Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs Ordinary meeting
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LIBE European Parliament
Follow its sittingsSpeaker 3
Is it also the implementation of the new security framework? And also aim at aligning the areas where we believe member states, based on not only the priority we see, but also based on the knowledge we have in terms of the overall needs of member states. So to have a broad projection of where we believe the financing needs to be targeted. And I think this will be the first opportunity to have a real discussion in terms of orienting basically the different areas where we will want the priorities to be set for member states, where we want the member states also to enhance the capacity here to make use of EU funding. Second step will be a formal, and that will be another very important element for you, a formal distribution of the allocations per member states based on the overall initial proposal in the context of the MFF, which touches upon member state by member state allocation.
Olivier Onidi
But in the context of the overall national and regional partnership plans translated into the different policy areas. So that will be the first opportunity, state by state member to have also a somewhat clear, at least initial ideas in terms of the allocation we foresee for each of the three elements. Is it asylum and integration, border, visa, and also security? And then the third step will, of course, based on a shared understanding of the needs of member states and policy objectives, be to start the national partnership plans, national implementation plans, which, again, according to at least the proposal and what we still have in the context of the discussion both as council and parliament, will, in any case, be subject to a formal proposal by the commission. So that's another way for us to steer the actual implementation of these funds.
On top of the national and regional partnership plans, we still have quite a substantial and commensurate additional instrument, which here will be managed in somewhat more of a classical way. It's the so-called EU facility, which management will be subject to the normal budgetary procedure. So that is typically also an instrument where parliament as a co-budget player will be able to impress and also steer the way we will implement the financing available in the context of this facility. I think that would be the overall picture. Thank you.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you, Messianidi. And now I'll give the floor to each political group representative for a maximum of two minutes, which will be immediately replied by our guest speaker. I will start by giving the floor to Mr. Tchaikovsky, E.P.P.
Tomáš Zdechovský
Thank you, Mr. Chair. I usually use only one minute, but thank you for the two. Thank you, Mister Onede, for your presentation. In the current MMF, a large part of the home affairs funding goes through the national programs.
In practice, this often means many smart projects, small projects. The MMF should also support large, cross-border projects. The threat we face are cross border. I am talking about migration pressure, organized crime, and hybrid threats. In the EPP amendments, we propose a clear change that we want a stronger focus on cross border projects, projects with clear added value, projects that connect member states and make you more secure. We want to avoid fragmented spending that brings little results.
We also stress operation capacity, not only strategies, but real capabilities, ensuring operations stronger support of Europol and Frontex. I think it's needed. Let me ask you a few questions first on the Schengen. In recent years,
We have seen internal border controls come back often because of immigration or security concerns. How will this fund improve the resilience of Schengen in practice? And second, we have invested in the EU information system for years, but real-time interoperability is still not fully working. Also, what is the timeline to make it fully operational? Thank you very much.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you, Mr. Tchaikovsky. Messianity, you have two minutes to reply.
Olivier Onidi
That's a very good start. I think for typical cross-border projects, this will be the essential aim of the EU facility. So a dedicated facility, which will support fundamental projects, which are really cross border. Now the national plans don't mean that we will only cater for activities which stop at the border. And I think the example you have taken is a very good example.
And this is the reason why also before getting into the drafting of the national plans, we will come with this overall EU framework, which will encompass EU-wide for all member states and Schengen associated the key areas and the first assessment of the overall needs in our area. If I look at the example you have mentioned, internal border control, we want that member states in the context of their national and regional partnership plan have an important component in terms of deploying further capacity for the police to work cross-border, for the support of joint patrols, for the establishment of coordination centers. This will be one of the features we will push in the national plans because, of course, there is always a national dimension in the co-financing of this. At the end, it translates into having both capabilities but also human resources you can deploy for such purposes. And this is a good example again, because under the current framework, despite having tried several times to convince my colleagues that this should also be eligible in the context of BMVI.
I always got from all the lawyers a negative answer. So we were not able to develop something which, at the end of the day, most member states now would like to do in order to facilitate the exit of the internal border control measures. On interoperability, full implementation of the entire scheme by '29. This year, the next milestone will be ETIAS in November.
Ana Catarina Mendes
Gracias, president, I will speak in Portuguese, if you don't mind. Thank.
Thank you very much for this presentation, Mr. Onidi. I apologize for arriving a bit late. When it comes to this, report on asylum and migration, what has worried me is these border checks and welcoming policies. So the increase in funding seems to be a good thing.
However, the bad news is that, for Amif, the funds are still the same as what we had in the previous MFF. And I hope that the report that I'm working on will pass, and that we can get the funding. Secondly, another concern that I have, mister Onidi, is that one of the objectives of the asylum migration policy is the abilities for defense in the union, and all different regions. You mentioned the need for more capacities at borders, etcetera, and I agree with that. But I'm wondering, are we not perhaps running a risk here?
Migration isn't about security. It's about sovereignty of our borders, and we do need to regulate that and stop migration from being instrumentalized. But we're talking about democracy, fundamental rights, and integration also. So I want to know if, firstly, you could perhaps explain a bit more about the mechanism that you talked about. And then, when it comes to NRPPs and the different ins, if we'll have different instruments being used or will each member state be able to deal with their own integration policies.
However, I do have an observation, and that's that more integration, more respect for fundamental rights, human rights, etc., is very important given what's happening in detention centers. And I think we need to have more social cohesion in our space.
Olivier Onidi
This Mercian Nidhi. Thank you. But on the there is indeed, I mean, a fundamental political choice to be made in terms of the overall amounts available per field. This is a political choice, which doesn't I cannot interfere in. Our proposal is based on a very thorough estimate, based on also a substantial experience in terms of the needs we have had to deal with over the last years.
Speaker 3
And over the last years, which were characterized by quite a substantial need for catering new resources in order to deal with enhanced asylum requests, better reception facilities. So the overall amount that has been proposed in the context of the MFF is an amount we feel comfortable with in terms of being sufficient to continue accompanying member states in the context of fulfilling the obligations that derive directly from a new legal framework known under the pact and its many dimensions. And we are quite comfortable with the amount proposed because we have had also very intrusive dialogue with member states over the last two years. When you granted us a substantial additional amount in order to prepare for the implementation of the pact. We set in motion something that we've never done before, which was a very close partnership with each member state, with the exception of one that was out of the game.
But all other member states were accompanied by a thorough reflection in terms of budgetary needs to fulfill all the many obligations stemming from the pact. And the result is very promising. If not everything is in place, if a number of reception centers still need to be built, if a number of dedicated centers, dedicated also specialized personnel need to be trained and recruited, the results are very encouraging. And I think the overall projection in the logic of the new MFF, building up national programs with a clear chapter in terms of all the many aspects that are meant to support member states in fulfilling their obligations in terms of asylum and integration will, I believe, help immensely to continue this very close partnership and very intrusive also overview of what member states need and what they actually do. Thank you, Mr. Nidhi.
Javier Zarzalejos
And now I give the floor to Monsieur Leseri, PFE. Ah, messier Tangier. No? Signor Tangier, P.F.E.
PFE, anyway.
António Tânger Corrêa
Well, thank you, Mister Chairman, Mister Director General. I think that you're absolutely right when you mean when you say it's necessary to change Schengen, I mean, to an evolution, positive evolution and so on. I mean, we are facing many of the member states are facing a completely irresponsible and, completely, out of necessity immigration, and that has to stop, and it has to be regularized. Now the question is obviously that we should move for a more controlled situation, not necessarily a full control of the borders like some want, but to have a mechanism that provides to the countries the necessary safety and insurance that their own legal system will be maintained. Now the question that I'd like to ask you is in the gather of flexibility, can we how can we maintain, let's say, the main rules of the future Schengen agreement?
Because if we are too flexible, these are entry gates for, obviously, exceptions, and exceptions will become a reality. Because this thing of the Azilim is nothing else but nowadays, legal immigration, illegal immigration, I mean, dressed by Azilian requests, which are not true. But once they are in our countries, it's a problem for us, and it's a problem for them, and it's a problem for everybody. So, mister director general, my question is, how can we deal with flexibility within the cadre of better control? Thank you very much.
Mr. Hannity?
Thank you. First,
again,
Speaker 3
Construction of the new financial framework is really to get a substantial reinforcement of the amounts available to support the full respect of the new rules in our areas. And you have seen quite a strong prioritization in the context of all the aspects linked with external borders, but also within the Schengen rules, the capacity of member states to work within the Schengen zone in order to cater for enhanced security. The enhanced capacity also to ensure the full enforcement of the new rules derives from the fact that within and in the context of the national and regional partnership plans, we have better opportunities to link not only the provision of financial amounts, but also the control on how member states would have implemented the amounts attributed to them to clear qualitative objectives. And those qualitative objectives will derive directly from the different key rules such as, for example, the capacity to stand and control our external borders, the capacity to reinforce mechanisms in order to conduct according to the rules, and we will see the result stemming from your discussions, your negotiations on the new return regulation. So return, also effective return mechanism, how member states will be building those, how member states will be enhancing those return operation based on the additional amounts.
There will be a much clearer correlation between this than we currently have since today, we work on the basis of a list, which is quite extensive of eligibility criteria but do not have much visibility in terms of really evaluating what has effectively changed or what has effectively been done on the basis of the EU financing. So I believe the system will be much more robust in terms of helping the implementation and enforcement of the rules you have decided.
Assita Kanko
Thank you, Kieran. Thank you, Mister Onidi, for your clear explanations and clarifications. As rapporteur for the internal security fund, I would also like to thank the commission staff for already providing explanation before in our preparatory meetings. It was very helpful. From my side, I'm working on my draft report, which should be done in a few weeks.
And, of course, I may seek to make some modifications to the objectives and definitions in the proposed regulation. As of the bigger picture, I'm glad with the proposed increased budget. I think this is realistic, and we may even need more in the course of the MFF. I heard your message about the potential flexibility that is available there. I think a challenge for us here in the parliament will be to make sure that in the new architecture, we can maintain proper oversight of allocations and the specific objectives.
Home affairs or even internal security interventions cannot be snowed under in the larger national plans. We must be able to follow the requests, money flows, and outcomes of AE fund interventions. As reporter for the ES regulation, together with the shadow reporters, we will, of course, do our best to make that work. And if you have additional comments about these aspects, I'm very happy to hear them. Thank you.
Olivier Onidi
you. I think it is a typical area where we have a joint interest to actually provide and enhance the dialogue amongst ourselves because you have traditionally been the key ally in order to substantially support us in getting new financial means in order to support our policy areas. In many instances and very often related to exceptional circumstances. So I think beyond what you will be able to change in terms of the legal framework that is under examination, the various regulation. There is a strong interest from ours and a strong commitment to actually make sure that we find the right modalities in order to associate you in the concept and also the choices that are being made throughout the different frameworks that we will be establishing in order to ultimately get those national and regional partnership plans adopted.
And hence, the what I said before, as soon as we will have a credible overall policy framework ready on our side, we will come and share it with you in order to discuss the different element of this because this is the start. This is the overall picture where we start appreciating the needs and also appreciate a sense of prioritization.
Speaker 11
Thank you very much indeed, chairman, and thank you, mister Onidhi, for coming to our committee once again to have an exchange on these policies on protecting borders, migration, integration. There's a great deal of structure to this. And we're also looking at our relations with third countries from the angle of migration. I have a couple of very precise questions. First, in relation to the agencies, the financing of Europol and Frontex is foreseen under the NRPP.
How will this operate to make sure that there is proper follow-up and proper monitoring of the agency's actions? It's very specific. Funds are usually territorial in nature. Then secondly, why is euro just in a different category? Why is there a different dynamic that applies?
