Committee on International Trade Ordinary meeting
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INTA European Parliament
Follow its sittingsBernd Lange
So also there, we should have a specific look at. So there are some elements in the proposed resolution. And now I give the floor to the shadow repertoires and to the other members of the committee. And Jurgen is the first for 2.5 minutes.
Jurgen
Thank you. Thank you, Chair. Thank you, Bernd. I will speak on behalf of Martine Kemp, who is the shadow on this. And I will read out her statement, basically.
Speaker 3
The partnership between Europe and Africa is one of the most important strategic relationships for our future. In an increasingly unstable geopolitical environment, the EU must strengthen its engagement with Africa through a partnership based on reciprocity, mutual respect, and shared responsibility. Africa is a continent of enormous potential, a young population, growing markets, entrepreneurial dynamism, and critical resources that are essential for the green and digital transition. Europe, meanwhile, offers stability, investment, technology, and predictable rules-based cooperation. This is why economic cooperation must be at the heart of EU-Africa relations.
EPP strongly supports the African Continental Free Trade Area, which can strengthen intra-African trade, create jobs, and improve resilience. The EU should continue supporting African integration efforts by sharing expertise and increasing investments, and technological cooperation. While supporting AFCFTA is essential, we should also continue to diversify our partnerships through EPAs and CFAs, which further strengthen our economic ties with African partners. At the same time, Global Gateway must deliver concrete results. Investments in infrastructure, energy, digital networks, and education must create local added value, sustainable jobs, and real opportunities for young people and women.
It should also better incentivize investments in strategically important projects and sectors. We also believe that cooperation on critical raw materials should benefit both continents. Europe needs resilient supply chains, but African partners must also benefit through local processing, industrial development, and skills transfer. At the same time, investment also depends on stable institutions and clear rules. Transparency and the fight against corruption remain essential for long term economic growth and investor confidence.
Finally, we believe that this partnership must go beyond the governments. Stronger cooperation between parliaments, businesses, universities, and civil society is essential to build a general partnership of equals. In this context, EPP also underlines the importance of fully involving the private sector, in particular SMEs, which form the backbone of our economies in both the EU and Africa, and ensuring they can fully benefit from our trade and investment framework. Europe and Africa face common challenges and common opportunities. The answer is stronger cooperation, deeper economic ties, and a more ambitious strategic partnership.
Thank you.
Udo Bullmann
Thank you, chair. Thanks, Bernd, for this initiative. Congratulations and proposals. And let me also say that I very much agree with your introductory remarks as well as to the text that, Juergen, was reading out, for on behalf of the PPE. Not my problem.
But we do resolutions and we do oral questions, especially ahead of a mission, with the idea to set the agenda. So a text has to be more than just what we normally say. It needs to give an orientation. And for my taste, I'm very blunt. The text, which we have in front of us, is not sufficiently reflecting what you rightly mentioned in your introductory remarks.
We have too many blind spots. We have too many things we do not talk about, and we have too much old thinking in this text. And so far, I'm more than happy then we have a deadline until, I think, June 3 to repair that. Let me only quickly point a couple of issues, which I think are relevant. We are rightly saying we need to have capacity building, but we don't take account of the capacity destruction that is going on under global conditions at the very moment, my number one.
My number two, we are talking about mitigating the risks in Africa. Do we really have a clear picture about the risk assessment procedures? We are talking about the capacity of the EIB and others to do a good job. Let's talk also about the very often false risk assessment of our rating agencies of the US as well as US dominated scenes. Let us talk about, rightly, PPE makes the point, involution of society. We have instruments like the DAX.
We have instruments like full inclusion of partnerships on a broad ground, also in our partner countries. This is of the essence, also applying to SMEs, of course. And the very point is, are we ready not only to build up production schemes in our partner countries? Are we, at the very end, ready to discuss what kind of segments of the value chains are to be imported by us, or do we, afterwards, defend and protect protectionist attitude? No.
We do not want to see renewable energies on our market. No. We do not want to see hydrogen in the our market. No. We do not want to see green steel on our market or green iron as a product to elaborate on green steel.
These are issues that have to be discussed, especially ahead of the South Africa mission because there are many points where our partners will come back to.
Thanks a lot, Ludo. Terry. Thank.
Thierry Mariani
Thank you very much, chair. The Patriots Group, of course, supports stronger trade links between Europe and Africa. We want to have partnerships that create wealth on both sides of the Mediterranean and help to keep people in their host countries and therefore limit illegal migration. Of course, this means there still needs to be parliamentary oversight. I agree when you talk about the multitude of mini agreements that have been pushed through by the commission without parliament's assent.
It is not acceptable that important trade deals are concluded without transparency, without democratic controls. The EU since February 2024 has an agreement in principle with Rwanda on critical raw materials. Rwanda was condemned in a resolution from February by our own parliament. Our credibility is at stake here. We have spoken out against massacres and pillaging, but the commission has gone against parliament's opinion and continued to privilege her as a partner in the Great Lakes region.
So democracy in action, I think, is easier to write in a building than actually put forward in practice. There is always also an absence of migratory conditionality. When we look at tariff preferences, these trade agreements, these are important measures for leverage when we are trying to find agreements on migration. They need to be used to ensure that we have effective cooperation with our African partners when it comes to the readmission of their citizens. That is a key link between providing trade preferences and getting cooperation from our trade partners who are responsible for these migratory flows.
There was finally a vote in favor on this subject in the European Parliament, in the last plenary on the generalized system of preferences. Now I understand the intent behind the declaration, but you talk about our trade deals correcting historical imbalances. I think that is counterproductive when dealing with our African partners. Europe, of course, has to look at its conscience here, but I think the large majority of African countries have now been independent for over 60 years now. Our African partners are more concerned when all the trade agreements are linked to decarbonization and the Paris agreement.
If the EU wants to decarbonize, Europe and Africa rather need to be more industrialized. You talk about civil society members leading this relation between the EU and Africa, but really the only legitimate control mechanism is our parliament and the African parliaments. They are our neighbors, our partners, and we have a shared history. When we look at France, for example, if we want strong balance, mutually beneficial trade relations, Europe has to defend its interest but not turn each trade agreement into something based on ideological preferences. Thank you.
Jessika van Leeuwen
Yes. In the ECR, we're very happy that we finally shift our focus to the beautiful African continent and acknowledge the importance of a strengthened EU Africa partnership for mutual prosperity and EU diversification for access to critical raw materials. The overall direction of this resolution, strengthening EU-Africa trade ties, promoting investment, and protecting value chain, is something my group ECR can support. However, we do believe that the text emphasis emphasizes too much on sustainability, conditionality, civil society involvement, and broad development language, needs some rebalancing. So our core message would be that a pragmatic European-Africa strategy based on equality, mutual interests, and clear European priorities is necessary.
Strong focus on strategic autonomy, securing critical raw materials, reducing dangerous dependencies, and countering the growing influence of China and Russia in Africa. Protection of European agriculture and food security. European high productive farming is a strategic geopolitical asset. Trade with Africa must never come at the cost of our own food production or lower standards for our farmers. Sharing of European knowledge on high productive agriculture in order to create more prosperity in Africa is very useful.
A clear link between trade and migration. Trade preferences must be conditional on cooperation, on readmissions, and on tackling illegal migration at the source. So we plan to table a couple of amendments, and they will focus on a pragmatic, broad European Africa strategy that explicitly mentions reducing strategic dependencies and addressing illegal migration through knowledge transfer in high productive agriculture. Stronger convergent clauses, and a real level playing field in all new trade and investment agreements, so our farmers and businesses are not undermined. Explicit protection of European food production.
Trade relations with Africa must never lead to a reduction in the EU output. A tougher stance on global gateway is necessary, strict investment tests, no unsustainable debt, and full accountability. Preference for bilateral agreements with individual African countries when they deliver faster and more concrete results for Europe, a direct link between trade, investment and fighting illegal migration by sharing our knowledge on modern agriculture to create prosperity and stability on location. So in general, we want more EU investment in Africa, but only when it creates real stability and local prosperity, not when funds are misused. So African leadership must also be held accountable for the usage of our funds.
And, dear colleagues, I know that we still have until June to send in our amendments, but I would like to remind you that looking at the agenda that we have ahead of us, June and the June will be tomorrow. So I invite everyone who likes to contribute to this resolution to table their amendments as fast as possible. Thank you very much, chair.
Thanks a lot, Jessica. Yes.
Benoit Cassart
Dear colleagues. I'd like to thank the chair and the rapporteur for his excellent work. I fully support this proposal. Africa and Europe are neighboring continents. They have a shared history, culture, and common languages.
Europe needs to build a true political and economic partnership with Africa based on the new multipolar world we live in. The African continent is being courted by major powers, Africa, China, Russia, the US, for example. So when we look at the volume of trade relations between China and Africa, we're talking 348,000,000,000 in 2025. So that's around a 17% increase on the previous year. Africa has considerable natural resources, around 30% of the global mineral resources, and plays a key role in energy production as well.
