Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs – LIBE DRFMG Working Group Meeting
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LIBE European Parliament
Follow its sittingsSpeaker 2
Yes. Very good. No. Don't worry about it. Thanks a lot, also.
Thanks for having us. So for the Fundamental Rights Agency, I have prepared two slides. Is it possible to show those slides? If not, then I just go without it. That's fine.
Okay. So the Fundamental Rights Agency has documented, analyzed, and also warned against the erosion of civic space in Europe for almost a decade. I wanted to start with those two graphs, but basically, what I would have shown you comes from an annual consultation that the agency runs with our fundamental rights platform. So those are human rights organizations across the European Union. There are about 1,200 of them.
And for several years, we ask them every year about a certain number of developments in their countries. And here, I would have shown you the collapse of confidence among the NGOs in Europe. For example, in 2019, 40% of EU level civil society organization described their operating environment as good or very good, whereas by 2024, this number has halved. On the second graph, you would have seen some of the sources of the pressure on civil society organizations in Europe. It shows the share of organizations that experience threats or attacks often or sometimes.
And here, four different types of pressure stand out. So these are smear campaigns, cyberattacks, politically motivated funding cuts, and criminalization of civil society work. These are all on the rise, and this gives us quite a disturbing picture of the growing pressure under which civil society in the EU is operating. And yet, I want to share why this year also represents an inflation point for civil society in Europe. In fact, 2026 offers a rare alignment of political attention, policy commitment, and practical opportunities.
The EU's new democracy shield recognizes civil society as the backbone of resilience and democracy. EU strategy for civil society, which is an important milestone, is the first of its kind, is now in place. It aims at strength, okay. Strengthening civil society organizations in terms of engagement, but also support for protection. So, together, these initiatives send a clear signal that protecting and enabling civil society is a core democratic priority.
So now the question is, how do we translate these commitments into practice? And here from the FRA work, we see three major opportunities. The first one is funding. So I start here because funding remains one of the most serious concerns for civil society. In France, most recent consultation were 44% of respondents among CSOs across the EU states said that they have experienced unexpected funding cuts or total freezes during the twelve months before the consultation.
As a result, many have been forced to scale back their activities, sometimes significantly, and lay off staff. 2026 offers a key opportunity to turn the tide. The EU's proposed 2028, 2032 budget includes plans to significantly increase support for civil society, democracy, and rights programs. And for this to become a reality, policymakers must prioritize these allocations in the ongoing MFF negotiations and make sure that the programs allow for long-term flexible funding for organizations working on democracy and rights. Second main opportunity which shows this year is participation, around participation of civil society.
For us, data show that too often, civil society finds their input is not taken into consideration. Some laws are adopted in a rush, and some may even have unintended impacts that shrink the civic space. Yet as policymakers realize how much they rely on active civil society to reinforce public trust in democracy and in democratic resilience, there is new momentum for developing more meaningful forms of civil society participation. FRAW comes the new civil society platform that is part of the new strategy, and this platform will connect the European Commission with civil society for dialogue on the rights, democracy, and rule of law. At national level, several member states are developing national civil society strategies to strengthen engagement with civil society.
Some states are introducing and amplifying innovative practices to provide support to civil society. For example, Poland strengthened tax incentives to leverage donations to small grassroots organizations. Finland, Romania, and Portugal had the OECD conduct a civic space audit to identify and remove barriers to participation. And these are just examples. DEFRA is publishing a comprehensive report by the end of this month, where we will be providing more examples from more countries.
So all of this points to a genuine opportunity to rethink not only whether civil society participates, but how it participates. And thirdly, protection. So this concerns threats against organizations and also against individual workers that they experience in their everyday work. Our consultation found that 86% of organizations that were experiencing such attacks had to cover protection costs out of their own budgets, since protection is all too rarely funded by donors. And the EU could address this gap.
A set of guidelines on the protection of human rights defenders inside the union, there mirroring those that exist externally, would be a strong signal. Furthermore, a dedicated protection mechanism could be considered, encompassing a reporting system, emergency protection funding, legal support, and capacity building for physical, psychological, and digital safety. And my last point, our progress depends on evidence. And reliable data allows us to identify risks, to measure trends, and design solutions. And in this sense, FRA will continue to monitor the development related to civic space.
Also, we will continue to highlight good practices and report and provide such information to the policy and lawmakers, including the European Parliament. Thank you very much.
Speaker 5
Okay. Okay. Thank you very much. So first of all, thank you for having me, and I will take the chance to use them another time, which is in Italian. So, okay.
Well, we're seeing a worrying trend. It's a worrying trend in many countries right across the world. It's not just in the European Union. Independent media and rights organizations are facing increasing obstacles that massively limit their capacity to act. This is something that we're seeing as a result of various things that have already been mentioned, but I will repeat a couple, just by means of example.
So more bureaucracy, legislative restrictions on accessing foreign funds. And these laws are often labeled laws on foreign agents. So this relates to the security sphere. And this makes everything very complicated. And anyone who comes under this legislation is seen as an enemy of the nation.
And then you have laws which limit the freedom of association. And the point is that you have to try and very carefully design. All this legislation tries to very carefully define which agencies are valid and which aren't. And some of them are very small, and so it's difficult for them to define themselves. Then legal pressure, accusations of terrorism, and also accusations of money laundering to penalize their activities, criminalizing dissent, using security measures to delegitimize what organizations do, and also to delegitimize activists and human rights defenders. These are all things done to try and limit the activities of NGOs and these kinds of organizations in many different countries.
I think one of the main concerns relates to activists who are trying to help migrants. And I'm going to give a couple of specific examples where it was of particular concern: Belarus and Turkey near the border with Greece. So these were people who were giving food to migrants. Now feeding the hungry has always been seen as a gesture of solidarity. But then when you start punishing people for doing that, this really undermines the values that underpin our humanity and our civilizations.
And that is something that is unfortunately happening in many countries now. I mentioned financing. And then there's also greater digital monitoring of organizations. In some countries, targeted surveillance takes place, and they use software such as Palantir. They cut the internet.
Disinformation campaigns are also used to discredit various operators, particularly the NGOs. And then there are physical limitations established as well, limitations on the right to protest, actual direct threats on the security of activists, that take place as well. A security-based approach as well. Sometimes blocking a road has become a criminal offense. And what about the NGOs in the Mediterranean, those which are saving lives?
They're currently being criminalized as a result of what they do. And we're also seeing a clash between international case law and the legislation adopted by some countries. Then this leads to a weakening of democracy. You need a strong civil society in order to have the appropriate monitoring of what governments do, and in order to protect minorities. Now there is some interesting data that we have from the Fundamental Rights Agency, for example.
And there's one piece of the data that is particularly interesting, the use of space by civil society or something. Well, civil society needs space, and limiting the space of civil society is something that we're increasingly seeing right across the world. According to Civicus Monitor 2025 figures, only 7.2% of the global population lives in an area where civil space still functions appropriately. Most people live in countries where there is repression. So this is something that's very widespread.
