Special committee on the European Democracy Shield Ordinary meeting
Legend
Transcript markers
- text Sentence being played
- text Search result
- text Intervention cited by the link you opened
Click a sentence to play the video from that moment. Select text to quote it with the speaker, timestamp and link.
More options
EUDS European Parliament
Follow its sittingsSpeaker 3
Madame Lakh, president, you mentioned the Global Digital Compact. So that has been the most significant step in our recent work on these technologies. All 193 member states of the United Nations came together to adopt the compact at the summit of the future. And, if you can, yes, stay with the Global Digital Compact. Yes.
So this was a process that was led by the UN General Assembly, co-chaired by Sweden and Zambia, as the European Union played a key role in the final outcome, working with countries from the global South, especially the 54 countries of the African continent. And this is a shared vision for an inclusive, open, safe, and secure digital future with concrete commitments and actions across five objectives, from bridging the digital divide and accelerating SDGs to delivering an inclusive digital economy, and importantly for today's context, fostering safe digital spaces and human rights. And information integrity is part of this cluster. There were two new areas of collaboration that were added by the Global Digital Compact to the UN's existing work, and that's data governance and AI governance. So the GDC, for the first time, provides a comprehensive vision of international cooperation on data and AI in the UN context.
There's a working group on data governance that is currently underway in Geneva to craft some principles, with a report due next year. And on AI governance, you know, madam, you mentioned the new independent international scientific panel and a new global dialogue on AI governance. So these are new, fresh mechanisms for bringing the world together on issues related to AI. The Global Digital Compact also recognized the fact, the evidence of the digital divide, and came up with several ideas and suggestions to build digital capacity, building AI capacity rapidly around the world so that the opportunities are not concentrated in a few geographies and the risks are not unfairly loaded onto the vast majority of the people on this planet. More on that later.
So if we can go to the next slide. So this timeline we have, this is an area of which the secretary general is very proud, that we have moved fast. We've not held back, and we've supported member states in their current policy dilemmas. So, we are now in the phase of implementing the AI mechanisms, one year of implementing the Global Digital Compact, more than 3,000 concrete projects across the five areas. Vast majority led by member states, some led by the UN system, others with civil society, private sector.
And through a digital cooperation portal, we provide transparency and visibility on those projects, and allow partnerships to come together. The GDC would be subject to a high level review in 2027, so we are working hard to ensure that we can put some more scores on the run board before that point. Next slide, please. This is a cooperation portal that I have mentioned. It has AI tools integrated into it so that our resident coordinators, 130 representatives of the UN across the world, can land these commitments, including on human rights and safe digital spaces, into their bilateral programs, the cooperation frameworks that they negotiate with member states.
Our regional economic commissions can, for example, align what is stated on the inclusive digital economy with the current predilections in the regions. Africa, for example, has finalized a free trade area, and there is a digital trade protocol that's annexed to it. And there's a lot of interest among African leaders on how to promote quality jobs, interoperability of digital public infrastructure. Earlier this year, I was at the ASEAN digital ministers meeting in Hanoi where they adopted a master plan on digital technologies from 2026 to 2030, heavily influenced by the GDC. Let me just move on to the last part of my presentation.
So this is on global AI governance. We'll go quickly through it. The science panel, 40 experts, 10 of whom come from the European Union, co-chaired now by Joshua Benjo, Turing Award winner from Canada, one of the fathers of machine learning, and Maria Ressa, Nobel Peace Prize winner from The Philippines, who has devoted her life and her career to exactly the kind of issues that, you know, you are discussing within this community. The panel will present its first report in July looking at the impacts of AI, the opportunities, and the risks, including on democracy, rule of law, human rights, and our political spaces. Next one, please.
The first global dialogue on AI governance in July, with all 193 countries at the table. You know about the summits that are happening, but this is the first time that every country will have a seat at the table. First in Geneva, next one in New York. So, hopefully, the AI governance discussions would find a stable, sustainable home, so that the international community has a place where it can come together to try and align different governance approaches. The reality is these approaches vary from the European Union to the US to China, find common ground, and anchor this AI governance in our shared norms, international human rights commitments included.
K? Next one. Just racing through this. Very important point. The third pillar of our work on AI is capacity building.
More than 80 countries do not have the minimum that's needed to participate in the AI age: data storage, talent, some compute for training AI models. So, how do we address this inequality? And this inequality, by the way, is not a North-South issue. Even within developed countries, we see the potential for a K-shaped society, a K-shaped economy. We need to build the capacity.
Yesterday, the Belgian minister was telling me that 40% of the Belgian population is in a digitally precarious situation. So they are not able to gauge this. So this is something that is an urgent task. Okay. Maybe last, so that we link this to your potential questions and comments on information integrity.
What's the framework we are following coming out of the GDC? Next slide. So we have these three areas that concern us the most: misinformation, disinformation, hate speech. So how they pollute the information ecosystem, threaten human progress, human rights, and this is a life-and-death issue for the UN. Our peacekeeping missions around the world have been subject to a lot of misinformation, disinformation, and it has led to some loss of life.
Our work on health, on vaccination, on climate change, and on addressing some of those issues. So while I think following what is there in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, we need to protect freedom of expression, freedom of opinion, access to information. We need to make sure that we have a healthy information ecosystem. So we've come out with a policy brief, and next slide, with some global principles for information integrity that rest on five principles: societal trust and resilience, your sense of the shield in a sense, healthy incentives, public empowerment, and public interest media, independent media. Of course, transparency and research, particularly vis a vis the digital platforms, because we don't have enough data often on what to base our policy responses on.
So I want to conclude by thanking you for this opportunity, madam president, and I look forward to our interaction today. Thank you.
Speaker 1
Thank you very much for the presentation. Now I'll give the floor to colleagues in order of political groups, starting with the EPP, Mister Kovacev.
Speaker 4
Okay, madam president. Thank you very much, Mister Gil, and welcome here in the European Parliament. I'm also in the foreign relations committee, a rapporteur on the recommendation to the general assembly. And, this week, we are going to discuss with my colleagues, other shadow reporters from the different political groups, our recommendations to the council for the next general assembly. But, and now going to the global digital compact.
As the digital environment has become an integral part of the lives of people worldwide, there are several principles I believe must be at the core of global digital governance. What is illegal offline must be illegal online. Online profiles must be verified with actual identifiable people or organizations behind them, and minors must be protected online while safeguarding high privacy standards. While the compact rightly emphasized safeguarding children and young people online, policymakers, including us here in the European Union, are currently debating what the most effective regulatory tools are to do this responsibly. Questions are emerging around the possibility of establishing clear international standards for age-appropriate access to social media.
We observe what's happening in Australia, for example, and the discussion in France, Spain, and Ireland. And for verifying user identification online. This is very important for online profiles to be identified. In order to better prevent and counteract abuse, exploration, manipulation, and the spread of hate and disinformation in the digital space. Especially, we see this in Europe, but not only in Europe before elections, how active are these disinformation campaigns?
