Committee on Security and Defence Ordinary meeting Delegation for relations with the NATO Parliamentary Assembly Joint meeting

Name: Committee on Security and Defence Ordinary meeting Delegation for relations with the NATO Parliamentary Assembly Joint meeting
Uploaded: 2026-02-24T16:10:45+00:00

00:06 - 02:00

Speaker 1

Dear colleagues, we will now have a debrief on the recent meeting of NATO defense ministers with NATO's Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Defense Policy and Planning, François-Marie Roujon. We understand the minister had their usual point on further strengthening deterrence and defense capabilities, and increasing defense spending. An important outcome of the minister's meeting was the launch of the Arctic Sentry Initiative, which brings together allied activities in the region under a single command. There was also a session on the NATO-Ukraine Council with the participation of the Ukraine Defense Minister and the EU High Representative, Kaya Kalas. A lot was said in the media about the level of participation of the US and the Undersecretary of War.

Eldridge called this lecture on NATO's needs to focus on its original mandate, where Europe must assume primary responsibility for its own conventional defense. In this direction, the US is putting pressure on NATO to reduce its international commitments, including the operations in Iraq and Kosovo. And this, together with the most recent US decisions to hand over NATO joint force command at Naples and Norfolk to European officers, indicates that the US is declaring its policy to reduce its commitment to NATO and European security. It is, of course, positive that Europe is taking greater responsibility for European defense, but we must be clear-eyed about the speed of this change while we are also stepping up to support Ukraine in its defense against Russian aggression. So, Mr. Guzhong, I would be grateful if you could debrief our members about the outcome and main conclusions of this ministerial meeting.

The floor is yours for 15 minutes if it's enough time. There's.

02:01 - 02:48

Speaker 2

Way enough time. Thank you very much, Madam Chair, and thank you for this opportunity. It's a real pleasure for me to be here with you this afternoon and to brief you on the main outcomes of our last defense ministerial meeting. So, allied defense ministers met on 12th February and had very fruitful discussions around NATO's priorities, which are, as you recall, strengthening NATO's deterrence and defense posture, ramping up our defense industrial production, and stepping up our support to Ukraine. World peace efforts are underway. It's clear that we are making good progress on all fronts, but more—and I would say a lot more—still needs to be done.

02:48 - 03:37

Speaker 3

Ministers, we confirm that European allies in Canada are stepping up and taking greater responsibility for their conventional defense. At the same time, the United States reconfirmed its commitment to NATO's deterrence and defense. In this context, the Secretary General also publicly welcomed that, with Europe taking on a bigger role, this will only strengthen NATO further. As far as our deterrence and defense posture is concerned, we are seeing significant increases in allied defense spending and clear progress towards investing 5% of GDP in defense, as agreed at the Hague Summit last year. This is a real mindset change, and all allies understand the sense of urgency and ownership.

03:39 - 05:53

Speaker 2

Defense ministers also discussed integrated air and missile defense, strengthening our command and control, improving our force readiness, as well as our ability to deploy and sustain allied forces through the necessary host-nation support. Ministers also exchanged ideas on how we, as an alliance and as individual allies, can constrain, contest, and counter Russia's malign activities. Another crucial element of the discussion was the need to boost our industrial production and innovation across the alliance. Not only must we ensure that our defense investment delivers as fast as possible the capabilities needed to keep our people safe and to defend every inch of allied territory, but we also must harness our technologies and develop industries and production lines on both sides of the Atlantic. I want to deliver on NATO's capability targets. We absolutely must leverage innovation at scale, as Russia's military is also transforming itself.

A new generation of companies is producing incredible technologies, and we're seeing evidence of this every day. We need to harness these developments. Going forward, we will be looking at how to mass-produce innovation in order to modernize our arsenals, and this means looking into contracting, financing, and manufacturing. As we look towards the summit in Ankara, we will also be considering, in a broader sense, how the alliance engages with industry and its role in our defense industrial preparedness. This includes ensuring the right foundations are in place, particularly access to critical raw materials, and reducing our vulnerabilities. In addition, and in the wake of Russia's increased military activity and China's growing assertiveness and interest in the Arctic and the High North, our allies agree that it is important that we step up as an alliance to ensure security in the region.

05:53 - 07:20

Speaker 3

This is why NATO has launched the Arctic Century. This multi-domain activity will further strengthen NATO's posture in the Arctic and the High North over time, as we expect persistent NATO presence in the region to grow. Ministers also had fruitful discussions about our continued support for Ukraine, including through NATO's prioritized Ukraine requirements list initiative. It is essential to ensure that US equipment delivered to Ukraine is paid for by allies and partners. Once again, the NATO-Ukraine Council was an essential mechanism for political consultation.

