Committee on Security and Defence Ordinary meeting
Legend
Transcript markers
- text Sentence being played
- text Search result
- text Intervention cited by the link you opened
Click a sentence to play the video from that moment. Select text to quote it with the speaker, timestamp and link.
More options
Offset
Transcript offset
Export
Live capture
Versions of this video
Transcripts may differ slightly from one version to another.
SEDE European Parliament
Follow its sittingsFrançois Arbault
29 topics for an amount of grants of 921 million euros, almost a billion, that we have put to work by the EDTIB on developing whatever it takes to be ready to have a, let's say, a drone initiative that would protect us from threats. So very quickly, and I couldn't list all those topics here, but in 21, for instance, we asked the EDTIB to work on unmanned ground vehicles.
It was even before the war in Ukraine. In 22, we had five topics, I picked only one, underwater swarms of undersea drones.
In 23, seven topics, I just picked up tactical aerial drones for instance. In 24, we had seven topics, combat drones for instance. I don't come back on the four topics that we had in 25. And in 26, the calls for proposals are ongoing. We have asked the industry to work on mid-size autonomous vessels, episode two, because we have already a project that is working on that and we want to follow up with that project.
So you see, this is just to show that in perspective, there is a kind of continuity of the effort that we deploy to support those flagships.
Now, coming back to the EDF 24, which are the key facts that you need to keep in mind in terms of assessing whether we have a success here or not? We note a record interest from the EDTIB and the defense players, and the defense players, with more than 400 proposals submitted. That's an increase of 40% as compared to 2024, the previous year. So this is very, really a mounting level of interest from the EDTIB. We had 31 topics, only the thematic ones, because as you know, there are also open calls where basically promoters of projects can bring their own topic if they see it as relevant.
A lot of the proposals that we funded, we've funded, actually are coming from those non-thematic topics, which means that it is very much open and accessible to new players, SMEs, because they are not, you know, in the straitjacket of a kind of prescribed topic. They can come up with whatever they see relevant.
We in the end selected 57 proposals covering all the topics and also balancing development actions with research actions. You see that we have 1,033 participations of 634 unique entities. So there are more than 600 distinct entities that participated on a sole year in the program. In average, the projects are supported by an average of 18 entities covering nine Member States.
So it is very inclusive and this is something that we are tirelessly working on. Now, second set of key facts, SMEs. You mentioned that, Chair. So as I said already, out of the 634 entities, we count no less than 238, sorry, SMEs. That's nearly 40%.
In terms of participations, because of course a given entity can participate in multiple projects, we have 365 SMEs which are part of the projects that we are funding this this year. So it boils down to close to 400 participations by SMEs this year.
And it's interesting to see, you know, on the right hand side that not only those SMEs participate in their dedicated SME calls, but also, and that's the vast majority, in the more thematic calls, the you know, bigger tickets where you also have bigger players, primes. So it shows that it's not only about having some kind of money for SMEs, it's about supporting SMEs across across the board. Now coming back to I think what was your kind of special point of interest today.
How do these projects in 25 but also across the years support those flagships? And again, flagships are also very much echoing, you know, what Member States for instance understand to be the key priorities, what we probably also anticipate to be the subject matter of the EDPCIs which soon we are set to fund. So, taking for instance the angle of the Eastern Flank Watch. Just in 25, we had four projects for almost 200 million euros that we think are directly relevant to the ambition that is, let's say, embodied by the Eastern Flank Watch. Just a couple of examples.
ACHILE 2, to make the soldier's equipment much more performing, you know, smarter, lighter, more connected for collaborative combat. FAMOUS 3 brings the next generation of EU armored vehicles closer to final testing. Not, not research but really kind of testing.
And why FAMOUS 3? Because it's already the third iterations of that ambition that we are funding across the years. So again, testifying of the continuity of effort that is a constant preoccupation. LATACC 2 enables collaborative combat between crewed and uncrewed ground vehicles, but also to work together with airborne vehicles in real time.
So this is all about enabling collaborative combat, including by getting the support of uncrewed capabilities. Trident enhances, for instance, counter-battery capabilities, so the ability to accurately locate very quickly and respond to enemy artillery fire. This is only for 25, but as you see on the right-hand side, we have altogether more than 40 R&D projects which are currently at work for almost a billion euros and which we can connect to the eastern flank. And again, I don't go into the details here because it will take too long.
Now coming then back to the drone defense initiative. Again you see that only in 2025 we selected nine projects for 150 million euros that are all relevant to the drone defense initiative. And again I won't you know going lengthily into all these projects but they are working on for instance new types of autonomous affordable drones for attack but also surveillance purposes. We are trying to purpose to to apply technologies innovation to engines to drones requirements. We are also for instance supporting unmanned systems for land sea and air which can actually help identifying and actually supporting casualties.
SHARP is a very interesting project for instance, I think it will attract your attention. It identifies non-EU components in use in in engines and aims at eliminating basically dependencies from those components, you know, so that we are more autonomous. STRATUS is again aiming at protecting from cyber attacks, you know, unmanned unmanned systems. Space Shield, next next slide. Again, three projects, 140 million euros.
And again, you see three three projects which are highly relevant, you know, for instance to inspect, repair and support objects in in space.
Azimuth, Eureka is about building elements of computer chips which can be used in space systems. Spider 2, again, the follow-up of another project, is about affordable satellites to continue and intensify observation of the Earth from space. And again, there are more than 30 R&D projects which are working, 600 million euros that support the space shield in one or the other way, and again, I don't go into too many details. The air shield, same approach, five projects just for 25 for more than 100 million euros working on different, you know, hyper-relevant aspects.
For instance, how to better protect troops from attacking drones. ANIMOS on how to make sure that aircraft are sharing information to make quicker decisions. Ship radars, for instance, for better detection, you know, at sea. And again, I could go on for long, but I don't want to be too long. Altogether, from the portfolio of projects, we have more than 30 projects for 800 million euros that are working in support of air defense.
Maybe I can pick up two which are working, you know, in parallel to develop the interceptor of hypersonic missiles. And we know the relevance of that when we see the attacks via hypersonic vectors in Ukraine lately.
So, the next slide is about summarizing what I just said. So, the EDF 25 relevance to the EU defense flagships. Again, not only the flagships, but the overall ambition displayed by the EU member states. You see that more than almost 55% of the EDF 25 budget is allocated to 40% of the projects which are potentially supporting the flagships. This is done through a very large participation.
I mentioned that, but also broad geographic coverage.
This is very, very striking that there are really participants from all the countries that are in support of that. Of course, the participation level is still commensurate to the established, you know, industries and RTOs in the member states, but we see really a high level of inclusivity nonetheless. There is, of course, and we are relying on the strategic weight of the eastern flank and Nordic defense industry. They are participating more and more actively into our projects and that's very, very good news. And again, we are very much also relying on emerging, let's say, industry and technological bases.
And we see, you know, be it Estonia, Greece, Cyprus, those countries overperform, let's say, you know, they are boxing in a kind of higher league in the sense of, you know, the proactive approach to participation.
I'm almost finished. I just want to broaden a bit the scope before I close by saying that, of course, we are working in support of the flagships, but we do much more than that. And here, and you can of course have the slides, this is just a few examples of other aspects on which we're working, for instance, quantum computing, a project selected this year on paving the ways to quantum applications for cybersecurity or complex simulations, or for instance, DART, which supports new digital tools to connect together very complex military systems.
But it's also beyond the EDF itself, and that's my final words. You have to keep in mind that through the EDF, we are working on a final set of 50 prototypes at the end of the cycle of the EDF. We are already negotiating the final work program for 27 that will actually really support a capability needs of the member states in all operational domains. And some products, I want to stress that, are already in use by the armed forces, including in Ukraine. The last example maybe is on maritime, because we have no flagships on maritime, but just in the maritime domain, which we see, we know is very important, surface but also underwater, seabed protection, we have more than 20 projects which are investing 700 million euros of EU grants into, you know, higher capabilities in the maritime domain.
But of course, we have EDIRPA for common procurement, ASAP for ramp-up, EDIP coming, already calls are already ongoing for industrial reinforcement and common procurement, but also of course the EDPCIs are in the process of being submitted, so very soon we will see those EDPCIs and we can expect them to be very much in line with flagships. So this is what I wanted to share with you, to try to make it very concrete, to call on concrete projects to illustrate how we are supporting those collective ambitions displayed at EU level.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
Thank you very much. It sounds really good. And of course we will send you all the information. So we will now move to questions and answers in a ping-pong format, so you have the possibility to answer immediately. I will give two minutes for each coordinator question and two, about two minutes, it depends a little bit, for each reply.
And we start with Nicolas Pascual de la Parte.
Nicolás Pascual de la Parte
Thank you, Chair, and thank you very much for your presentation of the European Defence Fund's proposals.
I think that I have one across the screen question is concerning the multinational or European dimensions of the projects. It's something that we have been also discussing with SAFE. Many or some countries and some companies think that the funds are proof that the European Union is to build up their own national capabilities, which is not the case, but they continue to think so. And how do you make sure or how do you privilege the projects and programs which are presented by two or more countries and by or presented by two or more European enterprises across the border? Do you have some mechanisms or conditionality to privilege across the border projects?
And if so, which kind of conditionalities in order to make sure that we are creating a European technological industrial base, not national capabilities in 27 fragmented national markets, obviously.
And the second question is concerning the initiative, one of the flagship projects is the space shield. You have shown up, if I remind well, a couple four projects. One is led by France, one of them, and the other is led by Germany and Spain. They don't look to be very compatible, rather incompatible, and we are wondering how can you measure them or bring them together to fruition, both initiatives, the one led by France and the one led by Germany and Spain.
François Arbault
So, in to of course a very pertinent question. So, as we know, the EU is not a prescriber of the defense capabilities. This is for member states who are making sovereign decisions to define what they need. And of course, there is also European exercise, you know, led by EDA, where member states discuss what are their common priorities. That's the capability development plan, for instance.
