Committee on International Trade Ordinary meeting
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INTA European Parliament
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Pascal Lamy
First one is a geoeconomic reason. We have to factor in the possible negative consequences of our new green trade instruments on the economy of developing countries. And the second one is a more sort of political one or say geopolitical one, which is that in our view, and we are a think tank, are prescribing.
Pascal Lamy
Proposing, we definitely now need to avoid damaging our relationship with a number of developing countries at a time where we need a proper, stable relationship with them given the international context as it has evolved with the US, China and others putting a lot of pressure on global trade. And many of these countries are under these pressures, but they don't have a say because they don't want to run a risk in saying what they believe, to antagonize either the Americans or the Chinese. European Union as well. Absolutely. We still can afford to do that.
But, I mean, I know you're on a special day, Bert, on this and you know where I am on that. So if that is correct, if the diagnosis is correct, CTIP is all deals of this kind are a formula which is lighter, as you just said, than traditional FTAs, but which is more focused on the greening of supply chains, including in some cases encompassing the availability of what we call in the Paris Agreement transition minerals, which we call transition minerals and not critical minerals. And this is a semantic nuance, which I insist on. And we also need to equip these new deals with specific capacity building elements, knowing that it was true many years ago that it's a great thing to open trade, provided countries can use trade to develop. And we have a sort of similar situation now.
We'll not advocate for a greater cruiser than eight for climate like we did it for trade, but there is something of that in the concept of a CTIP, which we've been pushing. And that leads me to the third and final point of this short briefing, which is our stance on the modalities of such deals. Of course, it's too soon to have a sort of definitive view. They are still being tested. And in terms of experience, we have a limited scope.
We have a limited panel. We have South Africa, and it still is very much in the making. And we have this Indian case, which I take as a good example because what I witnessed last week in Delhi was, let me be careful in the words I use, was a change in ambience. We know that the Indians have been traditionally extremely averse to anything that looks like green protectionism. We know the view they expressed when the Siban was adopted and put in place with this transition period.
What I saw in the discussion was a different ambiance. I did not get the sort of usual SIBAM bashing. I got constituency with different feelings, different attitudes depending on whether coming from the industry and NGOs and sort of traditional Indian trade wants. So things are changing. And I think this is the result of good messaging by the commission in the way this free trade agreement was handled.
Of course, Indians will not say they like Sivan. They will not say they formally accept Siban, but the reality is that we have to and we and they have to find a way to live with it. And that's, I think, something that takes us forward, as compared to a previous situation. So back to what I see as the conditions. We see roughly 4 conditions.
First, this should be clearly focused on the supply chain, where the supply chains need to change. Second, as I already said, I think they need to be equipped with instruments such as regulatory dialogue, such as capacity building support, which implies financial support, which is, by the way, where we still regret that while the Institut de lauré in Bursa floated the first SIBAM template during COVID. The view we had and we still have, which is that the proceeds of CBAM should go to a specific fund dedicated to helping developing countries cope with the consequences of these green measures, has not been accepted. And we remain of the view that that would be much more logical if the picture I described here, right. Third, they should benefit from solid monitoring, reporting, and evaluation.
And fourth, and I'm not saying this here because I'm here, this is a return in the piece we wrote last year. I think it should also benefit from proper scrutiny by the parliament, by NGOs, which is why we believe that the simplest way to provide for that is, there are ways to provide for that, but the simplest one is to make them legally binding and involve the European Parliament in the process. So that's roughly my condensed message. I think we really have to keep the big picture in mind. When I look at what US, China, Turkey, The Emirates are now cooking with a number of developing countries in a very obscure way.
I think the EU should sort of keep the lead in forging new instruments. We are more in line with today's and tomorrow's requirements. But that if we keep doing this properly, and I think for the moment, we are ahead in terms of the quality of these instruments, we can build a comparative advantage, which we will be implicitly or explicitly credited with by this country. And I think this matters for the future. Many thanks for your attention.
Bernd Lange
Yes. Many thanks, Pascal, for the presentation and for the study. I give now first the floor to the political groups and Jurgen Wohrmann for the PP and the First for about two minutes.
Jörgen Warborn
Thank you, Chair, and thank you, Mr. Lamy, for your presentation. It was very interesting and both, of course, the presentation, but also your work on this paper as well. And I'm happy to hear that you agree that we cannot realize clean industrial objectives without a partnership on a global stage. And I agree that CTIPs could be one way to increase the dialogue on EUDR and CBAM with third countries.
I have a few questions. And I start with a question, actually, to the commission because I've not yet fully understood how these CTPI's are meant to work. The commission has spoken about them extensively. But how many are currently under negotiations? And which ones are planned going forward?
And to Mr. Lamey, what problems are Clean Trade and Investment Partnerships actually solving that existing FTAs or current EU instruments do not? And if they are meant to complement FTAs, should we really prioritize one over the other? Then you suggest moving from non-binding to legally binding agreements over time. But isn't legally binding precisely what tends to slow things down and make agreements harder to conclude?
So how would CTIPs avoid the same deadlock that we often see with the FTAs? You also proposed that CTIPs include technical and financial assistance. And how is this different from existing tools like the economic partnership agreements? And how do we ensure that these partnerships are generally win-win situations rather than primarily development policy under a different label? Thank you.
Udo Bullmann
Thanks, Bernd, and complementing you as chair to bring in the masterminds in a situation where exactly this debate is needed. Thank you very much, Pascal, for being with us. Three quick questions. First of all, I'm chair of the South African delegation to the urban parliament. We had two so-called IPMs into parliamentary meetings last year to accompany and to prepare what was happening at the end of the year.
The result of all of this is that colleagues agree from both sides that we need a process, a regulatory dialogue, and a dialogue on the implementation of what was agreed upon. That is the best way of scrutinizing because we look at the issue from both sides. So to understand it not so much as a one-off, but rather as an avenue on which things can be negotiated and happen. Second thing, what is about the governance? Talking about binding ones, you know that we have a consent procedure in trade agreements, in the real trade agreements.
And this is an achievement because neither New Zealand nor Canada nor Mercosur would look as they look without the consent procedure that always was rightly used as leverage to improve the agreement. So, scrutiny is not enough. Where's the seat of the European Parliament? And thirdly, and lastly, you are talking about support. Support is about money.
Money is invested from the European budget. At the very moment, already 50% of the ODA, NDG Global Europe, is going into global gateway, but there is a constitutional treaty obligation ODA has primarily to fight poverty. So where is the idea once we put that in, whatever, to scrutinize if our money, the way in which we spend our money in agreements, is still fighting poverty and providing for more fights against inequality, for more equality in the societies of our partner countries.
Thanks a lot, Terry.
Thank.
Thierry Mariani
Thank you very much. These steps are new mini trade agreements that the commission is looking to increase. So who is taking these decisions on behalf of whom, and with what controls in place? It shows the commission is using a new type of instrument to once again reinforce its powers over that of the people then negotiated in a nonbinding way. We don't have the traditional agreement procedure set out in 02/07, 02/2007, and 02/18 of the treaty.
Parliament represents 450000000 citizens and is being more and more sidelined from the negotiating procedure and the drawing up of these agreements. This study is signed by people that are mostly favorable to these measures, but they still acknowledge this point. This seems a real concern for the direction of the commission. It's often found to be in fault for agreements signed with third countries, Mercosur being the latest example. These mini trade deals, I think, is the commission sending a message saying parliament's annoying.
We're just going to bypass it. Now I don't want to, quote once again the example of Rwanda and the critical raw materials deed, which has been denounced by a resolution here in parliament, and the commission simply ignores it and continues. So the issue with these mini trade deals, well, more time I spend in parliament, it seems they're just trying to take away the few powers that we have. I listened very attentively, and you said it does cause a problem at the end because parliament does need to be involved in this process. So if parliament is involved in the process, then there should be democratic control.
Fine. But if parliament is not involved before these trade deals are concluded, then absolutely not.
Merci. Lin.
Lynn Boylan
Thank you, chair, and thanks mister Nami for the interesting paper he has presented today. I think when we look at the new era of mini trade deals, I have to say I'm really concerned that what we're actually seeing is an attempt to return to a more overtly extractive relationship with developing countries. For example, critical raw material partnerships represent a tool of extraction and are in effect designed to facilitate a modern day resource grab, rather than any form of equitable partnership. And I'm really concerned about the emergence of so-called clean trade and investment partnerships, which prioritize access to critical raw materials, energy, and technology. And the commission themselves have admitted that CTIPs are designed to cater to the needs of European businesses, and they are negotiated in secrecy.
Furthermore, we saw with the South Africa CTIP, the global gateway investments, supposedly a development tool, were promised as part of the negotiation. The commission communication on the clean industrial deal specifically describes CTIPs as a tool to align external action policies with industrial policy. So they are couched in the language of climate action, but in reality represent too for the commission to just serve the interests of large corporations without any democratic accountability. And then if you move to the voluntary partnership agreements on forest law governance, we see the regrettable move towards forest partnerships, which are not, again, democratically accountable and which actively exclude civil society in our partner countries. So none of these instruments are subject to the scrutiny of this parliament, and are clearly designed to serve the interests of corporations, not the agenda or any agendas on sustainable development and not on climate action.
