Committee on Security and Defence Ordinary meeting
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SEDE European Parliament
Follow its sittingsMadam President.
You are
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
Mister Brown. Mister Brown, it's not your moment now. You sorry. We have now 10 twenty, and there are many colleagues who have questions. Not only you, Mr. Brown.
And so, thank you very much. It's everything. It's possible. I tell you I'm the chair and not you. So I close this, and thank you very much for all the experts.
Bye.
Okay?
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
So, colleagues, take a seat. We continue. The good message is we are a democracy. So please, colleagues, mister Brown, bye. So let us continue.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
Yeah. Be relaxed. I suggest cool down. Okay. So dear colleagues, hi.
Good to see you. You see, this is a defense committee. Sometimes there.
are It's
My pleasure. So.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
Dear colleagues, please take a seat. We will continue our focus on Ukraine, but from a different angle in you can we learn from Ukraine to build Europe's strategic defense readiness and lessons for the EU new defense instruments. This is a follow-up to our recent mission to Kyiv, where we had the opportunity to learn from Ukraine's Western experience and innovation in adapting its defense industry in response to operational realities. During our visit, we had the opportunity to meet some of the experts present today. So I have the pleasure to welcome Hannah Hrobkow, Co-Founder of the International Center for Ukraine Victory and Chairwoman of the National Interest Advocacy Networks, ANTS, Maria Kuzerenko from the Comeback Alive Foundation, and Olena Halushka, cofounder of the International Center of Ukraine Victory, who will intervene remotely.
I will immediately give them the floor, starting with Sana Robka. You have the floor for 8 minutes. And thank you very much that you are here. And, please, the floor is yours.
Speaker 8
Dear madam president and honorable members of the European parliament, let me express my gratitude for organizing this panel and also for your recent visit to Kyiv. This is crucially important that you are in the capital of the most influential capital in the world with the new technologies, seeing this and the spirit of our people. So in January 2025, during the inaugural meeting of the SADA committee, I presented a paper titled Countering the Access of Evil Warfare Alliance, Lessons from Ukraine and Challenges for European Security. Even then, we warned that the nature of warfare was changing rapidly. Today, we see this transformation clearly in the Middle East, swarms of drones, Shahid-type attacks against critical energy infrastructure, and the widespread use of low-cost but highly effective technologies increasingly supported by Russia and China.
If you want peace, you might say prepare for war. If you want peace, Russia must be defeated. Because after twelve years of the largest war in the European continent, the crime of genocide which Russia is committing against us is an attack on humanity. It demands a comprehensive international response to defeat Russia, restore international law, and hold perpetrators accountable. So today, we present two new papers.
First, it's the Russian war in Europe as a global laboratory of modern warfare. And second, stronger Europe, united front, where we are discussing the AI technologies in the battlefield, and my colleague, Olena, will present it. But let me start by describing the new paradigm. Every major integration project in Europe's history has its own raw material. After 1945, that raw material was coal and steel.
They defined power in that war. The founding fathers of European integration understood this and built the architecture of peace around them. Today, the raw material is different. It's algorithm, it's drones, and above all, it's the feedback loop between prototype and the battlefield. Whoever controls this loop will shape the next generation of security.
Right now, the loop exists in Ukraine, not in the Pentagon, not in Brussels, in Ukraine. Ukraine has become a global leader in the use of AI on the battlefield and the first country in the world to scale up both the production and combat deployment of ground-based robots. Twenty years ago, Europe watched the birth of the digital economy and believed it could catch up through regulations. Today, it regulates platforms it did not create. The same mistake must not be repeated in defense technology, and the window to act is far narrower.
Our authoritarian systems pose one advantage over democracies, speed of decision making. The only effective response is not simply more resources, but a shorter learning cycle. Ukraine already lives inside this circle. Every twenty-four hours, the frontline provides feedback that no testing group can replicate. Ukrainian resilience has become a convenient phrase in Europe.
It allows admiration for Ukraine without requiring Europe itself to change. As madam president of the European Commission mentioned during the Munich Security Conference, repeating Ukrainians change or die. But resilience only holds the line. Integration wins the war. Worse, if a Ukrainian company can sell defense technology faster to the Middle East or the Gulf than to the European Union, that is not Ukraine's problem.
It's a structural problem in Europe. An engineer in Kyiv who has spent three years testing technologies in real combat will not wait for lengthy tender procedures. He will go where the decisions are made quickly. And with him will go knowledge that no simulation can reproduce. Rethinking Europe's security frontier.
Europe still thinks is the follow in the following terms. There is the European Union, and there is Ukraine, a partner with which it could cooperate in defense. Even the boldest proposals, safe, EDIP, and or build with Ukraine, remain within this logic: partner, neighbor, or other. But reality has already changed. The eastern border of European security does not run along the Polish-Ukrainian border.
It runs along the Dnipro in the south and the steppes of Donetsk in the east. And it has been there for 12 years whether Brussels formally acknowledges it or not. The paradigm, therefore, cannot be integrating Ukraine into the European defense mechanism. The paradigm is this. The frontier already exists.
Europe simply does not yet control it. This raises a fundamentally different question for this chamber. Not how much we are willing to invest in a partner, but rather how long will Europe manage its own security frontier through an intermediary. No serious state and no civilization allies alliance builds its defense architecture by delegating control over its own frontier to another country while calling it support. It's either integration or it's an illusion of security.