And EDA very much also supports our work in the program committees. Now, we are basically asking industry to form transnational partnerships to develop together the capabilities that are response to the needs of the member states as sovereign states, but also as the EU because plugging different capabilities together is of course making a lot of sense. So, I would say that we are not prescriptors, member states still decide, but everything is made to create partnerships of transnational nature at the industrial level, the supply side. But of course member states discuss intensively the topics of each work program. It creates, it fosters a very intense discussion across member states on what is it that they need because when as basically every year since the beginning we have unanimity on the work program adopted by the member states, it means that they have compromised together on what they see as the most relevant item.
So we are both incentivizing with the EU grants the demand side and the supply side to speak together and and therefore I think it creates a virtuous effect.
Now indeed sometimes it can be that member states who are also very much called on co-funding the actions because in development as you know very well there is a requirement for member states to also co-fund the actions. As we get closer to market we want to make sure that member states are able to well want to acquire the results of the development so they have to show their commitment to that.
Sometimes it can serve their national, let's say, capability ambitions, but very often it's also the source of transnational ambitions. Just to pick one example, you mentioned space. We had Odin's Eyes. There have been two projects. It works on the early detection of, you know, missiles, early warning.
And now we see that, for instance, France and Germany are teaming up together to follow up on those projects that have been initiated by the EDF to actually develop the capability itself. So sometimes indeed it can be tricky discussions between Member States, but we are trying really to kind of foster, you know, some kind of commonality of ambition.
And for instance the I mentioned the endo-atmospheric interceptor of hypersonic missiles. We have two projects which are being developed, one under the lead of Spain, the other one of a French company. We are trying whatever we can to make sure that the follow-up will be a kind of common follow-up so that we are efficient economically and we are building a capability European-wide that is missing. But of course it takes a lot of discussion and we don't have all the levers, but we are trying to incentivize that cooperative approach.
Sven Mikser
Yes, thank you, thank you very much for a very detailed presentation. My question is going to be somewhat more general, but it needs some introduction. Obviously impressive amount of work has been done and is being done at the EDF, but the threat picture is also very rapidly changing and evolving. And so we are aiming at a moving target. And while we are inevitably moving closer to the targets we originally set out for ourselves, does it also mean that that we are moving closer to the target of of meeting the challenges as they are today?
Because we may have today, I mean, twice the number of some sort of defensive system compared to what we had five years ago, but if meanwhile the threat has grown threefold, then we are not necessarily going to be better defended. I'm as an Estonian, I'm very closely following and very much interested in the evolution of the flagship that has to do with the eastern flank.
Obviously, most of the projects you described are highly relevant to the eastern flank. But at the same time, we are seeing more frequent drone incidents. They are larger scale and actually more serious than they used to be. We are now nearing the completion of the defense simplification omnibus initiative. And part of that deals with the simplification of rules for the EDF projects.
So my question therefore is, do you think that what we have now achieved by way of trying to simplify these procedures, is it going to have any sort of substantive influence and positive influence? Will you be more flexible, more nimble, more ready to respond to this very fast-changing landscape, or are these changes more or less cosmetic? We are not in camera, but I hope that you can provide an honest answer to that.
François Arbault
Well, you depict indeed a very comprehensive set of challenges. I would say that, as you say, we need to do much more of everything and at the same time.
And on top of that, we need to reconcile the very short-term needs with the very long-term needs. We cannot, you know, sacrifice the future to the present. At the same time, we need to scramble to produce more of what we have already, but we need also to prepare the technologies of the future, the battle of the future, so it's a huge challenge. I think we are doing that in every possible way. We started with R&D and now you see this coming to fruition.
This is admittedly a bit more for the medium to long term, you know, the hypersonic interceptor. We need urgently to work on it, but we won't have it before a couple of years. So, but this is EDF and you see how it delivers.
Now we've done what? We've done also the ramp up of production capacity. We had ASAP, you know, that had helped to resolve the ammunition crisis. Now we are doubling down with the calls on EDIP, the industrial reinforcement action calls. They are open as we speak.
The first wave closes in on 16th of June. There will be another one closing in October, then in February 27. This is calling on industry to present projects of massive ramp up of production capacity of components, of explosive charges, whatever they need to irrigate the supply chains. Now we also do more on common procurement because this is about being more effective, ensuring embedded interoperability in whatever Member States procure together.
And again, we have calls under EDIP that amplifies the effort done under EDIRPA. Now, it takes also some governance effort and Member States also want to get organized themselves. This is very much the point of the EDPCIs. And again, they are coming our way. We had a request for submission of proposals that has closed very recently.
I cannot be very detailed today, but we are working on that. We can expect EDPCIs to be very much in line with the priorities identified in the nine CPAs or even the flagships. So, you know, we try to mobilize all the intervention logics.
Now, as you said, it's moving super fast. The example of our response to this speed is Agile. We have proposed, as you know very well because you are negotiating that new instrument that we've proposed, an instrument that is covering a bit of a blind spot that we have. Super fast, disruptive innovation at high TRL levels so that we face a problem on the battlefield, we ask the EDTIB to find solutions, possibly via startups, SMEs, and in a few months we give them a grant to test the validity of their idea. So, you know, we are, let's say, completing the panoply of tools from the very short term to longer term, but this is basically, I think, what it takes to be defense-ready and we can't wait.
2030 is just tomorrow, basically.
Speaker 9
A couple of points. Indeed, looking at, for example, the flagship priority concerning drone defense initiatives. I see many good suggestions what comes to engines, unmanned, and so on and so forth. But we, to my mind, priority is now protection, anti-drone protection.
And there is no most reliable, applicable European system. We are all suffering, I mean, from Estonia to Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and so on and so forth. My question is, is there money in the right mouth in this regard? So was any practical delivery, generally speaking, from all those 29 topics from starting from 21, which resulted in effectively applicable, usable anti-drones, European-built, European ideas developed anti-drone system?
So I want to see in one piece movement, heat, I don't know, noise-related recognition systems which might be, you know, now deployable, now deployable. I mean, not as we run around and we ask Ukrainians, I mean, to protect our space in order to feel a bit more safety in this regard.
And my second question is, you mentioned that among those projects, 410 proposals and 57 selected from 25. In average, nine member states are in coalition, in average coalition developing certain project. Speaking about those coalitions, what can you tell us more? Are those changing coalitions or they are more or less traditional as companies, probably countries know each other, mean know-how, kind of advantages, personal contacts? How those coalitions are formed and are they dynamically changing in order to pick up best possible and at the right time to be developed results?
Thank you.
François Arbault
Thank you very much. So on drones, indeed, we have to be, I mean, we know this is a massive game changer of conflictuality and the battlefield. So we have to be present on protection from drones, but of course also on and protection in the sense of protecting the populations, you know, detecting the drones, taking them down, but also but also using them to rescue, for instance, wounded soldiers, that's another example. We have many, many of the subjects that we mentioned actually are about, you know, taking down drones, for instance. And they are also, for instance, electromagnetic effectors, you know, lasers to actually take down drones or other type of, you know, all sort of projects are basically supporting taking down drones, also force protection.
So I can't list everything here, but happy to elaborate further in whatever way you see fit. But so we're working very much also on the protective dimension. Of course, all the ambition displayed on air defense is also highly relevant to this. And actually, I want to stress that the air shield, the drone initiative, the eastern flank watch, there are massive intersections between these circles, you see.
So there is a lot that we do on drones. Now, it's not only about R&D, as you say, but we are working, again, one billion euros invested since, you know, in the last five years on drones. So this is very relevant. But for instance, we have these industrial enforcement actions for which the calls are ongoing. This is about kinetic, you know, this is about components that can find their way into drones manufacturing.
This is about explosive charges, you know, for loitering munition, for instance.
So this is very short term. This is about multiplying by two, three, you know, capacity of production of installed, you know, producers to do to do much more. So this is this is very important. Last point also on that, and then I'm moving to the coalitions. I didn't mention it, but we have done a lot of things with the Ukrainians.
You know, immediately after the war, when Commissioner Kubilius came into office, he said, but we need to do more to tap the expertise from the Ukrainians that they are developing, unfortunately, by the combat experience. We've created Brave1, by which we are basically co-reflecting and developing with the Ukrainians, basically innovating devices, typically drones.
Now we have the Ukraine support instrument in EDIP. The calls are being opened and here it's about creating joint ventures, it's about co-investing with the Ukrainians to also learn very much from their experience. We've seen that the tide is reversing a bit. Now we have to learn from the Ukrainians and we have put the instruments in place to precisely learn from them and get also IP transfers and what it takes to also be combat ready. Now on the coalitions, the partnerships that underpin the submissions.
First, it's mandatory of course, you need to have at least three partners from different countries.
I think they are very much ad hoc in the sense that we see partnerships building up depending on the topics and who is best placed to actually contribute to a given project's expertise and know-how. Sometimes you take good habits, so you have partnerships that are formed and that continue to be successful over the years. That's why you have FAMOUS, FAMOUS 1, FAMOUS 2, just to, FAMOUS 3, just to quote the name of a project. We are very much nonetheless trying to make sure that there are no barriers to entry. For instance, we have the Info Days, a major event that we have each year in Brussels now, where you have thousands of companies and RTOs coming here.
We have matchmaking sessions live in at the Square here, but also, you know, online, we offer a platform for industries to say, "We want to be part of something, I mean, are there partners who would like to work with us?"
So this is very important and I think we are creating a lot of inclusivity by fostering in any possible way the transnational and multi, let's say, multi-form partnerships from small SMEs to more established, more established, you know, primes. It's about cross-fertilization between these different type of organizations. RTOs, of course, the research organizations, they get often forgotten, but they are very much, you know, in all the projects that we are, that we are funding.
Martins null
Thank you, Chair. I have also two questions and the first goes for European drone defense initiative.
