Committee on International Trade Ordinary meeting
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INTA European Parliament
Follow its sittingsHana Jalloul Muro
Third is the importance of the Global Gateway. Everyone mentioned how instrumental Global Gateway is to boost sustainable investment in strategic sectors. I think it became clear to all of us, whoever supports cutting funding to Global Gateway is also undermining the growth of our trade relations with partners in Africa. So financing, very important. Lastly, I want to highlight one more point because it struck me most during my mission and I think to all of us, it's the issue of skills and education.
Many stakeholders raised the question of skills of the youth there. Trade will not succeed also without investment in vocational training, technical education and labor mobility frameworks. So this is important. We do not talk about this enough in trade policy. Our trade relations need to include these dimensions too.
So I hope this aspect will become a more important part of the discussion in INTA when we address the future of our international investments and how much we can give from our Parliament to those countries. Thank you. In equal, you know, set of, you know, partnership I would say. Thank you.
Christophe Bay
Merci Monsieur le Président. Tout d'abord, je tiens moi aussi à remercier les organisateurs, que ce soit bien sûr l'équipe du secrétariat de la commission, mais aussi donc, comme vous l'avez souligné Monsieur le Président, la délégation de l'Union européenne en Afrique du Sud. Pour ma part, j'ai retenu de cette mission très intéressante un pays attachant avec, d'un point de vue économique, de très très grandes potentialités. Rappelons quand même que c'est la première économie d'Afrique et uniquement avec 400 milliards de PIB, 400 milliards de dollars de PIB, il réalise déjà de grandes choses. Pour autant, il y a effectivement, c'est un pays qui est encore en souffrance, 30 % de chômage, 60 % dit-on chez les jeunes.
C'est une réelle démocratie, ce qui est très appréciable de voir comment fonctionne ce pays qui a en son temps beaucoup souffert. C'est un pays aussi qui est marqué par un très grand pragmatisme. Je crois qu'effectivement plusieurs, ce pays est confronté à plusieurs défis. Le premier, ce sera bien sûr celui de la démographie et de l'immigration, comme ils l'ont souligné. Mais aussi, ne nous voilons pas la face, nos interlocuteurs ont été très directs, très francs, notamment je pense à nos interlocuteurs au Parlement de l'Afrique du Sud où ils ont été, disons-le, très critiques à l'égard du CBAM.
D'où la nécessité, comme vous l'avez rappelé Monsieur le Président, de continuer le dialogue à travers les différents instruments que vous avez mentionnés. Pour autant, je pense que l'Europe et les pays des États de l'Union européenne ont un rôle à jouer important. Je pense notamment dans la transition du mix énergétique sud-africain puisque pour l'instant 80 % du mix, si j'ose dire, est composé de charbon et ils ont ouvert bien sûr vers les énergies renouvelables, mais je pense aussi qu'il y a une carte à jouer en matière nucléaire. Enfin, comme vous l'avez souligné, c'est un pays qui est marqué par la géopolitique, invité au G7, invité au G20 et c'est un pays qui compte bien entendu avec lequel nous devons, à la fois les États et l'Union européenne, entretenir des liens, des liens forts et les aider à travers le développement de nos échanges à pouvoir se trouver une place en tant que non-aligné, ce qu'ils revendiquent très fortement dans le concert des nations.
En tout cas, je vous remercie d'avoir organisé ce déplacement, et je pense qu'effectivement nous avons beaucoup de choses, beaucoup de choses à faire avec l'Union sud-africaine. Merci.
Kris Van Dijck
Dank u wel, voorzitter. Ik ga mijn tussenkomst in het Nederlands houden. Vooreerst dank ik ook uitvoerig alle diensten, zowel hier van ons parlement als in Zuid-Afrika om dit programma voor te bereiden. En ik denk, voorzitter, dat we inderdaad op die drie dagen een heel duidelijk beeld gekregen hebben van opportuniteiten, maar ook van moeilijkheden waarmee Zuid-Afrika te maken heeft en waarvoor het belangrijk is dat we met hen duurzame banden hebben, ik zou bijna zeggen blijven hebben, want ik heb toch ook geleerd dat er momenteel in Zuid-Afrika 1600 Europese bedrijven actief bezig zijn. En het belang, het is door de voorgaande sprekers ook al aangeduid in het kader van heel de mondiale wijzigingen, denk ik dat Zuid-Afrika een belangrijke factor blijft.
Ik ga toch wel beginnen of verwijzen naar een van onze laatste vergaderingen, voorzitter, en dat was in het parlement. En eigenlijk was dat wel een beetje verrassend. Ik herinner me dat de eerste spreker, en hij was van de Democratische Alliantie, die een beetje kritisch naar ons keek van: wat komen jullie hier eigenlijk doen? Wat komen jullie doen? Is het om de grondstoffen te doen?
En ik denk dat wij allemaal over de fracties heen duidelijk stelling ingenomen hebben en geponeerd hebben dat wij naar hen gekomen zijn of komen vanuit het gegeven: wij willen tot win-wins komen. Wij hebben jullie nodig, maar jullie ons eigenlijk ook. En het is ook al door Hanna aangehaald, ik was vooral verrast ook door het verhaal dat zowel mensen van de middenveldorganisaties, maar ook de ondernemers zelf aanhaalden hoe lamentabel het gesteld is met de opleiding en het onderwijs. En opleiding en onderwijs, en in het Nederlands, meneer de voorzitter, u bent een socialist, de socialistische beweging in Vlaanderen die heeft altijd gepleit voor de volksverheffing om mensen op een ander hoger niveau te tillen. En dat is eigenlijk een universele algemene opdracht als we een volk willen ontvoogden, als we mensen kansen willen geven, dan moeten we eerst en vooral beginnen aan stevige opleidingen.
En dat is misschien niet direct de competentie van deze commissie, maar ik denk dat we dat wel in ons achterhoofd moeten houden en mee moeten nemen in het beleid richting Zuid-Afrika dat dat beter moet. Als ik daar hoor dat ze momenteel werken met het Russisch curriculum, nu, ik weet niet, ik ga daar geen oordeel over vellen, ik heb heel veel jaar onderwijs gevolgd bij ons in Vlaanderen, maar dan frons ik toch wel mijn wenkbrauwen. Ik ga hierbij afsluiten, want we komen straks nog terug over het debat als het gaat over CETEP, maar mijn algemene vaststelling is: een land met enorme uitdagingen en ik denk dat wij het bondgenootschap moeten consolideren om samen vooruit te gaan.
Vicent Marzà Ibáñez
Y nos tradujo, nos dijo de forma muy clara que necesita un modelo de cooperación, de intercambio entre la Unión Europea y Sudáfrica que huya del modelo transaccional de otros estados, de otros grupos de presión que hay en el mundo y que hacen relación con Sudáfrica. Que huyésemos también del modelo extractivista y que pensásemos en un modelo en el que aporte valor añadido y beneficios a las dos partes. Y eso yo creo que es compartido y lo vimos como misión en conjunto, que es eso lo que queríamos. Por lo tanto, creo que hay un espacio muy interesante de trabajo en conjunto que ellos mismos insistieron especialmente en una cuestión que yo creo que es beneficiosa para las dos partes. La primera, necesitan más apoyo técnico, más intercambio de conocimientos en diferentes ámbitos, desde el transporte, desde la electricidad, desde la generación de energía limpia, la gestión del agua, el saneamiento.
