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INTA European Parliament
Follow its sittingsHanna
Ukrainians continue to suffer and lose their lives every day. At the same time, we know that Russia is not winning this war. This is due to the courage and resilience of the Ukrainian people that we must praise always, as well as the strong EU support for Ukraine, which we must continue. Recent political momentum made it possible to adopt the 20th sanctions package and block the Ukraine support loan, and just a few days ago, open the first EU accession negotiation cluster. Ukraine deserves recognition for its continued reforms towards EU membership and for meeting the conditions required for the disbursement of funds.
This is an extraordinary achievement for a country at war. Recent political momentum made it possible to adopt the... I think I just read that. Sorry for this. However, we must increase pressure on Russia and bring it to the negotiation table.
In this context, I call on the Commission and the Council to revive the reparations loan proposal as soon as possible. Thank you very much.
Bernd Lange
Thanks a lot, and I give now the floor to the BUDG Vice-Chair, our really well-known Janusz.
Janusz Lewandowski
Thank you. Good hot afternoon. Good to have this loan accepted. Should go as soon as possible the first tranche, provided that all conditions are met. I am, on behalf of budgetary people, not so happy that the Commission choice was to finance 1.15 billion in debt service cost for the next year, for 2027, entirely through what is available or could be available in our budget, instead of resorting to Ukraine support loan that is specifically set up for this reason.
I know that Commission is pleading Council, Council is very happy about this solution, but not so much budgetary people in the Parliament, because this is reducing our flexibilities. So we are responsible to make sure that the support loan gets the full backing, with full backing of the Parliament, is not at the cost of funding for the other priorities of the European budget. Thank you.
Bernd Lange
Thanks a lot. And now gives the floor to the Commission for 15 minutes in total. How you divide this 15 minutes in your responsibilities, it's up to you.
Anna JAROSZ-FRIIS
Thank you, Chair, and good afternoon. I will start and we will seamlessly continue. My name is Anna Jarosz-Friis, I'm Director for Ukraine Service at DG NEAR. And indeed, as you have just alluded to, the Ukraine support loan that will soon start disbursing is not operating in a vacuum, but in conjunction with other support instruments to Ukraine which are deploying. And as you might have seen, two weeks ago, the Commission disbursed 2.8 billion euro under the Ukraine Facility against reform conditionality, providing a liquidity injection to Ukraine in this current moment and allowing it a bit of a respite while we are working on the disbursements from the Ukraine support loan that will start very soon.
Maybe just to recall the basic structure based on the Council decision determining the allocation of the Ukraine support loan for 2026 based on the Ukrainian financing strategy. We have 45 billions for 2026 and split between the defense procurement at 28.3 billion and budget support 16.7 billion, which in turn is split in between two instruments: a macro-financial assistance that the Director-General of DG ECFIN will talk about and the top-up to Ukraine Plan in equal part, 8.75 billion each. The two instruments in terms of policy conditionality are very complementary. In terms of Ukraine Plan, it will be the one disbursing last under the Ukraine support loan because additional resources require its revision in order also to agree new reform conditionality in line with the regulation, in particular to be focused on the rule of law. I am very pleased to inform the honorable members that after intense discussions with the Ukrainian authorities, primarily the government of Ukraine, but also Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, Ukraine has submitted a revised plan to the Commission.
And last week we have adopted a proposal for a Council implementing decision to approve it. Once done, it would allow for payments with the old money of the Ukraine Facility and the top-up from Ukraine support loan to take place. The bulk of the new reforms are focused on really on the rule of law, but also on some of the structural reforms that the economy needs in relation to the energy, the governance of state-owned companies, but also to strengthening the social aspects of the recovery as the country continues to rebuild despite the ongoing aggression. And then again, just to finish for kind of overall context, we still have 45 billion for next year. And we would start working with the Ukrainian authorities so that in September we can be discussing with them the financing strategy, how to divide or allocate the remaining 45 billion for 2027.
And with that, that's it from me and I give the floor over to Martin.
Maarten Verwey
Thank you, Anna, and I will indeed continue with the part on the macro-financial assistance part of the Ukraine support loan. And let me start with some good news here. Following request by Ukraine, the Commission has agreed last Thursday, 18th of June, to a first disbursement under the MFA component of 3.2 billion euro. And the disbursement will take later this week, still in time for the Ukraine Recovery Conference that will be held at the 25th and 26th of this week. We expect two more disbursements for 2026.
The second installment, which should amount to 3.7 billion, is tentatively scheduled for September of this year. And the third installment, indicatively of 1.45 billion, is expected towards the end of the year, which then should bring the total for MFA for 2026 to 8.35 billion euro. Now, the first disbursement was made possible by the policy conditionality aspect of the macro-financial assistance instrument.
And as part of the MFA component, the Ukraine, Ukrainian authorities have committed to a package of 32 reform measures this year. In line with the regulation, the measures under the MFA have a strong focus on improving public finance with three priority areas for action. First, broaden the tax base and generate revenues. Second, enhance the quality and sustainability of public expenditure. And third, improve the efficiency, transparency and accountability of public finance management systems.