I think that many member states have understood the importance of the air drones. They invested in air drones, in interceptors, in, in radar systems. Last week we were in a drone summit in Latvia. There were three interceptors who took down three Shahed-type drones in, in polygons, so it was really efficient and, and so on. What I am worried most is actually about this maritime domain, the, the naval drones in particular.
They can carry the 100 kgs of payload. They can sail for hundreds of miles in a sea and they can destroy any fleet or European fleet. But when I talk with the naval drone producers, they actually don't receive any orders from European ministries of defense. They deliver the orders to Ukraine. They produce naval drones for the Persian Gulf, but not, not for Europe.
Could you please comment, is the maritime domain and those naval drones also a priority? Otherwise, you know, this drone initiative works well for air, but not for the maritime.
And second about R&D. Basically the same problem. We invest a lot in R&D and there are so very lot of successful projects, but what they are missing are the procurements. And of course it's not up to Commission because you know, you give them possibilities and then this is Ministries of Defence who need to place the orders. But can we change something in conditionality in those projects in order to foster this problem?
Otherwise, all the drone producers I have met, they say there is no problem with the money anymore, the money is there, there is no problem with the technologies. What we are missing, we missing the procurements, at least to get first contracts. Thank you.
François Arbault
Thank you, thank you very much. Indeed, underwater drones are essential, but also warfighting, warfare under the sea, at sea and under the sea. The seabed protection is absolutely critical and of course we all have examples in mind. I would like to stress very much that, and I mentioned it, you recall that on the maritime, although it's not per se a flagship from the readiness roadmap, we see a lot of ambition being displayed. And actually it's quite, it's a low-hanging fruit because there are many, many data that are collected, you know, on the sea basins.
We need to be able to fuse that and to be more situationally aware of what's going on. But since the very beginning, we had this topic very much in mind, you know, for instance, already in '22, the second year of the EDF, we had a topic on underwater swarms of drones. For instance, in '24, we had mine sweeping via drones. Seabed protection is being a subject of the call that is ongoing.
We've done a lot. A very emblematic project is the notably Dutch and Belgium supported Miracle project, which is now really becoming an actual capability that is being deployed. And this is about really a game changer approach to the detection and elimination of mines.
Martins null
So just I don't talk about underwater drones, actually I talk on on-water drones, those that destroyed the Russian fleet in Black Sea for instance.
François Arbault
No, I think that you know, I mean very often when it comes to R&D we are not focusing on the let's say in the way this is phrased on the kind of end product, but I can I can tell you and I'm happy to come back to you bilaterally on the fact that there are a number of projects which are absolutely relevant to that. Now again, what we offer is all sort of tools for member states to invest in what they see as a top priority.
Now again what we offer is is all sort of tools for member states to invest in what they see as the top priorities so indeed it has been a game changer in in Ukraine with you know the Russian fleet being pushed back you know in out of the the the Black Sea. Member states you know have been given the means to invest in new capabilities with save the safe programs but is a lot in terms of you know let's say resources as you say it is available. Now it's for member states indeed to make decisions and actually we come to the second part of your question which is the procurement. We've done a lot to to foster so first on the R&D you're absolutely right and as I said the closer we get to development prototyping and testing the more we are demanding in terms of member states co-funding the action.
And this is even an eligibility criteria of the projects that are submitted to us. So you need to be able to submit on development to prove that there are a number of Member States that are following you and that commit to actually co-fund the action. What we see at times is that indeed that's where it's a bit suboptimal, that Member States struggle a bit to agree between themselves on the conditions of the co-funding.
Sometimes it's also a matter of who, what access they have to the action that they are co-funding, because sometimes they feel frustrated that the IP rights stay with industry. All this we are at work trying to solve. But indeed, you are absolutely right, it is essential that Member States procure what we have invested via the EU budget, and we are trying to foster that very much. Again, co-funding requirement is a possibility. I don't want to go technical, but you know that in the directive that you've adopted in 2009, there is an exception that says that if you have cooperated on the development of a capability, you are not subject to the procurement opening rules when it comes to actually procuring the stuff that you've developed together.
So it shows that it facilitates the procurement of the fruits of R&D. But indeed, there's much more that we need to do in terms of greater agility of the procurers. And that's probably be, that will be a subject of, you know, we are considering the, the let's say the review of the procurement directive. And this greater agility of the procurement agencies is something that we very much have, have in mind.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
Maybe next time we have to talk with each other in camera. I think we are public and sometimes it's, so the next will be Michael Gahler.
Michael Gahler
Yes, thank you very much for all that you illustrated here. I think the issues that have been addressed also by the colleague here are really relevant for me when it is, when the headline is how to reach readiness 2030. On the way, I really also identify the reality that we have existing industrial capacities that are not used. So, contrary to Russia, which runs three shifts, 24 hours a day, seven days a week, we have a lot of existing industrial capacities that are not running three shifts and seven days a week. And that is because the procurement is often missing.
So the question is of course can we with the instruments that we have encourage and privilege those who are simply quicker? I mean for me it is essential that we have an output that serves the purpose and then by the way I'm also not well praising myself oh we have so many SMEs. If they serve the purpose yes, but for me the real purpose is not to have so to say to promote a certain structure but again the output. So is there a mechanism, should we not have a mechanism that gives even more support to those who are simply quicker? And that would then perhaps encourage others who are lengthy lazy way handling things also to become quicker.
That is one thing, have we got a mechanism there? And then again on the this rapidly deployable European drone and counter-drone capability. In Ukraine, and it's good you explained how the Ukrainians are now telling us how to do things better. In Ukraine they are almost on an online basis with the frontline and updating things.
So is our initiative quick enough to to catch up with with the actual development? So are our procedures and mechanism not always so to say behind the real time where we are? So what is the mechanism to to always get the best things and the state of affairs implemented also for our purposes?
François Arbault
Thank you. Indeed, speed matters and more than ever before because we see the incredible acceleration of the innovation cycles on on the battlefield. Of course, we have to be fast in a way that is commensurate to the type of actions that we're considering.
So we have to be indeed faster and faster also in terms of delivering on the R&D actions. And indeed, you know, we speak on a daily basis to industrialists and research organizations and they admit that although complex systems do not, you know, shape up overnight, so, you know, when it comes to next-gen, you know, complex capabilities, it takes a few years and we need and we will continue to need those capabilities, of course. But still there is a general understanding that they have to be much faster and they are learning also from what they see happening in Ukraine. Now, we also have to be quicker in terms of, you know, allow me the expression, quick and dirty solutions.
And that's exactly, for instance, what we're trying to promote, to test, because it's a kind of test pilot with these agile proposals. If if our assumptions are validated, then we can imagine to amplify the effort under the next MFF. This is about really getting to the unsolved problems, to the solution at high TRLs level, powered up by by very short, I mean, small and quick quick grants. Of course, the quality of implementation and the speed is rewarded in the sense that, for instance, when we evaluate the projects in R&D, we look at the quality of the implementation, the seriousness of the plan. Now, again, speed has many different, let's say, aspects, but the industrial reinforcement actions, for instance, the, you know, ASAP was adopted on 20th of December, I think, last year.
The calls are already running. We have a first wave of calls closing in 10 days. And this will translate into investment into the productive apparatus. So we can hope to have, but then it's very much also the Member States. They have the money.
They can invest and they need to invest indeed to deliver indeed capabilities in the shortest possible timeframe.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
Thank you very much. So we have a few minutes left. Any questions? Okay, so thank you very much. Yes, please.
Nicolás Pascual de la Parte
Sorry, Chair, thank you very much for giving me the floor a second time. No, I have a question that perhaps I don't know if it is feasible or not. In order to learn what is going on on the battlefield in Ukraine and how quickly they develop the new technologies concerning especially the drone and anti-drone warfare, do you have anybody from the EDA detached in our two missions in Kyiv? In our mission, we have a special mission for security and defense and we have a delegation there. If not, would it be interesting for you to have firsthand news of how things are developing in the realm of drones, anti-drones?
Do you have some contact or if not, a detached official, somebody who is telling you how things are evolving in this particular field? Thank you.
François Arbault
I think we are very much on the ground in Kyiv and of course we're working in close cooperation with our, you know, delegation there. We have the EU Defense Innovation Office in Kyiv. That's the official name of that office that has been created. Commissioner Kubilius indeed decided that we have to be more present there. And this office is precisely meant to, you know, to articulate what we do already together with the Ukrainians because they are already part of, you know, the development of our new programs and action.
The Ukraine Support Instrument, for instance, is kind of co-developed with with them because it's about really about making the EDTIB and the Ukrainian industry to work together. But indeed, we attach a lot of importance to our presence there. And we are, for instance, we have the EU-Ukraine Industry Forum that takes place every year in Europe or in Ukraine.
It will actually take place mid-July this year and we will be there to, of course, to do whatever we can to accelerate the cooperation between our industries. But indeed, we have colleagues who are spending most of their time in Ukraine and in Kyiv to precisely make sure that we are really working 24/7 with the Ukrainians on industrial cooperation and innovation.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
Thank you very much. I'm sure we will continue and maybe also in camera if there are questions or is available to come here. Yeah, I think it's very important. So thank you very much and we will continue in two minutes. Our guests are already here and for the next point, the final item on today's agenda, the GLOBSEC annual battle readiness on the eastern flank.
So thank you very much.
So, colleagues, the next point and final item on today's agenda, the recent flagship publication by GLOBSEC entitled Annual Battle Readiness on the Eastern Flank. Please, colleagues, let's continue.
Everybody are interested in, I hope so. So, a warm welcome to Admiral Rob Bauer, Chair of the Globsec Advisory Board and former Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, as well as Martin Sklenár, Distinguished Fellow for the Future of Security Program at Globsec. First of all, let me congratulate you on the success of the 21st Globsec Forum in Prague. Please, colleagues. Thank you very much.
Shortly before the Prague Forum, Globsec published its annual report on battle readiness in the eastern flank, covering 10 countries from the Baltic to the Black Sea.
