Special committee on the European Democracy Shield Ordinary meeting
Legende
Markierungen im Transkript
- Text Aktuell abgespielter Satz
- Text Suchergebnis
- Text Redebeitrag, auf den der geöffnete Link verweist
Klicken Sie auf einen Satz, um das Video ab dieser Stelle abzuspielen. Markieren Sie Text, um ihn mit Redner, Zeitstempel und Link zu zitieren.
Weitere Optionen
EUDS European Parliament
Ihren Sitzungen folgenRedner 8
I'm really sorry. Someone will try to do it, but she doesn't usually do it. So, yes. I don't know where the technician has gone, but thank you for trying.
Redner 3
We need a password. Right? Okay. I'll continue, meanwhile. Although today it is discussed at the level of the UN, regional intergovernmental organizations, and the European Union institutions, the international community has yet to fully realize the scale of the regime's efforts to suppress dissent outside its jurisdiction and adopt effective measures to counter it.
The recent escalation in the Lukashenko regime's use of TNR, its increasing variety of instruments employed, its deepening cooperation with the Putin regime in applying TNR, and the inconsistent international community's response motivated us at iSense to do a study and produce a report that we released in September. You can find paper copies of the report over there, on the table. And at the end of my remarks, if the slides are up and running, there will be a QR code with a link to the report. You can find it on our website, isense.org. Well, in the past few years, targets of the TNR have broadened from traditional dissenters such as human rights defenders, journalists, and political opposition to include academics, legal professionals, diaspora communities, supporters of victims, and others.
All those living in exile and involved in human rights and pro-democracy activities in respect of the state realizing TNR, or those who support political prisoners or exiled dissidents, have good chances of becoming targets of TNR regardless of their national connection to the state. In legal terms, importantly, there is currently no common definition of TNR at the level of international treaties. Its absence has impeded the development of evidence-based and comprehensive policy responses to TNR. The drafting of the European Parliament resolution countering TNR is currently ongoing and may contribute significantly to establishing a common definition. Similar efforts are needed in the Council of Europe and at the UN.
The reason for the absence of a common definition may be that there are two divergent interpretations or understandings of TNR. The human rights-based approach and the countering foreign interference-based approach. These approaches reflect the dual nature of TNR. It not only threatens the rights and freedoms of those who are targeted, but also constitutes an interference with the sovereignty and security of host states through the use of a wide range of tactics aimed at manipulating and undermining their internal affairs and politics. Framing TNR as a violation of sovereignty has advantages, as it clearly delineates how authoritarian states interfere with the interests and authority of other states, underlining that TNR does not only target or threaten foreigners.
But it raises security concerns for the host states. On the other side, conceptualizing TNR through the lens of international human rights law brings into focus the experience of the targeted person, the human rights being violated, and importantly enables state actions to protect victims to be framed as obligations under international law, not something discretionary, a tool of choice. These two approaches, both important, need to be combined into a single one, which we call the consolidated approach. Speaking of international response, we see that the increase in the number of documented TNR cases globally and the development of research in this area have led to a recent surge in attention to the threat of TNR in the international community. However, at the UN level, the mention of TNR and its tools is found only in the work of certain special procedures and investigative mechanisms.
Importantly, there is neither a resolution of the General Assembly, nor statements by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, nor a mandate for a special rapporteur on TNR at the UN. This is wrong. Some progress on the slides, I guess. On the regional level, a lack of a coordinated approach to the problem is particularly evident. There is no coordination between the EU, the Council of Europe, and the OECD, the three leading intergovernmental regional organizations that are called to deal with these kinds of issues. Against the background of a lack of common understanding of the nature of TNR, both among the regional organizations and inside them, the resolutions adopted are often narrowly focused and uncoordinated among intergovernmental organizations.
Again, an upcoming EP resolution encountering TNR drafted now at AFET may be an important contribution if it includes a solid definition, is based on this consolidated approach, and provides a set of strong policy recommendations to the EU institutions and member states. Yes. Looking at the screen. No. Please go back to the previous slide.
