Committee on Constitutional Affairs Ordinary meeting
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AFCO European Parliament
Follow its sittingsSven Simon
Amendment 17 in favor, against, abstentions rejected. Amendment 18 in favor, against, abstentions rejected. Amendment 19 in favor, against, abstentions. I need to check that. I open the vote for amendment 19.
I closed the vote. Yes. And it's not functioning. Is it functioning?
It is.
Sven Simon
Is it? Okay. Alright. Close the vote. Adopted.
Adopted. Amendment 20 in favor. Against abstentions adopted. Amendment 21 in favor. Against.
Abstentions are adopted. Compromise amendment 2 in favor. Against. Abstentions are adopted. Amendment 23 in favor.
Against. Abstentions rejected. Amendment 24 in favor. Against. Abstentions are rejected.
Amendment 25 in favor. Against abstentions, rejected. Compromise amendment three in favor? Against. Abstentions are adopted.
Amendment 30 in favor? Against. Abstentions are rejected. Amendment 31 in favor, against, abstentions rejected. Amendment 32 in favor, against, abstentions adopted.
Amendment 33 in favor, against, abstentions rejected. Sorry. Amendment 35 in favor. Against. Abstentions rejected.
Amendment 36 in favor. Against. Abstentions rejected. Amendment 38 in favor? Against.
Abstentions rejected. Amendment 39 in favor? Against. Abstentions rejected. Amendment 40 in favor?
Against. Abstentions rejected. Compromise amendment four, in favor? Against. Abstentions are adopted.
Amendment 42 in favor? Against. Abstentions are rejected. Amendment 43 was withdrawn. Amendment 44 in favor?
Against. Abstentions rejected. Amendment one in favor. Against. Abstentions are adopted.
Amendment two in favor. Against. Abstentions are rejected. Amendment three in favor. Against.
Abstentions rejected. Amendment five in favor. Against. Abstentions. Rejected.
Amendment six, in favor. Against. Abstentions rejected. Amendment seven in favor. Against.
Abstentions rejected. Amendment eight, in favor. Against abstentions, rejected. Amendment nine in favor, against, abstentions rejected. Amendment 12 in favor, against.
Abstentions rejected. Final vote. A roll call vote. I open the vote. Yeah.
Gabi says it sounds a bit like in a Star Wars movie here, but we are close to that. I close the vote. 20 in favor. It was broadly adopted. Thank you very much.
I can try with another mic. But.
Yeah. Maybe it works. Yes.
Sven Simon
Yeah. Is that the same? So let's get our voting cards back. I forgot one thing. There is a member in the room who I would like to congratulate on the occasion of his birthday, Adrian Velasquez Quasara.
Congratulations. All the best. Happy birthday. So let's continue, colleagues. So, colleagues, please, those who do not want to participate in the meeting, please leave the room, and the rest finish your bilaterals.
Item number five, the institutional framework of the European Union and its interaction with national authorities in the application of Union law, with particular reference to Article 19 of the Treaty on the European Union. This today is an exchange of views on that report, and I will immediately give the floor to the rapporteur, Mr. Charlie Weimers. You have the floor for five minutes. Please start the floor.
Charlie Weimers
Thank you very much, mister chair, dear colleagues. Thank you all for taking part in this exchange of views. I look forward to having an open and broad discussion on this subject. The report that is the subject of this discussion concerns the application of EU law and its interaction with national courts, with particular reference to article 19 of the treaty on the European Union. This subject, although legally quite technical, goes to the heart of the relationship between the EU and the member states.
It concerns the role of the Court of Justice, effective judicial protection, and the limits of Union competence under the treaties. Under article 19 TEU, member states must provide remedies sufficient to ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by Union law. This is an essential requirement. The union legal order depends on national courts since natural judges apply EU law every day and are an essential part of preliminary ruling system. For that reason, the independence and proper functioning of natural courts are of the utmost importance when those courts are called upon to apply Union law.
They are also relevant to mutual trust between member states and to citizens who must be able to rely on them to uphold the law. In recent years, the Court of Justice has interpreted Article 19 TEU in a broad manner. It has linked article 19 to the value of the rule of law in article 2 TEU, and it has used that link to develop binding standards concerning judicial independence. This raises an important question, which will also be the main point of concern for this report. To what extent can article 19 be used as a legal basis for developing common standards on the organization of national judiciaries?