Ukraine's Defense Minister, Fedorov, updated on the situation on the battlefield and highlighted Ukraine's urgent needs, including defense. The Secretary General made it clear that NATO's support, including through the Pearl, would not waver. But we are reminded that in 2026, Ukraine will need $60 billion for its defense from its partners, and here, fair burden sharing will be key. And the European Union obviously plays an extremely important role in this regard. So overall, this DMM defense ministers' meeting provided important guidance to continue our work ahead of the NATO summit in Ankara.

07:21 - 07:25

Speaker 2

And with this, I now stand ready to take any questions you may have. Thank you very much.

07:27 - 07:35

Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann

Thank you very much. I now give the floor to our colleague, Emilio. And could you add, please? Thank you.

07:36 - 08:36

Speaker 4

Thank you, Madam Chair. And thank you, Mr. Guzhon. As the chair of the European Parliament delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, I wish you a very warm welcome here and thank you for having accepted our invitation to update us regarding the meeting of defense ministers of NATO. On February 12. That meeting was held at a very significant juncture.

I think I understood that the Secretary of Defense of the United States was not present, and that absence can be interpreted by public opinion as the latest sign of weakness in the American security commitments to Europe. But I welcome the fact that, thanks to NATO, primarily the greening crisis has been overcome. And.

08:37 - 08:37

I

08:37 - 10:50

Speaker 4

I think you can confirm that work is ongoing for security guarantees in the Arctic. In the difficult geopolitical context, I wanted to highlight the importance of building a European security architecture, strengthening transatlantic links, and promoting stability in the eastern and southern parts of Europe. The continued support for Ukraine and the presence of NATO in the East are also important. A just and lasting peace in Ukraine is a prerequisite for security in Europe. On Ukraine, unfortunately, Russia is still striking the strategic infrastructure of Ukraine, and Ukraine appears to need defense systems more than ever.

Could you tell us how NATO is coordinating aid from allies and Ukraine? And particularly with regard to the air defense capacity, have new packages for support been agreed upon on February 12 and then at the NATO-Ukraine Council? Secretary General Ruta talked about a change of mentality with regard to increased European defense spending. Could you also clarify what the Secretary General actually means in terms of this change, and explain in which areas the Europeans are stepping up their efforts and where there is still a lack or delay? With regard to the Naples and Norfolk commands, which have been under U.S. S.

Control up until now. Could you give us some idea regarding the motivation for the changes? And could you tell us if this is the beginning of the construction of a real European pillar within the transatlantic alliance? Thank you very much for your availability.

10:50 - 10:56

Now, I give the floor to the members of the first round. So, Christophe, from EPP.

10:56 - 10:58

Thank you, Anam Chair. We speak in French.

11:00 - 12:15

Speaker 5

Thank you, François-Marie, for your introductory remarks. I have a number of questions. At the meeting of defense ministers, the 5% target has almost been achieved by some countries. Others will never get there. Do the ministers really believe in this, or is this just lip service and fine words?

Another question on regional commands. The U.S. S. They have abandoned some positions, but the U. S.

The generals are still there. Is there a date soon when we will see them passed on to European command? What is the U? S. Mindset?

Do you see them willing to pass the reins to the Europeans for strengthening the Eastern front against the Russian threat and European troops in Romania, Lithuania, and Latvia? What is your feeling about a US presence? If we had a coalition of the willing, do you really think that the Americans would be involved? Thank you.

12:15 - 12:16

Martins?

12:16 - 12:47

Speaker 6

Yeah. Thank you. Well, we are all aware of the political tensions we have with one member state here in Europe. I mean, Victor Orban in Hungary, as well as Roberto Fitto in Slovakia. But how is it in those meetings where our defense ministers are together?

Do you also feel any tensions over there? Regarding the NATO issues, everyone is pretty united. Thank you.

12:56 - 21:44

Speaker 2

All right. Well, thank you. Thank you very much. Quite a number of the questions revolve around the same topic. So, I will first address what our U. S.

Have shared the implications for the flag to post, or the changes in the flag to post distribution of roles and responsibilities. Let me start with this. I think what the Secretary General meant when he was saying that there was a clear mindset shift is that we've heard consistently from our US ally, and that was not just under Secretary Colby as the defense minister meeting, but there's been a consistent line by US interlocutors, including Secretary Hecces, in past ministerial meetings. The expectation is absolutely clear that Europeans need to take a more prominent role in the conventional defense of Europe. That has been absolutely clear.

So, I don't think the fact that Secretary Colby was there rather than the Secretary of War actually meant anything because the message was absolutely clear and repeated. And I think his invention was also made public on the Internet. It can be found on the Internet. So I think the message is, first of all, extremely consistent in terms of expectations for Europeans. Now, to answer your concern over the sincerity or the sustainability of defense investment.

