Special committee on the European Democracy Shield Ordinary meeting
Legend
Transcript markers
- text Sentence being played
- text Search result
- text Intervention cited by the link you opened
Click a sentence to play the video from that moment. Select text to quote it with the speaker, timestamp and link.
More options
Offset
Transcript offset
Export
Replay
Versions of this video
Transcripts may differ slightly from one version to another.
EUDS European Parliament
Follow its sittingsMagnus Brunner
And criminal organizations do not only threaten the public safety, they also threaten democracy itself. And that happens through corruption, through intimidation, also infiltration, of course, of legitimate businesses and also public institutions. Organized crime undermines the rule of law and also citizens' confidence in governments. So we need to tackle organized crime and also strengthen cross-border law enforcement cooperation. This is really key for us, and I come back to that a bit later when talking about Europol, because Europol there plays also a very important role.
To root out organized crime, we will, hopefully by the end of the year, modernize the rules to tackle organized crime networks with a proposal coming up, hopefully in autumn. We'll see how that works, but very optimistic on that. And already tomorrow, coming back to Europol, already tomorrow we will be adopting a legislative proposal to strengthen the mandate of Europol, equipping it for today's increasingly complex landscape it faces, or we are all facing together. The new Europol will support faster and also more comprehensive information sharing and also, and this is key and this is new, real-time cooperation between the different law enforcement authorities of the member states for more effective investigation, for swifter investigations. And also, I think protecting democracy requires actually protecting those who serve it.
That's journalists, that's judges, that's election officials, politicians, local politicians especially, and civil society activists, because they are increasingly subject to threats, to harassment, and also intimidation sometimes. And I think effective internal security policies can, of course, help to ensure that those who defend democratic values can do so safely and also freely. And protecting democracy, I think, also means protecting every European's right to practice his or her religion. This is also something I think we also have to always have to keep in mind, practice his or her religion in peace, do so openly, of course, also. We are seeing actually a shocking rise in antisemitism and at the same time more widespread anti-Muslim hatred as well.
And the European Union can, of course, tolerate neither one nor the other. And for all these points, I would say, and this is really important, and I know the discussion especially in this house is maybe a bit diverse, good morning, we need access to data. And access to data, I think, is of central importance, as criminals, of course, often hide behind the anonymity of the digital world. And that's why access to data is so important, of course, everything lawful and respecting all the fundamental rights and respecting all rights and laws altogether. But we must deliver, I think, on this roadmap on access to data if we want law enforcement to be effective.
And to put it in an even simpler way without data access we cannot ensure security. That has to go hand in hand and all the experts all over the world and in within Europe tell us tell us the same. What is also a key element of our overall security approach is prevention early prevention. It is especially relevant to the protection of of minors online especially young people are among those most exposed to to manipulation to radicalization also and all other online risks of course as well. And to counter the radicalization of minors we are developing a prevention toolbox with education with safe online engagement with psychological support also in a I would say whole of society approach.
And we are working with the industry we have this EU internet forum where we invite industry the platforms together with the ministers from from the different member states to address radicalization and also crimes online the last EU internet forum just took place a couple of months ago in Brussels it was eye opening I would say and it was also interesting to see how it can actually work if the platforms are on the table if we well sometimes put some pressures on the platforms as well. Our task there is is very clear I would say to protect democracy from those who seek to undermine it and that is the the ambition of the democracy shield and it is it is an ambition that that Europe must pursue of course with determination and also with with confidence. So honorable members the relationship between security and democracy is is I would say mutually reinforcing and yes it can be complex as well of course we are totally aware of that of it but neither works as I said in the beginning neither works without the other a democracy that cannot enforce its laws I would say is fragile and a security framework that does not protect democratic institution has actually no place in the in the European Union. So working together Commission Parliament member states I think only then we can build a more resilient union meeting citizens expectation on the one hand and also defending its democratic foundations on the other hand. And what we should also always have in mind I think we should not allow our openness to be turned against us this is also key I would say we will not accept that our digital space also is used to undermine democracy and we will not accept hybrid threats without without any consequences.
So democracy is is a vulnerability yes but it's not just a vulnerability to be protected it is our greatest security asset actually we have and that's why the link between internal security and democracy is so key and thanks very much again for inviting me today.