I think it is in our common interest to promote stable and lasting growth. Europe needs to invest more in the economic development of the continent. Sustainable industrial development means the right amount of financing, mobilizing the private sector, and having public-private partnerships which are based on high ethical standards. Our priorities are clear: infrastructure, sustainable energy, access to water, digital development, electrification. Economic development cannot be done without stable states in place, the right type of governance, transparency, and a fair redistribution of wealth.
All of these are key factors. We need also to see financial inclusion through mobile banking or mobile money, for example. And we also need to see greater autonomy for women. This would be a very significant factor. We also need to work with the African diaspora, a real source of human resources, between our two continents.
I support the idea of a continental African free trade area. I think we need to look at a reinforced strategic partnership between Europe and Africa, when we look at our shared interests and common future. To conclude, the footsteps of those who walk together are never raised, and that comes from a saying from Burundi.
Lina Gálvez
Thank you very much.
much. So thank you on behalf of our group as well. Thank you for taking into account our contributions when drawing up this report. It's something which is strategic for our economic future, trade, the social aspects, and foreign policy at the EU as well. Now we appreciate that in the last points, you included some of our points on the social, environmental, and health care aspects.
This is particularly important. We do want to have a response from the commission because there are already existing agreements, and we want to look at the phytosanitary aspects with South Africa. For example, it's only just in recent years we have had 600 plant diseases coming in with citrus fruits, for example. So we regularly have these types of cases which are intercepted. It's not just a small percentage.
So we do want to have more clarity and a more proactive response from the commission based on this situation. And we want to see a greater opening up of relations with Africa, but we don't want to have any risks for consumers or farmers, as in the case I have just described. Now we see that there are positive aspects as well, mobility within Africa, aligning with the sustainable development goals. I think that is positive. We are perhaps a bit more critical than the Rapporter's opinion when it comes to the Global Gateway Initiative.
And so we've tabled some amendments in that direction. We are concerned about transparency in how the projects are being selected for Global Gateway. There seems to be a lack of checks and balances in place, to ensure that the local population are really benefiting from these investments rather than large European companies. We've had similar calls from NGOs. This mechanism cannot be a substitute for other development cooperation instruments.
We need to look at trade deals, rather than these mini deals with a lack of parliamentary scrutiny. We want to have agreements that are a win win for both sides, and that help tackle the shortfalls on both sides as well. And we want to make sure that these agreements don't finance authoritarian regimes or wars, or jeopardize our more sensitive or vulnerable sectors. So we think this is a solid base for EU-Africa relations, and we will continue to work with the Rapporteur on this. Thank you.
Lynn Boylan
Thank you, chair. And I suppose as we're discussing the future of the EU trade and investment relations, I think it is a crucial conversation because I think it goes beyond trade flows, and it speaks to our political, historical, and climate responsibilities. I think it's very important to be clear that Africa will be one of the regions most severely affected by climate change. And already today, some countries are losing between 25% of their GDP due to extreme climate events, and they're spending up to 9% of their budgets to cope with them. So in this context, I think continuing to frame our relationship primarily around access to resources is a major political mistake, but that is precisely the risk we are facing.
The global competition for access to critical raw materials is clearly intensifying, and China, the United States, and Russia are all advancing their interests often through extractive and coercive approaches. And I think that the European Union must not enter such a race. Doing so amounts to reproducing a neocolonial pattern that we claim to reject. So for the left group, the position is very clear. There can be no credible partnership without a genuine sharing of added value, and this means local transformation.
It means industrial development on the African continent. It means skills development, and it means technology transfer. And this applies both to the raw materials and to agricultural products. And I think without us, we're simply perpetuating the extractive model that structurally weakens African economies. We must learn from the past.
Trade relations must no longer be instruments of dependency, but they must be tools for emancipation. And it is precisely by committing to this approach that we can distinguish ourselves from other global powers. And I think credibility also requires democratic accountability, that's very clearly lacking today, the global gateway instrument, which is central to our strategy. It suffers from insufficient transparency and a clear deficit of democratic oversight. And I believe that the European Parliament must be fully involved, properly informed, and able to exercise effective scrutiny, and there can be no blank cheque for the commission on such strategic engagements.
And finally then, I'll stress one fundamental point, and that is the role of women in Africa. We know that women are at the heart of economic, social, and entrepreneurial dynamics. And if we're serious about building fair and sustainable partnerships, then we must invest in their empowerment, their access to finance, their education, and ownership. And colleagues, I think we need to accept that Africa is not just a reservoir of resources. It's a strategic, political, and human partner.
It is our responsibility to ensure that this relationship is built on fairness, transparency, and real sharing of value. And it's only under these conditions that we can build a credible, common future.
Bernd Lange
Thanks a lot. I have no further requests for the floor, so I give the floor to Dora Carrera. And I'm happy that you are here regardless of the responsibilities now in the changed time of DG trade. Thanks a lot. Doha, for five minutes, round about the floor to you.
Dora CARRERA
Thank you, honorable chair. It's always a pleasure to be here. And let me start by thanking you and the committee for indeed putting the spotlight on the trade and investment relations between the EU and Africa. Africa is indeed a strategic partner. And rest assured that although maybe a bit less visible than others, we have been working a lot with our African partners to strengthen those relations.
And as we've heard many times in the debate, and I've taken note of the interesting issues being raised, the partnership is indeed mutually beneficial. And, we need to calibrate that partnership to take into account the priorities and the interests of our African partners, but also, of course, our own. And indeed, we've heard that a lot as well. We seek to diversify our export markets. The EU also seeks to secure sustainable access to critical raw materials essential for the digital and the green transition and, of course, open new pathways with our partners for increased competitiveness and green growth as Sub-Saharan Africa aims to diversify its trade, empower SMEs and attract private investments.
So we are very much working with our partners. And what we are offering in terms of trade and investment is already very substantial. Let me start by recalling that 95, 97% of African exports have duty free access to the European market. The core of our cooperation is provided by the six economic partnership agreements with 15 African countries, whose main objective is to leverage trade. And you have, we have heard a lot about trade as a leverage, to leverage trade for the development of these countries.
Now most of this EPAS concerns trade in goods, and I did take note of some of you who mentioned that they need also to be brought to the reality of our economies in our times. But, you know, it's also important to highlight that these EBAs do offer this duty free market access to the EU, but also governance structures that have created a real framework for engagement and dialogue with our African partners. And this is working and this is important because it includes constructive and frank exchanges in many returns such as SPS, we have heard one raised. But IPAs are working. And let me just give you a very short snapshot of the trade flows in the last ten years between the EU and EPA and non EPA countries, which will demonstrate this point.
So our total trade with the African IIPA countries in the last 10 years increased by 35%. And this compares with eight percent for non-IIPA countries. So this already shows that the IIPAs lead to indeed a very much an increase in overall trade flows. And if you zoom in into African exports to the EU, again, the IIPA countries' exports to the EU in the last ten years increased by 61%, and this compares to 24% for non-IIPA countries in the same period. So this is a potent illustration that the IIPAs are working and are indeed supporting EU-African trade.
Let's not forget as well our generalized system of preferences, which covers 37 countries on the continent, including 33 least developed countries. And again, the EBA, the everything but arms regime, allows for duty-free, quota-free access to the EU market again. It's an extremely generous offer, even compared to similar offers from other developed countries. So this is also a very important point to make, and one that would merit maybe a little bit of visibility as well. Of course, we have other forms of engagement.
I won't go into much detail. Let me just mention the sustainable investment facilitation agreement with Angola, which, of course, was supported by this parliament in the ratification and which we are implementing now, the first of its kind. We have also concluded a clean trade and investment partnership, a non-binding instrument with South Africa. Again, I want to thank also the parliament for its support, and we've been very much keeping the parliament in the loop in terms of implementation. I'm very happy to continue to do that also in anticipation of your visit to South Africa, where I think it's interesting to go and see the CTIP in the making.
This will be a little bit the test of the pudding, really.
this
Dora CARRERA
instrument. Just one quick reference to something that we launched late last year, a trade and investment dialogue with Nigeria. It's a platform for discussion and engagement with one of the biggest economies in the country. So we were able to launch this dialogue at senior officials level, and we hope it will fructify and allow for a real exchange with this very important partner. So that's on the other forms of engagement.
Of course, I won't go into the Sustainable Kokobe initiative, where we had very much support of the parliament as well, and presents a real case study for engagement in a very sensitive sector. And we have also heard about the MOUs on critical raw materials that we have with a number of African countries. At continental level, let me just say, we very much remain supportive of the AfCFTA. And let me just add that in our view, the ACFTA and the EPAs are mutually reinforcing. And this is because, first of all, it puts a rules-based trade very much at the center of this dialogue, and it helps create a framework for predictable trade and investment conditions.
And as such, becomes, I would say, a pole of stability that is very much conducive to continental integration. Let me just highlight that among the 25 African countries, which are now actively trading under the ACFTA, which have completed all the necessary legal steps, we have 15 countries that have IPAs or FTAs with the EU. So that shows that these bilateral frameworks are not at all harming the continental integration, rather, the contrary. I will stop here because I'm already over my time. Let me just say that I'm very happy to come and discuss the implementation of these instruments and discuss the state of play of our trade and investment relations with Africa at any time, and very much look forward to further constructive discussions with the committee.
