Committee on Foreign Affairs Ordinary meeting
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AFET European Parliament
Follow its sittingsIt is not a point of order.
Grzegorz Braun
It is because you are, you are forcing this Commission to follow your line of, of uncritical support for Ukraine.
David McAllister
So the one minute is over, Mr. Brown. I think you made your point. It's not the first time you've made this point. Can we now move on, colleagues? Yes.
So, compromise amendment number one, who's in favor, against, abstentions, adopted. Compromise amendment number two in favor, against, abstentions, adopted. Compromise amendment three in favor, against, abstentions, adopted. Compromise amendment four in favor, against, abstentions, adopted. We go to compromise amendment 16 in favor, against, abstentions, adopted.
We go logically to compromise amendment 12 in favor, against, abstentions, adopted. Compromise amendment five is next in favor, against, abstentions, adopted. Compromise amendment 18 is next in favor, against, abstentions, adopted. We move on to compromise amendment 15 in favor, against, abstentions, adopted. We move on to compromise amendment nine in favor, against, abstentions, adopted.
From nine we go to compromise amendment seven in favor, against, abstentions, adopted. Compromise amendment six in favor, against, abstentions, adopted.
Compromise amendment 10, in favor, against, abstentions, adopted. Compromise amendment 8, in favor, against, abstentions, adopted. Compromise amendment 19, in favor, against, abstentions, adopted. Number 29, in favor, against, abstentions, adopted. From 29 we move on to amendment 301, Mr. Terheş, in favor, against, abstentions, adopted.
We go to compromise amendment 11, in favor, against, abstentions, adopted. Compromise amendment 13, in favor, against, abstentions, adopted. Amendment 350 is next, in favor, against, abstentions, rejected. Then we go to compromise amendment 14, in favor, against, abstentions, adopted. Amendment 367, in favor, against, abstentions, rejected.
Compromise amendment 20, in favor, against, abstentions, adopted. 381 amendment, in favor, against, abstentions, rejected. Compromise amendment 17, in favor, against, abstentions, adopted. Compromise amendment 23, in favor, against, abstentions, adopted. Amendment 412, and this is split in four parts.
The first part, in favor, against, abstentions, adopted. Part two, in favor, against, abstentions, rejected. Number three, in favor, against, abstentions, adopted. Number four, in favor, against, abstentions, adopted. We move on to amendment 432, Mr. Ruiten, in favor, against, abstentions, adopted.
438, Schirdewan, Kölönen, in favor, against, abstentions, adopted. Compromise amendment 21, in favor, against, abstentions, adopted. Amendment 461, Mr. Valchev, in favor, against, abstentions, adopted. Compromise amendment 22, in favor, against, abstentions, adopted. Amendment 473 is split in two parts.
First part, who's in favor, against, abstentions, adopted. Number two, in favor, against, abstentions, rejected. Amendment 476, Evin Incir, Demirrel, in favor, against, abstentions. We'll check this one. The vote is open, this is amendment 476.
The vote is closed, and this has been rejected. Compromise amendment 31, in favor, against, abstentions, is adopted. Compromise amendment 24, in favor, against, abstentions, adopted. Compromise amendment 25, in favor, against, abstentions, adopted. Compromise amendment 26, in favor, against, abstentions, adopted.
Compromise amendment 27, in favor, against, abstentions, adopted. Compromise amendment 28, in favor, against, abstentions, adopted. We move on to amendment 77, Mr. Volgin, in favor, against, abstentions, rejected. From there we move on to compromise amendment 30, in favor, against, abstentions, adopted. Ah, there it is, the final vote on the draft text as amended, this is a roll call vote, the vote is open.
The vote is closed, and this has been adopted, 54 in favor, 17 against, congratulations Michael Gahler. We move on to item number 7, the Commission report 2025 on Moldova, the rapporteur is Sven Mikser.
Dear Sven, would you like to take the floor?
Sven Mikser
Yes, thank you chair. Just to extend my thanks to all the shadow rapporteurs. We had a very constructive negotiating process and I can say that there is very broad support expressed in this report to the very impressive reform effort that the Moldovan authorities have been able to follow. There is recognition that further reforms are required and the Moldovan authorities have set themselves a very ambitious timeline. And in order to meet that timeline with regard to European integration, the pace of the reform will have to be maintained and in some areas even even accelerated.
At the same time, the report also calls on the Council and the member states to find the political courage to formally open negotiations. And well, I we have negotiated 19 compromise amendments that run in that particular order from 1 to 19. I hope that you will support all of them and support the report at the final vote.
Thank you Sven. Would anyone else like to take the floor? Mr. Stoyanov, please.
Stanislav Stoyanov
Thank you chair. Again, a minority opinion of the ESN group on the report.
David McAllister
Thank you. Anyone else? If that's not the case, then let us now proceed for the formal vote. Compromise amendment number one in favor, against, abstentions adopted. Number two in favor, against, abstentions adopted.
Compromise amendment three in favor, against, abstentions adopted. Number four in favor, against, abstentions adopted. We now move on to amendment 86 in favor, against, abstentions rejected. Compromise amendment five in favor, against, abstentions adopted. Number six in favor, against, abstentions adopted.
Compromise amendment seven in favor, against, abstentions adopted. Compromise amendment eight in favor, against, abstentions adopted. Compromise amendment nine in favor, against, abstentions adopted. We move on to amendment 141 in favor, against, abstentions, this has been rejected. Compromise amendment 10 in favor, against, abstentions adopted.
Compromise amendment 11 in favor, against, abstentions adopted. Compromise amendment 12 in favor, against, abstentions adopted. Amendment 184 Mr. Stoyanov in favor, against, abstentions rejected. Compromise amendment 13 in favor, against, abstentions adopted. Compromise amendment 14 in favor, against, abstentions adopted.
Compromise amendment 15 in favor, against, abstentions adopted. Compromise amendment 16 in favor, against, abstentions adopted. We move on to amendment 224 Mr. Zell in favor, against, abstentions rejected. Compromise amendment 17 in favor, against, abstentions adopted. Compromise amendment 18 in favor, against, abstentions adopted.
We go surprisingly to compromise amendment 19 in favor, against, abstentions adopted. And already we have the final vote. This is a vote on the draft text as amended and this is a roll call vote. All on board, the vote is closed and this has been adopted 58 in favor, 16 against and three abstentions. Congratulations dear Sven Mikser.
We move on to item number eight, the Commission report 2023 on Serbia. Tonino Picula is our rapporteur. Tonino, would you like to take the floor then now?
Tonino Picula
Thank you, thank you chair.
I would like also to thank to each and every colleague shadow rapporteur for their dedicated work on this important file as well as their teams for an excellent job. Of course I would like to underline that this report reflects a common position of European Parliament on very, very sensitive situation in Serbia in its recent history. Thank you.
David McAllister
Thank you, would anyone else like to take the floor? Then we move on to the vote. Compromise amendment one in favor, against, abstentions adopted. Compromise amendment two in favor, against, abstentions adopted. We move on to amendment 260, Vistisen and others in favor, against, abstentions.
We'll have to check this one. Amendment 260, the vote is open. The vote is closed. This has been adopted 36 to 35 and three abstentions. Compromise amendment three in favor, against, abstentions adopted.
Compromise amendment four in favor, against, abstentions adopted. Compromise amendment five in favor, against, abstentions adopted. Compromise amendment six in favor, against, abstentions adopted. Compromise amendment seven in favor, against, abstentions adopted. Compromise amendment eight in favor, against, abstentions adopted.
We move on to amendment 86, this is on the last page. The vote, who's in favor, against, abstentions rejected. And we can vote on the draft text as amended now, this is a roll call vote, the vote is open. The vote is closed. 51 in favor, 14 against and 10 abstentions, congratulations Tonino.
The next item is the item number nine, the 2025 Commission report on Kosovo. Our rapporteur is Riho Terras. Riho, would you like to take the floor?
Just want to thank all the co-rapporteurs for very constructive and good work together and hope that Kosovo gets out of the deadlock soon. Thank you.
David McAllister
Thank you, who would like to take the floor? No, then we move on. The vote begins, compromise amendment number one in favor, against, abstentions adopted. Compromise amendment two in favor, against, abstentions adopted. Compromise amendment three in favor, against, abstentions adopted.
Compromise amendment four in favor, against, abstentions adopted. Compromise amendment five in favor, against, abstentions adopted. Compromise amendment six in favor, against, abstentions adopted. Compromise amendment seven in favor, against, abstentions adopted. And then we come to compromise amendment eight in favor, against, abstentions adopted.
And already we have the final vote on the draft text, the vote is open, this is a roll call vote. The vote is closed. 47 in favor, 19 against, eight abstentions, congratulations to our rapporteur Riho Terras. Item number 10 is the 2025 Commission report on Bosnia and Herzegovina. Our rapporteur is Ondřej Kolář and Ondřej, the floor is yours if you wish to speak.
Thank you very much chair, I also would like to thank all my colleagues, co-rapporteurs and actually everyone who contributed to the to this report. It's a bit of a challenge to actually come up with an objective report on such a country like Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Ondřej Kolář
Thank you very much, Chair. I also would like to thank all my colleagues, co-rapporteurs, and actually everyone who contributed to the, to this report. It's a bit of a challenge to actually come up with an objective report on such a country like Bosnia and Herzegovina, which itself is a challenge. And I think that we did a good job, and I think that I speak on behalf of everyone when I say that we wish Bosnia and Herzegovina the best of luck. Thank you.
Thank you. Who would like to take the floor? Mr. Tangar-Correa.
António Tânger Corrêa
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just want to say that if this report is adopted, it's one more step of the approval of secession of Republika Srpska in Bosnia-Herzegovina by this Parliament. What is in this report is the vision of some sixth or seventh group in this, in this Parliament, and it does not reflect, reflect the reality on the ground, which actually, actually it's a reality very few in this room know. And I'm very sorry for that, because this is a bad step in that direction. Thank you very much.