So I suppose my question today is, you know, is there no concerns whatsoever regarding the lack of transparency and democratic scrutiny over the current direction of travel of the commission?
Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez
Thank you, chair. I'd like to thank the authors of this report. The US show that it's capable of ambitious trade agreements that are real watershed, but we have these successes in Latin America and Asia. But there's room for more flexible, more nimble strategies to complement our existing trade strategy. I read the report that you presented, and I'm a bit doubtful about the solution proposed by the authors in some instances.
Given the lack of nimbleness, they add more conditions, more standards, and more supervisory mechanisms. And I'm wondering if we're not falling into the same trap with a different name. What I am convinced by is the stress on clear financial commitments, because that could make a real difference. And in that regard, I'd like to ask you the following question. Beyond the critical raw materials and clean energy, which the report proposes, what other areas of cooperation do you think should be on the table if we want to ensure that these agreements also respond to the clear needs of our industry today?
Benoit Cassart
And despite the trade tensions with China, do you see any possibility for a sectoral agreement with China which would help to balance our trade relationship with China? Thank you. Thank you, chair. I admit I'm not very familiar with the report, but I'm struck by some of what has been said. I have two questions for you, just.
First, Mr. Lamey, thank you for being here. I know you have a lot of experience. You're a director of the WTO. Now does the promotion of this type of agreement, in your view, is that synonymous with the definitive end of the WTO?
That's my first question. And my second question, you finished by talking about a partnership with an important role for the parliament. How would you define that important role? Thank you.
Bernd Lange
Yeah. Thanks a lot. And I had also four questions in my mind, and one is indeed the relation to WTO. So in my understanding, always, we are necessary to have a comprehensive agreement with tariff reduction for 90% and whatever. How if such a mini deal would become legally binding, how this would fit into the framework of the WTO?
Secondly, on the participation of parliament and the implementation process in the CT, in the agreement with South Africa. There is a government-to-government dialogue foreseen and a business-to-government dialogue, but no dialogue between parliament or parliament and government. And you mentioned it should be. So what is your idea how the implementation of the parliament could or should work? And then, of course, I'm quite interested in trade policy.
And I see now a lot of mini deals with different countries. And quite recently, we also had a critical material partnership with The United States and 30 countries among them. So how does this big cake really fit together? And is there some common ground, by the way, to use this phrase raw materials for transition, I think it's quite charming. And the last question, and we will ask come to the commission as well, is regarding the commission.
So we have now the new framework agreement, which has been enforced since last Wednesday. And there is a clear obligation that the commission has to inform the parliament when it negotiated and concluded nonbinding international agreements on an equal footing to the council. How does the commission intend to ensure this in practice? So Miss Edouard Bourcieu, the Head of Unit Strategy Analysis and Chief Economist of Digitrade, will answer.
Edouard Bourcieu
Thank you very much, Mr. President. I will first echo what Pascal Lemie said about the need for the EU to take the lead in the current international environment, which, of course, is very difficult, very challenging. We've accelerated our FTA agenda. As you very well know, we've concluded negotiations with Indonesia in September.
We concluded negotiations with India, as mentioned by Pascal Lamy, in January. And we've just concluded negotiations with Australia as well, with many more also going on, in particular with the Philippines, which we hope to conclude still this year. This brings our FTA agenda to more than half of our total trade covered by such preferential trade relationships. It's the biggest, largest FTA network worldwide. There's a real interest, as we've seen recently, from our partners to engage with us, to get closer with us, to align with us in the current environment.
And of course, we've got quite an attractive offer based in particular on the breadth and depth of the single market, but also on the stability and the predictability of the EU. That's for the FTA agenda. But part of the offer is also the new kind of tools we've been developing, more targeted, simpler, easier to use in order to meet both our needs and the needs of our partner countries, in particular in the context of the green transition, of the energy transition, which is, of course, a big priority for the EU but also for many of its partners, and it's where the CTIPS come into play. Its CTIPS are meant to be flexible kind of arrangement dedicated to energy transition issues and mobilizing very much innovative in the way they mobilize different kinds of instruments based on a real whole of government approach. It's really investments, bringing in investments, EU investments in such countries based on public and private money using both the global gateway kind of financing and the global gateway investment hubs, but also European credit agencies, EIB in terms of public money, and working directly with the private sector to bring private money in.
So it's about investments, but also about regulatory cooperation and about trade investment promotion. So we bring all these elements together in a single framework dedicated to the green transition. It's both in the EU's interests. It's in terms of competitiveness, in terms of economic security, in terms of sustainability, but it's also in our partners' interest. And I think a key element is that we need both political commitments, which we had in the first TTIP we negotiated with South Africa on both sides, but also a clear business case.
So that's the preconditions for such agreements, such partnerships. Now, coming to more specific points. Pascal Lamy mentioned the need to focus on development objectives, on the needs of our partners. That's very much what we try to do. As I said, there are interests on both sides to develop green technologies, green supply chains, both in the EU and in partner countries.
That's very much what we've done with South Africa in the first city, which we've concluded. It's not only a question for the EU of getting the critical raw materials or the transition materials, as Pascal Lamy said, we need. It's also a question of making it possible for our partner countries to move up the supply chain. So there are concrete projects, very concrete projects on rare earths with extraction with South Africa, but also about rare earths processing with South Africa to make it possible for South Africa to invest, to share technologies, and make it possible for South Africa to climb up the value chain and process ores. So the same in other sectors in terms of energy reform in South Africa, transmission infrastructures in which we invest, a specific focus on gas, which was South Africa's main interest in these negotiations.
So that's for the first specific point on development. Now there was a question also raised several times about the modalities and the binding versus nonbinding dimension of the partnership. There's nothing excluded on this side. It's, again, these partnerships are meant to be flexible, to be partnerships that we can conclude quickly. We did it in less than one year’s time with South Africa.
In the case of South Africa, it was not a binding agreement. It was based on a proper process, a nonbinding instrument. In this context, we already implemented, Mr. President, to reply to your question about the new institutional framework, we already implemented what we will now be obliged to implement, meaning to share systematically all elements and the same information with the parliament as with the council. And we're happy to engage with the parliament to develop the modalities of cooperation on CTIPS, on information sharing, and on exchange of views.
But as I said, nothing is excluded. It was a nonbinding instrument in the case of South Africa, but it could very well be a binding instrument in other cases. It all depends on the content and what's in the agreement. We didn't have any market access component in the partnership with South Africa because, to a large extent, we already had an economic partnership agreement with SADEC, the South African region. So the kind of commitments we took in these partnerships were not binding commitments.
But in other cases, we may very well have to take binding commitments, request a binding agreement. It may also help in the long term to ensure that CTIPS continue operating and remain a priority for everyone. So it's something that, in our view, should be assessed on a case-by-case basis. And to finish, since my time is already over, there was a question by Mr. Warborn on the state of play.
So indeed, we've concluded one CTIP for the time being in November with South Africa. India is a bit of a different animal, as mentioned by Mr. Lamis. We have dedicated provisions on climate, but it's different from a city, from a proper city. With South Africa, so we got a very good outcome, thanks to the very high level of political commitment of both the EU and South Africa, with a conclusion at the time of the summit.
We had a real business case with South Africa, which was an essential precondition. We are now in the process of drawing lessons from this negotiation with South Africa for future agreements. We're also setting up the implementation mechanisms of the city with South Africa. It's a real, it's a very important step. It's probably a more important step than in other types of agreements, in particular because it's not a binding agreement.
So if we don't implement it, nothing will happen spontaneously. So a lot of the work still has to be done with South Africa, but there's a lot of willingness to do so on both sides. And we are also launching the process of setting up priorities for future CTIPS, identifying the needs on our side, on our partners' side, and identifying the right partners to meet these needs. Thank you very much.
Pascal Lamy
That's more than what I need. Let me first make it clear, if necessary, that I am not speaking for the commission anymore. I'm here as a sort of expert, giving you what I have in my mind and the result of the work of the Institut de L'Or teams on the topic. So the major issue in the discussion this afternoon has been there are a few other issues, but what kind of agreement is there? Are they binding or not binding?
Should the commission and the EU parliament have proper scrutiny and linking to this sort of, what's the nature of these new animals? You know, do they have legs or wings, or maybe both? I think it's a perfectly relevant question, which we have in a way each time we try to innovate. We don't really know the shape of what we are trying to do, but we know we have to do it. And this is my point.
If I take the example of India, which is the one I have the most fresh in my mind, my guess is that we will, I mean, let me put it differently. India's steel sector is going to grow three or four times bigger than what it is today in the decades to come. Why? Because this country has a lot of needs for steel production. If we want India to decarbonize as much as possible, given the huge ecological impact of all this, what's the way to go?