I think the main reason why we came up with the figure of 3.5% is not because we were asked by one ally to go to that level, but just because the defense planning that we are responsible for, and therefore the capabilities that we assess, need to resource the plan and to be able to fight the plans, especially after three decades of underinvestment. Those capability targets are grounded in operational plans. So those were not just produced or from thinner just because we thought it was useful or because we had to figure out a number. It was the exact translation, in terms of capabilities, of the operational plans that our heads of state collectively agreed on back in Vilnius three years ago. Heads of state having approved operational plans, the capabilities needed for those plans were distributed amongst allies. Therefore, the average assessment was that it would cost, give or take, 3.5% of GDP, not only for the new capability targets but also to make up for, again, three decades of underinvestment.

And so, the reason why I am quite confident that the allies will continue on that path towards 3.5 is not because we are being asked to do it. It's because it is necessary to fight the plans, and the plans are indispensable for our own security. So, I think also, if we compare to the situation we were in back in the Cold War, I think 3.5 is probably where we were back in the eighties. So it's not unfeasible in technical and political terms. Granted, I mean, it was a different situation back then, but I think, technically, it's feasible.

So, when we speak about the mindset shifts, coming to your question regarding the distribution or redistribution of roles and responsibilities within the command structure, I think it's quite telling that now you've got Europeans as the heads of the three joint force commands. And the three joint force commands are the operational commands in charge of large chunks of Europe's or Euro-Atlantic theater. So they are the battlespace owners, if I use military terms, and they are the ones responsible for issuing orders and employing the forces that allies would put under their responsibility. So I would slightly differ with the view that the US is remaining in control. It is Europe; it will be Europeans in control of the joint force command.

And underneath them, the US will be, well, they used to be already in AIRCOM and LAMCOM, but they are now shifting from JFC Naples to MARCOM, which absolutely makes sense because, anyway, it's a question of dual-hatting of U. S. Generals in the U.S. S. Chain of command.

S. Army, come up. S. Army Europe is also dual-hatted as COMLANDCOM for land forces. US forces Europe is dual-headed as COMAIRCOM for air command. And now we have, sorry, US naval forces Europe dual-headed as COMMARCOM.

So, I wouldn't downplay it, but I also wouldn't overplay it. It is, to me, a rebalancing more than a complete revolution. But I think it also sends a clear signal that Europeans, especially in the central region, are ready to resume command and responsibility for defense and deterrence. In regard to the question of shape, I don't think shape has been seriously discussed so far. And I think there's one very good reason for this.

It is that, in the end, somebody has to be responsible for escalation management all the way up to the nuclear threshold. And somebody has to be responsible also for decisions pertaining to NATO nuclear operations, which, as you know, are US weapons operated by some of the European allies. So, therefore, it makes sense at some point to have somebody who has visibility over the entire scale of escalation, including up to the employment of nuclear weapons by Europeans. When it comes to the US presence on the Eastern flank, I think it's a very good question. But so far, all the indications that we've had are that we have not seen any huge drawdown or reduction in the US force posture on the Eastern flank.

And we're still waiting to see whether they would change this. But so far, it has been quite limited, and we have not received or seen any indication that this will change. So, again, we are waiting for our US colleagues to express their views. When it comes to atmospherics at the defense minister's meeting, I think it was absolutely clear from all Europeans around the table that they were getting the message loud and clear from our USRI on the one hand, and that they were absolutely convinced that they needed to collectively deter and defend. So deterrence and defense are matters of collective action and collective signaling.

I think that was the atmosphere in the room. Have I covered all the questions? Yes. Oh, so sorry, regarding the first question. NSATU, so the command that we now have under NATO that coordinates the delivery and the planning for the delivery of capabilities is now in full swing.

So we are quite happy with the way NSATU works and has taken over some of the responsibilities from the US-led command. At the same time, all the decisions that were made were not made in the defense minister's meeting format, but in the UDCG. So, in terms of decisions that were made, I would refer you to what the UDCG has decided because it's not in NATO format. It was not a DMM per se.

21:48 - 22:21

Are there any more questions? Thank you very much. Really interesting, and thank you for your open words. And I think the message is really noisy and unclear, but it was interesting to hear. And we know what we have to do.

And I think NATO has to know what they want, and the European partners of the countries, and we have to go to our governments. And if they have no idea what they should do, we could help. Okay. Thank you very much.

22:21 - 22:23

Thank you very much, Patia.

22:23 - 22:58

And in case we call you again, sure. If it's possible at any time. Okay. So, dear colleagues, just the dates of the next meeting: on the 25th of February in Brussels and on the 18th to 19th of March in Brussels. That's it.

Thank you very much, and see you.