From personal experience, I would like to say that Ondřej Kovařík was the best rapporteur that we had for Bosnia and Herzegovina, and he offered really balanced report, and I call on all my colleagues to support this report. Thank you very much.
David McAllister
So, well deserved. Who else would like to take the floor? That is not the case, then I can now kick off with the votes. Compromise amendment 1 in favor, against, abstentions, adopted. Compromise amendment 2 in favor, against, abstentions, adopted.
Compromise amendment 3 in favor, against, abstentions, adopted. Compromise amendment 4 in favor, against, abstentions, adopted. Compromise amendment 5 in favor, against, abstentions, adopted. Compromise amendment 6 in favor, against, abstentions, adopted. Compromise amendment 7 in favor, against, abstentions, adopted.
Compromise amendment 8 in favor, against, abstentions, adopted. Compromise amendment 9 in favor, against, abstentions, adopted. Compromise amendment 10 in favor, against, abstentions, adopted. Compromise amendment 11 in favor, against, abstentions, adopted. Compromise amendment 12 in favor, against, abstentions, adopted.
Compromise amendment 13 in favor, against, abstentions, adopted. Compromise amendment 14 in favor, against, abstentions, adopted. Compromise amendment 15 in favor, against, abstentions, adopted. Compromise amendment 16 in favor, against, abstentions, adopted. Amendment number 12 in favor, against, abstentions, we'll have to check, it's amendment number 12, that was not clear from here.
The vote is open. The vote is closed. It's 34 in favor, 34 against, that means it falls. Then compromise amendment 17 in favor, against, abstentions, adopted, and we come to the final vote on the draft text as amended, the vote is open.
The vote is closed. This has been adopted, 53 in favor, 14 against, and 8 abstentions. Congratulations, Andrzej. Item number 11 is the 2023 Commission report on North Macedonia, and the rapporteur is our colleague Thomas Waitz. Thomas, the floor is yours.
Thomas Waitz
Thank you, Chair, and first of all, I want to thank the shadow rapporteurs for constructive negotiations, even though in a difficult file. And we were drafting these compromises with big support of five groups and partial support of two more groups. I hope we can carry the compromises. That would be important to keep us all together on this report. Thank you all for the cooperation.
David McAllister
Thank you, Thomas. Who else would like to take the floor? No. Okay. Then, compromise amendment 1, in favor, against, abstentions, adopted.
Amendment 91. Who's in favor? Against? Abstentions? We'll have to check.
I'm sorry. So this is amendment 91. It is now closed. 28 in favor, 35 against. This has been rejected.
Then we go to 110, yes. So again, Mr. Kovatchev and others. Who's in favor? Against? Abstentions?
So we'll have to check again. 110, the vote is open. The vote is closed. This has also been rejected. Compromise amendment 1A, in favor, against, abstentions, adopted.
Compromise amendment 2, in favor, against, abstentions, adopted. Compromise amendment 3, in favor, against, abstentions, adopted. We go to amendment 197. This is again a free vote. Who's in favor?
No, this is... So, amendment 197, who's in favor? Who's against? Rejected. I think this was rejected.
Or shall we check? We check. Okay. 197. The vote is closed.
And this has been rejected. What I do now? Compromise 4? And we go to compromise amendment 4. Compromise amendment 4, in favor, against, abstentions, adopted.
Compromise amendment... no, 250. Oh, 250, Mr. Kovatchev and others.
Who's in favor? Against? Abstentions? Rejected. 251.
Who's in favor? Against? Abstentions? Rejected. 252 in favor?
Against? Abstentions? No, we'll have to check. 252 we now check. The vote is closed.
This has clearly been rejected. So, then we move on to... Now we move on to compromise amendment number five in favor, against, abstentions, adopted. Compromise amendment six in favor, against, abstentions, adopted. Compromise amendment seven in favor, against, abstentions, adopted.
Compromise amendment eight in favor, against, abstentions, adopted. We move on to amendment 371 in favor, against, abstentions, this has been adopted. Should we check? 371, the vote is now open. The vote is closed.
And this has been clearly adopted, 43 to 15. Then we move on to 374, this one. Again, Mr. Kovachev and others. Who's in favor? Against?
Abstentions? We'll have to check this one too, 374, the vote is open. The vote is closed. This has been adopted, 34 to 33. Now we go to compromise amendment nine in favor, against, abstentions, adopted.
After that comes compromise amendment 10 in favor, against, abstentions, adopted. And this is the final vote on the draft text as amended, it is a roll-call vote and the vote is open. The vote is closed. This has been adopted, 43 to 17, congratulations to our rapporteur Thomas Waitz. We now vote on item number 12, the recommendation on "promoting transnational governance on water in the interests of conflict prevention and peace", for which the rapporteur is Leoluca Orlando.
Would you like to take the floor? That is not the case. Then we come to our last vote at today's meeting, compromise amendment one in favor, against, abstentions, adopted. We go to DEVE 35, that is over here. Okay, who's in favor?
Against? Abstentions? Adopted. Then we go to DEVE 39 in favor, against, abstentions, adopted. DEVE 51 in favor, against, abstentions, adopted.
Compromise amendment two in favor, against, abstentions, adopted. We move on to DEVE 11.
Who's in favor? Against? Adopted. Abstentions? DEVE 21 in favor?
Against? Abstentions? Adopted. DEVE 24 in favor? Against?
Abstentions? Adopted. DEVE 32 in favor? Against? Abstentions?
Adopted. DEVE 3 in favor? Against? Adopted. Abstentions?
DEVE 4 in favor? Against? Abstentions? Adopted. And DEVE 5 in favor?
Against? Abstentions? Adopted. The final vote is a vote on the draft text as amended. This is a roll-call vote and the vote is open.
The vote is closed and this has been adopted 47 in favor, 12 against. Congratulations. Colleagues, we managed the votes 20 minutes ahead of the foreseen time. You are amazing. Thank you.
So, ladies and gentlemen, can we now please be seated? We would like to continue with our agenda after this long, long voting session. Item number 13 is the consideration on the draft report on a new co-ownership for the future of Euro-Mediterranean relations, the Pact for the Mediterranean, and this will be presented by our rapporteur, Nicola Zingaretti. Just a few introductory words from my side. On the 30th anniversary of the Barcelona Process in November 2025, ministers from the member states and our Southern Mediterranean partners countries jointly launched the Pact for the Mediterranean.
This pact confirms the Mediterranean region is a strategic priority for the EU, and it is another step towards a more stable, secure, and prosperous common Mediterranean space based on the principles of co-ownership, co-creation, and shared responsibility. The pact seeks to drive meaningful change and unlock new opportunities for growth, stability, and cooperation across the entire Mediterranean. Colleagues, the first action plan under the pact was presented in mid-April. It is therefore timely that AFET addresses the pact, which will be a defining framework for our relationship with our Southern Mediterranean neighbors in the upcoming years. I will now give the floor to our rapporteur to present his draft report.
Nicola Zingaretti
Grazie, I will speak in Italian, dear President. Grazie, signor Presidente, e grazie onorevoli colleghi. Permettetemi innanzitutto di ringraziare i relatori ombra e tutti i gruppi politici, gli staff per la collaborazione costruttiva di queste settimane e che auspico potrà continuare anche ora che si apre la fase emendativa e di negoziato. Io credo che noi abbiamo una buona occasione per fare un passo in avanti e non dobbiamo sprecarla. A trent'anni, come lei ha detto, dalla conferenza che lanciò il processo di Barcellona, l'Europa finalmente torna a interrogarsi sul senso e sul futuro del proprio rapporto con il Mediterraneo.
Nicola Zingaretti
La scelta fatta dalla Commissione di rilanciare un'iniziativa politica, economica, diplomatica e culturale con un commissario e con una direzione generale dedicati, io credo che sia un segnale molto importante. Sicuramente è un'opportunità che noi dobbiamo cogliere, soprattutto perché arriva in un momento in cui a livello globale sembrano prevalere la sfiducia, la paura, l'indifferenza verso l'altro e spesso la guerra. Un momento dove lo scontro ha sostituito il dialogo e i muri hanno preso il posto dei ponti e tutti e tutte paghiamo il prezzo di questa situazione. In questo contesto, il patto proposto, come lei ha detto, individua una serie di azioni di cooperazione, di dialogo e iniziative tra gli attori economici, sociali, produttivi, culturali del Mar Mediterraneo, le università, le imprese, gli istituti professionali, le startup, le città e gli enti locali. Si tratta ovviamente di una sfida molto difficile e io credo che ora il Parlamento dovrà concentrarsi per chiedere che venga tutto realizzato e concretizzato.
Perché? Perché è proprio il carattere incompiuto del processo di Barcellona a insegnarci che non possiamo rinunciare a questo partenariato così strategico. Quel progetto di trent'anni fa nacque dopo la guerra fredda, con l'ambizione di fare del dialogo euromediterraneo un pilastro geopolitico dell'integrazione europea. Così non è stato fino in fondo, malgrado lo sforzo di tantissimi attori istituzionali. In questi trent'anni tutto è cambiato e purtroppo non in meglio.
L'instabilità politica è cresciuta, i conflitti si sono moltiplicati, nuovi attori globali, in primo luogo la Russia e la Cina, hanno rafforzato la loro presenza riducendo l'influenza europea. L'area condivisa di prosperità e stabilità immaginata nel 1995 è stata messa a dura prova dalle politiche migratorie, dalle sfide climatiche, alla costruzione di nuove alleanze. Stiamo parlando di oltre 500 milioni di persone, di una straordinaria diversità culturale, religiosa, linguistica, con un ricchissimo patrimonio di imprese che indirizzate alla cooperazione potrebbero aiutarci a realizzare temi come l'autonomia energetica e la crescita comune dell'intera area. È qui che si colloca il principio cardine del mio rapporto: una vera co-ownership, uno spazio di tutti, una piena parità con i nostri partner. Dobbiamo trarre la lezione dei limiti del passato.
Non possiamo attendere che siano i soli governi a ricostruire un clima di cooperazione e dialogo nel Mediterraneo. Dobbiamo avere coraggio, coraggio di investire nella società civile, nel dialogo, nello scambio economico, negli investimenti e nello scambio culturale.