Europe increasingly fears the unpredictability of The United States. Excessive dependence on a single ally for critical capabilities, air defense systems, drones, electronic warfare creates strategic vulnerability. If that ally's priorities change, Europe's security architecture could face severe disruptions. Your Europe's agency independence remains a political aspiration, but it must become an operational reality. Do not wait for ruins.
After the World War, after the Second World War, devastation pushed Europe towards integration. From those ruins emerged the coal and steel community, a project that made a new war between European countries structurally impossible. But integration born from ruins is the most expensive form of integration. Do not wait for the new runes. Instead, build a new union capable of victory in the technological age of warfare, and do not be afraid to win.
Most of the demons that paralyze decision making exist only in our minds. On the battlefield, there is only cold calculation, technology, and the speed of decision making. The strategic value of Russia defeat, defeat of Russian imperialists. The defeat of Russia would not merely redraw borders. It would fundamentally change the calculation of every authoritarian regime currently considering aggression against its neighbors. The exhaustion of Russian military potential will fundamentally change NATO's threat calculation for the next decade.
This is not only a moral victory. It's a budget savings for every defense ministry in the alliance. So it's really important to understand that the world today, the world is watching the force against a sovereign member of international system. If the answer becomes yes, security costs will raise everywhere on the planet. They already have.
But we are still far from the limit for business, for supply chain, for insurance markets, and for global stability. Russia's defeat will not magically restore international law, but it will restore something equally important: predictability. And predictability in the global system always has a price. So Europe must learn from Ukraine in order to strengthen its own strategic readiness. And in these papers, we explain all the warfare, how it's moved faster than a traditional defense system.
But my request to you is keep sanctioning Russia, and we do expect the twentieth package. And the next one will be a hellish one to help to collapse the Russian war machine, confiscation of Russian sovereign assets. We started the campaign Make Russia Pay, and it has to continue. And, also, recognition of Russian aggression as a genocidal war against Ukraine as a war in Europe. And, also, it's important to see Ukraine as a part of the new ecosystem, not just a partner who brings new solutions in modern warfare.
Thank you for your attention, and thank you for inviting.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
Thank you. Thank you very much, Hannah. And the next will be Maria Kolchenko.
Speaker 10
Thank you. Thank you so much. Thank you, madam president, dear madam president, honorable members of the European Parliament. One of the main lessons that can be learned from the Ukrainian experience is the principle that should be unshakable for security as such and European security: to call a spade a spade. It is a wrong diagnosis that often prevents us from the right treatment.
Speaker 9
The fact that Ukraine spent the first eight years of the war proving that this was not a smoldering conflict with separatists, but an operation of the Russian armored forces under a false flag, which, however, did not exclude the participation of regular Russian armed forces in its pure form. In fact, led us to an even greater scale of aggression and ultimately to the catastrophe of 2022. We argued in the trilateral contact group in Minsk, in the Normandy format, that this was precisely the aggression of the Russian Federation. But Russia stubbornly tried to pretend that it did not concern it in any other way than as a mediator. And this is exactly what the Russian Federation is doing here in Europe.
Right now, when the Russian Federation is using the avatar of the Wagner Group to further conceal the true role of the general staff of the Russian armed forces in the classic sabotage against the countries of the European Union. It is beneficial for Russia to call this activity either the activities of the Wagner Group or the Afrika Korps, although, in reality, the Afrika Korps is simply a rebranding of the name of the Wagner Group. And the Wagner Group is a structure directly subordinate to the General Staff of the Russian armed forces. So if we replace the wording Wagner basis with the basis incentives of activity of the general staff of the Russian Armed Forces, then a completely disappointing picture emerges of how far the Russian Federation has actually gone in its attempts to test NATO as an alliance for reaction. Because in this case, we are not talking about private players.
And according to Russian law, any PMCs are impossible in principle. This discussion has been going on inside the Russian Federation for quite some time, but it does not lead to legislative changes nor does it lead to the elimination of the article of the criminal court for mercenary activity. We are talking about regular units of the Russian military intelligence, which in fact means sabotage work of an enemy state on the territory of Europe on an ongoing basis. Russia has mastered the technique of public distancing from the nature of its own aggressive actions. When this technique does not work, Russia resorts to another technique that it loves, externalizing the concept of security as such.
This is try to present an attempt and at its own aggression as only self defense or defense of its own interests, which were violated one way or another. This is exactly how Russia's initial armed aggression against Ukraine and Crimea was explained. Supposedly, the residents of Crimea and Sevastopol needed to be protected from the alleged anti-constitutional coup. This is exactly how the ultimatums of the Russian foreign ministry were put forward in 2021, but already addressed to Ukrainians, European partners, and NATO as an alliance with demands to return to their borders of 1997, because NATO expansion allegedly prevents Russia from feeling safe. Now sabotage actions against Europe are explained in a similar way.
They say that Europe assistance to Ukraine poses a threat to Russia, and therefore, it considers itself entitled to violate European security. However, such distortions of reality cannot be categorically allowed even in a negotiations format at the level of public rhetorics. Acts of aggression by the Russian Federation cannot be bought off by externalizing security. Another important lesson from Ukraine to Europe is that Russia's war against Ukraine is not only and not so much tanks and not direct combat operations as such. In 2014, Europe and the world were confused by a banal operation under a false flag in the form of little green men in Crimea.