Por lo tanto, cuestiones en que los europeos y las europeas tenemos mucho que aportar y mucho que compartir. Que aquellas inversiones que estén ligadas tanto al JETP como al Global Gateway aporten valor añadido y generen trabajo también en Sudáfrica. Por lo tanto, abiertos a empresas europeas que intercambien, que estén presentes, pero que generen también parte de ese valor añadido no solo en empresas europeas y aquí, sino también en territorio sudafricano. Y creo que esto es muy importante. También pusieron encima de la mesa cómo compartimos valores respecto al respeto del medio ambiente, a trabajar para reducir las emisiones y que este trabajo tiene que hacerse de forma compartida, con certidumbres, con reglas claras y con inversión a largo plazo.
Y ahí creo que tenemos que aprender y mucho de estas certidumbres que tenemos que generar. Y por último, también se nos trasladó por parte de sindicatos, ONGs, asociaciones, personas presentes, de la necesidad de trabajar con una mirada clara que mejore las condiciones laborales allí. Por ejemplo, de las trabajadoras del campo que están expuestas a pesticidas que aquí están prohibidos, que los producimos aquí y en cambio los exportamos para que se consuman allá y por lo tanto se expongan a condiciones lamentables. Por eso creo que tenemos que hacer pasos en las dos direcciones, que beneficien aquí y que generen mejores condiciones laborales y humanas a los europeos, a las europeas y también a los sudafricanos. Gracias.
Bernd Lange
Muchas gracias. And I invite now Jörgen to give us the perspective of Darius, who couldn't be here today.
Jörgen Warborn
Thank you, Bernd. Yes, Darius, since he couldn't be here, he asked me to read out his statement. And he says, first of all, I would like to apologize for my absence from today's committee meeting due to parliamentary commitments in Poland. The ad hoc mission to South Africa provided valuable first-hand insights into the implementation of the EU-South Africa Clean Trade and Investment Partnership and the broader strategic relationship between the EU and South Africa. Our discussions with government representatives, parliamentarians, businesses, financial institutions, trade unions, and civil society confirmed a strong commitment on both sides to deepen cooperation and translate political ambitions into concrete projects and investments.
The mission highlighted South Africa's strategic importance as the EU's leading economic partner in sub-Saharan Africa, particularly in the areas such as critical raw materials, clean industrial value chains, and the energy transition. It also demonstrated that the success of the partnership will depend on delivering tangible results, including improving the investment environment, addressing regulatory barriers, and mobilizing financing for strategic projects. Overall, the visit confirms the potential for a deeper EU-South Africa partnership based on mutual benefit, sustainability, and economic resilience. Thank you.
Bernd Lange
Thanks a lot, Jörgen. So this concludes this item and we switch immediately to item five, which is closely linked, the question of the implementation of the CTIP. CTIP was concluded with South Africa on the 20th of November last year. And now we have step by step the implementation and on the 3rd of March there was a business to governance dialogue and some other steps are on the agenda. And Carlo Pettinato is here from the Commission, the head of unit of DG Trade, and he will give us an hint about the implementation for 10 minutes, please.
Carlo Pettinato
Thank you very much, Chairman. Good afternoon to everyone. I'm very happy to be here since I recently took over this role for trade relations with Africa and I want to congratulate you first of all for the very successful mission. We also heard very, very positive feedback from our colleagues in the delegation and our head of delegation about the mission, which certainly further contributes in deepening our ties and our relationship in I think this very fruitful moment of our relations with South Africa. I want to also commend and acknowledge the key role that the Parliament has played also as we developed this new form of engagement, which is the Clean Trade and Investment Partnership, which I would not call it a mini trade deal.
I would call it a new form of engagement, but we'll talk about mini trade deals later, because it really is a new way that builds over the Economic Partnership Agreement, which is our basic trade mechanism that addresses the trade relationship between the EU and South Africa. We celebrate indeed, as you have recalled, the 10th year anniversary this year on the implementation, which has been very, very positive. We've seen a very strong growth in, for instance, South African exports with an increase of over 50% of their exports. Also the European Union has increased exports to South Africa, but this has also generated a closer integration of our economies. Our companies, the European Union companies, are already the first investors, foreign investors in the country.
We've seen just in the last four, five years an increase from 1,200 European companies present to 1,700. So there is a growing interest, in particular as the policy choices of this government in South Africa really align very closely with the policy choices, for instance, on sustainability and energy transition that in the European Union we are strongly supporting. So as far as the CTIP is concerned, which has ambitious objectives, as we know, and it has been discussed many times in this committee, to turn those ambitions into reality, if I can summarize, we would need three things, three elements to be there, to be present.
First, we need companies, particularly European companies, interested and ready to invest in those areas, in those sectors of interest and particularly covered by the agreement. Secondly, and I'll come back to that in a second. Secondly, in addition to the private interest and private investment, we need also the intervention of the public funding. And and we know what that means and I'll come back there in a second to see what we're doing on that. And thirdly, it's not enough to have companies, to have the funding package, you also need the right framework, the right environment, regulatory environment, business environment, investment climate, however we want to call it, you need the right conditions, otherwise it becomes extremely difficult to put that into reality.
So, what are we doing, what have we done in this few months since the agreement has been signed in November? The agreement has the the a strong, strong political backing at at the leaders' level. It was signed by our president together with the South African president in the margins of the G20, it was a summit. So we we haven't waited, we're already working on different fronts. On the first front, the companies.
So we have this this pillar of the agreement which is the business the the government-to-business involvement and we are promoting with companies the the the sectors and the available opportunities to invest in in South Africa. We have seen a remarkable interest, not just interest by our companies. I mean I can I can quote all the business events that we we have organized also through our delegation in South Africa, the investment roadshow, etc. But we also see concrete steps. For instance, some of the most important initiatives that South Africa is carrying out, both on the production of sustainable energy, renewable energy, and on the transmission.
We have European companies that are participating in the procurement. We have already in the independent transmission program, which is one of the most important one that will completely transform the transmission of electricity in the countries, we have already four European bids, four consortia that are very well placed to to win some of the contracts. I heard earlier the importance of of the skills in the country and we also have these companies, the European companies are very, very interested and able to to build local skills. It's not just about coming in with the investment, but also to build the skills and to bring the technology, which is what South Africa wants. This is certainly not the extractivist model, as we know that it has happened in in Africa in the past, but it is it is a new model and for us the local beneficiation is is key, which means to make sure that the capacities are built and the value is also created mainly locally, not just the jobs, but also the value of the the processing phase.
So, second second point, which is the the funding part, the funding from the public public sector.
Of course, you are aware of the Global Gateway investment package. It's ongoing, in particular in the areas of green hydrogen, critical raw materials, and just energy transition. You also have the European Investment Bank, which is active in the energy transition program. So this is really a key, a key role. The funding doesn't mean that there is a funding directly of, of every single investment.
It is really to de-risk and to leverage additional funding, which is the concept, main concept of the Global Gateway. So this is falling together under also the, the platform, the umbrella of the, of the C-TIP. Thirdly, the business environment, the regulatory framework, and for, in order to make sure that these private investments actually are successful, that they happen, and the Global Gateway and the investment package actually takes place in a beneficial way, we are engaging with the, with the authorities in South Africa on a case-by-case basis, really on the specific barriers, specific difficulties that our companies are encountering, which are not only our companies, but it is all companies that operate in, in the country. So we're finding it very, very useful that, let's say for the first time, thanks to this C-TIP umbrella or framework, we are working really on a whole-of-government approach. So we have our, our counterparts for the Department of Trade that have the responsibility of bringing all the actors, responsible government agencies together.
Same thing in the Commission. We have all the responsible DGs, and we are able to address the problems in a concrete way and trying to find solutions. We have identified some priorities on the legal framework for wind, for localization policies, and particularly we're discussing on the localization. I know that it's, it's a topic that, that can be quite sensitive. In the past, we've always been adamantly against any localization requirement.