And if you're looking at it from the security angle, now you usually talk about JITs. Well, Europol is more effective, then Eurojust would have to have the same approach. Then relations with third countries from the migration and integration point of view, Mrs. Minder set out the three headings, in particular, heading three. Could you tell us how that's going to operate?
Speaker 12
How will the home affairs dimension be taken into account, in particular, if you look at our relations with countries to the south? Thank you.
Olivier Onidi
Agencies have become extremely important elements of what we do in our area. Agencies, and notably Europol and Frontex, will be subject to quite a significant reinforcement, provided you agree with the proposals that will come to you. Europol, we are nearly ready. You will have the proposal in June. Frontex, you will have it in September.
We have a little delay there. But in order to safeguard the budget, the budget for these agencies, like for Eurojust and the other agencies, is separate. So it will not be integrated into the national and regional partnership plans. It will be of those national plans, subject to a specific budget, of which we're trying to find the amount, because the amounts have been clearly also identified in the context of the MFF proposal. On third countries, we have and we kept the capacity in the context of our own home funds to support activities linked with third countries, but the essential and substantial origin of the funding will come from the Global Europe Fund, where we both have, in terms of the internal governance in the Commission, a fully fledged say.
So we are part of the discussions and the decisions also in terms of what will be financed under Global Europe. And the overall Global Europe legal framework also provides a clearly established priority for the areas linked with migration and security. So something that will help beyond the previous way of doing, which was to earmark indicatively 10% of the funds for migration related aspects. So the figures proposed for the two agencies, Frontex, 12,000,000,000 euros, 12,900,000,000 and Europol, 3,000,000,000. But it's really out of the home funds.
Erik Marquardt
Yes. Thanks a lot. I have no responsibility for MFF related files in Liebe, but like, I was asked to weigh some questions on behalf of our shadow operators. And so the first question is, does the commission think that allowing reallocation between the three home affairs envelopes will still allow all the objectives under all three regulations to be covered sufficiently? Second question, how does the commission ensure that this reallocation is done based on objective criteria?
And third question, is the commission willing to establish a minimum allocation for each objective of the three regulations?
Olivier Onidi
Monsieur Nidhi ? In terms of the reallocation, I think it's absolutely essential because we've seen over the past how important it was to have the capacity to actually switch. And we're very happy that this flexibility doesn't only concern our own home funds, the three funds. But actually, in the context of these consolidated national and regional plans, we will be able also to tag on a broader portfolio, which is notably the regional funds, and also play the full synergy with regional funds, notably in the area of integration, I think, and legal migration. These are the typical two areas where we will never have enough and substantial funds, where we want to make a big difference, and for which we rely immensely, for the moment, on the goodwill of our partners in charge of the regional funds.
This time, this being integrated in a fully fledged plan, we will be able to drive from this much more than in the past. The objective criteria, so the kind of ex post evaluation of what has been done with the funding. Again, I think it is a way better way of making sure that member states actually do what they are aimed to do and have a better control as to what is actually being done. For the moment, we have still, despite our efforts, despite the deployment of further resources in order to do extra cost controls, etc., we have a very partial view of what is being done, a very also limited view, the purchase of a few vehicles, the purchase of some IT equipment at borders, etc. But we don't have this qualitative appreciation of whether or not this has made a difference, whether this is enough. Here, with the new system, we will also constantly be able to adjust.
Speaker 3
And this is the reason why also, I think, minimum allocations would be a bit of a trap because it would constrain us. I think we'll try in the framework that we are preparing to provide somewhat of an indicative picture of where the funding should go. And then once also, and looking at the formal national allocation, member states will finally be granted after your decision on the MFF. We'll also have somewhat of a good picture on this. But to formalize minimum allocation, I think, will actually constrain us immensely.
Speaker 20
Thank you, and good morning, Mr. Onidi. A very practical question. First of all, you know full well that when it comes to security and the importance of migratory flow, it's the main reason why populism is on the rise across the EU, and this is a major concern for citizens, this issue of migration and integration. And it's against that background that I have a number of practical questions. On Schengen, for example, what can you do to impose matters in such a way that no country allows mass immigration without the authorization of other Schengen countries?
Speaker 18
You mentioned a credible political framework. The EU's credibility is at stake here. You know that the commission does not have a very good reputation in various countries. That's worrying. You said that there was a 3-fold increase in finances.
Speaker 19
Shouldn't you have an advertising campaign, publicity about this, so that citizens know and so that there is a wish to tackle certain issues. And we'll grant you here in Libya that that's what you're trying to do. So Pedro Sanchez, the Prime Minister of Spain, are you going to take any sanctions against the minister? Which ones? We did this with regard to Hungary.
Why not do it again here? Same for Giorgio Maloney, you know, there are very practical consequences to all of this. A further practical question, Bertrand Loubette, captain Bertrand Loubette was received here. He told us about his Franco-German brigade. You probably know about this, Mr. Onidie.
Speaker 18
Can I send him to you? He said that he had difficulties in being known and recognized in obtaining financing. Now this would be a good example to tell our citizens about, you know, saying we're taking action. So can he turn to you then to find out what kind of financing he can receive directly from you and what support he can receive from you?
Olivier Onidi
No. Thank you. Thank you for this, Schengen, and regular regularization. No legal means to interfere in something which is really a matter of national competence. Where we have some leverage is to make sure that the national authorities that would practice such regularization, which is basically to provide residents' permits and, in some cases, also a nationality to individuals, do this following some thorough security vetting.
And as far as we know, the current procedures in Spain do follow very thorough security procedures. Communication on what we are aiming at in terms of significantly furthering the support to a proper migration management, shouldering also areas in the home domain. Yes, I think we have a collective, really, responsibility to do so. I think it's a daily necessity in order to show that Europe is not standing still. Europe is doing many things, many good things, in order to improve the overall way we provide asylum, but also provide firm protection of our borders.
On the Franco-German brigade, this is typically the type of operation we would like to further support in the context of the enhanced flexibility proposed in the MFF. Currently, we have some means, but some very limited means because those means are limited to shouldering strictly national support and not providing for cross-border activities as such, which will, I believe, change if you ultimately adopt some of the key features that have been proposed in the MFF.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you, Mr. Henri. Now we start the second round of intervention. We keep the two-minute rule, and I will give the floor to mister Carlo Ressler, who happens to be the rapporteur for the regulation establishing the union support for the Schengen Area for European integrated border management and for the common policy on visas. Mister Ressler, you have the floor.
Karlo Ressler
Thank you, Mr. Chair. Mister Ronny Di, dear colleagues, I think that the substantial increase of the proposed home affairs envelope, in general, but also of the BNVI regulation on which I'm working, represents and reflects also a change in security reality, but that this is something that we all really welcome. But two main points from my side. First of all, stronger coherence with other home affairs funds can be positive. But as we have heard also in this discussion, it definitely carries a certain risk, overlapping of actions, double financing, and blurred responsibilities.
Speaker 22
And, although greater flexibility can improve responsiveness in times of crisis, it is also clear that it can create uncertainty for long-term investments, and we will need long-term investments in this area as well. So my first question to you is, how to ensure a clear division of roles between instruments in practice and prevent, in that sense, duplication or reallocation that could also undermine core border management objectives. And then secondly, which is mostly a comment further to this point, a key gap in the proposal seems to be the lack of clarity on the objectives, and also on the investment scope. Without this clarity, member states then lack guidance. The commission would gain excessive discretion in our view, and the budgetary authority would lose sight and its steering role.
So we need clarity on categories of eligible investments from border infrastructure to surveillance systems and operational equipment, as well as measurable objectives and expected outcomes. And this brings me to the targets and milestones, which we have a lot of discussions also in the context of the NRPP in general. But in the context of the home affairs area, they have proven really particularly difficult to operationalize and monitor in practice. So you can, perhaps comment on this weakness as well. Thank you.
Olivier Onidi
We've heard that there's a clear message coming from you in terms of having a better capacity to actually not only oversee, but influence some of the key choices. So we understand that this is also a prime source of discussion in the overall context of the broad way the MFF is constructed. In our area, I think the trick is really to come on with a successive layer of frameworks that will be meant to bring about member states to actually invest in the things which have the best value added in terms of like EU co-funding, but also that are the most relevant in terms of the policy they are meant to fully implement. For this, again, stage one comes with a comprehensive policy framework that is meant to identify the key areas where we believe the three funds allocated to home should be deployed. Stage two will be to start drafting these qualitative objectives.
And I think the qualitative objectives are really meant to circumscribe what member states will actually be expected to do with, again, more control over the end result. And those qualitative objectives, I think, are also meant to provide member states with the capacity to have a real multi-annual overview of what will be done in different policy areas. Is it in the context of borders or progressive reinforcement also of the capacity in the context of visa, etcetera, and provides us on a regular basis also the possibility to see incrementally the effects of the implementation and the capacity on an annual basis to formally propose to change those objectives, either to get to change fundamentally the nature of the objective or to have it better defined. In terms of how to better define the areas, I think there is scope probably when discussing the individual regulations to also be more precise in terms of the exact purpose of each regulation. That's one of the areas you are looking at as a reporter, trying also in the definition of what this regulation is meant to support, to have like enhanced also clarity in terms of not having too much of a wider scope, but also to make sure that all the essential elements for you are captured into this.
Birgit Sippel
Thank you very much. I may come back to a question that you may not have followed precisely from my colleague, Anna Mendes. So my question first would be, is the co-financing rate laid down in the NRPP applicable directly for actions carried out under the individual JHA instruments? Or can the co-financing rate be determined in the individual instruments? But I also have a second, maybe a third, question.
You said that we will push to ensure that cross-border instruments will be followed by member states, and you also want to push and ensure that member states do create national programs. So my question first is, who is we? Is it the commission that will push? Is it the commission who will control to what extent the budget where we take clear decision on different budget lines is used in the way we as parliament also want the budget to be used. And to be very honest with you, if it's only the commission who will control, then I don't trust that this will effectively work, because regarding border controls, internal controls, I see for years that border controls are taking place illegally, and I don't see any action from the commission.
So I criticize member states and the Commission. The second question, when it comes to the NRPPs. So, obviously, member states have a lot of flexibility on how and for what purposes to use the different funds. And you mentioned, following a question from Eric Marquardt, that we can do, and obviously, you talk about the commission, an ex-post evaluation. So for some time, member states can do what they decide.
We, as parliament, have no control then the commission, that's my understanding, is doing a kind of ex-post evaluation. But in the meantime, maybe the money has been spent in a way we never decided it could be spent. And is it that this new system regarding the budget takes away the responsibilities of this parliament to have clear control of the budget, which is an important element of a real parliament? Thank you.
Olivier Onidi
The essence of your questions, I think, is at the heart of the institutional debate between the parliament, the council, and the commission in terms of the overall architecture of this new multi-annual financial framework, clearly. In the current context, based on the proposal, it is indeed, as your colleague has noted, the commission that has gained somewhat of an enhanced role in terms of overseeing what and how the implementation of the budget is conducted. But much better than with the current tools that we have. The ex post evaluation is already practiced today. The change in the new approach is that the ex post evaluation will be done on a continuous basis because those national and regional partnership plans are meant to be plans that both the member state with support of the commission are going to be implemented.
And we do not only have the opportunity exposed once to look at how the money has been spent, but have a real appreciation of the impact of what has been spent. This is the big change. We're not looking at how many cars have been purchased. We are looking whether the investments being conducted have had an effect based on the Schengen evaluation, based on also changes in terms of irregular arrivals, etcetera, whether this has had an effect in terms of better managing borders, whether travelers also are processed more smoothly at borders, which is another very important element. This is a much better way of simply having a very partial view of whether or not the member states would have bought two computers, would have modernized or bought some communication means, etc.