I'm quite sure that if the EU had said, we need you to accept CBAM as part of the binding agreement, the answer would have been no. So it's not part of the binding side of this FTA. And yet, I think we have a good possibility and occasion, and that's what I smelled last week. We have a good occasion to influence positively the way India will decarbonize its steel industry while recognizing, and this is part of the answer to the importance of a proper regulatory dialogue, that 60% of Indian steel is done by big shots and 40% by SMEs. Now the big shots will cope with the sort of necessary certification, technical requirements.
The problem is that 40% of the producers don't have the capacity to do that. And this is where we can probably leverage something that would not exist otherwise, through proper regulatory dialogue and capacity building. So I listen carefully to what Edouard Borja said. He had a sort of typical economist's answer to your question. It depends.
And I think there is something right there. We have to adjust to the issues we have in mind. Of course, there are other reasons for a proper parliament scrutiny. For instance, if we use Global Gateway money, this is under the oversight of the European Parliament, like any budget expenditure. So that's one angle where you need to have your say.
So it's a further step in the expression of the wish of the commission to conclude agreements behind the back of the Parliament. I don't think so. It's not the commission's attention, I don't think, nor that of the EU in general. I think, and I repeat what I said in different words earlier, it depends. And you have to stick to our objective, which is CBOM, for example.
It's not to make money, it's not to create an obstacle to trade, it's to leverage the wish of our commercial partners to engage in a process of greening their economies, including their exports, and therefore our imports. And I can see the argument that might be made saying that we're promoting extractive industries, but we have to decide in the end what we actually want. Do we want to green our imports, to reduce our carbon use? If we want to do that, then that's the way to do it.
Making the point your chair mentioned, including with a sort of agreement with the U. S. On transition minerals. The reality is that China has acquired, built a monopoly, which distorts competition internationally, and that we came to the conclusion. You came to the conclusion.
The EU came to the conclusion. That's an area where we need to couple EU and U. S. Leverage so that China gets the signal. And my wish is that if that's the case, US will behave as proper partners in such leverage, and we'll see what it gives.
The China issue is not here. We will never get what we want with China, with the CPTPP nor with the free trade agreement, by the way. On this, I'm much more, sort of convinced than in the past that our problem with China is not a trade problem. It's a macroeconomic problem. And as I said, including in public in Delhi last week, we spent 20 years trying to adjust China to global trade rules.
We now have to think of how to adjust global trade rules to China. And this, in my view, is through a larger and proper use of government safeguard measures. That's my technical conclusion, although it's way beyond our discussion this afternoon. On the question about what about WTO, I mean, we've always been a coexistence of bilateral, preilateral agreements and the WTO. This is not a problem.
Where we have a problem is that, as your chair mentioned, there is no WTO framework to deal with environment and trade for a reason, not that the issue has not been identified. There is a committee on the environment in the WTO, but there is a political blockage so far. Northern countries accept that this should be discussed in the WTO. Most of the southern countries, including, by the way, countries like India, believe this is not a conversation about trade. This is a conversation about the environment.
It should be held elsewhere. And we've been locked into this position, which is why I welcomed at the time, and I still welcome the initiative Brazil took in Berlin to create this IFCCT, another set of acronyms, which we will need to get acquainted with, which is this informal panel, which is for the first phase co-chaired by Brazil and Australia. I think it should be announced pretty soon. And where, by the way, the Institut et Guellard in Brussels is involved to at last have a forum where people don't take official positions, but try to move forward to find solutions. We will need a global framework to deal with this issue.
WTO is the sort of normal place. So far, it hasn't worked, but we definitely will need that. And I hope that this attempt to relook at the issue will succeed. That's all for my answers, and many thanks for your attention.
Bernd Lange
Pascal, thanks a lot. It was really great to have you here, and your private advice is also well received. Thanks a lot. And we will continue the discussion about mini deals, and specifically South Africa. We are going as an inter committee to South Africa at the end of the month, and then we will have a close look at how the implementation is working.
Thanks a lot.
Pascal Lamy
Thanks very much, and thanks for your authorization to attend the next part of your session for reasons I don't need to.
Bernd Lange
disclose. Perfect. Thanks a lot. So, dear colleagues, please take your place and your seat. And we have some votes now in front of us.
Good. And before starting with the serious vote, we will have a test vote. And the vote is on the question if the chair is happy to have a trial log on the US terrorist tonight. The vote is open. If the chair is happy to have a trialogue tonight about the US tariffs.
So the vote is open.
Awesome.
Bernd Lange
I know we're missing three. So.
We are missing three votes. Not decided on this question.
Still missing votes. Okay.
Bernd Lange
Then I'll close the vote. And the majority is really in favor of having fun tonight. That's great. Thanks a lot for that. Good.
So the first vote is also an important part of the game. It is the new steel safeguards. And we had tough negotiations, and we had a wonderful rapporteur, Karen Karlspro, and we got a wonderful result. And we have now the final vote, and the vote is open. And the vote is closed.
Oh. Oh. So it is adopted with a big majority. Congratulations.
Can you read out?
The vote check? Because it doesn't.
Bernd Lange
Show up. Oh, so it hasn't shown up. 32 votes in favor, and one abstention. Great.
It doesn't show up on web streaming.
So if you can read them out. Okay.
Bernd Lange
Thank you. Does that work?
Is it the next one? Yeah.
So do. Next one is an yeah. Issue linked to Brexit a long time ago. You remember. But, nevertheless, we have to fix it here with Pakistan, and the vote is open.
Still missing one. Is it Miss Biden?
And the vote is, yeah, closed. And it is adopted by 34 votes in favor and 1 vote against. So then we switch to the new report on economic security who is in favor of amendment compromise amendment one. Against abstention, adopted. Compromise 4.
Compromise 4. In favor, against, compromise, four. In favor, against. Abstention adopted. Directed to the final. Mhmm.
Directed to.
the final vote, because
Bernd Lange
So I guess we have a lot of block vote and because it's covered more or less by compromise one, and you can really go to the end of the voting list because now we have the final vote electronically, and the vote is open. And the vote is closed. Oh, no. No. Okay.
I'll wait. Now it's closed. And the result is 26 in favor, four against, and seven abstentions. Congratulations, sorry for the report. And then we switch to the vote on the termination of the Voluntary Partnership Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Liberia on reflect on the timber issue.
Amendment 24 in favor, against, abstention, check 24. The vote is open.
24. They're.
asking each.
One check.
Bernd Lange
24. The amendment 24. Vote is open, and the vote is yes. Yeah. Closed.
And it is adopted by 18 votes in favor and 16 against. And, therefore, amendment 25 falls, and we switch to compromise three in favor, against abstention adopted. 28 in favor, against, abstention, rejected. 30 in favor, against, abstention adopted. 32 in favor, against abstention.
Rejected. 33 in favor, against, abstention check. 33, the vote is open. And the vote is closed, and it is rejected by 20 votes against and 18 in favor, compromised four in favor, against abstention adopted. 39 in favor, against, abstention rejected.
40 in favor, against, abstention adopted, compromise five in favor, against, abstention adopted, 47 in favor against. Abstention rejected. 48 in favor. Against. Abstention rejected.
Compromise. Seven in favor. Oh, I missed 6. Excuse me. Compromise six in favor, against, abstention adopted now.
Compromise seven in favor, against, abstention adopted. 55 in favor, against, abstention, rejected. Compromise eight in favor, against abstention, adopted. 59 in favor, against, abstention, rejected. Compromise nine in favor against abstention adopted, 65 in favor against abstention rejected, 66 in favor against abstention rejected.
One in favor, against, abstention adopted. Two in favor, against abstention adopted. Three in favor, against. Abstention adopted. Five in favor?
Against. Abstention adopted. Six in favor? Against. Abstention rejected.
Seven in favor, against, abstention adopted. Compromise one in favor of against abstention adopted. 14 in favor, against, abstention, rejected. Compromise, two in favor. Against abstention, adopted.
19 in favor. Against abstention, adopted. 20 in favor. Against abstention, adopted. 21 in favor.
Against abstention, rejected.
Check. Check.
Bernd Lange
21. And the vote is closed and clearly rejected. And 23 in favor, against, abstention rejected. And the final vote, the vote is now open.
It's closed, Jeff. Yeah.
Bernd Lange
It is closed. And the new resolution is adopted by 27 against three and eight abstentions. And now we have the termination of the agreement, and the two amendments were withdrawn. And now we have the final vote. Who is in favor?
Excuse me. The vote is open.
It's roll call.
Bernd Lange
And the vote is closed and clearly adopted, 33 against 3 and 2 abstentions. And then we switch to point 14, the cooperation with like-minded countries in the region East Asia. East Africa.
Asia.
Bernd Lange
East Area. And compromise one is the first amendment. Who's in favor? And against and abstention are adopted. Then we have compromise two in favor, against, abstention adopted.
