Special committee on the European Democracy Shield Ordinary meeting
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EUDS European Parliament
Ihren Sitzungen folgenMichael McGrath
The center will be supported by a stakeholder platform, bringing together researchers, civil society organizations, and other key players in the broader community of democratic resilience building to inform the work of the center. We envisage bringing this community together in the coming months. We will explore ways for EU candidate countries and potential candidate countries to gradually and meaningfully take part in the work of the center. This is in our mutual interest. At work under the center will, of course, be complementary to other measures put forward under the European Democracy Shield to safeguard the integrity of the information space, strengthen the integrity of elections, foster media freedom and media pluralism, and overall, to build societal resilience.
Our work is well underway on these issues. For example, only yesterday, I attended a strategy seminar of the European Cooperation Network on Elections, where electoral experts from across the European Union discussed the preparation of different deliverables related to the integrity of elections that were announced in the Shield, including the guidance on the use of AI in electoral processes and the Commission recommendation and guide of best practices on safety and politics, an important issue that I know many of you have raised. Work has also started under the framework of the Digital Services Act to prepare the announced incidents and crisis protocol, as well as the update of the DSA elections toolkit. I'm looking forward to continuing discussions with you ahead of the adoption of your final report. I'm also aware of the EUDS mission to Washington DC and New York last week, and I look forward to hearing your impressions of that visit.
Together, we must be resolute about protecting and promoting democracy as the best guarantor of European values, freedoms, and our way of life. We will continue to regularly update and involve the Parliament throughout the implementation phase. So, Chair and colleagues, thank you so much for giving me the opportunity to bring you up to date on the work that we have done in recent weeks, and I look forward now to our discussion.
Redner 1
Thank you, Commissioner, colleagues. Many of you want to have the floor, and that's perfectly fine. And I will do my best to make sure that everybody has an opportunity to make remarks or ask questions. It will only be possible if you stick to your speaking time. So we start with the first round of questions with the reporter and coordinators or their group representatives.
Two minutes per speaker. And as David McAllister, the chair, would say, half at two minutes means 122 seconds, no more. So let's start with EPP, Rabota, and Tomastobe.
Redner 3
Well, thank you, Cher. Thank you, Commissioner. As you know, I presented my draft. The political groups have made their amendments, and we have started the negotiations. And I think it is fair to say that we are asking for an even higher level of ambition, that we want more far-reaching reforms. But I want to be very clear that we are here to support you because we do think that this is a very crucial initiative from the Commission, as we need to better defend our democracies in Europe.
Redner 5
I have two questions. And firstly, on the center, I think it is clear from the communication that you look at the center as a coordination hub with the existing structures for combating Fimi. And my question is more basically: do you think in the future that you will perhaps clarify the mandate of this center even more from your point of view? Why has the choice been made that the center should not, I mean, basically assume the responsibilities and rather be alongside the existing entities? And the follow-up question to that is, of course, because the only concern and worry that at least I personally have is: will this be more efficient?
Redner 3
Will we actually achieve more results? And that is my first question. Secondly, on communication, it was also clear that you said there will be measures to protect election-related infrastructure that is critical. I know the cybersecurity package has been presented, and perhaps the commissioner could clarify if that was what you referred to in the communication as the follow-up, or can we expect additional initiatives? Because I do think we need to protect election-related infrastructure.
Thank you.
Redner 1
Thank you. For the SNDs, it's quite unusual, but it is gender-balanced. There will be one minute for Ana Katarina Mendes, and a historic day where Juan Fernando Lopez Aguilar commits himself to speak only for one minute. Please keep a record of this moment. So, first, Ana Catarina Méndez.
Redner 4
Thank you, Madam Chair. I will speak in Portuguese. Thank you.
I'd like to thank you for coming to our committee. We're all working on protecting democracy from attacks from various quarters. I have three questions after your introductory remarks. First of all, the center. There has been a report, and there have been amendments.
There are proposals for improvement. How will you guarantee political neutrality and funding, particularly with a view to Fimi? And then accountability, transparency, and measuring the efficiency of that center—how is that going to be done? There must be no overlapping. We don't want to see work done twice.
And then, finally, interaction with the digital platform. Another platform is being created. And my question is: how is that going to be done with a view to the legislative act? Thank you.
Redner 10
Madam, it'll be a minute. Take it as a fact that we, SND members, being part of this special committee, Democracy Shield, share the importance of the lessons learned, which are expressed in the conclusions. But I have an additional question to raise with you, and it is that it is obvious that comparative evidence shows that when it comes to foreign information, manipulation, and interference, distrust, political polarization, and inequality largely make a bigger impact when there are preexisting internal fragilities in democratic society. So the question is, are you willing to provide a holistic approach so that, beyond the external threats and external actors, we are also addressing institutional legitimacy and the reduction of inequalities? The question is how the Commission intends to integrate into the Democracia Shield a comprehensive approach that combines space security, social resilience, attention to reducing inequalities, and enhancing democratic trust.
Well,
Redner 8
Thank you, Chair. Also, happy on behalf of the Patriots to contribute to the gender balance in this committee. I will speak in Dutch, however. Commissaires
Commissioner, during the previous mandate, this commission made energy unaffordable with its disastrous Green Deal. The working citizen has been forced into poverty by this climate policy. And now, in this new mandate, the aim seems to be to destroy freedom of expression. We're talking today about the European Democracy Shield. The title implies that it will protect democracy, but let's be honest about the nature of the project.
It is a shield to protect the failing political elite against citizen criticism from its own population. You're talking about fighting foreign interference, meddling, and disinformation. You're setting up a European Center for Democratic Resilience. You're financing fact-checking networks and forcing tech giants to carry out Sensia through the DSA. But for months now, I've been asking the same question.
Disinformation is the intentional dissemination of false or misleading information with the purpose of deceiving or manipulating public opinion, causing harm, or influencing decisions. I'm asking the question again today, although I know that I am unlikely to receive an answer. Because, in your eyes, disinformation is anything at all that deviates from the Brussels consensus. Orwell warned us decades ago about the Ministry of Truth, an authority that decides what is fact and what is fiction in order to control the population. With this democracy shield, you are doing exactly that.
Redner 9
You're censoring the debate. You're distrusting your own citizens, and you are undermining democratic resilience. It's time to withdraw this disastrous plan and work as quickly as possible on solving the real problems of real people. Thank you.
Redner 1
Thank you. Before giving the floor to Isiah, just a semantic remark. Elites and elected officials have the same origin. So, if we are all elected, we are all elites. They are not them and us.
Thank you.
Redner 11
You, ma'am Chair. I think that every one of us in this room agrees that democracy has to be protected against external interference, but this cannot go together with limiting pluralism or extending the powers of the Commission without a clear mandate. I have many questions about what Mr. Commissioner said. And the basic question is: what is our role? Why are we here?
Redner 12
Why are we having this debate? The document on the European Centre for Democratic Resilience is still in the pipeline. We haven't proved it, and the commission has already announced that it is going to be created. Another question is: why do you need another tool? You already have some tools and instruments at your disposal that are supposed to protect us against foreign interference.
Redner 18
I agree with the previous speaker. Everything seems to indicate that it's an attempt to interfere in the electoral process in individual member states and an attempt to limit the national sovereignty of individual member states. It's an attempt to impose censorship and a certain way of thinking on our citizens. I have some experience from Poland with interpretation that the European Commission has applied to our internal situation. That was very detrimental.
Redner 11
What I have in mind are notions such as conditionality or the rule of law, which the European Commission applied for political purposes, and it blocked the EU funds from Poland. And, mister commissioner, has also taken a position on that matter. I will not quote what you said. However, you did give an interview on this matter to Deutsche Welle. Ladies and gentlemen, I am convinced that we need to strengthen our resilience against foreign interference.