This is the essential change. For this to work, of course, we need to find ways to better appreciate and define the objectives. And this is the reason why, in the context of the current discussions, we are preparing guidance in order to set up the different objectives. And then we will have a dialogue not only with the member states, but we also have a duty of dialogue with you in order to exchange on the type of key objectives we would like to embed in the national plans, and based on which we will have this qualitative overview of how the money has been spent. The other control mechanisms like the court of auditors, etcetera, of course, will still perform their own duties.
Birgit Sippel
Sorry, Chair, but I think my very first question has not been answered.
Sorry, very briefly.
Olivier Onidi
Co-financing. Co-financing rate, no change. No. There is, again, it's one of these harmonization measures. The overall logic has also changed.
You don't have a co-financing rate in terms of how much the EU budget comes in, but the co-financing rate is spelled out in terms of minimum co-financing that needs to be provided by the member state. This is a harmonized rule. We will have to respect this in our area as well. So, across the board, there is no specificity. The only element we have in order to further support one or the other aspect is in our definitions of the priorities, but also in using some of the additional so-called top-up mechanisms that are available in the context, for example, of the EU facility, which is still there not only to finance across the board EU activities, but also is there in order to cater for what we currently do under EMAS and such instruments, so that we can provide a substantial amount in certain areas, for example, what has been absolutely critical in the context of boosting the modernization of reception capacity or the resources in terms of processing vulnerable asylum seekers and the like.
This will still be available here again, with enhanced financial means. Thank you, Mercian Nidhi.
Fabrice Leggeri
Thank you very much, Chairman, and thank you very much to Mr. One ready for all this information. But I have a technical question on the architecture of the new situation and the negotiations that are going on. On the question of the budgetary architecture, are we going to keep the coherence, the cohesion of the actions covered under the competencies of our Libby committee? In other words, are we going to be able to keep this coherence of action as regards the European freedom and justice area?
And on the question of the funds, are we going to have proper cooperation with justice and police cooperation between the member states, and what the role of the agencies in all this is. Would it be possible to keep coherence there? And if so, is the technical means that is going to be used to do that? And second question on the political negotiation issue. You've mentioned that this is not up to you.
It doesn't come under your competence. But what about the resources that will be given to the member states to manage? Are we going to have co-financing? And the national funding is quite considerable in some member states. But will you guarantee that we will not have the kind of abuse that we've had with the financing of NGOs, which carry out their activities without any surveillance or control.
Olivier Onidi
Coherence, I think, is typically one of the main objectives pursued by the new architecture of the MFF. And specifically in our area, I think the fact that for each member state, we have a consolidated picture providing not only the aggregation of our different funds, but also of a very important additional fund that is enhancedly used by us. The overall regional fund will bring much more coherence because it will provide a much clearer picture in terms of the continuum, the continuum you exactly described between the different aspects of migration.
Olivier Onidi
Integration, the border, and security aspects as well. In terms of political choices, I think if we take the precise example of physical infrastructure, the fact that through our home funding, we do not finance any physical infrastructure is a political decision, which I do not see changing in the context of the new MFF. If in the context of the consolidated national and regional partnership plan, a member state has a strong need in order to have co-financing from the EU budget for physical infrastructure. That member states, like today, will probably do this in the context of the regional fund. We will have it in the consolidated national plan.
Speaker 3
It will be more visible. We will see much more of the synergy. But I believe that fundamentally, as of today, I do not see my political leadership changing this decision and using BMVI or the future border fund in order to fund physical infrastructure, except, of course, all the digital-related infrastructure, which is, again, seen as of high value added, of high needs, and has also had a very good effect in many member states. We have seen the strong modernization of surveillance means being implemented at their external borders.
Speaker 30
The proposal of the commission on these new funds will give us something very important in terms of flexibility. But I would like to begin with a comment about this new MFF and the architecture, which we will now have, and the need for more effectiveness. We have to also foster employment and agriculture through these funds. And we have to make sure that all farmers are catered for, as well as the general public. So having said that, security is a priority, in particular given the current geopolitical context.
Speaker 32
We have to make sure that the situation is more resistant, reliant, in order to face these crises and also, of course, respect the fundamental values.
More.
Speaker 30
Specifically, we have to give particular emphasis to the question of migration, as has been said. We have to try to control our land and sea borders better, these migratory flows, and the problem of illegal migration. So my question, how are you going to make sure that the implementation of the funds goes in the right direction? And as regards Schengen, how are we going to support the member states who are not in Schengen? And particularly, if you have a specific plan for that situation for those countries and for those like Cyprus who are in the front line as regards these flows.
And we are under the threat from Turkey. Thank you.
Olivier Onidi
Thank you. I think in terms of securing a strong prioritization on migration, asylum, border security. This is really translated into the political priority in the numbers that are being proposed and provided. Of course, the result of the discussion of the budget authority ends up with commensurate strengthened and augmented numbers. We will have a very, very clear signal. In the mechanics of implementation, I tried to explain that in the new architecture, we believe we have a better grip on making sure we can use the money more effectively. We can impress more on the real priorities based on the objective needs. And this, again, based on concrete experience gained over the last two years in working actually very closely with member states with, I would say, no resistance ultimately of member states on the actual prioritization of aspects.
It was rather consensual, I think, because it was based on factual needs looking at the background, the legal objectives and legal also obligations member states needed to cater for, both in the context of the pack, but also in the context of Schengen. Schengen and non-Schengen members, Cyprus has made immense progress in its preparation to become a full member of Schengen. I hope Mr. Chair would be able to come very soon to present to you the results of the evaluation that has just been conducted in Cyprus, which basically shows that Cyprus is ready. There are a number of steps, institutional steps that need to be taken, but I'm rather confident that based on the actual state of play and the further closing of a number of actions, we will actually be in full capacity to recommend Cyprus as a full Schengen member by the end of this year.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you, Ms. Enid. Of course, we are looking forward to hearing from you on the evaluation report. And now I give the floor to Mrs. Garcia Amida Vandervale from Greene.
Raquel García Hermida-Van Der Walle
We go. Gracias Presidente, thank you, Mr. Onidi, for being here today. Apologies for my late arrival. So I missed your initial introduction.
But from what I have understood, there have been a number of questions also posed on the architecture of the plan. I would like to support also some of the remarks that have been made by colleague Kessler Wesseler, sorry, by colleague Kanko, and also by colleague Sipol, regarding the lack of targeted interventions or at least a list of eligible interventions in the proposal. I think, to be frank, that this is quite concerning, especially when you look at the removal of some specific provisions in the 02/2127 regulation. For example, the focus on cross border cooperation, I think that's something that we definitely should bring back because my fear, as mentioned by colleague Sipo, is that at the end of the day, member states are going to use the flexibility, which I can, you know, I can sympathize with the idea of moving the priorities are different for member states, but they should always feed into the European priority. So I sympathize with the idea of giving a bit more flexibility. But on the other hand, if we give too much flexibility, I fear that we will end up in a situation where member states will be financing their hobbies, like internal border controls, which, by the way, have just been declared, again, illegal by a German judge instead of focusing on the more European approach.
So like colleague Kanko said, for the internal security fund, I would definitely push for a bit more of guidance clarification on the eligible actions as well as the cross border components. This is a general reflection, but then I have a very specific question for you. The new proposal explicitly adds private parties as some of the parties that might be benefiting beneficiaries of the funds or in cooperation with. So I would like to know a bit more about what the commission intends with this addition and what sort of situation we could be imagining, especially in the context of parliament having been taken out of the whole ecosystem? Thank you.
Olivier Onidi
On the eligibility, I know it's a big change, but my overall assessment of this is that, today, we have a very long list of eligibility, which actually allows the member states to do whatever they want. And the overall management of the funds is done in such a way that, again, once the allocation has been provided, we can only see and validate the receipts, basically, the cost statements of the acquisition of this and this equipment or of this and this recruitment training or whatever, without really influencing, without really any way of judging whether this has actually provided some support to the effective implementation of this legal framework in place or has helped in reaching the overall policy objective that was set. Without the eligibility criteria, we will put a lot more on us in discussing with you, with the member states and agreeing on objectives that are clear enough, that are measurable enough in order to assess the change. And these objectives are meant also to be adapted over time. So for the cross border, for example, aspect, the cross border activities are inherent in whatever is being supported by EU funding.
Speaker 3
So most of the objectives, notably in the context of further measures in order to support the quick lifting of internal border controls, will be actually framed and spelled out in such a way that member states will have to invest funding in order to develop joint patrols, in order to have police officers that are capable to work across borders, in order to have support equipment, in order to allow cross-border activities. I think it will make a big difference in our way to actually influence the funding on where it matters most, instead of having a very rigid, but at the end of the day, also very limited way of influencing based on the legit eligibility list, which at the end of the day really captures more or less everything that can be done.
Thank you, Monsieur Niedy.
Speaker 3
Private parties is we have encountered certain situations where member states are delegating a number of tasks to private parties. So we do not want to have an impediment to support some activities which might, in certain circumstances, be delegated to private parties. This is the case in the context of the management of asylum centers. It is valid in the context of even border management now, where for a number of basic procedural steps, member states are enhancing the recourse to private companies under, of course, public contract, but those are private entities.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you, Mr. Nidhi. I wonder if any member would like to take the floor. We have some time for that.
Fabrice Leggeri
Thank you, Chairman. Just a last question, if I may, to Mr. Onidi on financing of any new elements which are foreseen in the concept of safe countries, according to the returns regulation. How will you finance the hubs, the return hubs? They may be outside the European Union geographically, obviously.
So, what is the budget for that? And will co-financing be made available to the member states to carry out this initiative? What can you say at this stage, at least from a technical point of view? Is it technically possible? Of course, there has to be some kind of political validation, which is appropriate in this case.
Thank you.
Speaker 11
Thank you very much. Mister Onidi, I don't actually share your enthusiasm as to the new architecture of the MFF, because it's a paradox where we are trying to have a more European policy in the domain of Schengen and migration. We are trying to harmonize. But on the other hand, we're going back to national plans with big differences concerning the different member states. So that's not terribly coherent.
So what will you be doing to ensure that these European objectives are achieved with these funds, BMVI in the NRP? So under the umbrella of the NRPs, who is really going to be the decision-maker? That's my first question. And my second question goes back to what was said by Burgett Sipple. How can we influence in such a way that the Schengen spirit is still alive?
Because we don't have too many controls. We want to have a binational situation, and that rules are made available for these controls, and that they are not useless. We believe the parliament is very excluded. And so, are you going to do something concrete to implement this?
And then I will give back the.
Speaker 30
Floor to, I will speak in Greek. I'll be.
Very brief, Chairman. We spoke before about the protection of sea and land borders in terms of migratory flows. Is there any special measure going to be had for this blind spot and something that does influence Cyprus, because we don't have an actual border, we have the buffer zone.
Javier Zarzalejos
Now, Mr. Leonrigley, the floor is yours to reply to members' questions and your final remarks before we move to the next point on our agenda.
Olivier Onidi
I'll take the questions in the reverse order. The blind spot, the green line in Cyprus, is effectively controlled with equivalent measures as measures that would apply at external borders. And that is the impressive further measure that Cyprus took in order to demonstrate that the risk of having an island still divided is actually mitigated as if it's not an external border, but the measures being applied at and along the green line are equivalent, and this is what the evaluation report of the expert actually formally notes. The Schengen spirit will be very much alive in these national and regional partnership plans. Most of the objectives will be based on, first, the understanding we have in terms of how member states are implementing their Schengen obligations, and second, will be meant to actually push the member states to finally accelerate the pace of implementation of the weaknesses that are still detected in the member states.
