. Sessler, I would like to ask you, from your perspective, as far as you can say, why this has not taken place? And I would like to echo the remarks of my colleague who said we really would have appreciated the presence of the commissioner in this important meeting, and we hope to see him in Strasbourg to take this conversation to the next level. Or perhaps that won't be necessary because by then, we will have seen the action that needed to take place a long time ago. Thank you.
Speaker 6
Madam Miss has to leave, but I would ask you to respect a one-minute speaking time because a lot of people still have to speak.
This.
Speaker 18
Debate requires clarity because the sanctions imposed by the US against the ICC and its judges, Francisco Banerjes, the judges here, and NGOs are clearly an attempt at political intimidation, blocking visas and credit cards. The impact on families and children being included on lists is unacceptable. These are the ways in which the U. S. Is defending the government's actions in Gaza. So it's absolutely essential that we stand firm and defend our institutions, defend the guarantees of democracy that those institutions represent, and defend European citizens.
Speaker 19
Frankly speaking, the European Commission has not been doing enough. It has not really been up to the challenge of this situation. It's a question of respect, dignity, and finding and using the tools that we have, just like the blocking statute, which has been designed to protect European citizens and allows us to act practically and urgently once and for all. Madam, thank you very much. Miss Hassan?
Speaker 28
Two minutes. Yes. Thank you, Chair. And thank you to all of the speakers for their contributions, particularly George Holler, whom I'd like to thank for coming and for speaking here. My question goes to Mr.
Speaker 21
Stelzer. I'd echo what has been said by many of my colleagues. The Parliament has repeatedly voted for the activation of the blocking statute by the Commission in the September 25 Gaza resolution and the Doir report on human rights in the world of January 2026. The debates, which Redell mentioned, also reiterated this request to the Commission. So, could you precisely spell out what exactly the obstacles are that the commission faces when it comes to activating the blocking statute? I'd also underscore that it's not possible, on the one hand, to complain about this repression of democracy, international law, and international jurisdiction, while at the same time failing to identify where the responsibility lies.
Speaker 20
These sanctions obviously come from the U.S. S. But behind that, there is a clear link between Israel and the U.S. S. It's as a result of pressure from Israel that the US has yielded.
Speaker 23
It's the work of many parliamentarians to put an end to Israel's impunity, including within the European institutions. Thank you. Thank you very much. That concludes the round of coordinators. There are three requests for the floor.
Mister Juarez?
Thank you.
In minutes.
Speaker 26
Yes. Thank you to Miss Hoeller for being here, for your account, and full sympathy from this committee with what you have told us. It would seem that the child emperor, as I would call him, is now putting innocent citizens on sanctions lists and actually freeing actual criminals from prison. And I think here in Europe, we keep wishing and hoping that our words will make a difference. We even congratulate each other on the stern words we say about all this.
Speaker 30
And at the end of the day, every time, we're surprised that nothing actually matters and nothing changes. And so, I imagine that Mr. Stelzer was not very excited about coming to this committee today. My question to him is like that of Mr. Repas.
Speaker 32
Why isn't the commissioner here to talk to us about the blocking regulation? And I suppose my question is: are we sacrificing fundamental rights and values on the altar of the feared major economic consequences to our companies, which I heard you talk about, and to our economy? And if that's not a question he can answer, can we have the commissioner come in and answer in his stead? I have one more question for the expert from The Netherlands, and that's: legally, to what extent does the EU have a duty to protect the ICC as a whole, which is not something we seem to be doing at the moment? Thank you.
Speaker 22
Mister Tarkinia and then Mister Assens, one minute each, and then we're going to go back to our speakers.
Thank you.
Speaker 25
You, Chairman. I'll speak Italian. Well, let me just very briefly thank our speakers, particularly Judge Hola. But what I want to say is the following. One of the risks that we run is that of double standards.
And let me explain what I mean. I mean, here, we're seeing immunities that are not working. And we have actions that are also being used as a warning because, as we've heard, it could affect others quite soon. I mean, now it's the judge; it could be others. But I want to briefly mention a couple of people who work for international or important national institutions who have been killed.