Then we have 34 in favor, against, abstention, rejected. 41 in favor, against, abstention rejected, 42 in favor, against, abstention rejected, compromise three in favor, against, abstention adopted, 45 in favor, against, abstention rejected, and then we switch to 57 in favor, against, abstention rejected, 58 in favor, against, abstention rejected, 64 in favor, against, abstention rejected, 66 in favor. Against. Abstention, check. 66.
Did you kick on the wood 66? The vote is open. And the vote is closed, and it's rejected. 16 yes and 16, nine no, and five abstention. And 67 in favor, against abstention, it could be the same majority, but we check it.
67 votes are open. And the vote is closed, and it is indeed the same majority. So rejected. 71 in favor, against. Abstention rejected.
72 in favor.
Bernd Lange
Check. They want to check 71. They want to check on.
71. Check. Vote is open.
Which are the score? 71.
71. Vote is open. And the vote is closed, and it is rejected. 72 in favor, against, abstention, rejected. 74 in favor, against.
Abstention rejected. 76 in favor, against. Abstention rejected. 77 is what is drawn, and 78 as well. And now we have the final vote.
The vote is open. And the vote is closed and is adopted with 33 against 2 and 1 abstention. And now we switch to the vote on the interview report in view of the consent procedure on a broad package of agreement with the switch configuration. We were in Bern quite recently, and everybody besides one party is happy about this package. So amendment one, who is in favor?
Against. Abstention adopted. Compromise one in favor. Against. Abstention adopted.
Three in favor. Against abstention, adopted. Four in favor, against abstention, adopted. Five in favor, against, abstention adopted. Six in favor, against abstention adopted.
Seven in favor, against, abstention adopted. Nine in favor, against, abstention adopted. 10 in favor, against, abstention adopted. 11 in favor, against, abstention adopted. Compromise two in favor against abstention, adopted.
13 in favor, against, abstention adopted. 14 in favor, against, abstention adopted. Compromise three in favor, against abstention, adopted. 18 in favor, against, abstention adopted. 20 in favor, against, abstention adopted.
21 in favor, against abstention adopted, 22 in favor. Against, abstention adopted, 23 in favor. Against, abstention adopted, 24 in favor. Against abstention adopted, compromise four in favor. Against abstention, adopted.
Compromise five in favor, against abstention, adopted. 37 in favor, against, abstention adopted. 40 in favor, against, abstention, rejected. 43 in favor, against, abstention rejected. 28 in favor, against abstention adopted.
29 in favor, against, abstention adopted. 30 in favor, against, abstention adopted. The final vote is open. And the vote is closed. And it's clearly adopted 34 against 1 and 2 abstention.
And now we come to the consent vote on the Swiss package. The vote is open. And the vote is closed. Perfect. 34 in favor, one against, and two abstentions.
The Swiss people are happy. So, thanks a lot. So please sit down. Now we have the honor to have point 17. And you know, this is the last time we will see Sabine Weyant here in the committee.
And, therefore, please stay and be quiet. Alright.
Oh, wow. Everybody.
Bernd Lange
So, Lee, dear colleagues, please sit down, and so where is she? Outside?
Okay.
That was so fast.
No. No. No.
Bernd Lange
It's 16:19. The point was at 16:20. She's supposed to be here for 16:20 in one minute. Okay.
I mean, we always.
Ask people to come a little bit early.
Bernd Lange
So, dear colleagues, some days ago, I was really shocked because, yeah. You don't believe, but I was shocked because I heard that Sabine Wayan is now not longer staying as director general of DG Trade. And to be honest, I couldn't believe because we worked for such a long time together in a really productive and trustful way, so I was really shocked. And, immediately, I said that can't be, that we will sit have a situation where Sabine is not director general anymore, and she is not coming to the last possible inter meeting before she is leaving this post. And I think we can't really let go of her without having a last all around exchange of view about trade policy.
And, therefore, immediately, I ask to come to this interim meeting. And luckily, you accepted it, and now you are here. And I guess everybody has the highest regard for your work and for your views and the, yeah, the sharpness and clarity of your argumentation and your experience. Sometimes I was deeply impressed. Sometimes we had good cooperation.
Sometimes also some discussion, let's say, but always in a fact-based way, and that I appreciate very much. And I guess I can speak also in the name of my members so that everybody appreciated our exchange here in the committee. And as I mentioned, possibility now to have a view on the EU trade policy in general. And, of course, we are looking specifically to the United States. You can imagine, specifically after some posts we read recently.
And, but nevertheless, also the question on the relation between real deal and mini deals is for interest. And, we had just a discussion with Pascal on that, and how you see this. And, of course, in this situation where, I guess, the global situation of trade has really changed, and the world we had some years ago will not come back. You can like it or not, but we have to live with the situation and what does it mean for EU trade policy for the future. So I'm quite happy that, first, we had Pascal here with us.
I guess he was really engaged in bringing you to this career in the DG trade. And thanks a lot, Pascal, that you are staying here for this exchange. And, yes, Sabine. Now the floor is yours.
Sabine Weyand
Thank you very much, Bernd. And I'm very happy to hear that, after all these years, I'm still able to surprise you. So first of all, I really have the sense that this is a cycle coming to a close in more than one respect. And I must say I have had a rough time in seven years. I came to this committee 22 times.
Really? And the exchanges were always interesting, sometimes robust, but as I said, always, as you also said, always characterised by respect for each other, by listening to the arguments by all sides. So I think that is a spirit I very much appreciate it. Now, I am leaving this post with a sense of achievement. Achievements which are not mine or the Commission's, but which are EU achievements, which we managed to have because of close cooperation between the institutions.
And just to recall, I joined DG Trade coming directly from my job as deputy chief negotiator for the withdrawal of the UK from the EU. And I think we broke new ground in terms of inter-institutional cooperation. And that has very much informed also my attitude towards cooperation with the Parliament, also with the Council, in my job at DG Trade. And I think, if I look back, the first vote I was already in DG Trade at the time, was when you voted on the TCA. And I think that was a vote where you moved very quickly because we had prepared the ground so well, and I think that is a lesson I draw for the future as well.
That is the type of cooperation we need to continue. And then I look at the last vote, which was on the GSP, which was a very hard-fought-over file. We had difficult discussions, but I think, in the end, you landed on an agreement that shows that the EU is a reliable partner for developing countries while protecting EU interests and values. And from that point of view, we have two points that mark, I think, the overall approach. Key concept allows me to look back at seven years in DG trade.
The key concept that has informed the policy during that time was the concept of open, sustainable, and assertive trade policy. And if I look back, let me start with openness. I think this is something where we here really have developed at scale. The world's largest trade network is not that of China or that of the US. It is ours, and it is only getting bigger.
This is not just a question of quantity, it is also a question of the quality of the agreements. Our agreements support more than 30,000,000 jobs in the EU, with over 700,000 companies exporting already outside the EU. By the way, and here again a cycle is closing, the first trade agreement that we concluded for the first time in June 2019 was with Mercosur. And I am leaving as we are starting to provisionally apply it. As you can see, I am not shying away from also calling out the issues where we had difficult discussions.
But again, I think we found good ways forward through cooperation, through dialogue. The last word will go back to the European Parliament on this. But in the meantime, we road test the agreement so that the vote in Parliament can happen in full knowledge of what is at stake. Now, with Mercosur provisionally applied, we reach 45 agreements spanning 80 partners, and we cover almost 50% of our trade. And once we add Indonesia, India, and Australia, we will reach 83 partners and 53% of our trade.
And this expansion of market access, but also of sources of supply, is even more important in turbulent times, which are characterised not by the rule of law but the law of the jungle. And our trade agreements are an essential contribution to introducing reliability, predictability, fairness, and respect in these trade relations. And of course, we are continuing. We are focused on two regions at the moment: Southeast Asia and the Gulf Region, with the United Arab Emirates the first in line. Of course, we have to see how the current situation affects the possibility of concluding these agreements.
But what we want is a number of high-quality agreements, and that is what we are setting up. You mentioned that you had a discussion about mini-deals. I mini deals sound slightly negative in my ears. So we call them alternative forms of engagement, just as a suggestion. And here, I think we have made progress with our digital trade agreements with Japan and Singapore, the first sustainable investment facilitation agreement.
I think we always talk about trade, but we always have to think about trade together with investment. The first agreement we concluded was Angola in 2022. We have our inaugural CTIP Clean Trade and Investment Partnership with South Africa, which also goes back to discussions we had a few years ago with Pascal Lamy and a number of my colleagues in the Commission, where we developed the concept for the first time. Now, we have to make it deliver, and we have to develop approaches like that with other countries as well, where we bring together trade, investment, regulatory cooperation, and infrastructure projects. And all of this, of course, requires, as I said, working closely with your committee.