Speaker 3
So many of those qualitative objectives will derive directly from Schengen-related matters and notably some of the deficiencies. The EU facility is really going to be operated along similar ways as the way you operate today. So there, with the EU facility, you have, on an annual basis, through the annual budget procedure, the full capacity as budget authority to fully influence the exact activities, the exact priorities that should be conducted in the context of the EU facility. This is really the element that remains as of today. Yes, I would have liked to unionize most of the financial means and programs, but it's not realistic, unfortunately.
Olivier Onidi
I mean, we have today everything which is linked with shared management is very much linked with a national appreciation of what national member states want to do. What we try in the context of quite a substantial innovation, and I understand some of the doubts you are expressing, but I think it is worth taking the challenge because I really believe that the intrusive way we will be developing these national plans with the member states will give us so much more influence in terms of what they will identify in terms of activities and the way they will be implementing the co-financing that we will provide through the EU budget. So a step towards a more European budget, or at least a step towards having the assurance to have more EU value added in what is being financed through the EU budget. On the so-called innovation measures and the precise example of return hubs, I think we will see the result of your decision in the context of the return regulation. But if the return hubs or similar activities are legally framed in our legal order, there will indeed be the possibility to support those.
Speaker 3
And since those would be primarily within third countries, I expect that the return hubs as such will be, potentially, again, if legally accepted, financed through the Global Europe facility. So the facility that comes directly in support to partnership agreements in countries and will not impede on the money we have available for other purposes, rather linked with what is happening and developed in the member states.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you. Thank you very much, Merci Onidi, and thank you for the information you provided and for the exchange with the members. We conclude this point on our agenda. But Mr. Onidi remains with us for the next point, point number six, in which we will have an exchange of views on the implication of hybrid warfare for the EU's internal security.
Well, so now we move to the next point on our agenda. As I said, there will be an exchange of views on the implications of hybrid warfare for the EU's internal security. We welcome again, Messian Eddy, Mr. Olivier Eddy. And we welcome now, first time, Mr.
Philippe Gregoirevski, Head of Information Integrity and Country and Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Division at the EAS. Hybrid threats are no longer isolated phenomena, as they combine cyber attacks, sabotage and foreign information manipulation, often targeting both our critical infrastructures and our information space simultaneously. What makes them particularly challenging is that they blur the lines between internal and external security, and exploit gaps between policy areas. That objective goes beyond borders and seeks to undermine public trust, weaken democratic institutions, and test the resilience of our societies. These dynamics increasingly cut across core areas of our work, from security and resilience to the functioning of our information space, require responses that are both effective and firmly grounded in our legal and democratic framework.
Strengthening preparedness and coordination must therefore go hand in hand with safeguarding trust, rights, and the principles on which the union is built. Today's exchange provides an important opportunity to deepen our understanding of these evolving threats and challenges, and to reflect on how the union can further strengthen its resilience in a coherent and balanced way to provide security. So I look forward to a constructive discussion, and I give the floor to our speakers for 8 minutes each. And after that, I will open a round of Q and A for the representatives of each political group. So first, I'm pleased to give the floor to Mr.
Olivier Nidi from DG Home, and the floor is yours for 8 minutes for your initial presentation.
Olivier Onidi
Thank you, Kjell. I'll be very brief in some introductory words because I think it would be very interesting to actually have the comments from the members to see a little bit how to further advance on this major development, which is somewhat of a quasi-generalization of hybrid threat and attacks around us. Key message, I think, is that it's no longer something hypnotic. It's no longer something which is being looked at in class book exercises of different security or military authorities. It is something we are being subject to for some years now.
And we see not only the diversity of the way hybrid threat is trying to hurt us, but we also see the intensity actually growing. Is it in the context of election interference, disinformation, and my colleague will be very explicit on the many measures we have developed in this area. In our home area, just to look at this one, I would like just to cite a few examples we had to handle over the last few recent years: instrumentalization, weaponization of migration, and the way we managed to handle this with having a legal definition of the phenomenon, coming also with some enhanced support activities to member states subject to this hybrid attack. The capacity of ours also to look at some of the origin of this, air transport, our activities within the organization of civil aviation in order to have a code of conduct in terms of limiting the possibility for air transport to actually move massive migrants that would ultimately be instrumentalized and pushed across borders. Sabotage activities, another area which we have discussed quite extensively with you, which has led to, again, a very modern, robust framework, critical entities with also some very innovative ways of working with member states in very sensitive fields, conducting stress tests across the union, having also dedicated means of incident reporting, which are being shared amongst member states in order to prevent further possibilities of attacks on critical entities and the like.
Speaker 3
Recently, the discussions we've had with you, which led to, again, a commensurate response on drones. We've seen many different forms of drones, balloons and other elements being used in order to challenge our border guards, in order to also imperil the security of our border regions. Some of the measures that we have taken with the action plan on drones, which is quite extensive in terms of the range of different activities we propose or we also strengthen, but also some of the financing we have made available in order to support the acquisition of better understanding what drones and how drones can hurt us, but also counter drone measures, which are being rolled out in different member states. Organized crime, again, the nexus between organized criminal groups being used by state actors in order to hurt us in different ways, and the preparation of here as well a fundamental review of the overall legal framework on organized crime, where we will be adapting the definition of what constitutes the participation of a criminal organization and some of the means also to combat criminal activities in the EU through strengthened legal means. So effectively, I think there are a number of areas which are impacted and the number of areas we can use in order to respond.
First, in EU law, we need to have a legal framework that actually allows to hit those who try to hurt us through hybrid means. And this concerns typical thematic frameworks, like, for example, the one on organized crime, but also other frameworks, like, for example, modernization and constant strengthening of this regime on sanctions, which allow us to take and be more effective on what the sanction regime actually impedes on those using deploying hybrid threat around us. Our agencies, another aspect we are debating with you currently in the preparation of the new Frontex, the new Europol, to what extent we need to adapt and get also our agencies more ready and more effective in supporting the fight against hybrid threats. Cybersecurity aspect, which is a typical feature also on how to hurt us, the current discussion you are having in the context of the new cybersecurity act. And through that, again, to build up further resilience, but also have a better capacity to anticipate some of these hybrid threats and respond.
The technology aspect, very important in the discussion we will be having in the type of technology development we need in order to better apprehend some hybrid threats, which are intensely complex in the sense of very sophisticated technological means that are being used and a very strong impress on us in order to develop similar measures to prevent and to respond. Strengthen our capacity of intelligence, again, a prime function of the EAS, to build up a better understanding of what is happening around us, to have a better also cooperation between different intelligence sources in order really to all have the best possible complete picture and know how and who is behind those hybrid threats in order to pursue and stop the activities. And finally, international cooperation is another important vehicle. Those hybrid attacks are not exclusively meant to hurt the European Union. They're actually meant to hurt many countries around the world.
We see very intense, also hybrid attacks in our close neighborhood, first and foremost, in our candidate countries. So another duty is also to spread and enhance international cooperation in this field. Thank you.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you, Mr. Olivier. Now I give the floor to Mr. Gregor Ebski for 8 minutes as well.
Philippe Gregorowski
Thank you very much. I'm grateful for your invitation and being here together with Olivier gives me an opportunity to highlight good cooperation that we have with the commission. I will focus on three things. First, I'll talk about the threat picture, so how bad the situation is. So I'll try to scare.
Philippe Gregorowski
here. Then I'll double down with examples about Russia and China as threat actors. I'll give you concrete examples of how we are attacked, how Russia and China deploy FIMI against the European Union. And then I'll try to give you some hope, talking about the sword, about the action that we can undertake in order to counter FIMI attacks. So that's the plan for the remaining 7 minutes.
And we are in a period of significant geopolitical escalation. That's a fact, and Olivier spoke about it. And the broader security context has deteriorated. That's the assessment that is shared across the board. So we are in a different place than we used to be 5 years ago, 7 years ago.
And for the European Parliament, this is super important when you think about the tasking for the European institutions, when you think about the resources, when you think about how we should structure our work, the situational picture is different than it used to be. I'll give you an example of building up on what Olivier was talking about, the hybrid attacks against the union. So when you hear about hybrid attacks such as drones crossing the border of the European Union, it's never just the drones. It's accompanied by offensive information attacks, FIMI, foreign information manipulation and interference. And when drones crossed the border with Poland in September, together with that kinetic attack came an offensive information attack that was targeting Polish and other European societies.
And as a result, in the first hours after the attack was launched, people were confused completely. And if you were trying to find an answer on Google or chat GPT, what actually happened, where the drones came from, you would get an answer that it came from Ukraine, that these were NATO drones or other impossible answers, everything but the truth. So confusion, manipulation was the goal. We, as the European extraction service, work on solid methodology developed over the years together with the member states. And we publish regularly well, reports on what we discover, what we see trying to advance our capability to counter FIMI.
And that's an advertisement break. So if you're interested, please check this out. I'll hand over a copy of the report to the chat. Here you are. It's available on the EU versus the Zinfo website and on the website of the EAS.
We've discovered, according to this report, last year, 540 FIMI cases. 540 FIMI cases. In total, 500 social media channels and websites were mobilized to produce or amplify FIMI. That's a huge number. We've attributed beyond doubt more than one third of incidents, twenty-nine percent to Russia and six percent to China.
That's a lot. Russia and China disinformation and information attacks rely on extensive covert networks. This is why we cannot really attribute everything to particular threat actors, but that's enough for us to draw conclusions. It will be interesting for you to note that AI-generated content is present in 27% of the incidents. So the weaponization of the information space has become a persistent feature of today's international conflicts.
Now zooming into Russia. The Russian Federation is a key FIMI actor using coordinated information operations as a tool of statecraft. So it goes beyond warcraft statecraft. The rationale is strategic. We can democratic cohesion.
So the weaker we are, the less trust there is in institutions, in the role of the European Parliament, of the European Commission, of DES, of the governments, of the member states, the more polarized societies are, the better it is for our adversary because we are weaker. We are less coordinated, less able to take action. And the ecosystem that is developed by the Russian Federation blends state media, intelligence-linked networks, proxy outlets, influencers, troll farms, and bot networks. And you will see it well in the report that I've just handed over to the how this iceberg where you can see only what is above the surface of water is relatively easy for us to see, but there's a huge part of this information ecosystem that is so much more difficult for us to discover. China.
We see China's increasing convergence with the Kremlin, albeit done opportunistically for now. So China is cooperating with Russia. It's the two are learning from each other, expanding their playbook, cooperating on concrete operations. But China has specific tools in the toolbox of FMI. And one particular that I would like to draw your attention to is called transnational information suppression, and it consists of intentional action to target individuals in order to control the information space.
It's a chilling effect that deters others, other individuals from speaking up. So that's just an example you'll hear, you can find out more in the report. But I wanted to finish with something a bit more positive, with the hope. This is what I promised to you, which is linked to the sword, so the offensive capability of the union to take action against FIMI. FIMI should be described as a structured system, supply chain model focusing on the behaviors, on how disinformation is being done.
But we should not really think of it as an overpotent, extremely powerful system. A better way to imagine it is to think of it as a house of cards. So metaphors matter. So the way you think about threats matters. So when we think about FIMI operations as a house of cards, then you can think of how to dismantle this house of cards, how to hit it where you can actually make a difference, and we came up with a methodology for that that we call deterrence.
And it consists of faster responses, scaled up capacity to cooperate with our international partners, with the G7 rapid reaction mechanism, with the partners with whom we've concluded security and defense partnerships recently. So we have a whole network of good people around us with good structures that we can and should mobilize. And the third element of that sword is greater impact. By shifting from reaction to anticipation to disrupting, we are able to make it more costly, more difficult for the threat actors to operate against us. We have sanctions. We have cooperation of the law enforcement.