Yes. We're here.
Redner 9
And thank you very much for your efforts because it's not your job, and thank you for doing it.
Redner 3
Thank you. So, this is a list. Of course, the slides are a little more detailed. I'm only highlighting the key thesis. Okay.
Moving to the next slide. Specifically, addressing the Lukashenko regime's TNR practices. International bodies and regional organizations have repeatedly highlighted human rights violations of Belarusians in exile in various reports and statements, including this parliament in its resolution on Belarus in April 2024. On the individual country level, a referral of the situation in Belarus submitted by Lithuania to the International Criminal Court on September 24 is an example of the state's leadership and goodwill to fight TNR, since some of the crimes against humanity alleged in Lithuania's submission certainly belong to TNR. However, the international community has yet to fully recognize the scale of TNR practices by the regime and coordinate approaches.
The increasing momentum in the regime's actions testifies to its confidence in impunity and requires an active response from the international community. Next slide, please. Let's focus now on the evolution and the nature of TNR by the Lukashenko regime. As a result of the massive crackdown since 2020 and continuing nonstop, more than 80,800,000 Belarusians have left the country. The area of this settlement is wide and includes at least 25 member states with their own statute, many of whom are EU member states, of course.
After suppressing dissent inside the country and in response to the unwavering critical position and strong actions of exiled dissenters and the diaspora, the regime intensified TNR. The most active part of Belarusian society, including leaders of democratic forces and former political prisoners, having been forced to go abroad, is actively engaged in supporting those who remain in Belarus. Document documenting the regime's crimes and working towards the accountability of the perpetrators. This activity of Democratic Forces in Exile and their international recognition as key representatives, as real representatives of Belarus and the Belarusian people, stimulate the regime's active use of TNR. Importantly, in legal terms, TNR by the Belarusian authorities targets the civilian population, has a systematic nature, a large scope, and is implemented on the basis of state policy. What it means is that these actions, therefore, may constitute crimes against humanity.
These criteria qualify crimes against humanity of persecution falling under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. TNR by the Lukashenko regime not only threatens the rights of Belarusians residing in various countries, but also, as we have discussed in print, generally constitutes interference in the sovereignty of other states. Like other hybrid threats, TNR by the Lukashenko regime raises significant security concerns for whole states and the entire Europe. Next slide, please. The regime's main instruments of TNR are many.
It's a sophisticated and evolving arsenal with its scope dramatically expanding following the 2020 protest that applies not only to prominent political figures; anyone can become a target of security services. We had to use two slides to show the main tools. I will only be able to go through some of them to highlight the key elements that illustrate the problem. Next slide, please. At least 10 key instruments.
You can see it on the slides. In our report, we provide hundreds of examples of TNR cases with the application of these different instruments. Let me outline just a few of these tools. Next slide, please. In absentee trials, since July 2022, the law has allowed Belarusians abroad to be tried in absentee, including sentencing them to death.
Last year, the list of charges for which a person can be tried in absentia was significantly expanded. The investigative committee opens dozens of cases in absentia every month. Among them, defendants are not only opposition politicians, civic activists, journalists, and soldiers of the Kalinowski regiment fighting on the side of Ukraine, but also nonpublic persons, sometimes entire families. Increasingly, the regime uses criminal group cases in absentia, including from a few to several hundred defendants, such as the cases of the Coordination Council, Tsikhanovsky's analyst case, or participants in protest actions against the latest fraudulent Lukashenko elections. In absentee investigations and trials, not only do they put the accused at risk of being extradited from the country they now reside in or plan to travel to, but they also allow the authorities to conduct searches and issue threats to relatives inside the country remaining in Belarus.
Seizure of the property of dissenters who have left the country is used as a repressive measure on a mass scale. Again, numerous examples: essentially, people in exile, the Russians in exile, are banned from signing agreements on sales or gifts of property and are not allowed to give notary power agreements abroad. Essentially, they cannot dispose of or use their property, and this property is taken away by the authorities. And they do it publicly, intimidating others and bragging about their power and might. Next, actions against a person's family.
