Committee on Regional Development Ordinary meeting
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REGI European Parliament
Follow its sittingsSpeaker 2
The median is 5. However, regions can develop sub-priorities, which means that the number of areas covered can be far higher. This is illustrated by the regional innovation strategy of Bavaria in Germany, in which five priorities are divided into 25 second level areas. Our fourth finding is that the monitoring and evaluation is difficult for regions, and it is almost impossible to isolate and evaluate the effects of smart specialization. Of the seven fulfillment criteria, respondents indicated that complying with the monitoring and evaluation criteria is the most difficult.
Around half of the respondents found it either extremely or very demanding. Less innovative regions find monitoring and evaluation more demanding than those with stronger innovation priorities. An unsolved challenge is the difficulty of isolating the effects of smart specialization. There are, for example, World Bank studies for the Pomorsky region in Poland and the Basque Country in Spain. However, the scope of these studies is broader, and the direct effect of smart specialization cannot be fully isolated.
They found that smart specialization can foster sectoral growth, but also found it difficult to assert that the strategies have contributed significantly to sectoral efficiency. The fifth, there is still no evaluation to date. Since the launch of the concept in 2014, no evaluation of the results or impact of smart specialization has been conducted by the commission at the EU level. In 2024, the commission contracted an external study to assess the success of the smart specialization framework, but we are still waiting for it to be published. And then at the end, we give some recommendations, some opportunities, and challenges.
The first one is that to ensure that the process of designing smart specialization is useful, leading to the identification of meaningful priorities. This should result in regions defining their priorities at an appropriate level of detail. There is an opportunity for the commission to promote coherence between the priorities emerging from S3 and the research and innovation priorities of the industrial policy. The S3 community of practice or observatory could be better used to identify priority gaps and overlaps. A second future challenge is to assess the value of smart specialization as a process.
To meet this challenge, it is important for the commission to evaluate the implementation of smart specialization in the EU. It is, however, not clear to what extent the concept can be evaluated independently from the ERDF innovation spending that it guides. There is also an opportunity for the commission to provide appropriate support to member states on how to ensure effective monitoring and evaluation in a simplified way, the need for which was highlighted by our survey results. And the last one is to maximize the value of interregional cooperation to help unlock untapped regional potential. There is an opportunity for the commission to further promote cooperation among regions, including by identifying and facilitating suitable areas for such cooperation, supporting less innovative regions in developing their administrative capacity, and ensuring that suitable incentives to cooperate are in place.
Thank you very much.
Speaker 1
Thank you very much for the presentation. And now I turn to the members in the room. If any of you wish to take the floor, please send me a signal. Miss Guarda from The Green Group, please go ahead.
Cristina Guarda
Thank you very much, chair, and thank you to the court for this work, and we'll continue in Italian.
Thank you very much for the court for this report, which I think comes at a very crucial moment for the future of cohesion policy. Now before I was here, I was a Regional Councillor and worked for 10 years in the Veneto region in Italy. And I really had seen how complex this whole thing is, and the complexities that emerge from your report. Strategic approach is impeccable, but just on the formal level, because then funds always go towards the same players claiming the finance. So I'm not saying that they do that out of bad faith, but the question is who has the most voice at the table.
Well, it's the people that have the most resources coming in. And that's not just a problem of implementation. S3, as they've been conceived today, have a risk of just funding the same people who already have a strong position and already have the funds, and leave behind the people who really do need those funds to change. So the weakest actors are the people who find it harder because they're less able to use these instruments. They're really better for more mature areas.
So I think that we want more consistency with the EU policy, better support for the less innovative regions. So that's all on the right track. But the commission is doing exactly the opposite of all that. The way that the commission is looking at this is completely from the other side. Making S3 optional in NRPPs basically means doing away with two program cycles and all the work that's been done from 2014 to 2028.
I mean the whole thing is that you should make the instruments more efficient and more effective. So the basis is valid. It's in line with the basic concepts of cohesion, bottom-up partnerships, place-based approach. And that would have helped the regions to operate in a more strategic way in a context in which today's context shows that there are going to be more and more areas and there's more concentration of themes. S3 could really help be a sort of link between cohesion and industrial policy in Europe.
The idea would be to combine the ECF top-down approach with the bottom-up approach of the regional financing, which would really help Interreg to come into play. The place-based approach of this commission is not really at the heart and soul of cohesion, just transition CLLD. All
Cristina Guarda
This becomes optional, and all of this without any kind of ring-fencing, which is a very shortsighted approach. And really, the commission has not really taken into account the territories. So I would call on colleagues to strengthen our approach to this. And let me just round off with a few questions for the court. In the light of all this, how would you integrate S3 into the NRPPs?
What are you going to do to make sure that this instrument doesn't make the disparities worse between regions, but really provides the money to the people who need it most? Thank you.
Speaker 1
Thank you very much. We will maybe collect the questions, and then I will give back the floor to Mr. Thelbum to react. So, Mister Arimond from the EPP Group, please, you have the floor.
Speaker 4
I'll speak in German. First of all, thank you very much for this study and for this analysis. And if I've understood correctly, from the data, one can draw the first conclusions. And what we see is that many regions was very difficult. This particular strategy, this specialization approach, was very difficult for them to deal with.
Speaker 6
So there are questions mostly in that particular direction. When it is initially difficult, this particular thematic approach, can we say that the longer that this strategy is carried out, it will become easier for the regions because it will be an issue that they'll accumulate the necessary wisdom or the necessary ability to be able to function more effectively in the future? Or is it fundamentally difficult for these regions to participate in this particular strategic approach? The second question is the new structure of the commission for regional development, and how it ought to be formed and so on and so forth. And maybe the commission, that it's very euphemistically, if you like, expressed on the part of the commission because the new approach of the commission actually is no longer based on these particular criteria.
Speaker 4
This is left in the RRP approach. And whether this particular strategy NRP approach and whether for Interreg and for the cohesion policy approach that this particular strategy provides for that legal certainty, provides for a good implement to the regions so that they can implement this particular strategy into the future, expand the strategy. For right now, for example, from the ERDF, we have one aspect that isn't included altogether. And I think it would be very smart indeed if we could expand this particular strategy. I think that would be a very intelligent approach, and this would be incorporated into the text as well, not just principles of the NRP, where the member states would then decide, or the regions would then decide?
Speaker 5
And of course, well, the end of the chain would be the regions, how they would implement this particular strategy. And I simply wanted your particular assessment. Once again, I'd like to thank you for the information and the work that you've provided. Thank you.
Speaker 1
Thank you very much. If there are no more members asking for the floor, then I would give back the chance to Mr. Tertebrum to respond. Thank you.