The report evaluates military capabilities, political decision-making, defense investment, and industrial capacity. The report represents the first comprehensive comparative assessment of how frontline states are translating political will and increased defense spending into real operational readiness. So, Admiral Bauer, Mr. Slena, I kindly invite you to present the main points of the report, in particular its main policy recommendations and the role of the European Union in strengthening defense readiness on the eastern flank.
Please share among yourself about 15-20 minutes presentation time. The floor goes to Admiral Bauer and then to Mr. Slena. So, thank you. Yes, it's okay. It's your decision.
Okay. So, thank you very much.
Martin Sklenár
Thank you very much. It's a great pleasure and honor to be here and talk about the work of GLOBSEC and what we do in bringing forward European defense as we do this together. Let me go very quickly through the presentation just to give you an idea. Obviously, I hope you know GLOBSEC, but if you don't, we're a global think tank based in Bratislava and Prague. And we're working towards enhancing security, prosperity, and sustainability in Europe and throughout the world.
And we do believe that we can influence, you know, the future by the ideas that we are trying to generate in our events and through our reports. More than 80 professionals from 10 countries work in GLOBSEC.
It's a really big organization. You see our offices are across the continent and also in Washington, Washington, D.C. And as Madam Chair, you mentioned, our biggest conference, the Prague Forum, just happened, it's 10 days ago, we're still a little bit, you know, in shock.
What I what I really want to to mention is the the European Defense Initiative that we are developing in GLOBSEC, which is also the overarching framework for our research on the on the eastern flank and on the on the defense industry in Europe. We do hope that the European Defense Initiative, as we are framing it, becomes a policy-shaping engine for bringing together the industry representatives and the policy makers, the stakeholders, in a public-private advisory hub to make sure that the discussion can take place on the strategic platform and discuss many solutions to the situations that we that we have.
We want to strengthen defense in Europe and we want to support Europe and we want to help you do your job and other stakeholders also theirs, enhance industrial resilience and become a credible driver of the defense technologies of the next generation that we all believe are very important for us to master to keep up with the developments. These are the core focus areas, you can guess them quite easily: defense industry, financing, innovation and dual use, obviously transatlantic defense industrial coordination and the supply chain resilience and value chain reform.
As mentioned, we have created an advisory board and Admiral Bauer has kindly agreed to be the the chairman of the board, but we have also Michael Johansson, the the CEO of Saab in a very nice partnership with Saab that we are developing. We have former generals, General Raimund Andrzejczak and General Chris Badia coming round as the now the Secretary General of ASD, but also previously working in in many positions including NATO ASG for defense investment and you know industry cooperation. I'll hand over to to Rob to to tell us about his motivation to be part of the of the advisory board and and what it what it does, please.
Rob Bauer
Madam Chair, thank you very much.
Ladies and gentlemen, as chair of the NATO Military Committee, I have seen how crucial defense production capacity actually is. And I warned the ministers of foreign affairs in March 2022, when every nation said that they were going to give away weapons to Ukraine, and I said to them that I think that's great news, but I think you will start doing that from half-full warehouses or even worse.
So, the next problem that we have to tackle, and this is now more than four years ago, is that we have to ramp up the defense production capacity. On 10 July, next 10 July, the full-fledged war against Ukraine will have lasted longer than the First World War. And I think it's important that we understand that because everybody wants war to be short, but the reality unfortunately is that they aren't. Now, not only does Ukraine deserve our unrelenting support, we must also do everything in our power to ramp up our own deterrence and defense. And we must do so quickly.
Not only because Russia is becoming ever more aggressive and frustrated because Russia is not losing this war in Ukraine, and Ukraine is not, Russia is not winning this war in Ukraine, and Ukraine is not losing this war in Ukraine.
So they are becoming much more frustrated by the day and that also will go more and more against NATO. But we have also to be worried because of the expanding limitless partnership between Russia and China. China is displaying more and more aggression towards its neighbors and it's helping Russia fuel its war against Russia to the point that Russia simply cannot continue the war without China and has effectively become a vassal state.
Now the nightmare scenario for NATO is that China will attack at some point Taiwan in the coming years and then China will ask or actually even tell Russia to keep the United States busy with a war on NATO territory. Russia is more and more a vassal state in that relationship with China. Now if we want peace, we need to prepare ourselves for war. And governments, industry leaders and investors are all waiting on each other to move first, holding each other in a chokehold. Now McKinsey calls this the 800 billion Gordian knot because there's an enormous amount of money available but still everybody is waiting for each other.
Now the initiative Martin was talking about helps us to break free and move towards strategic public-private partnerships. We have to move away from a contract between a client and a producer. And that has been the situation for too many years. We need to get together, the governments and the industry to solve these problems, otherwise we can't. Because while it might be the military that wins battles, it is actually our economies that win wars.
And with that I pass the floor back to Martin.
Martin Sklenár
Thank you. Thank you very much. So what we have done in our research, we wanted to see how the, you know, the Gordian knot, how the resources, how the increasing inputs are turning into output, especially on the, on the eastern flank.
Our DNA, our pedigree in GLOBSEC is deeply rooted in Central and Eastern Europe, so we wanted to see how this region is actually increasing its readiness. So we looked at the military situation, the military capabilities. We looked at the political readiness, political situations, and how does it affect the actual predictability of using the force that is increasing. And we wanted to look at the industry, which was the most difficult and challenging part of the assessment. And in the report, in the annual Battle Readiness Report, we were not able to measure the industry quite well.
So what we have done, we partnered with McKinsey and created like a little bit of a spin-off report on this, a small publication on how the industry is actually doing. And we asked almost 300 companies for their feedback, or we received almost 300 companies' feedback on how they perceive the situation in the industry. Because one of the lessons that we have found is that there is no good data to measure the defense industry in Europe, its capacity and how the capacity is increasing. So this is also something to consider for the future.
We called it the stress testing of the Europe's defense industrial scale-up and I'll briefly take you through the main findings. Obviously, it's not ramping up as quickly as we would need, as we would require given the state of urgency. The average backlog of orders that we came to is more than five years. So that means the companies, the primes, they have contracts to produce, I mean delivery times reach beyond the five years. It's an increase of 1.4 years since 2022.
The share of companies who actually experience disruptions in their productions is about half. About half the companies have problems delivering on the contracts that they have closed. And you see the breakdown in the domains.
But but yeah, half of the production is disrupted, is is delayed and and we are not getting the capabilities and capacities that we that we need. We asked what are the biggest bottlenecks. We expected financing to be number one, but it's number three. The biggest bottleneck is production inputs, especially skilled labor. The industry is struggling to get the people that they need to to produce the capabilities.
And then second, regulatory requirements. This is something that we are very happy to to talk about also in the European Parliament. There's an expectation that the regulations will be simplified and I know I understand there's already efforts going on in this but regulatory and production obstacles and bottlenecks are before financing which seems to be still a little bit of a problem or a little bit of a bottleneck but not on the scale of of production inputs. And especially at the level of primes finance is not no longer an option. I will show you later I'll come back to this oh no that's not the slide.
So it seems like the primes have the backlog of orders and they get the pre-financing, but they don't push the finance down the supply chain. So the tier two to four suppliers have a little bit of a problem to invest into production capacities and increase the speed of production, which is something to consider also in your discussions. This is a very busy slide, but it basically gives you the calculation of every euro that is spent in Europe on defense brings basically almost two euros, 1.5 up to 1.9 euros of value into the European economy. So if you spend 84 billion, which is the spending on European equipment, then you get 150, 162 billion worth value in the European economy.
This is a year, right? So that's a, that's an argument for, for spending on European defense for the sake of the European economy, not just the European defense. Our recommendations for governments are that they should accelerate the contracting for new capabilities and establish faster regulatory and testing processes, mobilize and upskill defense labor force.
This is critically, critically important. We have recommendations for primes and suppliers. But I'm not going to go into them. We're happy to share the reports. You can read them.
But they mostly pertain to making sure that the money is available not only at the tier one or the prime level, but also at the other tiers and making sure that cross-domain partnerships with industry like automotive and others bring in not only the capacity, but also the skilled labor that is necessary for defense production. I'll stop here, Rob, if you want to add on industry. I think this would be very, very good.
Rob Bauer
I think when I, Madam Chair, thank you. When I started as chair of the military committee and thought about are we solving the problem by strengthening the armed forces as is now being done with the three and a half percent? And then basically the conclusion was no, because we don't have an industry that can actually respond to a peak demand signal.
And that's the result of efficiency thinking. Just in time, just enough is basically the driver of every industry in Europe. We've seen with the pandemic, we've seen now with the war, that these industries cannot deliver to the peak demand signal. And so that is one problem that we have to solve. And we are in year five of this war.
And we haven't, we're still talking to one another. First, is it necessary?
Second, is it ethical? Thirdly, is it against the sustainability goals? And ladies and gentlemen, it is necessary. The choice has been made for us by Russia and to a certain extent by China. So there is no choice, that's one.
Second, are we doing this fast enough? No, we don't. Can we do it? Actually, yes we can. We have the money, we have everything, but we need to focus and we need to prioritize.
And I think what we have come to realize in Europe especially is that we had free security for 40, 50 years. We had free goods from China and we had free oil and gas from Russia and all three are over.
And that's why Europe is now panicking in a way because we understand suddenly that on all these three topics we have to do more ourselves. And it will cost money and we will have to explain to our citizens that that will be to the detriment of something else. And it is your job as parliamentarians to explain this to the citizens and to explain why it is necessary. And really I want to talk about this much more in response to your questions.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
Yes, I'm sure there are questions. Thank you very much and be sure that we working here and in the national parliaments, we try to explain the public, really to explain it sometimes and the most times the problem of the governments who are not tough enough to do it because they're anxious because we have election and you know. So anyway, I will now give the floor to the members for their questions, starting with the coordinators, two minutes and maybe you could answer immediately for two minutes so that we have a kind of ping-pong and we start with Nicolas Pascual de la Parte from EPP.