So, here we're talking about Ambassador Luca Tanacio, the Italian ambassador killed in the Congo. And we have an international organization that is blocking the procedures. And then Mario Fachola was killed in Colombia; he was working for the UN. And again, that justice is not being done because the case is blocked due to immunities. The problem is that immunity is an issue when it comes to the justice system.
Speaker 29
We can't try to act in these cases, and this is a really serious situation.
Speaker 27
Chairman. What's happening is very serious. Trump doesn't act in line with what his judges say, but he also persecutes judges with sanctions. The most serious thing is that we are playing his game. I'm a criminal lawyer, and here I can clearly see the crimes of intimidation and obstruction of justice, which go against the Statute of Rome.
There is a blocking statute, and we've used it in the past to protect economic interests in the European Union. So, why don't we use it now to protect our judges? This is a great concern because we have contributed to genocide in Gaza, but now we are contributing to the persecution of judges who are trying to investigate what is going on. And we're doing that passively because we have tools to protect them, but we're not using them. The line that separates civilization from barbarity is this: having independent officials and judges, like the judge we heard from today, who can apply the appropriate measures without fear of reprisals.
It's not enough what we've heard from Mr. Tesla, when he says that the commission regrets what happened. That's not enough. We shouldn't regret anything. We should act to protect our judges. Not defending our judges makes us accomplices to the crime.
Thank you.
Speaker 6
You. I think everyone who wanted to take the floor has spoken, so that's good. So let's now give the floor to our speakers so that they can respond to the questions that have been asked to them. So, Mr. Ringer, he's online.
Five minutes, sir.
Speaker 5
Thank you for those questions. Highly interesting, but also challenging. So the key question that we are confronted with is: what could be done, what should be done, and what recourse is there to be had? I can tell you that the International Court of Justice will not have jurisdiction in this specific case. U.
S. Has not accepted the jurisdiction. There will not be an international dispute settlement mechanism available. Seeking recalls in the United States could be a possibility. The problem there is, in my view, that constitutional protections may not extend to non-U.S. citizens.
S. Nationals. So, if judges or prosecutors act without U. S. Nationality challenges their listing; it may be an issue.
I know some U.S. S. Persons, including natural persons working together with the ICC, have successfully challenged the sanctions in relation to them. They were prevented from cooperating with the ICC as experts, and courts have referred to issues of freedom of speech, for instance, and have granted or upheld the challenge. Then, a question about EU legal duties. The EU is not a party as such to the Rome Statute, but as I pointed out, and as Judge Horner also pointed out, there is a cooperation agreement between the EU and the ICC.
There's an Article IV, which could provide the legal basis for a general obligation of cooperation as appropriate, but the agreement doesn't really specify what the obligation entails in practice. What it could mean in practice is the following: So, what could be done? We've heard about the blocking statute today. We haven't heard yet about the anti-coercion instruments, which could also be a possibility.
We've heard a lot about the anti-coercion instruments in relation to the U. S. Claims regarding Greenland. But why not think about using the anti-coercion instrument to protect the ICC? Now, at the same time, this instrument has never been applied, and the risk of escalation is, of course, very real.
So, it's not the first option that I would consider. Second, activating the blocking statute. We've had many questions about the blocking statute, my €0.50 here. The blocking statute was indeed adopted at that time. We've also heard that from representatives of the Commission to counter the extraterritorial effects of certain U.S. actions.
S. Laws. So the blocking statute may apply as the U.S. S. The executive order has certain extraterritorial effects, which have been explained.
Now, even if the blocking statute applies, it may not have much bite. That is my concern. And this is because the essence of the blocking statute is a prohibition of compliance. It basically means that operators, EU operators, are barred from giving effect to U. S.
Extraterritorial sanctions and, well, halting business with the ICC. Now, when halting business or discontinuing business with the ICC, operators may always cite grounds other than U. S. Law. They can always say, just for business reasons, that we stopped dealing with the ICC.
And, in that case, the statute doesn't apply. Now, even if it applies and EU operators are forced to continue business with the ICC because that is the consequence of the compliance prohibition, they still risk being penalized by the United States. So, we should not forget that. They violate the U. S.
Sanctions risk violating such sanctions. And we all know that you. S. Penalties can be extremely high. So this is hardly an attractive option for operators with important U.