This is called coercion by proxy and is a widespread method in the toolkit, constituting the abuse of family members as a means to manipulate and subjugate dissidents abroad. It's easier and cheaper. You don't need to send agents abroad or across the borders. And the repertoire or ways of exerting pressure on relatives is not limited to threats, arrests, searches, and criminal prosecution. Recently, several cases were recorded in several cities where police officers came to relatives and took their genetic material, saliva, explaining it by the formation of a database of DNA samples.
So that, if necessary, people abroad can be identified. That's the argument made by the security services. They are putting pressure on the relatives, demanding information not only about a particular individual but about the life of the diaspora in general, and threatening people with arrest if they refuse to provide such information. Next slide, please. Abductions, enforced disappearances, and coerced return.
Well, obviously, you all know about the case of the forced public abduction of opposition journalist Roman Patecevic and his partner. But that is not an exception. We have more recent cases of Vasily Veramichuk, ex-soldier of the Krenosky regiment, who was abducted in Vietnam and transferred to Belarus by force. More recently, on May 25, the delivery of the country was shown on television: people brought in handcuffs to Belarus a former candidate for the coordination council, Pavel Bulacin, and a soldier of the Kalinowski regiment, Basil Recija. This is also shown on TV to demonstrate, intimidate others, and show that the authorities have full control over people and threaten them.
Next slide. The regime employs various methods to involve other countries in its TNR practices. Its primary practice is using Interpol red notices and diffusions for extradition requests based on fabricated criminal charges, most often crimes of extremism or terrorism. The regime used the Interpol system against its opposition before 2020. It has a history but moved up to using it on a large scale after 2020.
Film director and opposition activist Andrej Niot, who was arrested in Serbia on the basis of false charges of tax evasion, spent more than a year in detention, and only after an international campaign was he moved to house arrest and then eventually released. The latest example is the case of Alek Ahyev, Deputy Chair of the Belarusian Association of Journalists, who was put by Belarusian authorities on the Interpol wanted list in March 2025. And, of course, numerous requests for detention and extradition on charges of terrorism of leaders of the democratic forces, Svetlana Tsikhanovskaya and others from her office and the coordination council, former investigators, heads of the NEXTA Telegram channel, and others were rejected by the authorities of the countries in question and eventually removed from Interpol's list. This confirms the importance of working not only for further reform of Interpol, but directly with the countries to which the requests are being sent. Importantly, aside from the threat of detention and extradition, such requests make the lives of political exiles very difficult.
They can face difficulties opening bank accounts, applying for asylum, traveling internationally, legally staying in the chosen country, and potentially re-entering this country after travel. An appeal against inclusion in the list is supposed to take nine months before the red notice is removed. But in reality, it may take up to two years. Next slide, please. Cooperation with other states is not limited to just using Interpol.
There are other agreements: multilateral agreements on cooperation in criminal matters and also bilateral agreements. Belarus, of course, cooperates most closely with Russia on the issue of extraditions. Russia grants more than 80% of its extradition requests, and it can also transfer Belarusians without any formal procedure, without even a request for extradition, through direct cooperation of security services. When people are detained and brought by force, we have known cases of opposition members, active members Yuri Zhinovich, Aleksandra Feduta, journalist Hanaytze Majreka, and others. Currently, there are more than 5,000 Belarusians on Russia's wanted list, put there at the request of Minsk, which means that they are wanted in both countries.
It includes dozens of former political prisoners, activists, journalists, experts, bloggers, creative professionals, and others. And the search is working. Last year, more than 1,000 people wanted by Belarus were detained in Russia. Russia is not the only country that extradites and provides information about persons located on its territory to Belarus at its request. High-risk zone countries include most of the Commonwealth of Independent States, Serbia, China, Iran, Iraq, and many others.
You can see it on the list. Next slide, please. We now have a growing problem with the abuse of the financial control framework. That's the last tool I want to focus on. There are several government lists in Belarus that are expanded on a weekly basis and include thousands of entries, including a list of terrorists.