Dobbiamo iniziare, dobbiamo, direi, investire nelle persone. E quindi imprese, cultura, ricerca, università, sindacati, camere di commercio, organizzazioni della società civile, comuni e autorità locali. Il Mediterraneo come grande area dello sviluppo economico e produttivo e del progresso civile. Dopo diverse audizioni, incontri con la società civile, le associazioni, think tank, le istituzioni che si occupano di Mediterraneo, abbiamo ricevuto un mandato chiaro e concludo che ho inserito nel rapporto. Dobbiamo essere capaci di creare benefici più tangibili, più mobilità, migliori condizioni di vita, opportunità, sviluppo economico e produttivo, soprattutto per donne e giovani, un ancoraggio più solido su democrazia e stato di diritto, diritti umani e buona governance.
Sottolineo poi il punto essenziale su cui il Parlamento dovrà mostrare la nostra capacità di portare avanti i risultati. Il prossimo quadro finanziario pluriennale 2028-2034 sarà decisivo per dare al patto una sostanza reale. Per questo, come già si sta discutendo in questa commissione, nel quadro del Global Europe sarà prioritario chiedere maggiori fondi a sostegno dell'action plan e chiedere che ogni investimento strutturale porti con sé occupazione locale, formazione e inclusione per i giovani. Per chiudere, presidente, se l'Europa saprà ritrovare unità di visione, coraggio politico, allora il Mediterraneo potrà tornare ad essere ciò che è sempre stato nella storia: non una frontiera solo da difendere, ma un ponte da attraversare, non uno spazio di contrasto e di odio, ma uno spazio condiviso di stabilità, prosperità, crescita e pace. E anche per questo, il lavoro politico del Parlamento non dovrà esaurirsi in questo rapporto, ma come chiedo nel mio rapporto, proseguire negli anni a venire per monitorare, sostenere e implementare il patto.
Grazie, signor presidente e cari colleghi.
David McAllister
Right, thank you very much, dear Nicola Zingaretti. I now give the floor to the shadow rapporteurs wishing to take the floor if present, of course, for two minutes, and the first is our colleague Massimiliano Salini, please.
Massimiliano Salini
Thank you, chair. Grazie al relatore Zingaretti per le parole che ha utilizzato per descrivere una proposta di relazione che, come abbiamo già avuto modo di dire nei primi incontri, va esattamente nella direzione che noi riteniamo più corretta e coerente anche con la costruzione del patto e il mandato assegnato, come lui correttamente ricordava, al commissario competente per il Mediterraneo, cioè Dubravka Šuica. È corretta l'impostazione e apprezzabile perché tiene conto della tradizionale postura che l'Unione Europea fin dall'inizio ha tenuto nella relazione con il Mediterraneo e il Mediterraneo allargato, cioè un modello di cooperazione che si fonda sul principio, tutto europeo, secondo il quale in un accordo, in un accordo di cooperazione, entrambi i poli dell'accordo devono guadagnare dal punto di vista sociale, dal punto di vista culturale e dal punto di vista economico. Non tutti guardano ai soggetti coinvolti nelle politiche sul Mediterraneo con questo metodo, con questo approccio, e i risultati si vedono, si vedono proprio in questi giorni. Condivido molto l'impostazione data anche per l'attenzione, soprattutto nell'ultima fase della presentazione appena fatta, la necessità appunto di dare un quadro economico chiaro all'accordo, al patto che si sta descrivendo, in modo tale che il supporto in termini di politiche di bilancio documenti la concretezza delle prospettive politiche e culturali affacciate, in modo da uscire da una annosa genericità sull'argomento.
Infine io credo sia politicamente doveroso ricordare che quello che in passato, nel recente passato, è stato un ridimensionamento del protagonismo del Mediterraneo dal punto di vista anche economico, le rotte dal canale di Suez a volte interrotte e le alternative dall'Artico che si sono configurate come una forte possibilità, ripeto, alternativa al Mediterraneo, oggi la prevalenza della discussione politica e della discussione politica intorno a energia e flussi migratori ribadiscono quanto sia necessario tornare ad un vero protagonismo di quell'area. E quindi grazie per la proposta, credo sarà un lavoro molto molto utile per tutti.
Thank you, Massimiliano. Matthieu Valet for the Patriots.
Matthieu Valet
Merci Monsieur le Président, chers collègues, au nom du groupe des Patriotes pour l'Europe présidé par Jordan Bardella, je souhaite exprimer de sérieuses réserves concernant le projet de rapport que vous présentez aujourd'hui, Madame le rapporteur. Alors que nos concitoyens attendent une politique migratoire plus ferme, un contrôle renforcé de ses frontières extérieures et une lutte efficace contre l'immigration irrégulière, votre projet de rapport emprunte une direction totalement opposée. Sous couvert de coopération et du multilatéralisme, vous proposez de faciliter davantage les flux migratoires à travers de nouveaux dispositifs de mobilité avec un régime de visa Euromed accéléré. Cette vision ne répond ni aux préoccupations de nos concitoyens, ni aux défis migratoires auxquels l'Europe est confrontée aujourd'hui. Nous devons conditionner nos partenariats à des résultats concrets en matière de réadmission d'immigrants en situation irrégulière.
Nous devons lutter contre les réseaux criminels ainsi que les passeurs et soutenir le développement local dans les pays partenaires, c'est essentiel. Nous devons défendre une politique migratoire ferme fondée sur le respect de la souveraineté des États membres. Vous savez que c'est un sujet auquel nous tenons particulièrement. C'est pourquoi je considère que ce rapport s'éloigne totalement de l'essence même du pacte pour la Méditerranée, un sujet sur lequel nos compatriotes nous attendent fortement. C'est aussi pourquoi, toujours constructifs, nous déposerons des amendements afin de réorienter ce texte et de mettre en application les axes que je viens de vous développer.
J'invite donc l'ensemble des collègues à soutenir les amendements que nous proposerons, c'est la démocratie, à défaut nous ne soutiendrons pas ce texte mais nous avons bon espoir de vous convaincre sur des amendements qui sont concrets, issus du résultat des élections européennes il y a presque deux ans désormais. Je vous remercie de votre écoute.
David McAllister
Thank you. May I ask speakers to slow down for the sake of our interpreters, the message may be lost due to speed. Thank you, Matthieu Valet, and now our colleague Mr. Gambino from the ECR. Please, Alberico.
Alberico Gambino
Grazie Presidente. Vorrei innanzitutto ringraziare il relatore Nicola Zingaretti per il lavoro svolto su un dossier di grande importanza strategica. Negli ultimi anni l'attenzione dell'Unione Europea si è concentrata giustamente sul fronte orientale. Tuttavia è altrettanto evidente che molto resta da fare sul fronte meridionale. Per questo accogliamo con grande favore un'iniziativa che pone finalmente il Mediterraneo al centro del dibattito politico europeo e che consente al Parlamento di esprimersi in modo strutturato su una regione decisiva per il futuro dell'Europa.
Oggi il Mediterraneo non è soltanto uno spazio di cooperazione regionale. È parte di uno spazio geopolitico più ampio da cui dipendono sicurezza, energia, connettività, rotte marittime globali e resilienza delle nostre catene del valore. Riteniamo tuttavia che il testo in esame possa essere ulteriormente rafforzato affinché sicurezza, resilienza, energia, infrastrutture strategiche, gestione dei flussi migratori e stabilità del Mediterraneo allargato diventino elementi ancora più centrali della strategia europea e per la regione. Su questi aspetti intendiamo contribuire in modo concreto, costruttivo durante la fase emendativa. Grazie.
Helmut Brandstätter
Yeah. Thank you Chair.
Thank you Nicola Zingaretti, thank you for the cooperation, we're looking forward to working with you. I want to mention a few points which I think are very important because this region is our ocean and our ocean is full of opportunities and also of challenges of course. Let's talk about the energy, one opportunity, unlimited sun and space, so the region is well positioned to deliver green electricity and hydrogen on both sides of the Mediterranean. During the energy transition the region is also a good source for carbon resources and particularly gas. At the same time we will have to stress the point that we want to cooperate but yes on democratic principles and European values.
And we must not exchange dependency on one autocratic regime to another one. One point was mentioned a few times, it's migration. Yes, this is kind of a destabilizing effect but I want to tell you we had yesterday in the EUDS in the commission for a democracy shield Philip Obaji, a Nigerian journalist, and he explained to us that a big part of the migration is not by coincidence, it's organized by the Wagner group, by other Russians. They have only one aim to destabilize Europe and they are doing this every day. And so we have to we need a border management, of course a human border management, but we also have to understand who is doing it and of course we have to try to talk also to the to the country of Libya in order to explain to them that they couldn't do that with us.
And of course cultural and human to human exchange is very important especially in these times of disinformation which I mentioned. We must move to the entire new dimension relations and not to be hostages of colonial or post-colonial narratives. So as I said it's important for us, I'm looking forward to the cooperation and I think it will improve the life of people on of all sides of the Mediterraneans if we do the right work. Thank you.
David McAllister
Thank you Helmut, next is Leo Luca Orlando. He is not here and for the left Mr. Giorgio also not here. Would other colleagues like to take the floor, then the time would be now. Mr. Brown.
Grzegorz Braun
My question to the first speaker that is Mr. Rapporteur, sir, what would you exactly like to share and exchange with the savages who come to Europe to piss at Cologne Cathedral, to put on fire whole districts of our cities, to implement Sharia laws in Britain and United Emirates of Western Germany? What would you like to share and exchange? It doesn't deserve university that virtual Mediterranean university that you want us to pay money for. It doesn't take a university to teach someone not to rape, not to engage sexually with minors and so on and so on.
David McAllister
I now give the floor to the representative of the Commission, Ms. Katerina Volvova. Please.