At the same time, we mustn't muzzle European citizens with regulations like this. And I disagree with you, ma'am chairman, that the elites and the elected have the same root. A lot depends on where we are from, which country we come from, and, unfortunately, this is the way the EU approaches us.
Redner 1
It's not an opinion; it's a fact. "Elected" and "elite" come from the same origin. I have not invented it. Because you're elected, you're a member of an elite for most of your fellow citizens, and don't pretend otherwise. Renew Europe, Helmut Braun-Stitta.
Redner 17
I want to explain to the elite of the patriots what this information is. It's disinformation to say that Ukraine attacked Russia. That's disinformation. It's information to explain. May I finish it?
Redner 14
This is a thing: freedom of expression starts with the leader in the speaker's speech.
Redner 13
That's ridiculous. I want to start again from zero. I want to explain. Listen. You can learn something.
Redner 15
Okay? So, I start again. It's disinformation that Ukraine attacked Russia. It's information about what Russia is doing every day: killing people in Ukraine. But your Russian friends can write every day.
On all social media. That's Ukraine's fault. So, there is free speech, of course, in Europe. That's the first thing. The second thing is that protecting our children is very important.
We've just been to the United States. We heard that in the United States, many states have a lot of sympathy with what we say about protecting our children. Trump doesn't care for children, as we know. But we do, and that's how we will cooperate also with the states of the United States. And now I come to the point of the resilience center. Of course, there are a few institutions.
Redner 13
You name them, Commissioner. Thank you very much. But I think the coordination would be very good. So, I have questions. My first question is about the budget.
My second question is about what it should be legally. And the third question, which also comes back to the elites and the elected ones: I think parliament should have a really decisive role in this resilience center because we are the elected representatives of the Europeans. And so, I think it's really necessary that we have a role in that and that we control what they are doing. And that will not be the end of the censorship, blah blah. They will continue with the censorship.
That doesn't matter. But we can easily explain that it is elected people who control what they are doing. And my next question, of course, is how this coordination with you, you named EDMO. I think that's very important. How will that work?
And then, of course, also with the member states. And I think the member states also have to play a role. Today and yesterday, we heard from Armenia how intensively the Russians are doing their work there. And my last word: it's not only about disinformation. It's also about sabotage.
It's about the security of people in Europe, and I care for the security of the people of Europe even if you don't. Thank you.
Redner 20
Thank you very much, Chair and Commissioner. One of the biggest threats to our democracy is the fact that most of our communication networks, at least online, are controlled by a handful of US tech billionaires or Chinese companies who control whose opinion is visible and who is not. We have clear evidence from a number of EU member states and also from the UK that extremist parties are boosted against the will of the users, and the timelines are flooded with their content against the will of the users, while progressive and democratic parties and media content are systematically suppressed or downranked. Also, speaking about censorship, 99% of content moderation decisions are made on the basis of the contractual terms of those platforms and not on an EU or national legal basis. So, if there's censorship, it's done by foreign oligarchs in Europe, and there's no censorship in Europe done by the government or by the EU Commission.
So, my question is: in your document, you mentioned that you want to promote European social media platforms. And you said the time to act is now. I share that opinion. There are quite a few promising private initiatives right now to set up European social media platforms, in particular a platform that could be a basis for a number of innovative apps to be born here in Europe. So, are you ready to push for this right now, to work together with this initiative with DG Connect to get some funding to get this off the ground?
Redner 19
And my second question is about stakeholder engagement, which you also mentioned in your report, and civil society organizations. How do you see that, exactly? How do you want to involve them? And how do you want to protect them against the different attacks, including those by the US administration? Thank you.
Redner 24
Brussels is preparing to spend billions of European citizens' money in its fight against the terrible, as Brussels describes them, foreign threats. And by now, even children understand that Europe's most frightening enemies are not plotting in Beijing, Tehran, Moscow, or Washington. Europe's greatest enemies are here, in the capitals of European states. What is more, those who destroy Europe with their fanaticism are in power today in London, Berlin, and Paris. We Europeans truly need a democratic shield, but we need a shield that protects us from the ideological blindness of our own rulers.
Redner 21
Instead of creating conditions for building hospitals and schools, instead of improving the lives of millions of Europeans, the leaders of the European Union gave €200,000,000,000 to Zelensky, and then we will have to keep giving him more and more because the Americans have already stopped their financial aid to Kyiv. The Americans are not stupid, you know. Yes. Europe needs a shield that safeguards democracy and does not allow freedom to be destroyed. Over the past 4 years, Brussels has made enormous efforts to eradicate every opinion different from the official line.
One of the most important achievements of European civilization is the ability of people to speak freely and defend different positions. We must not allow this right to be taken away from us. We must firmly oppose attacks on democracy as well. In Europe, elections are already being canceled, as happened in Romania. Political leaders are being banned from participating in elections, as was done in France.
Parties are being targeted for prohibition, as is happening in Germany. All simply because they challenge the status quo, simply because they don't belong to the old and corrupt elites. That is why we urgently need a democratic shield. This shield must protect us not from the fake foreign threats, but from the very real authoritarian tendencies imposed by that very same Brussels. Thank you.
Redner 1
I'm happy that you were able to enjoy your freedom of speech and our pluralism in our community. Still. More than ever, Mister Della Valley.
Thank you.
You.
Redner 30
Let me apologize because there are other negotiations in process. I read this report, and to be honest, I am rather concerned. We want to protect our democracy against hybrid attacks in four countries: Belarus, Russia, and China. And we want to build a center with all the necessary competencies and financial resources. That concerns me.
Redner 22
Let me explain why. These are significant amounts, and a significant amount of fake news has been identified.
But.
Redner 22
Here are some.
People may intervene directly in the European Union, and others may not. There is no reference to Israel in this report. I think we need to talk about external interference. We need to refer to Israel, which is bombarding Palestine. And Israel has been controlling cybersecurity in the Maloney government.
We have heard of the Pegasus case, which has affected many European journalists. Now, talking about the European democracy shield, Alexandra Barbero, an Italian historian, was censured by US multinationals.
Which?
Redner 1
Speak is mine. We go directly to the second round, and he will answer all the questions together. So now it's one minute and sixty seconds, and it's Michel Wavrikevich for EPP.
Redner 25
Thank you, Chair. Commissioner, thank you for being with us and presenting the idea of the European Center for Democratic Resilience, which, as our reporter Tomas Tube presented in the draft report, is the operational heart of European democracy issues. My first question is a formal one. I understand that you support it, but I need confirmation from the commission that you support the idea of giving legal personality to this institution as a separate entity. The second question is about civil society, which you mentioned during your presentation.
How do you want to engage civil society and nongovernmental organizations in the activity of the European Center for Democratic Resilience? Because, in my opinion, they play an exceptional role in the protection of democracy. Thank you.
Thank you.
Redner 26
You, Madam Chairman. We like freedom, and that's why we need to protect ourselves from disinformation. Opinions are opinions. But if you say information, if you say something is information when it's not true, that is misinformation. So, thank you, Commissioner.
Redner 27
You've already explained what this center is going to look like. You've given us a lot of information, but I'd like to say that we already have a pilot project in the culture committee, and we hope that we will be able to use this information to improve the services of the center. There will be technicians, IT specialists, and that will be helpful for election campaigns too. There's misinformation twenty-four seven, and we also need to identify what information is and what misinformation is, even if it's not clear. This center will need to look at manipulated videos, identify and uncover misinformation in real time so that the instruments can be used for the democracy shield.