To obtain the first disbursement, Ukraine has for instance taken steps to strengthen domestic revenue mobilization, such as the extension of the military levy, a draft legislation on income from digital platforms and draft legislation to remove VAT exemptions on low-value imported parcels. Moreover, Ukraine has progressed with reforms to improve public investment management, its customs legislation and governance, as well as to strengthen the medium-term public financial management agenda. Now, for the, for the second and third disbursement under the MFF, further steps are envisaged in, and follow-up steps are envisaged in these very same policy areas. So in the area of domestic policy, revenue mobilization, quality and sustainability of public finance and public financial management. Taken together, these reforms have a great potential to support Ukraine's successful transformation and its integration with the EU and the wider global economy, and they will also help to build confidence and strengthen public finances and attract the much-needed private investment.
And as such, we see this also as very much complementary to the military effort that is made because you need also a strong economy to withstand the pressure on the military side. And with this, I turn it over to my colleague, Abel.
Abel
Dear chairs, honorable members, it's an honor to brief you here on the defense side of the UAF, where indeed we have a budget of 60 billion for two years and in particular in this first year, slightly over 28 billions that are going to be focused in particular on drones, missiles, air defense and ammunition. We have received from Ukrainian side already in March a first so-called product schedule that was focusing on drones and where we have received already last week, the 18th of June, their reimbursement request, which we hope will still be able to be made during the month of June. And so we're progressing in the implementation in real time. We hope to be receiving still this week the next set of product schedules that will be focused in particular on drones one more time, on missiles and on air defense. It is quite essential, dear members, that the Ukrainian and EU defense industries play of course a major role in supplying the EU armed forces to ensure security of supply, but also to integrate between Ukraine and the European defense base.
On the implementation, it is also important for you to note that the Commission has put in place quite a lot of checks and balances to ensure that the request for funds complies with the conditions set out in the regulation, in particular the eligibility of the contracts.
We have received some 255 under the first schedule that we are now checking. And we of course have not only ex-ante checks, but also on-site checks and ex-post checks for which DG DEFIS has a special team set up for the audits. The Commission is also working on the association of third countries in order to reinforce because as also Mrs. Strack-Zimmermann said, we can go in a cascade to third countries. And we would like to of course reinforce first the first part of the of the let's say of the cascade where countries could be reinforcing the EU base, which is ongoing in particular to associate NATO allies, Canada, which has a bilateral agreement under SAFE and could be associated to a delegated act, and the United Kingdom via Council implementing decision. Both of which are ongoing right now.
And of course that negotiation also focuses on the financial contributions that these third countries would have to pay, sharing the financial burden with the EU, notably for the payment of the interest costs. So that is where we stand in the implementation of the 28.3 billion of this year. Let me still put a point on the cooperation between Ukrainian and EU defense bases. When we knew the priorities for this first year, Commissioner Kubilius in particular engaged himself into a so-called missile tour, meeting the ministers of defense and industries to discuss the industrial production capacity and the availability of such critical products. We in parallel targeted also a mapping exercise to know what would be available from the EU industry and from Ukraine.
We have held technical level discussions with the industry and we saw that there is a significant gap between what the Ukraine needs and what the industry can deliver in the short term. Meaning that in a few months we have to in particular ramp up in particular the ammunition and air defense missiles, but also still drones and and long-range strikes. On the 18th of June, so last week, our Commissioner met the national armament directors to discuss this gap and also to see how we can bridge that gap towards the Ukrainian needs and the offers that we are receiving from participating countries and the industry. We also then look towards the possibility to stress member states coming forward with additional offers through national stocks that are still maybe available and also to rearrange procurement contracts that are ongoing right at this moment in time to make sure that this gap is bridged. I have to stress that if Ukraine doesn't receive offers for those products in time and at scale, then indeed there is the possibility to procure from non-EU sources.
And we are also in contact with non-EU sources already at this moment in time via NATO, via PERL and with countries that are engaged positively towards Ukraine, like-minded countries, third countries. Here we hope that we can have support as well because we think that all of the sides will be needed in order to really bring to Ukraine what it needs. We have a discussion with Ukraine ongoing on strengthening the EU-Ukraine participation. There is a possibility for a testing in Ukraine campaign. There is a possibility for ramping up production on components.
But we also stress towards Ukraine the need for more joint ventures between Ukrainian and EU companies and also to reinforce the Ukraine support instrument in order to ramp up the production. We believe in a win-win solution for all. Security of supply, resilience, innovation, technology sharing and mass production capacity all go hand in hand and are necessary to support Ukraine in what it needs. We hope that the needs of Ukraine and the Europeans' resilience and its ramp-up on the production side are not separate but joint, same strategic goals to be pursued. Thank you.
Bernd Lange
Thanks a lot to all three of you. And now I give the floor to the rapporteur on this file, Michael Gahler. Can't be here, he is replaced by the chair of the delegation EU-Ukraine, Pekka Toveri.