Thank you very much.
Thank you.
Bernd Lange
In the trade as well. And thanks a lot for offering this continuous dialogue, and I'm sure that we will come back to that, specifically on the question of the partnership with South Africa. As you mentioned, the implementation is a crucial one, and we will go to South Africa at the end of the month. And, therefore, we have the deadline for amendments to this first proposal of a resolution and the question set after the delegation on June 3. So you have time to reflect, which elements should be added.
And, of course, we will take our assessment after our visit to South Africa, also on board, and perhaps present some additional elements until June 3, and then we will have a, I guess, quite lively debate looking to the different items you mentioned. Thanks a lot.
12 check at high noon.
Bernd Lange
Oh, I forgot. Not just mentioning June 3, I have to say, 12:00, high noon on June 3. So, thanks a lot. And we switch immediately to the next item of our agenda, which is now item five, the agreement with The Republic Of Korea on mutual recognition in relation to the conformity assessment certificates and markings. So it's a little bit technical, but of course, it's really important for an improvement of trade relations that we have a recognition on these elements.
There is a draft of the negotiation directive, which is published. And therefore, it's, of course, important to have a little bit of scrutiny regarding the work of the commission. And therefore, I invited Mr. Leon DelVault, well known here in the committee, to present us the proposal, and then we will discuss this a little bit. I guess round about 10 minutes for the presentation, please.
Leon DELVAULT
Good morning, and to everybody, honorable members, ladies, and gentlemen. It's a pleasure to be back here. Try to put in that I like.
Bernd Lange
Very much. So that you are really mentioned, that's really good to be here again. Thanks a lot for that. It's true.
Leon DELVAULT
It's yeah. So I'll you mentioned it's a technical issue, so we'll put it a little bit, if you allow, in its context and then try to, nevertheless, give you a clear idea of what we're trying to achieve. So I think the EU Korea FTA remains a cornerstone of our bilateral trade relations with the Republic of Korea. It has been a success story, and we have seen goods and services increase significantly on both sides. I think as you are very well aware, these times we are going through and especially for trade and the geopolitical context, I think has increased interest of some of our partners to further come closer to us.
And of course, this is very much a wish that we share. And this is why we're looking now at ways to further enhance these trade relationships. But maybe to start off with some of the figures, some of the results of the EU FTA with Korea. So since the entry into force, trade has experienced a 5.3% average annual growth for trading goods, and even an impressive 20.5% growth annually for trading services. During the second half of last year and the beginning of this year already, we have seen important progress in several files where Korea has addressed long-standing trade irritants that we had been flagging in sectors such as cosmetics, pharmaceuticals, automotive and repaired goods.
There are some trade irritants, of course, we still have to work on, but we are confident. So just to mention, too, we have the application of eight member states for market access of EU beef to Korea, and the issue of market access on offshore wind power because there are some issues on auction criteria that potentially favor local manufacturers. Of course, there are also issues that the Korean side raises. They concern EU autonomous measures, as you will not be surprised to hear: CBAM, battery regulation, packaging and packaging waste, which they think imposes cumbersome requirements for the industry. But also some more recent measures, and it's still being finalized or discussed, like the upcoming steel measure, which will significantly impact Korea, which is our third largest source of import of steel, but also the Industrial Accelerator Act where Korea is one of the countries that have raised concern.
That said, I stressed the good cooperation that we are having with Korean authorities. And I think it's a recognition of this was the last month's EU Korea Trade Committee for which Commissioner Septovich traveled to Seoul. And that was also the occasion to have the first new Korea strategic dialogue on trade, supply chain and technology. So I think we're expanding, as I mentioned, trying to enhance the implementation of the FDA, but also expanding it to a discussion on economic security. And in that regard, we had the first specialized committee on economic and emerging economic issues, in parallel to the committee for which the commissioner traveled last month.
So our partnership is growing. It's strong, and we are looking forward to the upcoming EU-Korea Summit that will take place next month on June 10. And I hope this will allow us to further envisage progress. So to come back to the MRA. So we have put forward a proposal for a mandate to open negotiations with The Republic Of Korea for a mutual recognition agreement.
This agreement would enable the EU and Korea to mutually accept test reports, certificates, and markings from each other's designated bodies. What does an MRA offer? An MRA would facilitate trade by eliminating duplicate testing and certification. So in general, MRA seek to cut non-tariff barriers, boost exports, and streamline supply chains without a need to harmonize regulations or standards. They are of particular interest to SMEs as they significantly reduce their costs, as a financial burden of obtaining certification in another country is often disproportionate for SMEs that, on top of that, have to face, sorry, higher compliance costs.
One important thing to clarify is that MRAs do not lead to lowering any standard, safety checks, or harmonization of regulations with the MRA partner. This means that Korean products under an MRA will always have to demonstrate full compliance with EU legislation, safety checks and market surveillance, sorry, will continue to apply. And as I said, TMRA does not envisage any harmonization or equivalence of standards or regulations. So our autonomy, as theirs, will fully be preserved under an MRA. How does an MRA work in practice?
A designated laboratory inside the EU can test a product against the Korean standards, and the authorities in Korea must thereafter recognize the test report or certificate without requiring the same test to be repeated in Korea. The reliance on domestic conformity assessment bodies, so the bodies in charge to certify these products, creates, therefore, cost efficiencies. We have, since the '90s, concluded a range of MRAs with key partners to foster trust in conformity assessment systems, and facilitate trade. These partners include Australia, Canada, Japan, Israel, New Zealand, Switzerland, and the U. S.
These MRAs traditionally cover key industrial sectors, namely pharmaceuticals, medical devices, telecommunications, electronic equipment, machinery, and automotive, among others. So what's the relationship between the proposed MRA and our FTA? Our existing FTA, which has been enforced since 2011, has slashed almost 99% of tariffs. It includes, among others, a dedicated chapter on technical barriers to trade with four sectoral annexes, namely electronics, motor vehicles and parts, pharmaceuticals, and medical devices as well as chemicals. These TBT provisions promote international standards, recognize EU test reports, and ease certification, yet they lack full mutual recognition of conformity assessment results, leaving EU firms at a disadvantage versus Korea's MRA partners like the U.
S, Canada, or Singapore, just to name the three of them. So which sectors are we aiming to cover under the MRA? On his recent visit to Seoul that I mentioned, the Commissioner Septovich agreed with his counterpart to work towards the negotiation of an MRA once respective internal procedures are completed, of course. Regarding sectoral coverage, the two parties have identified the sector of electronics as a shared interest. In addition, Korea expressed interest in covering other sectors like pharmaceuticals, packaging, telecom, or broadcasting.
We have not committed to cover any specific sector so far, and this will need to be explored once we have the mandate was internally and then in discussion with Korea. So I think I can leave it here for I hope it was a clear presentation, and I'm happy to try and reply to whatever comments or questions you have, many things.
Bernd Lange
Yeah. Thanks a lot. And indeed, Mauro Shevkovich was in Korea recently. And because of that, unfortunately, he had to cancel a meeting at the world's biggest industrial fair in my hometown, Hannover, where he was foreseen as a speaker. So luckily, Korea and poor Hanover.
So, but I will give now the floor to our standing rapporteur on Korea, Lina, for three minutes, please.
Lina Gálvez
Thank you. Thank you very much, Chair. Thank you also for the commission and for the very good explanation. Indeed, as you said, Chair, it's a very technical issue. Sorry.
Very technical issue, but very geopolitical at the same time because, as you know, South Korea is one of our most essential strategic partners now in the world, but specifically in the Indo Pacific region, and this relation is both on not only in deep economic integration, but also on shared values. I think today, discussed a crucial step to modernize this partnership that we have with Korea and the commission's request for Monday to negotiate this mutual recognition agreement. It is a good example of it. While our free trade agreement has already eliminated 98.7% of tariffs, non-tariff barriers remain a significant hurdle. Currently, many European manufacturers are forced into double testing, also Korean ones as well, paying twice and waiting twice to prove their products meet technical regulations.
This is competitive training. And in the world we live in today, we cannot simply afford it. By failing to act, leave European Union supporters at a comparative disadvantage in a market that reached 123,700,000,000 in bilateral trade last year. For my group, for the S and D, this agreement is our priority for at least 3 key aspects. First one, to support, and it has also already been mentioned by the commission to support SMEs.
Small and medium-sized enterprises cannot easily absorb the high cost of redundant laboratory testing and certification. This MRRA is a concrete tool for their internationalization. Second, efficiency without deregulation. Crucially, MRA's agreement does not require regulatory harmonization. We are not lowering our guard, but we are recognizing the technical competence of each other's laboratories to verify that our high European Union standards have been met.
And of course, we will remain vigilant to ensure we have already this sort of agreement with other countries that, at the same time, they have an agreement also with Korea. So it really makes sense that we have our own one with South Korea. And third and finally, specifically, it is important because of a strategic momentum. This negotiation completes, obviously, the digital trade agreement. I hope it will be really signed very soon, and that will be one of my questions, how it's going.