Thank you.
Fabrice Leggeri
You, Madam Chairman. Commissioner, yesterday, the European Commission launched the European Centre for Democratic Resilience. We don't know yet what its competencies, budget, staff, or legal basis will be. Your Center for Democratic Resilience is actually attacking the democracy that we represent in this European Parliament. The context is serious.
In a report of 02/03/2026, the House Judiciary Committee in the US accuses the EU of exerting pressure on digital platforms to restrict lawful political content, thus imperiling freedom of expression, and in particular, the freedom of expression of conservative groups. In Europe, we know that we have ultra-left violence. We have Islamist jihadist terrorist attacks. Will the democratic shield cover those? Will it be covering all terrorist violence?
Where is your defense against the alleged antifascists? Where is your defense against the jihadists? Thank you.
Redner 38
Madam Chairperson, Commissioner, if proof were needed—not that it is—the EU Center for Democratic Resilience, your work, our work, the work of this House, is vital. Polarization is rife, not just in the House, but throughout the world. And apart from the focus, I know you're deeply committed as a commissioner to dealing with age-appropriate media education and digital literacies for children. I would like to harness and focus, I suppose, really on independent radio and local media. We need trusted news sources.
Redner 39
I just want to see where that sits in the new center. And also, Commissioner, we need to protect critical infrastructure from sabotage: subsea cables, Internet connectivity, power grids, etc. Because if the public is disconnected and there's a blackout, they will lose trust and have already lost trust in our democratic governments to protect them. So, I would just like you to address those two matters. Thank you, Commissioner Grumagat.
For.
The Patriots?
Redner 34
The aim of the so-called Democracy Shield program, on paper, is to strengthen the defense against interventions. Let me touch upon a certain kind of intervention, namely political censorship on social media platforms. According to the reports of the US House Judiciary Committee, the commission had about 100 meetings with big tech companies to push for more content moderation. Separate meetings were held before certain national elections. The procedure goes like this.
Redner 31
The commission is sponsoring so-called fact checkers. At the same time, it demands that tech companies moderate content based on proposals from these fact-checkers, and you plan to ensure even more funding for them. I don't have to tell you because you already know that almost all fact-checker groups can be found around liberal and left-wing media outlets. Surprise, surprise. So, on the surface, the commission is talking about foreign intervention.
Redner 36
In practice, a huge network of censorship is being built to silence right-wing and patriotic voices. Commissioner, my question is simple. Is the Commission willing to publish the records of the meetings with big tech companies concerning the elections? Thank you.
Redner 33
Yeah. Thank you, Commissioner. So you mentioned the Center for Democratic Resilience has already begun operating in practice. Even though there is no specific legal framework or definition regarding mandates or safeguards. The communication described is proving its situational awareness by anticipating and detecting threats, issuing early warning signs, and coordinating rapid responses.
Redner 35
In other words, classical intelligence cycle operations and functions. Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Treaty of the EU is unequivocal. National security remains the sole responsibility of the member states. That, of course, includes intelligence, counterintelligence, and the assessment and attribution of hybrid threats. Furthermore, under the Maroni doctrine, EU bodies cannot be trusted with broad discretionary powers involving political judgment without a clear treaty basis or strict limits.
Redner 32
So, my question is this: can you clearly confirm that the center will not perform intelligence-style threat assessments, mapping of influence networks, or structured counter-interference analysis? Thank you.
Redner 1
So, Commissioner, before giving you the floor, I have a small, very small additional question because we heard about billions of euros for the center. I was not exactly aware of it. We heard about a mega center. I was not aware of it either. So, can you clarify, because the question was already asked: how many people were on the staff of the center that was just inaugurated?
Thank you.
Michael McGrath
Thank you very much, Chair, and thanks to all the members for the questions. And I apologize in advance. It's not going to be possible to answer all of the questions because of the time constraint. I'm happy to come back, Chair, on another occasion where we can have more time to go through it in detail. I'm always available and at the disposal of the committee, as you know.
I've come from the petty committee that I just appeared before, and I have meetings with member states when I go back. There's a project group on start-ups and scale-ups that I need to report to as well. But I am happy to come back at any time. I will make a number of points. We've had a lot of statements, and some questions. And it has been, once again, I think, quite a polarized debate, and that seems to be par for the course whenever these issues are being discussed.
Many of the questions are related to the center, and I think some valid questions have been raised. I did give a considerable amount of additional information in my opening remarks, so I won't repeat any of those. Again, on some of the specifics in terms of the budget of the center, it is being funded from existing resources under the multi-annual financial framework. We will consider, in the lead-up to the next MFF and future annual EU budgets, whether additional provisions need to be made. It is a small team.
There are a few people at the moment. A number of people will be onboarded. The secretary is based within DGCOM in the European Commission, and it works in very close coordination, as you would expect, with other services, including, of course, the External Action Service because of the expertise that they have in the operation of the rapid alert system. DG Connect is a key partner, as is, of course, my own team in DG Just as well. But the center will start through a cooperation and coordination framework facilitated by the Commission.
It does not have a separate legal status. It is not a new EU agency. As I said, we have already set up the center. The secretariat in the commission is up and running. The center will take a project-based approach to roll out activities based on the identified interests and needs.
It will primarily function as a hub that will support member states while fully respecting their independence, and it will be based on their needs and indeed their capacities. So, the contribution and the views of member states about the evolution of the center, about the particular projects that it will need to work on or that they wish it to work on, will indeed be instrumental. We had a very good discussion yesterday at the GAC. There was a very high level of support from all the member states. Of course, they made it clear, as you would expect, and as they did at the high-level official meeting in late January, about the need to fully respect the allocation of competencies.
I've acknowledged the importance of that and have committed fully to respecting the allocation of competencies. And they also rightly highlighted the need to avoid duplication or overlapping because we already have considerable expertise and capability, but it is spread across multiple different institutions, member state authorities, and governments across the European Union. And fundamentally, the role of this center will be to better coordinate and to act as that hub that I have described. The role of the European Parliament will be very important. I will continue to engage with you.
The contributions that you have made in the course of debates and the work of the EUDS committee have indeed influenced and been taken into account by the commission in the design of the center and in the European Democracy Shield package that we brought forward. We will continue to engage in a spirit of cooperation with you and with the European Parliament more generally. As the center is voluntary and not a formal structure, there is no need for a legal basis or a legal proposal. Member states can join the center at will or decide not to join it. Participation is voluntary.
As I said, we fully respect the allocation of competences. The center will not have decision-making powers. It is not a regulatory body or a regulatory structure, but it is there to provide support to the member states in the important work that they are doing to safeguard democracy in their own jurisdictions. We will involve civil society through the stakeholder platform. I think that is the ideal way of ensuring that our important voice is heard.
On the question of tech sovereignty, as colleagues will know, EVP Vercunnen is working on a tech sovereignty package, which will include examining issues around cloud, chips, and other digital aspects as well. And I look forward to contributing to that debate around tech sovereignty when the EVP brings that before the college in the coming weeks. I think that is an important point to make. On electoral critical infrastructure, there is no specific proposal for the new Center for Democratic Resilience to undertake an initiative in that regard. As you know, critical infrastructure is already dealt with under separate initiatives, and indeed legislative initiatives, that we have brought forward.