In this context, I would like to ask you a few questions. The Global Digital Compact set important objectives on digital safety, child protection, countering disinformation, and protecting human rights online. Could you explain how this commitment will be translated into praxis with stakeholders, governments, international organizations, and digital platforms, who will be responsible for implementation? And there are concrete regulatory measures advised. How binding are those commitments expected to be, and what monitoring or accountability mechanism does the United Nations plan to put in place to track progress? Do you see a score within the implementation of the global digital compact to move towards common binding international standards for the protection of minors online, including minimum access age and their verification for certain digital platforms, particularly for very big ones.
You know that our digital single act in Europe, we consider very big platforms, those with more than 45,000,000 online users in the EU. How do you see the assets, the need? How do you assess the need and the readiness of the global community to move towards such standards? What is the thinking on the EU regarding achieving a balance between protecting children and preventing privacy and fundamental rights, particularly when discussing tools such as age or identity verification online? And what are the platforms?
And we observe also the discussion in The United States, the big tech opinion on this. And finally, do you expect major digital platforms to formally commit to the global digital compact, since the actors currently shaping the digital environment most directly are still only loosely engaged? Thank you very much, and appreciate a lot of your work. It's an extremely important topic.
Speaker 1
Well, thank you, Andre, for these many questions. Before I give the floor to Juan Fernando Lopez Aguilar, I would like to open the floor to colleagues for a second round. Please let us know if you want to take the floor. Juan Fernando, the floor is yours.
Speaker 5
Thank you so much, Mister Gill, for presenting the case of this global compact, which is much of our interest. Sure. You know that the European Union has meant to be a pioneer when regulating artificial intelligence, making the difference, but also leading by example, setting a standard. But the thing is that we are seeing a revolution which is unfolding day by day with vertigo, speed, track, open-ended. And the challenges are far from being actually foretold.
But the thing is that, of course, we do care about setting standards, particularly when it comes to its impact on rights and securing a digital future, which is equitable in its access and homogeneous when it comes to some standards that make them compatible with fundamental rights. And these are the questions I would like to raise to you. First, we have seen negotiations on the digital compact, the global digital compact. But the thing is that throughout the years, just in the past 3 years, the world is becoming increasingly polarized. And polarization is also expressed in the digital world, and, of course, in the artificial intelligence tools.
And I would like you to assess how do you foresee that the implications of this increasingly polarized international landscape are going to make an impact on the goal of reaching out for common rules to artificial intelligence and to the sustainability of the European artificial intelligence standards, which are challenged by economic actors and trying to bring them down. And that is, in my assessment, in my political assessment from the S and D group, one of the reasons why we are having this so-called artificial intelligence omnibus underway here in the European Parliament. Then the second point is, yes, artificial intelligence is meant to respect international law and human rights. But how to assess the challenges which are to be expected? The ones we have seen so far are huge.
Certainly, they have us on the move. But you're an expert, how do you foresee? Is it going to go any further? What are we to expect after its impact on fundamental rights, and particularly the international law of rights? And the third point goes to us, to the scientific panel on artificial intelligence, the so-called independent international scientific panel, and the global dialogue on artificial intelligence governance.
How do you envision that this mechanism will actually influence policymaking decisions and lawmaking decisions? Are they meant to be somewhat bigger than simple consultative forums? Are they going to get hold of the policy and lawmaking process? Thank you.
Fabrice Leggeri
Thank you very much. Thank you to the special envoy from the UN. Thank you very much for your presentation, and thank you also for coming to the European Parliament. You mentioned the general objectives and global objectives that you are supporting on behalf of the United Nations. You mentioned freedom of expression.
You also mentioned free access to information, or unhampered access to information, freedom of information. And you also said that there were, I think, 80 countries in the world that don't actually even have the minimum requirements or whatever they would need in order to be fully engaged in this globalization process for the digital and for artificial intelligence, 80, I seem to remember. A couple of questions, therefore, that I'd like to address to you, if I may. First question, what about the great digital powers? Where do they stand?
Those that are very active on the market, the United States of America or China for that matter, where do they stand on these issues? You know, do these two big powers actually subscribe to the UN objectives that you outlined for us a moment ago? Do they stand behind them? A second point, and in a way, this is probably in line with what my colleagues have already mentioned in this exchange. I was wondering, what about the challenges when it comes to funding?
There are 80 countries that don't actually have access to these technologies, so we clearly have a financing problem, a funding problem. But I would imagine that it's not just a question of quantity of funding, but also of independence. So, how do you view that challenge? Be it for private actors or public actors, how do you prevent them from actually damaging information integrity by means of funding? How do you prevent them from doing that?
And then another question would be on neutrality and on independence when it comes to the choice of actors or parties. I understand you mentioned a panel, an independent panel of scientists, and many of them, in fact, hail from the European Union. I was wondering, how do you select these members, the scientific members who sit on this panel? How are they selected? I understand they're supposed to be independent.
How are they selected? And then a final question, if I may. You know, where do you place the cursor, so to speak? You know, we have the challenge of freedom of expression. We wish to have freedom of expression, of course, that on the one hand.
But then, on the other hand, you do need some kind of scrutiny. You do need some kind of control. For instance, in order to fight crime, we've talked about the protection of minors online, but there are other types of criminality that we also need to fight. So, how do you address that balance? And then there are other risks, of course, that can also come into play.
Speaker 9
For instance, the legitimate objective of fighting crime. So, how do you address that balance?
For the ECR, Berata Shidlow.
Speaker 10
Thank you very much, madam chair, ladies and gentlemen. I would like to thank you, sir, for your presentation. Thank you also for the very valuable information that you have shared with us today. Thank you very much. Just a few words by way of an introduction before I move on to my question.
Speaker 11
Artificial intelligence and digital technologies have an incredible bearing on democracy, and I would like to, if I may, focus on this particular topic. I'd like to understand better the work that's being done on the areas that you have just mentioned. I understand that the work also addresses limits that have to be respected when it comes to censorship or influencing public opinion, you know, by which I mean having an influence on opinions, societal opinions, trying to influence that, which can be deemed tantamount to interference. So I was wondering, within the global digital compact, I understand that it's necessary. Of course, it is necessary, but we also, I think, have to flank it with another question.
Speaker 10
The digital systems, do they actually help strengthen democracy, or are digital technologies actually starting to replace democracy? That's what I'm wondering. You know, we see here in Europe a number of NGOs. They are, by the way, funded by the European Union, and their mission is to try to steer societal debate in a certain direction or to rectify it, so to speak. And I think we all agree that we need to fight against disinformation.
We all agree that we must protect minors, children, against inappropriate content. But, of course, that is something that has to remain our objective throughout. I acknowledge that. But at the same time, I have to wonder because I'm puzzled by these differences that might exist between protection on the one hand, and interference or influence on the other. Where do you draw the line?
