Committee on Security and Defence Joint meeting Delegation for relations with Canada
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SEDE European Parliament
Follow its sittingsJavier Moreno Sánchez
The question before us is, therefore, not whether we cooperate. We already do that. The question is how we deepen that cooperation in light of the growing geopolitical and geoeconomic pressures. This morning, the European Parliament Committee on Foreign Affairs adopted its report on NATO-Canada cooperation in the current geopolitical context. I had the privilege of serving as a reporter for an opinion for the Committee on International Trade.
The report contains an important section on the Arctic and calls, among other things, for enhanced EU-Canada cooperation on Arctic security, including joint monitoring and strategic maritime corridors, strengthened early warning systems, shared threat assessment, and coordination in addressing hybrid and unconventional threats. At the same time, even as we threaten our security and defense cooperation, we must not narrow our vision. The Arctic is not only a security space. It is also a space for science, research, and global environmental significance. EU-Canada cooperation in polar research, climate monitoring, sustainable resource management, and technological innovation is essential.
If we focus only on deterrence and deployments, we risk reducing the Arctic to a threat, a theater of competition. Our objective should instead be comprehensive engagement in security, sustainability, science, and partnership. That is the strategic balance we must aim to preserve. And now, it's my pleasure to welcome at this meeting our expert speaker, Professor Frederic Lassard from the University of Laval in Quebec, Canada, who joins us remotely. Professor, you have the floor, and thank you for being with us. We want to welcome you.
Speaker 6
Yes. Thank you very much. It's a great pleasure to be with you to share some ideas. On five, I have five to six minutes, of course, so I'm not going to be able to cover all these security challenges in the Arctic. I have prepared a brief presentation just to set the scene, as it were.
Speaker 7
And then, obviously, I'll be only too happy to reply to your questions if you have any. So, if I could say something about the security challenges in the Canadian Arctic as perceived by us in Canada, which is an important nuance, of course. And if I could move on to the next slide. So, first of all, the military infrastructure: if we take an overview of this, there aren't that many military bases for this huge territory. And this is partly because of the military choices that have been made and the perceived threat.
Speaker 6
There hasn't really been much perceived possibility of an invasion by Russia, China, or anybody landing on the Canadian coast; that would seem to be over the top. Obviously, there is still the question of what happened going back to the Cold War era. We know that the shortest route between Russia and the previous Soviet Union and the U.S. S. Is the Arctic?
There are one or two radars, but very few military bases. And you can see there are a couple of air bases, aerodromes, and certain advanced bases. And there are certain dual bases. There's a supply base, and the idea was to have a naval base there. But given the cost and complexity of the necessary works, the only thing that was built was a supply warehouse or depot and an inventory base at Resolute, which you can see on the map.
And the idea was to possibly build another facility at Grays Bay, in the Arctic Security Corridor. But the idea is whether to continue with this project, the industrial military port, and what would then happen with the Nanaceviq base, especially given the cost of this infrastructure. And you can see that there are many different points marked on the map, which makes it look as if there are many bases. But of course, well, there is the Rangers network. This is the Inuit militia integrated into the Canadian Army, and they are the ears and eyes of the Army in situ on the territory.
They're very familiar with the terrain, of course, and they're the ones who participate in the patrols and cover this vast territory. And obviously, given their good knowledge of the terrain, they provide this surveillance network, so there is not much in the way of infrastructure. But there is the radar network, obviously for monitoring air traffic between Canada and the United States. If we could move on to the next slide. And if I could say something about the Arctic Corridor.
You have the Grays Bay Terminal, which I have referred to. And the idea is to construct a route initially purely for industrial purposes, with the aim of facilitating the extraction of mineral resources because, of course, they are inland. So, obviously, if we want to proceed with extraction, we have to look at the logistics surrounding this. And then, of course, we have the ever-changing and rather worrying political context since President Trump has been imposed: annexation of Canada, for example, by the United States, and the annexation of Greenland. So the context has led to a debate as to whether we need a defense infrastructure here.