But if there are any particular views on that, and if it features in your final report, then, of course, we will consider that and respond appropriately. I do believe that the work of the center will evolve over time. It will be heavily shaped by the needs and inputs that member states are expressing and providing, but I believe it will evolve organically over time in that respect. We will adopt a holistic approach overall, that has been identified insofar as we can and insofar as we have the reach and the competence to do so. To chair this allegation of censorship and curtailment of freedom of expression is a regular attack line and a regular criticism, which colleagues are entitled to make. But, equally, I am entitled as commissioner to defend our approach because I do not see any censorship by the European Commission or by any other EU body.
Individuals are free to express their views strongly and robustly, and groups of individuals are free to express their views; indeed, they do so on an ongoing basis. And, in fact, I see it as my role to fully protect that right and make sure that right is vindicated. It is an important part of our Charter of Fundamental Rights within the European Union. The question of disinformation and FIMI is well laid out in a whole series of policy frameworks that we have brought forward and indeed is addressed directly and is described in the European Democracy Shield package that we brought forward last November. Indeed, there are clear obligations on the big tech platforms in relation to these issues under the Digital Services Act, and colleagues will be aware that there are actions underway in respect of those obligations and the regulation of them through the DSA, which is important.
But I think it is also important that the general public and citizens have access to reliable sources of information. And that's why I do believe investment in media is important, that media is supported, and that we have the European Media Freedom Act, which we need to fully implement because media is under pressure. And it's important that the public knows where to turn if they want to access reliable information. There's plenty of false information out there, plenty of disinformation. There'll be no shortage of that, but it's important that the public have access to accurate information.
The threats to our democracy, I believe, are real, and we need to respond. We need to respond in a way that fully respects the competence allocation across the different institutions and, indeed, the member states of the European Union. We cannot ignore efforts to interfere in elections in the European Union, especially when we see coordinated campaigns, much of which play out, of course, in the information environment, designed to interfere in the democratic and civic space within the European Union. So, Chair, thank you for the opportunity. As I said, happy to come back and engage directly, and hopefully have more time in the future to go through the questions that have been asked.
Redner 1
Thank you, Commissioner, for your participation in this meeting. As you can see, there is a vast majority of us who want to shed light on manipulations coming from outside of the EU, and we hope the center will help. And, of course, there are others who are afraid that there might be censorship, and I hope that this session provided them with evidence that no one is censored in this committee, in this Parliament, and in the European Union. Okay. We make a pause for 10 minutes.
Okay. Let's start because I know that Christel Saldemoser is not available, and Thomas Dechofsky is going to try to join later. So, briefly,
And I will resume in French. Now, it's a shame that our colleagues from the Patriots are no longer with us because this would have been an opportunity for them to hear about our exchanges of views with the Legal Affairs Committee of the Chamber of Representatives, something that was mentioned extensively a moment ago. But from the seventeenth to February 19, a delegation from our committee went to Washington and New York. We decided on this mission to the US in order to focus on tackling hybrid threats in Washington and also multilateralism at the UN. The US is, of course, a strategically important destination when we look at the current political context.
And it was important to hear what our partners had to say on issues related to free expression, information integrity, and the national security strategy. So, we went to the US just after the Munich Security Conference. In the UN, we wanted to know more about UN initiatives on information integrity, emerging and digital technologies, and other ongoing work on democracy. In Washington, we went to the National Endowment for Democracy, an independent, bipartisan organization which is not for profit and is funded by Congress. It might be the last remaining tool now that all of USAID has been closed down, but its aim is to provide support around the world for projects supporting democracy and freedom.
Then, we saw the Digital Forensic Research Lab of the Atlantic Council, which describes its work as the application of research on disinformation. That work has been ongoing now for quite a few years, and they are shedding light on the manipulation of information. They also look at human rights violations and the strengthening of digital resilience around the world. We were able to talk about electoral interference and their work on digital resilience. We had a look at the American perspective of the Digital Services Act, and that was something we also took up at the congress.
There, we met staffers from the Legal Affairs Committee in the House of Representatives. They have published this well-known report called "The Foreign Censorship Threat: Europe's Decade-Long Campaign to Censor the Global Internet and How It Harms American Speech in the United States." Of course, the discussion was very different depending on whether you were talking to Democrat staffers or Republican staffers. I would say that the Republican staffers had some difficulty explaining exactly what it was that they didn't like about the Digital Services Act, apart from the fact that it might end up costing money for the platforms. But to conclude, on the first day, the delegation met with teams at the Bloomberg office in Washington.
And there, we talked to them about the situation of the press in the United States and, again, about information integrity and the financial sustainability of the press. The next day, at the operational level, we met with cybersecurity units and counter-espionage units of the FBI. And they had very interesting things to say about cyber attacks in the U.S. S, targeting in particular critical infrastructure. They listed the various external threats that they face.
And when we're looking at an operational level in the US, we actually have the same list of those involved as we would have in Europe, Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. So, this is not a European invention. It turns out that the professionals, when it comes to tackling foreign interference and spying, list the same adversaries. And all of them said that they were especially keen to ensure that the transatlantic relationship and our partnership on this issue could continue, and I would say this despite everything. We then went to the Justice Department, and there we looked at the importance of Euro-American cooperation in criminal matters.
And, again, that was stressed. We met the Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Josh Goldfoot. And the aim there was to discuss the impact of organized crime. When it comes to the conduct of hybrid attacks, in particular cybercriminals and information pirates. We wanted to talk about the ways in which Russia and China use these criminal activities to benefit from them.
Finally, we went to the United Nations, and we had a series of meetings there in the sensitive context that we are aware of, with the UN going through a crisis of confidence. That's why we have a technical problem with the sound.
Redner 1
"Didn't touch anything, and that was not a cyberattack," says the chair. So, a funding crisis is linked to the crisis of confidence. We met the Deputy Secretary-General for Global Communications, Melissa Fleming, to talk about the issue of information integrity, the responsibility of online platforms, and protecting minors online. And I forgot to say that in Washington, the issue of minors and children online did seem to be something that was almost as much of a concern as what you might expect in Europe. So, back to the UN.
We met the Deputy Secretary-General Guy Ryder, and we talked about the impact of the proposals on the Summit of the Future 2024 on UN reform initiatives when it comes to AI. We also met representatives of the United Nations Office for Digital and Emerging Technologies, who are in charge of the Global Digital Compact, as well as representatives of the UN program on development, who focus on governance in areas around the EU. We also looked at how they work with the EU when it comes to the Global Gateway projects. So that is what I have to say to you by way of a debrief on that short but interesting mission. And since Peter Schiedlow is here, I don't know whether he would like to add anything, but he would be very welcome to do so.
Redner 11
You, ma'am Chair. As you said, the mission was very interesting. We had a number of very interesting meetings. I have a sense that Ma'am Chair has already mentioned the most important meetings, so I don't want to take up too much of your time. I would just like to thank everyone in the secretariat who made this mission possible.
Thank you.
Redner 1
Well, thank you very much. And yes, we would like to thank the staff also. The secretariat did a lot to contribute to the smooth functioning of the trip. So, the next item on our agenda is the meeting with the director of the NATO Strategic Communications Center of Excellence. I imagine that he is not online yet. Ah, he is.
Redner 1
I suggest, colleagues, that we have Janis Sans online. If I am mispronouncing your name, then I do apologize. And please don't hesitate to correct me. But you are the Director of the NATO Strategic Communications Center of Excellence, and I would like to welcome you. The Center of Excellence for Strategic Communications is an international military body based in Riga, Latvia.
It was created in 2014 by seven NATO members: Estonia, Germany, Italy, Lithuania, Poland, the UK, and Latvia. Since then, 9 other countries have joined, and 4 more are in the process of joining. Now, this center is not part of the NATO command structure. It is not subordinate to any NATO body, and it is not funded by NATO. The aim of the Stratcom Center of Excellence is to improve the capabilities of the alliance and its members or partners in strategic communications.