Nathalie Loiseau
Thank you very much Commissioner Bruno for your introductory remarks I will now give the floor to my colleagues two minutes each starting with EPP and Tomas Zdechovsky.
Tomáš Zdechovský
I normally use one minute, but if I have two, I will be very happy to give it, Mr. Commissioner, my questions. Also, you discussed about the issues that there is hate speech against the Muslim, but in other hands, we have to speak about the problems what this community is facing. And this is that Muslim Brotherhoods infiltrate a lot of organizations what are what are engaging in anti-Muslimism and in hate of speech of against the Muslim, but generally they are really very well organized. This is like mafia structure and they are radicalized young people to be active against the rules and against our our goals and against our values what we have it as European Union. Also, my questions are how does the Commission intend to address the challenge of the political Islamism within the framework of Democracy Shield and European internal security strategy?
And second, does the Commission believe that the current EU framework is sufficient to monitor foreign funding and influence activities linked to such network or are additional measures being considered? Thank you very much.
Juan Fernando López Aguilar
Thank you, Commissioner Brunner. This is a point in which we S&D and your presentation of the EU security strategy are not in disagreement. On the contrary, we fully endorse the very purpose of the internal security strategy and of course we share the concerns about the threats underlying the internal security strategy, transnational and hybrid in nature. And enhancing safety while protecting rule of law, fundamental rights and democracy and democratic accountability is what this Democracy Shield is about. We have been working in this committee for for more than one year now and we actually have prolonged the time frame for this committee precisely to to better deliver when it comes to added value to the internal security strategy.
So my question goes first as to the commitment of number one, implementing fully, protecting, enforcing the Digital Services Act because it's about measures related to electoral integrity, public security, foreign interference and protecting national elections that takes a lot of enforcement by the Commission of the Digital Services Act despite the the omnibus, despite the the risk of watering it down. Full implementation and enforcement is absolutely essential. The second point I would like you to comment is the compatibility of protect EU with that strengthening democratic participation, trust and fundamental rights. Of course, it's about a good balance between preventive and enforcement policies, preventing policies and enforcement measures.
But there is a point I would like you to address explicitly, and it is, of course, sharing intelligence. We have insisted much on building up a EU intelligence community, whatever the name. Intelligence sharing, one of the most outstanding difficulties we have encountered is precisely the fragmentation of the intelligence community. So you mention in the internal security strategy about bringing up sharing intelligence. What are exactly the measures that you are intending to develop in order to fulfill that goal and fill that gap?
Csaba Dömötör
Tisztelt biztos úr, ön felel az EU belső biztonsági stratégiájáért, amely stratégiát a Bizottság együtt kezel a Demokrácia Pajzs programmal. A biztonságot érintő alapvető célokkal egyetértünk: külső beavatkozások elleni fellépés, terrorizmus és szervezett bűnözés elleni védelem. Ugyanakkor a konkrét megvalósítási módokkal kapcsolatban már vannak aggályaink. Például a stratégiában szereplő hibrid fenyegetés, információs manipuláció, dezinformáció kifejezések nagyon tág értelmezési lehetőséget hordoznak. Felvetik annak a kockázatát, hogy legitim politikai véleményeket, kritikus álláspontokat biztonsági kockázatként értelmezzenek, hogy aztán korlátozzák őket.
Ez a fő problémánk egyébként a Demokrácia Pajzs programmal is. Nem a céllal van tehát problémánk, hanem a megvalósítási móddal, egyes használt eszközökkel, amelyek aztán nem a biztonságot szolgálhatják, hanem a baloldali politikai mainstream védelmét. Egy másik aggályunk a belső biztonsági stratégiával kapcsolatban, hogy további jogköröket telepítene a brüsszeli intézményekhez, miközben a belső biztonság hagyományosan tagállami hatáskör. És végül külön figyelmet érdemelnek a digitális eszközökre és az adatkezelésre vonatkozó javaslatok. Itt alapjogi aggályok is felmerülhetnek.
Kulcsfontosságúnak tartjuk, hogy a jövőbeni biztonsági intézkedések ne vezethessenek az állampolgárok aránytalan megfigyeléséhez vagy a magánszféra korlátozásához. A demokráciát nem lehet a demokratikus jogok korlátozásával megvédeni. Tisztelettel várom ezzel kapcsolatos véleményét. Köszönöm.