Speaker 2
Yes. Thank you very much, madam chair. Concerning your first question, that is quite difficult for the regions and that it's mainly going to the big and the same projects. That is actually the aim of, like we write in our report, of the entrepreneurial discovery process. And we give an example in one box where we say that in the Extramaduro in Spain, there was a very proactive approach where a significant number of participants, 600, were mobilized, stakeholders were motivated to contribute by the expectation that smart specialization could lead to a radical increase in research and innovation funding in the region. So, actually, that is the aim of this EDP process.
But we indeed see, and I think it's in our survey, in our report, that around half, 46% of the regions say that it's extremely or very demanding, and another 39% are saying it's slightly not demanding. But almost half find it very demanding, but that's actually the aim to avoid the remark that you are saying that's all the time going to the same projects, because if it is. But I was recently at a conference also on smart specialization, and there, they also said that they found it extremely difficult, for example, to include universities in it. But it's, of course, quite important because, otherwise, you might end up as you are, for legit reasons, saying that it's ending up in the same hands, and that is actually not the purpose of it. Because often, Vala, we explain it that community aspect such as the civil society has been actually left out on a more than regular basis, and that is actually not very good. If you talk about, we also see in our report at a certain moment, it's based on research that overly narrow priorities also bring with them some drawbacks, such as reducing the potential number of participants.
And in both scenarios, when the priorities are too broad or too narrow, the outcome is that using a region's economic advantages is actually not fully exploited or not fully used. When you talk about and also, mister Harimo Harimo, when you talk about the ring fencing and the NRPPs, well, I think last week or two weeks ago, we presented our opinion here in the Reggie, Budch and Agri Committee that was quite a lot of attendance. And there, we indeed highlighted the fact that it comes into the hands of the national plans, that, of course, it gives more flexibility to the member states, and more flexibility means that it's not always clear what will happen with the smart specialization. But having said that, in the proposal of the commission as it stands now, there are like they say at this moment that smart specialization, that the NRP plans shall effectively contribute to promoting the use of cooperation interventions as referred in. And they refer to the smart specializations, but they refer to it.
And it's true. There is no ring fencing for some. There's already some ring-fencing for some expenditure, but there is no ring-fencing at this moment for smart specializations. Honestly, we don't have an opinion on this. I think this is in the hands of the policy makers of the parliament and of the commission.
We base our facts, our analysis on facts and figures, but we are not making an analysis of how at how it works. But like we also see in our report that the commission integrated the S3 into cohesion policy in order to align it more effectively to funding and projects with the regional economic structures and their potential strength. So that was the reason, actually, to integrate it. When you are asking, is it like something new that it's hard for the regions to deal with this s three? We don't have a clear opinion on that.
But on the other hand, you can say it's the policy exists since 2014. This is now 12 years. At the moment of our audit, we had a full cycle of 10 years, previous MFF and already a part of the new MFF. We were waiting and expecting actually also that we could already integrate the evaluation of the commission they announced. And they said at a certain moment, you don't have to make your review because we commit to an evaluation that will be better.
Lucky us that we continued with it because the evaluation of the commission is still not there at this moment. And I think it's highly needed because we also see in our report that there is no alignment between the top-down priorities, for example, on microchips and on batteries, and that is now on top of the political debate with the industrial policy act and the bottom-up approach. And we think what we write in our report, the two should meet each other to reinforce each other. Otherwise, it doesn't actually, it's you don't use fully the potential for your economic strength. Also, what we see in our report is that based on our survey, two thirds of the respondents reported that using the observatory, the community of practice platform, while one third indicated they do not, which is quite a lot because the aim of that is that you can use it.
It's viewed positively among users. Okay? Otherwise, you no longer use it, with 80% agreeing that it provides valuable information on its three priorities and practices in other EU regions and member states and offers possibilities for potential collaboration. And then again, also on the NRPs, because you also highlighted it, I referred to my previous and to our opinion that we wrote on the NRPs, where we say, on the one hand, there is more flexibility. On the other hand, there's already for certain priorities some ring fencing.
Okay. What we also said, in our opinion, is that in our knowledge the NRPs might be a simplification for the level of the European Commission, but it's not a simplification at the level of the member states or at the level of the final beneficiaries. And that is indeed what you also highlighted, the complexity might stay at that level. And actually, some of the negotiation power or some of the work that has been done now at the level of the commission turns to the level of the member states and turns maybe to the level of the regions, which might actually, in the end, eventually even increase the complexity for them. I'm not going to repeat everything that we said in the previous session on the NRPs, although I could say way more on it because we have quite a strong opinion on it in our report.
But, I think I might have. And on the place based approach, what you also said and the interact, we also have a section in our report on the cross border cooperation because that is something what we saw in the RF that actually the cross border aspect almost disappeared. We will have to see with the NRPPs that actually what will happen also with this cross border aspect. And certainly, for certain regions, it's extremely important, like the country where mister Arimo and I'm coming from. We are only connected to the regions next to us.
Otherwise, we have no. We have to. It's also an opportunity, but it's crucial to do if you want to strengthen your economy. But that is actually applicable to many regions and for many countries in Europe.
Speaker 1
That's true. Exactly. I can confirm it from my country's perspective in Central Europe, Hungary. Thank you very much. You will have the chance to give any final remarks in case you wish to give any additional information.
But now we have the pleasure to welcome the representative of the European Commission, Mr. Nicola de Micheli. So please, Mr. Director, I will give you the floor now to react to the remarks and questions that have been said so far. Thank you so much.
Speaker 7
Thank you, Chair, and thank you, Miss Turtlebum. And thanks to the court for this report. I think that it's important to remember where we were before 2014. And we were in a situation in which, despite the fact that a lot of resources were pouring into the research and innovation system, very little was happening. This was the so-called innovation paradox.
And one of the reasons we assessed was behind this innovation paradox was the absence of a strategy. And this is why already at the end of the 90s, we started pilot projects, the regional technology plan, the regional innovation strategies, to help regions and to test a mechanism to create that strategy. And so in 1420, the smart specialization strategy became an enabling condition because we thought that a world with a strategy is better than a world without. Clearly, there was a learning curve. Clearly, this created difficulties at the beginning.
But I think and I remain convinced that we are in a better world because we have invited regions and member states to think and bring together all the different actors to bang their heads and to think about where they want to be in ten years' time. This is what the strategy does. It helps regions to focus their attention on the field of innovation, research, and industrial development on fewer priorities. Now it's clear that the situation is different depending on where you are, because the strategies reveal what the strengths and the weaknesses of the different regions are. In certain regions, you have better focus, more participation.
In other, a bit less. But, again, the value added of this instrument is really about improving the governance of research and innovation investment, in particular, by bringing together the public administration, the research institutes, and the universities, the industries, and the civil society. And I think that the success of the smart specialization strategy is due to the fact that today, have 170 smart specialization strategies, and regions are telling us that the strategies have become the frame within which they organize their investment in research and innovation independent from the European funding. So this is now the way in which regions operate. Does that mean that everything is fine?