And, Russia did not let the world recover from the first shock and intensified on a pseudo legalistic approach. Supposedly, it was about some kind of expression of will, the right of people to self-determination, and referendums. However, no legalistic explanations by Putin could and cannot dominate international law. Also, it was precisely this approach that was finally enshrined by Russia with the so-called constitutional reform of 2020. It is precisely on such confusion that Russia can, will, and be betting, that if aggression against Europe is dressed not in camouflage but in gray clothes.
What if we are talking about another pseudo republic under the pretext of protecting this or that ethnic minority, for example, on the eastern borders of Europe? Shooting up an artificial rally of this or that minority by representatives of the Russian special services is much cheaper than a full-fledged military operation. Then, consequences will be fatal. Loss of control due to confusions, discrediting NATO as a defense alliance, which in any case will spend a significant amount of time on reaction. And this is just one example.
This could also be attempts to repeat the famous march on Slatina, but now along the European route. In 1999, this was also an attempt to mask its activities literally by repainting four armed personnel carriers SK4. It was then that deputy minister of defense of the Russian Federation, Yunusbet Yevkurov, gained his authority and a kind of fame in the eyes of the world's military intelligence. And it is Yevkurov who is now overseas the activities of another instrument of the Russian Federation, which is designed to reformat the world order in a way that is beneficial to Russia, the Africa Corps. And this instrument, in turn, points to another lesson from Ukraine.
War is war, is global. This was proven by both the food crisis of 2022 and the challenges to maritime security created by this stage of the war. And there are no separate actions by Russia in Ukraine, in the Middle East, in North Africa, or on land and at sea. There is a comprehensive approach that Russia uses. Due to a project projection of the force, Russia also receives political opportunities to enter a particular region.
After all, when it comes to the Africa core, it is not only and not so much about fighters on the ground, but about the work of political consultants, media workers, diplomats, and their joint efforts. The most dangerous enemy on the Russian side does not necessarily have to be in uniform. Sometimes it is the military advisers who can wear both uniform and suits as Suravikin is currently dying doing in Algeria, moving between Algeria and Libya, but not limited to these countries. Often, it's a well trained person in civilian clothes who establishes connections, sells the services of people in uniform, and ensures the desired results for Russia in international platforms, for instance, in the UN. Often, these are people who manually organize migration crisis with the help of the refugees from Libya.
Sometimes there's a specialist who wins elections for pro-Russian candidates and so on. Sometimes there are Rosatom specialists who start Trojan horses in the form of energy projects, after which, one way or another, representatives of the Russian intelligence service enter the countries in the medium term. Sometimes it is Nikolay Patrushev himself who now has the monstrous structure called the Maritime Board of the Russian Federation. It unites the activities of the Russian special service among all ministries and the heads of the maritime regions of the Russian Federation. And, actually, it is Patrushev and president Putin himself who are responsible for these activities of the shuttle fleet, which is used not only to avoid sanctions against energy carriers, but also as a platform for future technical intelligence.
And it is these people who will try to impose their KGB vision of the future of the Arctic on the world. One way or another, war has many dimensions. War can be dressed in different ways, both in uniform and in diplomatic suit. By all, this is war. Russia's war against Ukraine and Europe, always about the need to see the vertical of subordination of direct actors and all about the need to have the courage to call things by their rightful names.
Thank you.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
Thank you very much, Maria. And now we turn to Oleana Haluska, who is online. You have the floor. Oleana, for 8 minutes. Welcome.
Speaker 11
Good morning. Madam chairwoman, distinguished members, it's a great honor for me to take part in this hearing today, though remotely. And let me start with three myths about this war, which I'm very often hearing in talks with foreign partners. Myth one is drone warfare is happening only because of the lack of ammunition and missiles. And if a NATO country is attacked, they will defend with more sophisticated and expensive platforms, like jets or artillery.
Myth two is that time is on Europe's side, and myth three is that supporting Ukraine is too expensive for Europe. Let's break down those myths in detail, starting with the first one, the war of the future. Ukraine's experience clearly shows that future wars are robotic wars. Small chip technologies deployed at a huge overwhelming scale can threaten the most advanced heavy platforms we are used to. Large numbers of drones can destroy a tank worth millions of dollars.
Maritime drones endanger big warships. Long range drone strikes can get to and reach strategic targets deep into the enemy rear. Ukraine's technological race is made possible by literally nonstop twenty-four-seven interaction between frontline unit soldiers, many of which established their in-house R and D labs, and weapons producers. This enables development, testing, and fast upgrades of military technologies under battlefield conditions in real time. How will this warfare further evolve?
Likely towards swarms of low-cost drones operated by a minimal number of soldiers, expanded kill zones that are saturated with robots both in the air and on the ground, AI-enabled targeting that will reduce the time of reaction to minutes or even seconds, and a technological race where advantage won't last years or months but weeks. That sounds pretty much like science fiction, but that's already the reality we are living in. And in the war of the future, the production of what I call the boutique weapons that are extremely precise, very expensive, but produced at a pace of maximum hundreds of units per year, that's the best to know where. And Ukraine, in fact, has become the world's only democratic full-scale laboratory of modern warfare. And while authoritarian regimes are learning very fast from each other, we have seen this already in the Middle East.
Madam Khobko referred to this as well. But are our partners doing enough to learn from Ukraine's experience? And that brings me to myth number 2. Time is not on Europe's side. It is on the side of those who are learning and who are adapting fast, and furthermore in action.
And today, that's the coalition of authoritarian regimes. Yes. Russia is struggling. Yes. Russia is facing a lot of issues, including financial problems.