Katerina Wolfova
Thank you very much, Chair. Thank you first of all to the rapporteur Nicolas Zingaretti for the report that he presented, also for all the constructive, positive and supportive approach expressed by the shadow rapporteurs in their interventions to support the report, but also the Pact for the Mediterranean. Today more than ever, the future of Europe is tied to the one of the Mediterranean. This is where the Pact comes into play as a framework, comprehensive framework of practical cooperation that is to refresh and give new impetus to the relationship between the EU and the Southern Mediterranean neighborhood through practical cooperation in areas of common interest to contribute and building common Mediterranean space that is connected, prosperous, resilient and secure. That's why the Pact is built around three pillars focusing on people, on economy, on resilience, migration management.
The Pact will not show its added value if it is not implemented. This is why we take it very seriously as the Commission with the colleagues in External Action Service and we are now really focusing on starting to put in motion first set of actions that have been presented in the Pact and that we have presented in the first version iteration of the action plan. So indeed this is very important that we start to show that the Pact can deliver. We can demonstrate to people, to businesses, to our citizens that this Pact is not just a piece of paper, but it can really deliver benefits to people and societies. We understand the concerns raised in the report on predictability and adequacy of funding.
The upcoming MFF represents a critical opportunity to give the Pact genuine financial substance. We therefore count on your support, dear members of the Parliament, in this endeavor. I can reaffirm the Commission's commitment to stay closely engaged with the European Parliament, to come and regularly report on the progress in the implementation of the Pact. And we look forward to hearing from you and to continue in this constructive working together on this ambitious project. Thank you very much.
David McAllister
Thank you, Ms. Volvova. I now give the floor to the EAS representative, Ms. Beatrice Salvador Garcia.
Béatrice Salvador Garcia
Yeah, thank you very much, Chair, honorable members and Mr. Zingaretti, the rapporteur, for this timely discussion about the Pact for the Mediterranean. The Mediterranean region, as you have already pointed out, holds unparalleled strategic importance for the European Union. And as the world grows increasingly contested and unstable, enhancing bonds with our neighbors and partners is crucial. The current geopolitical situation underscores the complexity and interconnection of challenges in the MENA region and the European Union. As we all know, the region faces a lot of challenges from youth employment to water scarcity that requires a unified and systemic response.
This is why we need the Pact for the Mediterranean more than ever. It aims to address systemic challenges with a long-term impact, build resilience within the Mediterranean region and strengthen interconnections to shield both shores from the economic fallout of external geopolitical crises.
It will work in synergy with the bilateral and regional actions from the EU toolbox and should play a vital role by fostering a positive agenda and joint initiatives. Our current priority, as the colleague from the Commission just mentioned, is implementing the pact to deliver concrete results for citizens of both sides of the Mediterranean. We would like to stress that given the significance of the security situation, particularly today, with increasingly complex and multifaceted challenges, the pact strives to cultivate a shared understanding on both regional and international security landscapes, enhancing collaboration in areas of common interest. As you have seen, the security component of the third pillar of the pact refers to these shared threats on both sides of the Mediterranean and aims to achieve a common understanding of regional and international security landscapes. To this end, in the joint communication and in the action plan, the EEAS has proposed holding a EU-Mediterranean Regional Peace and Security Forum.
The forum will support a coordinated approach to concrete peace and security topics of common interest. It is designed as an informal setting to foster joint regional situational awareness, share views and coordinate approaches on shared peace and security interests. The forum will take place in November here in Brussels and it will bring together officials from the EU institutions, EU Member States and Southern Mediterranean countries as well as experts from academia and think tanks. We are currently developing the concept, but we can already advance that it will focus on two key topics of shared interest for both the EU and our Southern partners, which are maritime security and counter-terrorism, and the discussions could identify possible areas where we could develop joint actions under the pact in following interactions on the pact. Thank you very much.
David McAllister
Thank you. I think that concludes our guest speakers and now I would give the floor back to Nicola Zingaretti for his concluding remarks.
Mr. Chair, can I have the floor? Mr. Chair, can I have the floor?
Costas Mavrides
I know, I had to go outside and talk to my son. Please, parakaló. Just want to make a very short comment. Really apologize because I had to make a very urgent phone call. Just two short comments.
First of all, I need to reinforce the idea that any cooperation in the Euro, in the Mediterranean, needs to make very clear that it has to be based on respect of international law. Why do I repeat this over and over again? Because we all know that there are countries, such as Turkey for example, that violates the international law including Cyprus and other Member States. And the second suggestion though, it's very concrete. There is a need for the setting of a crisis management center in the area that would manage not only fires or floods, but many other crises such as migration, climate change, geopolitical confrontations and much more.
So yes, repeatedly, respect of international law that is at the center of the rules to management center in Cyprus.
Nicola Zingaretti
Sì, grazie Presidente. Ringrazio tutti i colleghi che sono intervenuti. Ovviamente si apre la fase emendativa che affronterò con la massima disponibilità all'ascolto e ai contributi di tutti. Ringrazio in particolare i colleghi che hanno voluto già dare dei suggerimenti. Ovviamente la base di tutto è sia il beneficio di tutti i paesi e le realtà coinvolte, sia la difesa dei diritti umani e del diritto internazionale come criterio cardine di tutte le azioni.
Ringrazio l'intervento della Commissione e del SEAE. Condividiamo al 100% l'impegno comune di verificare che ora il patto venga attuato anche con stanziamenti adeguati che la rendano credibile per non produrre delusioni dopo annunci fatti con grande entusiasmo. Quindi si apre un lungo lavoro che dovremo monitorare insieme. L'obiettivo, ripeto, è cogliere questa grande opportunità di un'area di oltre 500 milioni di persone che all'insegna della pace, del benessere, del confronto, che poi sono stati i cardini della costruzione dell'Europa dopo la fine della Seconda Guerra Mondiale, possa produrre ricchezza per la nostra comunità. Sui visti, preciso che rispetto al collega che lo ha citato, che nel mio rapporto non parlo in alcun modo di nessuna forma di liberalizzazione dei visti.
C'è un riferimento esplicito per quanto riguarda gli studi, l'università e la possibilità di fare delle università europee il centro delle migliori risorse del pianeta Terra, tema che ha già affrontato il Parlamento parlando delle politiche dell'amministrazione Trump e quindi legato a questo flusso intellettuale delle risorse migliori per far crescere la sfera del sapere nel nostro continente. Per quanto riguarda infine il collega che mi faceva una domanda su come mi voglio rapportare ai selvaggi, io penso che non voglio avere nessun rapporto con i selvaggi né di altri paesi né con i selvaggi europei. Vengo da un paese dove selvaggi mafiosi hanno sciolto i bambini nell'acido, ma non per questo condanno il mio paese, o i selvaggi europei che nella Seconda Guerra Mondiale, nazisti e fascisti, hanno ucciso nei forni crematori 6 milioni di esseri umani. Ecco, con i selvaggi ovviamente non avremo nessun tipo di rapporto, né quelli europei né quelli di altri paesi. Anzi, siamo impegnati per la pace e lo scambio proprio per sconfiggerli.
Grazie Presidente.
David McAllister
Thank you very much. Colleagues, the deadline for amendments for this report is set on the 11th of June at 4 o'clock, the vote in committee is expected to be on the 10th of September. We move on then to item number 14. This is the draft report on EU-Syria political relations presented by our rapporteur Nathalie Loiseau. Just as an introduction, we all know the situation in Syria has changed significantly since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024 and the regional situation has also changed significantly.
The European Union took the decision to lift all sectoral sanctions last year and on the 11th of May this year the Council took the decision to resume the cooperation agreement with Syria. This was followed by the first high-level political dialogue between the EU and Syria. I now give the floor to Nathalie Loiseau to present her draft report.
Nathalie Loiseau
Merci Monsieur le Président. Ce rapport aborde en effet un moment charnière de l'histoire de la Syrie. La chute du régime de Bachar al-Assad a profondément modifié la situation du pays. Elle a créé des opportunités qui n'existaient pas auparavant, mais elle n'a pas résolu un grand nombre des problèmes profonds du pays. Notre objectif est clair : l'Union européenne souhaite voir une Syrie stable, souveraine, sûre et pacifique.
Une Syrie capable de se reconstruire, de protéger ses concitoyens, de lutter contre le terrorisme et à terme de permettre aux réfugiés de rentrer chez eux en toute sécurité, de leur plein gré et dans la dignité. Dans le même temps, nous devons faire preuve à la fois de clarté et de lucidité. D'une part, nous devons reconnaître les évolutions positives, car il y en a. Les autorités de transition ont engagé un dialogue avec la communauté internationale. Certaines mesures ont été prises pour intégrer les minorités au sein des institutions nationales, en particulier l'accord conclu en janvier entre les autorités actuelles et les Forces démocratiques syriennes offre une voie potentielle pour l'intégration de la minorité kurde dans le processus politique syrien.
Il existe une volonté d'aller de l'avant. L'Union européenne a décidé de rétablir l'accord de coopération Union européenne-Syrie et de lever les sanctions économiques, reflétant ainsi la nouvelle réalité sur le terrain. Mais tout de même, la situation en Syrie reste extrêmement fragile. La violence continue de toucher différentes communautés. Des minorités religieuses et ethniques ont été attaquées par divers groupes armés dont certains sont affiliés aux autorités actuelles.
Des millions de Syriens restent déplacés à l'intérieur du pays ou réfugiés à l'extérieur. 90 % de la population vit toujours en dessous du seuil de pauvreté. Daech reste une menace. Des pays étrangers tels que la Turquie ou Israël continuent d'empiéter sur le territoire syrien et de s'ingérer dans les affaires de la Syrie. Le pays est confronté à d'énormes besoins pour sa reconstruction, tant sur le plan matériel qu'humain, tandis que le système judiciaire doit être rebâti et que la lutte contre l'impunité pour les crimes commis pendant la guerre civile a à peine commencé.
