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AFET European Parliament
Follow its sittingsMarc Williams
Several parallel recommendations seek to create new structures to enhance and guide operational collaboration. Recognize that collaboration is important not only in its intent, but structurally. To the EU, there is a need for more specific infrastructure to address organized crime and its offshoot impacts, coordinating bodies that help standardize the approach across different departments. And finally, to the gap with data, there is a need to ensure OCG threat analyses are normalized. That is to say that we include consistent analysis of how these groups are evolving geopolitically, and what mechanisms are working to combat them.
I think, hopefully, with a minute or two to spare, that's a useful overview. Joanna and I are available to answer any questions for the remainder of the Q and A session, and obviously available to MEPs thereafter if you'd like to get in touch, with the email details that hopefully are on screen now. Thank you.
David McAllister
Right. Mister Williams, thank you very much. We now have time for some questions or comments. Michi Regala, first.
Michael Gahler
Now thank you for this overview or for this introduction and to present this study. I was always thinking while you were speaking whether there are existing organisms or organizations with a name that I could attach this label to. So is it now more those who organize the Panama Papers? Is it them? Or is it in a different way?
Is it the Wagner Group who are somewhere in Africa claiming not to be from Russia, but doing something else and being only paid mercenaries? Or is it the traditional mafia that goes global? So if you could perhaps simply come up also with some concrete name of organisms that you were thinking of, so that I get a better feeling whom we are talking about and which kind of people that is.
Nacho Sánchez Amor
Well, thank you for the work. I think not, you because you have been studying, I assume, this phenomenon, in your academic or your research. But from the political point of view, we are opening a path. We are creating some awareness that there is a new guy in the block. There is a new actor in geopolitics, and we have to be aware of that, and we have to try to tackle the challenges that this kind of blue ringed organism represent for traditional politics.
And for that reason, I think this is a seminal work on this thing. I would like to, I'm a little bit frustrated, you know, because I proposed this study. And my original idea is only partially covered because it's about geopolitical influence or domestic political influence. And for that reason, I would like to explore with just yourself your ideas in which way these three groups, the state oppose, the state embedded, and the state sponsored, they interact. Or if there are groups starting to be state oppose, but they reach the level of, make, say, take position in the parliament, is that the parliaments are very easy to have a seat paid by some criminal organization.
And in which way these three categories interact, in which way the criminal entities they pass from one to another. But I think I have to read carefully the paper, but I think we have to start talking not only about the geopolitical influence, but the domestic political influence of the criminal organizations. Then could be transnational or not, but there is a state capture or the parliament capture in one single state. It is a thing we have to take on our radar. But thank you for the first step in which I can assume and I hope is going to be developed not only from the academia, but also from the institutions as a new way to address this kind of phenomenon. Thank you.
David McAllister
Thank you, Nacho. Now I don't have a request to take the floor from other groups. Mr. Orlando, yes, you're next.
Leoluca Orlando
Thank you, express my appreciation for this study and share a few remarks. We're distinguishing between normal organized crime, if I can call it that, and organized crime as a kind of power system. So an interrelationship between a power system and organized crime. It's not only illicit interests and impunity. There are also aspects of exerting power, using power, and that then interrelates with the government and the institutions of a country.
And there are various different forms which you've referred to. It could be government-opposed, embedded, or sponsored. There are three different ways in which we can see this interconnection. But, basically, organized crime is interacting with power, and that means government institutions are involved in some way. An old Sicilian mafia boss was once accused by a journalist of not being serious and constantly changing his party allegiances.
And he replied, oh no. We always support the same party. We always support the government. It's a government that keeps changing party, not us. And that's how you could perhaps understand the difference between traditional ordinary organized crime and an organized crime power system, if you like.