Nicolás Pascual de la Parte
Thank you very much, Chair. Thank you very much for your presentation of this thing.
It's very positive your statement that you can change the world if you bring together the right stakeholders. Wonderful. I hope so that you can change the world. Well, but I think that before going about the lack of speed to ramp up the military capabilities, we have to make a previous reflection. We don't have an strategy and that's why it's very difficult to mobilize our military capabilities.
Putin marched into Ukraine in February 2022 because Europeans, either in NATO or in the European Union, we didn't have a credible deterrence strategy. As simple as that. Should we have had this credible deterrence strategy, Putin would have not marched into Ukraine.
But still, do we have this strategy today? No, we don't. Then it's not only to talk about ramp up capabilities. It's necessary to have two things. First, a peace plan for the end of the war in Ukraine, a European peace plan, not an American one, because the Americans are dissociating themselves, apparently.
Do we have as Europe a European peace plan together with our friends in Kyiv to put on the table vis-à-vis Russia as European Union? We don't. But second, do we have a plan of an strategy vis-à-vis Russia once the weapons are, I mean, once we have a truce, a peace eventually? What kind of relationship we are going to have with Russia? Isolation?
Confrontation? Critical dialogue?
Engagement? Containment? What? If we don't know what we're going to do with Russia, it's very difficult to mobilize capabilities. In the Cold War we had containment and we prevailed.
We prevailed. Now what we are going to offer our military and our politicians if we are not able to have a strategy? And you are in the best position to start thinking about that. Perhaps we don't have time here because, but you should. And the, if the second question, who is financing you?
Thank you.
Rob Bauer
Okay.
The financing question will go to Martin. I do not agree with you that we didn't have deterrence, that we don't have deterrence. We have deterrence. NATO deterrence worked. NATO deterrence is not to save the whole world from being attacked.
That's not what NATO is for. NATO is not the policeman of the whole world. The fact that Ukraine was attacked has nothing to do with the fact whether deterrence in NATO worked. It worked. The Russians have not attacked us.
And it's sad that the Russians attacked Ukraine. Of course, that's true. And they shouldn't have. And the reason why Russia attacked Ukraine was because they were afraid and are afraid that Ukraine is moving towards a democracy. That's the only reason.
So first, that's one.
Second, there is a strategy. And that started in 2018. There is a new NATO military strategy. As a result, all the military plans from the strategic level to the operational level to the tactical level have been changed and updated to basically deter and defend against the Russians.
Those plans have been agreed by the government leaders in the different NATO summits over the time and then the final decision was taken in The Hague on the capability targets which is actually which capabilities in terms of weapon systems do we need, sensors and weapon systems and ammunition do we need to deter and defend against the Russians in the three regions that NATO has defined which is in the High North and the Atlantic Ocean as one region commanded from Norfolk in the US, central region commanded from Brunssum in the Netherlands and the south of Europe commanded from Naples including the Mediterranean and the Black Sea.
So we basically now know exactly what we have to do to deter and defend against ourselves. Then we now know exactly what we need to be able to do that in terms of numbers of personnel, military personnel, and the capabilities. And the capability targets in the Hague was the shopping list per nation that was agreed with NATO, including the agreement between NATO and Spain to the capability targets.
So Spain has agreed to buy the things on the capability targets list. But Prime Minister Sánchez made it clear that he thinks they don't need the 3 and a half percent to buy that, which I think is not correct. But Spain will actually be followed in terms of, like all the nations, in terms of are the nations going to buy the things they have agreed to. So there is a strategy, it's maybe different strategy than you were talking about, but there is a military strategy that is about collective defense of the alliance again. And so I do not agree there as well.
I do agree with you if you meant there was no strategy with regard to how do we respond to Ukraine.
The term was and is until today, we are supporting Ukraine for as long as necessary. That's not a strategy because we can't answer the question to do what, to what end. Now, there's some reasons why that is sort of understandable why it didn't happen that way. But so it is, there's not a strategy to have Ukraine win or to have Russia lose. That's true.
I agree with that. But it's rather late to change that. And I don't think there's a political agreement possible on that area.
Thank you very much.
Martin Sklenár
So Globsec, we're here representing the security and defense part of the Globsec research and work. But Globsec has five different streams on geotechnology, on economy and business, on democracy and resilience, on security and defense, and on global European affairs. All of them combined a lot of research and for each of the research we are looking for partners. Some of the projects, some of the work, some of the research is financed by the kind of institutional grants and financing that is available after, you know, the crisis that has been developing in this regard. But most of our work is financed by partnerships with private companies from, you know, energy sectors, defense sectors, infrastructure and others.
And just one sentence on the what relationship do we have with Russia after whatever happens in Ukraine. Well, the Russians have answered that for us. I mean, they have shown us that no matter how the conflicts end up, they will be always looking for more aggressive actions. Since even before Georgia in 2008, we have seen that there's this pattern of aggressive actions followed by a time for regrouping and rearmament and then looking for another opportunity even closer to European or EU territory.
So this is what we should expect. I don't think that the relationship with Russia will ever come back to the same kind of, you know, very idealistic and naive basis that we have had previously.
Sven Mikser
Yes, thank you very much. Two questions. First, the issue of deterrence. I think that it's sort of always partly a philosophical issue, but it's nonetheless highly relevant to how we build up our defensive posture. The concept of deterrence presumes that your adversary is to a degree at least a rational actor, that he makes a sort of calculation, assesses the potential wins against the cost.
And for years, I think there was a sort of understanding in the in our capitals that that the useful lesson is the Afghanistan war and the Russians took around 15, 16,000 killed over the period of 10 years and that was too much and they left. And now they've taken several hundred thousand casualties and they are still they still keep going.
So one interpretation is that it might have been a sort of strategic mistake or miscalculation on their behalf. They did not expect such a level of casualties. But even if it was a sort of miscalculation, it still presents us with problems when we when we build our sort of deterrent mathematics. So how do we how do we as should we assess the the cost of deterrence or the the amount of casualties that Russians are are going to be ready to take for any aggressive move against a NATO ally or an EU member state? That's the first question.
And the second one, obviously we all share your concerns about the slow ramp-up or the slowness of the ramp-up of the industrial production. But one of the issues is that our adversaries, the Russians, they are at war and we are not. They have switched to war economy, we have not. And in wartime, the attrition is enormous and the turnover of material is very, very big. And when we ramp up our production, obviously there is a lot more to be donated to Ukraine, but nonetheless, we are not at war at the moment.
And when the Russians and the Ukrainians for that matter, when they produce say six million drones per year, that means that they produce around 100,000 per week.
And they innovate as they go. And the drones that are going to be produced next week are going to be used up by the week after. And these lessons learned have been taken aboard, and the next generation comes up in a few weeks that is already sort of different. They don't produce into warehouses as we are to a much, much larger degree. So how do we address that?
How can we speed up in such a situation our own innovation cycles so as to match that of a party that is already actively at war?
Rob Bauer
Let me start by the deterrence. And of course, there's a psychological end to it, because it is about making sure that your opponent believes that they cannot win.
That's basically what deterrence is about. And for 76 years so far we have been successful. Which is in itself quite amazing as NATO. But the question now is are we on the right trajectory to continue to do that given the war economy of the Russians, given their public statements that they have sent to NATO in December 2021 when they told NATO we want the buffer states back. So we know that this will not stop when the war in Ukraine is over.
And therefore we are on a trajectory of a conflict with Russia.
We are. And if people think we are not at war, I would argue we are partially. We are at war in cyber. We are at war in disinformation in the last couple of years. So it is rather naive to continue to believe that we that it is peace in Europe.
And things are changing. Not in the right direction for us. Now everybody's holding on to the fact that we are not at war in a in a judicial way, in a traditional judicial way.
But in many ways I think we are. And I think we should prepare ourselves for it. And deterring deterring against war is is a difficult skill. It's it's not it's not it's not pure mathematics. It's also psychology, etc.
So that's one. And if you talk about hundreds of thousands of Russians killed, it is actually 1.3 million killed and seriously wounded. An amazing amount of people where if we would have probably a hundred a week, we would have a serious debate in all the parliaments in our nations. So yes, there is an opponent that is willing to have a tremendous amount of people in its own nation to die.
For what? And so therefore we need to prepare ourselves because that might happen to us as well. And I think it is therefore and and you said it's a strategic mistake. Yes, I agree. Strategically the Russians have lost this war because they haven't achieved any of their strategic goals.
Not one. Now secondly about the war economy. One of the reasons why the Russians are not interested to stop the war in Ukraine. By the way, if the Russians stop the war in Ukraine today, pack their gear and go home, the war is over. If the Ukrainians stop the war today, they have lost their country.
That's the difference. So if people say why is Zelenskyy not stopping the war, well actually if he does he loses his country. So that's and because the Russians continue to fight, the Ukrainians have to continue to fight. That's the difference. Now there's three reasons why I believe Russia is not interested in ending this war.
One, because he has a war economy. If the war's over today, he has no economy which adds any value to his nation. Secondly, he hasn't achieved any of his strategic goal.
He doesn't even have the Donbas in the Luhansk region, for which he's fighting now 12 years. And thirdly, there's 700,000 Russian soldiers in occupied Ukraine. And if the war is over, they come home and they will cause a lot of problems in their own nation, because they don't get the higher pay, they're traumatized, they don't get the help they will need after the war, and therefore it is a huge problem for Russia. As we know that when the Russian, the Russians retreated from Afghanistan, the rise of crime in Russia was primarily caused by the returning military.
So the Russians are not, do not see any incentive to stop this war. And therefore, but we know Putin actually needs a war to continue his autocracy because the message that he sends out is that we are a danger to them. Now if we are a threat, NATO, to Russia, they should have responded completely different to the accession of Finland. They didn't send one soldier to the Finnish border. Not one.