Now, in addition, and you mentioned it already, we actively manage our trade relations with the US and with China, and we remained a leader on WTO reform. I will come back to these issues at the end. Another area that we have discussed often in a controversial manner in this committee is sustainability. But looking back, I think I am proud of the road we have traveled together. If I look at our latest agreements, I look at what we have achieved with them, I think we can be satisfied because we have managed to find an approach which treats our partners as equal partners, which does not impose unilateral EU requirements on them, but which basically works by focusing on the implementation of internationally-agreed commitments.
That is how we managed to have the Paris Agreement as an essential element in a number of agreements. But we have also worked in other directions on sustainability. We have secured access to clean technologies that are needed for decarbonisation and inputs for the clean transition. We have strengthened the sustainability provisions and the conditionality of our GSP scheme. We have worked on the enforcement of our TSD provisions in free trade agreements, whether it is ILO or environmental agreements.
And we have made progress through the Coalition of Trade Ministers for Climate and in other WTO tracks. So, I think that is, in the current environment, not a bad outcome, and one that requires being taken care of. I think the lesson I draw is there is no one-size-fits-all. We need to remain creative and adjust this to the environment around us, but also to the partners in question. Finally, on assertiveness, we have considerably strengthened our rule book and we, you, have delivered on key legislation from the enforcement regulation in 2022 to the recast of the dual use regulation, the international procurement instrument, which we recently applied for the first time in the medtech sector as regards China, the foreign subsidies regulation, which is now being applied, the FDI screening regulation, the revision will be voted this month and, of course, the anti coercion instrument, which is there, waiting to be deployed or to do its dissuasion effect through other means.
When it comes to trade defence, the last two years have seen a peak of over 30 annual measures being introduced. It is a peak, and your committee has very often drawn attention to the fact that this, of course, comes with requirements for resources, which are currently not there. So I continue to rely on your support to my successor to fix that problem. We have also introduced innovations in the way we operate trade defense policy. We have also not shied away from making recourse to safeguard measures, which can be broader than individual products, and have a protective effect for sectors that require it.
And we have found ways to also address the circumvention of measures because we see that, for instance, the problem of overcapacity does not stick just to the main country of origin, but travels around the world, and our trade defence practice has to capture that. Our commitment to protect the EU industry from unfair trading practices has been firm, whether through countervailing duties on battery electric vehicles from China or the most recent one, the measure to protect our steel industry from global overcapacity. And again, I am very happy with the outcome of the trial log, and the parliament amendments have definitely improved the legislation. We have also changed the way we work on implementation and enforcement overall with the Chief Trade Enforcement Officer that has been in place, Denis Redonne, who has often been in this committee as well, and will continue to come. And he has been in place for six years already, and this has made a marked difference in the implementation of our trade agreements, but also in spreading the knowledge about market access opportunities opened by our trade agreements throughout the business communities in Europe.
And, of course, Digitrade also has a new name, Digitrade and Economic Security. I think here we are still in the process of a shift in the mindset to think about economic security in a way that combines the necessary efficiency with the resilience that we need. And I am very happy that this is anchored in DG Trade, because it allows us to exactly make that balance between how much openness and how much protection do we need. And that will remain a balancing act for the future, going ahead. But let me conclude with a number of broader reflections.
I see three defining trends which will not go away, and which will demand attention. More from you than from me in the future. First, the volatility in transatlantic relations. That will not go away. We have seen that.
We have concluded the Turnberry Agreement. This has created a measure of stability, but we see the volatility and the unpredictability continuing, and we have no choice but to navigate and manage that. After all, the EU-US trade and investment relationship is and will remain the largest in the world, so we have to take care of it. And that brings me to tonight, because we will also spend the evening together.
Great!
Sabine Weyand
We have the second trialogue on the two regulations implementing the joint statement of last summer. And I think it is time that we move forward on this. So I am looking forward to a trial log tonight, which presents a breakthrough and which shows the EU stands by its commitments. It stands up for EU values and interests on the basis of agreements made. And I am confident that on the basis of the mandate of the Council and the mandate of the Parliament, we have all the ingredients that allow us to show that we remain a reliable partner, while giving us all the instruments to react to any developments that we see.
This is in our hands. We will at every moment have the possibility to react to whatever scenario comes our way. And I think that is very important, and the Commission is ready to come with all the necessary compromise proposals because we really want to see a breakthrough on this. Not because we think that will be the end of the challenges. No.
As I said, it will remain complicated to navigate this, but I really think that we need to stick to the hallmark of EU policy, which is to be a reliable partner because that allows us to also hold The US to its part of the deal. And there are areas which we are not stopping to raise with our US counterparts where the US still has to implement fully the Turnberry agreement. So I think that is how we see that going forward. And of course, we will have to remain vigilant and see what is happening, and have to manage any upcoming disturbances with a firm eye on EU interests. The second challenge that will remain is the rise of China and the impact that China's economic model has on the rest of the world.
And I am not talking about a cyclical imbalance in trade. I am talking about structural imbalances, macroeconomic imbalances, or what the IMF calls macro industrial policy that really suppresses domestic demand and creates durable imbalances in the relationship. I will not throw too many figures at you today. I have done that in the past. But just one: today, accounts for 30% of global industrial production, and that figure is set to rise by 2030 to 40% to 45%.
At the same time, they stand for 13% of the global consumption. That is an imbalance that the world just cannot digest. And here, we have to use the instruments we have, and I have mentioned a number of them, and we have to deploy them in a manner that is coherent and consistent and that strengthens the impact of individual measures, whether that is trade defence or whether that is economic security measures. But we also need to reflect on whether we have the instruments that we need, or whether we need to develop further our toolbox. I'm limiting myself to raising the question here.
I'm happy to leave that to my successor. The Commission will have an orientation debate about this at the end of this month, but the China challenge is one that will remain with us for a long time to come. And the third trend is we need a reform of the WTO, but it is proving elusive. Yaoundé was a disappointment. You were there with a number of MEPs.
We were very close, actually, to a decent outcome on reform, including an agreement with the United States. But in the end, it failed because there was a hostage taking going on. And the fact that there was no agreement on the extension of the e-commerce moratorium also led to the failure of the provisions on reform. That's not the end of it. As we are speaking, the General Counsel in Geneva is meeting the General Counsel of the WTO.
We see pathways forward both on the moratorium and on reform. And the EU is committed to making contributions on substance together with like-minded partners in the WTO. But we will also use our partnerships with groupings like the CPTPP, in order to move forward the reform that we need from both inside and outside the WTO. As I am losing my voice, it is time to come to an end. So, I wanted to thank you for the cooperation we have had, including the fact that it was challenging and critical, because that is what we need in order to move Europe forward.
I will move out of the DG trade. I should not say that seven years is a long time, because then people will say, how long has Bernd Lange been chair of the entire committee? So, I am also moving out of the Commission, but my commitment to Europe will not disappear. I am really looking forward to the opportunity that the Commission has given me to spend a year in Florence at the European University Institute, from which I will follow what you are doing here. And I am looking forward to fertilising my brain and having some fresh ideas, because being in the treadmill, that is actually quite difficult.
So, I am really looking forward to that, and I am finishing with a deep felt thank you to this committee, for its cooperation and notably to Bernd Lange, who has been an excellent sparring partner.
Thank you.
Bernd Lange
Thanks a lot, Sabine, and thanks a lot also for these personal words to me. Now I give the floor to the political groups. Perhaps they want to give some advice for the future at the University of Florence or whatever. Jurgen, you are the first.
Jörgen Warborn
Thank you, Chair. I have no advice for Sabine. I think she has everything she needs for the next step in the career, and congratulations on that. And thank you very much for the very good cooperation during these years. I really appreciated your overview and going back in history because I also started back in 2019 in this committee when I was elected the first time to the European Parliament.
So we have been working together since then. So it was indeed very good to get back your story because we share it in a lot of senses. I have a number of questions. I'd like to pick your brain on this last occasion. And I'm going to utilize your trends that you mentioned, WTO, China, and the U.
S. And let me start in the reverse order that you mentioned, so WTO first. I mean, in this very turbulent time, we need the WTO more than ever. And at the same time, we WTO is under more pressure than ever, probably as well. And I am quite concerned of the fact that we couldn't reach an agreement when ministers couldn't reach an agreement in Jaunde.
And now, as we speak, the idea is in General Counsel to solve that issue. But of course, ambassadors would probably need the flexibility of the ministers and then mandate. And I'm not really sure that this will work. And then we are in a new situation. And I say this because I think, Doctor.
Engorsi, she mentioned that we ran out of time, and we will consider it with the General Counsel. What's your take on this? Is there a possibility to unblock the situation regarding mainly the reform issue, but of course also on the very worrisome lapse of the e-commerce moratorium? We basically need a lot of political pressure for this. And one of the things that the parliament has mentioned several times is that we need the ministerials more often.
We need to have them every year, because ministers have to come together and create that political pressure. And if you have it every second year, it will feel like you amount to a lot of things you expect to happen every year. If you do small progress every year, I think that would be better. On China, yes, I share your position here. My simple question is, okay, what should we do?