And I think it's interesting to look at what happens when you take on one of those three forms. When law enforcement succeeds in tackling an opposed mafia, it may be dependent rather than sponsored. And another aspect which is not referred to at any great length in this document is the Italian mafia. I think, you know, unfortunately, sadly as it is to say, Cosa Nostra and 'Ndrangheta Camorra do have a certain reputation. Italy has unfortunately become known for some of these organizations and the mafia in Italy and their relationship with big money, big finance, and power systems back Blackfriars in London, and so it might be an interesting area to explore as well.
So why not take a look at the Italian mafia as well? It might also be interesting to do a comparison because it is the UN convention of December 2000, the Palermo convention, which refers specifically to these issues, the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime. Zero tolerance doesn't work. Zero tolerance doesn't work because law enforcement is only one side of the equation, and you need to work on cultures and ways of doing things too. It's like a wagon with two wheels.
Both wheels need to be moving, otherwise it's not going to move forward. And so you need to look at the specific characteristics of this non-normal power system organized crime.
David McAllister
We have two more. The colleagues have requested to take the floor, Mister Brown and Miss Sorrell, and then I'll close the speaker's list. Mr. Brown.
Grzegorz Braun
Thank you very much, Mr. Raffordeaux. A very interesting study: organized crime in international relations. If I understand well, organized crime has some true nature of international relations in some cases. So the group that fits your definition perfectly, absolutely perfectly, your definition of organized crime group would be the European Commission itself, obviously, with its criminal schemes of extortion, of hostile takeover, so-called pandemia, the Ukrainian Zelenskyy scheme of simply robbery, organized robbery of other people's money. So, what is it?
If it's not organized crime, what is it? Obviously, we have the Epstein scheme of blackmail, international blackmail. Epstein scheme working together with Netanyahu scheme. So please, sir, expand your study. Please give us more examples, and please, go to even further conclusions of your own reasoning.
Thank you very much.
Miss Searle, please.
Malika Sorel
Well, it seems to me, mister Williams, that in the European Union, we're facing two forms. You refer to three groups. I think we already have organized groups which are opposed to states, and then we have filtered groups which have started to filter into states, but we don't have yet this third group. Could you tell me what you think about the actions we carry out through Europol UEDR? What activities are the most important in your view?
I saw in Libbey, we're working on drugs-related matters, links to prostitution, arms trafficking, money laundering, VAT fraud. What's your view on all of this? We in the European Union are also signing agreements with a number of countries, countries which are where drugs originate from, but also countries through which the drugs transit. So we are criticizing all of this, but we haven't reacted appropriately. Where are we right now in the European Union?
Is there anything that we could qualify as a narco-state? Or are some countries on their way to becoming such a narco state? What's your opinion on those points I've just raised? And also, could you give us a comparative analysis of what exists, how we can combat within the European Union, within other countries, if we had some sort of comparative analysis across these countries to see what has worked, what hasn't worked. Because as you said, we're taking a lot of action in repression to law enforcement, but this is afterwards, downstream.
We'd need something upstream, on the prevention side. Could something be done there? And this would be my concluding point. Because in the European Union, if it seems to me, you might contradict or not agree with my point of view, but it seems to me that we have major problems with drugs. Do you think that tackling the consumption of drugs could be a way to tackle this problem?
Thank you.
David McAllister
Alright. Let me thank all colleagues for their contributions. And now, Mister Williams, if you could perhaps respond in roughly 10 minutes, and then we will close this item.
To yours.
Marc Williams
Thank you very much for the questions. I'll take the first one and maybe pass over to my colleague, Joanna, for the second. To help concretize the types of groups we're thinking about, so along the different categories, the state of those groups, think we referenced, but think Sinaloa cartel, Medellin cartel, groups that are known for drug trafficking primarily, but in practice control territories, provide services to communities. The Medellin Cartel ran for public office decades ago. And so, whilst our enforcement mechanisms are designed to respond to such groups as criminal entities, we miss the tranche of activities they perform that help solidify their power within communities.