And also because of the recent association of Korea with Horizon Europe. So I think this is also a very key element we have to look at. And obviously, in this world of fragmented supply chains with map, different ties with trust, like-minded allies. So I urge all parts to adopt the negotiations directly, swiftly, so we can eliminate these wasteful technical barriers and deliver tangible benefits to our workers and business. I'm really looking also forward to that we really could move forward on June summit between European Union and Republic Of Korea, and I will be part of a mission from the European Parliament and Korean Peninsula delegation that will take place in May.
So I hope we will be able also to deal with those issues personally there in Korea. And now I have to leave because I have.
to vote in Idlib, but.
Mika Aaltola
Thank you very much. The topic is important, South Korea. Major democracies are facing similar threat actors as we are as well. So I will speak on behalf of Capriel Mato and read his remarks and questions concerning the topic. This negotiation mandate with The Republic Of Korea on the mutual recognition of conformity assessments is a technical file, but has clear strategic implications for European content competitiveness.
Speaker 16
While the free trade agreement has already removed tariffs, non-tariff barriers, particularly the application of testing and certification, continue to affect effective market access for European companies. The objective here is to allow mutual recognition of results issued by designated conformity assessment bodies, thereby reducing costs and administrative burdens, especially for SMEs. Experience with other EU agreements show that we are sufficiently pieces of this sector of specific, unsector specific, this can effectively eliminate duplicate testing in areas such as electrical equipment and electromagnetic compatibility. So I would like to raise two points. First, how will the commission ensure a high level of reciprocity across sectors and avoid situations where EU operators remain at a disadvantage compared to the partners that already benefit from a more advanced arrangement with Korea?
Second, how will you ensure that the benefits are tangible for SMEs while preserving the integrity of the EU's conformity assessment system and its network of notified bodies? Thank you very much.
Thanks a lot.
Benoit Cassart
Colleagues, I'm speaking on behalf of Dan Barna for the Renew Group. Well, we welcome the negotiations. Korea is our eighth biggest commercial partner, trade partner, and the absence of a mutual recognition agreement is a considerable handicap for our companies compared to those of the US or the UK, who already have such agreements in place. Two, this mutual recognition agreement will allow us to raise non-tariff barriers by recognizing European Union certificates, by eliminating the double testing and reducing delivery times. Three, while big companies can absorb the significant administrative costs, obligatory testing in Korea remains a major obstacle for SMEs.
This agreement, mutual recognition agreement, is an essential tool for European competitiveness, in line with the strategic recommendations of the Dragon report. Now beyond the trade aspects, this agreement constitutes a pillar of our economic security and our securing our supply chains in terms of high tech components, and simplifying administrative formalities is a practical step towards open strategic autonomy. It's crucial that we undertake and conclude these negotiations quickly in order to consolidate access of European products, in particular in high-tech and electronics sectors, to a market estimated to be worth more than €120,000,000,000. Thank you.
Bernd Lange
Merci. And now give the floor to the vice chair of the EP delegation with the Korean parliament, Miss Anous Nerudoba.
Thank you, chair.
Danuše Nerudová
Dear mister Devlo, dear colleagues, I am glad to be able to join today's discussion on behalf of the delegation for relations with Korean Peninsula. I would like to thank Mister Devlo for his presentation on the importance of opening negotiations with South Korea for a mutual recognition agreement on conformity assessment certificates and markings. South Korea is a strategic partner for the European Union of high importance for our Indo Pacific strategy, but also a close ally on the international scene. Since the entry into force of the free trade agreement with South Korea over a decade ago, our bilateral trade and investment have flourished. The EU as a whole is currently the largest direct investor in South Korea with an FDI stock of 53,000,000,000, nearly a quarter of all foreign investment in the country.
The partnership between the EU and South Korea is a partnership that delivers, and this is of high importance in the current challenging economic times at the international level. The proposal to open negotiations on the mutual recognition agreement on conformity assessment certificates and markings with South Korea is a welcome step in this direction. It would complement the existing free trade agreements and help unlock its full potential, particularly for small and medium-sized enterprises, which bear a disproportionate share of the cost of duplicated testing and certification requirements. I would also note that South Korea already has mutual recognition agreements in place with several of our key competitors, including the US, Canada, and the UK. EU exporters, especially in sectors like electronics, currently operate at a real competitive disadvantage.
This agreement is therefore not just an opportunity. It is, in many ways, a necessity. In this context, I would like to raise two questions for Mister Devlov. First, what can we expect in terms of the calendar and the duration of the negotiations? And second, which sectors does the commission intend to prioritize in the initial scope of the agreement?
I would like to thank you for involving the delegation for relations with Cora Peninsula in this discussion, and we look forward to further cooperation with the International Trade Committee. Thanks.
Bernd Lange
Thanks a lot. Of course, that's our usual practice to integrate the delegation into our work as well. Thanks a lot for being here. From my side, also two points. So first, also regarding the small and medium-sized enterprise.
So this is related a little bit to the sectors. You mentioned from the European side, only electronics as a possible sector. That's quite limited, and I see that that's a huge volume of small and medium sized enterprise in these sectors which could benefit from that. Do you have, first, other sectors in mind as well? I remember that we had with Korea some problems in the car sector for car parts.
So we didn't really recognize the certification process. So are there any sectors, any elements which might also benefit much more small and medium sized enterprises? And secondly, you mentioned that we have now seven MIE with countries. Do you have in mind that there will be some other follower? And if yes, which partners could be?
Mister Leber.
Leon DELVAULT
Thank you very much, and thank you very much for the support expressed to our endeavor. I think we largely share the objectives that have been expressed, and it's good to hear, of course. To try and reply to your questions, I think there was a question from Sterling on the digital agreement. So our aim is to sign it in the margin of the summit next month, so on June 10. On reciprocity and tangible benefits, yes, we certainly aim.
That's the objective. That's the aim. How do we ensure this? I mentioned we and also reply to your question, mister Lange. I think the sectoral coverage is not defined.
I think we have also voluntarily kept it open. I think there was a convergence on the electronics, but I think that's a little bit the starting point. Koreans have insisted on or flagged some other sectors they would be interested in. I think I mentioned pharmaceuticals, packaging and packaging waste, broadcasting, and telecommunication. On our side, we are still discussing this internally.
So it's a bit premature to give you a clear indication. But it's let's say, since we are gonna we're for reciprocity and tangible benefits, it's likely that this will have to be enlarged, but it's too early to see where exactly so. But I'm happy to come back to this. So also, in that regard, that it's difficult to give an assessment of the timeline because we are really at a very early stage, and we need to see how constructive these discussions can be. On other countries, you know, that our priority is Ukraine.
So we have this, you remember this on the industrial products on the Ukrainians haven't taken now some steps to align to EU legislation, which should make it easier to start the negotiations on the agreement. So the priority will certainly be Ukraine. You know, the Western Balkan countries have also signaled an interest for this type of agreement. So this might also be coming, but they're not as advanced at this stage as Ukraine has. And then, of course, you know that the updates are in the pipeline for Switzerland, which is a very important trading partner, especially on MRAs.
It's really key for some of our competitiveness there. So that's okay. Thank you.
Bernd Lange
Perfect. Thanks a lot for that. We will stay in contact and follow the negotiation and hopefully a positive outcome with our, yeah, strategic partner Korea. Thanks a lot. This was point five, and now we switch to point six.
The trade relation with Israel. And as you know, in September 2023, the commission proposed to suspend certain trade related provisions of the association agreement between the EU and Israel. The proposal followed a review of Israel's compliance with Article 2 of the agreement, specifically regarding the respect of human rights and democratic principles. This entitles the EU to suspend the agreement unilaterally. But since then, nothing really has happened.
This is one issue in the trade relation. And the second is that the product labeling on products coming from Israel is based on a note from the commission from 2015 that the products from Israel should only be labeled as made in Israel if they are coming not from occupied territories, occupied since June 1967. And this there are some doubts that specifically after the situation in the West Bank that this obligation is not fulfilled in a proper way. So the court of justice in 2019 had made quite clear that the consumer in Europe has to be fully informed if a product is coming from Israel or if it is coming from the settlements. So therefore, also here the question: what is the latest state of this labeling issue?
Two issues which are highly interesting and, I guess, also relevant for the political discussion here in the parliament. And we have now Mister Vladimir Janik Tzek, the head of division of Middle East and North Africa of the EAS with us. And I'll give him the floor for about seven minutes.
Vladimir Janik Tzek
Thank you, Mr. Chair, and good morning to all honorable members. Let me say a few words, and I would like to focus on a number of things and also provide a little bit of a political chapeau to the discussion. I could focus on the latest state of play in the EU efforts and what the High Representative and Vice President has been doing recently. And also, I will come back to the discussion around Article two that the chair referred to, and also a state of play there and where we are also in view of the upcoming Foreign Affairs Council.