The organization of justice remains within the competence of the member states. This follows from the principle of conferral, which represents the very foundation of the Union. The EU may act only within the powers conferred upon it in the treaties, while powers not conferred remain with the member states. Over time, the Court of Justice has increasingly assumed a central role in assessing whether aspects of natural judicial systems comply with Union law. It has, for example, held that national courts may have to disregard the rulings of constitutional courts.
It has been found that certain national bodies may not meet the requirements necessary to participate in the preliminary ruling procedure. It has also developed a principle of non-regression in relation to the rule of law and judicial independence. These developments are significant, and they are accompanied by genuine concern for judicial independence and the rule of law, especially in some member states. The union must be able to insist that courts applying union law are capable of providing effective judicial protection. But the question is not whether judicial independence matters.
It clearly does. The question is how it should be protected while respecting the treaties. Broad and evolving interpretations of the treaties create legal uncertainty and gradually alter the balance of the treaties, which was originally established by the member states. So it is broadly accepted that the Court of Justice has a central role to play in the uniform application of Union law, but that role must remain judicial in nature. Must not become indirectly a general power to assess the national judicial systems.
The aim, therefore, should be cooperation, not confrontation. National courts are expected to respect the role of the court of justice in interpreting union law. But the court of justice must also be attentive to the constitutional responsibilities of the member states and always stay within the limits of the powers conferred on the union. The preliminary ruling procedure is central in this respect and should strengthen judicial dialogue and mutual trust. As repertoire, I will strive for a balanced approach in drafting this report.
We can both protect the effectiveness of union law, the balance of competences, and the rights of individuals. Defending the values established by the treaties includes adhering to the principles of conferral, subsidiarity, proportionality, and national identity. Public support for the union is also derived from how we uphold these core principles. I hope we can have a fruitful discussion on these issues today, and I look forward to hearing your views. Thank you very much.
Sven Simon
Thank you very much to the rapporteur Charlie Weimers, and now we do a round of shadow rapporteurs, three minutes each, and starting with the EPP, Thomas Laff Sokol.
Tomislav Sokol
Thank you, chair. Thank you for giving me the floor. I would also like to thank the rapporteur for his ongoing work on the file. I would highlight what I think are the crucial priorities from the EPP's point of view. So first, conferral is the basic principle of the EU law.
So conferral essentially means that EU has only those powers which have been given to it or conferred upon it by the member states. In that sense, it is the crucial principle setting the boundaries also of EU law and also of what the European Union can do and where it can act. It is often misaligned, I would say, with the principle of subsidiarity or often mixed up because subsidiarity essentially says that in case there is a shared competence between the EU and the member states, then the EU should act where member states can also certain issue by themselves. However, subsidiarity is only applicable in cases where, actually, there is some sort of EU competence, and we have to delineate who can do a better job, member states or the EU. On the other hand, conferral is the principle which sets the limits of EU competencies.
And why is this important? This is important because ECJ, the European Court of Justice or Court of Justice of the EU, as a crucial institution interpreting EU law, has historically, through broad teleological interpretations of EU law, especially through the preliminary ruling procedure, actually interpreted this principle and powers of the EU in a very broad way. And by doing that, I would say, in some cases, even going beyond the actual powers and limitations set upon it by the principle of conferral, I would say even going ultravirus, which means that it goes beyond the powers that it has. One particular example of this going beyond the powers of the European Union in broad interpretations of EU law is the mutual recognition principle, which has been used, for instance, in the area of family law to bypass national restrictions or even national prohibitions on certain things by making those member states having to recognize the same decisions, which are not legal in their legal framework by making them recognize the same legal decisions from other jurisdictions. By doing that, I would say that we that ECJ has gone in some cases beyond the powers that it has.
And by doing that, it has also acted as a legislator. And that even though we all are in favor of judicial independence, I think we can all agree that the courts cannot substitute for legislature because legislature is there to make legislation, because legislature, the council, and the European parliament have democratic legitimacy, which is required too. The problem, I will say, one issue related to the European Court of Justice is the lack of transparency. Because unlike some other courts like the US Supreme Court, the Court of Justice of the EU does not have concurring and dissenting opinions. We don't know how each justice decided in which case, and this is something that also makes ECG, I would say, probably the least or one of the least transparent institutions of the EU. Also, what needs to be taken into account, what was mentioned by the rapporteur, is the principle of procedural autonomy of the member states, which is, however, limited by the principles of equivalence and effectiveness.