And so those are the kinds of groups we're talking about when we reference state-opposed groups. In terms of groups that are embedded within the state, I think a couple of questions have alluded to Cosa Nostra and the Italian mafia method, which has fluctuated between being combative towards the state as well as collaborative. So there's an infiltration inherent there. The report presents the case study in particular of Paul Joss in Sierra Leone, one of Europe's most wanted criminals, and his ability to basically obfuscate law enforcement by embedding himself within the fabrics of those governance structures. And finally, on the state sponsored category, think TGR, smart, large organized crime group networks that have been linked to cyber campaigns, disinformation campaigns.
You have the Lazarus Group from North Korea. And so those are the types of groups that we're talking about now that helps crystallize the broad spectrum. But the unifying factor with all of them is they have transcended in a way the material financial purpose that I think our law enforcement is designed to respond to. There will be lots of activities that these groups conduct that are not directly for profit, that may yield benefit profit-wise in the future. But foundationally, we don't have the structures at the minute to identify and define those activities and then shape a response.
Maybe over to you for question two.
Joana de Deus Pereira
Yes. I think I will group two of quest two, the two questions two and three. Of course, there are new actors on the block. That's why we call them geopolitical actors. And what we have observed over the last decade is actually not only transformation and an evolution, but also a shape-shifting of organized crime groups that are sometimes even activated on demand.
So they are not only within their own market, within their own specific niche, but they are also in the market to respond, and be used as tools by some nonstate actors, by state actors, as the report mentioned, but I would touch on something that is quite important. Mister Orlando was mentioning quite rightfully that Ndrangheta, Cosa Nostra, they were kind of the traditional organized crime groups that we had in Europe. It's today, if we look at the business operations of both of these examples, we can almost compare them to very legit operations and structures. And they also get involved in some semi legit ones to kind of give some gray, sufficient gray zone, to make them operate court free, of the accountability and normative mechanisms. So what I think this study also highlights is, of course, not only an update on the mechanisms that we have because the threat has evolved, but also the extraterritorial dimension of these groups that once only operated in specific geographic regions and are now completely transnational.
And this is where it becomes quite important to look at hybrid threats, to look at how organized crime is also a tool in some of the current geopolitical conflicts in Europe and abroad.
Marc Williams
Thanks, Joanna. Perhaps, question three, there were lots of interesting remarks around normal organized crime as it was put and organized crime as part of wider power systems. I think there was much of those remarks that aligned with our study. Two key perhaps follow-up points. One is that I think it's important to recognize that these groups shape our societies in the way they force us to respond.
So for example, drug trafficking is a very visceral, tangible threat that we can understand and see, because we see victims of drug trafficking, and we make that connection quite quickly. It's much harder to understand if an organized crime group establishes a restaurant that garners favor with local communities, that attracts local politicians, that builds bridges within those communities, and the long term effects of that kind of network building and where that power is then implemented is very different from what we understand as organized crime. So I think one of the foundational findings of the study is that these groups are operating in much more strategic ways than our law enforcement responses and policy approaches are currently designed to respond to. Joanna, do you have anything else to add on question three before? On the fourth point, I won't remark about the common made in relation to the European Commission as an organized crime group.
That being said, within the contents of what was said, the parameters of our study were very narrow. I think what is important is to recognize that we are seeking to approach organized criminal groups defined as is currently situated within international law, but expanding upon that to understand that crime and geopolitics are interlinked. That is not to say that existing legitimate state structures are crime groups. That is to say that organized criminal groups have more power than we perhaps initially foresaw and more power than I think the current legislative framework is designed to combat. On the final question, I can.
Speaker 17
Would you like to take the first stab and then I can add my final Yes. Comment ?
Joana de Deus Pereira
So, the current EU framework is currently genuinely strong, and I would be lying if I said the opposite, but it has several limits or several gaps. Being one of them, for example, at the level of cooperation, of course, the European arrest warrant has transformed extradition within the EU, and it has replaced complex, diplomatic procedures. But is it enough? Probably, it's still not. And then, for example, if we look at the instruments that we have at the level of the internal security of the union, but also the instruments that are used by the European external action abroad, are they really communicating?