We have digital regulation and resilience building. So we have good tools for that. And now to conclude, we'll need to get our act together. So it's great to be here at the Libre meeting, basically, to highlight how important it is for us to make sure that the next MFF negotiations will have funding for that, that will not be focusing on the war that is to happen when things become kinetic, but that we take action now when we are attacked through hybrid FIMI information operations. Thank you.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you, Mr. Gregorowski. Now, I will give the floor to the representatives of political groups for two minutes each for the questions that will be replied also by two minute answer by our speakers. So I'll start with EPP, Mrs. Ana Maria El Pedro.
Ana Miguel Pedro
Thank you, your chair. Good morning. I will speak in Portuguese, if you allow me.
Speaker 40
Hybrid war exposes us to weaknesses, and one of the biggest ones in Europe is organized crime linked to drug trafficking affecting local infrastructure, ports, etcetera. In Portugal, we are exposed to the Atlantic, and we have participated in a lot of international projects. Last year, we saw huge attacks. Are we ready for the strategic to deal with strategic vulnerabilities in Europe, which could be exploited? And then we often see that people turn to hybrid attacks to affect government.
Speaker 41
For example, we've seen in Portugal in the last few years, there has been quite an increase in ransomware attacks, for example, affecting public infrastructure. So what is the coordination there with the security forces and the private sector, etc., how can we not be exploited easily? Thank you.
Philippe Gregorowski
Thank you for this very present question. There is not a single country of the union that would be affected by hybrid of VMI operations. If you think that you're not, then you're wrong. So you pointing out to Portugal as an example of a country that is affected by FIMI operations when you have crucial moments of democracy such as elections, it's more than right. So thank you for bringing it up.
A mechanism of cooperation, coordination that we have at hand that is working and appreciated by the member states is called the Rapid Alert System, RAS. That's a group of all the experts of the union who meet regularly. We had a meeting recently, some ten days ago in Berlin. We bring together experts working on FIMI from all the member states, and we focus on exchanging information on the attacks, so what's happening. We are focusing on how to respond, on identifying best practices to respond to the Fimi attacks.
We focus on working with partners because quite often, when we are talking about the global information space, we need to cooperate with others, both those who are attacked, but also those who can respond. So we work, for example, with Ukraine. We work with Armenia. We work with Montenegro. I'm giving you a bit of random examples just to show you the scale, the scope of our cooperation.
And all the member states are in. And all the member states have access to the latest alerts and the latest methodology that we develop together.
Birgit Sippel
Thank you very much. I carefully followed the two presentations, and I fully agree when you described what is going on with all the different ways of hybrid attacks, hybrid warfare, especially not only the drones that are crossing borders, but also everything that is done with disinformation and interference. And I also agree that very often the aim of those attacks is to influence public opinion, to weaken democratic resilience, and social cohesion. And for that, I also agree that prevention and sanction are very important. But to be very honest with you, I haven't heard any concrete thing.
What are our reactions once we are sure the activities are organized by Russia, China, maybe others? There are others outside the European Union. What is our reaction? If we know the drones are coming, can we shut them down? And when it comes, it's a question.
And when it comes to all the many digital attacks, what's our reaction? I heard that we are cooperating, that we have a network, but what is our way of sanction? Will we ask for money from the big platforms who are spreading all the misinformation? Are we ready and prepared to take harder action? And especially when it comes to the hate, the misinformation to weaken our democracy, and this is done with the support of big platforms, big providers, are we ready to tell them we push you out of our market?
Because I don't see that the money sanctions are working. So could you please elaborate a little bit more in detail what are our concrete actions we are doing? Because when you talk about the next budget and the money, I would like to know what it is concretely for which you need the money, and not only some vague presentations: we need to work on prevention and sanctions. Thank you.
Thank you, Miss Sibel.
Olivier Onidi
the different levels of response. If you take, like, some of the examples you have taken, drones, yes, a drone is being shut down. And the EU is actually supporting efforts of member states to have the capacity to counter drones and ultimately even to shut those down, helping whenever there are legal barriers to do so, to also open up channels of more efficient cooperation between the military and the civil authorities. The other, like, ultimate example you take is what do we do once we attribute an attack to a foreign player. And this is the area of diplomacy.
This is the area of sanctions. First, I mean, hybrid attacks are extremely complex. In many cases, it's actually quite difficult to form the attributes. When notably in some areas like cybersecurity, a cybersecurity incident is clearly attributed. There is a mechanism in the EU.
It's still subject to unanimity. It's a foreign policy instrument, but the EU is actually taking sanctions against a number of foreign actors, which are conducting cyber attacks in order to hurt us. When those are being conducted using proxies like organized criminal groups, etc., we do have the capacity also.
to have a
Speaker 3
Better understanding, to have better tools also to run the investigations in order to first identify the criminal organizations that are practicing ransomware and other similar measures, and ultimately also to convict those behind them. So we're not powerless, but we're still in an area where, I mean, it is constantly evolving. The nature of hybrid is that it's unconventional. So it stretches our lines in order to adapt our possibility to respond. And hybrid means also its accumulative nature of different forms of attack at the same time.
But the EU has, I believe, in many of the areas, been capable of supporting member states in their activities to counter hybrid threats.
Philippe Gregorowski
Which is a great segue to what I'll try to offer you to reply to your question. Again, your question touches upon the most important thing, which is it is complex. And if it's a complex attack, you need complex responses. So focusing only on one tool would just not be enough. That's why we have a whole toolbox.
And in the toolbox, we have actions that combine first situational awareness. So we need to know what's happening, not for the pleasure of knowing, but for taking action. But you need to know that you're attacked. You need to be aware of that. Then you need to make sure that your society is resilient enough.
So we are working through the democracy shield with the commission, strengthening resilience. But when you look at the world, it's not only about the resilience of our societies, but the resilience of our partners as well. When you think about accessing countries, our neighborhood, you don't want them to be prone to disinformation attacks coming from the outside. So we are working with our neighborhood, strengthening resilience of our partners in a very concrete way through supporting free media there, through supporting quality journalism, through support to their building up of their mechanisms to monitor disinformation in order to make their systems more resilient than regulation and disruption. You mentioned rightly the role of the big platforms.
The European Union is the only place in the world having solid legislation on platforms, the DSA. And that's something that we use actively when we discuss with our global partners. And the big platforms are big. But the more power we generate around our approach to big platforms as the union, the more partners we bring on board, the bigger leverage we'll have on the platforms. So that's yeah.
That's a thing that diplomacy can contribute to. I'll end with two concrete examples, very, very briefly. Of things that we took to three. One, the sanctions. We've sanctioned 49 individuals and 15 entities.
Sanctioned, meaning making their life much more difficult to operate in Europe. 14 individuals, 15 entities. The second example is when Viginome, the French institution, was attacked online and accused by Russians, manipulated. Well, the Russia tried to manipulate the information in this information space by saying that Vizhinom published the report disclosing Ukrainian disinformation, which was a lie. Then we, as DIS, contacted the platforms.
And in coordination with Visionam, we took it down. It did not become public. It stopped before it hit our societies. So you didn't hear about that, and that's great news because we're successful. And the third example is that through a rapid alert system, we exchanged informational concrete attacks against our member states that help member states to get ready.
And I have very concrete examples from recent months where we've prevented attacks, and it worked. So the fact that you don't hear about.
Speaker 43
It is just good news. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Reyeski. Now, is anyone taking the floor? Mister Lazlo?
Floor, sir.
Speaker 45
I would also like to talk about foreign information interference. From elections to elections, we hear from the commission that there are foreign information attacks, but never have we seen any proof. Same thing happened in Hungary. A person who said he would be an investigative journalist, and he presented himself as such. In fact, he was collaborating with foreign services with EU and American funding, eavesdropped the Hungarian minister of foreign affairs, and published the material.
Speaker 47
So why should we fund such people? And when shall we have open reports on these so-called interferences? I asked Miss Virkunen in plenary to publish their reports, but nothing was published. We cannot continuously allege others with foreign interference and attacks without presenting any piece of proof. The second question, how do foreign countries use organized crime?
Speaker 45
Often, say how Russia and other countries send illegal migrants to the borders of the EU. We have been hearing these stories for years. Fine. But why would the negative effect of a foreign migrant, of an illegal migrant, be to European citizens? What does it matter if they are sent here, or they come by themselves, or they are supported by NGOs funded by the EU to come to the border.
So why don't we criticize countries like the Spanish socialist government, which flies in from the Canary Islands to Continental Europe, to Mainland Spain, illegal migrants, and then would like to legalize them by their hundreds of thousands. This is the same kind of security risk and challenge for European citizens in the same way as if these migrants were sent by a foreign power. So how do you, what do you think about these questions? Are you checking up on NGOs and the funding of those NGOs who are organizing illegal migration? And coming back to information attacks, when will you publish these reports on foreign interference, alleged interference into elections?
Philippe Gregorowski
Thank you. And you give me an opportunity to actually agree with you on the fact that there are plenty of different sorts of information threats: fake news, disinformation, misinformation, manipulation of information space. It's all that propaganda wars, foreign foreign influence. This is why we need a solid basis, a consensus among ourselves, what we should, where we should bring our resources together, and we'll provide where we will provide added value. So we have done this exercise.
And over the last ten years, we came up with a solid definition of that basis for our joint action, which is called FIMI, foreign information manipulation interference, where we don't really focus on what is being said. So it's not one truth against the other, but we focus on how. So we focus on the evidence of manipulative behavior, on things that can prove to you that someone from the outside is trying to interfere within your system, within your democracy. And we are regularly publishing information about that, and I would encourage you to check EU versus Disinfo. That's a website that brings together those very specific cases of Fimi.
And we've collected more than 18,000 of those cases already. I mean, sorry. My colleague is correcting me. There's 20,000 now. The number is growing.
It's 20,000 cases. And in March, we've published now a new tool for you to see how actually those foreign actors try to operate within your system. Mhmm. And it's called Fimi Explorer. It's interactive.
The chair has the report there with a link. You click on the dot, and you see how it connects with Moscow. You.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you, Jorisky. We have to complete this round, and then there are other members wishing to take the floor. So I would ask you to be more specific in your question. Yes. There's a point about.
Olivier Onidi
On the migration, I believe there's a very clear difference in our law and in the practice between an irregular arrival and an irregular arrival that would be actively facilitated, notably in the case of instrumentalization by state actors. And there are a number of investigations ongoing. There is also ample evidence of massive movements of people having been organized by state actors in order to be pushed through our borders in some of our member states. So I think both the law and the practice operate a very clear differentiation between those two elements. Thank you.
Speaker 50
And gentlemen, since 2021, the Polish border with Belarus has been attacked in a hybrid way. And I am glad that, today, we are talking about this hybrid warfare and the problems stemming from that, and the activities that the EU wants to undertake. But I want to tell you that at that time when polls were starting to build a wall to stop this illegal migration, the EU gave us 0 zloty, €0, and refused us any help, even though we were not only defending our border, but the border of Europe. Now we hear something different. But at that time, instead of helping us financially, you were helping financially Russia by buying Nord Stream 2 gas.
Speaker 53
Luckily, there is no Nord Stream today. But, recently, commissioner Brunner was trying to convince us that we will have the combination of security policy with other policies. I was very glad, but I think that these are only words and not facts. Today, we hear the information in the media that the EU last year issued 10% more Schengen visas for Russian citizens. So, how is the security policy connected with the visa policy?
Speaker 52
Russia is a huge threat for Poland, for Europe, for the world, and the number of visas issued to Russian citizens is growing. Schengen visas. So if we are talking about hybrid attacks, these are also kinetic attacks which are undertaken by Russian citizens on European territory. So, can't we see the connection with the increased number of visas? And one now, one more thing, this house of cards that the hybrid threats are a house of cards, it's enough to take one card out and it falls.