Speaker 23
So first, let me start with the region and with the latest developments. Of course, currently, we have also seen that there's a strong focus on the broader region, where the EU continues to support diplomatic efforts to achieve regional peace and address all outstanding issues with Iran, and we have also seen the escalation with Lebanon. Despite this regional escalation, however, the US advocated for the need to refocus on Gaza and in particular on advancing the implementation of the Gaza peace plan, as well as on the situation in the West Bank, where we have seen increased tensions recently also, including due to settler violence and continued settlement expansion. In Gaza, I think it's fair to say that progress remains very slow with Phase two of the Gaza peace plan effectively nearly stalled, including on some key issues such as the militarization of Hamas, withdrawal of the ASF, as well as the launch of meaningful recovery efforts. We continue to follow the mediation efforts very closely.
Vladimir Janik Tzek
We discussed this also with high representative Mladinov who was here, in Brussels for two major events that I will refer to, in a bit. And our efforts, our support to these efforts continue. The humanitarian situation remains catastrophic, with a number of humanitarian trucks entering Gaza remaining under the targets that have been foreseen by the Gaza peace plan. So below the levels also that we saw last year during the ceasefire in 2025. This is due to a number of reasons, including issues of humanitarian access.
The EU, of course, is staunchly committed to supporting the implementation of the Gaza peace plan in line with United Nations Security Council Resolution 2803, which sets out the parameters in September. We have continued to work with partners along four main work streams: humanitarian aid, where we have remained the first humanitarian partner or donor; CSDP Missions, its contributions to security arrangements; support to governance and peer reform; and to early recovery and reconstruction. On CSDP, I would recall that Juban Rafa has been redeployed at the Rafa border, the crossing point. Since the operations began or resumed in February, over 4,000 people have now crossed the crossing point, comprising over 2,000 entries and 2,000 exits, including 760 medical cases. We also have a second CSEP mission, New Polkops, which remains active in the West Bank, and discussions are ongoing on possible future adjusted activities also for U Polkops.
Speaker 23
We have also engaged with the transitional structures that were set out under 2803, the resolution, and under the Board of Peace, with discussions with High Representative Madenov. I would recall the two rather important events that the High Representative and Vice President hosted here on April 20, the Global Lines for the implementation of the two state solution and the Ad Hoc Clairs on Committee, which convened here on the same day. The Global Lines saw the participation of over 60 delegations and also Israel for the first time participated as observer. The HLC was, of course, an important and well known platform, which resumed now. The interesting part was that the Brussels meeting allowed really everybody to convene around the same table with representatives of the Palestinian Authority, but also the Board of Peace, the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza. So that is the temporary committee for Gaza.
The high representative also engaged herself with Prime Minister Mustafa, who was here, so the Palestinian Prime Minister, and she has engaged and regularly maintained regular diplomatic outreach with Foreign Minister Saar, with whom she has raised a number of issues very consistently. Now briefly, allow me to say a few words on the impact on EU-Israel relations and in reference to the discussion on Article two. The development, of course, that we have seen in the occupied Palestinian territory and also in Lebanon as well as the recent adoption of the death penalty law in Israel by the Knesset have prompted renewed calls from various corners, including some member states, to reopen the discussion on article two of the EU Israel Association Agreement. As you know, four ministers discussed this last year extensively also on the basis of the review of Israel's obligations under article two, which the high representative and vice president conducted last year with the support of a majority of member states. Foreign ministers reverted to this discussion in April, so at the last, FAC.
However, we can say that there was no unanimity on the course to pursue. Foreign ministers are now expected to revert to the discussion in May, so that's the FAC on Monday, on the eleventh. There is a package of measures also that the Chair referred to that, of course, concerns the partial suspension of trade provisions related to trade, which, of course, trade colleagues can say more about, but all about the package was, of course, broader, with a partial suspension of Horizon Europe and the suspension of the bilateral financial support with the exception of support to civil society and Yad Vashem, and also a package of sanctions against violent settlers and Hamas. We see that there are further discussions needed in the council in order to reach either unanimity or QMV on each part of the package. We hope that there might be consensus at some point in view of the adoption of the package of sanctions against violent settlers and Hamas, in particular, also because there is a clear tasking by the European Council to the Council from last year.
As follow-up to the discussion that foreign ministers had in April, Services, that is also the AES and DG trade and services across the commission, are also examining further joint proposals that came from several member states regarding trade with settlements. And, the higher president, the higher representative and vice president will revert to this on Monday, also following her discussions with commissioner Shevzowicz. I will stop here and over to you.
Bernd Lange
Thanks a lot. And, mister Delvo from the DG trade side, also seven minutes.
Leon DELVAULT
Thank you very much. I think we've presented this already, so nothing that I would say is gonna be a novelty, but I'll try also to reply to your point, mister chair. So let me briefly recall the state of play on the commission proposal on the suspension of certain trade-related provisions of the association agreement with Israel that the commission adopted on September 17. As you will, as you know, this proposal was part of a broader package of measures proposed by the commission. It is based on a political decision linked to policy considerations.
E, the violation of respect for human rights as an essential element of the association agreement. This is to be implemented under a trade legal basis, due to the content of the provisions we propose to suspend. If adopted by the council, it would imply that the EU and Israel would trade on MFN terms rather than on preferential terms. This suspension would also be bidirectional, so not only would Israel, of course, lose its preference when exporting to the EU, but this would also be the case for the EU exporting to Israel. The proposal for the adoption of this decision requires a qualified majority in the council.
It remains on the table, and I understand it has been discussed at the Foreign Affairs Council on April 21. Discussion has taken place. We see maybe more interest by some member states than was the case before, but we have not seen a qualified majority emerging. As you also know, we are looking forward to the European citizens initiatives, which is likely to be put forward to the commission with the request to put forward the proposal to the council for the full suspension this time of the UAE Israel association agreement. The commission will, of course, formally respond to it once it's validated.
And maybe to Mr. Chet, to your point on the labeling. Indeed, there is an interpretative notice of 2015 that the commission has sent to member states, and it was confirmed by a judgment of the European Court of Justice in 2019. So the enforcement of these rules as is set up in the union lies with member states authorities. So in this case, for the labeling its market surveillance authorities, we have not received any notification of noncompliance from any member state nor actually complaints from businesses with regard to the respect or implementation of this interpretative inter sorry, for this interpretative notice.
Thank you.
Bernd Lange
Thanks a lot. Now I give, on behalf of the standing group, Patil, here, Kathleen Van Bijndt, the floor for three minutes.
Kathleen Van Brempt
Thank you. Thank you very much. Thank you very much to the representatives of the commission for their explanations. And today, we are in the trade committee, but we all know that this debate is not only about trade. It's about something much bigger than that.
It's about the credibility of the European Union that claims to stand for its own values and for international law, which we tend to do in many cases, but not in this case. And that's why this is bigger than trade. Last year, let me go a few steps back. It has been mentioned also by our chair, but the EIS's own review has concluded that there is a breach of article two of the EU-Israel association agreement. This is not a political opinion.
This is a legal finding. And that finding gives the European Union not only the possibility, but the responsibility to act. And thank you for the explanation, coming from the EIS, to explain that the situation today after the genocide in Gaza has not improved and that the humanitarian situation is still disastrous. But on top of that, we see more violence against Palestinian civilians, an introduction of the death penalty, more settlement expansion in the West Bank, and a military operation across the region including also violations of international law and war law in Lebanon. And there's also a more fundamental layer.
Under international law, including the genocide convention, we all, all of us here also in this parliament, have the duty to take action to prevent a potential genocide. So my questions are quite simple, and I do know that you haven't found a qualified majority yet. But, normally, the commission can be much more active. You don't just sit there and see, oh, there's not yet a qualified majority. What action did you actually undertake as a commission?
And not just say everything and drop it in the council's hands. What follow-up action is the commission preparing now that the last council meeting on foreign affairs did not come to a decision? What are you intending to do? And let me go to the issue of the trade with illegal settlements, also a very long standard issue and problem. And the current differentiation policy, which offers labels and tariff exclusion, is not enough.
It may discourage some trade flows, but it does not stop them. And at the same time, we are seeing that in member states, they're moving on their own. Spain is already banning products, and countries like Ireland, Belgium, Slovenia, and The Netherlands are preparing or are considering similar steps. And it's up to the commission to make sure that we have one approach to this and not all these different approaches in member states. And lastly, last week, we have seen the commission warn Israel that it is ready to consider sanctions over trade in Ukrainian grain stolen by Russia.
That is the right reaction. So good that we go in that direction. Well, so my questions and you haven't given an answer to that. When will the commission finally bring forward a really legislative proposal to ban trade with illegal settlements in the occupied Palestinian territory? Sorry.
It is that is your task. That is your obligation to come up with a proposal. Does the commission confirm that this can be done under the common commercial policy and therefore by qualified majority in the Council? And how will the commission stop a patchwork of national bans, and instead ensure a single coherent European approach? Thank you.
Bernd Lange
Thanks a lot, Kathleen. Now I give the floor to the Chaired Operators, Lydia, for the EPP SFR for 2 minutes.