Often, we analyze data, and we know that vulnerable groups are targeted. They are targeted because there is a determined will to influence their behavior, their online behavior, public behavior, all of which will then have an impact on, for instance, the organization of democratic elections. And I know that previous speakers in this debate have already mentioned that particular point. So these are issues that we have to address. I mean, some problems are deemed problematic, and they have to do with public institutions.
But at the same time, what about training courses which are organized and training courses which are actually designed to, so to speak, train people. I think this will come full circle to some extent. So my question really is how does the UN intend to guarantee that these global mechanisms, which are designed to manage or govern the Internet. How do you make sure that it does, we don't end up with a system that actually represses free democratic debate? We all support democracy, freedom, and democracy.
Democracy isn't a question of filtering public opinion using algorithms or expert algorithms to filter the debates. Democracy actually means that the powers must.
Speaker 13
Thank you so much, Mister Gill, for attending and speaking so eloquently and informatively about your work. And thank you for your work, and happy Saint Patrick's Day to you. And just to say right now, many people from your home country are lining the streets of Dublin to celebrate Saint Patrick's Day. We welcome them all. Some of them are there for good, I hope.
Some of them are visiting, but they're always welcome in Ireland. So, mister Gill, turning to your very important work and your contribution, much of the debate on AI and democracy now centers on a very real risk that my last colleague just mentioned, about cross-border election interference. And, of course, we've seen the rise of information manipulation targeting democratic elections, democratic processes across borders. Now the European External Action Service, Mister Gill, they said in 2024 that the European Parliament elections were a target of Russian misinformation activity. That's no news to your good self and your office.
But the commission's post-election review found that AI was being used to manipulate and to produce manipulative content at scale, including in marginal languages. So this is not only about hostile states, but it's about a growing rage and hunger for profit, the profit economy. One investigation, for example, in relation to that profit economy had found that a Sri Lankan influencer claimed to have made $300,000 from Facebook pages aimed at UK audiences, and that was pushing racist, Islamophobic, and anti-immigrant content with generative AI helping to scale it up. So with everything we have witnessed so far, and we're still in the early days, we hear of AI, but I doubt that, based on what you've outlined, we really do need to turn, and you are turning, and you are dealing with the destruction it can bring. So coming to my questions, you've said that the digital, that the global digital compact, it will address, is addressing misinformation and disinformation.
And the UN's AI governance work, your own very valuable work, it identifies risk not just to safety, but obviously to democracy, trust, and social cohesion. That's the fabric of our society. That's what we rely on. Four questions to add to the long list of questions, Mister Gill, but you can deal with them within the context of other questions because they mirror some of those of my colleagues. Number one, how do you, in your office, in your role, special role at the UN, how do you translate all of that challenge into something operational?
Number two, from a European democracy resilience perspective, where do you see the biggest governance gap today? Number three, what would you like national parliaments to do now in practical terms? And number four, turning back to Ireland as we celebrate our national patron saint today, we're a small European Union state such as Ireland. Where can we add the most value in this task, in this challenge? We want to work with you.
Thank.
Speaker 15
Thank you very much, mister Gil as well. Now you said that one of the five aims of the digital compact is to promote a digital safe space that respects human rights. Against that backdrop, AI does have huge risks in terms of armed conflicts. If you look at Ukraine, Gaza, drones with explosives, becoming more and more autonomous when the link to the human operator is dropped. The mission can carry on, so that means that software steers this, no longer humans.
Speaker 16
So how can I distinguish between a civilian or a white flag waved by a soldier? These apparatuses are being governed globally, and this digital compact would be a big chance for us to guarantee proper human decision-making in this. How does the UN intend to transform the compact into a legal framework that's properly binding as with the Osawa convention? The against mines given the con the context where Russia, China, and the US are massively investing in more and more autonomous arm system systems. I am scared of this setup in terms of what may transpire in future.
Speaker 1
Thank you to colleagues for the number and the quality of your questions. And now, mister Gill, up to you for the answers.
Speaker 3
Thank you very much, Madam Chair, and through you to the distinguished members for the excellent points. Perhaps I can start with the last question. Member states, in their wisdom, excluded the military domain from the global digital compact. So that discussion is being pursued in the context of a treaty in Geneva, the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. I had the privilege of, in my previous capacity, chairing the discussion on lethal autonomous weapons, over 2017, 2018.
And, sir, the question you have raised is a profound question. How do we ensure human control, responsibility, and accountability under international humanitarian law? So that negotiation has resulted in some guiding principles, 11 principles. But as yet, there is no legally binding provision except what already exists and should apply to armed conflict regardless of the state of technology, the principles of distinction between civilians and combatants, for example, the principle of proportionality in terms of use of force. But this is an area that we must watch very carefully as we seed more autonomy to AI systems, whether it is in the judicial process, in health-related decision making, or on the battlefield.
So I see, although you know, there is a separation between the military applications and the civilian uses. I see some commonality because the technology behind it, the classifiers, the machine learning classifiers, are very similar. So the fundamental point is humans over technology, not technology over humans. Several of the other questions have referred to this fine balance, Lacursuit, between control and freedom of expression. And this fine balance was mentioned in a slightly different way in one of the questions, in terms of protection versus the ability to innovate.
So where do we draw the line? So, unfortunately, I don't have a simple answer for this because the line cannot be static. So the nature of this technology is very dynamic, so we need to be more agile in terms of where we draw the line. And, obviously, each national context, each regional context, and that's where it becomes complicated. For example, for the European Union, has to find its own wise point of balance between how much to control and how much to, let, free. I think one point, flowing from that, is that we need a regular dialogue across civil society, parliamentarians included, the private sector, and the executive authority in terms of where that line sits.
And I see that the European Union, in terms of the regulation also, the law-based regulation, is trying to look for those opportunities to adjust. At the UN, for us, I mean, it's a similar dilemma, but we end up relying a lot on our principles. So the human rights treaties, for example, give us clarity when there is ambiguity around where to draw the line. After all, these are legally binding commitments that member states have taken. And last point I wanna make on this drawing of the line is that this is where the importance of the regular science-based assessments comes in.
So you know what is the state of play on the technology. Without that evidence, on what the technology is and how the business models that are translating that technology into money, how are they operating without understanding, for example, how users are engaging with these platforms? We won't be able to draw the line at the right point. To give you one example, you know, thinking of the context of the DSA, for example, the role of influencers has often, I mean, today, it's very, very prominent in terms of how people are swayed in terms of their opinions. But it's very difficult to get at that from some of the existing legislation. So you need to understand the metrics, the data around how that influence is spreading.
So, in terms of this dynamic city, we need that kind of regular flow of information, the assessment, whether it's at the global level with the scientific panel or it is at the national regional level. In my home country in India, you know, there is a model of smart regulation that has worked in some parts of the digital economy, not so much in others. But it's where, you know, civil society, the market, and the government come together. There are some risks there also, you know, heavy involvement of one actor or the other, separating conflicts of interest. But I think there's no getting away from that kind of smart regulation.