But, unfortunately, one thing it is doing really well, and that's learning, copying from Ukraine, developing their own solutions, and scaling them up on the industrial basis. And as an adversary of the free world, Russia is right now, at this moment, as I'm speaking, gaining asymmetric advantage over you because they are getting combat experience and technology that is improved and refined in battle. Even with the political will, Europe cannot reproduce in peacetime the cycle that Ukraine is going through because we are in war. It is impossible to get this experience during the drills or exercises without being present on the ground. It is impossible for your weapons to stay updated if they are not continuously tested, upgraded, and improved in real time in battle.
At the same time, while waging a conventional war against Ukraine, Russia is already actively undermining Europe, as madam Kucharenko has explained greatly in detail. This is not a hybrid activity. This is phase zero of war. And across Europe, we still see hesitation. Leaders often downplay the significance of Russia's attacks instead of using them as a mobilization factor for their societies in order to increase defense spending and commit to the support of Ukraine's victory.
Instead, we are hearing calls such as the latest one from the Belgian prime minister to normalize relations with Russia immediately at this moment, as Russia is committing genocide of Ukrainians. And we are still hearing the question of how long can Europe afford supporting Ukraine, which brings us to the myth number three, funding. Values aside, there is a very clear financial ratio for Europe to support Ukrainian victory, allowing even a partial Russian victory will cost Europe significantly more. Recent research by Norwegian think tanks, NUPI and CoRisk, published last year, estimated the cost of action versus the cost of inaction. Over the next four years, even partial Russian victory would cost Europe nearly €1,600,000,000,000 in refugee costs, reinforcing Europe's eastern flank and sustaining Ukraine's resistance.
Supporting Ukraine's victory would cost roughly half of that amount. And Europe has the resources, but it is not using them strategically. And, yes, I'm speaking what madam Hovko has already referred to. Russian Central Bank assets, frozen assets, this money can finance Ukraine's defense and long-term reconstruction, can scale up European defense, production, and can reduce the burden on European taxpayers. According to international law, which we are very often hearing from the European partners as an argument against using these funds, the aggressor must not only stop its violation, but it must compensate for the damages.
And latest World Bank estimates point that Ukraine's reconstruction will cost €500,000,000,000, much more than the frozen Russian assets themselves. If Europe is serious about strategic autonomy, then Russian money must finance our joint security. Actively managing these assets through a model similar to the Norwegian sovereign wealth fund would ensure stable long-term financing for Ukraine's rearmament, long-term fortification, and economic growth for decades to come. So what would I call you to ask you today? First, please explore alternative models of the use of frozen Russian assets through the transfer of this money to a separate fund. Second, please prepare for the war of the future.
Invest heavily in the battle tested robotic solutions that proved efficient in battle in Ukraine. And third, integrate Ukraine into Europe's defense industrial base. Be present in Ukraine, not and be ready for the brave steps. We hear the discussions about boots on the ground, SkyShield after the war, but those solutions are necessary now, because it's not about us anymore. It's about your competitive advantage and your preparation to deter Russian aggression.
Thank you.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
Thank you very much, Olena. You couldn't hear applause from the colleagues. So, I will now give the floor to members for a first round of questions, starting with the coordinators for two minutes each. Nicolas Pasquale de la Parto, the floor is yours.
Nicolás Pascual de la Parte
Thank you very much. I cannot but agree very much with everything that has been said and put forward for the European Union. Lessons learned. Politically, we have learned very tough lessons. We were ignoring the signals from Putin's Russia.
We didn't pay attention. We didn't want to look reality in the eyes when he invaded Georgia, when he waged two wars against Chechnya, when he annexed illegally Crimea. We prefer to look otherwise to the and now we were waking up in the worst possible way with the war in the continent. I think that these political lessons to wake up from the zone of comfort have been learned, and now our leaders are united in creating a European strategic defense readiness and a strategic industrial and technological base. From the military point of view, the lessons are obvious.
We have to engage with our Ukrainian friends. We have to integrate them as soon as possible in our European integrated defense structures, not because we want to help them, but because we want to help ourselves from them. They have better experience, better methods, better field-tested, and that's why we have to exchange our know-how. We have to integrate them in a way that it is a win-win situation. We have, of course, to engage in and to continue financing the war effort in Ukraine.
We have to use the asset, the Russian assets frozen in the European Union. This is clear. We have to find a way. It will not be easy, but it is a necessary step forward. We have to use this as a fund, as proposed, as a Norwegian World Fund or something similar in order to help Ukraine reconstruction in the future.
In addition to this, we also have to keep clear that we are committed with Ukraine. We have to say our public opinions, what is at stake, what is at risk, there is our security, is our freedom, is our model of life. Then let's draw the lessons, the political and the military, and the strategic lessons. I think that they are clear for all of us. Let's apply this, implement them in a quick way.
Slava Ukraine.
Mhmm.
Slava. Thank.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
Thank you very much. And the next will be Sven Mixer from S and D.
Sven Mikser
Thank you. Thank you very much. Very impressive. I agree with everything. I think that all of us were very impressed during our recent visit to Ukraine, particularly with the, well, evolution of the drone technologies and drone production, that has taken place over the past four years in Ukraine.
I think it was beyond impressive. We are ready to be impressed, but we were much more impressed than expected. Now how to sort of take these lessons learned over here in the European Union? I think that's a bit of a challenge because, obviously, the drone and counter-drone technologies feature very prominently also in all our defense initiatives. But the scale, I think, is rather different when you think of Ukraine now producing over four and a half billion drones annually and Russia possibly even exceeding that.