You can see it again on the slide. List of extremist individuals, list of extremist formations and organizations, and a list of extremist materials. Recognition of someone as an extremist or terrorist not only serves the purpose of locating the whereabouts of the person abroad and securing the partition, but also automatically triggers alerts in the global financial compliance systems, which are consulted by banks and financial institutions during their customer due diligence operations. And it's 95% automatic. So algorithms send information to banks whenever they receive information that the person is included in the terrorist or extremist lists.
And banks prefer to protect themselves from risks and get rid of clients who may create problems for them as an entire class. Although the EU instructed, or, you know, explained to the European banks that there should be no blanket derisking of all Belarusian clients. In reality, you know, really overcomply. We should always assume that banks overcomply to protect themselves from risks, and that's a serious problem. Next slide.
Well, of course, not only do Russia and Belarus cooperate between themselves on TNR, but there is clear symmetry and synergy between the two regimes in transnational repression. In Russia, TNR has visibly grown in its severity, and many practices currently applied in Russia copy those that were tested in Belarus, and vice versa. And the symmetries underscore the strategic alliance of Belarus and Russia, which share legislation and secret service cooperation. This is an authoritarian network exchanging extremist lists and facilitating mutual extradition orders. And, of course, this is a serious security threat to the European continent. Next slide, we are moving to the concluding part: recommendations.
We have two sets of recommendations on TNR in general. They are based on the understanding of the need for urgent action. We need to move from declarations and statements to concrete policies, decisions, and practices grounded in a consolidated approach combining human rights and security concerns. It is important to avoid overemphasis on security concerns because there is a risk of fostering a climate of suspicion and hostility toward all people from a particular country, such as, in this case, Belarusians. And this may add additional restrictions on their rights, putting people under double pressure from their host country and the country of origin, the Lukashenko regime in this case.
We talk about both the international and national levels. We need legislation, policy changes, institution building, personnel training, protective measures, effective investigation, cooperation with civil society and diaspora, and more. Again, there is a list. Importantly, this resolution, which we have already mentioned a couple of times, is an important milestone, hopefully. And then, we need to develop concrete institutional arrangements and work with individual member states to push for national strategies.
At the national level, in addition to all these institutional policies, training, etc., states should cooperate with each other. This is very important. Push for further reforms of Interpol. They are incomplete. They are not enough.
Use targeted sanctions against perpetrators and enablers of TNR, and finally, enforce legal accountability. And specifically, in that slide, place recommendations on addressing TNR by the Lukashenko regime. Many things work both for the general and specific measures, but here we need to monitor and effectively investigate cases of TNR by the regime, resist Interpol abuse, specifically the extradition request, develop a specific outreach strategy to work with democratic forces, diaspora, and civil society, reflect information on the use of TNR by the local Lukashenko regime in intergovernmental settings and annual country reports on human rights. And last but not least, follow the Lithuanian suit and submit your own referrals to the ICC, setting new information about the transnational nature of the crimes committed by the Lukashenko regime. I'd be happy to elaborate on these recommendations. We invite you to read our report.
Can I have the last slide? Where recommendations are outlined in detail, thank you. You see the QR code and the paper copies over there. Thank you.
Redner 5
Thank you very much for this detailed presentation. Now, I give the floor to Mr. Simon from Kutzem, who represents DG Fitsma, for eight minutes.
Redner 11
Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for the invitation to speak today before the European Democracy Shield Special Committee. This discussion takes place at a time when the use of sanctions has become an increasingly prominent tool of foreign policy. I've been asked to speak about the use of EU sanctions in response to hybrid threats from Belarus and their subsequent evasion. I will briefly structure my remarks into three points. First, I will make some general remarks on EU sanctions policy, and I will talk about hybrid sanctions adopted in relation to Belarus.
Finally, I will discuss how sanctions circumvention is addressed. Let me begin with some general remarks on EU sanctions. As you know, sanctions are essential instruments of the EU's foreign and security policy. They can be adopted following a UN Security Council decision, autonomously by the EU, or through a combination of both. They are part of an integrated and comprehensive policy approach, together with other policy instruments like political dialogue.