Last point on this, no getting away from the articulation of soft and hard norms. Because, again, the dynamicity implies that you cannot just rely on soft norms and self-regulation, and you cannot just rely on hard norms. So how to make the two come together is a challenge for public authorities everywhere. There was a set of questions and comments around the independent international scientific panel. So on the selection process, we had more than 2,700 candidates from around the world.
It's an open call. Anyone could apply. And as per the decision of the member states, we had to give due regard, due consideration to nominations supported by member states, but not only. And we applied some blind testing in terms of strict criteria for merit, ranked these candidates on a score of up to five, and took the top candidates, 600 or so, and then subjected them to an interagency consensus: my office, the International Telecommunications Union, UNESCO, the office of the high commissioner for human rights, in terms of the various areas of application and impact. And we landed with a shortlist, which was taken to the secretary general who then recommended a list to the general assembly, that took a decision through a plenary session.
So, there is this process of selection. And to ensure further their independence, a very unique conflict of interest process has been drawn up to kind of cut the panel off from three potential areas of influence. One is the countries of their passports, the member states. Second is their employers, whether it's private companies. It's a fact that today, a lot of the science and research is going on in the private sector.
You need to have a window into that without allowing the private sector to influence those assessments, and finally, from within the UN system. So within the UN system, we could also have our preferences and ideologies, in a sense. So how to kind of protect this, we drew up a scheme and, fingers crossed, you know, it should work. Now another set of questions, and I'm grouping them in the interest of time, was around the political environment in which we operate, the geopolitical competition, the concentration of digital power, data infrastructure, let's say, in two countries, and the fact that at the same time, we have 80, 90 countries which don't have data centers in the single digit megawatts or, you know, 10 people that their leadership can reach out to have them understand what's going on. So, do these big powers subscribe to the objectives of the Global Digital Compact?
I like to think so because they joined the consensus at that time, in September 2024. And in 2024, both the US and China presented resolutions on this subject in New York, and they were both adopted by consensus. Has the world changed since then? Of course, it has. You all know that.
So we are going through kind of these cycles, some turbulence in a sense, where, you know, some of the points where you have thought you had consensus on climate, for example, or on gender, and now you are struggling. But I tend to take the long-term view. And I think if we look back at all the achievements since international law started to be, let's say, formalized at the turn of the 19th century, thanks to the wisdom of many Europeans, I think we made great progress, and it would be a pity to lose some of that collective progress that we made as humanity. So we will navigate this turbulence. The related question around financing and funding, I think today, development aid budgets are under pressure everywhere.
The UN's own finances are very limited. I mean, despite the ambitious mandate that's been given to my office, the resources given are very limited. So we have to, you know, acknowledge it and work with it. But I think what's important is that some of the capacity building doesn't require big money, doesn't require lots of dollars and euros. It requires awareness, and it requires cooperation.
And I wanna link it back to the comment from our distinguished colleague from Ireland. So I think particularly small states, and we have a forum of small states in the United Nations. 100 states are in that category. Population less than 10,000,000 people. They have a very important role in this networked multilateralism.
That's the nature of the world today. You know, you have immense concentration, but you can balance that concentration with networked multilateralism where, you know, big money is not needed, but big political will is required, will to cooperate and to overcome some of the selfishness that's washing through the international system today. For instance, let's say the training of officials or experts. Some countries may have more of an understanding of how AI meets the health domain or the education domain. Others may have more of an understanding of how AI can help improve climate change-resilient agriculture.
So sharing across different countries through this networked approach. We had this question about the implementation. Because, you know, you can have commitments. Who's translating those commitments into action? In the global digital compact, about 75, 80% of the commitments are addressed to member states.
So we hope that it's not a legally binding document in the sense of a treaty. And even treaty-based commitments, you have to rely a lot on goodwill and regular reporting, etcetera. We hope that the digital cooperation portal or the 2027 review allows us to generate some peer pressure for implementing those commitments. And then within the UN system, we have a working group on digital technologies. I co-chair that with the secretary general of the ITU.
We have five subgroups tracking the different pillars of implementation, with the office of the high commissioner for human rights and UNESCO leading on that important pillar that is relevant to your work on safe digital spaces, digital economy, UNIDO and UNCTAD, data governance, UNCTAD, and the UN University. So we have a distributed follow-up mechanism within the UN, and the whole effort is chaired by the Secretary General himself. So it's given a lot of political importance, so we can track how this is being implemented. The braxes in the case of information integrity relies on four institutional entities: UNESCO in Paris, the office of the high commissioner for human rights in Geneva, my own office, and the office for global communications in the New York headquarters as well. So these principles, for example, I mentioned, you know, these are not, again, binding principles, and these were also not negotiated.
This is something that we, in the UN system, have come up with to support the implementation of these commitments. On the question of involvement of the private sector, the private sector interests in this space. I think we are facing a cruel dilemma. You know, we cannot advance on our policy work without the support of the private sector, that aspect of smart regulation that I mentioned earlier. But at the same time, the influence, the power of the private sector in this space vis-à-vis elected representatives, not only parliamentarians, but our executive authorities is growing, and their transboundary influence is growing.
So, from the beginning of the theoretical approaches to international relations, we've spoken about non-state actors. But today, you know, you are in a very different space with these very powerful actors. So I think there are a few points that flow from it, and one of them is that we have to find these ways to manage the conflict of interest while engaging with the private sector. But then we also have to have clarity about where their interests are. So if someone from the private sector says, you know, do not put any restrictions on.
Okay. But there is an interest, which is to maximize engagement, because many of these apps, these platforms, are addictive. The revenue is related to the degree of engagement. And we all know extreme content, controversial content, drives up engagement. So there is an interest there.
And how do we manage that interest vis-à-vis the public interest? I think that we have to have clarity. And an additional aspect is there's no escaping the need for investments in public interest technology, the need to invest in digital public infrastructure where data flows and is accessible to everyone, not just a few platforms, where, you know, there's a level playing field for different types of private sector actors, where, you know, the competitive policy is managed because many of these instruments come from the previous century, frankly. So how do you smartly address the concentration of economic power through competition policy? How do you smartly address the data access problem for different actors in this space?
Again, there's no escaping that responsibility. The investment in talent, a lot of the AI talent is now leaving universities, which cannot afford to pay this talent into the private sector. So how do you retain that talent through investments in the public sector? Those are all elements of this challenge. I'm just going to quickly scan my notes for not forgetting anything.
Oh, yes. The question about polarization and impact on the United Nations European Union.
I think.
Speaker 3
This is a relatively old phenomenon, but it has some new aspects that are quite worrying. The AI space, and I'm linking it to the question about, you know, using AI to generate some of this polarizing content at scale. The deepfakes is one thing. You know? I mean, someone you know, one of you mentioned the influencer in a country in South Asia.