So he knows we are a defensive alliance and not an offensive alliance.
Speaker 24
Merci Madame la Présidente. Merci Messieurs, Amiral. Je vais m'exprimer en français. Merci Messieurs. Il me semble qu'il y a un grand absent dans la discussion générale, ce sont les États-Unis et leurs priorités.
Et en l'occurrence, leurs priorités ne sont pas sur le flanc est de l'Europe aujourd'hui, mais je vais y revenir dans ma question. Mais tout d'abord, pour revenir à votre rapport général que j'ai lu, j'ai pu consulter avant de venir en commission, et tout d'abord, il fournit un panorama assez complet au niveau statistique, des données, l'analyse aussi des enjeux industriels bien sûr, mais aussi vous revenez sur les enjeux sociétaux, politiques, institutionnels aussi.
Et ça, je pense que c'est important dans nos réflexions d'avoir cette double vision de la dissuasion aussi, à la fois les budgets, les dépenses, les capacités militaires, mais aussi la la résilience de la société, la la motivation, la volonté, etc. C'est des enjeux très importants.
Autre enjeu, j'ai particulièrement apprécié la discussion politique plus générale, mais vous le dites très clairement, que la crédibilité de la dissuasion se construit d'abord nationalement et ensuite produit des effets collectifs. Et vous avez une formule pour dire que la dissuasion sur le flanc Est ne commence pas à Bruxelles, mais commence dans les capitales nationales. Voilà, ça je pense que c'est aussi un élément important. Mais c'est peut-être pour ouvrir le débat et me permettre une critique d'ordre général, mais sur la nature même du rapport ou des discussions que nous avons, c'est qu'il n'y a à aucun moment dans le rapport, par exemple, une remise en question, on va dire, du cadre stratégique général et notamment le fait de tenir compte du désengagement américain en Europe sur la partie conventionnelle bien sûr, mais et donc toutes les répercussions sur la notion de défense collective en Europe, sur la notion de dissuasion au niveau conventionnel en Europe et notamment sur le flanc de l'Est et ce que ça peut représenter comme conséquences pour la préparation des forces européennes.
Pourtant la réorientation américaine s'accélère. Pas plus tard qu'hier, le département de la défense américain a officiellement annoncé par un communiqué de presse et aussi auprès de ses partenaires européens la révision de la contribution américaine au NATO Force Model et la direction vers ce que Elbridge Colby a appelé le NATO 3.0, l'OTAN 3.0.
Et donc ça, ça a des conséquences très concrètes sur nous Européens, à l'ouest comme à l'est, là je ferais pas de distinction, qui va être la façon dont on va devoir repenser la stratégie de nos forces avec les moyens, de plus en plus de moyens purement européens et de moins en moins de moyens américains. Et donc ça, je voulais, c'est la question ou le débat que je voudrais ouvrir, comment vous incrustez ça, comment vous intégrez ça à l'évaluation, au rapport que vous faites, qui part plutôt d'une position où l'OTAN va rester la même avec les mêmes objectifs capacitaires. Voilà, comment vous intégrez ces évolutions stratégiques qui sont à mon avis incontournables et qui ne vont pas changer dans deux ans ou dans trois ans. Merci.
Martin Sklenár
Well, thank you very much and I'll answer in English if that's fine. But I skipped the part, I don't know if we can get the presentation back on the screen. I can show the slide on this and thank you very much for making some of the points that we want to make sure that the report also brings. I mean, this is the part where we looked at the military readiness and the military capabilities.
And I want to wait for the for the last piece of of data. I mean this is the data you can find in the report so I'm not going to go through this. But this is the this is the most important conclusion that we have. This is a report about the eastern flank. The eastern flank countries don't have the physical military strength to compare with Russia and Belarus on the other side.
This is the case. This graph this chart basically for me is the is the main case for collective defense in Europe and especially on the on the eastern flank. If you see the the greenish or whatever the color is the grayish columns are the are the Russian forces and and the purple ones are the are the eastern flank countries that they can they can provide.
Which is uh by by pure comparison like that, this is the case for collective defense and for collective defense of all everybody in in Europe, in the European Union, in in NATO. And uh and I understand this engagement question of the of the US, but uh the US recalibrating their their presence in uh in Europe has so many angles, right? I mean, uh on one side they are trying to uh withdraw some of the conventional forces, but on the other side they are they're having a discussion with uh countries also uh in this room about the potential uh new dislocations of their nuclear weapons, so you know, adding to deterrence in uh in that sense. And but the the recalibration doesn't mean that there's less uh capabilities for collective defense uh in uh Europe as we have heard.
I read a piece of news today this morning, so maybe it was a meeting yesterday where NATO HQ representatives, I'm sorry, NATO command representatives say that, you know, there are specific capabilities that the US is thinking about withdrawing, but the European nations are actually close to a level or will be very very soon at a level to be able to fully replace them. So the collective defense as it stands, I mean, the requirements will be covered and there shouldn't be any any gaps in the in the force posture even with changes in the NATO NATO force force model.
If I can add?
Rob Bauer
Yes, to start off with, it's fascinating when people talk about the Americans disengaging from Europe. I think Europe disengaged from the US for more than 30 years by not doing what they promised for 30 years. So that's one. So I'm glad at finally we have the The Hague summit capability target agreement. And what that is about actually is that this is what the US was doing in NATO, this is what Canada and Europe were doing, and the agreement in The Hague was about getting it to this.
Now if we do what we have promised, if we do what we have promised, then Europe is becoming more capable and in numbers but also in quality and types of weapon systems that now only the US has. And the US has to reprioritize because of China, because everything we see in the world is about the tectonic plates of power that are shifting.
And if tectonic plates shift, you have earthquakes, and if the tectonic plates of power do that, you have conflicts and wars. And this is about rebalancing power in the world between China and the US, not Russia. So, and that will go on for another 10, 15 years before there is a new balance. I'm convinced of that. So we will be living in an, in a, in an uncertain world for a longer time.
And that's why we need to ramp up our deterrence. That's why we have to increase our weapon systems, etc.
Now, so if we do what we have promised, we allow the US to reprioritize in numbers of forces and in the weapon systems that they might need somewhere else. So it is up to us to deliver on that promise that was made a year ago.
And if we do that, then we allow the US to stay in NATO and to actually do what it also has to do. And NATO as a whole becomes more capable because if we do now to do this, it means that the things that the US still has might also be used for NATO. And so, and that's why I talked about this scenario where China attacks Taiwan and Russia then will be told to attack NATO because it will force the US to be on both in both conflicts. NATO is not going to leave NATO. They're not.
A stable Europe and a secure Europe, a stable and secure Arctic and a stable and secure Atlantic Ocean is in the interest of the US. But they have other problems that are mounting and therefore they need to get things out of Europe. If you know that the US brought in 25,000 troops more into Europe in 2021 under the Biden administration because of the looming war in Ukraine. So if you now hear 5,000 troops out of Germany and or Poland and it became or and then now Trump sends more troops to Poland which is basically to repair what Hexset has said. Because Hexset took out troops from Poland as a result of Trump's remark on Germany and Poland is a valued partner from the US and so it was a mistake.
Now Trump will never say sorry so he said we're gonna send more troops to Poland. But in essence it was to correct the mistake of Hexset.
Now that is 5,000 troops maybe less in Europe, but then still it's 20,000 more than they actually need to have in NATO. So the US is talking to its allies about the withdrawal of forces in a controlled and responsible way.
That's why it's good we have a Supreme Allied Commander Europe who is an American. And he is still positive about this. He said yesterday or this morning, no, yesterday I think, in a press conference, Article 5 is ironclad for the US. The US ambassador was with all the other ambassadors with the Secretary General in Kyiv yesterday. So the US is still with us.
And whatever you read on Truth Social is not necessarily the same as what the US as a country is doing.
We shouldn't respond to every piece of red meat that Trump throws into the arena. There is a stark difference between what the US as a nation is doing and what Trump is saying. And if you look at Congress, there is a huge support for NATO across the aisles and amongst the American people in polling it has shown that the support for NATO is going up. So there is, we have to be careful not to break something that isn't broken. Yes, Europe has to do more in NATO.
And actually that was agreed in the Hague with the capability targets. So let's agree to do what we have promised, then we solve these problems.
Lucia Yar
Yes, thank you, Chair. Thank you both for being here. Mr. Martin Sklenár, also, I don't know if he was introduced at the beginning, he is a former Minister of Defence in Slovakia, one of the finest minds on security in Slovakia, so I just wanted to stress that. And with Gabriel Bauer, we were sitting in a panel the previous week where we had a little bit of a small clash of understanding of how much the US is withdrawing, how big of a reliability there is still towards the US.
So I, but I didn't want to talk about this. I wanted to talk about the public-private partnership that you are presenting and I'm very curious about how this project, this item will be addressing the realities because in the morning of this committee today, we had a discussion because we're slowly closing the omnibus files while addressing basically the bottlenecks that you've mentioned, production inputs, especially regulatory requirements and the finance that's somewhere else in the safe.
But I think the European Parliament is really doing its utmost for what we can do. We have a push from the defense sector, we have a push from the European Parliament, we even have a push from the citizens on doing more, so there is no discussion on that. But the realities of the governments, of the protectionist nature of the politicians in certain countries, this is realities which we also from the European Parliament side are facing at those dialogues, at those negotiations. And it is very heavy to convince countries like France, like Germany, even though being the flag bearers of the European unity and security, to do more and to maybe give up on certain prerogatives that they have.
So I wonder, and the question is how this strategic public-private partnership will be helping to convince governments more? What didn't we do yet that we could?
Martin Sklenár
Thank you very much for the for the question and uh yeah on the on the partnership this is what we see. The we you know we talk about the bottlenecks we talk about how we want to make sure that the industry is ready how to increase its capacity and especially when we talk about the innovation and technology we talk about the new relationship that needs to be in place between the governments as the customers and the and the industry right? But we rarely get into like what is the new relationship what is it really means and we hope to help define the relationship in a way. This might be a weird case for a couples therapy I don't know but you know you have to define the relationship then for between the industry and the and the governments anew because that's what is that's what is necessary.