And obviously, we have to have some kind of justification for this proposed route and see whether it is going to be used for military purposes. And the idea is to see whether, obviously, we can have the best surveillance tools for this particular space. If we could move on to the next slide. As you can see from this map, we have the warning system, which is essentially based on the network of radars constructed in the 1950s during the Cold War, called the North Warning System. And you can see, well, north of Alaska, Canada, and then it goes down along the coast of Labrador in order to have early detection of any Soviet bombers.
And this is still quite current. It was modernized. The network was modernized in the 1990s, so the North Warning System. And we also have the alert listening stations right in the North. And then you have the Pitufic Base, previously the Tula Military Base, which is the largest American base in Greenland.
We've heard a lot about that. So, this completes the network for surveillance of airspace based on the radar network. And then, of course, what is important as well is to stress that despite the deterioration of relations between NATO and Russia because of the Ukraine conflict, there hasn't been an increase in any kind of military activity by the Russians. There are a couple of patrol vessels. They used to be about between 10 and 20 per year.
This has not increased since the Ukraine war started. So, compared to the North American Arctic area or the Canadian Arctic. So, it would appear that the current networks are sufficient to detect anything that is going on. The question is, would this network be sufficient if Russia were to launch a major air attack? So, is there a need to modify the North Warning System?
As I said, the last modernization was carried out in the 1990s. And then, of course, there's the question of increasing air capacity. For example, the F-35s: that debate is still ongoing in Canada. And then, of course, there's the dependence on the industry of the United States in that context. So, there is the tension related to Greenland, of course.
To what extent do the United States really need to own Greenland in order to increase their defense capacities? There is the 1951 agreement, which allows the Americans to increase their capacity. And we do have the Pitufic base with a considerable military contingent. So, no justification has been put forward yet. And the idea, or to say that the Rhineland waters are bristling with Russian and Chinese vessels, is not true.
There was a defense network during the Cold War, a passive sonar detection network between Greenland, Iceland, and Scotland. The doctrine of use for Soviet Russian submarines has changed. And so, they don't actually need that. They don't need to penetrate that far into the Atlantic because they obviously have military aircraft. So, the doctrine is basically based on nuclear deterrence and the possibility of using cruise missiles because, of course, these can be launched from the Barents Sea.
So, the possibility of submarines getting into the North Atlantic is much lower. But of course, then there's the issue of NATO's military response when it comes to the way in which the Russian doctrine of use of submarines has changed. When it comes to the risk as perceived by Canada, we're not only talking about a military risk or threat. As I said, the context is changing since Donald Trump came to power, and there are tensions with Russia. But there's also the issue of sovereignty demanded by Greenland, differences between Canada and their partners, mainly the United States, because they regularly state that they do not recognize sovereignty as recognized or demanded by Canada.
There is the 1988 convention on icebreakers. At the time, it was not such a major issue. But under the first Trump administration, this changed. The Secretary of State at the time, Mike Pompeo, stated and very vigorously denounced the Canadian position, and we wondered at the time whether there was going to be diplomatic pressure exercised in light of that statement. Obviously, there's a Freedom of Navigation Operation, FNO.
Nothing happened. This did not happen under the first Trump administration, but there is fear on the part of the Canadian government that under the second Trump administration, they may actually push forward and test Canada's resolution to defend its position or perhaps to send U. S. Vessels patrol these waters deliberately. Anyway, as you can see, this is the position of Canada, the position of the United States.
The United States is not contesting the Canadian sovereignty of the islands in the archipelago. There's a territorial sea, territorial waters there, but certain sections of the Canadian archipelago fall outside the territorial sea. And then there's the Northwest Passage, which, under the International Law of the Sea Convention, is in national waters. So, obviously, one has to request authority from the Canadians for part of it. There are certain security challenges, of course.
Washington is asking Canada to monitor these waters, but they are also contesting their sovereignty when it comes to controlling the sailings through this. So, there is a tacit agreement. We don't really agree with this, but under the new administration, obviously, for the Canadians, what's going to happen? Is Washington going to question these demands and this will to monitor what is happening in this archipelago? Next slide.