However, this has also been interpreted in different ways, in practice severely curtailing, limiting the procedural autonomy of member states to determine their own procedural rules related to their judiciary. So to sum up, I think that this report should focus on determining how court of justice should act to stay within its powers, to respect the principle of conferral, to not act ultra vires, do not go beyond limitations set by the European Union law, and also focus on what we or how your court of justice can be made more transparent than it is now. Thank you.
Vasile Dîncu
I speak Romanian. Rajkovic. Dear colleagues,
The EU judicial system is one of the main reasons why the Union is now a mature and powerful political construct. Without an ambitious and powerful European Court of Justice, the European project would have been just a hope of the post-war era for theoretical international integration. Without any principles such as the supremacy of European law, faithful cooperation, proportionality, and so on. Without those principles, we would never have achieved this summit, as the great sociologist Jurgen Habermas used to say. So it is important to recognize the merits of the common judicial architecture, the role of the European Court of Justice, and the importance of the dialogue between the Court of Justice and the National Courts.
As an S and D rapporteur, let me stress the importance we give to European law. That is also why this parliament is a powerful and respected institution at this moment. I emphasize that the system created under Article 19 relies on the rule of law, loyalty, dialogue, and institutional seriousness and institutional efficiency. Of course, some aspects can be improved, such as the implementation of the decisions of the court can become much more traceable and transparent. The interaction with the national courts is, at this moment, ambiguous, as previous speakers have said.
But our group recognizes and shall promote the historical achievements of this judicial system that we have. I hope that the balance mentioned by the rapporteur, the need for achieving this balance, will be a constant of our debates, of our negotiations between parties, between various political positions. And I hope that in the end, we shall reach a balance between the efficiency of European law and individual national states' law. Thank you very much.
Sven Simon
Thank you very much. Next speaker on behalf of the Patriots for Europe, Fabrice Leger.
Fabrice Leggeri
Thank you very much, chair. I will speak in French. Firstly,
I would just like to highlight the work that has been done by the rapporteur, Charlie Weimers, on this text. The direction that he has presented us with seems to be going in the right direction. And my group is very interested in highlighting the principle of conferral, and that means that the European Union intervenes where the treaties provide for it to do so, where things have to be decided upon at the union level. From this point of view, we are confident in the fact that Charlie Weimer's report will recall the essential elements when it comes to the principle of conferral, which also applies to the EU's court of justice. And that means that the court of justice does not have the right to intervene in areas not provided for by the treaties.
Over time, we've been seeing certain developments that would lead us to believe that the European Union is a federal state or a confederal state, and that is not the case. My group will be paying close attention to this and reminding wherever possible that the European Union is made up of sovereign member states, which have decided upon this and on what needs to be done at the EU level and what remains the competence of the member states themselves. And the principle is that when there is a competence that is not attributed to the European Union, then naturally, that falls under national sovereignty. The court of justice must therefore respect this principle of conferral, which is essential in the construction of the European Union and has been so since the outset. We'll also be paying very close attention and was very satisfied to see that the reporter Charlie Weimers has taken this on board.
We want to ensure that there is respect for the principle of subsidiarity when there are shared competences. And I believe that this report might well be an opportunity to issue a reminder of the fact that the European Commission cannot intervene without impunity in areas where it has no competence. This falls to the court of justice to ensure that balance is respected between the institutions where the member states have sovereign competence and where, unfortunately, all too often, the European Commission does not itself respect the treaties. To conclude, we're also concerned to see a government of judges and that the court of justice is developing in this direction by developing competences that go far beyond what the EU treaty stipulates, by interpreting certain articles. I'm thinking in particular of article two, which talks about the union's values, which has been under the spotlight recently.
And, again, we have full trust in the reporter Charlie Weimers on this, but we will be paying close attention to make sure that there are no new rights being created that have never been decided upon by the member states and by the peoples of the member states. Thank you very much, chair.
Sven Simon
Schnell, Sandrogozi is not here for the renewal. No? Then we have, on behalf of the Greens, Vignette Van Answald.
Reinier Van Lanschot
Thanks a lot. And we had a good first exchange of views on this upcoming report, and I have a slightly different opinion than what has been expressed here so far. I think the talks about the selection of judges being nontransparent, that's not the case to the extent that is mentioned here. It seems like a thorough process, and the member states already play a big role in it. So I see that differently.
There's a special committee to ensure the suitability of the members appointed. And if we talk about the extent to which they fulfill their mandate in two, in a way that is too broad, I disagree there as well. They, for example, on the fundamental ruling, the command case, the court decides on the basis of the freedom of movement and not on the constitutional basis for legality of gay marriage. And freedom of movement is an inherent right in the treaties. Nobody can do anything about it.