Right now the governments are procuring and working with the industry from a point of view that they are somebody else, they are not part of the government, they are not part of the defense, they are the producers, they are there to to deliver on whatever are the you know the the stipulations of a contract. And and I'm not going to go into the history like what is the what is the tradition and what is the you know what is the what is the setup of the industry and how capable are they. But that has to change with the with the technology and especially with the with the advancements and innovation that we see coming from the Ukrainian battlefield. We also see the new relationship between the industry and the and the end user and the you know and the customer. The industry is right there with the soldiers.
The industry many times in Ukraine is the soldiers, right, who are producing the drones, they are innovating the drones, they are adjusting the drones to exactly the kind of tasks and and roles that they need them that they need them to do.
But they are in war, they have a, you know, in a way a simplified situation. I mean, it's tragic, but it's, you know, it's a situation where they can act much quicker than we can on our side. And yes, thank you very much for all the effort that the Parliament is doing in bringing through the omnibus legislation and everything that speeds up processes and brings more capability and capacity is welcome.
But we also have to get to a stage, especially with technological companies and companies in Europe, that we create a relationship that delivers the best possible production from the company for the customer. So the customer doesn't buy a product, the customer buys the innovation, buys basically a relationship with the company that delivers whatever they are, the best possible thing, the best possible product that they are able to deliver in the time when it will be necessary. This might be, imagine this like a drone company or an AI software producing company where you buy the relationship and then you basically use it in a small scale and scale it up quickly when it's necessary in a matter of weeks, because that's what we see is necessary.
And we want to make sure that the the platform that we are creating helps practically to deliver or to define this kind of relationship between the customers and the and the industry.
Rob Bauer
Please. I do remember the panel we were on together, so that was that was great in in in the Prague summit. So governments are protecting their industries indeed, and I think for the wrong reasons by now. Because in times of austerity with all the budget cuts, it was sort of understandable because they didn't make enough and therefore you protected your own governments to stay alive basically. But now there's so much money floating around, 800 billion available for all these factories.
Rob Bauer
So I'm not talking about closing any factory, but I would say, you know, we need to use the same standards, NATO standards. We need to go to joint procurement and as a result we will create a long-term demand signal, which actually is one of the questions from the financial world when it comes to investing in defense industry.
So that will then happen logically, that will follow. So don't close any factory, but start making the same. We are producing in Europe 178 different weapon systems versus 35 in the US. So we can get much more money out of bang out of the buck if we go to less different to less different systems. We need to go reduce the different number of systems, different tanks, different ships, different submarines, different everything.
So that is something where the where the Parliament might play a role in pushing the governments to do that. And the one the other thing I would like to say, everybody's talking about drones, it's very sexy to talk about drones every day now. Drones themselves are not the innovation, it is the AI, it is the software, much more than how you get more out of sensors and how you get more out of weapon systems. But we have to also understand and Ukraine is an amazing example.
Don't get I I fully agree. But NATO will not necessarily fight the Russians the same way as Ukraine had to.
We will fight the Russians differently. We will on the first day attack the drone factories in Siberia. If we're smart. And that's where we're going towards with the deep precision strike also part of the capability targets. And Ukraine was unable or was not allowed to do that.
So we will fight the Russians differently. So therefore it is about a mix of the high-end expensive sophisticated weapon systems, lower numbers, but also as a result of a lesson out of this war, a higher number low-cost weapon systems to defend yourself against low weapon systems the opponent uses in an attack.
Martins null
Thank you. Yes, to choose the right treatment first we need to establish the correct diagnosis and this is what your think tank is doing so thank you for your work. If I understand correctly what you said this we have some like chicken egg problem. The money is there, the governments procure more, but the lead time is very long, it's 5.2 years, and what they say to the industry: ramp up the production, produce more. While what industry says, they says: well, we need some long-term guarantees because if we will open like few more plants and then in five years you will stop procuring, then, you know, we will waste the money.
And I really don't get it because what kind of long-term guarantees they really need? Because everybody know that for next 10 at least years there will be more and more money into defense. So probably you can help me to understand this conundrum. And second, my question is, you said that government should mobilize and upscale the defense industry workforce.
What do you mean by that? Because, you know, what Russia did, they increased or tripled the salaries of the workers who worked in the defense industry. So many people from the other industries fled to this defense industry, and that's how they solved the problem in very short term. But here in Europe, we can't say to Rheinmetall, please triple the salaries to your employees because you need to ramp up the production. This just doesn't work like that.
So could you please explain me a little bit more what was meant by this? Thank you.
Martin Sklenár
Certainly. Thank you very much for the questions. What guarantees do they need? The only guarantee that they accept is the contracts.
And we thought like they have the contracts. The 5.2 years of backlog is an average. There's companies who have an eight, nine, 10 years delivery times right now, right? So it's different across the across the market. I think the misunderstanding or lack of awareness is that the situation, the security environment has changed so profoundly that some understand and some don't, that the demand for increased military capabilities or defense articles in general will be high for the foreseeable not even 10 years but several decades.
Not only to continue supporting Ukraine, but also restock in Europe, increase the level of capabilities that are necessary because the lessons from the battlefield show that you need, you know, a higher number of days of supply of ammunition or anything, your stocks need to be really at a different level for the kind of conflict that you should be, you know, expecting right now based on the experience from Ukraine. So, but the defense industry are companies who are dealing in a very specific situations. They have a very limited number of customers, they are very careful about making investments that they have to be also able to explain to their shareholders, you know, and others to make sure that...
Well, that's what it seems, right. But what we also want to make sure that the report highlights is that there's for for the capabilities and for the capacities to scale up, it's not only necessary to have contracts with the primes because that's how we do business in the defense, but it's also important to push the signal towards the the lower levels.
Martin Sklenár
That's where the capacity actually is created because the suppliers can produce more and then the primes can integrate, you know, and they can actually deliver faster. Because if we keep doing this, then the demand will be or the contracts will just add up and the delivery times will be longer and longer, which is a very good situation for, yes, the main companies who can plan out their work for a longer period of time and they get more stability and predictability, but it doesn't fit with the urgency that we feel is necessary now in the environment.
Yes, I mean, we have to look for different solutions than Russians, even though I take the point, learning from the enemy is something that we have to do, not only from Ukraine, but also from the enemy. So, but there's an opportunity. There is a lot of skilled labor in Europe in different domains, and I already mentioned automotive, but also other kinds of manufacturing that can be, there can be partnerships created and the workforce can be upskilled or, or, you know, transferred also to the defense industry. We have seen this happening. We have concrete examples of, you know, for example, KNDS or others taking those steps and taking whole factories and repurposing them from, you know, producing railway cars to defense equipment.
So it can be done. This is the kind of incentives also that the governments should see and look for to make sure that the upskilling comes faster at the speed of relevance, to use Jens Stoltenberg's phrase.
Rob Bauer
And if I may to add, so I think we need to look at these things much more holistically because the horizon of a lot of people is like in the industry, unfortunately, the first and the second quarter. In politics, if you're lucky, four years. And therefore, these are investments that are looking at 10 years, 15 years. And therefore, you need a different way of looking at the problem and the solution. And we all have to work together to agree that you might have to take decisions beyond the government that is now governing and beyond, let's say, the focus on the first and the second quarter.
Second, if you look at what happens in the defense industry, if the demand goes up and the capacity remains the same, what we actually see is that the prices go up. And that is politically very sensitive because it means that the people are spending more on defense to the detriment of healthcare or education or other things and then do not necessarily get more security because the defense industry cannot deliver on the weapon systems.
And so that's one.
And that's not good. And that's one of the arguments we also use when we talk to the industry. They have a societal role other than just talk about the money. And they play a role in solving this problem that is actually their problem as well because if there is no security and stability, there is no economy. And for a long time we thought those were separate things, security and the economy.
We thought if we have mutual economic relationships, we will never see war again.
Well, that was proven wrong. We had a contract with Gazprom. We proved to have a contract with Putin. People in Europe said when they knew about the 180,000 troops at the borders of Ukraine, yeah, we see all that, but we cannot believe he's going to do that because he's not stupid. It was our thinking, not his thinking.
We thought he's going to hurt his economy, so he's not going to do that. Well, actually, he did it. And he is hurting his economy. He is. And the Russian people are suffering.
But he doesn't care. And so the way we thought about the world is how we would like it to be instead of how it actually was. And that sort of reality check is something that we need to keep on focusing. There's bad people out there. We need to protect ourselves against it.
We need to therefore ramp up our deterrence. We need the industry. But the industry needs to understand that it is more than just about money and economics. We need this. That's why I talked about a partnership between the governments and the industry.
For example, if a government buys a piece of land and arranges the permits for the production of defense industry and ammunition and the storage of ammunition on that piece of land without a factory and you have in every nation a number of these plots, you can say to the industry, the moment the peak demand signal comes, here is a piece of land you can have your factory on, there's all the permits, go. Then they build a factory, they find the people, they find the latest and greatest tools and they start producing probably within a year and a half instead of six years.
So that's the sort of cooperation that we have to look at.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
Thank you very much, very important point. And thank you very much colleagues. So date of next meeting, any other business? No, okay. Date of next meeting will be the 20th and 23rd June in Brussels.
Martins.
Martins null
Just a small question, was this presentation available for the members as well?
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
Yes, of course. Yes, we will send it immediately. We have it already. So yes, thank you very much. And have a good weekend.
Speaker 33
Well hello everyone, we'll get the session started. So Ruth is our guest of honor who will be speaking today and I believe she's been given a speech to read out.
We will ask you to read as slowly as you possibly can. Imagine you are Ursula von der Leyen speaking in front of several hundred MEPs, nice and slowly and dignified, and the trainees then will go into the booths. So we'll, we'll listen to the trainees working from Irish into English. We'll do, we'll start with the 10-minute section. I'll tell you more or less when to start rounding up.