Pour ces raisons, le message central de ce projet de rapport est que l'engagement européen doit être au rendez-vous, mais il doit être conditionnel. En effet, l'Union européenne doit soutenir la reprise en Syrie, mais notre soutien doit être subordonné à des progrès concrets vers une transition politique authentique et inclusive. L'Union européenne devrait encourager les réformes qui renforcent l'État de droit, une gouvernance responsable et le respect des droits fondamentaux. L'Union européenne devrait soutenir la reconstruction d'une manière qui profite réellement au peuple syrien. Nous devons approfondir sans aucun doute possible notre engagement envers la Syrie et défendre nos principes sans aucun doute possible non plus.
Un avenir durable pour la Syrie ne peut être construit que si toutes les composantes de la société syrienne y trouvent leur place. Le rapport met donc l'accent sur plusieurs priorités clés pour soutenir l'objectif d'inclusion politique. Tout d'abord, l'aide humanitaire et la reconstruction : la situation humanitaire reste préoccupante et la reconstruction des infrastructures de base sera essentielle pour la stabilité à long terme. Deuxièmement, la sécurité et la lutte contre le terrorisme : prévenir la résurgence de Daech et faire face aux risques de sécurité persistants reste vital, aussi bien pour la Syrie que pour la région et pour l'Europe.
Les violences qui ont touché les Alaouites, les Druzes, les Kurdes et d'autres communautés, le terrorisme qui a endeuillé les chrétiens démontrent l'importance de garantir l'égalité des droits et la sécurité pour tous en Syrie. Et quatrièmement, la justice et la responsabilité. La Syrie ne pourra pas parvenir à une stabilité durable sans faire face à l'héritage des atrocités commises, sans soutenir la justice transitionnelle et sans apporter des réponses aux familles des centaines de milliers de personnes disparues. Pour finir, je voulais dire que ce que je vous soumets est un projet de rapport qui est un cadre, une structure qui, j'espère, sont clairs pour définir des grandes orientations politiques. Mais compte tenu des contraintes de notre Parlement pour la longueur de nos projets, j'ai l'intention de déposer moi-même un certain nombre d'amendements dans les semaines à venir afin d'approfondir le rapport et d'y ajouter des éléments qui n'ont pas pu y figurer jusqu'à présent.
Je me réjouis évidemment de travailler en collaboration étroite avec les rapporteurs fictifs pour élaborer ce rapport. Je vous remercie.
Thank you very much, dear Natalie. We now give the floor to our shadow rapporteurs, Ingeborg Ter Laak for the EPP, please.
Ingeborg Ter Laak
Thank you, Chair, and first of all, thanks a lot for this report on Syria. The EPP believes it's of utmost importance to create this in-year report on Syria since the recent regime change in the country. And I had the privilege to go together with Ms. Loiseau to Damascus on a mission from the European Parliament. And what we saw was immense. I mean, the challenges Syria is facing is beyond imagination.
It's everywhere. It's building trust within the people, building government structures, but also building infrastructure. And I think Natalie mentioned it all: public services, how to deal with misplaced persons, and but also their economy is completely gone because of the Assad regime really used the money, the profits they got from the drugs they provided. The new regime stopped the drugs, but now there's no income left. So the challenges are immense.
And it's good for the EU, we lifted our sanctions, but that's just a start. And now the EU is rethinking their relationship, but also their financial support. And I think it's important to make it conditionality and to talk about these conditionalities. For the EPP, it's almost the same as Renew. The size of the report was too short.
And for us, it's important to really include all the actors involved within Syria, so all the several ethnic and religious groups which are there and who some of them suffered more under the Assad regime than others. And how do you create a balanced social structure within this society? So that's important for us. It's important for the rule of law. It's important for holding free and democratic elections.
And also it's important for everyone, males and females, to be included in this society. And yes, EU has every, for the EU it's significant for us to help rebuilding Syria because of the stability in the region. It's basically our backyard. So it's important to take these steps, include diplomatic ties, humanitarian aid, and capacity building within Syria. Thank you so much.
Marco Tarquinio
Thank you. Marco Tarquinio would be next, please, Marco.
Grazie, Presidente, parlerò in italiano. Ringrazio anch'io sinceramente la relatrice Loiseau per la bozza di relazione che ha presentato.
È stato detto anche da lei presidente, la caduta del regime di Assad è un'opportunità storica per la Siria e per gli amici del popolo siriano, ma la transizione in atto è complessa e il quadro resta fragile. Per questo, come gruppo S&D insistiamo su un punto chiave: i progressi o i regressi del processo vanno monitorati costantemente e il sostegno europeo deve restare condizionato e reversibile, ancorato a principi e pratiche di una transizione realmente inclusiva. Mi ha fatto piacere sentirlo ribadire con forza anche in questa aula dalla relatrice Loiseau. Quattro priorità ci stanno particolarmente a cuore. La prima è la giustizia, la giustizia di transizione e la lotta all'impunità.
Senza responsabilità per i gravi crimini commessi da più parti in Siria non c'è riconciliazione duratura. Il secondo è la protezione di tutte le minoranze, anche questo è stato sottolineato anche da altri, è importante tutte le componenti della società siriana, le minoranze etniche, religiose e la comunità curda e la piena partecipazione di una componente che minoranza non è ma maggioranza, le donne. Terzo, il ritorno dei rifugiati, sicuro, volontario, dignitoso, nel pieno rispetto del principio di non respingimento. Infine, il rispetto della sovranità e dell'integrità territoriale siriana, principi che devono valere per tutti gli attori regionali, nessuno escluso. Presenterò ovviamente emendamenti in questa direzione e auspico a mia volta che i negoziati si svolgano nello spirito di leale collaborazione che questo dossier merita.
Grazie presidente e grazie alla relatrice.
Mika ANDRIES
Thank you chair, I will be speaking in Dutch. Geachte rapporteur, beste collega's, de val van het Assad-regime biedt Syrië een kans op een nieuwe toekomst, maar Europese steun mag geen blanco cheque zijn. Bij het lezen van het rapport valt op dat de nadruk vooral ligt op de vele uitdagingen waarmee Syrië geconfronteerd wordt. Die uitdagingen zijn reëel, maar we moeten ook erkennen dat de situatie binnen Syrië niet overal hetzelfde is. Veiligheid, bestuur en economische omstandigheden verschillen sterk per regio.
Het is daarom onjuist om de situatie in heel Syrië als uniform te beschouwen. Voor mijn partij, de PVV, is één punt daarbij essentieel. Als de Syrische autoriteiten economische samenwerkingen, investeringen en financiële steun van de EU wensen, dan moeten zij ook verantwoordelijkheid nemen voor hun eigen burgers. Volledige medewerking aan de terugkeer en overname van Syriërs die momenteel in Europa verblijven moet een kernvoorwaarde zijn voor verdere normaliseringen van de betrekkingen. Daarnaast maken wij ons zorgen over de positie van religieuze en etnische minderheden en over de aanwezigheid van jihadistische en door Iran gesteunde groeperingen.
De bescherming van minderheden, de bestrijding van extremisme en de stabiliteit van de regio moeten centraal staan in onze benadering. Tot slot erkennen wij de legitieme veiligheidsbelangen van Israël. Syrië mag nooit opnieuw een uitvalsbasis worden voor terroristische organisaties of milities die de veiligheid van Israël en de regio bedreigen. Een succesvol beleid ten aanzien van Syrië wordt uiteindelijk niet afgemeten aan het aantal Syriërs dat in Europa blijft, maar aan het aantal Syriërs dat veilig kan terugkeren en mee kan bouwen aan de toekomst van hun land. Dat zal de kern zijn van mijn amendementen.
Dank u wel.
Thank you, Mr Ghiardi for the ECR is not present, Hannah Neumann for the Greens, no, Ms Rima Hassan is present.
Rima Hassan
Merci, Monsieur le Président, chers collègues, Madame la rapporteure. La Syrie entre dans une phase décisive mais reste extrêmement fragile. La chute du régime d'Assad ne peut pas signifier un chèque en blanc et une normalisation précipitée. Tout soutien européen, toute aide à la reconstruction, tout partenariat politique doivent rester conditionnés à une véritable transition démocratique, au respect des droits humains et à la justice, ainsi qu'à la protection de toutes les communautés minoritaires. Je rejoins Madame Loiseau lorsqu'elle affirme l'importance de défendre la souveraineté de la Syrie, mais il faut aller jusqu'au bout de ce principe.
Vous appelez ici les acteurs régionaux à respecter l'intégrité territoriale et la souveraineté de la Syrie, et je le dis à mes collègues dans la salle, en vue des négociations, on ne peut pas prétendre défendre la souveraineté syrienne sans condamner clairement les violences commises par Israël. On ne peut pas parler d'intégrité territoriale sans rappeler avec force que le Golan est un territoire syrien occupé par Israël depuis 67 et illégalement annexé depuis 1981. Aussi, depuis décembre 2024, Israël s'enracine même au-delà de la frontière avec le plateau du Golan. Nous n'avons actuellement dans le projet de rapport pas un seul paragraphe dénonçant ces violations flagrantes du droit international, il n'en est mention que dans les considérations. Un deuxième point que je souhaite souligner ici : nous refusons que les réfugiés syriens soient la monnaie d'échange des négociations entre Bruxelles et Damas.
Tout retour doit être sûr, volontaire et digne, conformément aux dispositions de la Convention de Genève de 1951 relative à la protection internationale des réfugiés. Aucune stabilité ne sera possible sans une justice transitionnelle intégrant une protection effective de toutes les minorités. Tous les crimes doivent être poursuivis, quels qu'en soient leurs auteurs et leurs complices, dont les multinationales. Je pense notamment à Lafarge, dont les intérêts commerciaux ont directement contribué à financer l'État islamique. La reconstruction de la Syrie ne doit pas devenir un instrument d'influence ou de profit.
Or l'actualité montre déjà les appétits à l'œuvre : Chevron qui a signé un accord initial avec la compagnie nationale de pétrole et une entreprise qatarie pour évaluer l'exploitation pétrolière et gazière au large des côtes syriennes. La Syrie ne doit pas devenir un nouveau terrain de chasse pour les multinationales de l'énergie. Ses ressources doivent d'abord, et surtout dans ce contexte particulier que traverse la Syrie, bénéficier en priorité à la population du pays. La crédibilité de l'Union européenne se jouera précisément là : défendre le droit international coûte que coûte et la souveraineté du peuple syrien. Je vous remercie.