So it was called digital marketing earlier. So the digital marketers can turn their attention to any subject, and the new form of AI, Gen AI, allows them to work with any kind of content. So it's a powerful enabler of not only the digital marketing, the digital economy relevant work, but also the polarizing politically difficult kind of work. And you cannot just, you know, cut it off at the level of technology and excess because then it stops the economically beneficial work that is being facilitated by this new AI paradigm. So, working on how that content is distributed, how it is consumed, and how citizens are made more alert and capable of, you know, sifting the truth from the untrue.
Those are kind of challenges. Not easy challenges, because a lot of the work lies in the analog world, strengthening our analog institutions. So all the responses are not in the digital space. So if we don't strengthen journalism, we don't invest in public-interest media. I was in Switzerland recently.
You know, they had a referendum, and they've decided, the population has decided, we will pay a small amount every year to ensure that public interest media. So strengthening our analog institutions would be a key response to these challenges.
Thank you.
Speaker 1
Thank you very much, Mr. Gill, for those very detailed responses on this. This is something that we could go on for hours about. I would like to give the floor to someone you know very well, Lesia Soli, director on AI for the commission. You've got three minutes, Miss Gillet.
Speaker 17
Chair, honorable members, and the UN tech envoy, your excellency Gil. Many thanks for this exchange today, and I want to start by saying that the European Union supports the implementation of the global digital compact with its tech business offer and global gateway funding. The EU is contributing to the spirit of the global digital compact to support global South countries with investments in priority areas such as secure connectivity, cybersecurity, digital public infrastructure, and, of course, AI. And, we welcome an implementation of the Global Digital Compact, which is coordinated and streamlined with other existing initiatives that are led by the United Nations. And in this context, the European Union welcomes the progress made in relation to the international scientific panel on AI, and the global dialogue on AI governance.
Speaker 18
On the scientific panel, it's very important the independence that is necessary to deliver the scientific assessments of the eye, opportunities, and risk and impacts. And as regards the global dialogue on AI governance, for us, the multi-stakeholder approach remains a top priority. And we are also pleased that Estonia and El Salvador have been appointed co-chairs of the first dialogue on AI governance in 2026. Now, when it comes to AI policy in Europe, we are committed to the development of cutting-edge technologies and in collaboration with our partners. We started investing in AI factories, which is a very important infrastructure of compute capacity, data, and talent, and we are now connecting these AI factories with AI ecosystems in partner countries.
Speaker 17
And we are also supporting the demand side, but in particular key economic sectors such as health care, mobility, energy, and the public sector. And we don't do this alone. Of course, we offer our global partners cutting-edge, secure, and open-source AI solutions that can be readily adapted to the local level. So we offer algorithms that we invite countries to retrain on the basis of their own data, and therefore, the data doesn't have to travel and capacity is built locally. And this is part of our AI for good initiative, and where we really insist on the development of generative AI models for the local needs.
But, of course, as you mentioned and many have mentioned, we have also developed the AI Act, which is now being discussed. The simplification, the digital Omnibus, is currently under discussion, and the trial logs will start soon. Already the first handshake this week. And there, I just wanted to highlight the two codes of practice. We are developing a second code of practice.
The first one on safety frameworks, and the second one is about watermarking and labeling of deep fakes. And as many have highlighted, this is going to be very important for safeguarding democracies. We hope that both this code of practice will one day become international standards, and would like to offer a discussion and our approach through the code of practice, through our responsible innovation European approach for the global dialogue that you chair. Thank you very much.
Speaker 1
Thank you very much. Thank you to Mr. Gill for attending today. I think, in terms of what you say, and whether people didn't fully trust that previously. This does show the need for multilateral forums to ensure that the huge challenges brought by AI and digital technologies can be debated with all countries across the globe regardless of what we believe or what our orientations are because the digital agenda is borderless. And if we want to bring a response to this, then we do need a degree of international cooperation and understanding.
So I'd like to take the opportunity to remind all of you that we need the UN, and to criticize them and turn your backs on them is pointless given the huge challenges. I would like to thank the commission for attending today. And you spoke a lot about technology in this committee. We talk about democracy a lot. I would like to make sure that all institutional players think about both, because we shouldn't use our brains as silos.
Our work shouldn't be in silos. And in the EU and at the UN, we need to be able to mainstream democracy. Thank you very much. Moving on to the next item on our agenda, I would like to say goodbye to mister Gill. Moving on to the next item on the agenda, and looking at the amendments on the draft report from our colleague, Mister Thomas Tube.
1,655 amendments were launched on the draft report, which was brought to this committee by the rapporteur on January 29. First, we'll hear from Thomas Tobin, and then the shadow rapporteurs, three minutes each. I will then open catch the eye for the second round of questions, and I will be joining in not as chair, but as a renew member. So starting off with Mister Thibault for three minutes.
Speaker 20
Well, thank you, Chair and colleagues. As the chair said, 1,655 amendments. I choose to see that as a proof of a strong commitment in the European Parliament to defend our democracy. I can admit that the sum of amendments is somewhat a challenge as Rapporteur, but at least it shows that there was a need for this committee. Since we last discussed in this format, we have had one shadow meeting.
We have had five additional technical meetings, and we have actually three planned just before Easter Green Week. And, of course, we can already see now that there are some issues where we disagree, and it will be strange otherwise. But I would like to state that I do see a broad support for the overall direction of travel within the negotiations. I do see that the majority of the committee wants to send a clear message to the member states and to the Commission that we expect a more ambitious reform agenda in defense of democracy. On behalf of EPP, I have tabled 20 amendments to update the draft report.
As we all know, the world around us is not standing still. For example, I felt a clear need to update it with regard to our EU cybersecurity legislation. I do look forward now, to listen to the political groups and all my colleagues, but let me already now express my appreciation for S and D's strong commitment to restoring societal trust. I appreciate ECR's clear focus on Russia as an aggressor. I appreciate renews willingness to clearly name and call out the actors that undermine our democracy, and I appreciate The Greens' strong focus on fair rules online.
It is my conviction that we, together, even if we have some different approaches and priorities, that our final product can be stronger than the sum of our individual parts. With that, I'm now gonna let the political groups explain their priorities and amendments in their own words. Thank you.
Speaker 27
Would like to start by thanking Thomas Tube for a great piece of work and for trying to reach an agreement. And, also, I would like to point out, I would like to pass on a message from our colleague. On the one hand, we've got the compromise because the number of amendments shows the degree of compromise there is in the parliament in terms of protecting democracy. But, being aware of the risks we're up against and the need to call upon the commission to be more ambitious still in protecting our democracy, bearing in mind what we're aiming for. We've just seen this in AI, new technologies.