No. And I think that the court points to areas that can be improved. And let me just conclude by pointing to three points. The first is, again, on whether the strategies were introduced prematurely, and I think that they made a case explaining why we think that these were not the case. And by the way, there are also regions that are not in the union that are using this governance system to organize their investment, showing that it has created a positive dynamic in the way in which innovation and research policies are implemented.
The second point, that a very important point that the review raised, is the link between the bottom up or the priorities that are identified at local and regional level and the European priorities. We have carried out an analysis of the existing smart specialization strategies. And in reality, not surprisingly, 80% of the priorities that have been identified are aligned with the European priorities. And this, in a sense, is not surprising because regions do not operate in a vacuum. They are part of a Europe that is defining priorities, is defining the direction of travel in the field of competitiveness and industrial policies, and they're following.
And they're following also with their strategies. But it's also clear that not every region in Europe can become a microchip region. And there are regions that are more rural, that have different characteristics, different assets that need to concentrate on other areas. The last point is what is the future of this instrument? And I heard the honorable member, worried about the fact of whether the smarts the smart specialization strategy are or are not part of the proposal of the commission.
Well, they are part of the proposal of the Commission. In the context of the territorial instrument, and this is a territorial instrument, the new regulation indicates the smart specializations as one of the things we need to continue to use. They are not obligatory, but as I said, regions are now using it, using that system. And we will, as negotiator with the member states and the regions in the next round, be sure that this instrument will continue to remain at the center of the organization, design and implementation of research and innovation policies. Thank you very much.
Speaker 1
Thank you very much, Mr. Director. And now I turn again to Miss Turtlebroom. If you want to give some final remarks or reactions, then.
Speaker 2
You have the floor. Well, thank you very much, madam chair. I don't have very relevant in addition to our review, also to see what is the evolution of the smart specialization because we highlight in our report that the community of practice is only used by two thirds of respondents, so you don't use it for full. The top down and the bottom up, if the commission is saying 80% are the same priorities, but then there is 20% also not the same priorities. But in any case, the smart specialization has the potential and is not always using the potential fully at this moment.
And I will leave it here, Madam Chair.
Speaker 1
Thank you so much. Thanks again for the presentation, for your work. I would also like to thank the representative of the commission for your presence here. I think we really appreciate the possibility for regular exchanges and for the possibility to ask questions to the commissions and also to deliver our remarks and sometimes even criticism. And let's keep this good practice for the future.
I think we need it very much. Thanks again. With this, I close agenda item number eight on the ECA review, and then we can move to the next one, which will be the presentation of a study. Just checking if one minute break maybe, and then we jump to the next agenda item. Thank you.
Okay. Dear colleagues, let's move on. As I mentioned, we will have another presentation. It's about a study which has a relatively long title. I will try to go through it.
Navigating the European Commission's MFF proposal for 2028, 2034, mapping risks and opportunities for cohesion policy and regional development. The study is commissioned by the policy department for regional development, agriculture, and fisheries. It was on the request by our Regi Committee to assess how the NRPP proposal restructures support relevant to cohesion policy, and also to formulate policy recommendations on how it could be adjusted to better achieve cohesion objectives. Please also note that the study is available online on the website of the Regi Committee, and a few copies can also be found at the entrance of the meeting room. And who will present the study now is Ms.
Eulalia Rubio. Welcome to the meeting. Ms. Rubio is a senior research fellow at the Jacques D'Lore Institute in Paris, as well as an associate senior research fellow at the Center for European Policy Studies in Brussels. So after your presentation, we still can have an exchange of views.
Speaker 9
Thank you very much. So as you have already, the chair has already said, this is a study that basically what we try to do, it has been requested, is to decrypt a bit the next MFF proposal and particularly the NRPP proposal and how it reshapes EU support to cohesion policy and regional development, and on the basis of this, to formulate policy recommendations on how to strengthen the proposal to make it more effective for delivering cohesion policy objectives. Let me explain to you a bit before going into the content, the methodology we have followed for that. As you might already well know, the MFF or the NRPP proposal significantly changed the way of planning and implementing EU funds under shared management. So the first task we had was to clearly map the elements of continuity and elements of change with respect to the current legislative framework.
So if you see the study, you will see that the first chapter is basically descriptive, and we try to clarify what changed and what remains, the elements relevant for the conduct of the collision policy. And on the basis of that, and on the basis of our own assessment, but also the assessment of other experts we have interviewed, we explore the implications that this might have for the planification and implementation of collision policy. So how do we proceed in practice is, again, if you look into the tail into the first chapter, you will see that we don't do article by article comparison. We try to compare the two legislative frameworks on thematic blocks. And to assess and to formulate our recommendations, we follow or we concentrate on these six thematic blocks.
Then we ask ourselves what will be the impact as regards the union capacity to achieve cohesion goals. We also look at governance, and particularly the implications for regional authorities. We look also at the implications of following a more integrated and flexible programming, particularly the fact that we are going to program together CAP and cohesion funds in these single plans. We look also at the implications of the financial management rules and the shift from a cost base to a performance-based approach. And then we also look at synergies with the European Competitiveness Fund, and the role of the European Parliament.
So if I go to the first thematic block, as I say, it is about the capacity to achieve operational objectives with these new plans. Our assessment can be summarized in these three bullet points. Maybe the first one and the most important one, I would say, is that according to our assessment, the NRPP proposal lacks a clear intervention logic on how to promote cohesion. The cohesion is one of the five general objectives of the plan, of the FAN, but it is not clear how this translates into the 28 specific objectives that are supposed to be the objectives to promote the general objectives. And if you look into the formulation of these objectives, many of them are formulated in pure sectoral terms.
And combining with the lack of strong thematic or marking rules, you reached the conclusion, at least we have reached the conclusion that the underlying assumption in the proposal is that cohesion will materialize in two ways: first, because you'll reinvest some resources for less developed regions, and second, because you will guarantee a relatively balanced distribution of funds across the national territory. And we believe this might not be enough to make sure that plans are cohesion-friendly, actually. The second point is the place-based approach, which is today quite central, a central feature in the legislative framework. It becomes, it has already been set for smart specialization strategy, quite of optional approach. And the third point is more positive because I said two, let's say, critical things, but at the same time, we also recognize or we acknowledge that the integrated plans can also seize opportunities to do things better, actually, and to support more coherent territorial responses and also to address some cohesion challenges that are badly addressed with today's cohesion policy.
For instance, the divide between rural and urban, the agglomeration effects, in capital, in capital capitals in certain member states. So for certain types of cohesion challenges that are very important, maybe the national plans can be helpful. So, what are our recommendations? Slow down. Yeah.
It's always the same. Sorry. I will try to go slower. What are our recommendations for this first thematic block? Well, we think that there's a need to clarify the intervention logic behind the plans and reformulate the objectives accordingly.