S. Interests. Now you can compensate them via the EU, via EU funds or member state funds, but that will be very costly, bearing in mind indeed that the U. S. Penalties may be very high.
Final remark for me: although I am a lawyer, the way forward is not legal; it is political and economic. So, it's about enhanced strategic autonomy and resilience; Judge Holler also referred to this, regarding the ICC and the European Union. As long as we, the EU, and the ICC are dependent on the U.S. S. Service providers, technology, and banking: we risk being coerced by the United States.
I'm not privy to much detail, but I understand that, with European help, key steps have recently been taken to ensure that ICC operations can more or less continue by relying on European digital and financial infrastructure. And I think this is really something to expand further. Thank you.
Speaker 6
Thank you, Mr. Stelzen. Now I think I understood that we weren't going to ask any questions outside your remit. And I really think that the Parliament does need to try to ensure that the Commission triggers this blocking statute. But technically, would you be ready for that if the decision were to be made?
I mean, would you be ready to actually act? Or how long would it take? And my second question: we've heard a lot about independence and sovereignty. What do you have in your toolbox to ensure that we can be independent in terms of payments? I mean, do you have something available, or do we have to come up with something new?
Speaker 10
Let me maybe bundle a few of the questions that we've heard today, especially whether we would activate the blocking statute and what happened in the past. As you said, I cannot speak for the commission, but I can tell you what happened last time when we activated the blocking statute, because I have firsthand experience in applying it since the Iran case. At the time, this was a strong political signal to the US that we disapproved of the application of extraterritorial sanctions when we wanted to preserve the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran. The aim of the blocking statute at the time was to encourage EU operators to continue to do business with Iran. The problem was that a lot of this business had already stopped because the sanctions before had led to a decrease in EU-Iran business relations.
And the blocking statute was maybe not the right tool to encourage EU businesses to return to Iran. Another important development since then is the judgment of the European Court of Justice that I mentioned in the Bank Malli case, which includes a reversal of the burden of proof. It is the EU operator who wants to cease contractual commercial relations with an entity that must demonstrate that this was not done to comply with US sanctions if they are in the annex of the blocking statute. So, there are now two ways to enforce the blocking statute. One is through member states that apply the penalties and implement the blocking statute, and the other is by going to court.
Any EU operator that suffers damage can go to court and sue the person who has caused the damage, in application of the extraterritorial sanctions that are in the annex of the blocking statute. Then, to answer the question of the chair, whether we are ready, we were ready in the past. We were very quick. How quickly we can go also depends on the readiness of the European Parliament and the European Council to signal their agreement. So they can already renounce the two-month period by giving a statement that they are fine with the application of the blocking statute as proposed by the commission.
As I said before, there is no political decision on whether the blocking statute should be applied in this case. Last time in Iran, this went up to the highest political echelons. It was discussed at the European Council, and it is likely that a tool as prominent as the blocking statute, carrying as much political weight, would also be discussed at the highest political levels. In addition, there is a lot that we are already doing now. As I said, we are in close contact with the ICC and with the member states, not only those that are most closely associated with the ICC, such as The Netherlands as the host state, but we inform all member states of developments in this case.
Our primary aim has been to favor diplomatic outreach to the United States and to find practical solutions to allow the ICC to continue its important work. So far, the ICC as a whole has not been sanctioned and is fully operational. We also continue, as the Commission and DG FISMA in particular, important work to increase our economic sovereignty and payment sovereignty. Economic security is at the top of the agenda for the Commission. Payment services and independence from American payment providers are top of the agenda for the European Commission.
An important work is also being done to implement the digital euro, which might also play an important role. There is already the Payment Accounts Directive, which gives the right to a basic bank account, a basic safeguard that has also worked in this case. But we acknowledge that the situation the US-sanctioned judges face is far from ideal. That said, we would continue in this vein, keeping all options on the table and lending our support to the ICC to keep it fully operational. Thank you.
Speaker 6
Sorry, madam. Hola. You can conclude our question and answer session. You have the floor, ma'am.
Speaker 8
Thank you very much for that honor, Mister Chair. I will quickly answer the question from the honorable member of parliament from The Netherlands regarding the support from The Netherlands. The Netherlands has been very supportive as a host state. The court works very closely with it. It has been, is, and will continue to be instrumental.