A further element is perceived risk regarding how sailings are going to develop marine traffic, these so-called maritime motorways through the Arctic with the melting of the glaciers. Even though we've seen there has been some melting, this hasn't developed much. But there's one element on the Canadian side which explains the slowness: why this phenomenon is developing so slowly. And that is that the ice cover has its minimum in September, but then it's very variable. And you can see this from the maps.
This indicates the minimum ice cover. And there are certain years where you can see that there's very little residual ice at the end of the summer, while in other years, there's a lot of ice, for example, 2025. And obviously, this makes navigation far more complicated, and it is far more difficult to predict the possibility of navigating through the Northwest Passage for maritime companies. Next slide. From here, you can see the traffic from the figures.
There is obviously more navigation in the area of the archipelago. So, there is the aspect of the security of the vessels. Are the vessels respecting the standards? Are they able to sail safely through the waters of the archipelago to avoid accidents and impacts, for example, on marine life and marine animals? And this is a very important demand from the Inuit people.
They're not asking for a ban on sailing or navigation because they know that's a battle they will not win, but they want any navigation to be very strictly regulated, respecting strict standards so that the impact is as low as possible, particularly on the fauna. So, this is why we have the idea of navigation corridors to reduce the impact. Most companies respect this because they realize, of course, that in terms of public relations, if they did not respect it, it would look rather bad for them. So, there's a lower risk of any kind of incident, but it is not nonexistent. Traffic has increased considerably, so these have gone up quite a lot.
And so, there has been a considerable increase in the traffic. And we can see this also because there are a lot of mining and extraction sites. Those have increased as well. So, the traffic has increased as a result of mining logistics. You've got all the vessels that serve these various mining and extraction sites in order to transport the minerals that have been extracted.
Next slide. When it comes to transit, there is little activity here. So, broadly speaking, traffic is going up, so-called destination traffic. There are a lot of vessels that go into the Arctic, carry out economic activities, and then leave. So, those that take a shorter transit route, there are more of them.
These are pleasure vessels, commercial vessels using the Northwest Passage, but not very many of those. But since 2022 and 2023, there has been a slight increase. So maybe some of these maritime companies are becoming interested in the Northwest Passage. Yes. This is possibly the case, but it's only one company, the Waggenboer Dutch company, where there are more vessels going through the Northwest Passage.
Generally speaking, these are good vessels which sail between Canada and Asian countries. So this is just one company that is developing a niche market. Transit through the Northwest Passage. But, of course, other companies are interested in this. So, for the time being, it's just a couple of companies that have led to this slight increase in transit through the Northwest Passage.
Next slide. So, it is this kind of traffic that I have just explained, which is slightly risky. There was the Thamesburg around aground. And then you can see the list of vessels that have run aground. So this risk continues because the actual cartography of the Canadian Archipelago is not yet precise.
From this map, everything in green is standard aqua; anything that's yellow or red represents areas of Canadian waters that are not very well mapped. So it means that there is a risk when you sail into these waters. Most of the maritime companies are aware of this risk, of course. Next slide.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
Now, great. Thank you. That helps. So, thank you very much for this extremely interesting presentation, and thanks again to our Canadian colleagues for joining us. I would now like to give the floor to members, please, on a Catch the Eye basis, alternating between MEPs and Canadian members.
And so, we start. Let me see. Do we now lose him? No, he is still there. Okay. We start with Christoph Gomer from the EPP.
Christophe Gomart
Thank you, Chair. It turns out that I was in Canada in early February and on a French island, 25 kilometers off the coast, Saint Pierre et Miquelon, which is the closest to the Arctic and to Canada. There is a real willingness to diversify their partners from the CADALEA side in order to depend less on the US, even though the two economies are deeply interconnected, including in the defense sector. For Europe, as a priority beyond CETA, where we need to strengthen trade, we must go further in the space sector. The leader in satellites, MDA, has capabilities that are complementary to European ones in certain strategic areas such as early warning systems, i.e., missile defense detection, which we currently don't have and absolutely need to develop.
Europe's absence in the Arctic is a strategic mistake, I think. As the ice melts and new routes open, as our Friedrich Dasseur explained just a few minutes ago, Russia is expanding its presence. Europe has neither icebreakers nor a real presence in the region. This must change. Strengthening defense cooperation with Canada is essential.