What's the next step to work on this? And we base ourselves on openness, and that is very important. At the same time, we see that this doesn't really work with China. So how do we address this situation without closing Europe? And finally, on U.
S. So you said it's time to move forward, and you look forward to this evening's dialogue. So do I. I agree with you. I think we also should move forward.
And hopefully, it would be fantastic if we conclude the negotiations tonight. I and EPP would like that to happen. Of course, we will need to show flexibility from all institutions in order for that to take place. And I think you're right, we have everything on the table so that we could actually do it, and I hope that we will do it. Thank you.
Thanks a lot. Kathleen?
Kathleen Van Brempt
Thank you very much, Sabine. And like the chair, I was completely surprised by you leaving us. But that's life, as you said. And, of course, we in the trade committee being confronted with all these challenges the last couple of months that you feel that it's so fundamentally changing and you're part of that changing of an era, I think. And you mentioned, and I like that very much, open, sustainable, assertive trade policy as being the mark of your period, and I also think the period in this and the former trade committee.
And I think what we need to add to that, but I would like your idea, is open because we need to keep that because there's a lot of pressure on the openness and the sustainability. We need to connect that with something like protection. We need to protect our economy much more via trade. Yesterday, somebody said, you can ask Sabine anything because she has a freedom of speech now, and she will give you a straight answer. But I have to say, Sabine, I think more or less always, not always, but more or less always, you spoke your mind in this committee.
You were open-minded. I know people from the commission sometimes speak a lot of words and do not say anything. That was not your style, and thank you very much for that. And but one of the things that where you maybe not have been very outspoken was the Turnberry deal. And you don't have to answer that.
You will do that later on. I guess you will write something, a book or on that. But why do I mention it? Because we strongly believe as a S and D but also other political groups, and we had that discussion right after that. And I think you must have been surprised or not that there were so many people unhappy with that deal.
We still are not. And that brings me to my first remark for tonight. I think the only institution, and I don't say that because it's the institution that I like the most, but the only institution that stood a little bit firm against the coercion and the new era with the transatlantic relation was this parliament. And I think you should know, but you know that, you're a very intelligent woman, that for the s and d, these six s, and it's not about six or five s, that's not the issue. The issue is what's in there is very important to be able to get this deal through the parliament.
There is a possibility that it will not get through. Do not stress that. I, and by stressing, I mean do not try to check and balance whether that is true. It is absolutely. And I'm not, I really speak my mind here for the whole S and D group.
My second question is on the Industrial Accelerating Act and complies with what I said about Protective. You know we will have a huge discussion in this committee about what it means made in Europe or made with Europe. And it's still troubling my mind, I have to say, because we want to have good partnership. But if it's with Europe, it might mean that we sort of get the bottom out of the industrial acceleration. I really would wish to know what you think.
I have 1000 other questions, but I'm not gonna do that. I have two messages still. The first is I see good, strong women leaving trades committee in the commission. Sorry for that. I'm very happy that your successor is also a woman.
It's really, I'm very happy because very often in trade, it's very male dominated, and I think it is absolutely good that we have a balance over there. And the last is what you said at the end. Be free and tell us what you think at all times. We need that. Thank you very much.
Thierry Mariani
You, very much, chair. I very much welcome the commitment you've put into your work over the years. Now, as part of the opposition, so to speak, I might have a slightly different perspective. You talked to us about the EU's trade policy as a success when we talk about Mercosur, when we talk about India, when we talk about Australia. But I might have a slightly different perspective.
Member states don't have a voice over the different chapters anymore. This May 1, we've had the Mercosur agreement applied without delay, even though parliament voted to the contrary. We are being held hostage to a single strategy decided in Brussels, without any real mandate. Together with the French patriot delegation, we defend a very simple principle, which is trade competence, but there also needs to be an intergovernmental aspect. Trade agreements involve national governments, industry, agriculture, and the workers of each country.
They need to be part of such agreements. It needs to go through the national governments, not be imposed by the European Commission. The European Commission was not elected to do that. There's also the matter of sanctions. The EU is sanctioning.
It's almost a Pavlovian response, whatever the international crisis may be. So we're then cut off from key markets. We've weakened our own companies, and we're thrown into the arms of our fiscal competitors, the Americans, when it comes to gas. So it's not a policy of strength. It's a policy that actually ends up weakening us.
If we look at the cost of energy in Europe compared to our American competitors, that is a good example. And then to conclude, I think it's important to be clear. After the war, there comes peace. That is what history has always taught us. The EU, sooner or later, will have to have an external trade policy that is practical and balanced, particularly when it comes to how we source our fuel.
So, cutting off any kind of negotiations with traditional suppliers is suicidal, really. Even France and Germany, after the second world war, managed to reconcile a lot quicker than people expected. What the Patriots want is an EU trade policy that is reformed, that respects subsidiarity, that is pragmatic in its choices, and is at the service of the European people. Thank you.
Karen.
Karin Karlsbro
Thank you, Cher. So on behalf of Renew Group, thank you so much for the excellent cooperation. Thank you so much for your dedicated work, for your willingness to share information, to defend your position, very stubborn sometimes, for your willingness to find solutions, for good compromises and sometimes guiding us into the jungle of the trade. Thank you so much for that. You have always been here in the committee with you always bring lots of energy and new perspectives, sometimes on a very high intellectual level, and it's always been very, very nice and very interesting, very relevant to listen to your presentations.
It's been a pleasure. But I really wonder now when you are leaving this political world for another world, what do you think? How can we together, with we, I mean people in general who think that trade is a good thing, how can we be stronger in our communication and also design trade agreements so it's better, so people better understand it's not the right world, but think that trade is something for them. It reminds me of the title of the former working program, Trade for All, which I think was a very good title, because trade is not this high-level intellectual global thing. Trade is about jobs.
It's about products for normal consumers. It's about the base of the market economy, and it affects all of us as human beings. So I would like to listen to your reflections on that from another perspective, which is very important. And let me end with some personal words to you. I was also elected in 2019, and I think you were one of the first people I met from the commission.
And it has been I have appreciated so much to work together with you, and you are a source of inspiration. And it's always been very nice.
Karin Karlsbro
With all the context and to meet your enthusiasm about trade, in a time when, well, some countries and some politicians want to destroy trade relations with us. And you have a special asset among others, which I would like to end by just mentioning in this room, if you don't tell anyone else. I remember a photo from Turnberry. And for me, that photo, it was a sign of your integrity, which you have shown. I think integrity is something we should value much more.
And integrity from people working for the European Union, it's so important for our credibility and trust. And you personalize this experience, professionalism, and integrity. And we are so grateful for that, and for your hard work for all of us. So I hope you don't mind I mentioned this photo, but to me, that was brilliant. Thank you so much.
Catarina.
Catarina Vieira
Thank you very much. And, well, I haven't been working with you since 2019, but it has been very clear the enormous presence you've had. So especially on behalf also of the entire Greens EFA Group, I would like to thank you for the role you've been playing, not just as chief of DG trades over the past seven years, but also the work before that with the director general. And I know that, with the Greens, maybe we didn't always see eye to eye with DG Trade, but that does not mean that we won't miss, as the Greens, your sharpness and the quality of your work and your openness that other colleagues highlighted. And even though we didn't always see eye to eye, there were also many moments under your leadership where we saw positive developments in DG trades, specifically if we look at the last mandate.
So particularly the upgrade of the trade in sustainability chapter, the introduction of autonomous measures that support sustainability of international supply chains, and there, I'm speaking of the UDR, the CSDD, the CBAM, the forced labor regulation. All of this legislation matters very deeply, and it is very important to keep all of that in mind when we seek new trade agreements, and it also has strengthened our trade agreements. So, we continue to fight that fight, as you know, and we continue to find all of that very important in the new developments in our trade policies, and we continue to be critical of all the omnibuses and all of the simplifications, etcetera, as you can expect from us. But we also would like to thank you for all the work that you also did throughout the years in relation to these positive developments. Now we are in a different mandate, a different era, in a different geopolitical era with a lot of pressure towards concluding new trade agreements, and we are, of course, really concerned about the pressure and the rush with which these trade agreements might come through in the scrutinization processes and in making sure that the parliament and member states have enough time to scrutinize everything properly.
I imagine this also affected you and your own staff, the speed at which trade moves now. And I guess our message is that quantity doesn't automatically translate into quality. And, I'm sure you agree that it's really important to leave space for all interlocutors inside and outside the EU to talk about the impacts of trade agreements. I would have a couple of questions very briefly on mini deals, which you don't like the term of, so maybe you're the alternative term. But which scenarios do you see forward, and how do you see the role of the European Parliament, which does represent the people and then has less of a scrutiny role over these deals?