Beata Szydło
Dziękuję, pani przewodnicząca. Dziękuję, panie komisarzu, za przedstawione stanowisko. Ja pozwolę sobie kontynuować myśl, którą przed momentem przedstawił mój kolega z grupy Patriotów. Otóż wydaje mi się, że nie ma wątpliwości tutaj nikt z nas siedzących na sali, że bezpieczeństwo Europejczyków jest w tej chwili podstawową kwestią, którą powinniśmy również my w Parlamencie Europejskim, w instytucjach europejskich, Komisja Europejska, powinniśmy o to dbać szczególnie. Przyczyn zaburzenia bezpieczeństwa w Europie jest bardzo wiele.
I też bardzo trzeba powiedzieć jasno, że niektóre z nich zostają wygenerowane przez samą Unię Europejską. Mam tu na myśli chociażby nierozważną politykę migracyjną, która doprowadziła do tego, że dzisiaj Europa wstrząsana jest problemami związanymi z nielegalną migracją. Druga kwestia, która budzi moje wątpliwości, to jest kwestia związana właśnie z ingerencją Komisji Europejskiej w prawa państw członkowskich. Na ile i w jaki sposób Komisja Europejska będzie chciała zachować tutaj właśnie ten odpowiedni balans szanujący suwerenność państw członkowskich w kwestiach dotyczących bezpieczeństwa? Kolejna rzecz to jest ingerowanie właśnie w wolność słowa pod pozorem walki z dezinformacją.
Tutaj ta granica jest bardzo cienka i zdajemy sobie z tego sprawę, Źe mogą być takie pokusy, kt3re będą powodowały, Źe politycy czy ugrupowania polityczne czy kraje, w kt3rych akurat jest rząd nie po linii odpowiadającej włařnie Komisji Europejskiej, będą szykanowane w jaki spos3b pod pozorem włařnie walki z dezinformacją, a tak naprawdę będzie to ingerowanie w wolnořć słowa i w krytykę polityczną, kt3ra jest przecieŹ przynaleŹna kaŹdemu. I na koniec jeszcze jedno zdanie. Pan komisarz m3wił o tym, Źe nasilają się nastroje antymuzułmańskie i antysemickie. Ja proszę, Źeby Komisja zwr3ciła r3wnieŹ uwagę na sytuację katolik3w i chrzeřcijan, bo symbole chrzeřcijańskie niestety są r3wnieŹ atakowane i nie ma Źadnej reakcji. Dziękuję.
Alexandra Geese
Sorry, I didn't hear that. Yeah, good morning, welcome Commissioner, thanks for being here today. I have a question on attacks on democracy through terrorist attacks, in particular during election periods. I'm from Germany and during the past federal election campaign we saw a number of smaller but horrific terrorist attacks, one almost every two weeks in Germany, which ended miraculously after the elections. And there is a term among experts that's called stochastic terrorism.
It basically means that we see increasingly individual perpetrators who are not structurally affiliated with a terrorist organization, but who get targeted online. So the very vulnerable people, few social ties, maybe some mental derangement already that the algorithms and the social networks are able to pick up. And then these individuals are targeted with very radicalizing content and at a certain point even with instructions on how to commit these attacks. Are you investigating this phenomenon? Is that something that's on your mind, you're discussing in expert groups that Europol is working on, that member states are discussing?
Because this is what we are increasingly seeing, not this traditional affiliation with a terrorist organization, but really very isolated individuals, but who are very easy to target. Are you discussing this with DG Connect? Because in the Digital Services Act, we have a very specific ban on having health data, like people who are particularly anxious or depressed, political affiliation, religious data in the data profiles of the social network, the social media companies, but I don't think they comply with this ban. Is there something you discuss with DG Connect on how to enforce? Are you discussing how algorithms radicalize potential terrorists?
That's my main question. And second one on Russian intervention, especially sabotage, physical interference. This is also something we are perceiving increasingly in Germany, but also in other countries. And I have a feeling that the security forces keep this very secret. You know, you read some article with a lot of, you know, might be, could, should, online, and then that's basically it.