Speaker 24
And as AI and these technologies are undermining our democracy. We need to change things so that democracy is safeguarded, and that's why these amendments and these compromises had to do with providing information about threats external to the EU to our democracies, but within the EU too. We have threats afoot at member states, and we need to deal with them. We need to see that some member states use democracy to attack democracy itself and to promote a divide within institutions, and that's why we've launched amendments. At the same time, the EU, in the face of internal and external threats, needs to be strategically autonomous.
We need to finally spend money on promoting our techno autonomy so that we can resist these threats and respond properly, because that will make us more independent as opposed to being dependent on tech firms, particularly American ones, but also Chinese ones. And I would like to put out a call. This is a compromise of ours. The report, I think, is on the same wavelength. We don't need to set up a whole new.
Speaker 25
What we need is to apply the legislation that's recently been approved in the p, which the member states have the obligation to implement. And that's why I would like to put out a call once again for us to strengthen the current instruments so that we can protect ourselves not only in the face of manipulation of information, but to protect journalists, civil society in the work that they do. And all of that is to do with strengthening democracy. And finally, a couple of things. Talking about inclusivity as we do at this committee, and that's in the report.
Speaker 32
The importance of candidate countries, which will be part of defense and protection of democracy and resilience. Let's not duplicate institutions that have specific missions so that member states aren't just taking part on a voluntary basis, but we can fund resilience to fight against one of the biggest dangers to democracy, which is manipulation of information, disinformation. And we're constantly up against this, and it eats away at us, and the risk is that we'll be no more. We need to keep the European project afoot. Thanks to Raportel once again, and for your patience during the negotiations.
Jaroslav Bžoch
Thank you very much. First of all, let me thank the reporters and his team for the effort to somehow include and work with those amendments because it's a huge number. And, I can understand it's quite hard job, because there is a wide scope of views. Also, I can confirm that the main goal of this committee, and I think that we all can agree, is safeguarding and protecting our democracies and fight against disinformation. It's a cruel, and we know there is a FMI.
We just need to find out the right tools how to defend our democracies. So far, we agree on that. On the other hand, I have also some more comments because, as Mister Abbott said about naming the main threats, I can imagine that we all can agree that Russia is definitely one of the main threats. But, during the shareholders meeting, I was mentioning that if we want to name the threats, we should be way more, maybe way more broader because it's not Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, but also some countries in Africa and other countries in the Middle East, and not just countries, but institutions or not institutions, but groups like ISIS, Muslim Brotherhood, and the scope of what's threatening us, the democracy, is way wider than a few states, and that's what was my comment. So we can agree on Russia, but there are way bigger threats to our democracies.
Because if we talk about foreign interference, that's one part of it. But the other part of it is about our internal security. And those I mentioned, it's a threat to our internal security. And if it's a threat to our internal security, like ISIS, like the Islamist, the radical Islamist, then it's a threat to our democracies too. So if we put in the report the names of the main threats, we should make it way more broader or put it as a general and talk about hostile countries in general.
What we do not support is definitely the way how the majority probably sees the new center. We do support the commission, and I can imagine that it's surprising that we support something from the commission. But in this case, we support the idea that it's on members' day if they would like to join or not. And, also, we supported should be hop on sharing the lesson learned, sharing the best practices, etcetera, and that the member states could decide if they would like to join or not. On the other hand, and it was mentioned already, but in different regard, we have laws, we have legislation, but we have also agencies we can use to it.
So first of all, before we think about establishing any new agency or any new institution, we should look at what we have in place already. So we talk, for example, about Europol, Frontex, Eurogest. Those are the agencies we can use way more even in regard to fighting disinformation and foreign interference. And that was actually our amendments we were putting in this report. But, in the end, I'd like to thank the reporter again for his support because I know it's quite a hard job. Thank you.
Thank you.
Speaker 10
Thank you very much, chair. Ladies and gentlemen, I would like to join my voice in thanking the rapporteur. He's done a great piece of work here. This huge number of amendments shows that we're all committed to this. We all want to get as complete a document as possible that can safeguard democracy and protect us against foreign interference and which will, I hope, defend our freedoms, freedom of expression, particularly, as opposed to make it easier for further interference in the affairs of member states.
There are various priorities for my group, and there are about seven sticking points for us here. And that's reflected in the amendments that we have lodged. Firstly, we need to defend the principle of subsidiarity in accordance with article 5 of the treaties. We can't allow there to be a situation where the confidences of member states, independent member states, is taken on by the institutions. And we also need to safeguard freedom of expression.
Secondly, strengthening the role of member states. On this, we don't think we should be setting up new bodies and institutions. We need to better support the current institutions, and they should be helping the member states. Third point, defending freedom of expression and pluralism. And as I've said earlier, I've said previously quite a few times, we need to be looking at where to put the emphasis in terms of wanting to defend ourselves against disinformation and interference and freedom of expression.
We think that the essential issue here is defending ourselves against Russia. We need to take into account the fact that Russia is the main threat and the main source of problems in the EU. And then various different standards and rules and the EU's, that are up to the EU. This is an area where we need to be clear about the various issues of the roles of the EU. And finally, transatlantic cooperation, the role of NATO, and the role of our links.
Speaker 30
Those are our amendments. I'm open to cooperation in the future. Thank you.
The Greens, please.
Alexandra Geese
Yes. Thank you very much. I'm standing in for a shadow repertoire. Well, first of all, thanks a lot to the repertoire for a very comprehensive and, I think, a very good report. Because I think that is a great start.
We're very happy to cooperate with this. The reporter already pointed out that the Greens are focusing on fair rules online. I think that is extremely important because even the commission proposal analyzes the situation in a way that said the basic problem is the business model of the social media and big tech platforms, which privilege polarizing, radicalizing, and extremist content over any other kind of content. They privilege disinformation and lies over facts. They downrank media systematically.
And I would say they do infringe freedom of speech and freedom of information because for democratic, progressive, or moderate politicians, we see that our content is distributed a lot less than that of extremist politicians. And I think we can all observe the impact that has on the political landscape. So this is something that we need not only to call out, but also to recommend the measures that the commission can now take to counter this, which all have a legal basis under the Digital Services Act or, in some cases, under the Digital Markets Act. And I think this needs to be done. We also need to address the fact that some tech billionaires intervene directly in the algorithms to promote certain parties.
There's a number of studies documenting this that I would very much love to present to the committee. The second point, when you speak about the protection of politicians, I think we need to mention that female politicians are a lot more affected by threats online and offline in the real world. That needs to be taken into account. When we speak about the press, that the commission is pushing for funding for the press, I think we need to address the fact that the online advertising system is controlled by a monopoly, and that is the main reason why the press is underfunded. The revenue that used to go directly from advertisers to publishers now is going to Google.
It's a very simple fact, and I think we need to address that and attack that monopoly in order to make sure that advertising money goes to a broader range of actors, to put this mildly, in particular, to publishers. That is the reason for the underfunding. And I think we can just step in with taxpayers' money, while the money is going to Google because of a monopoly. There's an ongoing court case, and I think we need to mention this, how to reestablish a democratic and a market-based system and not get away from that monopoly. Last but not least, there's one big elephant in the room.