Pekka Toveri
Thank you, dear chairs, dear colleagues. I find it very positive that following the European Council's political agreement last December, the European Union has succeeded in translating political commitment into concrete actions finally. Reaching this point is a significant achievement and demonstrates that when necessary, the Union can deliver on its commitments. This loan is one of the strongest signals the European Union can send to Ukraine. We continue to stand with Ukraine in practice.
The uncertainty in the spring surrounding the implementation of this package was very concerning. If the European Union had announced its support and then failed to deliver, the message to Ukraine would have been devastating. At the time when Ukrainians are fighting for their country's survival, hesitation from Europe would have been a direct gift to Russia. It was disappointing that frozen Russian assets were not utilized in this financing round to the extent originally envisaged. Many citizens understandably ask why European taxpayers are expected to shoulder the burden of the loan while Russian state assets remain largely untouched.
While the legal challenges are real, we should continue exploring all possible mechanisms that ensure Russia contributes to the cost of the destruction it has caused. At the same time, this package also highlights the importance of democratic accountability. A 19 billion loan facility corresponds to roughly 200 euros per EU citizen. This is a significant commitment and precisely because it is significant, European citizens deserve transparency, accountability and proper democratic scrutiny. All our institutions have a responsibility to contribute to the successful implementation and oversight of this loan.
Even though the outcome of this negotiation was ultimately positive, the process itself was not perfect. There are lessons to be learned and we need to learn them quickly. Given the scale and significance of this facility, the preparation for effective monitoring and parliamentary scrutiny has not been sufficient. This is a lesson not only for Commission and Council, but for the Parliament as well. Our preparation for effective monitoring and scrutiny for this huge loan was not been enough today.
The European Parliament represents the citizens of the Union and transparent engagement with the Parliament should be considered a basic responsibility of the Commission. Members of this house carry a democratic mandate and are accountable to European citizens. Maintaining public support for Ukraine over the long term requires democratic legitimacy and public trust. That's what we are here for. What comes to the implementation, right balance is crucially important.
Ukraine needs flexibility to acquire urgently needed capabilities for the battlefield and the Commission should be prepared to apply eligibility rules in the Article 13 pragmatically where necessary. We must be realistic about Ukraine's defense needs. In the upcoming discussions, special attention should be paid to the objective of strengthening Europe's defense industrial base. While the objective is itself is understandable, we must recognize the reality of the Ukraine's battlefield requirements. The Commission must be prepared to apply the available derogation pragmatically and where necessary consider additional flexibility as it has promised to do in the statement on the implementation of the loan.
This is not all about European defense industry interest, this is about Ukraine's survival. Ukraine will continue to require rapid access to critical capabilities including drones, long-range strike systems, ammunition, air defense assets. And as we just heard from the Commission, Europe's defense industry is not is improving, but is not yet available able to fully meet Ukraine's operational requirements in terms of volume, speed and specific capabilities. At the same time, strong monitoring, transparency and continued progress in anti-corruption reform must remain integral part of the loan. The use of funds should be monitored through the agreed mechanism and any shortcomings must be reported openly and addressed transparently.
Problems should be corrected together, not concealed. Looking ahead, it is essential that the European Union prepares the next financing package proactively rather than reactively. Ukraine's financial needs will not be unexpected in the future. We should avoid negotiating future support under constant emergency condition and instead provide predictable and long-term frameworks that give certainty to Ukraine in their tireless defense of our whole continent. Thank you.
Bernd Lange
Thanks a lot. And I give now the floor Jean-Marc, he's the BUDG co-rapporteur.
Nacho Sánchez Amor
Sorry, sorry Ben, I have to leave. Then if you don't mind I can take AFET on behalf of the S&D. Gracias. Voy a hablar en espa!ol. Quiero transmitir en nombre de mi colega Thijs Reuten, que es el encargado del dossier, el agradecimiento del Parlamento, de nuestro grupo, por las clarificaciones que la Comisi"n nos dio en el #ltimo pleno.
Es una se!al positiva que finalmente tengamos la tercera pieza legislativa necesaria para hacer efectiva la defensa de Ucrania en marcha y porque la guerra, como se ha se!alado, est en un momento cr!tico y tenemos que ayudar a defender a Ucrania y de esa manera conseguir una paz sostenible. Por tanto, hay que pedir un esfuerzo m ximo a la industria de defensa europea y hay que estar preparados para las situaciones en que nuestra industria europea no sea capaz de proveer los equipamientos. Y ah! est previsto que podamos acudir a los mercados y desde ese punto de vista esa referencia al SAFE parece #til. Yo querr!a preguntar a los colegas de la Comisi"n si consideran que ese recurso a los mercados porque la industria de defensa europea no sea capaz de llegar hasta el final a dar servicios incluye a algunos socios preferentes que han tenido problemas para estar en SAFE. Estoy pensando en la importancia de la industria de defensa, por ejemplo, de Turqu!a.
Tambi%n querr!amos saber cu l es el estado de la situaci"n del uso de los assets rusos inmovilizados en la Uni"n Europea y si hay alguna situaci"n que debamos saber como Parlamento sobre el posible uso de esos recursos porque es la posici"n que se va a aprobar el mes que viene en el informe sobre Ucrania. Y eso era lo que quer!a preguntar en nombre de mi colega Thijs que acaba de llegar ahora mismo. Muchas gracias.