Now we're looking in a very concrete and pragmatic way in, in areas where it might be justified and it might be even beneficial for the country, or areas where really we have to look for flexibilities to allow for not applying the requirements, in particular where local companies, local technologies are not available, and so it's only the, the foreign investors, the European investors that, that can bring that, or also the question of business visas. We're addressing that very, very pragmatically together with the authorities. We look forward to have the trade and investment dialogue in early July, which is a government-to-government exchange as part of the C-TIP, and we already have, I think, promising news of some concrete move forward in some of these barriers that have been identified by our companies. So thank you very much.
Bernd Lange
Thanks a lot. And now I give the floor to the rapporteur and the shadow rapporteurs. The standing rapporteur is not present, so I start with the shadow rapporteurs, and Jürgen is replacing Darius.
Jörgen Warborn
Yes, thank you, Bernd. I'll read out the statement from Darius Jonski, and he is of course mentioning the fact we spoke about it at the last point, that he was at the mission, and he says that throughout our meetings, we witnessed a strong support for deepening EU-South African cooperation.
These discussions highlighted the significant potential of the C-TIP to promote sustainable investment, strengthening resilient supply chains and support industrial development. The C-TIP marks a strategic step forward in the EU-South Africa economic partnership. South Africa is not only the EU's largest trading partner in sub-Saharan Africa, but also a strategic partner in building secure and resilient supply chains for the future. And this is particularly important in critical raw materials and other sectors essential for Europe's green and digital transitions. At a time when the European Union is seeking to reduce strategic dependencies and strengthen its economic security, partnership with trusted partners such as South Africa are becoming increasingly important.
The C-TIP can help diversify supply chains, enhance resilience and support sustainable growth on both sides. As the EU seeks to strengthen and diversify its industrial supply chains, the C-TIP offers an opportunity to address geopolitical dependency and position the EU as a reliable and attractive partner. And to ensure that this partnership delivers concrete outcomes, I would like to ask the Commission the following questions. First of all, following the first business-to-government dialogue, what are the main priorities identified by industry stakeholders for the implementation of the C-TIP? And if I may add here, since I listened to the Commission's statement, you mentioned both the localization requirement and the business visas, for example.
Could you maybe provide some more in-depth knowledge of how this has developed so far? The second question is, what concrete progress has been made in removing regulatory barriers and mobilizing public and private financing to attract European investment in South Africa's clean value chains? And even here, maybe to add from myself, since the Commission already mentioned the financing, have we seen any public financing as a result for the public financing through Golden Gateway and EIB so far? And finally, how does the Commission intend to ensure that the C-TIP supports both South Africa's industrial development objectives and the EU's goal of economic security, resilience and competitiveness? Thank you very much.
Bernd Lange
Thanks a lot, Jürgen, and myself, I will now replace the S&D shadow rapporteur Udo Bullmann, who is at the moment in South Africa with the inter-parliamentary delegation. I have only questions to the Commission. So this is one of these new so-called mini-deals, and we will discuss that a little bit later here as well. And this is a little bit the question how the structure is really working. And now with South Africa, we have the EPA, we have the memorandum of understanding on raw materials, we have the discussion about CBAM and the steel issue.
So is this C-TIP, let's say, the umbrella for everything? Because you mentioned that now everything is coordinated in the Ministry of Industry and Trade. And if this is the case, then of course my question would be how the European Parliament and the Parliament of South Africa are involved in this discussion process, because formally, of course, this C-TIP is not a normal trade agreement.
And linked to that, of course, in our normal trade agreements we have the domestic advisory groups where civil society, trade unions and business are involved in the implementation process. Similar institutions, similar bodies we have not here. We have the business-to-government dialogue, but this is a totally different format and different, let's say, obligation for this. Is there, because of this JETP in the umbrella function, let's say, this idea coming from also the European Parliament about this domestic advisory groups gone? And certainly perhaps this is a new exercise.
Do you have in mind that we will go ahead with similar JETP with other countries, specifically in Africa, where perhaps it's a little bit more complicated to have traditional trade agreements? And Thierry is also not here, but Christophe is here. Oder Christophe, you want to take over, yes.
Christophe Bay
Merci Monsieur le Président. Cet accord présente effectivement des points intéressants et remarquables. C'est un accord global, donc il a les défauts et les qualités d'un accord global. Pour ma part, je relève peut-être deux points et j'aurai bien sûr une question au représentant de la Commission. Premièrement, aux points 3 et 4, il me semble que l'aspect sécurisation de nos approvisionnements en matière de matières premières critiques n'est pas assez développé.
C'est quand même un des points clés effectivement qui fondent cet accord-cadre. On aurait pu peut-être effectivement mettre plus l'accent sur cet aspect des choses. Deuxième point, et ça rejoint mon propos liminaire, la question de la filière nucléaire. Je rappelle que lors du G20, le ministre de l'Industrie sud-africain a annoncé la volonté du gouvernement sud-africain de relancer la filière nucléaire à hauteur de 5 gigawatts. Pour autant, dans le point 4, cette possibilité n'est pas mentionnée, si ce n'est peut-être à travers d'autres technologies pertinentes permettant la transition énergétique, mais tout ça semble un peu flou.
Donc voilà, ça c'est mes deux observations : faiblesse de la sécurisation de l'approvisionnement et puis absence de mention de la filière nucléaire pour autant relancée par le gouvernement sud-africain. Ma question n'a rien à voir avec mes points précédents, mais concerne effectivement des exemples concrets. À ce stade, dispose-t-on d'exemples concrets d'investissements ou de micro-investissements de la part d'industries ou d'entreprises européennes qui entreraient dans le cadre de ce JETP ? Et question sous-question, ces investissements ont-ils fait l'objet d'un accord, d'un financement de la part de la BEI ?
Kris Van Dijck
Dank u, voorzitter. Zoals daarstraks al even aangehaald, denk ik dat het JETP-akkoord een belangrijke stap is in onze samenwerking met Zuid-Afrika.
Het is een verdere verdieping van de relaties met toch één van onze belangrijkste partners in Afrika. En ze weerspiegelt dan ook een gefocuste economische samenwerking rond schone technologie en kritieke grondstoffen en duurzame investeringen. En ik denk dat dit voor de EU dan ook essentieel is. In die zin is het dus allemaal positief. Maar voorzitter, laat ons ook eerlijk zijn, een bindend memorandum creëert verwachtingen, maar dat biedt niet altijd garanties.
En partnerschappen worden uiteindelijk niet beoordeeld op basis van de verklaringen die worden ondertekend, maar wel op de resultaten die ze opleveren. En hiermee leg ik misschien ook al een link met het punt dat we straks gaan bespreken. Maar toch een paar vragen. Ten eerste rijst bij mij de vraag naar de uitvoering. Hoe zorgen we ervoor dat deze partnerschappen dus niet verzanden in dialoogfora en intentieverklaringen, maar leiden tot tastbare investeringen op het terrein?
En mijn vraag is dan ook welke projecten als eerste worden uitgerold en welk investeringsvolume wordt daarbij beoogd? En hoe zal worden verzekerd dat, en wij kennen die problemen in Europa ook, dat vergunningen, infrastructuur en lokale randvoorwaarden de uitvoering niet vertragen? Ten tweede, we moeten ook realistisch zijn over de geopolitieke context. China bijvoorbeeld is al jarenlang diep verankerd in Afrika, ook in Zuid-Afrika. Want als we de vraag stelden, dan zeiden zij ook boudweg: wij werken met iedereen samen waar we profijt bij halen.