Speaker 25
Thank you very much, Chair. Thank you to the external action service and the Digi Trade for the update, but I will speak in Portuguese. I
Speaker 26
I think we see the escalation over the last few months when we look at the very serious humanitarian situation in Gaza, when we look at the illegal expansion in the West Bank area due to colonists, and the serious situation with human rights and international law. These were reasons why the commission said it was going to suspend the agreement between Israel and the EU. But without an official declaration of the violation of article two, this is not sound in terms of a legal basis. So my question, and this goes to the representatives of the commission, is the following. Is there a recent evaluation on the political and economic impact of a partial suspension of this agreement?
And then on the issue of labeling, the EU's rules aren't very clear, and there should be a differentiation made between those produced in Israel and those produced in Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories. These products cannot enter the EU. So it's not a boycott. It's simply labeling to show the consumer where it comes from. If these products are still coming in and still being labeled as Israeli, they're benefiting from trade preferences that they should not be, and we're bypassing the origin rules and customs rules.
Now we know that customs checks are not always systematic, and it can be hard to identify the origin when it's complicated supply chains. And standards are applied in different ways from country to country. So all of this is quite problematic because trade is an exclusive EU competence, but the commission does have tools to act, to have better coordination between the customs authorities, to strengthen checks, to use specific provisions in the customs codes if there is a suspicion of fraud. So what specific tools are being used in order to prevent these rules being circumvented so that we have a coherent application of this within our legal framework? Thank you.
Sebastian.
Speaker 27
Yes. Thank you very much, Mr. Thier. Yes. This week in The Netherlands, we commemorated our dead who fell since the second World War, including the more than 100,000 Jews who were deported and murdered by the Nazis. An event under high tension because scum have been trying to hijack commemoration for years with their Gaza genocide nonsense. For after the October 7 pogrom in Israel and Israel's illogical response to it, the unthinkable happened in my view.
Speaker 28
Instead of condemning the perpetrators and supporting the victims, we saw that but mostly left wing so called politicians sided with Hamas and the terrorists instead of civilization. Since then, we saw also in this parliament countless attempts to punish Israel instead of supporting it. Once again, also today, attempts to suspend the association agreements while we, as the European Union, enter into numerous partnerships with well, descrutable regimes. An obsession with Israel is ongoing, and we have to call it as it is, antisemitism. The political madness which is on display in this parliament in Europe or across the world is total madness.
And we also count on the middle groups in the parliament, but also on, well, the leaders of states who still have common sense to not be intimidated by scum and choose for civilization instead of a repetition of history. We want to intensify economic cooperation with Israel because the people of Israel have a friend in us, and that will remain so. Thank you very much.
Bernd Lange
Thanks a lot. And now for the renew, it's Luby Carravazova. Carvazova?
Ľubica Karvašová
You. Thank you, Chair, and thanks to you and the Commission for your presentation. This is a very important debate. And I would like to take the opportunity to raise three questions. First, I would like to ask about the potential consequences of a suspension or termination of the EU Israel association agreement.
Speaker 30
Could the commission elaborate on how such a step would affect trade flows between the EU and Israel? Have you conducted so far any quantitative assessments or impact studies? And if so, could you share indicative figures on trade volumes, sectors affected, and so on, so we have an idea what we are actually discussing? Second, I would like to ask about the feasibility of further trade measures building on the recent initiative supported by several member states in the Council. And in particular, how does the commission assess the legal and practical feasibility of introducing a comprehensive ban?
Speaker 31
That would be very interesting to know your new view on. And of course, I mean the comprehensive ban on trade with Israeli settlements in territories occupied since 1967. Finally, I would like to turn to recent reports that have already been mentioned by colleagues that Israel may have imported stolen grain originating from Ukraine via Russia. In light of these allegations, what concrete steps has the commission taken so far? Are there ongoing investigations, coordination with Ukrainian authorities, or consideration of sanction?
Speaker 30
I think this is an issue we have to put at the table as well, in this context. Thank you very much.
Speaker 32
Thank you, chair. Also, let's start with the very basics. Article two of the association agreement is very clear, and its breach is also very clear by the human rights abuses conducted in the genocide in Gaza, the endless violence perpetrated against Palestinians by settlers in the West Bank, and by the appalling death penalty law against Palestinians and the war crimes committed in Gaza and Lebanon. This is clear. The EAS has founded, and also more than 1,000,000 European citizens have called on the EU to suspend the association agreement.
It's really up to member states to act, and that goes without saying. But yet, we're seeing it again maybe for the 30th or 40th time in this parliament. Moving on to the import ban of products from illegal settlements, which would not be covered, even if the association agreement were to be suspended. We need to be very clear. Our import of goods and services from illegal territories is fueling economically the Israeli policy of annexation of the Palestinian territories, and that cannot happen.
I therefore call on the commission to formally table a proposal to place an import ban on products originating from illegal settlements, and I would like clarity on where we stand on that process. Has the EAS discussed this with DG Trade, especially since last week's meeting of the Foreign Affairs Council, and when can we expect a proposal? Moving on to labeling, which sounds technical, but is also important. A recent study by the European Middle East project concluded that there was not a single instance of proper labeling among the hundreds of wine bottles examined in European shops. So if we have rules on labels, why can't anyone seem to follow them?
Speaker 34
And can I ask, in the context of the current policy, what is the European Commission concretely doing to enforce proper labeling of these products? Fourth point, I'd like to echo what my colleague said about the grains from Ukraine, and agree with President Zelensky when he said that Israeli authorities cannot be unaware of which ships are arriving at the country's port and what cargo they are carrying. This makes no sense. How will the EU proceed with sanctions against Israel and those individuals involved in the trade on stolen Ukrainian grain? And my very final point is I would like to understand if we took trade action against the illegal occupation of areas of Ukraine by Russia, what makes the situation so different that we can't enforce the same rules against Israel?
Manon Aubry
Thanks, Mr. President. Thanks to the European Commission, to colleagues for finally having a debate on the matter. I will switch to French, if you don't mind. Well,
Speaker 35
I'm going to go straight to the point here. Commission representatives, what more do you need to suspend the association agreement between Israel and the EU? 1,100,000 people have asked for this and signed our European citizens' initiative. The experts from the UN are asking this. Three hundred staffers of the EU, including the former high representative, Youssef Borrell.
We are seeing daily bombing of Lebanon despite the ceasefire. We have around 1 million people displaced. A huge amount of people killed in the Gaza Strip, obstruction of humanitarian aid. Journalists still cannot enter new illegal attack against the Gaza flotilla. And we just see a pursuit of apartheid in the West Bank.
If all of that is not enough to suspend the association agreement, this makes the EU the number one trading partner with Israel. So what is it that you need? Do you need the examination of an entire people? And the EU continues to say, well, we are still happily buying products that come from a genocidal government. Even the EU Commission's services have accepted that article two has been violated, the respect of human rights, which is linked to this association agreement.
And through this agreement, the EU is financing, legitimizing these crimes of Benjamin Netanyahu. So my question is very simple to you. The Israeli state seems to have all the rights in the eyes of the EU. How can you explain it when it comes to sanctions against Russia? You were able to move past blockages in council, but here, you are hiding behind the block in the council.
Speaker 36
Where is the European Council's, Commission's proposal? Europeans do not want to be complicit in this horror, so you need to properly represent them. Thank you.
Bernd Lange
To the chair of the delegation for the relation with Israel, Hildegard, and for two minutes as well.
Hildegard Bentele
Dear colleagues of the Inter Committee, thank you for inviting me today. With regard to a potential suspension, I would like to recall the procedural requirements for such a step. First of all, I would hold your opinion that a new report on potential human rights violations would need to be issued since the report from 2025 is outdated and was additionally strongly flawed, having been issued by an anonymous office relying on very few sources and never having been made public, especially not to us as members of the European Parliament. Second, the Association Council would need to be convened, Israel would need to be given the opportunity to present its position and eventually remedy the potential violations, etc. If UN and the Commission choose to embark on a new policy of examining EU association agreements on the basis of human rights violations, I would encourage you to do so in a non-discriminatory manner and subsequently focus on all potential perpetrators, including, for example, Israel's neighbor, Egypt, where severe human rights violations have been reported for many years, where the death penalty remains established practice and where executions are reported, carried out on a monthly basis.
Speaker 38
With regards to product labeling, I would also call on you not to act in a discriminatory manner and not to violate the IHRA working definition of anti-Semitism as it is currently the case. There are more than 150 conflict-occupied and disputed territories in the world, yet the EU requires labeling only for Israeli products originating from disputed areas. What we are currently witnessing is the politicization of food labeling requirements, as socioethnical considerations are suddenly being introduced into what should be a technical and consumer-focused framework. Again, if you, dear Inter colleagues, intend to embark on a political or human rights-based labeling policy, then this should be done in a non-discriminatory manner. For example, future Chinese products should be labeled made in China, suspected of oppression of the Uighurs.
Speaker 40
I could also point out that the ECJ judgment does not specify the exact wording acceptable for the implementation of the required labeling, and that national guidelines are therefore needed for this purpose. I am running out of time. Allow me just a final remark. Figures clearly show that Palestinians benefit significantly through higher wages, health insurance, and other social services when working together with Israelis in places such as the Barkan Industrial Zone in Samaria, Mishor Adumim near Jerusalem, or the Ariel Industrial Zone. I strongly believe, as it was the case in the European Union, economic cooperation between Israelis and Palestinians can offer tangible and pragmatic pathway towards coexistence, and I continue to believe that the European Union should remain a destination for products of such provenance.