I do agree with the definition of Russia as a major threat. But we also see the influence of the US in Europe. The US has been considered by the major democracy research institute, the Swedish VDEM Institute, which you are certainly familiar with, mister Repertur. It's not a liberal democracy anymore, and this is shocking. And we know that the US in their national security strategy very clearly says they want to weaken the European Union.
They want to bring certain parties to power and to support them actively, and they want to use the tech platforms which control our infrastructure, in particular our information infrastructure, to achieve that goal. So I think this is something we need to address in that report and outline very clear measures on how we wanna make sure that Europe is a sovereign continent and the European Union is made up by sovereign countries, and we will not tolerate foreign interference from anyone, not from Russia, but also not from the US. Thank you very much.
Speaker 33
Yeah. Thank you, madam chair, Mr. Toby. We should be very careful not to weaken the freedoms and constitutional structures on which democracy rests. While there is a need for genuine intelligent operations and to counter terrorism and to expose foreign funding, the question is who acts, how, and on what basis. So my amendments address three concerns.
First, freedom of speech. The report introduces concepts such as harmful narratives and anti-system ideologies. These categories, however, are vague, with tools built on obscure concepts which will inevitably undermine free speech. I'm also concerned by the idea that citizens sharing political views could be treated as security concerns simply because similar narratives appear abroad. Democratic politics naturally produces mobilization, coordination, and amplification.
Speaker 38
That is not illegal. It is not interference. It is democracy at work. EU action must therefore target illegal conduct and foreign operations, not the circulation of lawful political speech. Second, the narrative governance.
Speaker 39
The report promotes an ecosystem of fact-checking networks, NGOs, and other stakeholders feeding analyses into the system. This raises an obvious question. Who selects these actors? Under what democratic authority and what legal redress exists if they are wrong? Government-subsidized actors, whether fact checkers, journalists, or media organizations, already pose serious challenges for pluralism.
Speaker 33
It becomes even more problematic when publicly funded actors are asked to classify political narratives or identify systemic risks, effectively privileging some viewpoints while delegitimizing others. Third, the legal limits of union action. Elections, democratic debate, and political organization belong primarily to the constitutional order of the member states. The treaties are clear. In article four, paragraph two of the treaties, national security to the member states. Yet the more the report calls for expanded powers for the European Center for Democratic Resilience, the more glaring the absence of a legal basis becomes.
Speaker 37
Even Commissioner McGraw struggled to identify one. A simple hub may not require a legal base, but what this report proposes clearly would. And that these questions remain unanswered. Thank you.
Speaker 34
Speak in Spanish. Thank.
You, chair. We have a report in front of us, and I'd like to thank the rapporteur for his efforts on this because he's done a huge amount of work. But there are a number of issues which won't achieve any type of consensus. I think there's a deliberate attempt to create resent resistance not due to external interference. We, of course, agree on that.
Not to interference from a clear threat such as Russia, or China, or Iran, or Islamism. The Muslim brotherhood are very much present here in Europe and are being financed directly and indirectly by various bodies and public authorities, and this is concerning for all of us. So all of this series of nongovernmental organizations, it looks like we're being told we have to encourage them. And madam said herself that funding independent journalism is an oxymoron. We can't fund independent journalism because it's not independent when it's journalism that just parrots European Union propaganda in the majority position in this parliament and the commission.
Speaker 36
So what we're seeing here is that they're using the pretext of interference to try to protect themselves, and this is a problem.
Fabrice Legeray.
Fabrice Légère.
Thank.
Fabrice Leggeri
You, chair. I'd like to pick up on what my Patriots colleague said. First of all, the risk of infiltration by the Muslim Brotherhood, and of Islamism is something that has been ascertained in our countries and the EU. We see that in local elections. You know, madam Loiseau, in France.
It's also the case in Belgium and other countries. So our democracy, including local democracy, has to be defended against Islamist infiltration. I would also recall the importance of freedom of expression in the current context. Here, we have representative democracy in our institutions. So NGOs should not try to be, seize democracy.
It's people who vote. We have representative democracies in all of our member states. So I don't really see what would be the basis for madam Vondelayan to come to intervene or interfere in the democracy within our member states.
Thank.
Speaker 1
you. I'll take off my chair's hat, and I'll now speak as a member of the catchy eye procedure. Thank you to the rapporteur for a very dense report. A lot of colleagues have already said a number of things. I'm also guilty because I tabled the number of amendments.
As other colleagues have said, I think we have to name all of those responsible for interference. There's no such thing as good interference that you like, and bad interference. There's no good and bad threat. A threat is a threat. So I'm quite concerned that when we've all read the American security strategy, no one's mentioned The United States as a country who both black and white and in their discourse, are interfering in European countries.
I want those of you who think you like this type of interference to understand that if others were to do it, you would not like it so much. On democratic resilience, so there's a lot about that in the report. And I just want to emphasize to harmonize the work that's being done and methods that are used across the EU to ensure greater efficiency. But it can't be entirely done at EU level because efficiency means that each member state has to do what they can do best and in the way that is best for them, and they will understand their specific threats most. And that's not something that can necessarily just be reproduced across all 27 member states.
On reliability of information, that's a major topic and something that's in all of our minds. I think the draft report was very good on this. I was very interested in what was said on due prominence for content, for journalistic content. So not censoring people, but content that's produced by journalists who respect journalistic ethics should have higher visibility than content produced by, who knows, who. And so I would be in favor of influencers having a certain status and therefore responsibilities, just in the same way that you should be asked not to cheat their communities by selling products that are incorrect.
And so they shouldn't be claiming to provide information when that's not what they are doing. I think that would be a good thing. And just to touch back on the previous agenda point, technology should be at the service of democracy. We should stop bowing down in front of technological progress and doing what those in the tech industry request of us. We have to see that it's in line with our principles and our values, or a check whether it's not in line with our principles.
I'm very much in favor of subsidiarity, but I don't want subsidiarity to be used as a pretext to forget the fact that there are European values that all member states adhere to. No one can ignore them or turn their back on these values. For example, the role of civil society. Civil, democracy is not only elections and representatives. Democracy is also a whole ecosystem that involves pluralist, independent media and a lively civil society.
And that's something else that we have to protect through the democracy shield. I'm sure that the work that our shadow and the rapporteur will do will reflect our concerns and be successful. So thank you once again. Mr. Demeter wants the floor.
Csaba Dömötör
The aims that are set out here are aims that we could subscribe to. After all, who wouldn't want better defense against foreign interference? However, speaking from experience, what we've noticed is that when the European Commission speaks about this, the defense against foreign interference and fake news, you know, in these communications, they're actually trying to repress certain voices from the right in particular. And we haven't really talked about this much so far. You have to remember that there are three groups that would receive more funding: NGOs, the media, and fact checkers.