In the European Union, for example, there's been a decline in the abilities of civil society to function, and this is something which is of great concern. There are restrictions on civil liberties. Many member states are adopting legislation which is similar to that in place in authoritarian contexts, and often public order and security are used to justify this legislation. Germany, France, and Italy have reduced the space for civil society through legislation, for example. And this is a context that makes it more and more difficult for these organizations to act as mediators between governments and civil society, it makes it difficult for them to defend fundamental rights, in particular, when it comes to working with migrants and also in the area of LGBTQI plus people and also with regard to the environment.
Let me just recall that during the first State of the Union speech, President Junker back in the day praised volunteers as representing the kind of Europe in which I want to live, and that was a quote. Just a few years later now, the European Union is in a very different situation, and Junker hasn't spoken out in spite of the fact that activists are now being seen as criminals rather than heroes. There are also European laws which encourage member states to adopt more restrictive legislation. For example, helping people to stay in a country illegally. This relates to migrants.
The idea of illegal migration has been abused, and this has led to problems for humanitarian organizations and particularly those which provide civil assistance to migrants and refugees. In my country, Italy, for example, a significant member of the political party talked about sea taxis across the Mediterranean, and he was referring to these organizations that save lives at sea. In my country, there's an article of the constitution, Article 118, which encourages individual citizens to carry out activities in the general interest. So this goes against that kind of thing. Brings me to the EESC.
Now this is a civil society organization that plays a crucial role in promoting civil society participation and giving a voice to organized civil society. But the fact is that those who fight for fundamental rights do a better job when they work together, and that's the basic point of the EESC. And there have been various reports written in the EESC on these kinds of things, for example, on the financing of civil society, etc. The idea is for civil society to be able to operate across borders. In 2018, we set up a group on fundamental rights.
We've written a report which is entitled Developments from a Civil Society Perspective, and that gathers up all the work that we've done between the years 2018 and 2024. And we work together with the FRA, the Fundamental Rights Agency, the rep whose representative is sitting next to me. And we believe that working closely with the European Parliament could also be very fruitful. We believe that this could help guarantee rights. Thank you.
Speaker 1
Thank you. Thank you very much. I will now give the floor to Missus Elena Crespi, Western Europe program director, International Federation for Human Rights. Thank you.
Speaker 7
Thank you. Thank you, chair, and thank you to all the dear FMG members for the invitation to contribute to this important and timely discussion, and also for the European Parliament's continued attention to the situation of civil society in the EU. My remarks draw on the work of FIDH, the International Federation for Human Rights, which I represent, and of our member organizations across Europe, who document restrictions affecting civil society and human rights defenders across the region. They also build on the work of the Human Rights and Democracy Network, a process-based coalition of 67 civil society organizations working on democracy and human rights at the EU level, and particularly its working group on EU internal human rights policy, which I have the honor to chair. As we heard also from previous speakers, a growing body of evidence, including.
Including work by FRA, the European Economic and Social Committee, but also the European Commission's rule of law reports, alerts by the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, as well as monitoring by UN and OSCE mechanisms show that civic space is facing increasing pressure across Europe. These pressures take multiple forms, as we have heard from my colleagues who intervened before me. Restrictive legislation, judicial and administrative harassment, funding constraints, smear campaigns, and hostile narrative targeting NGOs. Taken together, these developments point to a gradual but structural narrowing of civic space within the European Union, where legal, political, and financial pressures increasingly combine to constrain the ability of civil society organizations to operate freely, access resources, and participate meaningfully in democratic processes. There are three trends that are particularly concerning.
First of all, the progressive delegitimization and political stigmatization of civil society actors. Across member states, civil society is increasingly framed as a political adversary rather than a legitimate democratic actor. Our members report increasing smear campaigns and attacks targeting, in particular, organizations working on issues such as migration and asylum, environmental protection, but also minority rights, anti-racism, corruption, and the rule of law. These are portrayed as partisan actors, foreign agents in some cases, and even threats to national security or terrorists. This narrative has tangible consequences.
It contributes to an environment where civil society is treated as a threat rather than as an essential partner in democratic governance, and where attacks against the NGOs and human rights defenders are increasingly normalized. Attempts to question the legitimacy of civil society participation in policymaking or to portray NGOs receiving international and even EU funding as politically biased actors are particularly concerning, including and especially when they originate from within the EU institutions, as they contribute to weakening the very core values on which our union is built. Civil society organizations are not adversaries or enemies of democracy. They are one of its very essential core pillars. Across a second trend that we observe is the growing use of legal and administrative tools to indirectly restrict the civil society action.
Across Europe, civil society organizations increasingly face burdensome registration and reporting obligations, restrictions affecting foreign or international, including EU, funding, defamation laws or strategic litigation against public participation or slabs, administrative investigations or audits, and regulations restricting advocacy and protest activities. While these measures often appear as technical or isolated, and even when they do not explicitly target civil society, their cumulative effect is to create structural barriers to civil society action. And the result is a progressive bureaucratization and legal vulnerability of the civil society actors. And for many organizations across Europe, including our own members, resources are increasingly spent on compliance, defense, and often survival, rather than on substantive and much-needed human rights work. Third, civil society organizations face growing financial pressure and a shrinking enabling environment.
Many organizations operate under financial pressure or with fragile funding models and rely heavily on short-term project funding. At the same time, political narratives questioning the legitimacy of public support for NGOs have contributed to a climate of suspicion around civil society funding. And this is particularly worrying in the context of ongoing discussions on the future EU multi-annual financial framework and the sustainability of funding instruments supporting civil society. In parallel, civil society organizations are facing difficulties accessing decision-making processes, reduced consultation opportunities, and in some cases, direct restrictions on advocacy and public campaigning across Europe. So financial pressure, combined with legal and political constraints, and a shrinking space for dialogue and public participation, risk weakening the ability of civil society organizations to fulfill their democratic role.
Two broader patterns stand out. First, civic space restrictions rarely occur in isolation. They often go end to end with broader democratic and rule of law backsliding. As much as a vibrant and independent civil society is an indicator of a healthy democracy, attempts to weaken civil society are frequently among the earliest signs of democratic decline and should be treated accordingly. Second, this phenomenon, these pressures, are not confined to a small group of member states.
While some countries face more advanced deteriorations, worrying trends are visible also, as Pietro Barberi was saying earlier, in long-established democracies, including founding EU member states. This shows that regulatory models and political narratives targeting civil society have spread across borders, especially when they have been insufficiently challenged. Different degrees of deterioration do require different responses, but no member state should be immune from scrutiny when EU values are at stake. It is also important to highlight that, as I mentioned earlier, certain actors are particularly targeted. Our members report increasing pressure on certain types of organizations, as I said earlier, working on migration, environmental protection, anti-racism, but also women's and LGBTI rights and rule of law more broadly.
And these sectoral dynamics suggest that civic space restrictions often emerge when civil society challenges powerful interests or dominant political narratives. However, shrinking civic space ultimately affects all citizens by creating a chilling effect on activism and on democratic participation. Allow me to conclude on two key points. Well, first of all, the essential role of civil society organizations and human rights defenders must be clearly reaffirmed and protected against narratives that seek to portray them as public enemies. When civil society is weakened, democracy itself becomes fragile.