That figure, when we talk about drone defense here in Europe, we usually talk about it in a context of hybrid or counter terrorist operations. And it's, I think, paradigmatically a little different whether you talk about countering four or five drones that are disrupting the operation of a civilian near an airport, or you are talking about tens of thousands of drones swarming your defenses. And I think that one thing that is very difficult to do is to replicate the pace or the speed of the invention, is the innovation cycle in that we are seeing in Ukraine during a long drawn out high intensity war where you basically burn out or the additional material is enormous, and you need to replace tens of thousands of inventory items every week, and you then integrate the battlefield experience. So what's your advice? How can we actually sort of match the scale of a threat in Europe that is operating not actually yet according to the sort of wartime mentality and therefore cannot sort of match the speed of innovation cycle that we see in Ukraine.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
Thank you. Thank you very much. The next will be Pierre Roma from the Patriots.
Thank.
Pierre-Romain Thionnet
You, Chair. I'll be speaking French. If you can hear the interpretation. Okay. Before I make my point, I've just seen the latest news from Donald Trump about NATO and the Strait of Hormuz.
He says that since no European allies want to help them, nor do any of the Asian allies, then he concludes that this is a one-way alliance. And he says we don't need the help of anyone. I think that's only likely to enhance the idea that the idea of American security is even weaker than it was in the past. I'm just referring to this because Missus Hopko referred to the fact that allies may have varying priorities, which vary over time. And so there's a risk with relying on an ultimate security guarantee from any ally.
We see what's happening in the Middle East. America is bringing over assets from the Far East. And so anything happening in Europe or Ukraine is going to be at least third in line in any new American strategy. So in Europe, we focus a lot on strategic autonomy. I'd just like to hear what Ukrainians think about this idea of European strategic autonomy.
I think that today and in the future, even more so, Ukrainians are going to be the most fervent defenders of European strategic autonomy for a very simple reason, which may seem to be contradictory at the start. But Ukraine has been dependent on aid from the outside, but they are actively seeking ways to no longer be dependent on anyone, not the Americans and, certainly, and also not Europeans. The Europe, the Ukrainian defense industries are trying to make up for any shortcomings or areas of dependency. And so they're trying not to be dependent on anyone in their defense strategy for the future. So I would just ask you what you would say, or what would you reply to any European countries who seem to be frightened of this strategic autonomy?
Because they think that if they say that they want to be independent, particularly from America, then that's going to encourage America to move away from Europe even further. So what's your reaction to that, and particularly in light of the Ukrainian experience?
ECR, Aleksandra?
Alexandr Vondra
No. Thank you very much. It was very valuable to listen to your presentation. I think we can find a lot of inspiration and no doubt. You know, Russia is an aggressor, and it's a top interest of Europe to contain this aggression.
The Ukraine is a victim, and it's in our interest to help you. And I think here, you have the MEPs who feel this the same for years, and they're trying to convince the other to do more than we are doing. But, you know, the world is complicated, and it's going to be more complicated. The interest of the other players are not necessarily the same. So, we should take this into account, too.
So and with your plea, you know, advice Europe, you must integrate Go and all. Are you really convinced that without the US, we can do it now? That's my question.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
Thank you very much. And the next will be Pedra for renewal.
Petras Auštrevičius
Thank you, chair. Congratulations to your impressive trio and presentation. So once ladies speak about warfare and lessons to be learned, we have to be serious. Otherwise, we will make a double mistake, not just stop learning, but be ignorance. You know, it's a major disadvantage of mankind.
It brings to further mistakes, definitely. Looking at the Russian warfare, you know, just recently, I read one more book on defense of Luhansk Airport. And I was already forgotten, those so-called humanitarian corridors or so-called white trucks, what Russians used to bring everything, ammo, you know, equipment to intervene on Ukrainian territory, and then to attack them further on. So not to speak about green men, about disinformation platforms, and the rest. We've been learning by, you know, being too late sometimes, definitely too late.
But my general question, I mean, it's not your first time to make interventions to meet European and probably international, for us, politicians, militaries, whatever. Do you have a feeling that we are learning? I mean, is Ukraine's example somehow inspiring enough to make transformation, not just listen, but to understand and to make further actions in order to transform? And here I come with the open question. Of course, it's excellent, I mean, to have you on panel, but maybe there should be some cell established here in, I don't know, what country, I mean, Belgium, Germany, whatever, for this transferring of experience of Ukraine, you know, of different kind.
I'm sorry for the delay.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
Thank you very much. And for the Greens, Willie, the floor is yours.
Villy Søvndal
Thank you very much to all three of you for a very good presentation. I think, basically, there are two ways of winning a war. One is a military way, and the second one is an economic way. And you touched both of these in your presentations. Two of you mentioned the frozen Russian assets.
I think in this room, we very much agreed that we should spend these. See, last I visited Kyiv, we were told that there is a lot of capacity to produce more weapons than you do today. So the leg is not capacity, the leg is finance. Is that still the case? Could you just elaborate a bit upon that?
Upon the set of leads, which is the economic way of tightening the grip on the Russian economy, I think more is done than was before. I see more ships being stopped now, which means it's getting more expensive to transport oil that way, but we still have to continue to make this better. And the last question is to Olena about the most innovative military you have. I'm elected in Denmark. We started very early to co-produce with Ukraine.