So take it out and not just talk about it, and show it to citizens that you are able to do something, because I'm afraid that you are not able to do it. You are strong against the weak, but weak against the strong. It's easier to sanction Hungary or Poland than others. Thank you.
Olivier Onidi
On the borders, I don't have the precise figures with me, but we have constantly reinforced our financial support to Poland and other countries in terms of strengthening their capacity to manage their borders in many different ways, including in physical protection of the border. So there is
Olivier Onidi
So on borders, we'll get you the figures. You will see it's quite impressive, actually, what we have provided to Poland. On the visa, we have significantly limited the possibility to issue visas to Russian citizens, starting with stopping the issuance of visas to formal officials of the Russian Federation. We do not have the legal powers to just grant any Russian citizens a visa. It's a decision of the member states.
There is no consensus at the EU level to do so. But constantly, with guidance, we have ensured that there is a clear reduction in the number of visas being provided to Russian citizens. In the visa being provided, there are also visas provided to actual Russian citizens, which are clearly against the regime. So we have also to be careful not to shut totally the door to this. There is a decrease.
Speaker 3
There is a limit to what we can do, but it is something we keep investing in order to further convince member states to limit even more the granting of visas.
Philippe Gregorowski
Yeah. So I'll take this opportunity to speak Polish. You
Mentioned the house of cards. Well, what you said, this is something that really I greatly enjoy your words, because you are telling us to do more. And we'll be happy to face this challenge, and we are hoping for the support of the European Parliament. You wanted a concrete example where we managed to remove one of these cards, and we did it recently around a week ago. The EU has adopted two sanction packages, which hit the infrastructure of the Russian foreign interference and manipulation.
Nikola Minchev
Thank you very much, chair. Dear colleagues, first of all, I would like to thank mister Ronny Di and mister Gregorowski, sorry for the, I'm working on a Polish pronunciation, for being here with us today to discuss this important issue. In my home country in Bulgaria, hybrid warfare is a war on reality that is led by local proxies to erode trust in the European Union. And to neutralize them, we must counter their damaging narratives and myths. For example, the energy myth that Russian proxies claim that Gazprom ensures lower prices, while as we have seen in Hungary, long-term reliance is an economic trap and a tool for blackmail, not a benefit.
Or the investment myth that, for example, the deindustrialization of the EU causes poverty while large Russian projects bring prosperity. In reality, of course, these projects are often vehicles for strategic corruption. Or the security myth, where there is a systematic campaign claiming that EU integration and support for Ukraine would drag us into war, while in reality, the aim of this narrative is to lie to isolate us from the European security architecture. My question to mister Grigorowski would be, you have already touched upon this, but what concrete tools can the external action service provide to help frontline member states to counter such Fimi campaigns? Thank you very much.
Mister Reykjavik.
Philippe Gregorowski
Thank you. The challenge is real, and this is what I started with, with a bit of a bleak picture. But we are not powerless. This is not an in-camera meeting. So let me be a bit general, but I'm happy to brief you in a more secure setting on concrete actions that we undertake.
What I can say is that the resilience of our system is set by the fact that we are a democracy, and our ambition is not to control information, but rather to empower the member states to first monitor, then detect, and then to take action. And we have tools for that. We have a rapid alert system. We have regular alerts. We have a secure platform to exchange information, to exchange best practices.
So the awareness of the threat is growing up. And the fact that we can cooperate and support each other taking action is making our systems much stronger. Well, I'm happy to give you more in the more secure setting.
Speaker 63
Thank you, chair. And I would actually like to build on the excellent questions and remarks of missus Siebel and just follow-up on some aspects. The first one is, who are the perpetrator states? Because I think it is important to clearly also name them. You named Russia and China.
It is quite clear these are not the only ones. I'm thinking of Iran, Turkey, Egypt, Azerbaijan. I'm pretty sure you have more. So if you could be more explicit on who are the countries, maybe at the lower scale, but that they also engage in this kind of hybrid warfare against the European Union. Second question, we've seen this mainly with the drones, but it's the same case for a number of other hybrid warfare tactics, that it is quite unclear where the competencies lie.
Speaker 58
Sometimes it's the regional authorities. Sometimes it's the national ones, but sometimes it has a cross-border dimension, then it should be the European ones. How far are we in coordinating for each of these tactics of who's actually in charge? What are the protocols? How can these different actors work together?
Speaker 61
It's a legal question, but often, it's also an operational question. And I think the drones just have exemplified the problems that we are here. Building on this one, often, it is still member states telling us it's national security, stay away from it. But then they can't, I mean, then they just can't protect their national security. So how far are we in having member states engage in European solutions for problems that they can't solve themselves?
Speaker 59
Which member states are, for example, very much understanding of the European need and which ones are a bit reluctant? Then especially on the issue of cybersecurity, these kind of cybersecurity attacks sometimes have very drastic effects. And we had some communities in Germany, for example, they couldn't perform services to the citizens for months. We're speaking of birth certificates, passports. I mean, these very simple things.
How far are we to step up protection of especially these low-level structures that they have very little cybersecurity capacities by themselves? And last question on the Fimi. You said there's a lot of FOMO in social media. I agree. The problem of the question for me is, is the problem the legislation?
Speaker 60
So do we not have good enough rules to protect us from this, or is the problem the enforcement? So are we not strict enough in executing and implementing these rules? Thank you.
Philippe Gregorowski
Thank you. Four questions. Two minutes, thirty seconds for every question. Is the problem the legislation or the implementation or the law enforcement? Again, we came up with this Fimi toolbox where we try to see the whole picture.
And focusing only on one is just not possible. You have to take a comprehensive approach. So we have now the democracy shield that will help us mobilize the commission's resources to work on resilience, but we are developing a sword to hit back, to make it more costly for the perpetrators to act. Who are the perpetrators? Excellent question.
Well, influence operations are part of the toolbox for all the countries that are going beyond regular diplomacy. So we have a mandate to focus on Russia. We also have the capacities and the mandate to focus on China. Does it mean that other countries don't do it? Now we are observing what’s happening around Iran.
We are quite aware of the attacks that are linked to that as well. The list is much longer, and the information space is so dynamic that also nonstate actors become part of the threat who act on commercial interests, but who also act on state interests, which makes it quite difficult for us to address it, but we have a methodology that is actor agnostic. So whenever we detect something, we're able to see, detect, and counter to the best extent possible.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you. Thank you, Mrs. Severinsky. Now I give the floor to Monsieur Karem, the group at the left. No.
I've got on my speaker's list, but apparently, he left. Then, madam. Mister.
Speaker 20
Onidi, you said that migration is sometimes used to exert influence now. When Obermann had a major meeting in Germany a couple of years ago, he asked his compatriots to take German nationality because they would have the right to vote. I can send you the video, Mr. Enid, if you like. But the point was to influence the German electoral process, and he even specifically stated, I call on you to vote against parties that are hostile to us. Now when is the commission going to look into this strategic issue of taking on member state nationality in order to influence elections?
Because as I see it, that is electoral interference, Mister Onidi. Now massive regularization of migrants in Spain and Italy on that score. Your answer, I must say, does not convince me at all. Then a question for Mister Krygorovsky. You said that China and Russia account for a lot of the disinformation efforts.
Where do the other efforts come from, the 75 %? Then Pegasus and Spyware, that's.
part.
Speaker 19
Of the hybrid war, but there's also espionage on high-ranking European officials. I suppose that has an influence on electoral processes as well. Do you have any information on espionage for us? And how about Iranian hybrid attacks? Has there been a rise since the start of the conflict?
Thank.
Philippe Gregorowski
You, and thank you for your very pertinent questions. 25% of the attacks identified and confirmed by our teams come from Russia and oils, 29% from Russia, and 6% from China. But we need to look closely at what we're talking about. We've attributed that percentage, but the fact that 65% is not a tribute doesn't mean it comes from other countries. We have no proof to have 100% certainty that those attacks were perpetrated by one or other actor, and it's difficult to obtain evidence and certainty because you need in-depth cooperation between the various intelligence services of the member states.
And, of course, you need to draw the line somewhere. And that's why the methodology that we're trying to promote is so important. When it comes to your second question, espionage, well, that's not a question for us, and more of a question for the intelligence services, really. Those are not operations that we keep tabs on in the EAS. And then when it comes to an increase, potential increase in Iranian attacks, we haven't seen any attacks on the union since the war started.
Iran is present, of course, when we look at the information environment, but there haven't been attacks on member states. If you take a look at the report that we published in March, then France was the most targeted country by Russian attacks. So please just consult the report then.
Javier Zarzalejos
Now let's make the most of the few minutes available. There are no follow-up questions. And Senator Lopez Aguilar.
Juan Fernando López Aguilar
I know that this point in the order of the day is especially wide, but I would like to address a question to Monsieur Onidea on behalf of the commission, because it regards cybersecurity. We have a cybersecurity directive in place, so called NIS two directive, but then there is a new package presented in January. So first point is how is estimated the impact of that new package in the implementation of the and the transposition, which is due in some member states of the first directive. Second, the role of ELISA as an agency regarding cybersecurity in order to anticipate, prevent, manage, and respond to cyber incidents. And third, of course, the point of fundamental rights, how is to be addressed the impact of cybersecurity when it comes to the charter of fundamental rights, especially some which are supposed to have an impact on disinformation for interference in the actual process of the integrity of the European idea of democracy.
Thank you.
Speaker 70
Yes. Thank you very much, and thank you for the information you have given us. I understand it's difficult, that the situation is not easy, and that you are doing a lot. But nevertheless, it seems like there are basic things that are still difficult, like even the definition of hybrid warfare and how to attribute the responsibility for some attacks. And then the question that Anna Neumann asked, and I think it's really, very important that you, how do I say this?
Speaker 69
That we are able to differ to see between one has to be actioned by EU, one has to be actioned by a member state. If we can't, if you can't resolve those things, it's really a problem. There have been a lot of questions that have been asked, so I will not go into all of that. But for me, there is also another fundamental concern, and you have voted both of you, and it's the fact that we have most of the time a reactive position of the EU. And I think the EU cannot limit itself to always respond in the aftermath.
Speaker 71
We must be able to create a credible and effective deterrence. And my question, very concrete, is what is being done to move beyond a passive stance? Because these risks really need to be preserved from that weakness from our side. And if we want to show some resilience, strength, and strategic credibility, we have to be able to do more. One last thing.
Speaker 69
What really reassures me is that you have said that it's more to share in a more secure environment. So thank you again for what you are doing, but I think there's a lot to be done yet.
Fabrice Leggeri
You, chairman. Well, we still haven't spoken about the terrorist dimension of hybrid attacks. And I therefore ask our two representatives, can they tell us about cooperation between them and the member states on this? Because a lot of foreign powers are very interested in supporting certain terrorist groups. I'm thinking of Iran, for example, who are financing a terrorist group in other countries, that you might be surprised to hear about, and it's very complicated to say this in public.
So what can you say about the way we are collectively preparing to challenge these terrorist hybrid threats in the European Union?
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you, Mr. Algeria. Now the floor back to our speakers for the replies and the final remarks.
Olivier Onidi
On cybersecurity, I think the big difference between the NIS two package, which is effective law today, and the new cybersecurity act is NIS is essentially looking at the prevention aspect. So building up the resilience in terms of the role for all the actors in terms of cybersecurity. The Cybersecurity Act is meant to strengthen the capacity to actually respond. And one of the first and prominent parts of this is indeed the building up of further capacity through Eneesa in order to provide operational support and operational response in case of cybersecurity events. Terrorism and state actors, I think in our field, we are in the field of trying to provide the utmost support in the investigative part.