Second, monitoring civic space restrictions is important, but monitoring must be followed by effective enforcement action and accountability when EU values are violated. Tools exist within the EU framework, but what is needed above all is the political will to use them consistently, wherever civic space and EU values more broadly are under attack. Finally, strengthening the enabling environment for civil society requires not only strong safeguards against legal and political pressure that undermine independent civic action, but also financial support through EU funding mechanisms and effective protection for at-risk actors. The recently adopted civil society strategy is a welcome step towards strengthened engagement and support to civil society actors across the EU. However, further efforts are needed, particularly regarding protection of civil society organizations and human rights defenders and the sustainability of funding mechanisms, especially, as I said earlier, in the context of ongoing negotiations on the future EU budget.
In this regard, the European Parliament and the DRFMG, in particular, can play an important role by promoting a positive and evidence-based narrative about the role of civil society in democratic governance and challenging attempts to delegitimize or undermine its work, including these attempts coming from within this house. In by ensuring stronger follow-up to civic space concerns identified, for instance, in rule of law reports by the European Commission, but also in civic space reports and reports by other international organizations and civil society by holding other institutions and member states to account consistently and effectively through the various means at its disposal and giving space to civic society concerns in this context as the House of Representative Democracy at EU level. And finally, ensuring adequate funding to civil society as part of ongoing MFF negotiations to ensure that civil society is supported also financially in the face of growing restrictions and challenging any attempts to question civil society's right to receive public and EU funding. So ensuring that civil society organizations can operate freely, access resources, and participate in public debates at both the national and EU level is a key condition for a healthy European democracy.
And civil society stands ready to continue working with the EU institutions in that joint effort. Thank you very much.
Speaker 1
Thank you. I'm glad I told you that you could overpass your five minutes because we had a little bit more time because you, I think, went to ten. So, anyway, it doesn't matter, but we have to have a hard stop. So I hope it's not going to prevent any discussion, but the good thing is that we are not too many to be able to ask questions. I'm always looking at the glass half-full.
Alessandro, you want to take Christophe, you want to take the, sorry, you want to take the floor?
Krzysztof Śmiszek
Yeah. Thank you so much. And it is really crucial that we, parliamentarians, we meet in this house with the representatives of the civil society since it is a, it was underlined and said many times here that this is a pillar of the free civil society, is a pillar of functioning of the European Union values, which is democracy, rule of law, pluralism, human rights, and many others. Maybe just is that a question rather it's maybe a comment, and if there's anyone from this, from the, from our, I mean, of the guests who want to comment on it, I would be happy to. Because I'm coming from Poland.
And for a few years, I mean, for at least eight years, not so far, not so long ago, we've been witnessing actually everything what you mentioned. So direct attacks on human rights activists, I mean, civic activists, shrinking space for NGOs, limited financial resources for those who wanted to be active in the public sphere. All the smear campaigns, we've been there. We've been there. We've done that.
I mean, the government. So I am very much interested because I was also, I mean, a few years ago, I was also a member of the civil society. And what was really striking is that in modern times, I would say, the autocrats and those in government who are not very happy to be criticized by the civil society, they not only, let's say, direct their attacks at activists, at NGOs. This is one thing. They do it.
But, what they do additionally is that they create their own, let's say, civil space or they create their own civil society which is at the first glance, if everything looks great because the associations, foundations, institutes that seem to be quite independent at the first glance. But when you, you know, go deeper a bit, you see that they are somehow artificially created just to please the government, just to step in in critical moments when NGOs and civil society is organizing itself against something, then you have all of the sudden, you have, like, plenty of NGOs that are emerging and saying, oh, the government is actually doing great. This is that, as you know, these people say, you will need to think about it. We need to, you know, consider pros and cons in terms of the proposals of the government. So actually, question, like, question is whether you see it, whether you I mean, I'm pretty sure that you see it.
But what could be the best, let's say, strategy to make people aware that, you know, NGOs are not always, you know, the same. You know? The sometimes, they are just real Gongos. They are like governmentally organized organization, you know, made up or created just to support at the end of the agenda of the government. So my question is whether you have a kind of plan or strategy or advice how to recognize them and how to, you know, separate those false voices, which are not the real voices of the real civil society.
Thank you so much.
Speaker 1
Thank you, Christophe. I might like to ask another question. It might be a little stingy. It's not stingy. It's just that so when we are listening to what you are saying and when we are taking into account what we are, I'm going to say the usual suspects, it's playbook what's happening.
What I found intriguing is that, for example, Mister Babier, you talked about France, Italy, Germany. You talked about the founding members, and these are not the usual suspects, if I may say it, the way we see it. And you've seen that I have not named names. So the question that I do have, I've been in government myself, and I was very interested with what you said, mister Crespi, that sometimes there are rules that you take which are not aimed to attack civil space, but has a result being piled up to attack them. And intention is very important.
It's not sufficient, but it is very important. The other point that I want to make is that you said also, Missus Crespi, that usually attack to civil society, which is aimed at civil society, goes hand in hand with rule of law backsliding and other kinds of things very strongly. When you look at this side of the spectrum, then there is another, which is not opposite to that side of the spectrum, but there is another way of looking at some things, and I want to see if you find it legitimate as well, is that we are facing in Europe many countries with a huge deficit, huge debt. Money is not flowing any more. A lot of money has to be spent on defense, on this and that, all different things.
There is also very hard choices to be made between health care, for example, and defense, etcetera, you know all those stories. In the whole things, there is a request to be more tied to the money, which would include, for example, subsidies, subsidies that have been sold. Do you think those, do you consider that this question and the fact that we are asking, we, not me, but that countries are asking an effort, a budgetary effort to civil society, is legitimate? Do you believe that the countries which are asking, for example, more transparency on who is beneficiating from this money is legitimate since every government, every parliament is pushing for transparency, transparency, transparency in the government expenditure, in everything that we do? How do we decide? Who have we seen?
For example, European Parliament, who have we seen, etc. Do you think that this debate is legitimate or it does not apply to you, or it does apply to you? Until where is the barrier? Where is the red line? Same with the administrative burden. To be honest, we are fighting our way through as a political group against the administrative burden for enterprises.
I don't see why we should not do the same for NGOs. Simplicity. Simplicity. Simplicity. But I might say that it is so much in the area.
Everybody wants to cover themselves, and therefore, every entity who receives public money or receives aids or whatever, they are requested to do paper. Where do you believe your entities believe that you are targeted towards administrative burdens, on the contrary of just living the life like a lot of people are living today? I'm not saying it's right. I'm just saying that it's a common trend. Of course, my question is not aimed at the usual suspect countries because we it is so much of a piling up of evidence that it's impossible to even contemplate the idea that is by chance.
You know? I'm more talking about those countries that you are talking about, for which I would really want to have examples and things a little bit developed, if possible. So I don't know how we're going to organize, because I'm sure this question, those questions are aimed at the three of you. Do we start from the same circle? Be careful to we it's quarter two to leave enough space for each of you and also for come back if possible.
Speaker 2
Thanks a lot. So I will start with the question on the fake NGOs and how to recognize. So that's, of course, a very tricky question, but we have seen this across the EU for several states for several years. One criteria that could be considered is perhaps the compliance with the EU values, for example, calls on donors to ensure contractually with their NGOs that they themselves adhere to EU values and are in compliance with the charter. This is the kind of conditionality on the CSOs could be also part of the MFF, for example.