Jean-Marc Germain
Thank you very much, I will speak in French. D'abord, bien s#r, comment ne pas nous f%liciter que l'Union europ%enne ait %t% la hauteur avec ce pr't de 90 milliards d'euros l'Ukraine. On a assist% ces moments o# chaque %tat membre et les institutions europ%ennes sont capables de se d%passer avec des sommes qui sont %normes pour faire face un probl'me qui l'est tout autant puisqu'il s'agit non moins que la s%curit% de l'Union europ%enne.
Bien sûr, en tant que groupe S&D, nous aurions souhaité que la question de l'utilisation des avoirs russes soit ne soit pas abandonnée. D'ailleurs, nous demandons à ce qu'elle ne le soit pas et que dès lors que la possibilité d'utiliser les avoirs russes gelés pour financer le soutien à l'Ukraine, quelle qu'en soit la forme, et en particulier la reconstruction, nous paraît être politiquement juste et nécessaire. Troisième élément sur les questions budgétaires, comme l'a dit d'ailleurs notre vice-président, nous avons regretté que les États membres n'acceptent pas d'augmenter leur contribution au budget de l'Union européenne pour financer les intérêts de cet emprunt, et ce d'autant plus que la contribution des États membres au budget européen n'est pas de 1,1 % comme c'était prévu initialement dans le deal du MFF actuellement, mais compte tenu de l'inflation de 1 % et même dans la copie que nous avons reçue pour 2017, on est en dessous de 1 %. Et donc il nous semble que cette question doit être toujours sur la table et qu'en tout cas, il ne faut pas sacrifier les priorités du budget européen pour financer ce prêt totalement nécessaire. Troisième élément qui est aussi une question qui s'adresse à la Commission, on a bien noté les prévisions du FMI qui ont fondé le dimensionnement de l'enveloppe de 90 milliards, qui était d'une somme de 136 milliards sur la période 2026-2029 et 95 milliards sur 2026-2027, ce qui fait d'ailleurs que les 95 milliards sont pris en charge quasi intégralement par le seul budget européen.
Donc la question, c'est est-ce que vous pouvez confirmer ces chiffres ou est-ce que les nouvelles actualités conduisent à augmenter ou à diminuer cette enveloppe ? Et puis question aussi liée, est-ce que des progrès sont faits sur les cofinanceurs qui pourraient se joindre à l'Union européenne ? Troisième question, quelles sont les perspectives si jamais la guerre était amenée à durer avec l'intensité qui est la sienne actuellement ? Quelles sont les évaluations après 2027 et du coup, quels seraient les éventuels besoins de faire appel à nouveau à un soutien de l'Union européenne ? Et puis dernière question qui a déjà été évoquée par mon collègue, est-ce que dans la première mise en place des 60 milliards pour la défense, les dispositions qui ont été prévues offrent assez de flexibilité pour répondre aux besoins militaires ukrainiens sur le terrain ?
Je vous remercie.
Bernd Lange
Merci beaucoup. Now I have a big tableau of speakers from the different political groups, coordinators, rapporteurs, standing rapporteurs, shadow rapporteurs. So each has now one and a half minute. I'm a little bit generous on that, so but please don't extend it too much. EPP, we have first Jörgen Warborn.
Jörgen Warborn
Thank you, Bernd. Thank you, Chair.
I'm speaking on behalf of Sandra Kalniete, our shadow rapporteur on the monitoring group on Ukraine. And she says the following. Honorable colleagues, Ukraine has done its homework, now Europe must deliver. The Commission's assessment is clear. Kyiv has met the strict policy condition for the first tranche, while defending its energy grid and our freedom.
Accession negotiations are underway, Ukraine's European future is a living process. On behalf of the EPP group, our messages today rest on three commitments. First, speed. The first tranche is on track, but in a war of attrition, time is the ultimate weapon. We cannot allow future disbursements to be held hostage to procedural hesitation.
Ukraine's budget cannot wait. Second, policy cohesion. As the INTA committee, we cannot approve 90 billion euros in aid with one hand, while tolerating unilateral import bans inside our single market with the other. True strategic support means keeping our border open. Third, the principle of moral symmetry.
This loan mechanism is the right step forward, but we must stand by our ultimate position: the aggressor must pay. Our taxpayers are showing immense solidarity, but Russia's immobilized assets must be the ones clearing the final bill. We must move to freezing Russian assets to using them more decisively, and we need longer-term legal certainty for our sanction regime, not perpetual short-term extensions. Ukraine is Europe's security shield, let us reinforce it now. Thank you.
Janusz Lewandowski
Thanks a lot Jörgen. Very shortly, one question already asked twice in this room, that is whether the reparation loan backed by frozen assets is still on agenda because I don't see any developments political or legal, and I agree with the speakers so far that the aggressor should pay for damage and rebuilding and not the European taxpayers as it is actually realistically the case with this 90 billion loan. Thank you. Thanks a lot. So, Nacho took the floor, Sven is not there, and Jean-Marc also spoke.