They will do this by developing and harmonizing doctrines, conducting research and experiments, drawing on lessons learned from the use of strategic communications in operations, and strengthening training. Now, of course, we are keen to know more. So, without further ado, I'd like to give the floor to Mr. Sartz for about 10 minutes.
Redner 42
Madam Chair, thank you. Thank you very much for a very kind introduction, and, of course, thank you for the invitation to participate in your deliberations. As I said, our center of excellence is under NATO's umbrella, but it is a common effort of multiple NATO allies, most of whom are also currently EU member states, to enhance the understanding and knowledge of strategic communications in the context of war. Increasingly, we're thinking in terms of information warfare and cognitive warfare as waged by our adversaries through research, experimentation, and methodology development. So the way we work, we pretty much look at case studies.
So, obviously, Russia as a threat actor since 2014 has been one of the key focal areas for our research. China increasingly becomes a part of our research focus. Also, groups have been, and still are, to a lesser extent, a focus of our research on how cognitive space information is instrumentalized against democracies in a context of crisis and war. And then, of course, we are also looking at particular cases. So we have, obviously, a very specific focus on the war in Ukraine and how the information dimension of this war is playing out, what kind of capabilities Russia demonstrates, and methodologies, to see what is workable or not.
Also, we're looking at different regions. For instance, the Arctic has been a focus area for our research for quite some time. But also, a specific area where we have developed our research and knowledge is election security; therefore, we focus on ways to create a more resilient democratic process against hostile foreign interference. So these are some of the kinds of areas we work on, but obviously, one other area is, and I think there's been quite a lot of cooperation with the EU in that area, where we research the ecosystem where information is transferred, most notably social media. We've been running experiments testing platform resilience towards inauthentic manipulation; in other words, we conduct botnet interference across different platforms on our own accounts and test how much of what is bought is being delivered.
So we've been doing that for 7 years, also now since the Digital Services Act has come into place. The answer is typically the same. It's still very cheap and very available. There's been some improvement over the last year, and we assume that it is because of the Digital Services Act. But the employment of robotic systems for manipulating algorithms and the visibility of content on social media is still highly prevalent.
The best results are from the platforms that can block 30% of these inauthentic activities. So that means that 70% still goes through, and it is still the better part of those platforms. There are some where the kind of throughput rate might be around 90%. And then we're, of course, looking at different elements of those social media algorithms, etc. We're doing experimentation and testing as well.
The other part of our effort is how to help allies and member states improve their capabilities. So we run specialized sets of training for specialists, especially in areas of high specialization, such as information environment assessment capabilities, new trends in social media, and AIs in strategic communications. We also oversee the quality of the courses across the alliance, mainly for military purposes in these areas. But also, we're designing new methods for how we can test and develop ecosystems where we can train our capabilities. So, with that in mind, this October, we launch the first strategic communications live exercise, which is a fully AI-driven synthetic information environment.
So, in other words, it has its Facebooks, Twitters, and YouTubes, but they are synthetic. There are kinds of traditional media, blogospheres, and then there are audiences that are played by AI agent systems. And the purpose of that ecosystem is to recreate realistic information, environment, and circumstances, and train governments to respond in real time to the crisis that would be very similar to the ones you would see in high-end hybrid scenarios. And this October, we have invited allied and also EU member state governments to send their governmental teams that would have to respond to the high-end hybrid attacks by adversary states. And this ecosystem allows us to measure it in a more realistic way, so there will be winning and losing.
And so, that's one of the new contributions: how we're trying to boost the capabilities of the countries as well as the international institutions. The last point I want to bring up is the fact that I've just heard about some of the EU initiatives that you're undertaking. I think that is very important. But what I'm trying to say is that we are facing yet another revolution in the information space. All of our data indicates the advent of artificial intelligence in information warfare.
They are still at the very early stages, but we envisage that the scale and scope of AI integration in hostile activities in the information space is soon going to be very significant. The fundamentals, we have already seen. So, first and foremost, everybody talks about deepfakes, and I think it is very important to recognize that just thinking in terms of deepfakes is not sufficient. Already, 25% of the newly created content online is not human-created. So we have to have better systems to recognize what is hostile, what is foreign, and what is just mundane synthetic content.
The second element that is, I think, very much coming in, which we observed, is that instead of robots, we have AI-enabled personas that are capable of integrating themselves into digital communities, being very aware of the context and the circumstances, and able to overtake and steer discussions in smaller groups, for instance, Facebook groups, in a particular direction. And the existing monitoring systems that were detecting these bot systems are struggling to actually differentiate these specific accounts, and I do believe it will just grow. The third element, which is very important, is that we've been seeing an increased amount of data poisoning or methodologies on how to make your chatbot, ChatGPT, or Gemini actually answer in a way that the manipulator wants it to. For instance, for whom should I vote in the elections? There are now an increasing number of players that can manipulate the answer in a way that the LLM gives you the answer the manipulator wants.
There is a very strong trend for increased uptake of the so-called phenomenon of AI friends. I'm sure you've heard about the number of AI apps that give the possibility to create your AI friend for multiple kinds of purposes: psychological, therapeutic, or romantic, and this is a very fast-moving ecosystem. And what we, of course, observe and predict is that there will be malign use of those ecosystems, which would fundamentally change the way we understand these hostile activities. And that is just the beginning. We recently produced a report together with Cambridge and Oxford universities on the future of the information ecosystem.
These are just the first points of what is to come. There are much more profound, likely effects of that technological transformation on the public space, also in Europe, which would fundamentally change the way we run the exchange of information, but secondarily, also the manipulation options for hostile players. That would be it. Thank you very much.
Redner 1
Thank you very much. I'd now like to give the floor to colleagues, starting with Sandra Calnetti for the EPP. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
Redner 43
Patriots, I'm greeting you particularly, and the horror stories you just told us are very inspiring. But I will get back to, let's say, the past because much of our EU response to foreign information manipulation and interference still treats the problem as external, something that comes from outside into our borders. But increasingly, foreign regimes do not need their own media outlets. They rely on EU-based amplifiers, influencers, fringe political actors, and alternative media ecosystems, and this allows hostile narratives to circulate under the protection of our own democratic freedoms and laws. And we can ban or sanction foreign state media.
Redner 44
It is far more difficult when the narrative laundering happens through EU-based actors operating legally within our information space. And so, my question to you is: are we prepared to confront this gray zone where foreign interference operates through domestic proxies, and it is very important for the elections? And do we have adequate transparency and accountability mechanisms to address it without undermining fundamental rights? Or are we still regulating yesterday's threat model? I think you already answered that part partially.
So, thank you.
Redner 11
Thank you for the presentation. I will share with you my perspective as a Polish national. We are a frontline NATO state, and we are also a key hub for support in Ukraine. Therefore, we experience constant pressure from Russia, be it cyberattacks, sabotage, or disinformation. I would like to ask you how your experience and the conclusions you have drawn from the situation in Ukraine can be used to strengthen the potential and capacity of the measures taken by NATO?
Also, what is your assessment of the readiness of individual member states in counteracting this information, and how can we avoid overlapping activities?
Redner 1
Merci. Thank you. So, I will give the floor back to our guests to respond to those two questions.
Redner 42
Thank you. Thank you very much for the very good questions. First, I think the question about how to distinguish between hostile foreign and local actors is one of the core answers we have to get right. And the reason we're still having this discussion is that it is very hard because, on one side, I think even though we might disagree with many views, it is very important when these views are the kind of organic views of those who represent them. We should let them be.