David McAllister
Thank you. May I once again remind you to try to slow down, the interpreters need to catch up. Now, Mr. Frölich from the ESN group is not present. Any other one who would like to take the floor? Please indicate.
Yes. The floor is yours.
Kostas Papadakis
Thank chair, I will speak in Greek. Ξεπερνά κάθε όριο υποκρισία η ανησυχία της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης και της ελληνικής κυβέρνησης για τη συνεχιζόμενη ανθρωπιστική κατάσταση στη Συρία. Είναι απολύτως όμως συνυπεύθυνες και η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση αλλά και η ελληνική κυβέρνηση αφού οι αποκρουστικοί τζιχαντιστές από μέχρι πρότινος τρομοκράτες μετατράπηκαν σε ένα βράδυ σε εταίροι την ίδια ώρα που συνεχίζουν τις θηριωδίες τους απέναντι σε εθνικές και θρησκευτικές μειονότητες. Οι δε σύμμαχοι της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης, η Τουρκία και το Ισραήλ είναι αυτοί που κατέχουν μεταξύ άλλων και εδάφη της Συρίας. Όλα τα παραπάνω διαδραματίζονται στο φόντο των σφοδρών ανταγωνισμών για την εκμετάλλευση των δρόμων μεταφοράς εμπορευμάτων και ενέργειας ανάμεσα σε Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες, Κίνα, Ρωσία και Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση στην περιοχή.
Με αλλαγές συνόρων, με θύματα τους λαούς και ενώ μεθοδεύεται η δημιουργία στρατοπέδων μαζικών εκτοπίσεων προσφύγων σε τρίτες χώρες. Ο λαός της Συρίας είναι ο μόνος αρμόδιος ώστε με την πάλη του για τα δικά του συμφέροντα να παλέψει ενάντια στους δυνάστες του, στο σύστημα της εκμετάλλευσης και σε κάθε ιμπεριαλιστική συμμαχία για να ζει κυρίαρχος στον τόπο του.
Efi Deisou, thank you.
Anyone else would like to take the floor? If that's not the case, then from the EEAS we have Mr. Alessio Cappellani. Are you present?
You have the floor.
Alessio CAPPELLANI
Merci beaucoup Monsieur le Président, Madame la Rapporteure. Donc tout d'abord quelques éléments de contexte. Je trouve que la discussion est assez consensuelle en effet. Nous pensons aussi que la chute du régime de Bachar al-Assad a ouvert une perspective positive pour le peuple syrien après des décennies de souffrances immenses. Bachar a laissé un pays totalement détruit.
Il a été rappelé par plusieurs intervenants au niveau économique et social, au niveau des infrastructures, la destruction, les services de base, éducation, santé, des centaines de milliers de Syriens qui ont été tués, qui ont disparu, qui ont été torturés et qui ont été obligés à laisser leur pays et un tissu social complètement à reconstruire. Donc la chute du régime de Bachar al-Assad en décembre 24 a offert une opportunité positive au peuple syrien mais aussi à l'engagement de l'Union européenne avec la Syrie. Pour les derniers 15 ans, la Syrie a été pour l'Europe une espèce de trou noir, pas d'engagement politique, pas de relations diplomatiques, simplement le soutien au peuple syrien dans la souffrance de cette période très difficile, soutien à la société civile, soutien aux mécanismes des Nations Unies. Vous vous rappelez peut-être les conférences annuelles de soutien à la Syrie organisées ici à Bruxelles. Les relations bilatérales entre l'Union européenne et la Syrie ont été basées pour longtemps sur un accord de coopération signé en 78, contrairement à la plupart des autres partenaires de la Méditerranée qui ont conclu avec l'Union européenne un accord d'association.
Donc depuis le départ d'Assad, l'Union européenne a décidé d'accroître son engagement dans le soutien de la transition syrienne, une transition bien évidemment très compliquée. Et donc en termes d'engagement, nous avons tout d'abord levé les sanctions en mai 2025 sur la plupart des secteurs économiques. On a adopté des conclusions du Conseil en juin de l'année passée. En janvier de cette année, les présidents du Conseil et de la Commission ont visité la Syrie. Le président de l'autorité de transition Sharaa a participé au Conseil informel européen de Chypre en avril.
Et finalement nous avons organisé le 11 mai ici à Bruxelles le premier High Level Political Dialogue avec la Syrie qui, dans l'absence d'un accord d'association, nous permet d'avoir un engagement structuré au niveau politique d'une façon organisée et claire. Quel est notre objectif? Notre objectif est de construire sur ce moment positif dans la relation bilatérale pour renforcer notre dialogue bilatéral. Nous voulons introduire la perspective d'un accord d'association comme pour les autres pays de la Méditerranée et nous voulons soutenir la réintégration de la Syrie dans la région au sens large en termes de connectivité.
Et donc bien évidemment la situation en Syrie, vous l'avez rappelé, reste très fragile. On peut voir toujours la situation comme le verre à moitié vide et à moitié plein. La Syrie a été et restée à l'extérieur, a été épargnée du conflit entre l'Iran et les États-Unis et Israël, mais elle est touchée par les conséquences de cette crise. La situation socio-économique reste très difficile. Il y a des vulnérabilités au niveau de la sécurité, on en a parlé, la présence de Daech, le contrôle du territoire.
Il y a la question de l'inclusivité de la transition, les élections, le travail sur la nouvelle constitution, le parlement. Il y a un énorme problème de state building, c'est-à-dire que l'administration syrienne sort totalement détruite par la période précédente. Et il y a des interférences, vous les avez aussi mentionnées, au niveau des acteurs extérieurs. Mais donc en conclusion, nous pensons que le renforcement de l'engagement de l'Union européenne avec la Syrie, c'est la meilleure façon pour appuyer ce processus de transition compliqué et c'est la meilleure façon pour en avoir un effet de levier dans les discussions avec les interlocuteurs syriens. Et ça permet aussi au côté syrien de pouvoir bénéficier non seulement de notre soutien financier bien évidemment, mais aussi des différents mécanismes et instruments qui sont à disposition de l'Union européenne comme de l'assistance technique, etc.
Merci beaucoup.
Thank you. And the representative of the Commission is Ms. Anna Piras, Head of Unit for MENA B.1. Voilà.
Anna PIRAS
Thank you, Chair, and thank you, honorable members, for the good report and for the support that the Parliament and this committee has dedicated to the Syrian crisis since 2011 and in particular in the last year since the fall of the Assad regime. I won't dwell on the positive momentum because my colleague Alessio has already described the different rendez-vous that we had with the Syrians in the last period, but I believe this report comes at the perfect moment. It is broadly a show of support, but also a show of what should be the strategic priorities of the EU in the relations with Syria and what should be the main expectations vis-à-vis the authorities. And I think in terms of the strategic objectives, just to summarize also what the rapporteur mentioned and what we share also, I think it can be summarized in three elements. We want a stable and safe Syria, we want a genuinely inclusive Syria, and we want a prosperous Syria, which can partner with the EU on different important issues.
And I think it's quite topical to have this discussion after your discussion on the pact, because many of the key issues such as security or connectivity or migration are actually regional challenges that need to be tackled within as a with a broad cooperation of the region. You all mention what we expect to see from the Syrian authorities with regard to the transition, and I think we are very aligned and we constantly stress these messages in our exchanges with the transitional authorities. Alessio mentioned the high-level political dialogue, and this is precisely what we've been asking and what we've been stressing in terms of this dialogue. And it's reassuring that your report covers broadly the themes too, and I think it's very important and we are stronger when we speak with one voice. But beyond talking and asking, what we are doing is actually using our financial packages to support an inclusive Syria and to support the reform impetus of the authorities.
So our support inside Syria at the moment focuses very much on local communities. One of the first programs we signed last year supports mediation and dialogue between groups through grants to local NGOs and local authorities to increase their capacity of delivering on key services in areas such Aleppo or in Homs. Another key flagship of our support has been the technical assistance hub, which will be up and running the next few weeks.
We are also targeting support to key sectors such as health, agriculture, access to finance for livelihoods and others. And in 2026, about 40 million euros will be dedicated to justice, accountability, social cohesion and equal participation. So I'm very happy to kind of to give you more details if you if you want, but we'll soon sign a program on justice and rule of law as mentioned by Madame Loiseau. We are planning support to media freedom, creating the space for a more informed dialogue. We will continue to support local democracy, local democracy through including through actions that target dialogue between communities, but also that help them rehabilitate key infrastructure through dialogue.
We will support specific actions on women's political participation. We will support transitional justice, including the work of the two national commissions for the missing and transitional justice. And we'll also continue to organize the day of dialogue with civil society, which in past editions was organized in this house. So our strategy is not just to expect results, but work together with the different actors in Syria, being central authorities, local authorities, civil society, women, youth, people from all communities in Syria, private sector, in order to reach these goals. So from the side of the Commission, we are accelerating the implementation of the current funding in the areas that I mentioned, but also we are programming the next phase of funding for 26-27, which was pledged by the president early in the year.
So we hope that this this support will be adopted over the summer and will focus also on these key areas of supporting institution building, enhancing inclusive service delivery and promoting justice, human rights and social cohesion. Let me just finish with a positive message. The needs are immense, but so are the opportunities. So it's really important for us to work with private sector in order to expand the work on reforms and to allow the conditions for them to be active in Syria. And we're very ready to to support these efforts in the in the spirit of fostering regional cooperation and connectivity.
So thank you very much for the discussion. We're very happy to contribute and to in the in the drafting of the report from the side of the Commission. And again, thank you for your support to the Syrian transition. Thank you.
Thank you very much, Miss Pires. Nobody else would like to take the floor, that allows me to hand over to Nathalie Loiseau for her concluding remarks.