We also think that it would be good to put some safeguards to prevent the plans to have negative collision effects. And we mentioned two of them. One would be to give the commission the possibility to issue country specific cohesion recommendations, which will be a bit like the CAP recommendations. That means not inside the European semester, something that the commission unilaterally would formulate, and the member states would have to take into account to formulate, to prepare the plans. And second, we think that the plans should be subject to a territorial impact assessment to make sure that in the long term, they will have positive cohesion effects or if there are some interventions that are negative in terms of territorial consequences that either these are very much important interventions that for the net benefits justify to be there, or they are compensated, the negative territorial effects, with national funds.
And last point, we believe that it would be good to clarify the notion of right to state that it is one of the specific objectives of the plans. If we go to the governance, what is our assessment of the governance on the plans? I would say or we would say that, actually, the role of regional governments remains largely at member states' discretion, but it must be said that this is the same today, actually. Member states are quite free today to decide if they put regional cohesion programs at the regional level, at the national level, and how much responsibility they give to regional authorities in the planning of today's cohesion funds. However, we know or we assess or we deduct that because there will be integrated plans, and due to the lack of strict regional earmarking, this will necessarily lead to greater centralization.
We also acknowledge that some degree of centralization, of more centralization than today, can be beneficial, and I would say even necessary if you have integrated plans to ensure the coherence of the plans. But what we think is important is that you need to respect the division of legal competence if you want the plans to be well planned and well implemented, and also to ensure an appropriate chain of accountability. In this respect, our recommendations for the governance are three. The first is to add a legal check to the regional check. A legal check would mean that on top of asking member states to explain in the regional check how they have involved and consult regional authorities in the preparation of the plan, member states should also explain and justify that the distribution of tasks in the implementation of the planning and implementation of the national plans respects the legal division of competence, meaning that if in a sector, the regions have legal competence to act, they should be involved in the planning of measures.
Second point is that in some specific cases, and particularly in areas of exclusive regional competence, we believe that it's inevitable to have region-specific milestones and targets. This is essential to ensure an appropriate accountability chain. But because if you define national aggregate milestones in these areas, they will reflect the aggregate effort of separate entities that are implementing these measures. And therefore, you risk punishing, for instance, regions that are doing things well for the lack of effort by the other regions. So in these areas, if you want to have an appropriate chain of accountability, you need to go down to the regional level to define the milestones and targets.
And third point, you also need to ensure predictability in payments to regions. We believe that it is normal that in national plans, the demand, the payment requests, have to be centralized. And it's good also because this gives you a bit of flexibility to pass the milestones and targets according to the implementation progress they are doing. So you it's good to have this flexibility, but you need to make sure that regions have some predictability that when they implement milestones, they receive at the rhythm of they implement the milestone, they receive the payments. And for this to happen, what we propose is that milestones and targets be included in payment requests following a strict chronological order of the time of fulfillment.
With respect to the more integrated and flexible programming, our assessment is that integrated programming can offer opportunities, in some cases, to reduce existing overlaps and fragmentations, particularly between cohesion and CAP pillar two interventions, rural development, but this will not happen spontaneously. And there is a risk that synergies do not materialize. And particularly, we highlight the risk of cap-related investments crowding up, cohesion investments in some cases. We also believe that the 10% rural target risk is also being absorbed by cap related interventions, and also highlight that it will be difficult to monitor. It is difficult to classify investments according to the territorial dimension.
And third, we also raised concerns about the risk of using the midterm review reserve before the time to mobilize it in advance. We highlight the fact that this has already been proposed by president Mondherlein in response to the Mercosur, but we also realize or detect that, actually, in the legal provisions of the midterm review, there is this possibility, also open possibility, to mobilize it again early on time for justified unexceptional circumstances. So what are our recommendations on that is the first is to replace the 10% rural target, with a 10% earmarking to support integrated local development strategies. We believe that it's better to give member states the discretion to distribute this 10% between different local realities. And we also believe it is much easier to earn mark, local strategist, territorial instruments than actions according to the territorial dimension or where impact takes place.
We also believe that it's important to exclude non ring-fenced cap interventions or cap spending, and also common fisheries policy spending, from the ring-fenced funding for less developed regions. We think that it's important to make sure that this ring fence for less developed regions is exclusively used to help them develop for long-term cohesion-related interventions. And we also believe that it's good to prevent early access to the midterm review. So we recommend to delete this possibility to access the reserve before time. As regards the shift to performance-based delivery mode, we have already heard about this in the previous intervention.
I think this is something that is already said by many people, including the ECA in their report. We believe that the performance-based approach proposed for the national plans is an improvement with respect to the RRF approach. But the simplification gains, we also believe that they might be overestimated. And basically, they might be overestimated for three reasons. The first is that the shift will imply a shift in the way of delivering EU funds of a very large chunk of money.
So it's not only LRF, it's all EU funds, or practically all EU funds under shared management, and that will imply a need for a structural change for public sector workforce and for procedures. So it's an important change for the public administrations. And that's why we refer to adjustment cost. The adjustment cost will be important, particularly for weaker administrations. But also, two other issues that are important or they might complicate things is that the definition of payout values that have to be attached to each milestone and targets.
We believe it will be difficult to be done without guidance. And also, the lack of clarity on the audit approach can complicate things and can make member states prone to continue to apply and to collect extensive data on costs to avoid potential audits on the use of funds. And last but not least, the performance-based approach can be complicated, difficult to apply to certain types of interventions such as innovative operations. So our recommendations on that, we believe that it's important to provide guidance and strong technical assistance for weaker administrations, also to provide guidance on how to apply simplified cost options to all the administrations. And secondly, we believe it is important to create a methodological handbook for payout values.
This is something that the ECA report also raised concerns on, that the need to have some kind of harmonization in the way of estimating these payout values that have to accompany all milestones and targets. Otherwise, each member state will provide a different way of estimating these payout values, and that can create a lot of heterogeneity. And this is particularly important for measures reforms that do not have a direct budgetary cost. So it's very, you can potentially imagine very different ways of estimating these payout values. And third recommendation, we believe that there should be an effort to adopt milestones for innovative or risky projects.
So I'm already a bit out of time. Let me speed up a bit. Okay. So the fifth point is synergies with the European Competitiveness Fund. Here, our assessment is that, well, it is repeatedly said that the steering mechanism will serve to coordinate different uses of the EU budget in different programs.
It has been already said also by the commission that the steering committee, the steering mechanism, the first year of the NRPP will be also important to guide the national plans, but we believe that the steering mechanism is mainly for the annual budget to coordinate decisions on annual budget, and it will have, nevertheless, limited influence on national plans. So we cannot believe that because we have now this steering mechanism, the national plans will be better coordinated to other types of EU funds managed at the EU level. Second, if we look at the existing synergy mechanism within the regulation, there are some mechanisms to try to coordinate better the use of EU funds, the European Competitiveness Fund, Horizon Europe, and national plans. But basically, this steering synergy mechanism served two purposes. First, to ensure EU financing for excellence projects through the use of SEALs as of today.