So trying to get the evidence that state actors are involved, and this is the same with the growing use of organized crime. I think in terms of providing more evidence and more sharing, this is primarily the role of this intelligence capacity within the EAS, as well as, to a certain degree, the capacity of coordination in the context of Europol.
Philippe Gregorowski
Thank you. Very briefly, on the division of labor between the institutions and the member states, what we definitely don't want to do, we want to stay away from, is interference into narratives. So we really don't want to, this is not what we do. We are not the Ministry of Truth. So we stay away from that.
We focus on the behavioral side, on the infrastructure of FIMI operations. On the link with terrorism, there is a FIMI dimension to terrorist operations conducted by the threat actors, and you had an example of that when Russia organized through their proxies a terrorist attack on the railway infrastructure in Poland. And that operation was conducted hand in hand with an information operation as well. So we worked with Poland in order to address the terrorist attack conducted by Russia. Now on the deterrence part, I'll give you four concrete examples.
The first one is stronger cooperation with law enforcement. The second would be sanctions that are more like better-targeted, focusing on financial and operational structures of the threat actors. The third would be increasing the cost of operations of the Fimi threat actors, making it more difficult and more costly, so that those operations economically are more difficult for the threat actors to perform in Europe. And the fourth one would be proactive stratcom. So proactive deployment of our strategic communication, our positive message about the union.
Debunking, pre-banking, working in an attractive way with strategic communication. So that would be four elements of deterrence that we'll be deploying now.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you. Thank you all, and special thanks to our guest speakers, Mr. Segureski, Mr. Onidi, who has shared the morning with us, the voted speaker in this committee. As we know, we conclude this point, and let me remind you that after the next item of our agenda, we will be holding a vote.
Thank you.
Javier Zarzalejos
Well, now we move to item number seven on our agenda concerning the reporting back from trip logs. We will start with reporting back on the trial logs and the proposal for regulation laying down rules to prevent and combat child sexual abuse, the so-called cease and regulation for which I'm rapporteur. As you know, the inter-institutional negotiations started last December with a so-called kick-off trialogue taking place under the Danish presidency. Since then and since my last debrief at the Libya committee meeting last January, two of the projects took place. First, under the Cyprus presidency, took place on February 26.
It was a very fruitful meeting, and the discussion was constructive and forward-looking. Call legislators reached indeed agreements on several issues, including some structural elements of the EU Center, the cooperation between the Center and Europol, the cooperation with third countries and international organizations, and the possible creation of an executive board. Some other sensitive elements such as requirements for authorities of the member states, the right to information and assistance, database support, and setting up of gender action plan remain, however, open. The second trial took place on April 16, and it was devoted to risk assessment, risk mitigation and risk reporting, to the closing of the issues still pending from the previous trial and to the detection activities. As for Articles three, four, and five, the college's data found the ground for a possible compromise that would ensure the proper alignment with the Digital Service Act, while preserving the specificities of the system regulation.
At the time, the parliament produced the mandate and the report, there was no Digital Service Act. So we need to make some adjustments and align both pieces of legislation. This trial was also the occasion to start the discussion on detection. On this topic, the positions of college legislators remain far apart. As you know, the council has removed detection orders from its negotiated mandate, while the parliament maintained them, but as a truly exceptional last resort instrument that would intervene only when all the measures in Articles three, four and five, I mean, assessment, risk reporting, risk mitigations, have been exhausted and only under very strict control.
That being said, both parts, I have to say, showed availability and openness to compromise and agreed to mandate the technical teams to engage constructively and explore possible solutions with the help and the support of the commission. By the way, I'd like to take this opportunity to comment on the very important, fruitful, and dedicated work that technical teams are doing, making this regulation, which is particularly complex, make real progress. So, but before concluding this item, I would like only to add that now that the interim regulation could not be extended, we are facing a serious legislative gap. There is a clear political will from both sides to advance on this file. So the co-legislators, I think, feel indeed a political responsibility to establish swiftly a permanent set of legal rules to protect children from the dissemination of system online.
I wonder if there is any remark. If that is not the case, I'm sorry? Yes, Mr. Tanager.
António Tânger Corrêa
Thank you, mister chairman, because you're the chairman of the Livent, chairman of this group about chip control. I'd like to state, for the record, our position at this point in time, if you don't mind. Well, protecting children online is essential, but we cannot accept that this objective becomes a justification for creating permanent mechanisms for monitoring private communications. And this is the core concern with the current direction of TCA's, AR. The commission argues that these are simply risk mitigation measures, but experience already shows how regulatory pressure can lead platforms to overmonitor and overrestrict lawful content.
In its recent reply to parliamentary questions, e-923-2000-2026, the commission itself, I repeat, the commission itself stated that near 50,000,000 content moderation decisions were later reversed by platforms. This is very important. 50,000,000 reversed by the platforms. This is not reassuring. It demonstrates the scale of wrongful or excessive interference already taking place.
Now we are discussing extending this logic into private communications themselves, including through the detection orders and form of client side scanning. This creates serious risks, false positives, disproportionate interference with lawful communications, weakening encryption, and the normalization of mass surveillance. Protecting children cannot justify the permanent monitoring of private digital communications. What we need instead is prevention, strong age assurance with privacy-safe safeguards, effective enforcements against platforms exposing minors to harmful environments, and targeted investigations under judicial oversight, not indiscriminate scanning of private communications. Europe must combat child sexual abuse effectively, but without sacrificing proportionality, privacy, and fundamental rights.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you, Mr. J. We had an ample opportunity to discuss those issues. But just let me reassure you that nothing in the parliament position, and certainly not in the regulation, of course, would amount to a general monitoring of the communications, which is illegal under our European law and according to the case law of the court. And on the other hand, the position of the parliament is quite clear in protecting encrypted communications. On this basis, the parliament has been particularly, I would say, devoted to setting up quite a number of safeguards.
And of course, giving more weight to the regulation to the prevention side of the problem. That's why we wanted an enhanced risk assessment. We want to put in place mitigation measures that can prevent the dissemination without interfering, and keeping detection orders as a last resort, targeted ones and under judicial control. That is the basic position as you know of the parliament's mandate. Mr.
Garner?
Moritz Körner
Yes, Mr. Chair will be very short. I also want to say that we have a very strong and very good position in the European Parliament, found under your leadership. And it's very important that we defend this position, especially the targeted detection orders, because they would make sure that exactly the things that the speaker before, the previous speaker, mentioned are not the case. So we fully support the line of the parliament's position, especially on targeted detection orders, to make sure that there's no mass surveillance, and that's our position.
And we look forward to a strong compromise, because we need to have a final regulation here to save children and protect our privacy.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Karan, for your words. And what I have to say is that the atmosphere of cooperation among shadow reporters is extremely positive, and the work being done by the technical teams is really highly commendable. So now we move to our next file on which reporting back is expected.
This is the recast of the 2011 directive on combating the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children and child sexual abuse material, for which Mr. Gerron Lenners is the reporter. Mr. Lenners, floor is yours.
Jeroen Lenaers
Yes. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. Also maybe a little bit looking back first, we had a very ambitious position as a parliament.
It was adopted unanimously here in the Lieber Committee and with a large majority at the plenary as well. Although from the onset, we were, of course, aware of the fact that these negotiations will not be easy given the quite big gap in terms of ambitions of the parliament and, I would say, the lack of ambition at the level of the member states. So under the Danish presidency, we made some progress, but things were not progressing as swiftly as we would like, especially also given the fact that at the end, the Danish presidency canceled a trialogue unilaterally where you and I both have also sent a letter together with our shadow operators to express our discontent with that behavior. So that's the past. We're now working very well under the Cypress presidency.
I would like to also thank the Cypress presidency for their efforts. The third trial took place on the March 3, which is already, like, two months ago, and there were many articles that we endorsed that were already worked out at the technical level. Most important issues, I would just briefly go through them. The criminalization of instruction manuals, which was very important for the parliament and also including a definition to facilitate cross referencing under the CSA regulation, if you are once you have successfully negotiated it. We will also extend the scope to also criminalize situations where children above the consent age are caused to witness sexual abuse in the most severe cases, which was a good wish for the parliament.
Now we had a big discussion with the council on whether or not there should be a difference in sentencing for abuse of children below or above the age of consent. For the parliament, it makes no sense because, when a child is abused, the simple fact of whether or not he could have given consent should not be relevant. Abuse is abuse in any kind of case. However, this is very problematic for the member states, so we found an agreement where we accept the separation as long as we have adequate ambition from the council on the level, the minimum level of penalties, and we expect the council also to deliver on that. We are broadening the scope to all disabilities.
We're extending the scope to also include self-abuse and self-rape. We have a stronger framework for hotlines to function more effectively in all of the member states, which is very important because they are on the front line of this fight against child abuse. We have stronger articles to criminalize solicitation, and we have an agreement on the fact that employers will be required to conduct background checks, such as criminal records, in all sectors involving direct and indirect contact with children. It is important to avoid any kind of gaps. Now there are still a lot of work to do.
We had the discussion within the scope of the AI omnibus on notifying apps, etcetera. Also here, we have a bit of a wider discussion on AI systems as such, the creation of them, the sharing of them, the use of them. The UK, as an example, is already leading in this field, and I really strongly feel that Europe cannot lag behind. Also, with the help of Europol, we're gathering the data and the statistics to make sure that we get a good agreement there. The council has committed to coming towards us there, and we are continuing to work on this.
We also continue to work on criminalizing traveling for the purpose of child sexual abuse. Just in The Netherlands, we had the reporting some months ago that yearly 20,000 Dutch citizens, men, travel abroad to abuse children. So that's only from The Netherlands, 20,000. However, there's strong resistance from the council to include the traveling as such as a crime because their point is that intent is impossible to prove. I think it also sends a very strong moral position to criminalize this, and we have done it in other files such as the directive on combating terrorism.
So I don't see any reason why not to do it here, and we will continue fighting for this. We've made an agreement on the list of aggravating circumstances, which we're very happy with. And our next trial is scheduled on June 2. So all in all, we're making good progress. But at the same time, I would say that some very difficult issues are still ahead of us, including the level of penalties, but mainly also on the issues of the statute of limitations where the parliament really insists on having long statute of limitations because we know that victims of child abuse often only later in life already to file charges and start proceedings, and we cannot put a clock on justice for child sexual abuse.
On the definition of consent, which is, of course, again, we've been through this on many other files as well, but especially when it comes to child sexual abuse, it is important to have a good definition of consent. It's just to mention my speaking time is up, Chair. Perhaps the alarm went off in my house. I hope it's nothing serious. In any case, so consent and then the issue of grooming, where also we really need an ambitious legislation at the end, which we don't have at the moment.
But like I said, we are very happy with the cooperation under the Cypress presidency. I would also really like to thank all the shadow operators because we really have been fighting as a unanimous, united front, and all the colleagues from all groups and from the secretariat of the Liebe Committee for all the work that has been done at the technical level because it's been a huge work, and we're very grateful for everything they've done. Thank you.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you, Mr. Annes. I take good note of the effectiveness of the alarm in terms of the management of the words. Let me add to you that it was precisely yesterday that the shadow reporters expressed a broad support to include these dreadful manuals within the system regulation as a material that should be covered to be identified and removed. Any remarks on this file? So we wish you good luck in dealing with these complex legally complex issues that you have described and the support of the negotiating team of the parliament.
And now, we move to the return regulation. We have Mr. Esmani to report back to the committee on the developments regarding this file. Mr. Rasmani, the floor is yours.