So is there a magical solution there to make sure we are also part of it? On the future of trade agreements, especially when agriculture can be so sensitive, do you see India perhaps as a model, where it's easier to reach a deal if agriculture is out? And on WTO reform, which you also mentioned, I mean, I could ask so many questions, but I don't have the time. But if you want to elaborate further on the WTO, we would really like to hear it. And finally, last but not least, this committee has lately been quoting a lot of songs, but I shall elevate the debate because I read online that you're a Shakespeare fan and connoisseur and a fictionado.
So instead of quoting a song, I'll quote Shakespeare: this above all, to thine own self be true. Sharpness, quality of your work, and honesty have been at the forefront of your work here, so thank you for that. Wish you all the best, and we'll see you around. Enjoy Florence.
Marina Mesure
Thank you, Chair Director General. I'd like to emphasize the industrial policy area. Europe is facing a major crisis with energy costs, which we discuss a lot here in E Trade, unfair international competition, which affects all the free trade agreements that you have encouraged. So the result is that our productive base is under pressure. In France, for example, in 2025, there was a record of industrial firm failures in 10 years.
Now what we need is a consistent approach with an industrial policy, an energy policy, and a trade policy. And the trade area, in recent months, we've seen a slight change in doctrine in terms of what the Inter Committee had proposed in terms of tariffs to protect key sectors such as steel, and also the proposal about the incipient European preference. And this is something mentioned by the S and D colleague. And I still have a question about the accelerator and the difference between Made in Europe and Made with Europe by broadening the definition, including all countries with which we have free trade agreements. Where is the European preference after all that?
Well, especially, we're talking about public money. That might be promoting unfair competition again with these huge subsidies and with European money, that is. So, can you tell us? Because clearly, in that last intervention, you probably have a little bit more latitude to explain. But for you, what's behind getting preference, which is something that we really badly need in Europe?
Thank you.
Thank.
Javier Moreno Sánchez
you. I mean, I will speak Spanish. First, I'd like to join the thanks expressed by other colleagues. I think we've had an intense dialogue, a very frank dialogue. We're grateful for that because in all committees and other committees, it's not always like that.
And thank you for always having been here with us. I would like to wish you luck in your new occupation in Florence. I think we'll know you're in Florence, and we wish you a lot of luck, and we hope you'll continue to work on this European project. I have one question, one request, and one piece of advice I'd like to ask. So talking about the W3A and picking up what Jorgen said, we see we have to work harder than ever.
I agree with Jørgen on this. But what do you think of the idea which we had as an inter parliamentary conference that every year, you have the ministers one year in Geneva and one year in a different country, but that every year, so that the ministers be much more heavily involved. Now it's good to have the ambassadors, but there'd be more political impulse. And the request is a very personal one. Yesterday, we had two members of your team from DG Trade to talk about relations with Canada, which were excellent.
So can you tell I request you to let them continue working to heighten the visibility of Seytan because that will help us in getting the national parliaments to ratify. And we want this digital agreement that will be signed in September when there's the summer. We don't know if it's possible, but we'll keep working towards it. And finally, a word of advice, please, on Mercosur. You said it's been 25 years and more.
And with Pascal Lamy, we're nearly on the point of getting it done in 2004, but it didn't happen. But it's nearly done now. But how do you sense the environment with your I can't imagine. I can imagine that colleagues in Latin America are very happily that it's getting going. What do you think we have to do with this house to show that this agreement is what we can do jointly to show the benefits and to get it finally ratified? Because as you've just said, it is this parliament that has the final word, the final say, and it'd be an awful shame if it were not to proceed in the end.
Thank you.
And Enrico.
Enikő Győri
Thank you, madam. My case, it was only six years, but I have to say that I have always appreciated your professionalism and frank way of exchanging views with us. I go directly to my two questions. The first one is, well, actually, we see that the commission is speeding up. If I compare the previous term with the present term, well, this commission, as far as free trade policy is concerned, is much less ideological.
I think that's why we have more agreements. But there is one aspect, and Thierry was already mentioning it, I'm especially worried about, and this is the cumulative effect of FTAs on our farmers. And I'm still very worried, and I already initiated this, to have a debate on the cumulative impact on the agricultural sector of all the free trade agreements we have had in the last period of time from Mercosur, Ukraine, Australia, etcetera. So is the commission ready to have a kind of cumulative impact study and not just at general EU level, but also what impact it has on individual member states? And my second question concerning China, I know that it's never good to cry over spilled milk, but still, six years ago, we had the Kai, which fell, and it was a failure.
I was always very strongly convinced that it would have served Europe's interest, European companies' interest, and it was a missed opportunity for us not to have it for ideological reasons. And now as you are getting a free person, what's your evaluation? But would it be possible to bring it back to have something which would level the playing field for European companies? And because at least it would have created a contractual framework for our relations. Thank you so much, and good luck.
And I think Florence is much nicer than Brussels. So.
Last words from Sabine.
Sabine Weyand
Thank you very much for all these nice words. If I had known you would be so nice to me for my last appearance here, I would have left earlier, you know, to benefit from it. No, thank you very much for your kind words, but also for maintaining the critical spirit because that is important. We are in a situation where Europe suffers from a lack of competitiveness, which basically hampers our ability to hold our own in a global environment, which is characterised by the law of the jungle. If we want to survive in that world, we first have to get our own house in order.
And yes, that means bringing together energy, industrial, and trade policy. It also means protecting where protection is necessary. But let's also be clear: protectionism does not protect. We need inputs from outside the world. We need markets outside the EU.
We will not reach the economies of scale we need to be competitive if we are only limited to the EU market. That is not possible. We do not have all the raw materials we need. We should not depend on getting them only from China. We need to see what we can get inside the EU.
But we will depend on input from outside the EU. Innovation is spurred by outside competition. So we will not be competitive by reducing competition in the EU market. And that is what we tried to achieve with the IAA, where we said, here, we basically want to make sure that competition is fair, which is the reason why we opened up public procurement for those countries that reciprocate, that are open to the EU. Because our companies also depend on being able to compete in public procurement outside the EU.
That is a large part of their income. So that is why what we are doing here is based on reciprocity. And I think that is what needs to guide also the implementation of the IAA. There is still a lot of work to be done in the IAA because a lot of provisions are obviously subject to differing interpretations. So that needs to be clarified in the legislative process.
And then there is a lot of detail that is relegated to secondary legislation. I can only invite you to also be attentive to that, so that we really get the balance right here. Now, in terms of using trade policy to protect the EU against unfair competition, yes, that is necessary. But it only works, it basically creates a breathing space for industry in order to become competitive again. If we don't use that breathing space to address the root causes of the lack of competitiveness, then the industry will not survive.
Then we would risk ending up turning the EU into an industrial museum, where we only protect sectors that are no longer able to compete globally. That is not what we want. We want to use trade protection so that the industry actually reforms, modernises, and innovates. That is what we are trying to do. The steel protection will only work if the steel industry in Europe seriously invests in its modernisation, in becoming greener, in decarbonising, etc.
Otherwise, it is just subsidising profits of companies that would not invest in their modernisation. That cannot be the case. So we need to be serious about the consistency and coherence between industrial, energy, and trade policy. And yes, have a massive problem of energy prices in the EU. A lot of these problems are also homemade.
They also depend on how we organise energy markets in the EU. From that point of view, you are in luck because my successor, Didi Jule Jørgensen, has been Director General for energy. So she knows all these issues inside out. But that is what we need to work on. But let's not make the mistake that by shutting ourselves off from competition from the rest of the world, we would be able to be competitive.
You cannot just play defense, you have to play offense. That is what we need to do through trade policy, through industrial policy, through energy policy. Now, in terms of trade policy proper, yes. And I am the first to have touted the fact that we have concluded many more agreements than we did in the previous mandate. But this does not come out of the blue.
This is not, you know, these are not agreements that have been done in three months or six months or even a year. No, these are agreements that have come to fruition after years, sometimes decades, of negotiations. And all this work went into this. We would not have been able to conclude in India, you know, within a year or whatever, if we hadn't had careful preparation. But the fact that the world has become a much more inhospitable place, that there is less respect for the rule of law, that there is a lot more throwing around of weight, has also changed attitudes and, yes, led to more pragmatism on all sides.
But we have held out for high-quality agreements. I must say, India is so much better than I hoped we would be able to do when we set out to do this. Indonesia is a high-quality agreement. Mercosur is a high-quality agreement. Australia is a high-quality agreement.
And all these agreements are the result of years of painstaking negotiation, of painstaking consultations with the Member States, with the European Parliament. Don't forget you all have monitoring groups which follow this in great detail, working with companies. I mean, we are checking all this back. So the idea that the Commission imposes trade policy measures or trade agreements is simply not reflecting reality. At each step, we tie ourselves back to the interests we defend.
Until the end of the negotiations, there is a continuous process of consultation. And we are trying to take everyone on board. But it is also clear that it is much easier to reach consensus if a single Member State does not have the power to block an agreement. Because in the end, the responsibility for trade policy has to go hand in hand with democratic scrutiny. It has to be at the same level.