So, then on the Patriots, it's Andreas Laszlo. And then we have Thierry.
Thierry Mariani
Merci Monsieur le Président. En plus des 43 milliards d'euros d'assistance macro-financière versés entre 2022 et 2026, où figure déjà une part importante de prêts, s'ajoute donc désormais 90 milliards de prêts décidés en décembre 2025. Ces prêts dont la Cour des comptes de l'Union européenne nous dit de manière alarmante déjà dans son rapport annuel sur l'exécution du budget 2024 que les États membres sont désormais exposés à des risques importants si ces sommes ne sont pas remboursées. Or, on se demande comment l'Ukraine dont l'État est en faillite pourra-t-elle rembourser ces prêts.
La réponse est qu'elle ne le fera probablement jamais, et vous le savez. Puisqu'à la Commission, vous avez prévu que ces remboursements soient conditionnés par des réparations de guerre russes une fois la paix signée. C'est-à-dire que nous conditionnons le remboursement d'un prêt à un scénario hypothétique négocié entre des belligérants qui ne se parlent même pas. Le Sénat français a d'ailleurs souligné l'absurdité de cette comptabilité fictive dans un rapport d'information d'octobre 2025, que le scénario le plus probable est que l'Ukraine ne pourra jamais rembourser ses emprunts en temps et en heure et devra compter à nouveau sur d'autres rallonges européennes pour se maintenir à flot. Tout cet argent européen disparaît en Ukraine dans l'effort de guerre, le fonctionnement de l'État, mais aussi et surtout dans la corruption.
Voici donc une question simple pour la Commission : quand allons-nous donc cesser de donner de l'argent en sachant très bien que ces prêts ne seront probablement jamais remboursés ? Ne vaut-il pas mieux tout de suite dire la vérité aux contribuables européens : c'est vous qui paierez parce qu'il n'y a pas d'autre solution ?
Richard
Yes, thank you, Chair. Well, just answering quickly to colleague. Ukraine not paying back, well, let's remind about the German Marshall Fund as well. Somebody could claim that those who were given loans had never paid back, but they paid by different ways and means. Nevertheless, I wanted to start to reiterate ECR Group's position.
We remain strongly committed to supporting Ukraine, not only military, but also in keeping its economy functioning and its reform track towards EU membership alive. As we heard from the Commission, we are very much pleased to hear and see the, welcome the news on the macro-financial assistance, 3.2 billion going ahead. However, the scale of the pressure Ukraine is facing is vast, with IMF projecting an external financing gap of 52 billion for 2026 and 43.7 billion for 2027. That is on top of what we are projecting, the 90 billion loan. So this is why the discussion should focus less on the headline numbers and more on delivery, conditionality and durability.
So I have set of questions for the Commission. The first one is reforms and conditionality. So Ukraine's democratic institutions are functioning under martial law, rule of law and fundamental rights are respected, core anti-corruption bodies are operating. At the same time, we see growing concerns on judicial reform and integrity of judges' declarations. So here I would like to ask the Commission how the Commission assesses the situation and how can the Parliament and Commission contribute and support Ukraine with staying on track with reforms in a way that is firm on standards but avoids public grandstanding that Moscow would gladly exploit.
Second, on disbursements. After this first instalment of 3.2 billion, what is the timetable for the next payments and which benchmarks should we monitor most closely? Please be specific on those areas. And third, on international burden sharing. If the EU is covering around two-thirds of Ukraine's financial needs for 2026 and 2027, what is the plan for the remaining one-third?
What has the Ukraine donor platform delivered in practical terms? And I would like to conclude to invite maybe for the Commission, for Member States to commit, as some of the Member States have done it already, 0.25% from their GDP providing assistance to Ukraine. There are several Member States who are doing that, and I mean there should be more and total 27 that are committed 0.25% from GDP in assistance to Ukraine. Thank you.
Villy Søvndal
Yes, thank you very much, Chair. We stand with Ukraine as long as it takes, it's an often repeated sentence in this house. And the loan is the strongest concrete example so far of our support.
When Russia attacked Ukraine more than four years ago, I'm sure that a lot of people in this room were in doubt of what would happen. What would be the future of the people of Ukraine? Over these three years, four years, I've been very much impressed to see how much resilience and how much willingness to fight the Ukrainian people showed. I think we should be proud, proud of what we supported. I come from Denmark, and I think it's important that the European countries step up, because we are in maybe a defining moment of this conflict just now.
So we should be very, we should do it more in common to help to fight for their freedom. Finally, we see that the process for Ukraine's EU membership is becoming a reality and not blocked anymore. This will ensure the process to implement the necessary reforms will begin. Therefore, I ask our colleagues, please never forget what the brave European people are fighting for. They're fighting for their own freedom, but they're also fighting for the freedom of the rest of us.