It has to do a little bit maybe also with definitions of civil society, civic space, civil society organizations. The strategy proposes a definition, for example, and EU values should feature in that. In that sense, maybe I can mention that together with various civil society organizations and OECD, the FRIES is developing a framework of indicators to be able to measure better and in a more complex and holistic way how the situation regarding civic space is progressing in different EU states. So we would be able, as a result, to look also at some trends and to have really more breakdowns comparative information. On the question on the budget, I was quickly checking with my colleagues here and who they so I mean, you will probably as people working from the civil society side, really, you will have more ideas, but it would be an interesting idea to turn it around maybe that we actually to address resilience to build societal and democratic resilience, including defense. We need civil society organizations, so they are part of this preparedness.
Hence, there shouldn't be a question of a divided budget. You know? And I think that was it from my side. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Vabieri.
Speaker 9
Thank you very much. Again, silence, so please wear your headphones. So be quicker.
Otherwise, I cannot.
Speaker 5
Follow the station. Okay. On the question raised by the Polish MEP, well, there is something that doesn't only relate to the creation of new organizations, actually, because if it was just that, it would be pretty easy to respond. And my colleague has just answered the question, and I fully share what she said. So basically, basing yourself on European values.
But there's another issue. There's a certain level of conformity among some organizations. So it's the narrative. The narrative is to criminalize civic participation. Obviously, organizations try to conform and stick to whatever the rules are.
So that's the risk. We future. A foundation.
Speaker 5
Strong what we had and we they've now become the main organizations, the main reference organizations, so things can change. But in these cases, it's even more complex. I know that in Poland, things have been difficult. I mean, we saw that in the EESC, actually. The appointments made by Poland were interesting, to say the least.
So we actually saw that happening back in the day. But nevertheless, we were able to maintain the underpinning of European values with a bit of work. But you can't just have a text stating what the European values are. You have to actually implement them in practice, and that's a genuine problem. Now moving on to the other question from our chair.
Well, that's something very specific. You've got cuts taking place all over the place because civil society organizations are often the ones being cut. And there are often reasons to do that, political decisions or whatever. But then you have another issue. I mean, the fact that you legislate by and create a series of limitations which organizations have to adhere to in order to access resources restricts what they can do.
And that basically leaves out the smallest organizations. And that means that the organizations that you have actually working out there at the grassroots level risk disappearing. And obviously, have to look at how they're going to act as well. But obviously, if you do basically just cut funding, a vital part of civil society will be lost. And I think that really is something that's key.
I mean, we've seen examples in many countries. Our colleague from Fragh gave us an example from Finland, but there are also many examples in France, for example. So the problem is to try and manage civil society as a whole. And then sometimes what you get is policies that produce limitations, and these limitations then cause problems for local grassroots organizations, which are extremely useful. I mean, population aging means that we really need people to be active in local areas, because otherwise, we're gonna see a massive issue in terms of solitude for all the people being left on their own.
Thank you.
Speaker 7
Yes. Thank you, Chair, and thank you for the interventions. I maybe start from the second point, actually. Well, first of all, yes, I think we have all pointed to the fact that the deterioration and the shrinking of the civic space, but also the democratic and rule of law backsliding that goes with it, are no longer a prerogative of certain, newer democracies. And I'm also not naming countries, but we all know where the deterioration has been most advanced and the attacks, the challenges to civic space and the rule of law have been the most acute.
But I think this is not necessarily, I mean, I think the right question that we should ask ourselves is not really who is the worst. I mean, I don't think it is about establishing a hierarchy among member states and ranking them depending on their rule of law or fundamental rights or civic space performance. That's not the point. The point is that we see and, as I said earlier, yeah, different situations, different degrees of gravity and of seriousness do demand different measures and different responses. But what is worrying when looking at what is happening across the region, in countries that we thought were safe in terms of democratic backsliding and attacks on fundamental rights and civic freedoms is that we really see a normalization of practices, a redefinition of our common standards and the sort of paradigm shift that means that we see, like, growing hostile discourse towards civil society organizations and democratic independent democratic actors more broadly, including independent media, academic institutions, and so on.
It is an increasing delegitimization of public mobilization, forms of activism that do not only concern organized civil society, but also public activism and citizens at large. And an extension of a certain logic where we see, like, how across the union measures and legislation adopted under emergency circumstances, either in the counterterrorism frameworks or in response to the global health emergency, to the pandemic, have actually slowly but surely become embedded into the regular, ordinary legal order. And this is what creates the shift. So what is very worrying about looking at different countries across Europe and different experiences is precisely that. It shows that, in fact, today, like contemporary democratic backsliding doesn't necessarily resemble a coup d'etat or even a sort of radical or drastic change that goes through constitutional reforms as it happened in Poland or in Hungary, but it can be a much less spectacular change and shift that's basically based that leads to a progressive transformation that is made of an accumulation of different discourses, measures, laws, and sometimes some of which are even sometimes legal when taken individually, compatible with constitutional, with the country's constitutions, with even the with EU law, with international law.
But that slowly but surely really leads, like, to a weakening of the safeguards of rule of law safeguards and an erosion of fundamental rights and democratic freedoms. And even though in some of the, like, well-established consolidated democracies like France or Italy or Germany or others, we don't necessarily see the same blatant attacks against the democratic institutions. What we see, what we observe across Europe today is that these democratic institutions, because of all of this accumulation of different measures and different factors, see their capacity to resist a potential authoritarian shock weakens. And this is why we think that paying attention to what is happening, not only in the usual suspect countries where the deterioration has reached a much more serious level. I agree with you on that.
And the more solid or, you know, long standing democracies is that. And then just to answer to your other point on the economic crisis and the funding deficits and whether this justify restrictions to civil society to funding to civil society. So first of all, I would like to say that as civil society, we do not oppose measures aimed at increasing transparency and accountability both at the EU and at national level. On the contrary, these are some of the very principles that we as civil society organizations have consistently supported. The risk is that we see, well, first of all, that's on the one end, funding cuts are not applied consistently or in an equal manner to civil society actors as well as to NGOs and to enterprises or, you know, the private sector more broadly.
And indeed, like, especially well, when looking at the administrative burden even more so, I mean, we are now moving towards the regulation agenda that mainly benefits the private sector, private companies, to the detriment, in fact, of fundamental, social, and environmental safeguards that civil society has been fighting for the past decades. So I wouldn't say that the administrative burden that is imposed on civil society organizations and on the private sector is the same, quite the contrary. And, also, I think that the funding, I mean, it is a very long discussion. I think we don't have, we won't have time today to address this. But, well, the cuts, the economic, like, the economic deficits and the cuts that's mainly also a cut that is felt in economic and social policies and that affects access to economic and social rights is, on the contrary, one of the main root causes also of the rise of populism, attacks against democracy, and of the shrinking of the civic space. So preserving civic space is something and supporting civil society that defends and sometimes is the last rampart, again, against violations and attempts to undermine fundamental rights, both civil and political and economic and social, would actually be a great investment in Europe's future, in the future of democracy, and also in the future of the union as an economic union, ultimately.