When we look at cycles like impact, and if we think of the transnationality of organized crime groups and how the EU deploys significant resources through the neighborhood and development instrument? These are legitimate questions that we also raise in our report. I believe that the biggest weakness in terms of is actually in terms of enforcement when we say, and it's on the report, that less, for example, less than 2% of the estimated criminal proceeds within the EU are confiscated annually. And when we talk about subjects such as asset recovery, we see there several gaps. Then we lack in terms of external enforcement cooperation that the EU does not control.
And if we think of drug trafficking, if we think about trafficking in persons, this becomes particularly complex. But also, if we think about strategic infrastructure that is being systematically exploited, such as seaports and free zones, and the fact that we continue to have multi-jurisdictional governance to address corruption and customs vulnerabilities, this might become an issue. And for that reason, we made several suggestions and recommendations in our report that I think, Marc, you can conclude and address.
Marc Williams
Sure. And we're on time. But just to that point, I think to remark on the comment made, you're absolutely correct that there is great work being done by law enforcement. Europol, as an intelligence hub and a coordinating body, is producing results. That said, the report highlights that disruption and the impact of disruption on the long term function of these groups is tenuous, and so greater work is needed, as you've described, to look at consumption.
But by its nature, when we respond through law enforcement, it's reactive. We're responding to something that has happened, and there's only so much impact we can have if we can't be more strategic and understand the aims of these groups moving forward. So respecting state sovereignty, understanding principles of legal restraint, the recommendation is not that organized crime has now become foreign policy, but that elements of the ways in which organized crime manifests do not fit neatly into the current definitions. International law, international humanitarian law, it sits within those gaps, and that is what I believe we need to start plugging if we want to understand how these groups evolve, how they continue to survive despite taking out kingpins, and what we can do to tackle them more effectively. Thank you.
David McAllister
Alright. Thank you. We have to conclude in a few minutes, but I understand that Nacho had.
Nacho Sánchez Amor
A follow-up question. Yes. Thank you. If we start our approach to the phenomena of the legal current definition of the phenomenon is not good because the nature of the phenomenon is changing. How can we describe Yakuza, Muslim Brotherhood, substituting the state in the poor neighborhoods of many Arab countries, Bagnarulub has been mentioned by Kaler.
Illegal mining. Illegal mining is illegal, but it's not criminal except if you contaminate on purpose with Mercurial River. The first negotiation with the Maras before the second Bukele, the gray walrus in Turkey and in Europe, it's not the same phenomena. It's not the same organization. It's not the same genetics, but these groups are infiltrating politics.
And I think we have to plow on this idea, but thank you for this approach that I hope is the starting point for a more developed approach from politics and for the political and institutional bodies. Thank you.
Joana de Deus Pereira
Thank you for that comment. I can rapidly respond to that. Giving a comparative example to what the European Union does well, for example, we do not have a common understanding or a conceptual definition of what terrorism is by the European Union, but we have defined the activities, what are terrorist activities. And I think it would be a strategic, efficient avenue to define what are organized criminal activities. If we start with this, the three categorization, for example, of activities.
If we start with the descriptor of the activities and not looking at the entities because I think it was said by all interventions, the groups are evolving, the groups are shifting, they are morphing, but the activities is actually what we are trying to target. So identifying the what instead of the who, which will be, in my professional opinion, much more efficient and effective.
David McAllister
Any further comments, questions? That is not the case. Then this brings us to the end of this item. Let me once again thank Mr. Williams and Mr.
Deos Pireira for their work and valuable insights. Under any other business, would somebody like to raise an issue? That is not the case. The dates of our next meeting are May 4 in the afternoon and May 5 all day in the morning and afternoon. I wish you all a wonderful day.
Our meeting is now closed.
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