Het is een beetje kort door de bocht, maar daar kwam het toch wel op neer. Als Europa hier een geloofwaardig alternatief wil bieden, moeten ook wij snel handelen, minder regeldrift en administratieve belemmeringen en duidelijke prioriteiten stellen in de strategische projecten. En tenslotte, hoe zal de Commissie de voortgang van deze CETEP concreet monitoren? Welke benchmarks worden gebruikt en wanneer kunnen wij als Parlement de eerste resultaten daarvan verwachten? Maar ik kijk dus hoopvol uit naar de uitrol van deze CETEP.
Dank u wel.
Vicent Marzà Ibáñez
Sí, gracias, señor presidente, gracias también al representante de la Comisión Europea. De hecho, de sus palabras y presentación, yo creo que podríamos estar la inmensa mayoría de acuerdo que es un instrumento que puede ser muy interesante. De hecho, en intercambio de opiniones que tuvimos, el diálogo que tuvimos con las autoridades sudafricanas, así se percibía. Pero es cierto, y ya ha visto las preguntas por dónde van, y yo no voy a ser una excepción. Nos gustaría saber qué pasos concretos se dan y cómo se van a dar.
Y me voy a centrar en esto. Es muy importante para nosotros, para poder hacer bien nuestro ejercicio de fiscalización también como Parlamento Europeo, saber cómo van a concretar esos objetivos genéricos en objetivos específicos, de qué manera se van a poder escoger las empresas, cómo van a acogerse a esta reducción de riesgos y bajo qué criterios, qué condicionalidades les vamos a poner para que generen oportunidades y desarrollo económico también en el territorio, además de beneficios para las empresas europeas. Y en ese sentido, me gustaría saber cómo trabaja la Comisión, en qué objetivos específicos y cómo los va a desarrollar y qué papel esperan y requieren del Parlamento.
Ya le digo yo que nosotros no solo queremos participar, sino debemos participar en una cuestión clara. Y es que en el momento actual, como se ha dicho y usted lo ha dicho también, en el que otros actores a nivel internacional ya han hecho proyectos que podrían parecerse a este, tenemos que diferenciarnos. Y esa diferenciación que genere confianza con la contraparte, en este caso con Sudáfrica, solo se va a basar, y así lo vemos en nuestra misión, en generar confianza de verdad y beneficios mutuos que estén basados en el desarrollo sostenible, no en una inversión para extraer, sino en una inversión para acompañar, generar valor y mutuo beneficio. Y en ese sentido, cómo lo van a afrontar y en concreto, por ejemplo, para la red eléctrica que necesitan desarrollar, si vamos a participar o no. Era uno de los elementos clave para ellos de desarrollo.
Necesitan poder conectarse a la red para poder tener una generación industrial mucho más verde y mucho más productiva. O cómo vamos a contribuir, por ejemplo, casos concretos a que no desaparezcan puestos de trabajo al mismo tiempo que se hace la transición verde en elementos tan esenciales como por ejemplo el acero de Sudáfrica. Gracias.
Benoit Cassart
Thanks a lot, Vinuba.
Oui, merci Monsieur le Président. Je vais m'exprimer au nom de Dan Barma qui s'occupe de cela pour notre groupe Renew. Je tiens tout d'abord à féliciter l'équipe de la Commission pour son travail et les progrès accomplis à ce jour dans la mise en œuvre de ce partenariat. Fin mai, j'ai eu l'occasion de participer avec mes collègues à la mission de la Com INTA en Afrique du Sud. Nous avons eu des discussions très concrètes avec des ministres sud-africains, des représentants de la Banque européenne d'investissement ainsi que des partenaires issus du monde des affaires et de la société civile.
Le partenariat pour un commerce et des investissements propres est stratégique pour l'Europe. Cependant, la réalité du terrain montre que sa mise en œuvre effective exige une coordination beaucoup plus étroite et efficace. Le succès du PCIP repose sur la transformation en un partenariat consolidé fondé sur la réciprocité. L'Afrique du Sud ne doit pas rester un simple fournisseur de matières premières. Ils ont besoin d'un soutien pour la transformation et la valorisation des matières premières directement à la source en vue d'une industrialisation locale.
Pour que le programme Global Gateway atteigne son plein potentiel, il est urgent de réduire les obstacles administratifs tels que les longs délais d'obtention de visas de travail pour les spécialistes européens et de garantir la transparence des marchés publics. De plus, il est essentiel que les procédures de marchés publics dans le secteur des énergies propres soient transparentes et privilégient les entreprises locales et européennes respectant des normes de gouvernance élevées. L'Union européenne n'a pas besoin de se contenter de promesses. Contrairement aux approches transactionnelles qui peuvent offrir des concessions à court terme en échange de dépendances à long terme, comme c'est le cas avec la Chine, l'UE a toujours accordé à l'Afrique du Sud un accès préférentiel au plus grand marché unique mondial tout en demeurant son investisseur le plus fiable et son partenaire économique de long terme sur la base d'un partenariat fondé sur des règles. Le CTIP devrait renforcer davantage cette relation de confiance en assurant une croissance durable, un développement industriel et des opportunités économiques pour les deux parties.
Merci.
Le CETIP devrait renforcer davantage cette relation de confiance en assurant une croissance durable, un développement industriel et des opportunités économiques pour les deux parties. Merci.
Carlo Pettinato
Thank you very much for the questions and indeed I sympathize with a lot of the calls from the members about not setting up another forum for dialogue because this is not what we want to do. And in fact or new rules or new bureaucratic processes because we have not set up new rules. If you look at the CETIP, we are not on top of the economic partnership agreement we have new rules, but it provides a platform again to address all the various actions and various tools and various authorities to address concrete, concrete problems, concrete obstacles in a whole of government approach. And this is what we're trying to do. Now, the agreement was signed in November.
So, there are lots of things that are happening, but to say give us the figures of what the CETIP has delivered today, it's not an exercise that we can do. There are actions that have started, these investment takes as you know years, there are actions that had already started and there are actions that are accelerating. Now, if we look at for instance, Chairman, you asked what are the priorities that the business are saying. Now, we didn't just, you know, ask or imagine what could be the priorities. We launched immediately an exercise, a call for expression of interest of companies to gather the feedback very quickly in addition to these roadshows and events to gather as much feedback from concrete cases and concrete companies on the ground.
So, for instance, in the March business to government dialogue that we had, it was the first ever, both EU and South African industry advocated for the South African government to simplify its regulatory environment, to accelerate its energy sector reform, including to address the current grid congestion. As you know, the grid, the transmission is a major problem and this is where the procurement, ongoing procurement that is going on for the transmission, there are four European consortia that are participating and we're discussing with the government how to promote their participation there. So, for instance, to establish clear timelines for their investment plans and pragmatically balance pricing and localization considerations. Again, localization, we want to talk about it on a case-by-case basis with the government. We do recognize that in some cases it is necessary for their strategy, but in other cases it can be counterproductive and we're discussing that with them.
Not only with them, we're discussing it with the funders, with the European Investment Bank who has certain rules that prevent them from funding projects when there are strict localization requirements. We're discussing with them how to, you know, overcome that and look at the projects on a case-by-case basis in a pragmatic way.
Also, what the business are asking to increase the predictability, the transparency. So the businesses are not necessarily against localization requirements. What they want is predictability. Predictability and transparency. And this is across the board, South African and European investors.
What they need is they have long-term plans, they need predictability. And so this is something that we're addressing in a sector-by-sector basis with the government to improve that. And also, of course, sectoral priorities like the market opportunities for electric vehicle batteries. And you know, on the batteries, we've reached a very pragmatic agreement with the government of South Africa to allow for the cumulation in the production of batteries in order for them to export and qualify for the export to the European Union. So these are some of the priorities that the business have indicated to us.