Could you say a bit more about how that is developing and which further steps countries in Europe could take to not only finance, but also co-produce weapons? Also, it's very important just now in a situation where a lot of the weapons in the world are going to Iran and the Middle East. Is it possible to close some of this gap with Ukraine production or coproduction with Ukraine and European states? And just a statement to end, I think you are very right that it's very expensive not to give the help that's needed to Ukraine now because we are going to pay very expensive, Europe for decades if this war is not won in the way that Russia has driven back to the international borders recognized. Thank you.
Rasa Juknevičienė
Thank you. Thank you very much. Really, Hannah, Maria, Olena, excellent, brilliant presentations. Thank you. Your work on the Western Front, like your people fighting in this Eastern Front, is extremely important and useful, and for us, those your friends here in this room.
First small remark, your excellent argument, Solyna, for frozen Russian assets are most needed by voters in Belgium and Hungary, especially in Hungary now. I think we are all of the same opinion in this room. The previous topic here in this room on Russia and this one are very closely related. Sometimes it seems to me that today, the only saviors of Putin's Russia are in Washington, DC. Just as the, of course, about the most important problem in this war, which is very important.
This is a lack of our strategy towards Russia. The prevailing view is that Russia has always been and will always be imperialistic, big, aggressive, and, therefore, we need to somehow move towards compromises so that we can return to cooperation more quickly. This is a big mistake here. This is a very useful narrative for Putin, but fundamentally dangerous for us, for Europe. Russia is fundamentally a weak state, just like the USSR was.
The reason why Putin is still at war in Ukraine is that the West, which is minimum 10 times stronger, fears the collapse of Putin's regime. Ukrainians could be the most important helpers for us here in this Western frontline, to convince decision makers to stop being afraid of defeating Putin's Russia. This is like my question. And because only this defeat of Putin's regime can pave the way for stable, lasting peace on the European continent. And the last point, which was already mentioned, by the way, by my colleague from Patriots, just as the United States has been and continues to be important to European security, Ukraine is now becoming just as important for us for our security.
And thank you again.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
Thank you very much, Raza, Io. Are there any questions? Okay. So, the floor is yours. So yes.
Eight minutes if.
Speaker 10
You okay. Thank you. So let me start from the issue addressed here when it comes to Lugansk Airport and those white vehicles of the Russian Federation by which everything was transferred into the Eastern front. That is why I'm always insisting, and colleagues of mine are always insisting on that fact, that lessons learned from the previous stage of the war actually should be learned. And we should not call it, like, the four years war of the Russian Federation against Ukraine.
Speaker 9
I mean, war started in Crimea back in 2014. So that is why we need to do our homework and analyze very carefully and strictly. We need to analyze very carefully and strictly the Normandy process and the Minsk process. I think in that process, we will find a lot of answers when it comes to the issue of ceasefire, when it comes to the issue of monitoring of ceasefire regime because we have already been there. So that is why we need to analyze it carefully, and we need to address every issue and every attempt of establishing a ceasefire from the position of that previous experience.
We had already such attempts to establish eastern ceasefire, I don't know, autumn ceasefire, school ceasefire every single time for eight years in Minsk. But, actually, it led us to nothing when it comes to attempts to establish a ceasefire in such a negotiation format. So that is why we need a real leverage, to make a pressure over Russian side to actually sustain the ceasefire regime and even to establish ceasefire regime. And I think that we need real physical leverage when it comes to the Russian Federation because it is not a secret that Russian Federation will be stopped only there, when Russian Federation would be stopped physically, and that's it. Unfortunately, no observation mission like SMMOSC or something like that would be helpful in that dimension.
When it comes to European autonomy, when it comes to security and trying to act without the US, I'm not pretty sure that we should address this question like this. It is not about whether Europe could do it or not. Unfortunately, it is today's European reality. Right now, we are standing without aid of US in security dimension, and we're standing on that position in which, actually, Donald Trump is trying to make the things really hard for European Union, for NATO as an alliance. And he has no belief in this alliance at all.
So when it comes to the Russians' act of sabotage, when it comes to the activities of the shadow fleet, when it comes to the general activities of the main directorate of the general staff of the Russian Federation, first of all, once again, Europe should finally call the things that they should call. It is not the Wagner Group. It is not PMCs. It is directly the activities of the Russian military intelligence. So if we start with the addressing of this issue with the right names, I think we will find a solution.
Second thing here, I'm pretty sure that when it comes to the operations of the military intelligence of the Russian Federation, here Ukraine could not be presented only as a receiver of your aid from the European side. Here, we also could be real contributors to your security when it comes to, first of all, the data, when it comes to the general analysis of what main directorate is doing right here, right now, when it comes to the general analysis of the activities of the military intelligence of the Russian Federation all over the world. I'm pretty sure that we have something to share with you, and I think that it would be really fruitful if we establish this dialogue on a permanent basis. And, after this exchange of the views, after the rounds of these consultations, I'm pretty sure that we could, finally shape the strategy, how we are acting against this so called acts of sabotage wear tin gray, not in direct camouflage or military uniform. So, starting with that, I'm pretty sure that, if we address this problem comprehensively and altogether, I mean, European Union countries and Ukraine, I think we could find real and, I need to underline it here, real, efficient, and cheap solutions.
Because sometimes it is much more important to analyze the activities of certain personnel of the Russian military intelligence, not the activity of some battalions in Africa or not to analyze the activities of some, like, some units. Sometimes it is much more important to understand what Patroche thinks, for instance. Or sometimes it is much more important to follow the Surovikian's roots in Africa because it's influenced directly European security via Mediterranean space. Sometimes it's much more important to analyze what Yunus Beykiv Kurov is doing in his negotiations with the Syrian side, which is also influencing European security. It influencing the weight of the Russian Federation in the world when it comes to maritime security, when it comes to our general understanding of what is happening in this theater.