But I am, again, happy to say that the relationship has been positive and very helpful. To conclude, I don't have many words. I will reiterate what I have said and call on these committees and the parliament to really keep this issue on the agenda. It is important that it doesn't fade into the background, and we have heard a lot today about the blocking statute. I understand there might be different views.
It may not be a perfect solution. But if I can add my 2¢, I think it is a step in the right direction. But in this situation, the protection of judicial independence and the rule of law really must be high on the agenda, I would say, of the European Union. For one reason other than the obvious one, because I believe that the national rule of law and the international rule of law are all connected. And if we allow the undermining of the international rule of law, it will sooner or later trickle down to the national level.
And I think that is something we really have to pay attention to. I thank you very much for this discussion once again, to the chairs, to all the members of the parliament, and to everyone present. Thank you.
Speaker 33
Thank you very much, and please express all our sympathies, solidarity, and support to all the other judges who have been sanctioned as well. Would you like to say anything to conclude, please?
Ilhan Kyuchyuk
Dear judge and all the speakers for today's present, I think the signal from the European Parliament, in particular from the two committees, is very clear. We are with you, win in this struggle. And the message to the European Commission is that we have to find ways to uphold the international order by maintaining high democratic standards and our institutional order before that. And also, thank you, dear colleagues, for being so active and engaging in this discussion to get together with us today. And, last but not least, this was, I think, exemplary cooperation with the withdrawal committee, and we are happy to continue and even more to strengthen our cooperation with you, dear Munir, because we see the reason.
Speaker 34
See the reason for that. And, yeah, with that, I would like to thank you and wish you well. Colleagues, please take your seats. I'm about to start. Mister Voss?
Ilhan Kyuchyuk
Okay. Next item is the establishment of European business wallets, and the rapporteur is Mr. Voss. And I'll give.
Axel Voss
You, Mister Voss, immediately take the floor for 4 minutes. Thank you. So, dear chair, dear colleagues, Europe does not lose competitiveness because our companies lack innovation. We lose competitiveness because they spend too much time navigating bureaucracy. So up to 20% of staff time in companies is absorbed by compliance tasks.
So, for SMEs, the burden is even heavier. And when they operate across borders, procedures are still fragmented, repetitive, and sometimes even paper-based. So this is not acceptable in 2024. So, the European business wallets can be a real breakthrough here. They create a harmonized digital framework for identification, signatures, mandates, and secure document exchange, with full legal equivalence across the Union.
And for the first time, a company registered in one member state could seamlessly approve its identity, submit documents, and receive legally valid notifications anywhere in Europe digitally, securely, and instantly. So, ambition alone is not enough. It's about delivering materials. First, from my point of view, the implementation must be realistic and fast. Businesses cannot wait years before they see the benefits.
We already have the eIDAS ecosystem. We already have European trust services. We should build on that and ensure rapid availability for companies, not long transition periods. Second, this must strengthen Europe's digital sovereignty. So, the wallet should be based on European technology, European standards, and European cybersecurity requirements.
At the same time, it must remain market-driven and technologically neutral, and innovation does not come from overregulation. It comes from competition. Third, we must protect SMEs from new burdens. The purpose of this proposal is simplification. So, onboarding must be simple, and costs must be proportionate.
Micro enterprises and self-employed professionals should benefit, not be overwhelmed by complex compliance layers. If we get this balance right—speed, sovereignty, and simplicity—the European business wallet can become a cornerstone of a truly digital single market. And this, that is Europe, our business need, and this is what we should have in mind when we are talking about this. So, thanks a lot for your attention.
Ilhan Kyuchyuk
Thank you very much, Mr. Voss. And now I give the floor to Shadora Portur, starting with "What about us?" for Sinduro.
Speaker 26
Thank you, Chair. Thank you to Axel for his exposé. And speaking for myself and having looked at the proposal, I warmly welcome the proposed business wallet and hope we can make a valuable contribution to it along the lines outlined by my colleague, Voss. I think that the digital sovereignty that he mentioned, especially, is important in light of our previous agenda item even. I think the simple onboarding sounds good.