French novel vessels are already permanently based in Saint Pierre Michelin. Its port could become a forward European hub close to our Canadian allies and at the gateway to the Arctic. Europe must step in. Thank you.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
Thank you very much. So the question will be: the problem is I couldn't see anybody nearby. So, Senator Doan, are you interested in asking a question?
Speaker 11
Great technology. Thank you very much for hosting this, and I know many of my colleagues wanted to attend. But as parliamentarians, you fully understand that events happen and people have to rush off to various committees. But I very much appreciate the presentation we had as well. I was in Churchill, which is in Northern Manitoba, a few months ago on Hudson Bay, and there are tremendous opportunities in that area with climate change melting the ice for faster transport of goods and services to Europe, particularly minerals and natural gas.
Our first position, of course, is—and I'm sure everybody fully understands this—but let me state the obvious: Canada fully supports Denmark, Greenland, and the residents of Greenland in their self-determination of what they want to do. To that end, Canada just opened a foreign affairs consulate office in Greenland, which we did not have before. Our head of state, the Governor General, attended that opening as well to signify the significance of that for Canada and the importance of Greenland's independence and self-determination. Unfortunately, as an earlier presenter mentioned, the world has changed dramatically in the last year or so. Canada has always had close integration with Europe.
We see that as even more of a priority than it has been because of the unfortunate situation in the United States with Donald Trump, his actions, and the impacts they've had on Canada directly, Greenland, and certainly the European economy. So, rather than a question, I just want to reinforce the importance of a relationship and the opportunities to grow that relationship. It was mentioned earlier as well about the SAFE initiative. And I'll guess I'll conclude with the following. Canada has underspent on our defense preparation for the last several decades.
Prime Minister Carney has changed that dramatically. We're going to reach 2% of her NATO target by March in six weeks. The government has announced $81,000,000,000 over the next five years, rising to $130,000,000,000 by 2035. A significant portion of that will be based in our Arctic. The Liberal Party of Canada, in their election platform, indicated that they would be increasing the number of Canadian Rangers and the reserves.
It was in the presentation about the rangers being our eyes and ears in the Arctic. That is true. They have been underfunded. So we'll be looking to a) increase their numbers, b) restock their supplies, and c) put more bases in the Arctic to address any concerns that we have about China and Russia over the next number of years. Thank you very much for the opportunity to say a few words.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
Thank you very much, Senator. And the next speaker will be Jose from S and D. The floor is yours.
José Cepeda
Thank you, Maron Charo. I prefer you to speak in Spanish, please. Thank you.
Thank you very much. It is a great pleasure to be able to share thoughts with our Canadian colleagues, and as a member of the European Parliament and with the members of parliament in Canada, we, as members of this committee, can observe many of the initiatives that unite us. And I've seen some surveys which say that 68% of the Canadian population would like or feel much closer to the EU, and only 34% feel closer to the U.S. Yes, I think that's a sign of how the Canadian population feels and that they feel very close to an Atlantic project, which deserves to be strengthened. More in terms of military and defense matters, I would like the experts to express their view on this Golden Dome that Trump speaks so much about as a strategic tool in relation to Greenland and the whole Arctic, because it almost falls within the scope of this anti-missile shield in the case of a Russian attack.
So, I would like to know a little more about your views on that possible cooperation. I know that Atlantic cooperation under NATO, because of the recent fragility, has to be supplemented. The SAFE project, which is very interesting for you and Canada to participate in, apparently needs some reflection because the security of the Arctic requires greater satellite integration, as our speaker said a few months ago. And the whole system of coastal radars, military strategy, and the military aspect. So, I would like to see how, from a Canadian perspective, we can continue to move forward in cooperation between Canada and the European Union.
Senato Ringuette ?
Sorry. Okay.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
Yes. We couldn't translate, but I think it's okay. Surprise. Surprise. Did you see that?
Yes. We could hear you.
Speaker 16
Okay. Thank you very much. And I want to reiterate what my colleague, Senator Down, has just indicated. First of all, our concerns regarding the Arctic are certainly growing. And as our presenter has indicated regarding Canada's revendication of Arctic sovereignty, it has already been twelve years in the pipeline, and still we have no commitment.