They are precautionary and temporary. They seek to change behavior in order to prevent conflict, defend human rights, or respond to crises. Sanctions are carefully designed and targeted to avoid unintended consequences and to limit negative effects on the general population. EU sanctions are territorial in their application. They apply within EU jurisdiction and to EU nationals.
At the moment, we have more than 40 sanctions regimes in place. Most of them are autonomous EU sanctions regimes. The majority of these regimes are geographical in nature. For example, the EU sanctions on Russia and Belarus. But we also have thematic sanctions regimes that target specific types of activities, namely terrorism, chemical weapons, human rights abuses, and cyberattacks.
Different types of sanctions can be adopted by the EU, from individual travel bans, asset freezes, arms embargoes, to sectorial restrictions covering a broad range of activities, including imports, exports, the financial sector, and media. With respect to the Belarus sanctions regime. The EU first adopted sanctions on Belarus in 2004 in response to the political situation in the country, namely the unresolved disappearance of two opposition politicians. Additional sanctions listings were introduced following the 2006 and 2011 presidential elections. In the context of improving EU-Belarus relations, most sanctions were then suspended by the Council in 2015 and later lifted after Belarus released its political prisoners.
However, new sanctions were introduced following the 2020 fraudulent presidential elections and the brutal crackdown by Belarusian security forces on peaceful protesters, democratic opposition, and journalists. Further strengthening of sanctions came after the unlawful forced landing of the Ryanair flight in May 2021, and then subsequently, the instrumentalization of migrants at the Belarusian border in November 2021. In February 2022, the Belarus sanctions regime was broadened to cover not just the domestic situation in Belarus, but also Belarus's involvement in the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine. Several packages of sanctions have been adopted since, often in parallel with new sanctions targeting Russia. To give you some figures, in total, there are currently 285 travel bans and 369 asset freeze listings.
Let me now turn specifically to the sanctions imposed as a consequence of transnational repression and hybrid threats. I have already mentioned the response to the grounding of the Ryanair flight in May 2021. This action resulted in the introduction of an aviation ban, trade and financial restrictions, as well as additional sanctions listings. Following the migrants' instrumentalization in November 2021, this action resulted in a new listing criterion, allowing the listing of persons who organized or contributed to activities that facilitate the illegal crossing of the external borders of the Union. Following the Lithuanian airspace incursions in December 2025, the council introduced a new hybrid listing criterion allowing the listing of individuals, entities, and bodies that benefit from, are involved in, or somehow facilitate these actions or policies attributable to the Republic of Belarus and which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability, or security in the EU and its member states.
Finally, let me briefly address how the EU fights sanctions circumvention. Tackling the circumvention of sanctions is a priority, and the Commission stands ready to close loopholes where they are identified. Both member states and the Commission continuously monitor the implementation of EU sanctions. To decrease the risk of circumvention of Russian sanctions, the commission regularly proposes mirroring relevant Russian sanctions provisions in the Belarus sanctions regime. This is particularly important given the close cooperation between the regimes and the country's economic integration within the context of the Eurasian Economic Union.
In response to continuous trade patterns, monitoring, and concrete examples of sanctions circumvention, the Commission takes appropriate steps, including proposing to adjust the sanctions regime to close any loopholes, alert member states to potential violations, and issue specific guidance and alerts. For instance, with respect to the import of Russian and Belarusian wood via third countries, in violation of EU sanctions. A sanctions alert was published on the website of the Commission. The commission also manages the EU sanctions whistleblower tool, which allows anyone to anonymously report violations of EU sanctions. The EU sanctions help desk is there to assist small and medium-sized enterprises in complying with sanctions across the world.
The commission has also established a dedicated central mailbox for both EU and foreign authorities and operators. For an overview of EU sanctions currently in place, including EU sanctions lists and links to the relevant legal acts, I invite you to consult the sanctionsmap.eu website. There is also the EU sanctions tracker. That's a tool to see active financial sanctions and travel bans. Thank you for your attention.