And second, basically, to reduce the administrative burden for member states through transfers. So why? Through transfers, member states can delegate implementing tasks to the EU level. But it remains this tension that has been already mentioned in the previous session between ECF that will try to promote competitiveness based on scale and therefore, can create agglomeration effects and national plans whose task will be to promote territorially balanced development. What are our recommendations on that?
We do two recommendations here. The first is to make more explicit that the EU facility shall be used to mitigate the potential negative territorial effects of the ECF. And by this, we also add that for us, the ECF should be clearly guided by excellence criteria. Otherwise, you will not have the capacity to have a strategic and an impactful effect. But we also have to acknowledge at the EU level that there might be negative territorial effects if there is this agglomeration.
And for us, the perfect instrument to try to deal with these negative, potentially negative effects, is the EU facility, not the national plans. The national plans can be more or less aligned, but by their nature, they will never be capable of mitigating these effects. So we propose in the study, you will see some slight amendments to the EU facility so that it is more clearly understood that it also has to take this role. And we also believe that, as it has been said before also, different types of instruments that exist today are still important, even if they have not maybe given the right results, and they can be improved in the way of implementing them. The international innovative investment projects and smartest resolution strategies are in the national plan regulation, but we believe that they could be further promoted in this regulation.
So I arrive at the last package of assessment and recommendations is the role of you of the European Parliament. So here, we say basically three main things. The first that we acknowledge that the national NRPP proposal and the NF the MFF proposal will offer potential benefits in terms of transparency, not so much because of the national proposal, but because of the creation of this single gateway, in which all data will be collected in a harmonized way that will, in principle, facilitate the monitoring or the visibility of what we are financing through the EU budget. But we also see risks on the European Parliament capacity to exert effective scrutiny. And we see two things in this respect.
I mean, there will be only one implementation report from the commission after four years of the implementation of the plans. And then the fact of having access to the single gateway, it's good, but that only gives you information about fulfilled milestones and targets. But you don't have the information of why some milestones and targets have been fulfilled already, why others are not being fulfilled, there are some obstacles, and you don't have more information about what is the real impact on the ground. We also see a problem with the weaknesses in the parliament's role in deciding on the use of the facility, which is unclear. So what we propose in this respect, we think we propose to have more frequent commission reporting.
So instead of one implementation report in four years, maybe biannual implementation reports, and also to allow the parliament to access annual review meeting reports to scrutinize better real performance in the implementation of the plans. Just to remind you that these annual review meetings reports, there will be annual review meetings organized between the commission and the managing authorities at the national level, and there will be reports of this meeting. So we believe that the parliament should have access to this report on request, on demand, of course, to scrutinize what is happening. Second, we also propose to give the European Parliament, the council, more time to revise delegated acts. Today, in the common provision regulations, the time to revise delegated acts is two months.
In the new national plans regulation, it is shortened to one month, and we do not see the reason why it is, we need to give it less time. And, finally, we also recommend make some recommendations to ensure more parliament involvement in the mobilization of the EU facility. Basically, we ask the commission to say very explicitly from the beginning in the steering mechanism preceding the annual budgetary procedure, to say explicitly how she intends to use the EU facility. So I stop here. Thank you very much.
There was a last slide with the conclusions, but, basically, the conclusions, I can summarize it saying that the national plans can create risks for but can also say create opportunities. And what we try to do is to mitigate this risk and to help seize these opportunities to make it more effective for equation policy. Thank you very much.
Speaker 1
Thank you very much. Very interesting and very useful statements and findings from your side. Now I would like to give the floor to the honorable members. First, to Ms. Sabrina Repp from the S and D group.
Speaker 10
Thank you very much indeed for the presentation. I thought what you said at the end was nice. If you've got poor design, then you end up with a problem with national and regional plans. And I think that description really fits. And that's why we're here discussing ways to strengthen the national and regional plans, and that's what we're doing as rapporteurs and shadow rapporteurs.
So let me just comment on a couple of things that you mentioned. We want to see the NRPP as sort of an umbrella regulation, and that we still then keep the individual funds underneath that layer, and that we can sort of dock into those individual funds and their structures. So I think that would give us clear earmarking, ring-fencing, and more predictability. I think the movable target is you mentioned the local development strategies that you're suggesting we use. I think would be a good measure. Yet at the same time, we see that we've got the 10% target if we look at the RDF that's tagged on to farming.
If you look at that, we've got less than we should have for the rural target. So the rural target is something that we want to defend. We want more funds for rural areas, more than the 10% figure that we are hearing. You also mentioned the risk at the point of the midterm review, and that there may be transfers. When it comes to the n plus 10 months, we've got a challenge when it comes to the speed.
It's not actually possible to really disperse those funds and use them within the allotted time. So I fully support what you said. If we're going to have a midterm review, that's a good thing, but it shouldn't be used to move funds away from things. We need some security and some guarantees. And when we're looking, for example, at transfers away from agriculture to other policy, if you've got the regional plans that have direct payments for farmers on the one hand, at the same time, the large share of that's not actually locked is in the cohesion fund area.
So we've got the rural target that's going to be within the cohesion area, and that's going to be opened up. So I'm not trying to suggest we should be pitting farmers against regional policy, but we shouldn't allow that to happen. So I wonder if you can comment on this. How much do we need for the rural areas in terms of as part of a local development strategy? How can we guarantee more predictability so that we can have some transfers into individual policy areas?
And finally, what are the latest developments when it comes to cohesion and the CAP, which are brought together in the NRP, but we're seeing that it's really being transformed. We can't have the changes that are being suggested at the political level for the regional policy.
Speaker 1
Thank you, Miss Repp. Next one on the list of speakers is Mister Muloli from the Renew Group. Please, you have the floor.
Ciaran Mullooly
Thank you, chair, and thank you to the author of this report and the team behind this piece of work. You have answered many questions for me already. And regrettably, then you have created another set of questions arising from those answers. It is extremely difficult to join up the writing with regard to the proposal. It is extremely difficult, not just for me as a member of the parliament, but for the people who were accustomed to the four previous schemes of cohesion.
Three of them still found someplace, one of them gone, disappeared. And, you know, when your conclusion is quite an indictment when it says that the NRPP proposal lacks a clear intervention logic for promoting cohesion. I mean, I agree. I just cannot see any other way, but it will become some type of a slush fund by member states that they will take the funding for agriculture, align it to that specific area, and then see what is left that they have to speak to. And the person who shouts the loudest at the back or at the front of the class will do best.
I because I cannot see any criteria left. You point out very clearly that, you know, the place-based approach is no longer there. You know, you're asking for clarification on the issue of the right to stay, the freedom to stay. What's meaningless in the way the parameters are set up at the moment. It is extremely disappointing.
And, you know, the role of the parliament here is critical. The role of this committee is critical. We have to get to grips with this structure and the proposed structure. Because when I meet people, they ask me where the funds are going? Who will decide in the future?