To ensure Ukraine victory, however, we must stand right by their side for as long as it takes, with the loan, with sanctions to Russia, also with quick negotiations about membership for Ukraine. And at the same time, of course, we must insist that Ukraine continues down its path to rule of law and that our governments stay on course in the implementation of anti-corruption measures. A European future is on the horizon for Ukraine, but for it to come into reality, it requires commitment both from our side and also from the Ukrainian people. Thank you very much.
Alexander Jungbluth
Vielen Dank, Herr Vorsitzender. Ich beschränke mich auch auf eher finanzpolitische Fragestellungen in dieser Angelegenheit. Zum einen wurde jetzt sehr oft angesprochen, dass eben die Nutzung der russischen Vermögensgegenstände genutzt werden sollen und wurde auch so ein bisschen Kritik geübt, dass das nicht schnell genug ginge. Ich bitte zu betonen, dass auf finanzpolitischer und auch aus rechtlicher Sicht es eben weiter große Bedenken dagegen gibt, diese Mittel zu nutzen. Da würde mich mal interessieren, wie da der aktuelle Stand ist.
Ich habe dazu mal ein kurzes Gutachten gelesen. Dieses Gutachten sagt insbesondere, dass man hier differenzieren müsste zwischen einmal den Assets und den Zinseinnahmen, die daraus generiert werden. Kurz gesagt, bei den Assets ist es problematisch, diese Vermögensgegenstände zu nutzen, bei den Zinseinnahmen noch sehr viel problematischer. Das heißt insbesondere die aus den eingefrorenen Assets erzielten Zinseinnahmen dürften diesen Gutachten zufolge nicht genutzt werden. Vielleicht könnten Sie darauf kurz Stellung nehmen.
Dann bei der nun stattgefundenen Auszahlung der 60 Milliarden insbesondere für militärische Zwecke möchte ich mal wissen, es wird mit Sicherheit auch ein laufendes Verfahren zu der Mittelverwendung geben, also dass es dort ein gewisses Monitoring unsererseits gibt, insbesondere vor dem Hintergrund, dass es ja doch zu wesentlichen Korruptionsfällen innerhalb der Ukraine gekommen sind und deshalb grundsätzlich unsererseits ja ein Interesse daran bestehen sollte, dass diese Mittel auch vernünftig verwendet werden.
Und das Dritte ist dann tatsächlich diese Rückzahlungsoption. Und viele der Kollegen haben sinngemäß gesagt, ja, der Aggressor wird dafür bezahlen müssen. Ich bitte hier an dieser Stelle zu betonen, dass ich glaube, dass der realistischste Ausgang dieses Krieges ein Frieden zwischen den beiden sein wird und kein militärischer Sieg der einen oder anderen Seite. Das heißt, ob man das jetzt möchte oder nicht, dass ein ein Frieden am Verhandlungstisch wird dazu führen, dass es eben keine Maximalforderung dahingehend geben wird, dass Zitat der Aggressor bezahlen wird. Und vor dem Hintergrund, dass eben nicht davon auszugehen ist, dass diese Rückzahlung eben vollständig durch Russland geschieht, möchte ich dann noch mal eine Stellungnahme dazu haben, wie es aus haftungsrechtlicher Sicht dann im Zweifelsfall aussehen würde.
Bernd Lange
Danke. So, now we have the possibility for other members to ask for the floor and I have one, Mr. Geise.
Thomas Geisel
Vielen Dank, Herr Vorsitzender. Ich habe drei Fragen. Das eine, dieses Darlehen soll ja in Höhe von 60 Milliarden für Waffenkäufe dienen, in Höhe von 30 Milliarden zur Abwendung des ukrainischen Staatsbankrotts. Was ist die Einschätzung der Kommission, welcher Anteil der 60 Milliarden an die europäische Rüstungsindustrie geht und welcher Anteil dieses Geldes für die Waffenkäufe außerhalb Europas genutzt wird? Die zweite Frage: Wie lange reichen die 30 Milliarden nach Einschätzung der Kommission, um den Staatsbankrott der Ukraine abzuwehren?
Und die dritte Frage im Nachgang zu dem, was Herr Jungbluth gefragt hat: Unter welchen Voraussetzungen geht die Kommission davon aus, dass sich Russland tatsächlich zu Reparationszahlungen verpflichten würde, die dann der Refinanzierung dieses Darlehens dienen könnten? Vielen Dank.
Thank you, Thijs.
Thijs Reuten
Yeah, thank you, Chair, and as as colleague Nacho Sánchez Amor said, he already said a couple of things on behalf also of myself, but I want to reiterate and be very, very precise and ask a precise question to the Commission, because the commitment of the European Commission clarifications provided during the plenary of February still stands fully as regard as far as the Parliament is concerned. So that means that when maximum efforts for European defense industry to scale up capacities in the interest of Ukraine ourselves will do, that's great, but if not, where Europe cannot deliver what Ukraine needs in volumes or in time, there must be, and I say, no obstacles to procure such items in another way, no obstacles. That's not small obstacles or limited obstacles or obstacles with a limited duration, no, no obstacles. So I would like to hear from the Commission confirmation that they really uphold this principle also when we hear some signals, despite all the positive news from Ukrainian partners, that there are also some adverse signals in this regard. So please clarify that issue as well.