Redner 5
Thank you very much. Now, I would like to give the floor to my colleagues, starting with S and D. Even in Chile, you want to ask a question? No. So, Mr. Kaminsky for ECR.
Redner 12
I wanted to thank you for your professional, very credible, and precious report concerning the repressions by the Belarusian regime. I want to remind you that a couple of weeks ago, the European Parliament adopted a report by the Human Rights Commission on transborder repressions. And, unfortunately, only later could I talk to you and read your report in our European Parliament's report. Not all situations were described, and I do hope there will be a possibility to amend it because the Foreign Affairs Committee is preparing a similar report. And I wanted to refer to two things which are very offensive.
Redner 17
Interpol, for one thing, it's unbelievable that this very important institution is abused by those regimes. I was at one time a minister of foreign and internal affairs in Poland. I could see such problems when, all of a sudden, we received a red notice from Interpol concerning a veteran from Ukraine accused by Russian prosecutors. He was accused of paid murder. He was in Poland, and it turned out he was an organizer of one of the battalions of Ukrainian defense during the Crimean aggression.
Redner 14
This was unbelievable. Immediately, we freed that person, but we had a number of similar situations involving Ukrainian opposition people. They were sent and described as criminals in Interpol red alert notes. I was very clear in contacting the Interpol authorities that during the war with Ukraine, the Interpol authorities confirmed they introduced other procedures to check on the request from Russia and Belarus. For a while, it worked.
Redner 12
But from the information we get today, we can see that the problem has reappeared again, and this requires an official reaction on the part of the commission and other state institutions of democratic states because this terrible process must be finished. And another thing, you mentioned an application by the Lithuanian government to the International War Tribunal. I think it should be supported internationally. I myself sent a question in writing to the European Commission asking whether they will join this application. I haven't received any answer, but I do hope there is some understanding and consensus here in the European Parliament around these issues, because that should be an issue where we act together.
And together, we should work towards making this application more international so that it proceeds. There is a lot to do, and therefore, I would like to thank you very much for your hard work and for your attention to some issues which we may not have noticed. And the regime uses those terrible difficulties in everyday life experienced by the Russian opposition. For example, problems with banks. In some systems, there are provisions concerning, for example, the criminal links of members of the opposition.
Now, we must be effective because it is indecent. It's very wrong, and we must not tolerate situations where a regime uses and abuses the system for its purposes. Therefore, thank you.
Redner 15
Yeah. Thank you, Chair. I want to follow up. My colleague is far as Interpol is concerned because I know from meetings, rapporteur for Belarus in the parliament, and from meetings with Ms. Tikhanovskaya and her team, I know that it's not new.
Redner 16
So, they spoke about it quite often. I still don't understand why we haven't changed it. So, I think we need a resolution in the parliament, and we'll talk about this because this red notice thing is really incredible. Then, I have a few questions. First of all, you talked about pressure on persons abroad.
Redner 18
What is the situation regarding pressure on Western companies that still operate in Belarus? I can imagine. I know that there's an Austrian company, and one of the persons was thrown into prison. It was very difficult to get him out. I don't know if they were kind of, yeah. If they wanted something else, that is open to me. But please, if there's anything you could tell us.
Redner 16
Then, about countries, are there specific countries where this TNR is applied? And then you told us that there are countries which are cooperating with Belarus, and I saw the country Serbia. I mean, they want to be part of the European Union. Is there any information on whether there were contacts with Serbia and why they still cooperate with Belarus? How about the embassies?
I think there are embassies in all European countries. Are they used like the Russian embassies, where there are people working as spies or to suppress people from Belarus? And what is the EU doing about it? And then, my last question is about the USA. We know that there are political prisoners who were freed after conversations between the American government and the Belarusian government.
And, obviously, the Americans finished some sanctions. And so, we had a discussion in this house with some colleagues about whether it makes sense for the European Union to try to have contact with the regime in order to get people out of prison. Do you think that makes sense or not? Thank you very much.