Then, on the other side, we had multiple cases where, as you rightly pointed out, Madam Calnete, the hostile foreign actors hid behind those seemingly independent local actors. So what I would suggest is actually, I think in these terms, and I have to admit, I think that a lot of kinetic word logic is applicable to this information word logic. So where this parallel is of importance is that a successful war requires significant logistic support. So most of these hostile foreign interference campaigns are not one-time. It's never just one account.
It's never just one site. There are multiple sites, accounts, or entities, also in the physical world, that work as a concerted network. So first, I think there is an indication of these entities working as a network, including with the networks that are proven to be part of hostile foreign governments, as an extension of their operation. Second, I always think we have to look at two elements that implicate that these internal actors are not just voicing their opinion: money flow and instruction. And we've had multiple cases in member states where seemingly independent voices tried to most likely be part of the Russian narrative, for instance, in the Baltics.
When looked at much closer, investigative journalists put it out that in one particular case, they actually received both money and instructions from entities that are pretty much related to the Kremlin. So, that is what we need to do more. So, my point is that it is a specific responsibility of the entities, that would be counterintelligence and intelligence entities within a member state, to be very accurate in bearing out these instances. And that is, I think, the only way we can do it. But I would admit, as I've said in my introduction, I think now we're increasingly going to be solving the problem that we saw yesterday.
Yesterday. And I would say probably we should think more about the problem that is coming our way, which is AI and transformation, because I think that will be much more impactful and significant. And it's not just that it will potentially have very bad implications. We might also correct some of the problems we're having right now with that, but unless we do something about it, it will, for sure, not be to our benefit. Then, on the lessons from Ukraine, I think that is where we really did a lot of effort to understand what creates these resilience elements.
And you're right. Poland is one of the frontline states, especially in their cognitive warfare, and we just finished the study where we looked at how this information attack occurred at the time when the drones penetrated Polish airspace. It was interesting to see that Russian bots and networks were able to match the amount of the Polish original postings across Facebook and other platforms with inauthentic content in a way that on the day when these drones were downed, you'd have a 50/50 amount of Polish language content saying that it is Russia's fault versus saying that it is Ukraine's fault, which is very clearly inorganic. So, yes, that is correct. Poland is under threat.
The first thing that we have to learn from Ukraine is that you have to know what happens in your information space. Once again, as I've said, it's all about networks and logistics. You have to act to deny accessibility to the information space. That is the second thing. Third, we also have to think about networks.
So, it's not only about denying. And sorry to say, data shows that fact-checking is not effective. Once again, fact-checking is not effective. It's important to do, but it doesn't have an effect on the actual narrative spread. What we need to do is to have our own narratives much more actively, and that's why I think Ukrainians did a really marvelous job at countering the Russian narratives.
And always concentrating on whatever Russia or China defines as the next subject and just pushing back is not a good solution, because you'll always be on the defensive. But Ukrainians have shown that once you take your own initiative, you start to be much more proactive. And luckily, in these circumstances, we don't have to compromise our values when doing so. That is when we become more productive. And interestingly, given that Russia runs a very hierarchical system, the moment we start to be much more proactive, that is where they're struggling to give the right response, and they are not very good at that either.
Individual member states vary greatly. That is very varied, and that is my assessment. There are some member states that have invested much more in that capability, and some member states that are probably, I would say, more vulnerable. And that is not an even field, if I may say so. Thank you.
Redner 1
Thank you. We have a member who came a little late because we have many committees working at the same time today in the Parliament. But Missus Pedro joined us, and I think she wants to ask a question or make a remark. Mrs. Pedro?
Yes. Thank you.
I apologize for being late.
Redner 45
I was in a committee, voting. Mister Thartz, allow me to use the Portuguese, if I may.
We have different models, Chinese models that are being used by Europeans. So what we're talking about here really are economic issues, but we're also talking about how we can put across narratives, focus on topics, and push personal subjects to the fore. It's about exerting influence, and it can have an impact on information ecosystems. I'd like to talk about 3 vulnerabilities. First of all, setting the function criteria.
Redner 46
It's not always transparent. There's a policy that underpins it. The public debate is always about censorship, but there are things that are far more subtle than that that affect public opinion. And some of the international community is busy with the future risks of AI, but we shouldn't underestimate the existing risks. We have this AI and the Chinese models.
What does NATO think of those? Do they need to be analyzed in technical terms or the strategic aspect? And what can NATO do together with the EU to promote transparency and democratic accountability when AI is used in political contexts? Thank you.
So, the floor is yours.
Redner 42
Right. Thank you very much. Great question. First and foremost, we don't have an agreed response by NATO to your question, so I will give you the response based on NATO's Tarracom Centers of Excellence research and point of view. As I've said, we finished recently a report on the outlook ten years ahead, how it might look. And I think why it is important is because it gives you a context to things that might be happening right now.
So what this report states is pretty much that in probably less than 10 years from now, the kind of AI you or the citizen will be using will predetermine the way you would see the world and, therefore, the way you would be behaving. And there are multiple reasons why I think that is quite an accurate statement. So, to that end, what we concluded is that those who control the infrastructure behind AI that people are eventually using can have control over their perceptions of reality. And that is in the circumstances where fragmentation of reality is already increasingly visible vis-à-vis our own societies. I'm sure we all observed it, but it is quickly increasing, and also the phenomenon which was always a kind of given: when we see it, therefore, we believe it is real, ceasing to be a factual statement.
And that is going to have a fundamental change in the way people perceive things, including in the political processes. So, going back now to your point, clearly, I think a Chinese approach right now is very strategic because DeepSeek and multiple other models are decently good, very cheap, and very available for putting as a cornerstone of your AI development. And I think that is done with the idea that China becomes part of the future ecosystem of information distribution and therefore controls these entities of how people would view the world and therefore act, including in the electoral processes. And I don't think it is a very futuristic scenario. I think it is pretty much a near-term outlook of things.
So what I would say is I would not repeat the same mistake we did with TikTok. I would limit it, and not because of the Chinese ownership, but because of the transparency, data use, and the kind of basic value principles that are underpinning these models, which I think are the things that we really have to look at. Of course, if these future models are very balanced and always look at a human's best interest, we might correct a lot of these mistakes. But currently, I don't see many of those models that we are increasingly using going much in that direction. There are few, but not many. So, I think if we think about the future democratic health and options, we have to think in terms of who will be controlling the AI infrastructure that people will be using, because it will be a very direct link to the way they perceive the world, behave, and, therefore, also the way they act in electoral and other democratic choice scenarios.
Redner 1
Thank you very much for these very useful remarks and comments, which are useful for our work at the moment, as we are creating a center for democratic resilience in the European Union. I think we have a lot to learn from your expertise and your experience, and I take it as important advice. Fact-checkers are useful, but they are not the magical recipe. Proactive strategic communication is obviously lacking at the EU institutions' level and at the member states' level as well. And we keep reacting, running after this information and Fimi operations instead of filling the space with what we have to say and what we want to promote, which would be much more effective.
Redner 48
Thank you very much. And I hope we will continue the exchanges with your center. So, we pause for just a few minutes, and then we have the next item. Well, colleagues, we'll try to start. Unfortunately, our guest speaker from Ottawa cannot be connected.
Redner 1
We have tried again and again, but it is not working. So, unfortunately, we have one member of our committee present: Beata Schudlow. We're waiting for another one. And I will give the floor to Mr. Sebastian Hubertin Jiguere from Public Safety Canada will give a five-minute introduction, and I hope other MEPs will come.