Bernd Lange
Thanks. And now the chair of the delegation for the relation with Palestine, Lynn.
Lynn Boylan
Thank you, chair. And I think for today's exchange of views, we should just stick to the facts and not engage in casting aspersions on any of the institutions or engaging in conspiracy. We're looking at the existing labeling requirements for the illegal settlements, which are insufficient, and also why we need a suspension of the EU-Israel Association Agreement. And I'll first deal with the settlements. In July 2024, the ICJ issued its advisory opinion on the settlements.
Paragraph 278 of that opinion is crystal clear. It says the states are under an obligation not to render economic assistance to the occupation. Profits from trade or legal settlements are the proceeds of a crime. This is notably something that the EU took very seriously when it came to stolen Ukrainian grain that was destined for Israel. They acted very decisively and quickly.
They used the leverage that they had and seems to have had an effect. The existing EU policy on settlement products labeling an exclusion from preferential treatment is clearly not in line with the ICJ opinion, which obliges states to take steps to prevent the trade or investments that assist in the maintenance of the illegal occupation. And labeling is very clearly about maintaining trade, and that's notwithstanding the fact that, as others have said, a recent investigation couldn't find a single case of proper labeling. So my first question for the commission is when can we have the legislative proposal to ban the sale of settlement goods to the EU? This is completely within your remit.
Now moving to the wider issue of suspension of the association agreement. Either party can denounce the agreement. It does not require a meeting of the association council. It's almost one year since the EEAS issued its damning report that found Israel in breach of article 2. And in that period, Israel has continued killing Palestinians, continued its expansion of illegal settlements, has killed 3,000 and displaced 1,000,000 Lebanese citizens, has introduced a racialized death penalty, and continues to destroy EU-funded infrastructure.
And we've had several requests for suspension from Ireland, Spain, Slovenia, Belgium, the Dutch parliament, and over 1,000,000 EU citizens. And I I'll wrap up here, chair, but I will make the point that the credibility of the EU is on the floor. The double standards and failure to uphold international law are blatant. And I'll note a poll from today from the European movement, which has found that in Ireland, support for the EU has fallen to its lowest standard ever. It's down 11% since 2019, and 33% of Irish people believe the EU is not upholding its core values.
Bernd Lange
Thanks a lot. And now I give the other members the floor, and Hannah is first.
Speaker 41
Thank you very much. It's a pity that this is always polarized. Everybody giving polarized opinion here, and it's going to stack, as Lynn said, to the facts. First of all, I think we are all very tired of using the term antisemitism. I haven't said it many times, and I will repeat it.
Arabs are Semites. So if we are all same antisemites condemning Israel, then the Israeli government is super antisemite because it's killing thousands of Arabs that are Semites. For god's sakes, let's go to talk properly here. Arabs are Semites too. So please, let's always have this in consideration.
We do not have anything against the Israelis or the Israeli state. But yesterday, this Israeli government that is killing with impunity thousands of people. So what we were talking about before, the ban of the products of Israel that we need to follow because it was said also crystal clear an opinion of the ICJ. And in the eyes of the ICJ, the commission has responsibilities in international law. So they are not really fulfilling properly their duty, as it is said.
It's important to say here that if not for the fact of the killing of more than 72,000 people in Israel and now also in Lebanon, let's go to talk about the death penalty. It was said here before, if we do it for Israel, we do it to other countries like China. For god's sake, we voted in Strasbourg. Everybody with a huge majority at the statement on human rights in China. Am I right or not?
So, yes, if you are to do this, no, then for the rest of the countries too. So I think we are being very logical in this parliament when we talk about human rights. So if we talk about what if some countries, we talk about the others. It's going to have political coherence on this. What has happened in the West Bank is not acceptable.
Killing people with impunity and these soldiers and these illegal settlers are not being charged, not even in court. This is, for us as Europeans and the European Union, that is not acceptable. And this is not being against the state of Israel. It's a state against this government, which is killing with impunity, and nobody is being charged for that. And last, and not least, two questions.
So when will the commission take action under article 2,207? A proposal for a real EU ban on goods coming from the illegal Israeli settlements. Nine countries already calling on the commission to act. What are you waiting for? Thank you.
Thanks a lot, Saskia.
Thank.
Speaker 42
Thank you very much. I'll be speaking French in the intergroup. We already asked a number of times for more, for the commission to be more proactive in the EEAS as well to try and get the commission, the council to get at least the minimal voting to suspend this agreement. There are hundreds of questions. We've had letters.
Speaker 44
We've had support from NGOs, from citizens on a huge scale, but still, the institutions seem to be providing a very lukewarm response when it comes to suspending the association agreement with Israel. It's not even stopping trade with Israel, which is openly violating international law. It's a partial suspension and to reestablish tariffs. That is where we are in our discussions. You say that there will be sanctions against Israel for having bought stolen Ukrainian grain, and that is good.
Speaker 43
I repeat that. But when are we going to sanction Israel for reestablishing the death penalty? War crimes in Lebanon, humanitarian catastrophe. You say to us again and again that the EU is the biggest humanitarian donor when it comes to Gaza and the Palestinians. But what does that mean if this humanitarian aid never reaches its target?
It rots at the borders, and we do not hold the Netin Yahoo government accountable. They're not reimbursing us for this last stay. Where is the EU assuming its responsibilities here? Acting to prevent genocide is an obligation under international law, and one of these ways of acting is suspending this trade part of the association agreement. Nobody contests that Israel is openly violating article two, a key part of the agreement in Gaza in the occupied territories.
So we want a clear response, but not just a clear response. We need the commission to be more proactive, and from the EEAS as well. We want your response to be very clear. Ending trade with the economies is necessary to be in conformity with international law. There is no legal way that you can trade with illegal settlements unless the EU decides that it will align itself with Putin and Netanyahu's policy and be a body that no longer responds, respects international law.
Speaker 28
Sebastian. Yes. Thank you very much. Yes, mister chair. There just appeared a message on Blue Sky that Hamas leadership is thanking the Greens and the left for their remarks, because I think it was, again, a display of political madness.
And I think we should debate in this going this parliament based on facts and also not in a hysterical manner. And I think the overuse of the word genocide, which I think is legally unjust because who said, who said there's a genocide? There's been no investigation to it. Nothing has been proved instead of that rather nasty sick guy from the ICC who has been suspended because, well, he raped women over there. So I think we should base and discuss things in this parliament in a normal dignified way.
And I think.
There and check by yourself. Yeah.
Speaker 28
Silence your voice. I'm still giving my remarks. Maybe you should listen sometimes for us instead of only sending. Because, like, people in Europe are getting sick of these people, and so do I. So I think we should, well, I think we should conclude.
Shame on them. Please, be quiet. Your voice, please, madam.
Share. I think I.
Speaker 27
Think women with those pink words shouldn't address me? It's a shame what she's doing. Silence your voice. This is a debate.
Bernd Lange
The microphone's colleagues. Dear colleagues. So everybody has one minute, and we can discuss. And next is Manon.
Manon Aubry
I have to say that it's hard to stay calm when we hear representative of the far right. Who not only still deny the genocide going on in Gaza, but who qualify a judge from the International Court of Justice as a nasty guy. Sorry? But how can you qualify a guy from the International Court of Justice as a nasty guy? I think you should be ashamed of that.
Speaker 35
The same way you should be ashamed to be here, the representative of Benjamin Netanyahu. You should be ashamed of not seeing what's going on in Palestine. You should be ashamed of supporting a government that is killing massively. And the way you behave, just right now, is not only an insult. And it's an insult to all of us when you say silence.
Manon Aubry
No. I'm not gonna stay quiet. I'm not gonna say stay quiet when I hear this kind of qualification. And I'm proud here that there can be a voice and that this voice is coming from the left, that it's here standing in front of people like you and being able to denounce the genocide in Gaza and asking the commission to take action. So now I do hope that we're going to get answers from the European Commission.
Lynn.
Lynn Boylan
Sorry, chair. I just wanted to say that it's very serious if somebody's making allegations about an ICC judge who has been cleared of any sexual misconduct allegations. He is not here to defend his name, that needs to be corrected on the record.
Speaker 40
Sorry. I mean, I'm attending here, I think, the second or third time this kind of discussion. And I want to just get it clear. We are here in the inter-committee. We have a title here.
We talk about trade-related aspects. We can have this discussion all the time with all the aspects, you know, political, CFSP. We can do this, but then we should agree on it and do it for all the colleagues who sit here. I was trying to be very focused on the title of the debate, and I ask you and urge your chair, please get this discussion back to where it should be. We are in the trade committee, we are here with trade colleagues.
Caroline.
Kathleen Van Brempt
Yeah. I'm a little bit in the middle here in the sense that, I don't like the extremes shouting at each other. It will not help one single person in The.
Middle East who are in.
Kathleen Van Brempt
a dire situation today. We need to act, and we need to act as the European Union. And that was my plea, but it's also, and now you will stop nodding, think, Missus Bentley, because I started my plea, and that is essential. This is not just about trade. This is about international law, and we are in a very dire situation.