Nathalie Loiseau
Thank you, chair. I look I'm looking forward to work with my colleagues. I see a lot of consensus in a number of important items that were raised by my colleagues. So I think and I hope that the negotiation will go smoothly and that we will be able to provide for the first INI report on the situation in Syria for quite a number of years. And I'm looking forward to it.
Thank you very much, chair.
David McAllister
Well, thank you, Nathalie, that was brief. Without any further ado, I can announce then that the deadline for amendments for this report is set on the 10th of June at 4:00 in the afternoon. The vote in committee is expected to be on the 10th of September. Item number 15 is closely related to item number 14. This is the presentation of the main insights from an upcoming paper commissioned by our committee titled The Impact of the Fall of the Assad Regime on Syria and the Wider Region.
The paper is not ready yet, but it was decided to hold this exchange of views with the main recommendations from the paper and then for the authors to finalize it soon afterwards. So thanks for all your understanding.
This work seeks to assess the key forces that have influenced the trajectory of Syrian developments since the fall of the Assad regime and how they will shape the country's development and political transformation in the near future. The work focuses on three aspects: internal developments inside Syria, the role of regional powers in shaping the present and future course of the Syrian transformation, and thirdly, the European political, humanitarian, and development engagement in the country and how it can support a stable, inclusive political order. The paper was commissioned by Parliament services to the Trans-European Policy Studies Association, TEPSA, that hired the experts working at the Institute of International Relations in Prague. I would like to welcome the experts that worked on the study. Joining us online because his flight was cancelled, we have Mr. Jan Daniel, senior researcher at the Institute of International Relations in Prague.
He is the lead author of this paper. The other authors who are involved and listening to this presentation online are Ms. Anna Filippiová, PhD candidate at the Department of Middle Eastern Studies in the Faculty of Arts of Charles University in Prague and a research fellow at the Association for International Affairs, and Mr. I hope I'm pronouncing his name correctly, Clément Steuer, senior researcher at the Institute of International Relations in Prague. So, I hope he's connected. Dr. Daniel, welcome to our committee. Thanks for being with us today.
Before we start, allow me to mention as usual that the views of the experts expressed today and in the study do not necessarily represent official European Parliament positions. Dr. Daniel, we look forward to hearing more about your main findings and the floor is yours now for ten minutes. Ahoj.
Jan DANIEL
Thank you so much and good afternoon. I hope that you can all hear me well. Once again, thank you so much for inviting me to present our analysis here and I am truly sorry I cannot be in the room with you for this presentation. As it was already mentioned, unfortunately my flight this morning was cancelled. So once again, my name is Jan Daniel, I'm a senior researcher at the Institute of International Relations Prague.
My two other co-authors are Anna Filippiová and Clément Steuer and I would also like to mention our research assistant Filip Sommer who contributed to the paper as well. Next slide please. In the study, our task was to assess the current shape of the emerging political order in Syria and sketch its potential future development and impact that it will have on the region, on neighboring countries, and of course on the EU. Very briefly, in the first part of the paper we evaluate the shape of the emerging Syrian political system. We note the authoritarian tendencies of the current government, we note the continuing role of informal political actors, the troubled relations with minorities, and finally we consider also the worrying economic and humanitarian situation in the country which is marked by poverty and dependence on humanitarian assistance.
We then explore the role of external actors as the country must navigate competing external influences from Türkiye, the Gulf states, Israel, Russia, Iran, the United States of America, and of course the European Union.
We believe that the trajectory of Syria's post-conflict development will be shaped less by formal political arrangements and much more by the internal dynamics through which actual authority is translated into inclusive reconstruction and governance or lack thereof. So rather than a linear transition towards stability, the emerging order is likely to reflect an ongoing tensions between the consolidation and centralization of Al-Assad's political power and pushback from the side of civil society, pushback from the side of minority communities and also the interests and influence of external actors. We cluster the main trends shaping the future of Syrian political order around two main domestic trends and two main external trends. Among the domestic, we believe that the future of Syrian economy, as we have already heard in the previous presentation, is actually the key one. So at the core of Syria's internal dynamics lies the transformation of its economic system.
The current trajectory suggests a shift from a fragmented war economy towards a hybrid model that combines elements of state control, the role of informal networks and external dependencies. However, the revival of the economy and broader reconstruction are the key aspects of the legitimacy of Assad's regime and are at the core of his social contract. It is important to point out that as much as the future of Syrian economy is the key for the future of Syrian stability, it is definitely the fact that the emerging economic structures are unlikely to be neutral. Rather they will serve as key instruments of political control and regime consolidation. In our reading, the key trend here is not whether reconstruction will occur, it will occur in some ways, but how it will be structured, how resources will be allocated and which actors are set to benefit from the process.
Going to the second trend, the domestic institutional development. We believe that the evolution of institutions will actually play a central role in shaping governance outcomes. The key issue here and the key form of this trend is whether the Syrian political institutions will develop some form of functional mechanism or they will just serve as an extension of Syrian president's executive authority. So the important aspects of this trend or actually the key aspect of this trend is the extent to which the authoritarian practices or authoritarian tendencies of the current Syrian government are moderated or recalibrated. We assess that full transition away from authoritarianism is unlikely given Al-Assad's track record both in Idlib and in Damascus, however we do see regime's willingness and ability to respond to social pressures and external demands.
And these are actually policy moves that are well documented and that will be crucial going forward. Going to external trends or to regional trends, first the regional security order. The current Syrian government is trying to disassociate itself from the conflicts in its neighborhood and it tries to prioritize post-conflict recovery. Nevertheless, the broadening of the regional conflict, the opening of new axes of conflict such as the escalation of the proxy conflict between Turkey and Israel or emerging rivalry between states of the Persian Gulf will shape the future regional security order and will have a crucial impact on Syria. At the same time, we need to consider also the regional economic environment because Syrian economy is actually broadly exposed to the shocks from the war in Iran.
The regional crisis added another factor to the continually rising inflation which contributes to prevalent poverty, unemployment and potential decline in local production. Syrian economy and public services were put under increasing strain by arrival of Syrians who fled the fighting in Lebanon.
And more, perhaps even more consequentially, the war in Iran and its impact might also affect Syria's foreign partners' abilities to deliver promised funds and investments on which the Syrian strategy of economic reconstruction actually relies. Here I am talking mostly about the countries of the Persian Gulf, but also the EU and others. Next slide, please. Out of a combination of these trends, we defined three main or three ideal-type pathways that emerge from this analysis. The first one envisages a state consolidation.
Here we are talking about accountable governance with meaningful integration of minorities, transitional justice mechanisms, and economic recovery that is anchored in sustained international engagement and favorable regional economic development. For us, this does not imply the absence of authoritarianism. We believe that that is unlikely, at least in the short term or even in the mid-term, but rather we see here a partial institutionalization and existence within certain limits that are defined by the need for popular legitimacy and the need for foreign support, that is actually conditioned and conditional on the maintenance of basic human rights and political freedoms. The second pathway that we see here or that we project is authoritarian stabilization. In this pathway, Assad's network centralizes power and delivers a degree of order, perhaps also a degree of stability, at the cost of pluralism, civic freedoms, and accountability of political institutions.
However, we believe that in this pathway, the stability that is maintained is actually shallow, uneven, and it is heavily dependent on coercion and patronage provided to Syrian elite actors. Economically, this system remains dominant by rent-seeking, clientelism, and selective distribution of resources. This is partially enabled by the flows of limited funds from regional actors that are willing to invest in selective lucrative regions and areas, which, however, do not create a basis for solid economic recovery. The third pathway anticipates renewed territorial fragmentation. This is characterized by persistent zones of foreign influence or even direct control, recurring sectarian violence, together with entrenchment of local enclaves outside of Damascus' effective control.
We believe that this pathway stems as much from economic mismanagement on the national level as from the adverse effects of regional economic downturn and withdrawal of promised funds and investments. The lack of economic growth, continuing insecurity, and lack of the rule of law discourages most of the international investors from getting engaged in Syria, hence the economy actually never picks up. So what does this mean for the EU and what does this mean for the European Parliament? Next slide, please. We assess that the European Union actually retains significant leverage to shape these three pathways and maybe even to help to shift the tracks between them.
We believe that this should be done principally through reconstruction financing, supporting local non-governmental organizations and civil society, and providing humanitarian assistance, but also through sustained diplomatic engagement in the region and with key regional partners. We also believe that the European leverage, which is real, is constrained by several factors. First of all, the absence of direct security instruments and forms of political engagement that would be comparable to those that are wielded by regional powers, and also it is constrained by the speed at which Gulf actors and Türkiye have moved to establish themselves as Syria's key economic and political partners in the post-Assad period.
We however believe that EU and European Parliament must remain adaptive across the three Syrian potential pathways. We try to indicate some indicators which pathway might be unfolding and we believe that the EU and European Parliament actually should calibrate their tools to respond to different pathways. Being a constructive partner which supports Syrian authorities in the case of state consolidation, being a critical watchdog that actually provides rigorous oversight of realized projects and funding in the second pathway, or just making a contribution to humanitarian crisis making in the case of fragmentation. We also believe that European Parliament actually could exercise its legislative, budgetary and oversight powers to ensure that the EU's engagement in Syria advances institutional resilience, inclusive governance and sustainable development and that Europe neither entrenches authoritarian rule nor enables further fragmentation of the country. Thank you very much for your attention and I will welcome any questions or comments you may have.
Well thank you very much Mr. Daniel, Dr. Daniel for your presentation. We now have time for an exchange of views. Who would like to take the floor? According to my speaking notes it's the AFET coordinators if they wish to take the floor. Michael Gahler.
Michael Gahler
Well I think thank you very much. I'm afraid I came in a bit late but I saw the three scenarios. And of course politically wishful would be the first one and we should with our policies of course try to contribute to this and in so far I hope that all relevant stakeholders and that is not only us the Parliament of course but our executive side well also are in a situation that they have their own concepts for implementation in this regard. And what is important of course is that they can speak on behalf of all of us and in such crucial situations it is so important that the ones who have their responsibility currently in Damascus know that the EU speaks with one voice and that we abide by what we have promised. And I think we have in this very situation all means from the financial and the political point of view to be a constructive and cooperative partner provided that the conditionalities that we also set with regard to minorities, with regard to political plurality that that is provided.