Tomasz Buczek
Ja mam pytanie w kontekście ostatnich wydarzeń, jakie miały miejsce na Ukrainie, odznaczenia przez pana prezydenta Zełenskiego batalionu sił specjalnych walczących na Ukrainie przez nazwą bohaterów UPA. Jest to bardzo ważna kwestia dla milionów Polaków, którzy pamiętają doskonale rzeź wołyńską, którą niedługo będziemy obchodzić 11 lipca. I jest to żywy problem, który w naszej ocenie również powinien być wzięty przynajmniej przez Komisję Europejską pod uwagę, czy nie nakłaniać stronę ukraińską do tego, aby coraz, żeby Ukraina odchodziła od propagowania i czczenia bohaterów kolaborantów hitleronazistów.
To jest moja propozycja, może poddalibyśmy tutaj dyskusji r3wnież, jeżeli będzie taka wola.
Bernd Lange
Thanks a lot. So I guess this was the last request, just looking around. Okay, then I give back the floor to the Commission to answer these various questions. Up to you who want to start and how you divide it.
Anna JAROSZ-FRIIS
Um, thank you, thank you very much. I will start with addressing the questions in terms of financing gap, international burden sharing, rule of law, and then Martin and Harald will continue. So maybe on, on the general issues of the rule of law, there were several remarks, but also a question in terms of how the Parliament can, can support Ukraine best in that process. Let me just say two important matters. As honorable members are certainly aware, last, last Monday on the 15th of June, an intergovernmental conference took place and opened the first clusters of negotiations with Ukraine in relation to fundamentals.
That is a recognition by member states of an assessment by the Commission that's been there for quite some time, that Ukraine has reached the progress that is absolutely merited in terms of opening of the first clusters of the accession negotiations. It also means that Ukraine is receiving a very clear list of what to do next. These are so-called interim benchmarks in the context of the rule of law. So it's crystal clear for Ukrainian authorities, for the government, for the parliament, and for the other anti-corruption and also law enforcement agencies, what are the priorities for the reforms and how they should continue. We are then picking up the core of it and putting it as part of conditionality for the revised Ukraine Plan.
And these will then, under the Ukraine's commitments, will happen in the course of 2026. So we are really seeing a lot of commitment on the Ukrainian side to continue. There's a lot of work that still has to happen. And I think we would be incredibly grateful if the Parliament continued engaging with your counterpart in the Verkhovna Rada to pass the message and impress on them the importance of their legislative work in order to bring these reforms forward. There's a lot of inter, very valuable inter-parliamentary work with Verkhovna Rada going on.
It's from our point of view incredibly precious and we would be very grateful if that continues. But you know, the roadmaps, the homework is crystal clear and also the prioritization of, of these reforms are very clear.
Um, on the financing, um, I think to, like, we are working on the basis of the assessment of the financing needs and financing gap, which is what's left to cover after Ukrainian internal revenue-raising measures and the funding committed by the Union, the Member States and other partners has been taken into account. With the Ukraine support loan, but also with the efforts that were the result of lots of work in the G7 fora and also in the Ukraine Donor Platform, the funding gap for 2026 is covered, and here the Ukraine support loan and in particular its defense leg is a complete game changer in that respect. In terms of 2027, the Union's commitment and the contribution is clear, and the work on stepping up or encouraging other partners to step up their efforts is ongoing, among others later this week at the occasion of the Ukraine Recovery Conference in Gdansk, when we will have both the finance ministers' meeting, expecting announcements from some of the partners, and also further discussions in the Ukraine Donor Platform. That work is certainly not over, but it's continuing in the fora that are actually effectively relevant to that respect. It's useful to remember that there's a huge uncertainty around those needs because they are very much driven by the war.
Thank you.
Maarten Verwey
Okay. Oh, sorry. No, several of you made reference to the immobilized and frozen Russian assets. Let me say a few words on that. First of all, as you can imagine, we have first focused now on getting the Ukraine support loan up and running and to make sure that we actually are in a position to disburse, which we think managed to do.
Second point to make is that the December statement of the European Council is still in force. So just to recall what that statement more or less said is that, first of all, very important, Ukraine only has to repay on the loan when it receives reparations from Russia. That's one. And until such time, these assets remain immobilized. Second, and the third point that was mentioned in that statement is that the Union reserves the right to make use of the assets to repay the loan.
So these are the three elements that have been put out and they are still relevant. Now, there was a concern raised, and this was certainly a concern before December, on the point that was made was that we should find a way to create more certainty about the continued immobilization of these assets. This was very topical certainly in the last months of last year, but since then a number of things have happened which make that a bit less of a concern today.
You may recall that the Council actually adopted a new regulation under Article 122.1 based on the notion that Russia was not only creating damages to Ukraine, but also damages to the European Union, and that gave an additional ground to keep these assets under lock. So that's, so there is in a way a double lock. And the other part obviously is that also the composition of the European Council itself has changed. So at the moment, I think we are a bit less concerned on that part. Then there was one comment on the, if I understood correctly, on the use of the interest rate versus the use of the assets.