So I think, of course, we understand that civil society actors may also be affected by cuts. But when these cuts affect the very fabric of democracy and those who fight also for these fundamental guarantees, including in economic and social policies, I think this is not a wise move by the EU. And also very often, see that these attacks are fundamentally politicized, and we don't see this, of course, against the private sector. And the difference is that civil society work cannot be considered as political lobbying. On the contrary, also, the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe has recognized that the right to receive public funding is a fundamental and essential component of the rights to freedom of association, that is a fundamental right protected under EU law and under the treaties and the charter.
So it cannot be put on the same level as political lobbying by corporations, and that is why it should be preserved. I don't know if that answers your question. But.
Speaker 1
On many aspects. Thank you very much. We are already reaching four o'clock, so which is the time to go to the second part of our meeting. Unless Christophe, yeah. He wants to come back.
Krzysztof Śmiszek
Yeah. Just I just cannot, you know, help myself to comment on what Elena said because I really, I mean, using the words like is not a proper word, but I do appreciate that that was her mentioning, not me, that we are witnessing here in this house a normalization of, I would say, a competition between political groups who is going to be more and more hostile, aggressive, and I would say even radical towards our NGOs. And I think that we are in very weird times that even sometimes so-called democratic groups are creating this atmosphere of being suspicious what's behind NGOs. And I think that we all need to take one step back and, you know, to think once again that these people, these organizations are actually the cornerstone of the functioning of the European Union. I mean, otherwise, if we are going to, you know, fight who is more radical and who is more aggressive towards NGOs, it just leads to nowhere.
Thank you.
Speaker 1
Thank you very much. We are now going to move to the second part of the meeting, which will focus on possible ways forward, transparency enhancing support and transparency for the civil society. Yes? You could ask the speakers to go to the first yes. That would be so nice, mister Munier and mister Teixeira, if you want to move forward.
And our guest, if you can stay where you are, if you want. Unless you want to leave, you can leave. If you want to sit, you do whatever you want. This is the place of freedom still. Still.
So, definitely, in this room, you can do whatever you want. As long as you're respectful, everything is okay. Okay. Nearly everything. Monsieur Monier, it's good because you are going to be, if I read well my agenda, you're going to be the first one to talk.
You want to, yeah. Mister Teixeira, you are welcome to join us as well if you want. It's much more fun from here. You have a great view. Monsieur Monet, I will give you the floor immediately, and then we'll continue with the speakers.
Thank you all for being here.
Speaker 10
Thank you very much, madam chair, and good afternoon to all. Really, I would like to thank you for giving me the opportunity to address the topic of the day on the need to protect and empower civil society by strengthening support and ensuring transparency. I'm really also very grateful for the group's continued interest in civil society. Our deputy director general also had the opportunity to present our EU strategy for civil society in Libya in January, and I'm very happy to further engage with you today. So I will say just a few words on the strategy as a start.
So you probably have all seen that we adopted on November 12 a democracy package consisting of a strategy for civil society, the first one that we had at EU level as well as the European democracy shield. And here, I must really say that these two initiatives are self-standing, but they definitely complement and reinforce each other. They are really part of an approach that the commission wants to promote with a series of concrete measures to empower, protect, and promote strong and resilient democracies across the EU. And here, the approach recognizes that the civic space and a strong democracy are the two sides of the same coin. And for those of you who are also familiar with our rule of law report, you will have also noticed that this is something that emerges also from this work.
So here, it is very clear for us from the side of the commission that civil society organizations have an invaluable role in the democratic ecosystem. And we wanted to do this with this strategy at a critical time where we see that civil society is facing growing threats globally, but also across the EU, as this was highlighted also by previous speakers. So here, from the side of the commission, we want this strategy to send a strong political signal of support for civil society organizations at the EU and at national level. The strategy proposes a framework for action to achieve three key and mutually reinforcing objectives. First, to strengthen effective and meaningful engagement with civil society.
Second, to ensure an open, safe, and enabling civic space by providing support and protection to civil society organizations. And third, to support civil society organizations with adequate, sustainable, and transparent funding. As the focus of today's meeting is on support and protection, I would like to highlight a few concrete measures that we are putting forward. Here, I will start with the setting up of an online knowledge hub on civic space. That's something that we're doing together with the Fundamental Rights Agency to better understand developments relating to the civic space, including on threats.
Here, the idea is that this hub will act as a one-stop shop detailing all the existing monitoring resources, protection projects, tools, and activities, including available protection measures. So here, the idea is that it would be a fully searchable database. What we think is also that by consolidating information and resources, the hub will help identify trends and gaps in civic space monitoring, and inform relevant action to address these developments. Based on the information gathered and the findings that will be generated through the hub, we will also explore further protection measures. And we will also work to better understand the most effective way to design and implement these measures, including options such as early warning mechanisms.
We think that this hub will serve as a catalyst for developing additional protection mechanisms grounded in clearly identified needs from civil society and from human rights defenders. And this is something that has been a goal for many civil society organizations for many years, and now we are putting it into practice. Let me also say a few words on fundings because this is also one of the key objectives of the strategy. And here, it's really essential to provide long-term support and offer protection to civil society organizations, and it really shows that our priorities are mutually reinforcing. Here, we had also a lot of consultation ahead of the strategy as well as evidence gathered for the evaluation of our programs.
And it's clear that there are important funding needs for CSOs to be able to carry their activities independently and in the long term. So here, concretely, that involves continuing to ensure access to funds. So what we've done under programs such as the serve, but also working at the EU and national level to foster an enabling environment for donors, for donation, and for philanthropy. Here, also, the strategy recognizes the need for other forms of support, for instance, in kind or in pro bono legal support. So as we are moving ahead with the implementation of the strategy, here, we really look forward to continue to engage with you, with this group, of course, but with the civil society organizations.
And, you might have seen already the first announcement we made on March 4, on the creation of a new civil society platform. Here, the idea is to provide a transparent and structured framework for regular dialogue between the commission and civil society, especially on EU values and the protection of fundamental rights. And here, we are delighted to count on the support and direct contribution of civil society organizations represented by Civil Society Europe in the steering group that will support the creation of the platform. So here, we really believe that supporting and empowering civil society is a shared responsibility and benefits from a united approach between institutions at the EU, but also at national level. And here, this is also why you will see in the strategy that we explicitly invite the parliament to support the implementation and the objectives that are in the strategy.
I will stop here, and thanks a lot again for inviting me.
Speaker 1
Thank you. Before I give the floor to Mister Teixeira, I will first give the floor to Miss Kirsty McCourt, who is senior advocacy adviser from the Civil Liberties Union for Europe. You are connected remotely. Hello. Welcome.
I will give you the floor for 5 minutes, please.
Speaker 12
Perfect. So thank you very much. My name is Kirsty McCourt. I'm from the Civil Liberties Union for Europe. We are a network of human rights organizations across the European Union.