And importantly, I also think that what we're doing now is exactly the type of simplification that we should be delivering. When we look at obstacles to the single market—actual obstacles, things we can do something about—then this type of simplification needs to be addressed, and we need to ensure that companies in our single market can benefit from simple procedures and digitization. The devil, of course, as always, will be in the detail. A system that instills just as much trust as a stamp on paper, if not more, is what we should be after. And part of that will be clear identification and, as mentioned, I think, standards of data protection. This wallet also needs to be attractive to use and accessible for all sorts of organizations, including an ambitious rollout in the public sector, which we should look at.
And for this, we should consider feasibility and support quite carefully. We should also avoid any confusion about what this proposal is and is not. It is something that can speed up compliance and paperwork. It could be an incredibly valuable tool for procedures requiring identification, such as the Know Your Customer requirements for anti-money laundering. But what it isn't is a one-stop shop to comply with absolutely everything, and neither can it be.
Speaker 35
It's a means to an end, and in my judgment, a very good one, but not an end in itself. Thank you very much.
Dainius Žalimas
Yes. Thank you very much. I really get the honor to read her remarks. Thank you, first of all, for organizing this useful exchange. I am very happy to see this proposal from the Commission to set up a European business wallet that builds on the digital identity wallet system.
In this parliament, we talk a lot about simplification and competitiveness. And for me, this is the best example of how we can deliver a simpler business environment for our companies. It is by making use of new technologies and finding smart ways to improve all the necessary administrative processes. But it is not enough to just set up the system. We need to make sure that it will be adopted by companies if we want this solution to actually make things better.
So, my priority when looking at this proposal is to ensure that it gets a certain level of functionality so that it can actually be of value to companies. And we must keep in mind at all times that the final product should be easy to use for companies. I know that changing our way of doing things is always hard, and we will never convince our companies to switch to their business wallets if it is too complicated to understand. I will also look to see whether there are any opportunities to further strengthen the once-only principle. Because having to submit the same document to a different department has no place in this day and age.
Another important issue is making sure that we have interoperability or compatibility with existing systems and solutions in those countries that have already taken the first steps in providing digital identity solutions for their companies. I welcome the Commission's attention to this in the proposal because we have to avoid penalizing front-runners. Otherwise, we reach disincentivizing innovation. And lastly, I want to emphasize the role this can play in facilitating cross-border activity for companies. Bringing down internal trade barriers and friction is the easiest way to improve business conditions in Europe.
Together with a digital-first strategy, we can deliver real benefits to our economies. I look forward to working together to deliver a positive opinion on the commission's proposal. Thank you.
Ilhan Kyuchyuk
Mario Montovanni for Issia. Not ready? Okay. Mister Ravadev, would you like to take the floor, please?
Speaker 37
Thank you very much, Chairman, colleagues. The European Commission's proposal to set out a framework for European business portfolios is an ambitious and strategically important step to ensure a genuinely functioning digital single market within the Union. When we speak about cross-border interoperability in the public sector, it must be clear that the problem no longer lies in the lack of digital services, but rather in the lack of legal and technical interoperability among those services. Nowadays, most public services are already available online at the national level, but beyond the border, they simply fail. And this is a serious impediment for citizens, for businesses, and for the functioning of the single market.
Speaker 36
The commission's proposal correctly emphasizes the mandatory evaluations of interoperability whenever new digital public services are developed. It also emphasizes common standards and the reuse of existing solutions. This is a step towards a genuine implementation of the once-only principle, and it is particularly important that the Commission proposes a horizontal approach linking different sectors, from tax registration to public procurement. At the same time, it must be clearer how the new obligations of interoperability will be combined with existing sectoral frameworks of reporting. We need good coordination because we cannot afford parallel procedures or new layers of bureaucracy.
The new requirements addressed to public authorities and providers must not result in additional burdens, especially for smaller administrations. They must be an instrument to prevent future fragmentation, rather than a new bureaucratic burden. So, it is particularly important to have a proportionality clause and simplified procedures for SMEs and small public administrations. Let me emphasize that the proposal poses a risk of overreliance on future implementation acts. Such acts will be needed for the structure of the unique identifier and for the technical specifications and standards for the directory, which are prerequisites to limit parliamentary oversight over key elements of the system.