We had decided to have this item on information, manipulation, and interferences, and the way Canada is handling them, as well as recent decisions taken by Canada. At the moment, we're in the Foreign Affairs Committee. We have voted on a report to advocate for stronger relations between Canada and the European Union. So, Mr. Oberta Jigar, the floor is yours.
Redner 47
Merci. Oberta Jigar. I'm with Public Safety Canada, which is part of the Department of the Interior. I'm Canada's national coordinator to counter foreign interference. It's in the position that was created in 2023, and my job is to bring a coordinated response to foreign interference.
Very briefly, I can say that from our perspective, in 2016 and 2017, it became quite clear that some authoritarian states were becoming much more aggressive, losing their inhibitions in pursuing very aggressive actions against Canada, and also using covert, illegal actions to push their interests on Canadian soil. And we're talking about the full spectrum from election, electoral, and political interference, information manipulation, repression of diaspora and dissident communities, and cyber attacks. This is allowed because technology has lowered the bar in terms of the threshold and has provided new tools for attack, but also created more vulnerabilities in our societies. Also, because Canada's demographic landscape is changing, Canada oftentimes becomes the battlefield for political affairs from overseas. And also because more and more, we can see some of the territory states collaborating in their attack against able democracies.
We, in Canada, have continued to evolve our response. The first thing we did was to make sure that we are securing elections because elections are inflection points that are quite fundamental in maintaining public trust in democratic institutions. But then we sort of built on other mechanisms as we went along. And I would summarize the actions that we've taken into three buckets. I would say one has better coordination.
I think what's quite fundamental when you're dealing with foreign interference is that you need a wider table of departments in responding to the crisis. So not only do you need your classical national security agencies, but you also need a wider range of players. And so, we have created this table where senior officials are considering intelligence and the evidence, and are discussing a response with a wider response toolkit. There's also the creation of my office here at Public Safety, which provides a sort of coordination function across departments. We have also improved our laws.
Oftentimes, we realized that we didn't have the right legal framework to address the issue of foreign and defense, especially some of the gray zone tactics. We have introduced, in 2024, new legislation on foreign interference, which has introduced some new criminal offenses relating to foreign defense and has also lowered the threshold for what we consider criminal behavior, which makes the work of police agencies in Canada easier. So, it is also addressing some of the tactics relating to interference. We've also introduced legislation. It's called the Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act, which will create an obligation for individuals who have an arrangement with a foreign power to conduct influence work in Canada to influence a political process or public policy, requiring them to register.
So, some call it the Foreign Agent Registry Act, but it's really a tool of transparency. And, also, we have given our security service the ability to have resilience briefings with any entities outside of the federal government, which means that they can engage with civil society actors and provide them some intelligence that is useful to build their resilience. The last set of series of improvements that we've made is that we have invested in our capabilities. The first one was to protect elections. I would say no.
That has been quite fundamental. So we have created the Security Intelligence Threat to Election Task Force, which, when an election is called, includes the security agency, the national police, our FMI units, and also our agency. They have dedicated teams that monitor threats to the election and report to a committee of senior government officials, which we call the Panel of Five. These officials have the function of receiving this information and judging if there are threats to the election that compromise its legitimacy, and they have the ability to speak to the Canadian public. So this has contributed quite enormously to raising the bar in terms of election security monitoring for foreign defense. We have also worked quite a lot on transnational repression.
We have engaged directly with vulnerable minorities. My office, leading this effort, is essentially establishing contacts with groups that are victims of transnational repression, teaching them the basics of physical and digital security, and making sure that they understand who to call and what to do if something happens. And so, just to build resilience, we have also trained police officers of jurisdiction. Oftentimes, when people are victims of repression from overseas, they contact the local police, but the local police is not equipped to deal with this. They don't recognize that there is a foreign element to it.
And so, creating the right links with the security agencies and frontline police officers has been quite important. And lastly, we've worked on raising international awareness to the fact that transnational repression matters not only when someone is about to get physically hurt, but also all the gray zone tactics and the snowdrop that have a huge impact on diaspora communities. And then, in terms of capabilities, we also have a theme unit. It's called the rapid response mechanism, and I think my colleague who was supposed to be here could not join. Their job is to monitor and detect inauthentic behavior in the information space that is driven by state actors.
Now, the unit is going to be dedicated solely to the protection of Canada, and we'll get some more resources. In terms of what we need to do next, I think that the hybrid threat concept is not something we use very widely in Canada, and I think it's a useful one because it creates a conceptual way to address this issue of the sliding scale to full warfare and sort of pushes the national security community to have better relations with national defense and to come up with better responses. Also, we are collaborating with our EU colleagues and have a lot to learn from them on this issue. I would say, also, we need to increase our capacity to tackle information manipulation efforts, especially the right policies and the right capabilities to address artificial intelligence and the very difficult operations that involve the channeling of money to influence our networks, as we have observed in many countries until recently. So maybe I can pause here, and we can have an exchange.
Redner 1
Thank you very much. I will give the floor to my colleagues, starting with Miss Annals. There are also two members of the mission of Canada to the European Union who are present today. So, I would like to give the floor to Mr. Siobhan Hastricht. How do I pronounce it?
And, mister. If you want to take the floor, it is yours. Thank you.
Redner 50
Thank you very much, Madam Chair. We're prepared; we have the talking points for our colleague from the rapid response mechanism. So we're prepared to deliver those, with your concurrence and confirmation that he hasn't been able to be connected.
Redner 49
Yes. Please do, because there is the possibility to have the connection with Ottawa.
Redner 50
Okay. Thank you very much. So, my name is Che Van Hastricht. I'm the counselor for the political, economic, and public affairs section at the mission to the EU. I am not an expert on foreign information manipulation and interference, but I'm happy to deliver these talking points on behalf of my colleague in Ottawa.
So, I'm here to share Canada's efforts to counter foreign information manipulation and interference in a very turbulent time. Like Europe, Canada is concerned about the increasingly sophisticated, persistent, and pervasive foreign interference activities in the digital ecosystem. We all know too well the ways that the cognitive spaces have been co-opted as a battlefield. We have seen malign actors undertake manipulation efforts squarely aimed at corrupting their target audience's thought processes, influencing their general outlook, and impacting their decision-making capacity. And these manipulation efforts rarely occur in isolation.
They are often paired with malicious cyber activities that help these actors scale and automate their operations. FEMI typically targets our political systems and institutions, economy, foreign policy, military capabilities, and social cohesion, as well as those of our partners. There is a significant risk to our sovereignty and to our national security. There is so much that we can learn from each other. We know that Europe is often ground zero for actors to test their tactics before using them in Canada and elsewhere.
Through the rapid response mechanism, we monitor the digital information environment for foreign threats, such as foreign information manipulation and interference, and lead the Government of Canada's international response to foreign interference. We also support Canada's international engagement to counter foreign state-sponsored information operations in our role as the permanent secretariat to the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism, or the G7 RRM. The G7 RRM is composed of all G7 member states, the EU, as well as associate members. This structure allows various partners to bring together their valuable experience in encountering foreign interference, threat detection capabilities, and willingness to stand up to malign actors. The EU is a valued member of the G7 RRM, and our colleagues at the EEAS chaired the G7 RRM working group on collective response and helped establish a collective response framework.
The G7 RRM collective response framework establishes shared principles, roles, and responsibilities for participants, outlining the full range of policy and operational tools that G7 RRM members can use in responding to FEMI threats. The Collective Response Working Group is committed to implementing, operationalizing, and testing the framework to strengthen coordination and improve future response efforts. Canada's 2025 G7 presidency focused on advancing G7 RRM priorities and strengthening the mechanism's collective detection and response to emerging hybrid threats, including transnational repression in the digital space. All G7 leaders committed to actions in the first-ever statement on transnational repression. Canada and the EU, alongside other G7 RRM partners, collaboratively developed an annual G7 RRM Digital Transnational Repression Detection Academy to offer ongoing training to monitor and detect digital transnational repression threats.