And I want to draw initially on the findings of our annual rule of law report, which will come out in a couple of weeks, and I think builds on some of the discussions that were already had in the first panel. So we write this report together with our members across the different member states, and look at each of the four chapters under the European Commission's report. Looking specifically at the chapter on checks and balances, where there's a strong focus on civic space, we looked at 22 countries. So unfortunately, not all of the member states, but a large majority of them. And we found that the European Commission had only made 15 recommendations in this area.
In the area of justice, anti-corruption media, there are double that number of recommendations. And the small number of recommendations is not because there aren't, as I think we've seen over the last half an hour or so, it's not because of a lack of issues in this area. In fact, our members found that there was the greatest decline in this area when they assessed whether they felt that their Member State had declined, made no progress, or progressed in the area. 13 out of the 22 Member States said that there had been a regression in the area of the checks and balances. And that compares to kind of 6, 7, 3 in the other Member States, so double in the other direction.
So I think what is important to note is this is an area where we see significant decline, but far less attention. And I think that also builds on what Elena from FED Ash was saying, that when the issues remain unaddressed, then they're able to multiply. And so you can say that in many ways, this lack of scrutiny in the area of civic space and checks and balances makes this area more vulnerable to abuse. It allows for maybe small violations to kind of multiply and become entrenched in the system. One of the most stark findings is that there were no recommendations on the right to peaceful protest despite concerns over the years in nearly every single member state, kind of often starting with bans on individual protests, heavy handed policing, and then those practices are kind of solidified into laws and policies.
And we saw several member states this year adopt regressive laws around the right to peaceful protest. The other areas that we saw particular concerns was around the excessive use of fast track legislation. So not in emergency circumstances, but becoming normalized, problems around freedom of association and transparency, and issues around independent institutions such as national human rights institutions. The other very alarming thing that we saw this year, and it was kind of already evident last year, but is more and more evident this year, is a closing of civic space within the EU institutions themselves. So we saw this in three areas, fast track legislation, so mirroring in a way what we see in the member states, but the use of omnibus legislation not as an exception, but from one initial omnibus proposal around the environmental due diligence, which was problematic in itself, but nine further omnibus proposals during the course of 2025.
The other areas around fundamental rights concerns in EU laws themselves, whether those are inadvertent or intentional. And one area that we see and Fra has also done work around this is around the lack of adequate impact assessments of fundamental rights that could then prevent the fundamental rights issues arising in laws. And the third area is around smear campaigns and particularly I think has been intimated at within the European Parliament, a kind of attack, a very concerted attack against civil society organizations and particularly watchdog organizations culminating in a, in a way, in the last months in the kind of NGO scrutiny, the scrutiny working group focusing on the work of NGOs. So I think we see here, I mean, the rule of law reports are one part of the solution to document the problems, identify the trends, and then act on those trends. But if that documentation isn't sufficient and there isn't sufficient action through recommendations or through other parts of the toolbox, it leaves this space vulnerable to further attacks and violations.
Looking at some of the other areas that we've been focusing on, the civil society strategy, we also welcome it. It sets out an important relationship and diagnostic, and the role of civil society within the EU institutions, and there are important elements such as the platform that was mentioned. But I think we anticipated further concrete steps within the strategy. And one of those was a protection mechanism for human rights defenders and civil society within the EU that we and others have identified as a specific gap. We saw, through council conclusions and through the commission's own reporting, a commitment to further focus on the protection of human rights defenders and civil society.
And so had been looking, and as Farah had already mentioned as well, for a model where it would be possible to report violations that happen, and then a rapid response funding mechanism, which could be structured in such a way where you have a central coordination hub in Brussels and then protection hubs in the member states that are able to source and identify those who are able to provide protection, whether that's legal aid, whether that's psychosocial support, whether that's digital protection, etcetera. Looking at the funding, I mean, I think we very much welcome the increase, the proposed increase in the Agora EU budget and the subsequent proposals by the European Parliament to further increase that. The existing SERV budget is approximately 0.1% of the EU budget. The proposal by the Commission is approximately 0.2% of the EU budget. And we and other civil society organizations have proposed 0.5% of the EU budget.
Still very tiny percentages to address the multitude of needs that we've identified. So we would continue to push for an increase in the budget. And then to really look at the structure of funding and how that is organized in a way that it facilitates the work of civil society, that there's a really core focus on union values, that there are budget lines that allow for funding for things such as a protection mechanism for human rights defenders and civil society. And also that while the Agora funding is critical and it's important to have that very dedicated funding to civil society and to union values, that there should also be a consideration and a push for civil society funding within other budget streams as well. So the European Competitiveness Fund, Horizon, and other funds as well.
I'll leave it at that. I'm very happy to answer any questions. Thank you.
Speaker 1
Thank you, Mrs. McCord. We are waiting to read your report on the rule of law, report with excitement, if I may say it like this. Mister Teixeira, you are senior police policy officer in the rule of law and civic space at Transparency International. Transparency International, I give you the floor now.
Speaker 13
Thank you very much, madam chair. Good afternoon, and thank you very much for the invitation. We live in a time when we regularly speak of defending democracy, of shielding democracy. There is a recognition that your values are under attack, and with it, the civic space in the EU, both at the EU and national level. I'm happy to name one or two names.
At the EU level, the creation of the scrutiny working group on NGOs in the European Parliament, and the ongoing push to defund NGOs and prevent them from raising awareness on the societal issues they work on, are only two examples. At national level, we see similar attacks, such as the creation in Hungary of the sovereignty protection office with powers of investigation that are not subject to any judicial review, and which the advocate general recently considered to infringe EU law. Again, this is just an example of many that could be mentioned today. This pressure is also true in enlargement countries. One only needs to read the news on Georgia, Serbia, and others to be aware of this.
It is a fact that NGOs are under extreme pressure now more than ever, and as it has been mentioned, they are often the only line of defense against autocratic pressure, against attacks on our values, against democratic and rule of law backsliding. And it is in this context, it is with this context in mind that we should speak of strengthening the support to civil society. Now many points have been made today. I will not restate them all. But I do want to emphasize that the next MFF is key, and for which I will leave you three main points.
On funding, the landscape is very challenging. The cutting of funding by USAID and other funders in the EU is a clear example of this, which then leads me to mention Agora U. There must be an acknowledgment that, as a percentage of the MFF, the funding going to the Agora U program is not as sufficient as it could be in the numbers that were just mentioned. Given the context, there is a clear need for a much greater financial support by the EU to civil society organizations. The second point is on the operating grants, which we believe the current language shows a shift towards project-based support, which we believe is much more limiting.
Continuous structural support is needed, especially for EU-wide networks. And finally, on the possible restrictions. So, on the scrutiny working group, there has been a lot of discussion on civil society advocacy at the EU level. Democracy relies on a diversity of voices and opinions, and awareness-raising and advocacy are a central part of this. Yet there is no level playing field in terms of resources when it comes to EU advocacy.
By nature, not-for-profits depend on external funding for their activities. EU funding cannot be restrictive on the ability of civil society organizations to actively participate in new policymaking, and this should be explicitly recognized both at the national and EU level. I'm happy to take any questions you may have. Thank you very much.
Speaker 1
Thank you very much, Christophe. Don't have hello, Isabelle. How are you doing? So great to have you here. We are, I know.