Of course, this is an ongoing process. It's not a one-off. We will keep on talking to them and taking their feedback on board. Chairman, you also mentioned the participation of their parliaments and their civil society. Another example, the CETP does not create new governance.
What we do, we rely on the governance system of the Economic Partnership Agreement, which is already there. So, for instance, we consult our civil society as part of this agreement. We have our civil society dialogue. We consult the parliament very, very regularly. And we mention civil society consultation as part of the CETP, as this is part of our commitments that both sides have.
We haven't created another DAG. No, we haven't. So each side will consult their civil society in their own, following their own local systems, local systems, and also the parliament as they feel. And I'm glad to know that there is an inter-parliamentary meeting and mission, I think starting this week, so which will also allow to the two sides to talk about the CETP and the priorities. There was, I think, a call to give examples of what is actually happening.
And I wanted to give a couple of examples on under the Global Gateway, which is linked to the CETP. I mean, you all know that there was a package that was launched to of a Global Gateway investment package of 4.7 billion. With the member states, this has been increased to 11.5. So this is already being implemented. For instance, a second green hydrogen blended facility with the German development bank KfW was launched to support the market development of a green hydrogen economy in South Africa.
The critical raw materials blended facility also with KfW to support sustainable CRM projects and a technical facility on CRM, green hydrogen, and e-battery with GIZ.
So these are examples that already in the last few months have been moving. You you also asked is CTIP an umbrella for everything? EPA, MOU, CBAM, steel. I think these are different different things. The the difference between the CTIP for instance and the critical raw raw materials MOU is that this is a very very the MOU is a very sectoral cooperation memorandum of understanding with a roadmap on that sector.
The CTIP is wider than that. It doesn't cover only one individual sector but it allows to discuss several sectors in the sustainable field and to to bring in and to to leverage investments as well. And I wouldn't call it an umbrella for EPA because the EPA is the basic of our trade pure trading goods relationship. The CTIP is on top of that why because we bring in the investment facilitation component that doesn't exist in the EPA and and the services side. So it's a little bit different they are complementary of course and and it brings this new approach the whole of government approach.
CBAM and steel I do see they are extremely sensitive matters of discussion with with South Africa. There are specific fora that allow us to to discuss that but I wouldn't say it's the CTIP now is also the umbrella for those discussions on on steel you know there's an article 28 negotiation in Geneva and and CBAM there are technical discussions that are already taking place with our colleagues of DG TAXUD. I'm very glad to to report that these technical discussions have already taken place also in May I think with with very constructive discussions there. You ask if we are considering other countries in Africa. Of course we're exploring all the best ways to engage with with the economies in Africa to build up over our economic partnership agreements.
I cannot say today if there will be another CTIP in Africa. We'll see how this one goes the experience and then we will draw its conclusions. These are instruments that in my view have to be tailor-made country by country depending on first the policy priorities. We in South Africa we found a partner that have very very aligned policy priorities on the energy transition. We need to see if if we can find partners of this kind elsewhere.
Yes when when I hear Mr. Van Deek about what really matters is investment on the ground the licenses the conditionalities this is exactly what we talk about with our African South African colleagues because it's the companies directly that tell us we have a problem on I don't know the visa that requirement is impossible for me or for my supplier so we bring that on the table and we try really to address that. And this is the investment facilitation component that is not in the EPA which is something else that we can we have the possibility to address here. I don't remember if there was anything else but more or less this is what I remember. Thank you.
Bernd Lange
Thanks a lot for this explanation and let's see how the implementation is going on and how we will really have a benefit on both sides and we will have a close eye on that.
Thanks a lot. And the next item is a little bit linked to the CTIP. We discussed this several times. We had also our former trade commissioner here with us, Pascal Lamy, on this so-called mini deals. And now we have a study about the role and impact of the latest generation of EU mini deals, such as this Clean Trade and Investment Partnership.
It is prepared by Professor Andreas Maurer from University of Innsbruck, well known here in the Parliament. He was engaged several years ago here also in the Trade Committee. And I'm happy that he is here to give us an overview about the findings. So it's always a little bit the discussion, which are the advantages, so quicker, no such a long negotiation process, no two years of ratification and so on, so on. And what are the disadvantages?
Non-binding, what about dispute and so several questions are in the in the air. And this leads of course to the question, what are the recommendations for the Parliament? And I'm sure that some ideas Andreas Maurer is now presenting us and I give him the floor.
Andreas Maurer
Yeah, thanks chair. Thanks also for the invitation giving me the opportunity to speak again in front of INTA. The issue is, yeah, the role, functions and impact of so-called EU mini trade deals. CTIPs are part of that family. I'm going to address and throughout the research I have addressed together with CTIPs these so-called critical raw material memoranda of understanding, the existing sustainable investment facilitation agreement with Angola and news on the door.
Other states, the US, are are doing the same basically, mean yeah, what the speaker from the European Commission also said, agreements that are not full fully-fledged trade agreements but something on top of existing agreements. And the European Union since 2021 is working a lot in on in that field. Why now and why since 2021? Obviously, of course, mean the COVID-19 pandemic, the wars of Russia, the US and Israel against other states, the US-China strategic competition do make supply chain resilience first order EU policy objective that tariff liberalization which is usually addressed in free trade agreements alone cannot address. And therefore we have or we are confronted with a new set of of instruments.
The focus on critical raw materials is also mean quite obvious. Lithium and other materials, mean they are geographically concentrated. China does not hold only dominant processing position but is also using its positioning position in hammering out deals with other third countries and therefore also creating huge competition vis-à-vis the European Union.
And the Critical Raw Materials Act of 2024 allows or empowers the European Commission to conclude what the CRMA is calling strategic partnerships. That also solves at least partially the issue of why is the European Commission doing that alone without having a Council of Ministers mandate, without going through the Article 218 procedure, without asking the European Parliament for consent. Legally speaking, formalistically speaking, the European Commission can do so because the Critical Materials Act is asking the European Commission to do so. And the third issue is linked to that, it's the issue of speed vis-à-vis FTA timelines. I mean, we are basically, I hope so, in the middle of preparing the ratification of the EU-Mercosur agreement, which lasted more than 20 years.
The CETEP with South Africa lasted only eight months. That's a huge difference. And that does, it matters if an actor like the European Union is in heavy competition with other countries with regard to sourcing and processing critical raw materials for the green transition. China and the US, they do move extremely quickly in that area. So, this study is concentrating on three instrument types: the SIFA with Angola, which is a binding treaty which passed European Parliament's consent, and the example for the moment is the only example which we have is with Angola.
The 16, to date 16 critical raw material memorandum of understanding. Memorandum of understanding sounds quite nice, it sounds a little bit like agreement. Those who speak German now have, let's say, a slight preference because in German we call that Absichtserklärung. And Absichtserklärung vis-à-vis trade agreement makes it very, very clear what a memorandum of understanding is. It is not very much, yeah.
It's just a lettre d'intention en français, bon, okay. But it's a floor, it's a floor of diplomacy and moving quite fast. So it's not binding. The European Parliament's role, thanks to the reformulated framework agreement with the European Commission, there's a new point 31 in that framework agreement which allows the European Parliament to require information. I'm going to come back to that.
There are 15 of these partnerships. And then the CETEP, which you already spoke before again, it's also a memorandum of understanding. I mean, it has another title, but it's also only a memorandum of understanding which has a little bit more substance because it's larger in substance. But it's also only a memorandum of understanding. Information of the European Parliament passes via point 31 and the example is South Africa.