Overall, however, the Commission's proposal is a good one, strategically speaking. It recognizes that we are facing a structural problem and that interoperability must be a legal requirement rather than a voluntary practice. It is our task as lawmakers to guarantee that the framework is at the same time mandatory and really implementable so that it reduces rather than redistributes administrative requirements. At the end of the day, if we want the single market to be a space without barriers, we should deepen legal integration and further develop digital infrastructure. Thank you.
Mario Mantovani
The proposal on the European business wallet is something we really need to discuss. I mean, giving businesses a tool that enables them to interact with public administration, sign and seal documents, etc., is the kind of tool that the single market genuinely needs, I'm sure. But let me just say that we currently have 9 different digital tools that are aimed at businesses and administrations: Hebris, Boris, UTS, the business wallet, the 28th regime, the digital passport, etc. They're all complementary, but they all at least partially overlap. So, I want to share that concern of mine with colleagues and the commission.
I mean, I don't want us to try to resolve the fragmentation of the single market using fragmented tools that are burdensome for businesses. In addition, businesses continue to manage a whole series of identification codes: the single European identifying number, the obligatory international code, the customs code, and the national VAT codes, and none of these tools are being eliminated. On the content of the proposal, I would turn to Rapporteur Vos, and I would like us to propose specific provisions at least for micro businesses, those with less than 10 employees, which will be good to have non-burdensome access to the digital wallet, a multilingual interface, technical assistance for onboarding, a set of obligatory functionalities which are in line with real requirements, and also, for example, for requests for public funding or participation in public tenders. E. These things that are quite common should have assistance and easy procedures.
And we need to ensure that we don't have the burden, once again, falling on those who have the fewest resources. Thank you.
Ilhan Kyuchyuk
Thank you. I don't see any other member wishing to speak on this matter, and I would like to invite the European Commission to take the floor if they wish to do so. And I was informed that Madam Radu is here. Alina Radu is the deputy head of unit for DigiConnect. You have the form, madam.
Speaker 39
Thank you very much. Indeed, this is a commission proposal aimed at simplification, very much in response to the Dragi and Leta reports, and intended to address the administrative burden currently borne by companies. We know that 55% of the SMEs in Europe report that administrative burden is their primary challenge, and this business wallet comes in response to that. As it has already been said, it will provide a unified, legally recognized, and secure digital tool for public administrations and businesses to identify themselves, to sign, to share documents, to talk to each other, and to public administrations. I also wanted to emphasize that it will cater to the needs of the self-employed and those of the sole traders.
It also very much recognizes the issue of digital sovereignty that was raised here today. There is a provision in the commission proposal that business wallet providers are meant to be European companies established in the Union and not subject to control from third countries. Likewise, the proposal of the commission also recognizes that there are indeed existing systems that have to be considered and on which we are building, very much avoiding overlaps but still reusing the existing system precisely so that we don't add burden on companies. However, at the same time, although we have similar systems in some member states, they are not functioning cross-border. And this is something very important in the context we are discussing today.
Of course, the business wallet, we expect it to be the basis of the European digital public infrastructure, together with the EU digital identity wallets. And we are very much available and open for discussions whenever needed in this house. Thank you very much, and we look forward to the next steps.
Ilhan Kyuchyuk
Intervention for your intervention. Mister Rapporteur, back to you for 2 minutes.
Of Deutsche.
Axel Voss
Thank you. Let me try in German this time. Firstly, I'd like to thank everyone who has spoken. Everyone is full of ambition, and I think that is a good thing because we all really need to do something new. We don't want to get stuck in a rut, and we need to take advantage of what is already there.
I am grateful for the hint concerning overlapping legal acts. I'm not sure we'll be able to fix everything, but I appreciate the suggestion, and we'll have to see how to go about it. If we go into all of these things, like unraveling bureaucracy and wallet providers in the EU. These are all a good start. It's a way of fostering a digital single market.
It needs extra bits and pieces, but it is an important step forward. And I think that this ambition is good for the debate we're going to have. Thank you.
Ilhan Kyuchyuk
Thank you very much. Just to remind the members that the presentation of the draft opinion is planned for our jury meeting in April 2026, of course. So, with that, I close the meeting, and the next part will start at 05:00. So we have a 20-minute break.
Good planning.
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