So the fact that the court judges according to these fundamental rights, I think, is perfectly within their mandate. So I will also file amendments along those lines, because I think the direction where this is going is not the correct one. Thank you.
Sven Simon
Thank you. Next would be the left, but they are also not there. So that we go to the ES and Christine Anderson.
Christine Anderson
Yeah. Thank you, chair, and thank you, Waim, Charlie, for your work. It's a great draft, and there is a couple of things we would like to bring to the attention of you. So, we, of course, we must reaffirm that article 919 is procedural and it's not a general competence clause, so it should ensure enforcement, not harmonization of national judicial systems. A call for clear boundaries between judicial independence requirements and the national competence over court organization.
In terms of safeguarding subsidiarity and member state competence, we'd like to stress that primary responsibility for judicial systems lies, of course, with the member states and require that any EU action based on article 19 must demonstrate necessity and proportionality, and we should avoid a one size fits all model. Transparency and accountability of EU level interventions, of course, call for greater transparency in commission rule of law assessment and dialogue with national authorities. So what we could do is, like, have publications of methodologies and indicators, and we should clearly distinguish between legal findings and political assessments. The role of the national courts must be strengthened rather than having it centralized on the EU level. So national courts as first line guardians of EU law should explicitly be stated, and we could have a more structured judicial dialogue avoiding, of course, transforming it into a hierarchical control.
What we should absolutely encourage is better access to the preliminary ruling procedure, fast procedure, and urgent cases. On guardrails against competence, grip via case law, we should invite reflection on the expanding interpretation of article 19 by the court of justice. And, of course, we should suggest a call for judicial self-restraint. On institutional balance, we should stress that enforcement of article 19, I'm sorry. Yeah.
19 must be respected, the separation of powers, and, of course, the limits of commission discretion. Make a long story short, article 19 is essential to ensure that EU law works in practice, but it must not evolve into an open-ended mandate for reshaping national judicial systems beyond the competencies conferred by the treaties. Thank you.
Sven Simon
Thank you very much. I should now give the floor to other members who want to participate in the debate. Juan Fernando Lopetaguila.
Juan Fernando López Aguilar
Yeah. Thank you, Chair, and thank you all. I've followed carefully and mindfully the statements that have just been shared throughout the discussion of this particular file. And I would like you to remind that this is a constitutional affairs committee of the European Parliament. There is a constitutional affairs committee in the European Parliament, and the reason for this constitutional committee to exist is not to care about the constitutions of the 27 member states.
Surely, they all have their constitutional dispensations. Certainly, they all have some kind of document by the name of constitution. Sure. But we do too. And if there is a consensus, widespread consensus about the constitutional foundations of the EU, it has to do certainly with the potential of article 19 of the duty of the European Union, which is precisely the role of the European Court of Justice as guarantor of the respect of EU law according to the principles of primacy and direct effect.
So I think we should all have in mind that matter of principle before putting in writing a resolution that could actually be detrimental to the nature of this constitutional affairs committee and the European Parliament as a whole. I think we would be a very misguiding, if not wrong, utterly wrong message that the European Parliament could question the role of the European Court of Justice precisely by doing its job, which is guaranteeing the primacy and direct effect of EU law. Besides the values of Article two of the duty of the European Union have enshrined what they were once called Copenhagen criteria, meaning those democratic parameters that have to be fulfilled and credited to be part of the EU, to be an active part of the EU, to get on board the EU, meaning not only rule of law, representative democracy, human dignity, nondiscrimination, equality before women and men to begin with, but also the principles of protection of minorities and promotion of pluralism as a value in itself, those values are enshrined, and I'm quoting literally Article six-three of the Treaty of the European Union, to be the synthesis, the summary of common constitutional traditions. Again, constitutional foundations.
Again, constitutional nature. So I can only remind those involved in the negotiation, with all due respect, that they care about this matter of principle before putting in writing a resolution that could actually question or jeopardize the credit of this European Parliament as a sound, sensitive legislative body committed to the very nature of the EU itself as a system, as a union, which is based on law, framed by law, and bound by law, not by the law of member states, but by the law of the EU. Thank.
Sven Simon
I am not allowed to say that, but I think this was a very important warning from a very experienced colleague. So, please, I would also underline the shadow repertoires to keep in mind what Juan Fernando just has said. Again, Thomas Lavsokol.