In September 2023, amidst growing concerns about foreign interference, the government of Canada launched an inquiry into foreign interference and its effects on Canada's democratic processes. This inquiry revealed how rapidly evolving misinformation and disinformation campaigns, often driven by foreign actors, pose a major threat to democratic systems, generally, with Commissioner Ho warning that information manipulation represents the single biggest risk to the integrity of elections. These findings highlighted vulnerabilities that are relevant not only to Canada but also to democracies worldwide, where foreign interference operations increasingly target public trust and electoral processes. This inquiry built on earlier assessments that had already prompted the federal government to establish the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force in 2019, which my colleague from Public Safety mentioned. The mandate of this task force is to ensure that Canada's security and intelligence agencies, along with our Ministry of Foreign Affairs, jointly monitor and assess foreign interference threats to federal elections.
As part of the site task force, RRM Canada has monitored federal elections, including the most recent federal election, which took place in 2025. Going into the 2025 election, we expected technological innovations such as AI to play a significant role in foreign interference attempts in elections. We are pleased to report that this was ultimately not the case. Of course, that does not mean that the threats posed by Phoebe AI and malicious cyber activity will not affect future Canadian elections. Ultimately, everyone is vulnerable to this cognitive warfare.
It will become increasingly difficult to see what is true and what is false. We know that AI can be leveraged to generate fake images and videos, such as deepfakes. It can also be used to amplify messages and content in an authentic, coordinated way. This is what makes RRM Canada's work so important, not only during elections but at all times. In the wake of these lessons and good practices, we are now turning our attention to the ways in which the information landscape continues to evolve so that we are even more resilient in the future.
While Canada is in a strong position to learn from our experiences and mature expertise, significant challenges remain. For example, how will bot campaigns evolve, and what can Canada do to disrupt these information operations? As coordination across threat actors increases, how can we tighten our respective efforts to counter these threats with our collective weight? In a quickly evolving threat landscape, how long will it take for our tools to become obsolete? We also recognize that combating Pheme is made more difficult by the ever-evolving cyber landscape.
These are questions that we may not have an immediate answer to, but we must continue to face and resolve them. Canada can learn a lot from Europe about the best approaches to do so. We can also stay savvy about what else may lie ahead. We know that enabling a strong public is the best defense against these emerging threats, but only when complemented by an equally resilient and nimble government. Global Affairs Canada tackles this directive by issuing statements, conducting diplomatic demarches, and complementing our work with domestic security, Internet, and intelligence partners to put collective weight behind countering Fimi.
Our work enables and empowers Canada to continue stepping up to lead globally, but we know we can't do it alone. While Canada has a strong understanding of Fimi threats in general, we know that international cooperation strengthens our ability to meet the grandeur of the threat at scale. In addition to speaking with the many experts online here today, we are also looking at opportunities to host capacity-building workshops with members of the European Union to exchange best practices in countering. We look forward to joint initiatives and exercises to better understand Fimi in Europe and to counter them together. Thank you.
Redner 1
Thank you very much for your comments. Now I give the floor to my colleagues, starting with the EPP and Michel Wavrijkevich.
Redner 25
Thank you, Chair. First of all, I would like to express my admiration and appreciation for Canadian attitudes regarding the country and protecting democracy. And, as we can see, you provided the highest possible standards for democratic resilience. So I am looking forward to the cooperation, and I would like to ask you about the potential ways of cooperation and synergy between the European Union and Canada, especially when we are planning to operate the European Center for Democratic Resilience. Where do you see the ways and paths for our cooperation?
Thank you very much.
Jean Grey Bardesson.
Redner 11
Thank you. I would like to thank you for the information you have presented to us. I think that the conclusion which comes clearly is that we're dealing with a growing challenge, with challenges developing faster. And we have to look for new tools that we would be able to use to combat the challenges. And the question is whether we are ready.
So, I want to emphasize that the solutions introduced in Canada are of interest to us. Therefore, I have two questions. My first question is, of course, we heard about it, but could you make it more specific? What are the first conclusions from the operation of the Transparency Register of Foreign Influence? And the second question, which I think is the most important for me in the context of combating foreign influence and the Fimi issue.
The question is, how do you cooperate with digital platforms to counteract Fimi without excessive interference with freedom of speech? So, to put it shortly, how do you perceive the limit between freedom of speech and foreign influence? How do you measure it, and how do you solve the issue? Thank you.
Redner 1
Thank you. I would like to ask an additional question. Canada is a country of migration, with many different foreign diasporas present in the country. How do you deal with the use of this diaspora as targets of FMEs or as vectors of FMEs as well? Is there a specific practice that Canada is trying to implement and that you could share with us?
So now I give the floor back to Sébastien Humbertang Giger.
Redner 47
Thank you for your questions. On the first question regarding our potential areas for collaboration, I see three areas. The first one is that it is our common response when a threat action is being detected and attributed. So I think that in itself is always more impactful when many countries together, you know, sort of identify a threat and denounce it. The second area for collaboration, I would say, is the sharing of best practices.
We've been quite happy to share our experience when it comes to election monitoring and protection of democratic processes. We are learning a lot from engagements with our foreign partners. We should have mechanisms to systematically share the best practices. And lastly, information exchange about the threat actors themselves. The more we understand the threat actors in the most intimate details, the more we will be able to tackle them.
On the second question, the Foreign Influence Transparency Commissioner is not yet in place. We are about to launch it. It's a question of weeks. So, we don't have clear lessons to draw from. We have collaborated quite extensively with our Australian, UK, and US colleagues who have such registries, and I've been learning their experiences and their best practices.
So, I hope to come back maybe in a year from now and provide a perspective on this capability. On collaborating with platforms, it's always a delicate balance, obviously. I think the key here is to focus on the behavior itself. So, for example, the RM is looking for evidence of inauthentic behavior. So the information moves in unnatural ways, and then you can attribute this artificial sort of promotion or dissemination of information to a threat actor.
So, you're not looking at discourse, but at the way the information moves. I think the more precise you are in your intervention, the better you can protect democratic discourse, while at the same time addressing the information issues relating to Fimi. And lastly, on Diaspora groups, I would say that engagement has been the best tool. So, engaging directly with Diaspora communities, especially groups that are extremely vulnerable to foreign interference, non-dissident communities, foreign journalists, and rights defenders, and making sure that they have clear connections with the non-government agencies that are there to protect them. They understand the threat landscape and what laws protect them.
I think that is quite fundamental. Otherwise, they feel that the state is not working to protect them. It creates a climate of fear and paranoia in certain groups and communities. So I would say engagement is perhaps the best tool in that case.
Redner 1
Thank you very much. Do you want to add something? So from us, oh, I'll make it.
Redner 51
Your pronunciation is excellent. Thank you. Nothing further to add. Thanks.
Redner 1
Well, thank you very much to all of you. I think it was really inspiring. We noticed that you also took inspiration from Australia, the UK, and the US. And it's a pity that some members of this committee are not present here now because they would see that your inspiration comes from terrible autocracies. They always fear that what we're trying to do would amount to censorship or decrease the level of democracy in the European Union.
We see that Canada and other very strong democracies are fighting hard against foreign interference, and for very good reasons. Thank you again. Any other business from colleagues present in the room? If it's not the case, the next meeting will be on March 17 in Brussels. And later today, we have our coordinators' meeting at a quarter to five.
Thank you very much.
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