I know your time is limited, so we'll try and get as much out of you as we can while you're here, but I'll give you an idea when to stop. So we'll let everyone, I think we can send everyone to the booths. The trainees have been given the speech in advance, they know more or less what the subject will be about, and so they're in charge of their own preparation.
Speaker 34
The next item is the Chair's announcements. I'd like to inform you that the meeting is being webstreamed. The interpretation is available in the following languages: German, English, French, Italian, Dutch, Greek, Spanish, Portuguese, Finnish, Swedish, Czech, Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Hungarian, Maltese, Polish, Slovak, Slovenian, Bulgarian, Romanian, and Croatian.
Speaker 35
If you can all hear me, I have one thing to say, a message from Kathy. You will all have received emails this morning. Shea, it's your first confirmation email, and you know, respond straight away if you can so that they're all reassured. And then the three of you who talked about a second language for the accreditation profile, you'd have received an email asking you to confirm your second language, and there's a deadline in it, and just make sure you respect the deadline. Okay?
Speaker 33
So Ruth, I think everyone is settled, so you can take it away with your speech whenever you're ready. And I'll tell you roughly 10 minutes in, you can start winding down.
Ruth
Uachtarán Metsola, a chomhghleacaithe onóracha, tá onóir im’ chroí. Croí ar son mhuintir na hEorpa uile, idir óg agus aosta. Ar mhaith le hEoraip atá saor, neamhspleách. Croí ar son ár luachanna agus ár n-ionracas. Croí ar son ár saoirse agus ár gcomhionannas féin i gceann an chine.
Ná bíodh aon mhíthuiscint ann, is croí ar son ár dtodhchaí é seo.
Is mór an onóir dom a bheith anseo inniu ag labhairt libh faoi thodhchaí na hEorpa agus faoi thodhchaí na hÉireann agus faoi thodhchaí an domhain agus faoi thodhchaí na ndaoine go léir. Is mór an onóir dom a bheith anseo inniu ag labhairt libh faoi thodhchaí na hEorpa agus faoi thodhchaí na hÉireann agus faoi thodhchaí an domhain agus faoi thodhchaí na ndaoine go léir agus faoi thodhchaí na n-óg. Is mór an onóir dom a bheith anseo inniu ag labhairt libh faoi thodhchaí na hEorpa agus faoi thodhchaí na hÉireann agus faoi thodhchaí an domhain agus faoi thodhchaí na ndaoine go léir agus faoi thodhchaí na n-óg agus faoi thodhchaí na seandaoine. Is mór an onóir dom a bheith anseo inniu ag labhairt libh faoi thodhchaí na hEorpa agus faoi thodhchaí na hÉireann agus faoi thodhchaí an domhain agus faoi thodhchaí na ndaoine go léir agus faoi thodhchaí na n-óg agus faoi thodhchaí na seandaoine agus faoi thodhchaí na n-oibrithe.
Mhaígh sí go bhfuil luas na hathraithe go léir ag dul ar aghaidh. Agus ar an ábhar sin, táimid ag iarraidh go mbeadh an t-athrú seo ag tarlú go tapa. Agus táimid ag iarraidh go mbeadh an t-athrú seo ag tarlú go tapa. Agus táimid ag iarraidh go mbeadh an t-athrú seo ag tarlú go tapa. Agus táimid ag iarraidh go mbeadh an t-athrú seo ag tarlú go tapa.
Agus táimid ag iarraidh go mbeadh an t-athrú seo ag tarlú go tapa. Agus táimid ag iarraidh go mbeadh an t-athrú seo ag tarlú go tapa. Agus táimid ag iarraidh go mbeadh an t-athrú seo ag tarlú go tapa. Agus táimid ag iarraidh go mbeadh an t-athrú seo ag tarlú go tapa. Agus táimid ag iarraidh go mbeadh an t-athrú seo ag tarlú go tapa.
Agus táimid ag iarraidh go mbeadh an t-athrú seo ag tarlú go tapa. Agus táimid ag iarraidh go mbeadh an t-athrú seo ag tarlú go tapa. Agus táimid ag iarraidh go mbeadh an t-athrú seo ag tarlú go tapa. Agus táimid ag iarraidh go mbeadh an t-athrú seo ag tarlú go tapa. Agus táimid ag iarraidh go mbeadh an t-athrú seo ag tarlú go tapa.
Agus táimid ag iarraidh go mbeadh an t-athrú seo ag tarlú go tapa.
Tá muid inár gcónaí i ndomhan ina bhfuil an teicneolaíocht ag athrú go tapa. Tá muid inár gcónaí i ndomhan ina bhfuil an t-athrú aeráide ag cur isteach orainn go léir. Agus is iad na dúshláin seo go léir a fhágann go bhfuil sé níos tábhachtaí ná riamh go mbeadh an Eoraip aontaithe. Ní mór dúinn oibriú le chéile chun na dúshláin seo a shárú. Ní mór dúinn a chinntiú go bhfuil an Eoraip in ann a ról a imirt sa domhan.
Ní mór dúinn a bheith in ann ár luachanna a chosaint. Agus ní mór dúinn a bheith in ann ár leasanna a chur chun cinn. Creidim go bhfuil an Eoraip in ann é seo a dhéanamh. Creidim go bhfuil an toil pholaitiúil ann. Agus creidim go bhfuil na hacmhainní againn.
Ní mór dúinn anois na cinntí cearta a dhéanamh. Ní mór dúinn infheistíocht a dhéanamh inár slándáil. Ní mór dúinn infheistíocht a dhéanamh inár dteicneolaíocht.
Cinnte a dhéanamh maidir leis an gcineál sochaí agus an gcineál déimealathas inár mian linn maireachtáil. A bheith oscailte don domhan ach chomh foirfeachtach a bheith againn le comhghuaillithe idir shean agus nua. Tar éis an tsaoil, is é seo an t-am an tsaoirse agus an chumhacht a bheith againn chun ár gcinniúint féin a chinneadh.
Agus tá a fhios againn gur féidir linn é sin a dhéanamh. Mar, i dteannta a chéile, léiríomar an méid is féidir linn a dhéanamh nuair a bhíonn an t-uacht againn, an t-aontacht againn, agus an díocas céanna orainn. Cá mhéad uair a dúradh linn nach mbeadh an Eoraip in ann é seo nó é siúd a dhéanamh? Le linn na paindéime. Maidir leis an bplean téarnaimh.
maidir le cosaint, maidir le tacaíocht a thabhairt don Úcráin, maidir le slándáil fuinnimh. Tá léirithe againn i dtaobh gach uair, has an Eoraip le chéile agus d'éirigh léi.
Agus ní mór dúinn sin a dhéanamh anois. Mar sin, a chomhghleacaithe, ceann de na ceisteanna lárnacha inniu, an bhfuil an Eoraip in ann ag an gcomhrac seo? An bhfuil an aontacht againn agus an diongbháilteacht?
An toil pholaitiúil agus an cumas polaitiúil chun gníomhú le chéile? Nó an é go bhfuilimid ag iarraidh a bheith tréigthe arís? A bheith faoi scáth na n-imeachtaí? Sin rud nach mór dúinn ar fad a fhreagairt, gach ballstát,
gach comhalta den teach seo, gach coimisinéir,
Gach duine againn. Dár liom féin, tá an rás sa léig. Mar sin, is cur i láthair ar son na hiontaofachta é mo chur i láthair inniu. Iontaofacht idir na ballstáit. Iontaofacht idir institiúidí an Aontais Eorpaigh.
Iontaofacht idir na fórsaí déantúsacha atá ar son na hEorpa sa teach seo. Táim anseo agus tá an coláiste ar fad anseo. Agus táimid réidh chun an méid sin a bhaint amach in éineacht libh. Réidh chun an tromlach déantúsach ar son na hEorpa a neartú.
Toisc gurb é an t-aon cheann é atá in ann beart a dhéanamh do mhuintir na hEorpa. A chomhghleacaithe onóracha. Is chun na saoirse agus an neamhspleáchais atá muintir na hÚcráine ag troid sa lá atá inniu ann. Díreach cosúil le Sacha agus a theaghlach. Ní raibh Sacha ach bliain déag d'aois nuair a d'ionsaigh na Rúisigh.
Lorg sé féin agus a mháthair tearmann in íoslach i Mariupol, a mbaile féin. Maidin amháin, chuaigh siad amach chun bia a fháil. Is ansin a tharla sé. Thit ráth de bhuamaí Rúiseacha anuas ar chomharsanacht shibhialtach. D'éirigh gach rud dorcha, agus gortaíodh Sasha sa chos.
Bhí strapaí á n-úsáid go díreach faoin nglúin. Laistigh de chúpla lá, thóg saighdiúirí na Rúise faoi ghlas iad. Thug siad Sasha agus a mháthair leo chuig áit ar thug na Rúisigh 'campa scagacháin' uirthi.
Tógadh Sasha chun bealaigh ansin. Dúirt siad leis nach raibh a mháthair de dhíth air. Rachadh sé chun na Rúise agus bheadh máthair Rúiseach aige, pas Rúiseach, ainm Rúiseach. Chuir siad go Donetsk faoi fhorghabháil é. Ach níor ghéill Sasha riamh.
Ar stad gutháin iomaíoch, d'iarr sé go tobann ar strainséir, agus chuir sé scairt ar a sheanmháthair, Lyudmila, a bhí ina cónaí san Úcráin thiar. "Mama, tabhair abhaile mé."
Ní raibh aon drogall uirthi. Dúirt cairde léi go raibh sí as a meabhair le himeacht. Ach rinne Liudmyla ach seacht míle de thuras chun dul chuige. Le cabhair ó rialtas na hÚcráine, d'éirigh léi.
Ask anything about this video — I analyse its transcript to answer.