I would have a question. I mean those who are against the new government have of course an interest to influence them negatively. What is your assessment of the current Iranian regime as they lost their partner Assad? Do they leave it by that or is it that they actively try to undermine the current situation? And for me is also important what is your assessment and that has something to do with our stance towards Syria, how do they put their position, how do they position themselves towards Russia?
They have Latakia and Tartus as airfield and port and I think that's not in Syria's interest and not in ours but currently they seem not to compliment them out. What is your latest assessment in this regard? Thank you.
Nacho Sánchez Amor
Sí, gracias presidente. Yo lo que pediría a los colegas y a todos los interlocutores es que moderemos nuestras expectativas.
Es decir, hemos hablado de elecciones. Yo creo que hay que ser realistas. Un país que va a entrar en una fase de estabilización hacia una consolidación de un estado ahora inexistente o hacia una consolidación autoritaria en el segundo en la segunda hipótesis de estudio, yo pediría a todo el mundo que refrenara su interés en convertir Siria de repente en Suecia. No va a pasar. Y por tanto no creemos altas expectativas para tener altas frustraciones.
Hagamos el esfuerzo de poner condicionalidad en la desaparición de la violencia intracomunitaria y los demás pasos del proceso tendrán que ser muy lentos y seguramente no siguiendo los habituales estándares europeos. Y en relación con la ayuda, al contrario que en otros escenarios del Oriente Medio, yo creo que en este caso sí, y no por motivos de interés de haber tenido que acoger muchos millones de sirios durante estos años de la guerra civil, sino por verdadero sentido de estabilizar la zona ya desestabilizada por otros actores, tiene que haber un compromiso fuerte de la Unión Europea de ayudar en la reconstrucción. Por tanto esos serían mis dos mensajes: limitemos nuestras expectativas para no tener grandes frustraciones, concentrémonos en la construcción de un estado viable y pongamos un gran énfasis en nuestra condicionalidad para apoyar la reconstrucción en la desaparición de la violencia intracomunitaria o interétnica o intergrupos.
Thank you. For the Patriots, would somebody like to take the floor? And it's not the case for the ECR, Renew, Greens, the Left, and the ESN. Anyone else who would like to take the floor? Then I please, Mr. Takkula.
Marco Tarquinio
Chiedo scusa, parlo ancora in italiano, presidente, grazie. Io credo solo una sottolineatura, condivido le preoccupazioni che sono state espresse dai colleghi che hanno preso la parola, soprattutto adesso da Sánchez Amor. C'è un punto che vorrei sottolineare. Credo che gli ultimi due scenari, quello del cane da guardia critica rispetto a una possibile involuzione autoritaria e quello della persistenza degli aiuti alla popolazione, sono due scenari concreti che dovremmo considerare connessi tra di loro e probabilmente necessari, persino indispensabili alla condizione che abbiamo davanti. Il grande interrogativo e la speranza per quello che riguarda il consolidamento dello Stato, l'auspicio che è stato fatto a più voci, riguarda il ruolo che l'Europa saprà giocare condizionando il processo in atto.
Io su questo non so se la ricerca che non ho avuto modo di leggere e di approfondire, se non per i cenni che sono stati diffusi poco prima di questa riunione, vorrei capire che tipo di valutazioni vengono fatte su questo, sull'incidenza di ciò che stiamo mettendo in campo, con anche qualche rischio che assumiamo a occhi aperti. Grazie.
David McAllister
Thank you. Anyone else who would take like to take the floor? Then perhaps to conclude, I also have a question, Mr. Daniel, and I'm going back to what Michael Gahler said. Now we all understand that the fall of the Assad regime undoubtedly represented a major setback for both Iran and Russia. However, influence doesn't disappear overnight.
So beyond the military dimension, to what extent from your point of view do political, economic, and security networks linked to Moscow and Tehran remain embedded in Syria today, and what should we as European Parliament be looking at to assess whether this influence is genuinely receding?
Back to you, Dr. Daniel, for up to seven to ten minutes.
Jan DANIEL
Perfect, thank you very much for excellent questions. I will try to cluster them and I will try to answer according to best of my abilities. Those are definitely not easy questions. I would start with the question about Russia and question about Iran. According to my reading and according to the views of our interlocutors and our interviewees that we basically interviewed for this study, the current Syrian regime knows that it still needs Russia.
And Russia can actually be a significant spoiler. And for the Syrian authorities, it actually makes much more sense to keep Russia currently as a partner than to alienate Russia and potentially let Russia to activate its networks on the ground, its networks among the coastal communities, the networks that it might use when it comes to disinformation and so on and so on. So that's the first thing, that Russia is perceived as a potential threat, but is also pragmatically perceived as a partner that Syria actually needs to cooperate with. Security is one thing, but it is important to note that Syria has been, Syria under Assad has been a partner of Russia or Soviet Union for several decades. And the infrastructure, the weapons that Syrian army used and all these let's say more technical things actually create a lasting dependency on Russia.
And that is not something that will easily go away. So the current regime is aware of that and knows that Russia can actually pose significant troubles if the current regime decides to act against it. This is my own reading. At the same time, Russians are good in providing this kind of limited support, but also in trying to establish themselves as potential let's say mediators when it comes to situation in the south of Syria, when it comes to relations between Syria and Israel and so on. These offers have not been picked up so far, but we know that Russia diplomatically is trying to use them.
Second, Iran. Iran is perceived much more negatively and is perceived as a threat by the current Syrian authorities. And according to our interviewees and according to our own reading, if Russia is perceived as a potential pragmatic partner, Iran and let's say the whole axis of resistance, meaning Iranian proxies and partners among the non-state militias, are hated by the regime. The lasting influence of Iran lies mostly in the area of let's say smuggling networks, in the informal economy, in or among actors who were once Iranian partners.
But as we know, the current Syrian government actually did act against what they call Iranian sleeping cells. They did act against the lasting Hezbollah networks. They did act against smuggling networks on the border between Lebanon and Syria, as well as on the border between Iraq and Syria. So, our interlocutors, when we specifically asked about this question, assessed that there is not much left from Iranian influence on the ground. But returning back to previous point, there is definitely still some potential disruptive influence that Iran wields.
Again, talking about the use of disinformation, talking about stirring sectarian tensions and so on. And I believe that Iran, once it actually is able to focus on this issue and once it serves its strategic interest, would be allow, would be basically able to use these instruments. Regarding the point of what should we actually do and if, or what we should actually do is one thing, but whether we are not expecting too much from our Syrian partners and whether we should, let's say, stay content with limited stability without necessarily pushing for inclusive governance. I believe that I, and on the basis of our study, I believe that Europe actually does possess quite significant leverage. The funding that the Europe provides is more reliable than the funding potentially provided by the countries of Persian Gulf.
It might come with strings attached, but when Europe decides that it will deliver some funding, it will realize some projects, it will actually do it, which might not be the case for, let's say, the partners whose involvement is less controlled by institutions and is less predictable. And I think that this is a point that the EU can make towards Syrian authorities and it is also something that is, that is in my, in my reading, a significant European leverage. At the same time, we did hear from our interlocutors that everyone basically, everyone except for Iran and in some form except of, except of Israel, actually does want the current Syrian government to succeed and to stabilize the country. So in this sense, everything, let's say, or the broader regional setting actually plays into, into favor of Syria. And that also opens, opens an option for Europe to actually be, if not tough on the regime, but at least to actually come with certain conditionality and to try to shape it according to the European interests.
And we believe that authoritarian regime without, without inclusive governance that leaves certain parts of society alienated, which leaves certain parts of society politically marginalized or economically marginalized, is actually not stable in a long term. It does, it does foster resentment, it does invite insurgency, it does invite armed uprising at some point if there are certain communities that are not satisfied with the current, current arrangement. And Syria, where civil conflict is ongoing or happening again, will not be a stable Syria.
What are the risks that we might be creating or what are the risks of European involvement? Going back to what I said previously, I do believe that we might empower the central institutions maybe too much. We might create a new clientelistic structures, we might create a new networks of patronage and we might support let's say new ruling coalition that does benefit from the external funds but that is not able to translate them into inclusive and sustainable economic growth across the whole Syrian territory. And going back to what I was saying before, this does not actually create conditions of sustainable and stable governance in the long term. I am not sure if I missed a question.
If you can please remind me if there was a question that I missed, I hope I tried to answer everything that I took a note of.
David McAllister
Okay, thank you very much. Any comments, any questions? But it's not the case. Mr. Daniel, thank you for being remotely connected with us. I'd like to also thank the other authors, Ms. Filippi and Mr. Stojar once again for their work and valuable insights and we look forward to reading this final paper in due time.
That leads us to the next item on our agenda which we cannot start now because we have guest speakers and the provisional time was foreseen for quarter past five. So I would adjourn now the meeting until shortly after five o'clock when we can come together and hopefully we begin. And it would be nice if some colleagues were actually present. We have rather high-ranking guests from the United Nations and hopefully it won't be an embarrassment. So five o'clock.
Okay, I was just informed five o'clock we continue and please inform the dozens of colleagues who are already having a nice evening.
Good morning, colleagues. I'm sorry for the delay, but we had some technical issues. I would like to welcome you to this meeting of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. I would like to welcome our guests, the representatives of the European Commission and the European External Action Service. I would also like to welcome the representatives of the Member States.
The first item on our agenda is the adoption of the agenda. Are there any comments on the agenda? I see no comments, so the agenda is adopted. The second item on our agenda is the approval of the minutes of the meeting of the 24th of October. Are there any comments on the minutes?
I see no comments, so the minutes are approved. The third item on our agenda is the chair's announcements. I would like to inform you that the next meeting of the Committee on Foreign Affairs will take place on the 7th of November. I would also like to inform you that the deadline for amendments to the report on the implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy has been extended to the 10th of November.
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