Because when it comes to the Black Sea security, we could not divide it from the Mediterranean security at all, because it is a direct connection between these two issues. And I'm pretty sure that, right here, right now, both of us as a side, European Union and Ukraine, should be responsible when it comes to our own security. Right now, my country is trying to find some solutions with or without help of our allies from US. But, we have no choice. We have no choice at all because it is only, it is only thing for us to sustain, to keep standing, to try to protect our country this way or another way because we have no opposite choices.
The opposite choice for us is genocide. We have no options. So that is why we need to stand on this position. We need to protect our country. And that is why I think there is no choice for all of us.
We need to find these solutions for our common security. And I think that altogether, we are capable of doing so. Thank you.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
Thank you very much. Maria, you won't continue or first, Olena?
Of course.
Okay. Olena.
Speaker 11
So the brochure that Hannah Hopko presented to you that we have recently developed is literally half of Ukraine's experience and half of the recommendations that we would basically offer to our European partners on how to adopt Ukrainian experience and what else can be done. So very briefly, first and the most important thing is to unblock the Ukraine support loan. I mean, €90,000,000,000, that's a very important funding, but even that is only for Ukraine's basic needs. So we would need more funding for that, but even this one is not coming. And, according to our estimates, we will face a huge budgetary deficit, but also, for the money for the defense procurements, starting from May.
So it's incredibly important that this money comes as soon as possible. Second, invest heavily, as I said, into robotics, engage this into your European defense programs like SAFE, ReARM, ADIP, for your and also it's important to stimulate the private funding in Ukrainian defense industry. For your reference, in 2025, the private investments into the Ukrainian defense industry amounted to $100,000,000. I mean, that's peanuts compared to the needs that our producers are facing. So that needs to be accelerated significantly.
Then joint ventures and split production and co-production. The case of Denmark was mentioned here. A couple of lines were opened for the drone production of joint ventures. In Germany, in the UK, there are plans to expand in Nordics. That's very important to make sure that there are production lines both in Ukraine and abroad, that there is a split coproduction of the components, etcetera, etcetera, to make sure that, again, as I've said, weapons can be tested, upgraded, and then scaled up through production lines both in Ukraine, and abroad.
And everyone will win from that. Whether it makes sense for your countries to, let's say, stock plenty of drones, I don't think so, because they are getting outdated very quickly. As we've said, you know, it's a matter of months that the technology is dominating the battlefield, and then it's upgrading. And then the previous one isn't efficient anymore without extra upgrades and refining. So it's a constant process.
It would make much more sense for you to invest in the production lines that can be upgraded with the needs of the battlefield, then, you know, stock plenty of hardware and expect that it won't be updated in three to five years. The next super important issue, diversify components from China. We are right now seeing the crisis with the prices for fiber optic, with China, which is increasing, which significantly increases the price of Ukrainian drones. This is a clear case that if we rely very much on the supplies of components or production materials from China. That's the tool and leverage for them to put pressure on both Ukraine and Europe.
And while that's, I think, a big priority. And but also keep in mind that this localization also takes time. And we support very much the approach that the European Union is introducing that only up to 35% of components can come from third countries, in order to get European funding. It's still important to make sure that there is this balance between today's immediate needs and the capacity to scale up this production, localize, and substitute those components. So that's a hard task.
But if it is implemented properly, it would help to bring this, from my perspective, strategic autonomy to Europe. The next thing, support charities like Come Back Alive, like the Dignitas Fund. They are doing an amazing job in boosting this technological progress, but also Dignitas are doing important trainings of the pilots on FPV drones or ground robots. And this is also something which can be scaled up into your countries too because without, and that's the experience with the Middle East war shows that, the drone itself is just part of the solution. If you are not having the pilots, if you are not having the engineers, those that can maintain this drone, it won't be super efficient.
It's not a silver bullet. So this training system where civil society and nongovernmental institutions can be the partners, from my perspective, is also a good experience for you to scale up in your countries too. And as I've said already, consider the braver solutions that are right now discussed as the possible after the war security guarantees, like troops on the ground, Sky Shield, as your tools to learn from this warfare that cannot be postponed for later. And the last question was on the capacities. Yes.
Funding is a huge issue. What I heard is up to 40% of our capacity is not properly used because of the lack of funding. For 2025, our capacities were declared to $35,000,000,000 worth of production, and only 60% of them were actually utilized. And that's why funding really matters, which brings us back to the question of frozen Russian assets. Thanks.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
Thank you very much. And last but not least, Maria, the floor is yours. Thank you. Sorry. Sorry, Hannah.
Speaker 8
Yeah. Thank you, Maria Ignace, for this panel because I see even during the discussion, there are very strong questions and answers. But, coming back to one question, without the US, can we do it? Or this was the question for our French friend. So, actually, I think this is the wrong question.
The right question is whether Europe can do without Ukraine because the US, it's about resources. Ukraine, it's about knowledge and experience. Look at Trump's behavior now. Trump needs cards which Ukraine obtains. Trump, who used to blame Ukraine and discredit our president, our nation, and, actually, I support what Russia said, he's not a mediator anymore.
He is helping the Russian economy, not imposing sanctions. He is helping Russia to survive, and actually, he took the wrong side. And this is very discrediting. And after the Greenland crisis, I think the big question to Europeans and your agency is how the war ends, it is not just the question about accountability for Russia. It's also about the Europeans' agency for the future.