Redner 5
Thank you. From my side, one remark and one question. One remark for ISENSE. Thank you for underlining that transnational repression is both a violation of human rights and a violation of the sovereignty of states which welcome refugees, opponents, and activists. And we focus today on Belarus for good reasons, but we know that other states do indulge in TNR on our own territories.
It has been true for Azerbaijan, for Turkey, and for China. And there should definitely be a better common definition, at least at the European level, if not at the UN level, for the reasons you explained, and common cooperation to make clear that TNR are not acceptable. Decisions we take to welcome refugees are sovereign decisions, and you cannot use our territories to harass, pressure, or even worse, target your opponents in the European Union. And then my question goes to T. G.
Fisher. Thank you for your explanations. They are very helpful. I wanted to know how you cooperate with third states like the UK because they have expertise on sanctions. That was very helpful when they were member states.
And I hope that, since Brexit, there are ways to make sure that not only we coordinate our lists, but we also make sure that we don't create gaps in terms of the rhythm of imposition or implementation of sanctions. And what about the current state of cooperation with the U.S.? S. Administration? Thank you for that.
So, back to our guest speakers, starting with Mr. Eisen. Ciplatze.
Redner 3
Thank you, Madam Chair. Mister Kaminsky, thank you fully for your comments. I appreciate your strong position regarding repression by the Lukashenko regime and the strong EU policy in response. And indeed, the problem of the abuse of the Interpol mechanisms is something that needs more creative thinking because, you know, I think many have taken it as a success that some reforms, some changes have been made. The review of alerts, the special mechanism for that.
But in practice, the system continues to be abused by authoritarian regimes. That's the reality. And the person is almost automatically detained before anything can be done, and that, by itself, is a violation of the rule of law and an abuse of the system. And some people spend not hours, but months, like in the case of a film director. So, we need to take extra measures both at the level of further reforms and work with the ministries, relevant law enforcement agencies on the national level, indeed in Poland and all member states, but also include these in the EU foreign policy as a requirement for candidate states, those that are in negotiations on accession, and, simply, trade partners and all trade and cooperation agreements.
You know, we now have strong engagement with Azerbaijan and others because of economic interests or security interests, for that matter. So, we see Azerbaijani law enforcement or security services harassing dissidents in Europe, right, on the streets of Europe, threatening them and potentially attempting to assassinate them or do something similar to the Khashoggi case. And, you know, Azerbaijan is now a respected partner in providing hydrocarbon supplies. And that brings me to the questions by MEP Braustaten. Well, I leave the question of pressure on Western companies in Belarus to my colleague, Conga.
This was not the focus of our research because it is inside the country, while we focused on transnational repression, targeting people and organizations outside. But countries where these incidents happen more often are the ones you asked about. Well, first and foremost, those are where more Belarusians are residing. And as I said in my remarks, there are more than 25 countries where they can be found now. But obviously, Lithuania and Poland are the leading two states where most Belarusians have left for, but also Germany, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Austria.
So in that sense, it is important to work with diaspora organizations and the offices of democratic forces. We have one in Brussels. We have one in Prague. We have one in Tallinn, and there are representatives of democratic forces in many countries, even if there are no offices or diaspora organizations. Which states cooperate?
Well, with the regime, obviously, you know, we had Russia at the top of the list, but there is not much we can do about it. But Vietnam, Turkey, Serbia, the United Arab Emirates, and some other Asian countries were mentioned. There are some examples in the report, but I fully agree with you that the EU has the tools to influence the governments of these states and make it a condition for economic and trade cooperation. Embassies, absolutely. Of course, you know, Russia and Belarus are notorious for using diplomatic status as a cover for agent involvement.