Tomislav Sokol
Thank you very much. I would just like to refer to two things that have been said. First of all, the transparency. Since I was the one speaking about transparency, I was not speaking about the way judges are nominated. I was speaking about the way they decide.
And here it is true that unlike many other courts, I mentioned the example of US Supreme Court, but there are other examples, ECJ is definitely much less transparent because we don't have concurring and descending opinions. We don't know the stance of each individual justice. We just get the final decision, which is usually compromised between different parts of the court, etcetera, but we actually don't know how this whole procedure, how this process actually worked in practice. And this, so this is what I was referring to. I think there could be significant improvements there based on best practices from other jurisdictions.
So I was not referring to the way justices are nominated. I was speaking about the way how justices make their decisions. On the second point of what his team colleague Lopez Aguilar said, I would just like to emphasize a couple of things. So first, when I speak about the rule of law, it's not à la carte. So we cannot just pick and choose the principles of EU law that suit us and forget about the others.
So nobody's questioning the principle of primacy or principles of direct effect, but principles of conferral and subsidiarity also exist. They are part of the EU treaties. But the principle of conferral is explicitly described in article five of the treaty on the European Union. So nobody is questioning the constitutional foundations of the EU, but the way how these principles, which we do have in EU treaties, actually should be interpreted. And on the way that the parliament should not question these things, I mean, we question different things all the time.
We question the constitutional setup of countries like Uganda, Hungary, Poland, Germany, Italy. I mean, we do things which are not really, strictly speaking, part of Ethiopian parliament's legislative powers. We do it all the time on various issues. So we comment on everything, and I think it's the parliament's prerogative, the parliament's right as the sole, the only directly elected body institution of the EU to do that and to say what it thinks on different topics. This is a known initiative report, so it's not a legislative report.
And in that sense, I believe that we are entitled to say what our position is. And, again, without questioning the constitutional setup of the EU, by the way, how these things are implemented and interpreted in practice. Thanks.
Sven Simon
Thank you very much. Who else would like to take the floor? The draft report will be presented in AFCO, at our meeting, on June 2. I think it would make sense if we invite people to have a little hearing. We should start with the president of the court itself.
He is, I think, generally very willing to appear in such a discussion. He is the figure who is the longest serving president ever, I think. And to my knowledge, he has a good chance to get reelected another time. And he keeps the court in his heart, and I think he's very open to any kind of debate. And we should, maybe find two, three other, x I don't like the word experts, but, I mean, you know what I mean, participants with a severe background in the field.
Maybe other judges from constitutional courts of the member states, I could think about that we would have comments on the draft report, and then we could come up with a final version. And, again, I think it must be possible to have a debate on the institutions of the European Union. This is a primary task of the AFCO committee. We always have to keep into account, and I learned that from my esteemed colleague, the chairman of the Liber Committee, that it is, of course, a different context if we discuss those issues in a political arena or in a parliament compared to academia, and it has a different meaning in the end what we write down and what we decide here with a majority on the report. But I think it is important to just take, to continue with this discussion and critical thinking on the institutions of the EU.
Otherwise, we risk the acceptance if there is no broad majority in the population which accepts the setting, or maybe we can improve it. So, taking into account, I would like to give the final word on this agenda item to the rapporteur again. And I maybe you can also include in your final word whether you would agree that we invite some experts on the June 2 when you present your draft report. Charlie Weimers, please.
Charlie Weimers
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Colleagues, thank you very much for your contributions to this exchange of views. I'm grateful for the different perspectives expressed here today, and I'm, of course, open to a hearing with experts and the president of the court. So let's try to find a way forward there, chair. So several points raised today will be useful moving forward with this report.
I hear a broad agreement that effective judicial protection is essential. The national courts also play a central role in the EU legal order. At the same time, there have been concerns expressed about legal certainty, the principle of conferral, transparency, and the need to respect national constitutional traditions and identities. As rapporteur, I will reflect on all these views expressed. My aim remains to prepare a balanced report, and I firmly believe that our common objective should be to strengthen trust, that is trust between the Court of Justice and national courts, trust among the member states that their competences are being respected, and trust among citizens that their rights are being upheld.
So I look forward to working on this in a constructive spirit and hearing more of your views, down the road. So thank you very much, mister chair. Thank you very much.
Sven Simon
Any other business? Does anybody like to take the floor? That's not the case. Then our next meeting will be held on the second of June at 4PM. Thank you to the secretariat and the interpretation.
It was very difficult today because of this technical issue which needs to be solved. The meeting is closed.
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