Is it the government of the member state? Is it your parliament? Is it your committee? And in one specific area, I have a major problem, chair, because I was the author of an initial report on the just transition fund in the parliament so far, and it is gone. It's disappeared.
Although, you give me hope again today when you go back to speak for that clarity about the right to stay, and you tell me that it is there. Article four of the RDF CF regulation pays attention to this broadly listed list of disadvantaged areas. And in there, it's just transition areas. But you point out, it's not defined enough. So we need clarity, particularly in those funds.
People are reliant on them, particularly in the area of a just transition. I hate to labor the point, but I was in Poland. I was all over Europe. I spoke to people. The coal mines don't close until 2047.
That's the last closure. So, you know, we cannot walk away at this point as a committee and say, oh, well, it is not there anymore. The council did not like this idea. It is not something we can change. It's up to the member states to do it.
The member states will not do this, Chair. The member states will use this as a slush fund. They will select their projects, their favorite projects, and they will allocate a switch between member states finance and indeed switch between EU finance. It is not an acceptable way to go forward at all. I'm very grateful to the authors for highlighting the key issues here.
I entirely agree with them in terms of the need to go back and refocus this proposed structure. At the moment, it lacks total clarity, and it is downright unfair to people in the just transition category who've lost their job and were promised support and assistance, and now who knows where it is. Thank you.
Speaker 1
Thank you, Mr. Mulloli. We have one more speaker on the list, Mr. Goncalves from the S and D Group. Please go ahead.
Speaker 12
Thank you, chair. I will also speak Portuguese. Our it was in the morning.
Thank you. I wanted to thank you for presenting this study, which really corroborates some of the implications that we've already discussed in this very committee, regarding the proposal for the next multi-annual financial framework. Now the Commission is presenting this reform primarily as a sort of exercise in simplifying and integrating these instruments. However, the study clearly shows this simplification can come with significant risks. Here, we're talking about decentralisation decisions at the national level, we're talking about competition between policies within the same fund.
Speaker 13
We're also talking about a possible dilution of the objectives of the cohesion policy itself. And I'm, of course, very concerned by this merging. Are we facing a structural change that could reduce the importance of the cohesion policy? Are we gradually abandoning or moving away from the project of the Europe of regions? Because we have heard the commission on a number of occasions state that the regions will continue to be safeguarded or ring-fenced and heard.
However, it remains to me very unclear exactly how this will take place. So based on the analysis of the study, I want to pose two questions. First of all, do you believe, do you consider that this architecture could lead to a progressive marginalization of cohesion policy in relation to other policies? And secondly, concerns specific instruments for the outermost regions. Is there still room to maintain specific instruments for the outermost regions, specific instruments, for example, per se, that currently exist?
The study shows there's a structural change with various of these specific programs removed or deleted from this. Do you think this decision should be reconsidered to preserve these programs without weakening them within the national plans and without making them in their turn dependent on the priorities of national governments? Thank you.
Speaker 1
Thank you very much. Now I give the floor back to Miss Rubio to reflect and answer the questions and remarks.
Speaker 9
Thank you very much. A lot of questions. I will try to organize it. Let me start with the last one or the almost last one. What do you believe if collision policy would be marginalized with the national plans, which also links to the question that has been or the comment of mister Muller about if collision will disappear.
And I think if you go to the study, you will see that when we start the thematic block on the union's capacity to achieve cohesion objectives with the national plans, we start with a long text in which we reflect about what is cohesion actually, what is cohesion policy. Because to ask this question, you have yourself to ask, first of all, what is cushion? And let me play a bit the devil's advocate here. I think cushion is not an instrument. I think cushion is not a problem.
It's not a budgetary instrument. Cushion is an objective. And that's the point, actually. If cushion is an objective, you can reach the objective in different ways. You can reach this objective with funds differently used, differently earmarked.
You can reach this objective also with reforms, actually. So I think we have to be open to thinking in this way. If the objective is cohesion, the first question that I would say you as European Parliament have to pose yourself is this: will it be effective for cohesion, for, as the treaty says, to promote a harmonious development of the union. The question should not be, the people that is benefiting now from the budget, and I will create a lot of enemies now, but the question should not be the people that is benefiting now from the budget will continue to benefit. From an objective position, the question should be, is this a good instrument to achieve cohesion in Europe.
And if we start with this, then we see things differently. We see risks, and it's what we have tried to explain. There are some risks. We also see opportunities because today's cohesion policy does not work perfectly well. It creates, it has created some conversions, but there's also a lot of cohesion challenges that have not been resolved with cohesions today and that are not being resolved.
So I think if we think in terms of objectives, we have a different picture. And linked to this, I will link to the question of the rural targets and the predictability. There is, I think, in many parts of the study, we and when we were doing interviews, actually, and we have also organized an expert, a change to discuss this question, there is a tendency to resolve everything with nerve marking. That's for sure. And I think we need a bit of flexibility.
We need a bit of flexibility because cohesion problems are also different from one country to another. Earmarking seems a good solution, but if you earmark everything, you have no flexibility. So there is a priority that there is a choice to be done. If you are marked for rural, you cannot mark for other local areas that maybe, I mean, you are putting also on as a specific objective housing in these plants. While housing is more in the urban areas than in the rural areas, so then you have also to remark.
You have also today on our marking for urban sustainable strategies. Now they are losing this marking, so they can urban people can tell you why you are marked 10% for rural and not for urban. Then we will have 20%, 10% for rural, 10% for urban, then we will not have any kind of flexibility. So there is a danger of wanting to mark everything. And we have specifically tried to avoid term marking.
We have specifically tried to find different ways of safeguarding this cohesion purpose without term marking. That's the purpose of the territorial impact assessment, for instance. And that's the purpose of the cohesion guidelines or recommendations, that they can be very much adjusted to each country's specific cohesion problems. Earmarking is quite blunt, actually. It's the same percentage for everyone, and it's quite rigid.
So the same for predictability. I think it is important to have some predictability for the regions. But if you look into the Ten National Plans, there is still a bit of predictability. It's not the predictability they have today, but member states will be obliged to put how much money they give to each category of regions at the beginning. So the predictability they will give them, they will know beforehand how much money will be for less developed, well, for less developed, of course, because there will be ring fencing, but also for transitional regions and for more developed regions.
You can then argue if it's enough or it's not enough, but it's not true neither that they do not have any predictability. There will be some predictability. And, there is a trade off. I mean, the more predictability you have, the less flexibility you have. Now I'm trying to defend the national plans, but I think it's important to say the things that are not so bad and, of course, looking at the risk and trying to mitigate risk.
Just two other points on the commitment rule. We did not put any proposal on that. We know that it's a bit challenging, this n plus ten months, the commitment rule. At the same time, we acknowledge that it's not exactly the same type of commitment rule we have today because it is a rule that applies to the totality of the national plan. It does not apply to a program.