And one of the key tools that I haven't had time to discuss in my remarks, but it's in the report and was on the slides, is co-opting individuals of different kinds: local shady figures, criminals, or just people in need of easy profit. So they're hired, and this work is often done by people, you know, under the embassy roof, so to speak, for all sorts of sabotage or physical attacks, etc. And of course, there is one other big area that we haven't had time to touch upon, which is digital interference, hacking, surveillance, and stealing of databases. And on the basis of this, it not only disrupts communication and operations or is used for threats, but is also used to open criminal cases, especially against those who are inside the country, our contacts, those who provide us with key information. The most notorious cases, of course, include the case of Belarusian Hayyun, a key partner of ours who, for years, provided key information on military activities inside Belarus of Russian and Belarusian troops, based on their visual observations.
Now, more than 2,200 people are under criminal investigation. Finally, on U. S. Sections, or let me put it this way, I think that many Belarusian experts and civic activists share the view that there should be a combination of a very principled, firm policy of the European Union based on isolating the regime, maintaining and expanding sanctions policy, fighting the evasion and circumvention of sanctions, a principal position of no lifting of sanctions until the oppression ends and serious changes in the regime's nature happen and accountability is put in place, while the US follows the humanitarian track. Therefore, this combination of two approaches seems to be the most efficient, and I personally don't think that the EU should join the US in doing this.
I'll stop here and ask Olga to add on the other, yeah. Time.
Redner 19
Well, yeah, just a small addition on the US. Honestly, with all due respect, US policies are changing not even every day, but every hour. So, I don't think that you should follow the chaotic, stochastic approaches. And, honestly, if there is no principled coup, I don't think the regime should actually change its behavior. So, it's the common position that I sense you should remain firm.
Any kind of opening of dialogue should be, you know, preceded by certain steps of the regime. Currently, the regime is using limited dialogue, actually a very limited engagement with the US, to use this as a tool to put pressure on the EU in general and on neighboring countries like Lithuania and Poland. Well, speaking of the companies which are still remaining inside the country, I understand we are talking about one. First and foremost, they are definitely experiencing pressure on demands to limit access to certain tools, let's say, to evade or circumvent surveillance. For example, the latest report showed that people who use certain services inside Belarus cannot, for example, register on Signal.
They just cannot do this. They cannot confirm these numbers. But as far as we know, since 2020, Belarusian and Russian digital surveillance systems like Swarm have been united de facto. So, we may only assume that one has to comply with all these demands, and it's not just Belarusian but also Russian. So, that's to give the full picture.
Serbia and other countries, it's like follow the money until they are inside the EU. And even if they are inside the EU, look, I'm sorry, but look at Hungary. Right? So, people who need to get into the EU for different kinds of purposes that are not really good. They don't go to, for example, the Polish consulate.
They receive Hungarian visas, and we all know that. But also, Serbian businesses have lots of lucrative projects inside Belarus. For example, the US actually removed sanctions from one of the Serbian companies. So unless there is strict regulation, there will always be a way to extradite someone, to say, oops. You know, it was a mistake, but the person is already in Belarus.
So, in the countries that are close with the regime or have huge financial interests there, so far, we just cannot recommend this because, unfortunately, there is no 100% guarantee that the person would not be just sent off by the plane and they say, "Oh, we committed a mistake." Sorry. But, you know, life is already lost.
Redner 11
Thank you for the questions. Yes. Very briefly, on the state of cooperation with states in the U.S. S. Well, we cooperate on a regular basis, both bilaterally and in the wider context.
Think of G7 with third states. But let's not forget that these sanctions are autonomous sanctions, so the EU decides autonomously whether to maintain them or lift them. And while developments are welcome, like releases of prisoners, the current sanctions remain justified. And just to give an example, the latest incursions into the airspace of Lithuania show that these sanctions are still in place. And in fact, we increased our sanctions in response.
Finally, on the question of whether the EC will join the IC case. Well, I think that colleagues in the relevant DG will certainly prepare a reply to that question.
Redner 5
Well, thank you very much to our guest speakers for their very insightful interventions. We close this item of the agenda now, and we will meet again this afternoon at 1:30 for the next items of the agenda. Thank you very much.
Stellen Sie eine Frage zu diesem Video – ich analysiere das Transkript, um Ihnen zu antworten.