Just to be clear, also in the original reparation loan idea was never the idea to confiscate the assets. So there was no confiscation foreseen. And already prior to the reparation loan idea, we had this G7 initiative, the ERA so-called ERA loan initiative. And that initiative actually makes use of the interest rate and we to repay the ERA loan. So as we speak, already these revenues that are generated through the immobilization of the assets, they are already being used as we speak.
So let me stop here.
Abel
Honorable members, to add on the defense side of the questions. I think it's obviously clear that the availability of 28.3 billion under the 2026 budget for the Ukraine support loan has to be targeted on what Ukraine needs. And it is absolutely clear from what all of us witness that the needs in the battlefield are obvious on drones, counter-drones, missiles, air defense, but also long-strike ammunition, so-called extended-range ammunition and deep strikes. And these have been ensuring that there is a window of opportunity at this moment in time that we are all witnessing. So when we are implementing, we are implementing as to the regulation, which is foreseeing that the cascade can enter fully into force with products that can be procured by Ukraine through product schedules from Ukraine, from the EU, and from third countries in the cascade where that is needed.
I think that we have been clear from Commission side here in this room and in other rooms that this is functioning in this way. And there is a flexibility that is needed, as I also said in my opening statement, because there is sufficient products on the market only when we use the full extent of the regulation and go also in certain cases to third countries. The first product schedule of drones that was requested was only Ukrainian because there's simply no production volume in the EU at the moment of request in March. And thereby there will be a first payment now in June of about 5 billion going to these contracts that have been concluded under the first product schedule, some 255 in total.
But also for the product schedules to come, I can clearly see that there will be a combination of Ukrainian, European and third country products that will be procured from Ukraine and that will, I think, go without any further doubt in sync with the regulation. Two more points that I would like to highlight. Of course, the Commission together with Ukraine and the Member States is looking at the possibilities that SAFE offers, because of course under the request of Ukraine we have a number of contracts by Member States under the SAFE plans of those Member States which can be co-opened up and which can thereby make, let's say, deliverables to Ukraine. And we are looking at that at this moment in time in order to, again, reply to the Ukrainian needs. And I would also want to underline one more time, as I spoke in the introduction, that of course we are looking very carefully ex-ante, during execution and ex-post on the specifics of each product schedule.
So we are looking at those contracts that have been concluded and when we are then paying out on such a specific product schedule, we are doing all of these checks. We are therefore also in contact with all of the other bodies that the Union has and also with the anti-corruption bodies that Ukraine has and making sure that this is as serious and as tight as it possibly can be. So I hope that this will be able to reverse and deliver and to make sure that what many of you have said, to be able to be standing alongside Ukraine in this battle against this war of aggression of Russia. Thank you.
Bogdan Andrzej Zdrojewski
Można? Thank you very much. I will speak Polish. Bardzo oczywiście trzymamy kciuki za Ukrainę. Jesteśmy pełni podziwu dla ich wysiłków.
Wiemy jaka jest skala tej wojny, ile jest ofiar. Wiemy także, że Ukraina aspiruje do tego, aby być w Unii Europejskiej. Dajemy jej różne warunki, także przy tej pożyczce, aby było mniej korupcji, aby była większa transparentność, aby postępowania przetargowe, krótko mówiąc, nie budziły wątpliwości. Ktoś, kto aspiruje jednocześnie do bycia w Unii Europejskiej, musi podzielać też nasze wartości, zwłaszcza szacunek wobec prawdy. Ja nie mogę przejść obojętnie do porządku dziennego nad tym, że te środki pomocowe, nasze finansowe, trafią do batalionu, który ma patrona zbrodniarzy, zbrodniarzy nie budzących wątpliwości.
To nie jest symbolika, to jest pokazanie czy Ukraina jest rzeczywiście zainteresowana wejściem do rodziny państw europejskich i uważam, że nie można przejść bez przynajmniej wyrażenia sprzeciwu wobec tego stanu rzeczy. Nie oczekuję tu żadnej warunkowości w postaci takiej, że nie pomożemy, bo taki batalion takiego patrona ma. Ale zróbmy przynajmniej coś, co do nas należy. Brońmy europejskich wartości, w których nie ma miejsca na lekceważenie, krótko mówiąc, zbrodni hitlerowskich, podważanie istnienia komór gazowych, ludobójstwa, etc., etc. Zróbmy cokolwiek w tej materii, aby jednak powiedzieć, że tego typu rzeczy nie powinny mieć miejsca.
Bernd Lange
I guess there is no doubt about that. Thanks a lot for this remark and thanks a lot once again to the Commission. And I guess it's important to have a clear picture about the state of play. And it's also totally clear that the loan is vital for the Ukraine to stand against this Russian aggression and we will support this of course. There will be of course a follow-up, no doubt about in due time.
It's not fixed yet, but we will have a close eye because it's a lot of money which we are spending here. There is also no request for any other business and therefore I can conclude this meeting. Thanks a lot for joining.
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