I am so sorry. I forgot. I didn't forget. Of course not. We are waiting to hear from Veronika Mora, senior policy officer, co president of the European Civic Forum.
Can you hear us?
Yes. I do. Do you hear me?
Speaker 15
Thank you very much, and thank you for the invitation to speak here. Just a sentence about the European Civic Forum. It is a Europe-wide membership-based network composed of more than 100 civil society organizations across Europe and mostly focusing on working towards an enabling civic space in Europe. And in this context, I have a bit of a hard time because so many things have been said by the distinguished speakers before. So I would like to focus on the title of this session, like what to do or how to move forward, and just to kind of give a structure or summary of the many things that have been mentioned before.
Speaker 14
So how can the EU support civil society? I would say in three terms, on legal, financial, and political levels. In this letter, in the political field, this is where we welcome the creation of the European civic, of the European civil society strategy, which very strongly acknowledges civil society as part of a democratic architecture or ecosystem in all of its functions, not only as service provider or charitable organizations, but also as advocates of the public good and channels of public participation. However, any strategy is only worth as much as it is implemented. And in this respect, I was happy to hear the progress made in terms of creating the civil society platform and the knowledge hub.
But I think there is many more to do in order to, let's say, fill the strategy with life and to put it into practice, such as the early warning and alert system, which has already been mentioned and for which good examples exist already in civil society. Just let me refer to the monitoring action for civic space project in which European Civic Forum has participated. But it is also important that such an early warning system is followed up by real action on the part of the EU institutions. Similarly, the need for a protection mechanism and funding for a protection mechanism was described or mentioned in detail, so I wouldn't go into it to observe time. On the legal field, we appreciate that the EU has limited competencies in terms of civil society legislation. Still, I think there are tools and opportunities.
A case in point is the European Cross Border Association draft directive, which unfortunately has been stalled in the legislative process in the council. However, similar actions could create a truly single space for European civil society, enabling organizations to work both on the national level and across borders, on the European. Now talking about financial support, of course, it seems to be more straightforward, and the importance of the next MFF negotiations have been mentioned by almost all previous speakers. I would just like to point out that civil society should be involved in this process as active contributors in developing the funding programs for the next seven year period, but also as potential beneficiaries across all programs. So the eligibility of civil society organizations should also be considered, particularly in terms of the programs under shared management, namely the national recovery plans, where civil society organizations should be important partners in implementing the programs on the national level.
The need for a new Agora EU program has also been mentioned before, and I would just like to point out that the citizens' equality rights and values program in the current MFF period has provided a lifeline to many organizations, working on democracy, rule of law, and human rights on the European and the national level. So this is why it is essential not only to continue this program, but to look at the demand, to improve its financial allocation along with supporting independent media and the arts, the creative sector, which go hand in hand with civil society. So we welcome not only the increased allocation, but also the proposal by the culture committee to further increase the allocation to €12,000,000. And as Kirsty McCord said, it's still a tiny portion of the overall EU budget. Thus, I think the dichotomy of where the money needs to go, to security or to civil society, is null and void in the sense that it is not a real dichotomy in itself.
Finally, this session bears a title or includes the word transparency in its title, as well as how to improve the transparency of civil society. And here I would like to start by refuting anybody who says that civil society is non-transparent. This claim is basically a pretext from those actors that try to attack or vilify or delegitimize civil society on the national and European level. I'm Hungarian, so I know how it works on the national level. We've been hearing this for more than a decade, but this statement has never been substantiated by any fact or any clear evidence to the contrary.
In most European countries, civil society organizations had to adhere to rigorous transparency requirements by law, by publishing their annual reports and similar demands. And also in terms of receiving European funding, civil society organizations must report on the use of the money received according to the financial regulation. And if they enter into any discussion with the European institutions, they need to register themselves in the transparency register. So, therefore, I dare say, that the claim that civil society is not transparent is basically a tool to undermine and delegitimize civil society. And even the European Court of Auditors in its report, has not found any trace that civil society organizations are not using European funding properly and transparently.
So, therefore, I would say that, and finally, I would also like to mention that for civil society organizations, their credibility and public image is one of their greatest assets, which can only be ensured by rigorous transparency. Therefore, it is in the interest of organizations themselves to work transparently. So this is what I wanted to say very shortly, exceeding my time as the last speaker of this session. Thank you very much.
Speaker 1
Thank you very much. It was very interesting, and we were very happy to hear you all in what you have to say. We now give the floor to the member of parliament, mister Christophe.
Krzysztof Śmiszek
A bit boring. That's I'm all the time taking the floor. So but, I mean, but the session is really fascinating. So this is the reason why. Maybe just a short comment because, many times, it was raised that sometimes we see this, like, competition where the money should go for safety or, I don't know, military or civil, civic space.
I think that there's no competition because we need to treat a strong, civil society as a part of this European Union resilience. And when we see that, you know, in recent times or nowadays, we see tanks and, you know, bombs everywhere in the world. So this is not only the only, let's say, expression of war, but also cyber security or disinformation is also a part of a. So we need to be, as a society, prepared to tackle cyber war. And I think that civil society plays a crucial role in enhancing our resilience as a European Union. And one thing at the end, I mean, this session is, like, really timely because we are just having a new strategy for civil society, but also we are discussing an extremely important program, which is a which could be one of the main resources of supporting European civil society, which is Agora EU.
And I'm really happy that so many European NGOs are already in dialogue with parliamentarians, with the European Commission, and with other European institutions. And I hope that this dialogue will bring tangible results at the end of June, and the report on Agora EU from the European Parliament will be an expression of our support for strong and resilient civil society. Thank you.
Speaker 1
Thank you very much. If there is no other request, I will myself take the floor to ask a few questions. Maybe just a remark. In French, we say, if you choose something, you have to renounce somebody else to something else. The truth is that civil society is very horizontal.
So, of course, it can play a role in every single dimension that we want to give to the MFF. Nobody, I think, who defends civil society is going to be against that. But there is also a principle of reality where the member states are depending on which one, but most of the member states are in a very dear situation, economical situation, and where choices will have to be made. Whether we like it, whether we don't like it, it's the it's a reality principle. And I think it is important when we want to preserve civil society and all the work of human rights, rule of law, etcetera, to know how we're going to address this.
And I don't believe it's sufficient to say, oh, we shouldn't have to choose because the truth is that there will be moments of choice which are going to be made by the different governments or maybe even by the European institutions. Well, that is just what I want to point out. Still, I have questions. We are for the one who don't know, we are working on the rule of law cycle, where we are also addressing what are the propositions from the European Commission regarding the national and regional partnerships. So for what we hear, those will entitle a much stronger link between reforms which are awaited, the rule of law, how would you say, respect of the rule of law, respect of Article two, etcetera, etcetera, in order to disperse the money.
It's not clear 100% how it's going to work, but there is one aspect that I want to hear your thoughts on, which is the aspect regarding the civil society, where we were always speaking about smart conditionality to make sure that when a country would be how would I say? I'm looking for yeah. We'll have their funds seen frozen, civil society would still be able to access that money. And I would love to hear your thoughts on the feasibility of this and how do you believe it should be organized. To join the idea of the fact that civil society is not sectorial is really transversal.