Malik Azmani
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. We had our first dry dock just before the Easter break, and our second dialogue took place two weeks ago, on April 22. The presidency was twice represented by the deputy minister of migration and international protection in Cyprus, Mister Yuna Nidaz. The commission was represented by the commissioner himself, mister Bruner.
The atmosphere was very constructive at the political level, and this was also the very same for the cooperation at the technical level. And I'm, therefore, happy to report that we progressed steadily on the tax, and we are now trying to schedule a third and normally last trial log for the Strasbourg session in May. This was only possible because I can also rely on an excellent cooperation with the Shadow Rapids in this field, because that's why I would like to mention. The most important political elements at stake can be summarized in the four points, as the Chair already mentioned. The four points are the mandatory mutual recognition of return decisions.
It's one of the key improvements in this proposal, allowing also for a very important step to have a common European approach to returns. This is why we had chosen also as a parliament in our mandate to retain the commission's proposal for the gradual progression towards mandatory mutual recognition as of mid-2027. We see that the council wants a gradual approach that may lead to mandatory mutual recognition. The commission would first assess the impact of the mutual recognition and only afterwards submit a legislative proposal for mandatory mutual recognition, only if the necessary conditions are met, taking into account the outcome of the impact assessment. And in our view, this does not meet the political objective underlying this article.
That certainly also creates unnecessary delays. We have heard from the presidency that this is a very sensitive matter for the member states, with considerable additional administrative burden. And some member states argue that issuing a new and return decision could, in some cases, be faster than proceeding to the recognition of an S61. And the parliament mandates, however, foresees the member states' discretion to opt out of mutual declaration in defined circumstances, including where the return of the Third Country National can be carried out in another more expeditious manner. We do appreciate, however, that the council in its general process established also the European return order as a mandatory instrument, and we do see how it can contribute also to facilitating the mandatory mutual recognition in the future.
Another element of the division is the date of entry into application of this new return regulation. We have insisted that this new return regulation is a matter of urgency. Since the presentation of the proposal, we have all treated this file as a priority, and the European citizens are expecting us to deliver on it. Not in two years, as the Council General Approach foresees, but now as soon as possible. And we are at the verge of implementing our new migration system, as laid down also in the pact.
Today, we are expected to complement this reform with an update to our return system, and without further delay. It's therefore a must that the regulation enters fully into application immediately once it is adopted. In case of the pact, member states have given themselves two years for a total of 10 legislative facts, and it will be then hard to defend that for this regulation at its own, then the states would require again another two years, especially in an area where urgent action is needed to give also an immediate positive boost to our low return rates. The two other points on our agenda are both in the sphere of the external dimension, with, in particular, an article that the parliament has added in its position on the external dimension, and the cooperation with third countries. The external dimension of our return policy is an integral part of the comprehensive approach to migration management, which we already clearly referenced in the PAC provisions as well.
The council formulated some reservations of a legal nature, and I believe that with the help of the legal services of our institutions, we will be able to find also wording that can make it clear that return is not an isolated policy area. To reiterate the importance of the external dimension also in the context of return is of the highest political importance also for the parliament. I believe that in the next dialogue, we will be able to find Mr. Chair, the balanced compromises. But of course, in the end, you are also always depending, of course, also on the flexibility from the So let's see.
But, I have trust, and I would like also to express my gratitude already, not only to the shadows, but also to the technical teams and also the Liebe Secretariat, because in the legal services, it is incredible how much work on a time pressure, of course, is already achieved. And this, I'm positive, and I have a positive feeling about that it could be doable to do this, in January, in May. Thank you.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you. Thank you, mister Osmani, for the work you're doing and supporting this very important file. Is there any remark by any member following the report of Miss? Yes, Mister Lenners.
Jeroen Lenaers
Yes. So I'm not part of the negotiating team, but Francois Xavier Bellamy, my colleague, couldn't be here, and he does want to share some points. Well, first of all, I would like to thank Malik Asmani as a rapporteur for the efforts and the whole team for the efforts under very tight deadlines. Also, memorize that we have a clear mandate backed by a comfortable majority in this parliament, and it's relatively closely aligned with the council. So we also expect progress in these negotiations.
But on, I think, two main points, it would also really like to support what Malik Asmani has just said, first on the mandatory mutual recognition where, of course, there is an understanding of the practical difficulties and the operational complexities involved. And we are also ready to seek a compromise with the council on that, but it is essential to maintain a clear path towards a system of mandatory mutual recognition in the future. So that's the first important point. And the second, which is even more important, also politically important, I think, is the date of the application. I think it's really unacceptable that the council even considers having a two-year period before the regulation enters into force.
There has to be an immediate entry into force, which is also not uncommon for regulations, especially. I think it's very hard to explain that after all this work, given the fact that we've been negotiating, if you count the old proposal already for 8 years now for a return directive or a return regulation, now we're finally making progress. If we actually have the content on the table, we cannot wait for another 2 years for it to be implemented. So also there really is all support for the Rapporteur to be very, very strict on that. Thank you.
Yes, miss Adelves.
Speaker 78
Only to join the Dutch party here today and to express my gratitude to Mister Osmani for the work that he has put in to date. We look forward to having the conclusion before summer, hopefully, and to stick to our parliament mandate, which, like Mr. Lenars has already said, in many instances, is very close to the council position. But, there are some points that, for us as a parliament, are really crucial. For example, the point on the external dimension, but we look forward to the upcoming dialogues and having this done before the summer. Thank you so much, again.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Asmani, for your report and the points raised by shadow reporters. We all expect a successful outcome of this negotiation in good time. And now we can move to the next file on which the rapporteur will be reporting back to the committee.
It's the so-called Mid Caps Omnibus. There are three committees involved, and the rapporteur for the PP, the Liebe Committee, is the PPE member Lucas Mandel. So, mister Mandel, I give you the floor to report back to the committee.
Lukas Mandl
Thank you very much, chair. Dear colleagues, as Cora Poteur on the Liebe side for the Omnibus four file on the simplification of certain regulations, in particular regarding the extension of mitigating measures from SMEs to small mid-cap enterprises, I would like to report back to the committee following the first trialogue. The first trialogue meeting took place in a constructive and positive atmosphere. There were encouraging signals from all institutions that the file is broadly seen as balanced and necessary, and that there is a shared commitment to move forward efficiently. The colleges' latest expressed their willingness to engage in pragmatic and solution-oriented negotiations, which gives reason for optimism for the next steps.
This omnibus package is vital in creating a simplified framework for European businesses, while reducing excessive administrative burdens. SMEs and SMCs are crucial for our European economy, and we must ensure that their growth, innovation, and competitiveness are supported by providing them with a favorable business environment and an easy-to-use regulatory landscape. They must be able to thrive, scale up, and operate on a level playing field when competing with larger companies. We, therefore, welcome the spirit of the Commission's proposal and have Ms.
Speaker 79
Amanda, please. Further increase the threshold. Yeah. Speakers, time is over. Slowly.
Yeah.
You're too fast.
Speaker 80
I'm too fast. But we have to be fast for European businesses to reduce the regulatory burden.
But not in your intervention, then.
Lukas Mandl
I apologize to the interpreters, and I will try to not speak so fast. We welcome the spirit of the commission's proposal and have proposed to further increase the threshold in the definition of SMCs, allowing more companies to benefit from exemptions regarding the obligation to keep records of high risk processing operations. We also clarified that records must be maintained only for those specific processing operations identified as high risk, rather than for all processing activities, thereby avoiding unnecessary administrative burdens. At the same time, we maintain that public authorities and public bodies should continue to keep records, given the specific nature and purposes of their data processing activities. Furthermore, where an enterprise's core activity involves systematic monitoring or the processing of special categories of personal data in line with Article 37 of GDPR, the obligation to keep records will also remain.
Overall, our approach builds on the GDPR's risk-based framework, ensuring that businesses can reduce red tape and save time where appropriate, while maintaining necessary safeguards where risks to individuals' rights and freedoms are higher. We are yet waiting to have a first discussion on the GDPR-related provisions with the co-legislator, so we will see how much they are willing to compromise. I'm looking forward to your support and feedback, and we'll, of course, always report back from the dialogue. Thank you again.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you very much, Mr. Mandel, for your report. Any member wishing to step in? Yes, please.
Mhmm.
Thank you very much.
Mister Weber, the floor is yours.
Thank you.
Irina Vondra
Thank you very much, Chair. Thank you very much, Lucas. Just a quick feedback from my side also as one of the shadows. I think that this file is a positive step. However, I have to say that I am a little bit skeptical that the estimations of the commission for the cost reductions are a bit exaggerated.
So the file as such will maybe not bring sufficient relief to these companies. But nevertheless, on the category of SMCs, I think that we can build on it for the future legislative act. Now going into the trial logs, I really hope that the council will recognize the added value from the parliament's position, as I believe it really improves the proposal, particularly in terms of clarity for the companies. The reporting obligations should indeed be cut for the smaller companies so that they are able to focus on their job and not waste time with unnecessary reporting. However, those companies that are processing data as their core service should maintain the reporting to show that they comply with the already-mentioned legislation.
The commission proposal, I have to say, went in the right direction, but it left ambiguity with the risk or high-risk categories for the GDPR obligations. So, in the parliament, we have made this clearer. If you have to appoint a DPO or do the assessment for the GDPR, you also have to do the reporting. And this way, I think we make sure that regardless of the size of the company, the burden will not shift to determining whether the companies should report or not, but it will be legally very clear what we want to achieve, and this is to capture companies that do the processing as their core job, while enabling relief for those which do not. Thank you very much.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you, Mrs. Dova. Any other member wishing to take the floor on this point? Well, if that is not the case, we conclude, unless Mr. Mandel has any additional remark.
Lukas Mandl
Thank you very much, Irina, and thanks to everybody involved. It looks like a very constructive approach from our parliament side, definitely, and also in contact with the other institutions. So we can provide results to European businesses, and that means for European prosperity, soon. That's what I hope for, but for good reasons. Thank you again.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you, Mr. Mandel. Now we just take a break until 13, when we'll reconvene for our voting session. It will be short, just a couple of files to vote on. So it won't take long.
In principle, let's see. And at thirteen, we reconvene for the vote.
Just for the sake of.
Speaker 85
Well, dear colleagues, please take your seats and be ready for the vote. Thank you, Mr. Tchaikovsky. Well, now we go on to the voting session. I can see from the number of members present in the room that we have the required quorum.
Javier Zarzalejos
And before we proceed to the votes, I would like to announce that the following Libre and non-Libre members will participate in today's vote. EPP Andrea Wesseler will replace Lena Dupont. Jagna Marsulati Svalsak will replace Magdalena Adamovich. Gordon Andre Sobjewski will replace Christophe Brescia. On his and Andre Frankeira Rodriguez will replace Anna Katarina Mendez.
No replacement reported on PFE or ECR. On renew, Pedro Fristo will replace Sophie Vilmes, and no replacement has been reported in the Queens Left or ESN. Then we can proceed to the vote of the first file. We will vote on the conclusion of an agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Lebanon on the cooperation between the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation, Eurojust, and the authorities of the Republic of Lebanon competent for judicial cooperation in criminal matters. There is a single boat.
It's a roll-call boat. So we now open the boat. We close the vote, and it is adopted. And a second vote today is on the interim report, the Libya opinion, interim report in view of the consent procedure on a broad package of agreements to consolidate, deepen, and expand the bilateral relations with the Swiss Confederation. We'll be voting electronic vote, and we vote on compromise amendment one.
Vote is open. It is closed and adopted. We vote on Compromise Amendment 2, vote is open. Quote is closed, and it is adopted. And we now go for the final vote, which is a roll-call vote.
Boat is open. Vote is now closed, and it is adopted. So we finish our voting session, and the committee will reconvene its session at 3 in the afternoon.
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