And because member states will have flexibility to decide which milestones and targets to put in payment requests. So that gives much more flexibility than today's commitment rules. That's why we were not totally sure. I mean, we acknowledge the challenge. At the same time, if there is more flexibility also in payment request, maybe this compensates the shorter period in terms of the commitment rules.
And on cushion and cap, just last mentioned, cushion, it is we acknowledge the risk, and I have already said the risk that cap eats up, you know, they have much more capacity maybe to convince, to ring fence some parts of the national plants. At the same time, it has to be acknowledged that they are different. CAP is sectoral. It's quite sectoral. Cohesion is cross-sectoral.
And that's also the difficulty to, I mean, reinforcing something for Quezon, a lot of sectoral objectives can have an impact in terms of Quezon. So to me, the best way to preserve cohesion is not necessarily a lot of ring fencing, but making sure that in promoting sectoral goals, you promote it in a cohesion friendly way, let's say, which is a bit different than when you have, like, a policy for a specific sector, which is much more much easier to say, well, this spending is for the agriculture. I stop here.
Speaker 1
Thank you very much. Now I turn to the representative of the Commission, dear Mister Nicolas de Michalis. I think you do not have a very easy job now if you want to react on the comments and questions, at least the major ones. Please go ahead. Thank you.
Speaker 7
Thank you. Thank you, chair. And thanks for this very, very rich, very interesting, and provocative work that I'm confident will inform the parliament in defining his position in this negotiation. Just a few points maybe to explain where the commission proposal comes from. A policy that is often accused of being slow in spending, a policy that, and we heard it in the previous discussion, does not necessarily show a strong link between how the money is spent and the European priorities, a policy that is rigid, in a moment in which we have been confronted with a lot of crises that have required a fast response and the emergence of competing priorities.
Does the commission proposal make a collision more fragile? This is a question that the colleges later will have to answer, and the balance will be found at the end of the negotiation. But let me share with you a few reflections why we think that this is not the case. Cohesion remains at the center of the European budget in the context, indeed, of a much more integrated and delivery model. There has been a lot of discussion on national versus regional, but you said it in your presentation already today, many member states only have national programs.
Because at the end of the day, it's not the regulation that determines whether there will be regional or national programs, are institutional arrangement, the political history of each member state that translate those resources into more or less regional programs or not. And I suspect that this will continue to remain the case also in the next, in the next round. A single plan? Yes. A single plan.
But today, we have a partnership agreement per member state that then is translated into a number of programs. Tomorrow, we will have one national plan that will be translated in sectoral or regional chapters. And the regulation says that some of the authorities, the managing authorities, the certification authorities, so the authorities that manage today the collision policy may be reconducted in the future. So what I'm simply saying is that it's not the regulation that will determine exactly what will be the form of the organization of the programs and the priorities. It will be the tradition, and the institutional arrangements of member states.
There is a worry about earmarking of resources, but as you said, there is an earmarking for less developed regions, and so the redistributive element of the budget is preserved in that way. And so we do think that this system is clearly a change compared to the current system, but a change that is needed to gain in flexibility. And let's not forget that we have spent the past two, three, four years together with the parliament and the co legislator to change collision policy regulation every other day to respond to the last crisis, whether it was COVID, whether it was the refugee crisis, whether it was the energy crisis. So we need more flexibility than it is the case at the moment because the world, whether we like it or not, has indeed changed. Now on the performance, performance is not only a question of simplification.
It's also a question of changing the logic of the way in which the budget is spent. And, frankly, I think that is way more interesting to have a negotiation and a discussion with the member states or a region or where you want to be in ten years' time, what you want to do with the money, rather than discussing earmarking that, indeed, introduce a one size fits all type of logic and checking payment claims. It's gonna be difficult. Of course, it will change. It will require a change both in the commission and the member states in the way we think about priorities and programs and plans, but I think that is more welcomed and is necessary.
And by the way, this is a company, as you know, but a very ambitious framework for data collection and publication that will improve transparency. That transparency that would help this house, this parliament, in its oversight role, in its role as a budgetary authority. And there is interinstitutional agreement has been aligned with the proposal of the next EU budget, strengthening institutional cooperation on the one end and embedding budgetary flexibility. And the steering mechanism aims precisely to strengthen the annual budgetary procedure, reinforce the role of the budgetary authority with a structured dialogue ahead of the commission annual draft budget. So in the end, I think that as the author of the report said, there are risk.
There are opportunities. And I think that we need to concentrate very much on the opportunities that needs that this new framework provides and prepare using the next couple of years to prepare to be sure that at the end, we will have a plan that fully uses those opportunities. Thank you very much, chair.
Speaker 1
Thank you very much, Mr. Director. Thanks to all who have contributed. Thank you again for the study and for the presentation. And, indeed, I can confirm from my side and on behalf of the Reggie Committee that, indeed, we have to focus on the opportunities and continue working together, addressing the risks, of course, and I'm sure that the parliament will work hard on that aspect. So with this, I will conclude now on this agenda item.
We still have AOB, if any of the members would like to raise any issues. If it's not the case, then just please kindly note that there will be an extraordinary Regi Committee meeting on March 25. So it's Wednesday next week at 7 PM in the evening with the presence of Mister Executive Vice President, Fito. And the date of our next regular meeting is on April 14 in the morning and in the afternoon as well. Thanks again to all the participants, and my sincere thanks also to the interpreters.
Have a nice rest of the day.
Speaker 16
Dear colleagues, I think that we can start. Something like one hour before the forcing time. We are lucky because we'll have more time to dedicate to the discussion on the draft compromise proposal on this file. And before all, okay.
We have Martina, of the left, and the king of patriots, connected remotely. And I would like just to remind you the reason why we had to run a little bit on the preparation of this draft. Which are very inclusive, but also a little bit repetitive in some concert, and this was because of the tight deadline given by the elite committee. And, this is why, I actually, there you will find that you found a lot of repetition about you found also most of the amendments covered or not covered, sorry, included in the compromise. And for the rest, I will give some information maybe on there is also one mistake in the compromise, but I will say something on it later on. And if you, I will also give some deadline for written remarks at the end of the meeting.
But then I will give the floor to Cristina Negoiesko, the assistant to Mr. Storza, for introductory remarks.
Speaker 16
I have no introductory remarks rather than let's make this very inclusive and rapid as fast as we can given the title. So if you agree, we can start with the consideration of the compromise on article, and we start with compromise one on article two definitions. I start with the EPP.
Speaker 18
I'll take this opportunity to maybe have one or two introductory remarks myself. But to, let's say, spare you any long speeches, I just say that we're aware that our group has tabled quite a lot of amendments. On quite a lot of issues. And whatever it's warranted, we will have remarks. But in our view, in general, the compromise amendments are well drafted.
And specifically on Compromise one, I'm just double checking our final side notes on this. I don't think we have any remarks at this stage. For us, it is acceptable.