So this is why I think it's of crucial importance that Ukraine is not only defending Europe today. Ukraine is helping Europe to prepare for the security challenges of tomorrow. And my request to you, MPs, is to start preparing your society because resilience is not just military preparedness. It's also society's understanding of threats. So, with my colleague, former member of Ukrainian parliament, Igor Lutzenko, who was kidnapped during the dignity revolution and tortured and survived, he is now a military guy.
And, he invited me several months ago to shut down Shahids and to have to learn this new experience. So, actually, I think you should also invest your time after reading our papers, also to come to Ukraine, and we could organize training because this is when you obtain the skills and knowledge. You cannot only count on the White House and believe that the United States will help you because European civilization is a civilization of thousands of history. We are great that Americans will celebrate 250 anniversary of their democracy this year, but European civilization and we Ukrainians, in our DNA, we are patriots, but we belong to European civilization. And this is why we want Europe to win and to be prepared and victory in Ukraine and Russian defeat.
This is the only way for all of us to secure our future. Okay. We were deprived of missiles, with SPARKS three missiles to Patriots and others. It pushed us to develop our own weapons and new technologies. About 60% of the weapons in the hands of our warriors are made in Ukraine.
Can you imagine? If someone asked me twelve years ago when we saw the green men in Crimea that now be sitting in European parliament and asking you, not just produce statements when Russia is throwing missiles and drones already against your nations like Lithuania, Sweden, Poland, you should follow Putin's example when he said, if the fight is unavoidable strike first, Europe should reciprocate. If Russia throws 20 drones on Poland or other territories, then you should also move the war on Russian territory. This is how Ukrainians' armed forces conducted the most effective sanction packages with deep strikes against Russian oil refinery, also the special operation spider web. It's another instrument how Russia understands only the strengths of Ukraine.
Otherwise, they will keep progressing, attacking you in Syria and other theaters. So this is key. And, actually, in February in Kyiv and its surrounding areas, more than 70% of Russian Shahid attack UAVs, which were intercepted by Ukrainian air defense, were destroyed by Ukrainian interceptor drones. Not American or not European, Ukrainian interceptor drones. So this is important for you also to know.
We could open a drone academy. We could provide solutions, but it's important that Ukraine is part of the European family because it's not just about sharing our solutions. When you don't have this ecosystem and all these capabilities, and actually on 24 hour testing at the battlefield, the technologies. Also, your instruments, which we are discussing today during the panel, you have to speed up because of the tenders, the procedures. I'm talking to Ukrainian companies.
They are receiving now thousands of calls from different companies from the Middle East, and they say, okay. We are ready to cooperate with the EU, but we cannot wait 6 months for tenders. When the technologies we already tested and produced, we need to scale up. And, really, when Ukraine is under supported, undefunded, Europe, Europe should do more, and actually, Russia should not be overprotected, like blockade in the Baltic Sea, the Danish Strait. Why is it not still closed for Russian ships?
I know that there is one provision saying that if Russia is committing genocide, it should be used to stop all the ships because they are fueling the machine, which kills Ukrainians on a daily basis. So this is really important to understand. And when we are talking about these peace talks, it's a fake peace, which is a continuation of the war because it's stopping some of the projects. I hear in Brussels from some different country members, Hana, maybe we should not invest more because the war will stop soon. The ceasefire is gonna happen.
I remember the ceasefire talks back in 2014, 02/16/17, and others. So now it's Russia, China. China with North Korean troops are preparing for deployment on Belarusian soil to attack you. So all these North Korean troops, they learned a lot when we demanded instructors to be sent to Ukraine to learn our experience, like North Korea did in Kursk region and others. So they know how to use drones, how to use air intelligence, and all these new AI technologies.
So we need to win together. And, I really ask you, don't buy this peace talks as a way to end the war. Without Ukrainian victory and Russian military accountability, we will never enjoy the peaceful sky here, especially with the new technologies which Russia has obtained. And, also, why is it important for Ukraine to restore territorial integrity and sovereignty? Because on these occupied territories, temporarily, there are 1,600,000 Ukrainian kids.
Young Ukrainian boys are already being put on record for future conscriptions for Russian armed forces. So Ukrainian kids are Russian soldiers tomorrow, fighting against all of us. So this is, I think, I'm really very thankful to the committee and madam chairwoman for initiating these crucial debates now, because I do believe in European agency. And I know you have potential. You have resources.
You have everything, and capabilities will be there. So, actually, we can replace Chinese components, having companies here and building, manufacturing, and scaling up here. The question is the political will to defeat and political will, actually to join and to celebrate victory together. And one day, I hope this committee meeting will be happening in Crimea because I'm believer that Crimea will be occupied. Thank you.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
Yeah. Very good. Yes. Hannah, Maria, Olena, really, thank you very much for your input and your very clear message. I believe my colleagues, we are absolutely on your side, and it's absolutely important to explain it to our people.
We will do it now for years. We have strict continue. And so thank you very much for your time, and we are looking forward to coming again to Ukraine. And you are always invited to come to us, to tell us, and we will see us also when you are a member of the European Union. But first of all, Ukraine has to win this war.
And so Slava Ukraini.
Hello, I'm Slava. And you are always welcome in Ukraine.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
Thank you. Thank you very much, and we know this. And so, take care. God bless you, and see you.
Thank you. Thank you.
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