That's just the overall overview. So not only on critical raw materials, but also in the area of energy and climate, in the digital economy, and in forestry, we have a huge increase of this type of instruments. Non-binding versus binding FTAs, what are the differences? So first, with regard to speed, yeah, clearly MOU, CETEP, it's, we speak about months because there's also no ratification needed. Binding FTAs and binding SIFAs do need years in order to enter into force.
The legal certainty for a CETEP or an MOU, I mean, there's nothing. There are no enforceable rights or obligations. For binding FTAs, it's extremely high, essential for long-term FDI, for foreign direct investment.
The enforceability on MOUs, there is no enforceability beyond let's say the investments you undertake. There's no dispute settlement, while in FTAs, yes, of course, there's state-to-state dispute settlement mechanisms, it's clear. The empirical trade effect there, I mean I would be careful because we only have two articles from academics which have addressed in 2016 these kind of non-FTA agreements which, yeah, you call memorandum of understanding or letter of intention. And there they have measured the impact and came to the conclusion that the impact is zero or weak, while for binding FTAs, at least statistically, it's significant. European Parliament's oversight, well, point 31 of the framework agreement, information.
Open question is, does information mean ex-post only or also ex-ante, and has the European Parliament the possibility or leverage to push the European Commission, at least the European Commission if not the Council, to receive some ex-ante information? While for FTAs, of course, you are familiar with the full Article 218 procedure. The transparency, it's very opaque. I've counted now the last 15 minutes, I have heard three times roadmaps. I've never seen a roadmap to date.
And also the public, I mean even you members of the European Parliament, you have never seen a roadmap. Now I understand the European Commission saying it's too early. It's too early, we have not finished yet the joint roadmap with South Africa or with Canada or another country. But the issue is when we are speaking about roadmaps, we are speaking about key performance indicators and these kind of things, but we do not know what they are. We have never seen them.
While of course for an FTA, it's a publication in the official journal, everything is there. The European Commission reports regularly on the FTA implementation and it's mandatory to do so. The signaling of norms in the non-binding agreements, of course it's high. There's a rapid diffusion between countries, while in FTAs it's rather moderate and slower, but sustainable, durable. The risk of legitimizing bad practice is present.
The memorandum of understanding, you have dealt with that in the European Parliament with Rwanda, is under attack because there are allegations that Rwanda allows conflict minerals entering from the Democratic Republic of Congo and the civil war into Rwanda and then sells it as Rwandan critical raw materials. While for FTAs it's at least lower because there is ratification scrutiny that applies throughout. Just for the strategic partnerships, so it started in 2021 to establish some kind of a template with Canada and Ukraine. Then the next wave with Kazakhstan and Namibia, Namibia also a complicated case, I will come back to that. Then wave three and wave four are the largest ones with Argentina, Chile, Congo, Zambia, Greenland, Rwanda and other countries.
The last one for this year is with the United States. The C-TIP, we have heard a lot about that, so I have not to go into detail. Substantially, it's wider than the CRM MOU because it's not only addressing critical raw materials, but also the entire spectrum of renewable energy, low-carbon tech, climate mitigation, electricity grids, clean fuels. So there's much more in. Problem is, neither party faces any legal consequence for underperformance or for non-performance.
Investors, they are there, but they cannot rely on the C-TIP text. Due diligence, there's a dual instrument problem which we have not addressed yet because together with the C-TIP, there was a separate CRM memorandum of understanding also signed with South Africa, where I think there's been substantially some kind of duplication in it. There's no real governance framework. There's no European Commission communication. There's no standalone regulatory framework.
Colleague from the European Commission explained why, because we are to avoid bureaucracy or over-bureaucratization. There are no defined KPIs. The forum between business and government is a business input and civil society at large is not really involved. What is different between C-TIP and critical raw materials overall, you can see here. I've not go, no need to go into detail.
SIFA, so the investment facilitation agreement, what they do deliver is some much more transparency on investment regulations, a streamlined authorization procedure, investor focal points which make it much more transparent for investors, a right to regulate with regard to environment and labor standards. The Paris Agreement or climate policy and responsible business conduct commitments are in. And there's some kind of a state-to-state dispute settlement clause and the European Parliament has to give its consent. Parliamentary accountability gap between FTAs and MOUs, clear. 218 applies for the entire spectrum of SIFAs, EPAs, FTAs.
For the critical raw materials and so on, there is only this kind of inter-secretariat agreement between the Council, the External Action Service and the European Commission from 2017, which does not address the European Parliament, but at least it is readable for the European Parliament. Parliament has access to that. Parliament consent is required for all FTAs. For the other ones, there is no consent. The information according to the framework agreement and 218.10 is full and immediate, while 31 in the framework agreement, yeah, just says something about information and notification.
Transparency in FTAs is full. In a memorandum of understanding, press releases and we are fully dependent also as researchers on the willingness of the European Commission's Directorate-General to publish these documents. None of these documents can be seen on the official journal. The Council role in FTAs, of course, formal mandate. In the MOUs, there is an informal political consensus based on this 2017 agreement between the three institutions.
The monitoring in FTAs is clear. The monitoring on critical raw materials MOUs has to be solved and discussed by you with the European Commission now. I will close just by presenting you, let's say, a proposal for how to transit from informal to more formal frameworks.
We are now at step one with a non-binding C-TIP. The next step which I'm going to propose would be for the next two years to have some kind of a binding implementation protocol based on Article 218, also something which has then to pass the European Parliament for consent procedure. In year 225, integration of this instrument into the EPA or the FTA, whatever is relevant. And then continuously, I mean from day one, from today onwards, asking the European Commission to provide some kind of an annual implementation report which also presses the European Commission to make it a little bit more transparent what the measurement is. The priority recommendations, and there I stop.
I think the European Parliament should require a roadmap publication within the next six months for the C-TIP and for the older MOUs. Ask the European Commission to do so. It should negotiate with the European Commission a bilateral inter-institutional agreement on how to interpret point 31 with regard to these non-binding instruments. It has to trigger the monitoring groups to observe and to speak with the DG AGRI and DG TRADE on these MOUs. And I think it should be nice, it would be nice to systematize these things together with a systematization of inter-parliamentary delegations in the respective countries or with the respective countries to talk about these instruments.
I think for the C-TIP, I would suggest to request the Court of Justice for an opinion whether C-TIP does not necessitate the threshold of a binding agreement under 218. Parliament should require the European Commission to define conversion timelines, so promote graduated transition frameworks from non-binding instruments to more binding implementing protocols following what we have observed with the digital trade agreements model with Singapore and Korea. And finally, there should be some kind of a requirement towards the European Commission as such. We cannot be dependent on Directorates-General. They are nice and they are willing and so on.
No, thing is that the public and the European Parliament has the right to ask the European Commission as an institution to provide some kind of a comprehensive register for these kind of instruments. Because one day Mrs. von der Leyen is going to leave and then everything is going at zero, also the DG websites are starting from zero, and we cannot be confident about the fact that the new DG websites will also cover these kind of publications. So in order to avoid this problem, I think it would be good to invest some time, some minutes, to create, let's say, a publicly accessible website with all these instruments and hopefully also the roadmaps. Thank you.
Bernd Lange
Thanks a lot, Andreas. Now we have 20 minutes left. And first I will ask my colleagues and then afterwards I will ask the Commission. And I welcome Mr. Jan Willem Verheijden, the Chief Economist, who will respond as well. But first, my colleagues.
Jürgen.