Yes. We are aware that many of the things here are complex and long-winded. Thank you. Raza? Yes.
Speaker 20
Thank you for this flexibility to have it earlier because we are all rushing home at a certain point in time now.
I have some remarks. We have some remarks. First of all, I would like to start with point one. I think we should maybe say such as to me, it's very weak, very weak words, which equipment, which equipment capabilities, which capabilities, collections of what data, infrastructure, what is this? So that's my first remark.
Then I wonder if academia doesn't cover the university alliances. Clusters of what? This is in point six. Then in the new added part, I think we need an a, but that's somewhere, but that's not so important.
A problem with regional and local universities. Because I went online to ask the intelligent ones, and they explained that the regional university, I'm not talking about local event. A regional university, unlike a national research university, typically offers a full range of undergraduate degrees and some master programs.
And we talk here about research about even postdoctoral. So if I understand that the wish is to involve also another main universities or known universities, whatever, also universities which have lesser reach.
In our amendment, I think, there was the way to say it why universities with regional dimension or local dimension, if you want? I don't know. This was our try trial to somehow accommodate this idea of a regional university, which is actually or local university, even not we consider not to be a right word here. So this was to the new added six a then, okay.
Let's put it in the urban ecosystems, universities, and organizations. I mean, to me, it's worth, which I don't know if you cannot somehow make them more, you know, not there in the principle, they are repeating itself, including local, regional, sort of public service providers, universities, research organizations, and so on. I mean, they repeat themselves.
And I forgot in six b new, next to regional level, I think we always spoke very often about the local level, also as authorities and also about local innovative ecosystems. So I think the local level maybe should be also added.
Then, to point 11, access to the background is subject to identification by written agreement.
By whom? Then.
I understood that seal of competitiveness will be replaced by seal of excellence, or is it that's my right understanding? Don't know if it's really what we need. Maybe it could be additional, but not, I don't know.
Because everywhere in the text, saw this was a replay, a replacement, and I don't know if that needs to be somehow clarified. Thank you. That would be so much for compromise one.
Thank you.
Colleen.
Speaker 22
Kinga, do you have comments on compromise one? King. I'm sorry, but we cannot hear you. And if you agree, I will give a deadline in the end of the meeting, giving a deadline for committing in writing if you agree. And if you cannot communicate, we can proceed in writing.
A few on this.
Speaker 23
I just don't know who is taking, is there someone taking the notes? Or oh, okay. No. I just thought because it was going to be taken up on screen, but it doesn't make a difference. Okay.
So thank you first to Roberto and the Raptors team for a very inclusive approach and, of course, the tight timeline and even tried to speak to her own colleagues in Horizon, but covering Horizon in a tray. And, yeah, the rapture is just not moving.
So can we do? So just on point one, the word infrastructures after data, I don't think it's necessary because we talk about research infrastructures. Infrastructures and then list them, and we talk about archive data. So I think the word infrastructures is not necessary. It's just duplication.
Down in par point six, while we had quite an extensive amendment 161, a definition of university alliances, we can accept the raptors proposal to include it as is here.
In six a, mu, with the same point as the S and D made concerning regional local universities. Don't think that that's necessary, but maybe the wording that Raza had proposed and local dynamic or something you said could with the No.
A context or a dimension.
Dimension. Yeah. That could be more acceptable rather than focusing on regional local universities. Just a couple of lines above that, the word own, so innovation, own strengths. I don't think the word own makes any sense there.
I just don't think it's necessary. Maybe it could be struck out. Innovation strengths are good. As is just a question on c. The amendment comes from the Greens, I think.
Yeah. The word anchored, I understand where you're coming from. I don't know. Can we go maybe territorially linked? And the word anchor, it is used two or three times.
I think it's the same, the shadow amendments. Just a proposal maybe to consider the word linked instead of anchored, but it's something small. In number seven, I think it's EPP 154.
Some of this edition don't really see necessary that open access means the practice of granting universal and online access. Just means online access should mean that. So maybe open access means online access free of charge to results and research findings for the end user and end it there, because ensuring that both producers and end users can pursue in the system without barriers to access, that open access covers that.
So the second part of the amendment really seems redundant and repetitive. So it could just end after, as I said, and research findings for the end user. In number 11, the same question with Raza.
I really don't understand the second part, this addition of this amendment. Access to background is subject to identification by a written agreement. We don't agree to the inclusion, it seems completely yeah. It doesn't make sense. It is not necessary.
And the next one, number 12, it's marked as 157, but the amendment is 156.
Sorry.
Speaker 23
Sorry. Which part? The whole amendment, the access to background is subject to identification by written agreement, and I think rather by whom and whose sets the criteria and who makes the call. It's just it doesn't have any yeah, link whatsoever.
So just back on number 12, as I said, it's amendment 156, not 157, I think.
Yeah.
Speaker 23
Have the same we've major issue with this seal of excellence amendment 159. We do not agree at all to include this, and it's incorporated in a few places throughout the paragraphs or the articles and the recitals.
We have the competitiveness seal, and we should stick to that and not create one, in our opinion, just for the sake of it. So we would not include this amendment or maybe we somehow expand further on the seal of competitiveness, but it should be linked with the competitiveness fund for renew, that's yeah. We should say, yeah.
What do I have? Competitive as per art eight of this re regulation, and then it which links it back to the European Competitiveness Fund regulation? And that's it for now.
Thank you.
Let's have everyone first.
Speaker 27
You for the floor, and thanks to the operator for preparing this first draft and also to be, of course, inclusive. Toward the group's proposals. No substantial comments indeed on the first compromise amendment.
I mean, it's easier to be, of course, fifth in the line, and then colleagues have already said a lot. First, what may be a certain worry for us would be that, here, we would maybe like to see also our definition included in the human rights clause.
That comes from the amendment, I can tell you exactly. So. Definition of the human rights clause. Then indeed, amendment 157, it stated that it is that it will fall. Although it's checked there as standing.
And, actually, this is the definition of nonprofit. So this would, I mean, if the operator can consider this to be included from our side. Then let me check. So here also, we would have a question regarding the addition of the paragraph 22a on the seal of excellence.
Well, if we understand there is a seal of excellence within the horizon, that is, given to the projects that received a certain okay. That's changed from the previous.
Yeah.
Speaker 27
Because this one actually was intended to be given only to the project who would receive a certain number of points. That passes the threshold, but there would be no funding anymore. And then they would be eligible to be funded under the ERDF.
For instance.
Yeah.
Speaker 27
This is why I want to have a clarification, because competitiveness is a bit something different. Okay. Okay. And then, sorry. My son is going on the screen.
So yeah, for this compromise, that's it. Yeah.
Speaker 16
Sorry? Martin, if you have comments, you can send a message maybe. If I can, we cannot hear you.
Speaker 27
So. Just to say, so this was our amendment 158 on the human rights laws.
Could you say something, please? Maybe we solve the problem.
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