And that is the reason why I am a big fan of having the European Parliament be the parliamentary arm of our trade policy. Because that is what you are here for. Because if you decide on trade policy not for one Member State, as a national parliament would do, and that is logical, that is what they are elected for, a national parliament is not elected to decide on trade policy for a whole continent. You are. And that is a huge responsibility, but it is also the guarantee that the decisions are taken at the right level, and that there is a consistency between responsibility and democratic accountability.
And we really have to stick to that. We have that in the legislation. There is no reason why we wouldn't have that in trade policy. I think that is extremely important. Now, on China.
Look, we share the same planet. We have to continue to find a way to exist together. But we also have to do that with clarity about what we can take and what we cannot take, and with the ability to defend our interests and values. That means that with China we have to have a dialogue. So we need to engage with them.
That is not easy, but there is no way around the fact that we have to engage with them in order to manage the relationship as best as we can. But we also have to be able to have in our hands the tools to defend ourselves if the dialogue does not deliver. I think that is what we need to do as regards China. And then the third component is, of course, diversification. So, I mean, we are always, and that is why I only talked about this in the end, because we tend to be focused on the big elephants, China and the US.
But there is a whole world out there which accounts for 80% of the global economy and trade that is not China or the US. And those are the countries with whom we need to engage. Those are countries that are close to us in terms of valuing a rules-based international system, whether that is multilateral, plurilateral, or bilateral. That is what we need to focus on, while at the same time managing these relationships. And as regards the US, look, I cannot protect myself against being instrumentalized by debates.
I have seen that in the media. But I just want to be clear. There has been a clear discussion about all the options starting from the start of the Trump administration. And we have, as it is the duty of officials, prepared all options for action. There was a discussion then, and I think with industry, with business, with all Member States, and then you have to say what is the best solution in the current circumstances?
Now, we all would have preferred to be in a world where we could continue to rely on WTO rules governing all trade, including transatlantic trade. That was not on offer. And then the question is: What is the best alternative? And I remain convinced that the Ternary Agreement is what worked best for the defense of European interests in that situation. And that was the unanimous assessment of all Member States, and it was what business told us.
Now, you established your negotiating position after already a year of experience. And I think that is in a way that is now an advantage, because it allows us to draw lessons from what has happened and to make sure that in agreeing what we committed to, and that is important because that is our hallmark, to be reliable. So we have to deliver on this. And I am glad that your mandate is to agree to this, provided certain conditions are met. Now, we have to work through the detail of that, and we have to make sure that in delivering on what we committed to, we maintain the ability to react to whatever will come our way.
I think that is important. And we have all the ingredients for that on the table. So I don't know whether we will be able to sign on the dotted line tonight, but I really hope that we have a breakthrough where the political compromise is struck, and then, of course, we will have to wrap it up and tie up the drafting details, etcetera. But I really think it is time to come to the political conclusion. And then we will have to take it from there.
As I said, this is a relationship that will require painstaking engagement and management, and that is what Commissioner Shevzhovic is doing. This is a very intense dialogue at all levels, and that is the way it will remain. Yeah? But that is what I wanted to say, and I really hope that we will have a breakthrough tonight on the trialogue. Now on the WTO, I wish an annual meeting of ministers were the solution.
But look at Yaoundé. First of all, the question is, how do you get ministers to come? Most members of the WTO were not represented in Yaoundé at ministerial level. Admittedly, there was the additional problem for several of them, especially everyone coming from Asia, to actually reach Yaoundé given the war in Iran. But it is also a question of the organization of ministerials.
You have to make it worthwhile for ministers to come, because there is something they can decide. The first two days of the conference were spent on so-called outreach sessions, where after one day I thought this is not helpful because it actually means that countries just doubled down on their pre-established positions and there is actually no real engagement and no real negotiation. So, as Doctor Ngozi said, we ran out of time, but that is because the actual negotiations started too late, and we didn't have the right people there. So I think we need to think a little bit more about how we can organise ministerial meetings in the future, so that it is clear that the ministers actually have something to decide. And then I think the frequency needs to be looked at in the light of what a ministerial is supposed to achieve.
So I would not think that an annual ministerial is automatically solving all of these problems. What can we do in order to convince a sometimes reluctant public about the benefits of trade? I mentioned before, we have invested a lot in the implementation and enforcement of trade agreements. And that also involves market access days, where Denis Redonnay and the team are travelling through the whole of Europe speaking to businesses. There is a lot less scepticism at the level of business on trade than there is in published opinion, or even sometimes in parliaments.
If you talk to the practitioners of trade, you get the real stories. We have this network of trade champions, which are the ones who actually benefit from our agreements. If you listen to these people, you know what works and what doesn't work. And that is what we need in order to make sure that the agreements we negotiate and implement actually correspond to the real needs of those who are trading and investing. I was recently in a dialogue with young people, and the focus on digital trade and artificial intelligence is something which we have not integrated yet in our trade policy.
So for me, first of all, I think we should not believe that there is a generalised resistance to trade that is not also borne out by Eurobarometer or other polls. There is a lot of openness to that. Then we have to speak and listen to the practitioners, and we have to make sure that our trade policy evolves in the light of the needs of the business sector. And we are at a moment of a total reconfiguration of the supply chains of our economies, etc. And trade policy has to reflect that.
So there is not one silver bullet solution, but let's talk to the people who actually trade, who know what they need, and let's make our trade policy work for them. Now in terms of, and I think on Mercosur, I think the proof of the pudding is in the eating, as it was for Canada. I remember that there were enormous concerns about the Canada agreement and beef trade. None of this has materialized. We are net exporters of beef to Canada.
We are convinced that the same experience will be made with Mercosur. Because we have belts and braces and everything else, we have worked with the Member States, with Parliament, to have these safeguard provisions of a nature which we have never had before. It's quite resource-intensive, but it gives us reassurance. We have strengthened controls of sanitary and phytosanitary standards. So all this, I think, should give us the confidence that this agreement will work.
But I think the advantage is really that we road test this agreement now. So you will have already quite some experience before it comes back probably from the court of justice for your final decision. And I think that is a positive experience. Agriculture is sensitive, and yes, we have become more defensive on agriculture. And that is reflected in our trade agreements.
That is reflected in Marcusor, it is reflected in Australia, and we do have a study on the cumulative impacts of our trade agreements. That exists. And I don't know whether it has been debated in this committee, but it is regularly debated in the agriculture committee. So I would recommend a joint session, if I may, not for me. But I think a joint session between the two committees, looking at the study, which we have recently updated, a joint work between DG AGRI, DG TRADE and the Joint Research Centre.
So there is a lot of data to delve into. So this is considered, and it is there. The question is also what you consider sensitive. I think in terms of beef sensitivity, which has been the most pronounced one, or at least the one getting the most public attention. Australia, I think, is the last agreement with that sensitivity.
Now, as I said, we can assess the cumulative impact, and I think this is something we are proud to stand over. CHI is a missed opportunity. Will we bring it back? Would a contractual framework help? I think CHI was in agreement for another time and for another China.
Sabine Weyand
Don't think that, and here I quote the previous vice president for competition: If something has been in the deep freezer for a long time, you should not take it out and serve it again. Now, I think what we need to see is what are the level playing field rules we need with China. But they are also the ones that the rest of the world needs. Hence, the need to have, as part of WTO reform, clearer rules on the level playing field, on industrial subsidies, on state-owned enterprises, public bodies, etc. That is basically the heart of what we are seeking in the WTO reform.
And that is something where we also have strong support from other countries and a lot of like-minded countries. So a lot that we can do here. And I think I will leave it there, knowing that I haven't answered all your questions. But I'm very happy because I, first of all, thank you very much for a very friendly discussion. No doubt this will continue with my successor.
Bitte is a great colleague. She knows trade policy inside out, but also other policies, so that's good competition and energy policy, so that's a very good mix. And I am sure she can rely on the same cooperation that I have enjoyed with your committee. So thank you very much, and maybe see you in Florence.
Bernd Lange
Thanks a lot, Sabine. Of course, as always, your thoughts are a little bit provoking, but I will not use the opportunity now as chair to reply to your thoughts. I want to really use the opportunity to thank you for your work, always with a clear compass and a steady hand, and always in the European interest. And that's really the most important thing. Thanks a lot for that.
And my colleagues know that I'm always looking to some musical references. And I look quite carefully at what I would now mention to you. And perhaps you know this group Green Day and the song Time of Your Life. It seems really a good fit for the current political situation and the situation that you are living. Quote, it's something unpredictable, but at the end, it's right.
I hope you had really the time of your life. Thanks a lot. Thank you very much. Thank you so much. Yeah.
Yeah. We spent the night together.
Indeed. At a trialogue.
Oh, wow.
Bernd Lange
So, wow. So, dear colleagues, formally, there is one point on the agenda, the monitoring groups. I would propose to postpone it to the next meeting. Any objection to that? No.
So this means the next meeting is in June on the 22nd and 23rd. Thanks a lot for that. Have a nice evening, and see you soon.
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