Jörgen Warborn
Thank you, Bernd. I'll try to be as brief as possible. There was a lot of things to unpack here. But when I read the report, one of the key findings I made, even though this is of course a report about the mini-trade deals, one of the key findings I made is that we have to go back to basics when it comes to our free trade agreements.
Because one of the statements of course in the report is that it takes too long time, and that's why the mini trade deal has some advantage because they're more flexible and speedy. But that also, it also says of course that the mini trade deals, when it comes to trade effects, has zero or weak trade effects. So we put some time in it, and then they don't have any effects. And of course that is something we have to put into thinking as well. So free trade agreements is better in terms of effect than the mini trade deals.
And the reason for this is the binding nature, I guess. And that's, and also that negotiations, it says in the report, tends to be the stopping point of our negotiations. And in fact it's the starting point, of course we have ratification, but then it's a starting point for the traders, for the businesses. And if we kind of stop to promote and to discuss and to advertise and communicate all the, all the good parts that come out of them, then of course no one is using them. So I see first of all, go back to basics with free trade agreements, make sure that they are, we are not overloading the boat with everything in our free trade agreements.
And second of all, if we're using the MTDs, they are the stepping stones into binding agreements. So that's a start and then we have to continue with them. So my simple question is, would the Commission agree with this analysis? Thank you.
Vicent Marzà Ibáñez
Sí, gracias, señor presidente. Primero que nada, dar las gracias al profesor por el informe. Nos gusta y nos gusta mucho porque, como se estaba ya explicando por el anterior interviniente, es necesario este tipo de análisis para poder poner la balanza, ¿no?, y saber cómo tenemos que trabajar en un contexto como el actual. Es claro que la flexibilidad de los mini deals es su principal, su principal punto a favor, su dinamismo, su capacidad de negociarse rápido, pero al mismo tiempo, sin mecanismos vinculantes, sin un efecto directo sobre el comercio y sobre todo, sin un mecanismo de transparencia, de objetivos claros, de hojas de ruta, de reporte claro y vinculación a los mecanismos parlamentarios, pues queda muy flojo, ¿no? Y en ese sentido, agradecemos mucho que no se haya quedado solo en un informe, sino que pase también a propuestas.
Propuestas que compartimos totalmente y que nos gustaría lanzar a la Comisión como preguntas. Y es si, tal y como desde nuestro grupo parlamentario y otros se está exigiendo y se está poniendo el foco en que deberían haber hojas de ruta claras, transparentes, acordadas en estos mini deals, si esto también es de la opinión de la Comisión o no, si van a aplicar estas recomendaciones que son claras de mecanismos que sean vinculantes. Porque vemos que es un mecanismo que puede funcionar bien si tiene efectos y si es transparente y si hay control democrático. Y al mismo tiempo, porque los acuerdos comerciales de libre comercio expansivos generan mucha problemática también de negociación, por eso tardan tanto tiempo, pero al mismo tiempo exponen sectores productivos que no están en condiciones de competir en igualdad con otros. Y por lo tanto se generan unas desigualdades en el comercio que hay que corregir.
Y en ese sentido vemos interesantes los mini deals, pero con la aplicación de todas las recomendaciones del profesor. Por eso insisto a la Comisión si las van a aplicar, si ven puerta y cuándo vamos a trabajar en ellas. Gracias.
Thanks a lot, Szomak.
Jean-Marc Germain
Thank you, Chair. I am going to take the floor on behalf of our S&D coordinator Brando Benifei who unfortunately could not be there with us today. First, of course, he wanted and I also want to thank warmly Professor Maurer for this excellent and highly relevant study. And I will also ask a couple of questions to the Commission before Commission will take the floor. So, two comments and three questions.
First, from S&D perspective, we recognize the value of this new instrument. In a rapidly evolving geopolitical environment, the EU needs flexible tools to strengthen supply chains, support green transition and deepen cooperation with strategic partners. Second, and however, as it was emphasized in the study, flexibility cannot come at the expense of accountability. The study rightly outlined that the CTIPs and the CRM memorandum of understanding increasingly shape our external economic relations while remaining outside the level of democratic scrutiny that Parliament exercise over binding trade agreements. Equally concern is the lack of clear obligation, monitoring mechanisms and measurable outcomes which make it difficult to assess whether these partnerships are delivering for both EU and our partner countries.
So this leads to the three questions. Two first are for Professor Maurer. And the first is what do you see as most effective and realistic measures Parliament could pursue in the short term to strengthen oversight and democratic accountability for these instruments? Second question for you, Professor, would concern partner country development. How can the EU ensure that these partnerships support local value addition, industrialization and quality jobs in partner countries rather than being perceived primarily as instruments to secure European access to critical resources?
And then third set of questions to the Commission would be first and concerning the proposal of the report, would you be agree to publish all CTIP and CRM roadmaps? Are you, do you agree to establish standard performance indicator for each CTIP and memorandum of understanding? Would you agree also on the proposal to include financial commission directly in the CTIPs text rather than through parallel arrangements? Are you ready to develop a pathway towards more binding commitments where appropriate? And last, are you ready to extend the FT single entry point complaints mechanisms to CTIPs and MOUs?
Kris Van Dijck
Dank u wel voorzitter. Voor eerst wil ik ook professor Mauer van harte danken voor deze studie en de bijdrage. En ik denk dat het duidelijk is dat de mini-handelsakkoorden inderdaad kunnen bijdragen tot een sneller en efficiëntere werking. Strategisch belangrijk om die vrije de klassieke vrijhandelsakkoorden dat die vaak te lang duren. Dat is zo.
En voor mijn fractie is de prioriteit helder. De akkoorden moeten concrete voordelen opleveren voor Europese bedrijven, voor onze bevoorradingszekerheid te versterken en de concurrentiekracht van de EU te verbeteren. Maar ik heb hier ook een dubbele vraag. Enerzijds willen we toch monitoren en zien dat er beterschap is. Maar langs de andere kant ook de waarschuwing dat we niet tot een rapporteringslast komen die eigenlijk de sop de kool niet waard is, die het efficiënt en snel handelen wat op de helling zet.
Ik heb wel een belangrijke bemerking en die komt eigenlijk ook een beetje in de richting van wat Jörgen daarstraks aangehaald heeft. De balans tussen deze mini-handelsakkoorden en de ik zou zeggen traditionele bredere vrijhandelsakkoorden die we kennen. Ik denk dat we sowieso een les moeten trekken dat dat sneller moet. En waar ziet u professor ergens de balans tussen het ene en het andere? Wanneer zijn mini-handelsakkoorden belangrijk en wanneer moeten we toch het instrument van de bredere vrijhandelsovereenkomsten hanteren?
Dat is eigenlijk mijn belangrijkste vraag. Dank u wel.
Bernd Lange
Yeah, thanks a lot. And then I give the floor now to Jan Willem Verheijden.
Jan Willem Verheijden
Thank you. Thank you very much. Thank you very much Chairman and thank you very much to Professor Mauer and the members of Parliament that intervened. I would in particular like to thank Professor Mauer for the interesting presentation, for the interesting, very interesting study that will help us in in our reflections on the covered instruments. Mini trade deals is not a term that we have used so far.
We normally speak about alternative forms of trade engagement and these different instruments covered by the by the study, they they follow different policy rationales and have their own own logic. So obviously for C-TIPs, the rationale has been very much to to create a whole of government approach, a whole of commission approach and to to increase our leverage and our effectiveness by combining different policy tools. And other instruments covered by the by this study also have their own rationale. Having said that, there are of course commonalities as pointed out in the report. These are instruments that contribute to trade and investment relations.