And I completely agree. I completely agree with you when you said we need to be firm on the Uyghurs in China. We need to be firm also in Egypt. Why not? Yes.
Absolutely. And we asked for that in this committee when we were discussing the agreement with Egypt. So this is the plea of the SND. International law is not something where you can pick and choose. And you do it when it's about Ukraine, and you don't do it when it's about the Middle East.
And there we have to stick to facts and figures and listen to judges and to international organization. And I have no problem if you want extra research on article two. There has been research. And since then, the humanitarian situation in Gaza is catastrophic. People still are dying because they don't have access to medical care, and they don't have food.
And since then, there's been bombing of schools and hospitals in Lebanon. And since then, in the West Bank, people are getting killed without any legal proceedings on that. And that's why we need action of the European Commission both on the ban on the products from settlements. And by the way, it's not only. It's we also have the Western Sahara. Remember, it's not we have a framework as Europeans, and we need to uphold them everywhere.
Bernd Lange
Thanks a lot. And, Tildegard, once again, we are sticking to the discussion on trade policy. And we started with the commission on 20 September 2025, where they said we should suspend certain trade related provisions of the agreement because of the breach of human rights and democratic principles based on article two. And there's totally clear the link between breaching of human rights and democratic principles to trade, and that's also, I guess, covered in the discussion here. So I have no further requests for the floor.
And then I give back the, oh, excuse me, Benoit.
Benoit Cassart
Thank you, chair. I think there are things that are undeniable, the catastrophic humanitarian situation. But, also, it's for the council to take sanctions as an inter committee. We have to calibrate the impact of such decisions. But my question is the following.
In terms of sanctions, if we were to suspend the Israel agreement, have we calibrated the direct economic impact that that would have? But that question was asked. But have we also estimated the impact on future partnerships? Could Israel turn instead easily to other trading partners such as the US, China, whatever? And regarding us, what would be our plan B in terms of other trade outlets?
So, in terms of economic impact, what would be the impact on us and on them of any decisions that we might take? Thank you.
Bernd Lange
I'll now give the floor first to the commission, mister DelVogh, and then to the EAS. Well, yeah, you like it the other way around.
Speaker 23
Okay. Thank you. I will try to reply to or respond to some of the comments and questions that we have heard here today from our point of view. First, maybe, I would revert to the issue of the review, which I also referred to in my introductory remarks, which indeed was conducted last year with the support of a majority of member states and the council. The conclusions were that there were indications that Israel would be in breach of its obligations under article two.
On this basis, of course, the foreign ministers discussed a proposal from the high representative and vice president, various options, which then led to the proposal in September also following the Sotto speech. So since September, there has been a proposal from the commission on the table in the Council. And as we said, I think, and as you know, no measure has found either qualified majority or unanimity respectively. So there are some measures that require unanimity. There are some measures that require qualified majority, but none of them has really reached the required minimum.
So I think it's fair to say that there is a variety of views in the council. The conversation continues. I think the member states are quite united in their aim to do what the EU can do to help improve the situation on the ground. And the high representative and vice president has been also very pragmatic in the sense, and I think she also shared very frankly some of her views with you and several plenary meetings. I think she has been quite frank in outlining what is possible, what is not possible.
She's trying to foster consensus as much as she can. The conversation will continue. As I said, there was a suggestion from several member states to look in more detail into some trade-related possibilities for further differentiation. So and next we are not in a position today to offer a preview of what the conversation will be on Monday, but I can reiterate again that our representative and vice president will outline some options to the foreign ministers, and she has reached out to commissioner Shevzovic in this respect, and we'll see. She will also seek the views of the foreign ministers.
There's also, because there were questions on what else we can do, and I would particularly reiterate the package that is on the table, for sanctions against violent settlers and Hamas. We really hope that the council here will be in a position to find consensus. There's also clear tasking from the European Council, in this respect. So there, I hope that at some point, can see some more positive views. And perhaps finally, on the issue of the vessel that was seen in Haifa, of course, there was also a lot of media attention.
And what I can say is that the EU made an outreach through our ambassador to Israel. So we have made an outreach to the Israeli authorities. It's something that was very closely coordinated with Ukraine, so with the Ukrainian ambassador on the ground. We can take positive note of the fact that the vessel called Panoramidis, turned around and basically didn't unload the grain after the decision by the Grain Importers Association. There was also a lot of media coverage, including from foreign minister Tsar.
For us, I think it's a positive that the vessel was not able to unload. And, of course, the EU policy here is quite clear. And, of course, we reiterate our clear condemnation of all actions that help fund Russia's illegal war effort. With that, I would hand over to my trade colleague.
Leon DELVAULT
Thank you. And I think this was a very helpful framing from our colleague from DES. Just to recall, even if it doesn't seem to be fully live up to expectations of all the members of this committee, the commission has taken a view, has put forward a proposal on the suspension of the agreement. And I think our colleague has recalled the latest development in that regard. The situation, I mean, that we are in for taking decisions is defined by the treaty.
And there's so much the commission can do and should do. Maybe on the question on the impact. So we haven't conducted a proper impact assessment on what the suspension would lead to because, of course, it would be a decision that would have been taken on political grounds and not, I think, with an economic rationale. But if you look at current trade flows, around two three of Israel's export to the EU take place under MFN terms, so a nonpreferential. So only 37% of Israeli exports come in under the association agreement with US tariff preferences.
Close to 70% of EU exports come in at zero MFN rates into Israel. Our estimate based on current trading volumes indicates that suspending preferential access would expose EU exports to up to €574,000,000 in duties. And for the Israelis, it would be €227,000,000 in duties. So the sectors impacted would be imports from Israel include the fresh and processed fruits and vegetables, processed foodstuffs, as well as rubber tires for agricultural vehicles, chemicals, and plastics. For these goods, the EU accounts for approximately one third of Israel's exports, and the resulting tariff differential would range from 0% for medical devices to over 30% for foodstuffs.
As regards EU exports to Israel, the vast majority, as indicated, of Israel's MFN tariffs are zero. So they have autonomously put them to zero, except for vehicles, which have a tariff of 7%. Therefore, the impact would not be large, except perhaps for EU dairy exports. To be noted though that less than 1% of total EU dairy exports go to Israel. So that's for the economic.
On the labeling, fully understand concerns that have been raised. But just as I said, this is really something that market the member states are in charge of. We have received no notification from any member state that there is an issue. Of course, if there are representations to the contrary, we're always ready to listen and discuss, but we have not received any signalizations. Sorry, that was not English.
But on the settlements, as I mentioned, there is the notice. To come back to settlements, we there have been new requests that also our colleague from the ES referred to. The commission, we are currently having this discussion internally. There is no new development that I can purport here? Just maybe to say that our member states are entitled to take measures, you know, that a specific import ban in principle falls within the exclusive competence of the European Union.
Nevertheless, there are exceptions to it. Article 24 of the import regulation may allow member states to take certain trade-restrictive measures if they can be justified, notably under public morality or public policy. No. It's I, of course, heard what members of the Inter was saying, but at this stage, no member state has formally seized the commission with a request to do so. But I would like to, nevertheless, although, of course, we don't want to establish any perils, just to say there have been occasions where some member states have taken measures lately related notably to Russia.
So this is also not something that is just relevant for this region. But as I said, at this stage, we have not been notified. We know that some are contemplating, but again, they have not notified the commission. On the ICJ, I think we have also discussed this several times. I'd just like to recall the commission's position.
Our view is that EU positions and policies are fully aligned with UN resolutions regarding the status of the occupied Palestinian territories. Therefore, EU positions are overall consistent with the conclusions of the advisory opinion of the ICJ. As regards the duty of nonrecognition, the duty to distinguish in the dealings between Israel and its territory because essentially the sorry, Israel and its territory and OPT because we have this the fact that the association agreement does not apply to the occupied territories, as well as the duty of nonassistance. I think this covers what I wanted to say or had can say. Thank you.
Bernd Lange
Yeah. Thanks a lot. So, of course, I have some knowledge about the whole situation. But if I would now be a naive listener, I have the picture in my mind. The commission is sitting there and waiting that a member state is doing something.
And this, to be honest, is not my understanding of the Commission. I think commission should be active, sometimes also looking to some suspects which are raised by citizens and have also some, yeah, investigation assessment about the situation, not waiting for member states. Perhaps you can reflect on that. And, also, we have now the reform of the custom with union ready so that this argument, the member states are only responsible is not valid anymore. So we have, we'll have a risk assessment.
We have a European customs authority. So will this help to have a better understanding about the market situation regarding labeling and the other elements you mentioned?
Leon DELVAULT
You asked this question to me. I think this is something I I'm not able to comment because, of course, it's DG tax dealing with the customs reform. I'm really I don't feel empowered or even just aware of the developments that I could share here. But in any case, it still needs to enter into force. But okay.
Bernd Lange
Thanks a lot. This concludes the public part of the inter for this morning, and we will continue at 03:00 German time. 03:00. Okay. Thanks a lot.
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