They would receive more money. Now according to our experience, when the European Commission finances these kinds of entities, they're basically funding left-wing entities, liberal entities, and I think that needs to be noted and flagged. Now, to extend that, from a budgetary point of view, we wouldn't actually be in favor of that because it would distort democracy. And most specifically, we can't support proposals where you're actually establishing new entities that would be acting without any kind of democratic legitimacy and would actually, you know, be calling out what our states are doing, and that's what's going on here. So I'm afraid we can't support the proposal as it now stands.
Regarding US interference, madam chair, we have some experience in this domain. And let me tell you that there are NGOs. The previous Biden administration used to fund these NGOs, and the commission is trying to take over the funding. The European Commission right now is suggesting that they take over the funding of these NGOs. So if there are risks across the pond, then I think that we need to be aware of that and to take measures accordingly.
Thank you.
Thank.
Speaker 45
Good morning. Thank you very much for giving this the floor and to have the opportunity to intervene during this exchange review. The parliament is an essential actor in promoting and defending democracy. On the side of the commission, we have really committed to work closely with the European Parliament, notably with this committee. The expertise of this committee is particularly important, and we are looking forward to continuing a very good cooperation.
Speaker 50
The commission has already taken due consideration of the working document presented in the spring by the reporter, mister Toby. This document has been a source of inspiration for the work in the context of the European Democracy Shield. We also welcome the draft report in January. And what we see is that there are extensive common grounds and synergies between the draft report and the work being carried out under the democracy shield, to mention some of them, and this debate showed the importance of some of them. The recognition of the threats and challenges our democracies are currently facing.
Speaker 51
The whole of government and whole of society approach to reinforce our democracy, building on a robust legal and policy framework that is relevant for democratic resilience. The importance of the existing regulatory framework like the Digital Service Act, the Regulation Political Act, the AI Act, the European Media Freedom Act, and the directive on SLAP, for instance, the setup of the European Center for Democratic Resilience, and last but not least, the three pillars of the European Democracy Shield. And this leads to us, obviously, not exhaustive. Commissioner McGrath and our services already inform you on the state of implementation of the action being announced under the European Democracy Shield in each of its priorities, such as the Open Center for Democratic Resilience or work stream to support fairness and integrity of electoral and other democratic processes. As also mentioned by commissioner Magrai during the last exchange on the Road on the Shield in this house, the commission is looking forward to the adoption of the final report. And as always, we are committed, and as mentioned in the communication on the Open Democracy Shield, to regularly update and involve the parliament in the implementation phase of the shield.
Thank.
Thank you very much.
Speaker 1
you. Mister Brandstetter from Renew has arrived, so I'll give him the floor.
Helmut Brandstätter
I'm to be late, but been in the foreign committee and Morapoteeva Serbia, and we discussed Serbia. And, by the way, has a lot to do with Democracy Shield because as we've seen in our last visit to Serbia, the situation there and the Russian influence, of course, is very strong, and we heard in this here as well. I want to thank Thomas Tubei. Thank you very much for the report, and thank you to all the others. There are so many amendments, so we'll have a lot of discussion.
But I think it's really so important because we see this danger for our democracy in so many ways. And so we really have to do everything to keep that. But we always say, I'm the luckiest generation that ever grew up in the West of Europe because we always had freedom and democracy, but now it's not a given anymore. And I think this is really what we have to do. I think there are many different points.
I just want to mention, we just learned it from Slovenia and other countries, interference in election is a very important point. The second, of course, is freedom of speech and freedom of the media. It has to be paramount. It's really in the center. And then, of course, this resilience center.
And for me, this is a very important point because the resilience center, and I see and hear it already, will be marked by some people as, okay, they want to do the end of free speech or something like that. No. It's the contrary. The resilience center must be in the center of our democracy and have to be very open. And that's the reason why I always say we really should have control of this resilience center by voted members of parliament.
I think this is our job to watch what they are doing. And I think we have to find the construction that this resilience center is in our center also, and we can control what they are doing. So these are some of the points which are very important for me. And as I said, we will have the discussion about the amendments. And again, thank you very much to everybody for cooperating.
Speaker 5
I endorse the s and d points that have been made by our person in charge, Anna Caterina Mendez. But, after having heard the discussion, I can't refrain myself from highlighting a point that has not been made, is that we cannot allow ourselves again, after a year of hard work of a special committee, which is the case of Democracy Shield, of not making sure that the mandates to the commission to deliver, to bring about new legislation and new initiatives are absolutely compelling. We cannot allow ourselves, because we have seen that much too often, particularly in the past mandate in which we had nothing less than five special committees. I was a member of the Pegasus Committee and just miserably enough, just in the last plenary of the European Parliament in Strasbourg, we, of course, stressed that much of the lessons learned and much of the mandate regarding the commission to act and bring about new initiatives are still to be fulfilled, are yet undone. So we cannot allow ourselves this time not to highlight in the final part, which is usually the last paragraph.
It conveying the messages to the rest of the institutions, in particular to the European Commission, that that mandate is absolutely compelling for the commission to take initiative to do its part of the job after us having done ours. Thank you.
Speaker 47
Else would like to take the floor, I'll give the floor back to Thomas Tovey.
Speaker 20
Well, thank you, Cher, and thank you all, colleagues, for your comments and statements, and, of course, all the amendments. Just a few points from my side. I fully agree that, of course, we need to make sure that we apply our digital legislation. I think this is one of the key points which, of course, we need to stress. Secondly, I think I'll stop at saying, let's continue discussing who and what is a threat to democracy, and what should be mentioned in the report.
I see that there are some different flavors of that, and I have no problem in further discussing that. On the question of freedom of expression, for me, this is a cornerstone of democracy. I have no interest in repressing opinions, but I would like to make a clear distinction that, for me, Russian troll factories will never be freedom of expression. That is the distinction that I would like to make. Then, of course, to the question of, is it given that the European Union, when it comes to our digital infrastructure, needs to be in the hands of the US and Asia?
I mean, that is, of course, a very big question. I don't know if we will solve it in this report, but for sure, this is one of the key things that we need to discuss. Because as long as we have this amount of this information and we still see that the actors are not taking responsibility, it does not work for us. And, of course, it also means that we need to discuss the fact that we want to decide about the rules in our own continent. Lastly, I mean, I can fully agree.
Perhaps in the end, if we are still friends, in the end, if we have a clear majority, I would say that perhaps we should also have a more strategic discussion. What should be the impact of this report? Because, of course, now we have a rather holistic kind of broad way of working with it, which I think is helpful. But, of course, we won't have an impact with this report, especially towards the commission. Thank you.
Speaker 1
Thank you all very much. Best of luck. The voting committee will take place on June 23. So the this morning session is closed, and we'll be back this afternoon at 03:00.
Ask anything about this video — I analyse its transcript to answer.