They are more targeted than traditional FTAs. They have for instance a sectoral focus or focus on specific types of of barriers to to investment or to trade. And they are much faster to conclude as has been said many times this afternoon than traditional FTAs. And the study by Professor Mauer also points out that today's geoeconomic reality is such that we need to have agile solutions and fast solutions.
We face increasing pressure on our competitiveness and our economic security. And to compete with China but also many other partners, our what we have on offer in terms of trade engagement needs to be wider than just FTAs. And that's why we have seen several instruments develop alongside FTAs. Now the report obviously focuses a lot on the binding versus non-binding nature of these different instruments and the consequences that the binding or non-binding nature has. First of all, I would like to highlight one thing, which is that the report refers to non-binding CETPs and MOUs explicitly bypassing the Article 218 TFEU procedure, which obviously requires a deliberate action and intention to bypass.
This is obviously not the case here. What we do in assessing different trade policy responses to different issues is that form follows substance and not the contrary. So we look at what best serves our competitiveness, our economic security, what are the concrete issues that we are facing and how we can respond to that, what instrument is best placed to achieve that and is effective. And I hear the study on the one hand suggests that these instruments are so important that they need to be covered by the 218 TFEU procedure and at the same time they would not be effective if they're non-binding. From our perspective, there is obviously we think these non-binding instruments can be effective of course, but it's also too early at this stage to draw conclusions on the effectiveness since many of these instruments have just come into force.
Now obviously also the sheer amount of FTAs that we have been concluding and signing in recent years with India, Indonesia, Australia, ESA 4, Mexico, Chile, they confirm that there is no bypassing of the 218 TFEU procedure and that binding instruments are very much still at the forefront of trade policy. But obviously in complement to FTAs, we sometimes consider that a non-binding instrument is useful. And for the CETP with South Africa, there was a choice to have a non-binding instrument, which doesn't mean that that will be the case for future CETPs. There's nothing stating that CETPs should be non-binding, but the CETP with South Africa has been non-binding. Next CETPs could be binding and they could also be a combination of binding and non-binding, which really depends on the issue we're trying to tackle and the most effective way of tackling that issue.
Now obviously a non-binding instrument can transition towards a binding instrument and there was obviously a question about this, but there is from our perspective no compelling reason why every non-binding instrument should transition to a binding instrument. So that really depends on the situation at hand, at the effectiveness in particular of the non-binding instrument. The report also speaks about selective de-legalization, which refers to binding commitments that would apply for to developing countries, sorry, binding rules would apply for the commitments from developing countries towards us, where non-binding rules would apply to our commitments to developing countries. This is obviously misleading. These the agreements, both the binding and the non-binding that we agree are reciprocal and we're aiming for win-win solutions.
Now as regards the involvement of the European Parliament, we obviously very much welcome and greatly appreciate the input from the European Parliament and that is also the reason why on C-TIPs we have engaged more than what is required by the at the time because it was the the negotiations took place before the framework agreement was concluded. So we have really taken every opportunity to engage with the European Parliament in different formats, in different configurations. And it's also our intention to do so on future C-TIPs and future other forms of trade engagement. I see I'm, can I can I continue because I see I thought if you would allow me one minute I wrap up. So to conclude, we consider that the report is very comprehensive and very provides many interesting insights.
We will have a closer look at the report's recommendation on performance indicators for instance, on transparency, although we are trying to be as transparent as we can be and as engaging with civil society for instance as we can be. We agree that the conclusion of the agreement is not an achievement as such and that the effectiveness effectiveness will have to be tracked and proven. And we fully share the report's views on the importance of public oversight and the importance of involvement of the European Parliament also with regard to non-binding instruments. Thank you very much.
Bernd Lange
Thanks a lot and you can be sure that the European Parliament will be involved. Andreas, five minutes.
Andreas Maurer
Yeah, thank you. Thank you very much for the comments and the suggestions on the questions by Jean-Marc for the S&D, how to strengthen, I mean the easiest way to strengthen the would be the budget and the very fact that the European Parliament is 50% of the European Union's budgetary authority. And given that when if you think I mean C-TIP and other instruments also involve European budgetary money, European Parliament has all possibilities to use that as a leverage to get information, to make it more transparent, to make to to become a little bit more pressing vis-à-vis the European Commission and the member states. The second possibility, maybe it's a hidden one, but I mean it's not your committee, but it's rather the Foreign Affairs Committee, but you are also involved.
We are speaking in these days again about enlargement, and not only about enlargement vis-à-vis Ukraine and Moldova, but also vis-à-vis the Western Balkan countries. And I remember when Austria, Finland, and Sweden joined, Norway likely to join, and then the parliaments of these countries were quite surprised of the very fact that with enlargement, they also bought into what we here in Brussels called the Trevi acquis. And they said, "What is Trevi?" "What happened in Trevi?" Trevi was an amount of non-binding agreements between police forces, ministries of interior, and so on, which later became Eurojust and Europol.
And that was a list, a Trevi list, and they said, "Yeah, okay, that's informal." And with now you are becoming members, and as you are members of the European Union, you are also buying into these instruments. No member of parliament really realized what Trevi is about. And my fear is that you need to make it clear, or people in Albania, in Montenegro, members of parliament in Albania, they need to know what these instruments are. Are they part, do they buy into that acquis or not?
And there I say the European Parliament is a perfect place to make that clear. They say, well, these countries need to know where they are going and what they are buying into. Second, on local value addition, I think that there will be a separate study for FEPS, on the Federation of Progressive Studies, which is looking into that. If you take the example of the SIFA with Angola, the possibility there to add something on local value addition was that Angola, the government of Angola, asked for specific clauses with regard to public procurement and gender equality. And the European Union accepted, and you as Parliament, via the consent procedure, also accepted that.
That the Angolan way to provide women with a little bit more possibilities to engage in small and medium-sized enterprises is an instrument which has been facilitated by the SIFA. So what can you do is Parliament could engage more of the stakeholders potentially involved by systematizing a bit more its existing joint parliamentary networks with those countries where the memorandum of understanding or the SITIP do exist. And maybe also, why not, using that joint parliamentary network to issue an INI report, a legislative initiative report, by INTA, towards the decision of the European Parliament and the European Commission on key indicators and key measurement standards to have some kind of local value addition in the third countries with the help of the stakeholders in the third countries. Just on the European Commission, it's too early and so on, I fully understand with regard to South Africa. With regard to Namibia, I would not understand.
Namibia, the MOU has been signed in 2022. That is four years on. Just some months after the MOU with Namibia, the government of Namibia, personally I would say wisely, decided to ban an export on unprocessed materials after a two-weeks parliamentary procedure in the parliament of Namibia. Now, with a fully FTA with Namibia, that would have been an issue for debate, for adding a protocol or for amending the existing FTA.
With the memorandum of understanding, well, okay, you sign with a lot of fanfare the memorandum of understanding and weeks later your partner says, "Whoa, pff, I'm not interested in, I'm deciding just the opposite," and you do not, you cannot do anything. I'll say media communication by the European Commission, and I fully understand, it's also very much one-directional. Again, the decision to have this memorandum of understanding has been sold with a lot of fanfare. The decision by the Namibian Parliament just passed the Namibian Parliament. It was not part of our, of our media attention here.
And that is a problem, yeah. And that, that problem could have been solved in a much more decent way if it would not have been a memorandum of understanding, but a fully-fledged trade agreement. Okay, that's it. Thank you.
Bernd Lange
Perfect. Thanks a lot, Andreas. Thanks a lot to the Commission for being here, and we'll stay in contact on this, I'm sure. Um, this concludes the meeting of INTA for today, and we will have now in one minute the coordinators' meeting.
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