So, I guess if our European colleagues could interject and help this very important file move along, I think it would help in regards to how we strategize to make sure that the Arctic is in a good defense position, militarily and geopolitically. So, I want to thank you for holding this meeting this morning. And I hope that we continue this very much needed cooperation between Canada and the EU. Thank you very much.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
Thank you very much, Senator. And the next MEP will be Pierre-Romain Thionnet.
Pierre-Romain Thionnet
Thank you, Chair. And thank you to the Canadian colleagues online and Professor Rassehr for his presentation. Some of what we've heard during our mission to Greenland last September gives the impression that we're in the paradoxical situation that, when we listen to the experts, think tank personnel, and reports, it is clear that there is no specific military threat in the Arctic today, either from Russia or from China, on the European coast, the Canadian coast, or the Greenland coast. As Professor Lazaire showed, there's no specific Russian military navigation around Greenland, or Chinese either for that matter. And yet, you have this American pressure, which obliges everybody to announce new investments in the Arctic frantically, even though the experts tell us there's no warming threat. So, it's a little paradoxical.
It's kind of a panic. We have to announce investments or increased cooperation in a very short term, even though clearly, strategically, there's no analysis showing any imminent threat in the Arctic. And then, in terms of geostrategic matters, as the professor mentioned, it's ballistic and nuclear in that area, so Canada has less room for maneuver because it is integrated into NORAD. And in Europe, too, we're integrated into the American deterrence system, and we depend entirely on the Americans for advanced detection and ballistic detection. The impression is that this enhanced cooperation is based on ballistic and nuclear matters, but not so much between Canada and Europe, and it seems difficult for Canada to escape its dependence on Europe.
And as for Europe, are the European partners prepared to move towards less dependence on the US in terms of nuclear detection and so on? My question to the professor is: is there an element of panic in the reaction of the Europeans and perhaps the Canadians too? I don't know. And the real challenge in cooperation is in terms of nuclear issues and whether their cooperation is really possible. Thank you.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
Thank you very much. And the next speaker will be Senator Francis. Okay. We couldn't find him. So, we continue with Aleksandre, MAP.
Alexandr Vondra
Yeah. Thank you, Chair. Thank you, first of all, for organizing this. It's very interesting, those brainstorming sessions from Canada are very valuable. You know, I would take Donald Trump's harsh rhetoric, which is unacceptable, of course, aside and would concentrate on my question about the Canadian and the EU interest.
So I could hear correctly that we share not just the same values, but also an important strategic interest, particularly in the Arctic. I also heard the statement in the beginning that we have full respect for the rights of indigenous people. And certainly, that is simply the truth: Greenland is between us. Europe belongs to Denmark, and it is between Canada and the EU. So just imagine a hypothetical situation now that the Inuits in Greenland would decide to hold a referendum on full-fledged independence.
And China or Russia is watching this and made an offer which is difficult to decline, you know, instead of granting half a billion dollars in a year, like Denmark is criticizing now, to offer 5 or 10 billion in a year in exchange, you know, for help to campaign in the referendum and in exchange for allowing them to build a military installation. For Russia and China, those prices are peanuts. So my question is, if you model this hypothetical situation and knowing that there is no immediate threat, what should the Canadian and the EU reaction be? Or are there some measures, you know, that we can apply to prevent this kind of scenario?
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
Thank you very much. So, Mr. Lazaire will have to leave in 10 minutes. So, one minute for a question or command from Willy, then Damian, and then he has a chance to react for five minutes. So, please, Willy.
Speaker 21
Thank you very much. I'm elected in Denmark, which may be useful to know in this discussion. Thank you very much for this opportunity. I think we share every interest in this world to work closer together, be it in trade, in security, in Greenland, in Ukraine, in the world of rules, in climate change, or in research. We have exactly the same interests.
Speaker 24
So, also a plea to the European countries to be a bit more quick and decisive about the trade agreement with Canada. That's what we owe. As far as the EU and Greenland are concerned, we have three common interests. We have an interest in security in a situation where we cannot count on the US. We have an interest in the Northeast Passage. Who is going to control that?