It's an actor. So it's transversal towards all the different themes or subjects that we are going to approach. The strategy towards civil society has been launched the same day as the democratic shield. Question is, how do you believe that those can work in fighting disinformation, infringement, etc.? So how do you see those two strategies can fit together?
And because we are still a free institution, all those questions are for all of you who want to answer, taking into account that we have twenty minutes ahead of you. So who wants to take the floor on those questions? Yes.
Speaker 13
Thank you very much. I will answer perhaps two parts of what was mentioned. If you allow me, it feels, when we talk about whether we support more or less transparency, working for Transparency International, I feel kind of obliged to reply. We fully support transparency, yet this word is many times misused. And that also comes, together with that, the point of bureaucratic burden.
And perhaps I can mention just one or two things to give us an example. So under the current transparency register, the financial requirements for organizations in that register. For organizations that are for profit, they are required to give their funding that is allocated for advocacy or awareness raising. Civil society organizations must declare all of their funding, even if it is not related to advocacy. And as it was mentioned, civil society organizations are not just those as Transparency International, even Transparency International works on corruption regarding school lunch vouchers in some other country.
We are an international organization that is represented in more than 100 countries. And so the burden is disproportional, and it also skews the discourse. Because when the old register was in place, we knew that civil society organizations represented less than 20% of all of the organizations registered and less than 20% of the funding. And from literally one day to the other, when the new register came into place, because of the way that the financial declaration is made differently for profits and not for profits, that number changed from one day to the other to 99.99%. So the new register increased the burden and decreased transparency.
The same can be mentioned on an ongoing discussion on a legislation, and I know Mister Munir is standing right next to me, on the proposal for a third country interest representation registers in which our position has always been that there should be one register in each country and at your level as well that focuses on interest representation. No matter if it is for profit, not for profit, if that funding is from the EU or not from the EU, making sure that there's one system that is clear to everyone with no loopholes that has the same requirements for everyone. And yet there is a current proposal which would put in place a register focused on third countries, leading member states, some member states to even double or even multiply the current registers that they have that are effective. So transparency and administrative burden do not go hand in hand necessarily. And perhaps I'll, if you allow me, I'll just quickly answer another point, which is on the smart conditionality.
And I would say that perhaps the biggest concern is how that assessment would be done. And I think we can take the current situation with the frozen funds for Hungary as an example. Just a few weeks ago, it was considered that the opinion by the was that the unfreezing of funds that were done for Hungary, due to the judicial independence reforms, were considered insufficient and that the funds should have not been unfrozen. For us, the question is on the transparency of assessment. How are these assessments made, and exactly under which conditions, and whether political considerations come into play or not?
And so when we come to what will happen to frozen funds, what will happen, will those funds go to support civil society? For us, there's a big question mark on the entire procedure from the freezing of funds all the way until the attribution of those funds to NGOs, and which NGOs and under which measures and which conditions and so on. Thank you.
Speaker 12
Thank you very much. Yes. So just to build on a couple of those points. Immediately following on from what Vitor was saying on conditionality. So I totally agree around the transparency of the assessment, and I think the European Court of Auditors has also looked into this and also questioned.
I mean, one is when the fronds are frozen and that decision that is made. Another question is around when there's a decision not to take any action and what is the how do we understand those decisions and what was the basis for not taking a decision to freeze certain funds. There's a proposal to more closely link the recommendations in the rule of law reports to the budget and the conditionality of funds, which we think at some level can work. But for that to work, the recommendations would need to be much more specific, clearer, attached to certain benchmarks, and time-bound. And what we're seeing is that those things are not currently in place, and, you know, we see recommendations that are being repeated year on year because there's no progress.
And the recommendation is simply repeated, and there are no consequences for the lack of implementation. From our calculations last year, roughly 92, 93% of the recommendations are repetitions from previous years. So there would need to be much greater clarity around the nature of the recommendations and the time frame within which they have to be implemented if you're then to link those to the budget conditionality. There would also need to be somewhat of a separation between the kind of technical decision-making and the political decision-making. I mean, think as Victoria was just saying. And to, you know, we've long advocated that a number of experts should be involved in the European Commission's rule of law reports to give a more independent element to it.
And then the question of the smart conditionality and what happens to those funds, that there needs to be forward planning, long before any funds might be frozen or used in another way, to understand who has capacity in a country to be able to absorb and potentially regrant or redistribute those resources. And so to understand, that and do the mapping of, you know, where civil society has capacity, where there are regranting organizations who are able to play a certain role. There have been proposals that in some places municipalities could still receive funding even if central government isn't receiving funding. But there really needs to be a close look at how that would all work and what capacities there are. Just very briefly on the question of funding, I mean, we all kind of appreciate the, yeah, there's a limited number of resources.
So, you know, one is the question of how many resources and how the budget is divided up. But secondly then, are the elements that, either facilitate or obstruct the work of civil society. And, you know, funding can go much further if civil society organizations are able to act in an efficient way because the rules are there to facilitate the work of civil society. I mean, think, Vera mentioned that unfortunately, the ECPA, the European Cross Border Association directive, has been proposed to be withdrawn by the European Commission, despite the fact that there seem to be no public calls for the withdrawal of that proposed directive. And that's an example of a directive that would have, in part, for organizations working across borders, facilitated the life of organizations, which now seems to be somewhat, hopefully not, but there's the potential that it's off the table.
And then secondly, the activities that are actively designed to distract and take the time of civil society organizations, such as the scrutiny working group or other such activities. So to be conscious both of the availability of funding, but also the procedures and systems that are in place to facilitate and create an enabling environment for civil society to operate. Thank you.
Speaker 15
Yes. Thank you. Just very shortly following up on what Kirsty said regarding the smart conditionalities. Another possibility of how the money could and should be used is maybe to replenish the EU Agora budget on the long run. Seeing the demand for both, the serve program and the other strands, which will be under the EU Agora, we can imagine, especially in the current worsening or deteriorating conditions, that overdraft in the coming seven years on these programs will be even larger.
Speaker 14
So under the circumstances, any additional allocation for this program would be welcome, and one possible source stems from the smart conditionalities, otherwise agreeing with all the open questions that Kirsty has raised. Thank you.
Speaker 1
Thank you very much, Miss Mister, Munier. Maybe on the common path between the civil society strategy and the democratic shield?
Speaker 10
Thank you very much. I'm sure that all of you are also familiar with the European democracy action plan that was a bit the ancestor of the shield, if I can put it like that. And there, we had embedded in the different sets of priorities and action, the role of the civil society. But our thinking now when we came with the democracy package was that it was time to have also a self-standing approach to the civil society, also focused on some specific needs and specific risks that have been identified also in our discussion with the civil society itself. But it's what I was also saying at the beginning is that these are initiatives that are mutually supportive and that if you go through the shield, you will see that in many instances also, we foresee a role for the civil society.
So for example, if you have looked also at the development linked to the, sorry, the stakeholder platform that we announced in the shield that will come in support to the European Center for Democratic Resilience. So here, this is also a way to associate the civil society to the work that's being done. Also, the entirety, I would say, of the approach of the shield is also based on the whole of society approach.
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