Speaker 26
We have an interest in rare earth mining in a way that does not disturb nature there. So let's move together, please, and let's do it quickly.
Thank you.
Damian Boeselager
Yes. I'll be super quick. I think, Javier, we have been a couple of times already in Canada together, and it's nice to see the colleagues again. I just want to ask very precisely what the professor thinks, and maybe also the colleagues in Canada, about what should be done now. Because, of course, I mean, the trade agreement is not fully ratified, but it's 99% in place.
So, maybe what could be the next concrete steps in terms of defense or economic cooperation?
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
Thank you very much. Just a short message: MP Mellon and I have a technical problem, though. I have to apologize. And, Mister Lazaire, you now have the next few minutes until you have to go to answer or add something.
Speaker 6
Thank you very much. A lot of very interesting points there. Now, I can't express a view on the policy objectives of my government as to what should be done in the short term to strengthen cooperation with the EU. That's something that the current government wants to do to strengthen cooperation and to lessen the dependence on the Americans in the short term, to give us some leeway in that regard. In terms of surveillance and security cooperation, the point was made that there is no imminent threat to the Canadian Arctic.
There are no invasion plans from Russia or China. That's something you see in the media, but you'd have to wonder where that sort of thing comes from, and it's perhaps driven to some extent by the American media as a justification for making Canada the fifty-first state. But be that as it may, we're looking more at a surveillance capacity. And I think there is a need to increase Canadian capacity, perhaps with support or cooperation from European countries, because, as I said, it's a very low-density population, very low-density resources, and things are beginning to change. Navigation is increasing, not just transit navigation.
And you have a lot of companies that want to develop natural resources, the extractive industries. So that raises the question of the surveillance of all these activities and the search and rescue measures, our capacity to help ships. That will also entail a need for surveillance and supervision. And a nonnegotiable for Canada is that it controls the Northwest Passage. I won't go into the legal aspects, but that's the political position of the Canadian government. But there's a possibility of cooperation to get better surveillance tools, passive sonar drones, facilitate the construction of icebreakers, and an agreement signed with Finland for icebreakers, which is beginning to bear fruit.
Perhaps we could also strengthen and facilitate the capacity for sharing information, artificial intelligence, and so on. And there are many possible routes of cooperation between Canada and many European Union countries to facilitate surveillance and control of what is going on in the Arctic region, and that will also ultimately benefit everybody in the region. Now, there are also some areas of possible cooperation with Greenland, Saint Pierre, and Miquelon, but we already have cooperation in terms of systems that could be developed further to facilitate surveillance in the Arctic, North American Arctic in general.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
So, thank you, dear all. I would like to thank you for this extremely useful discussion today. Thank you very much, Mr. Lazaire. Thank you very much, Javier, as Chair of the Canada Legation. This concludes our exchange of views, but discussions on this topic must continue on both sides of the Atlantic.
And we still have a lot of work to do together, and even the Russians are not immediately ready to be there anyway. We realize what has happened in the last two and four years in Ukraine, so you never know. So I think it's a good idea to really work together very closely, and it's a wonderful friendship. So, we still have a lot to do. And thank you all to our guests for joining us. Have a nice afternoon.
The last word?
Javier Moreno Sánchez
I just want to thank our Canadian friends again. And as I said, I hope that we will be meeting again very soon. I think there's a visit scheduled for, sorry. It was deferred to November. So, I look forward to seeing you again and continuing this cooperation.
And I said, for us, you are an essential partner. We have here the rapporteur, Tobias Kramer, who has just joined us with this report from the Foreign Affairs Committee on relations with Canada, which was approved by a big majority and which will be adopted in plenary session in a few weeks' time. So, in any case, we'll continue our parliamentary cooperation and our friendship. So, to all our Canadian friends, we'll see you soon.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
Thank you very much. If there is no other business, the joint meeting is deemed concluded. Thank you very much, also for the technique. It's always a miracle. So, thank you very much, goodbye, and have a nice afternoon.
Thank you.
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