And when you talk to investigators, they say, yes, we do have the data, but it never comes out. Is that something you also discuss? Because in that case, the purpose of the Russian interference is achieved, because there is this feeling in the public that there's something wrong. It might be attributed to parties who have nothing to do with it. So would it help to discuss this more, to bring this more out in the open?
Thank you.
Christine Anderson
Ja, guten Morgen. Herr Kommissar, bei aller Einigkeit darüber, dass ausländische Einflussnahme existiert, möchte ich doch vielleicht auf einen möglichen blinden Fleck in unserer gegenwärtigen Bedrohungswahrnehmung hinweisen. Der Bericht stellt zwar zurecht fest, dass bestimmte transnationale, ideologische, kulturelle und religiöse Netzwerke langfristige Einflussstrategien über Vorfeldorganisationen und legal registrierte Strukturen erfolgen. Dadurch entstehen natürlich auch Risiken politischer Einflussnahme und institutioneller Unterwanderung. Hier werden Netzwerke mit Verbindung zur Muslimbruderschaft sowie Institutionen im Umfeld des Moskauer Patriarchats genannt.
Soweit so gut. Aber nehmen wir diesen Ansatz doch mal ernst und denken ihn mal konsequent zu Ende. Wenn ausländische Einflussnahme nicht nur über Online-Desinformation, Bots oder Cyberangriffe erfolgt, müssen wir dann nicht auch viel stärker auf Formen der Einflussnahme achten, die tiefer in unsere gesellschaftlichen Strukturen hineinwirken? Ich denke da insbesondere an Akteure und Netzwerke, die legal innerhalb unserer Gesellschaften agieren. Ideologische Unterwanderung durch Strukturen im Umfeld der Muslimbruderschaft, aber auch an staatlich gelenkte religiös-politische Einflussnahme über Organisationen im Umfeld von DITIB oder vergleichbare aus dem Ausland gesteuerte Diasporastrukturen.
Diese Akteure versuchen nicht in erster Linie Algorithmen zu manipulieren. Sie wollen eben vor allem politische Institutionen, Organisationen und politisches Verhalten von innen heraus prägen. Daher meine zwei Fragen. Hat sich die EU aus Ihrer Sicht möglicherweise zu sehr darauf konzentriert, Informationsflüsse und Online-Narrative zu regulieren, während langsamere, aber möglicherweise gefährlichere Formen der Einflussnahme viel zu wenig Beachtung finden? Und zum Zweiten: Bewertet die Kommission staatlich gesteuerte religiös-politische Einflussstrukturen, etwa im Umfeld von DITIB, als ein relevantes Risiko für unsere innere Sicherheit?
Vielen Dank.
Nathalie Loiseau
Thank you. I have three more intervention with the catch-the-eye. Two other colleagues who want the catch-the-eye want to register. Yes, I know I have Mr. Lagodinsky and a few others. Maybe we can first give you a first moment to answer, and then we'll do the catch-the-eye, Commissioner.
Magnus Brunner
Yeah, thank you very much for the discussion and the questions. I'll try and do my best to answer as good as I can. Starting with the EPP. It was actually the first question on similar to the last one, of course, when it comes to Muslim Brotherhood and how it infiltrates also the society. And my answer is clear: yes, it does.
And that's why we, a year ago, actually tried to look into the all the funding possibilities, and we really have to look into the member states' fundings possibilities as well. What we did is a year ago we started to really sort of recalibrate everything, look more behind the scenes, because we are aware that, of course, sometimes if we fund institutions or whatever, maybe not even behind that institution, but further behind, could be a sort of influence by Muslim Brotherhood and others.
And this is really something which, which worries us a lot, which, which we really try to tackle, as I said, started to tackle a year ago, looking more intensively into the funding possibilities. And now it's, um, what we are doing now with the member states is really trying to push them a little bit further on looking into the fundings as well because funding I think is key and we don't always know what is behind, behind a certain institution. Um, and so this is really a key, a key point you were both, both raising. And, uh, when it comes to the terrorist part you mentioned as well in the beginning, um, we have, we have our EU terrorist agenda where we try, where we also try to look into the radicalization, especially when it comes to the young people of course. And this is also a key because and that's some of you mentioned that as well, the online dimension of course when it comes to young people, when it comes to minors is, is also something very worrying.
Um, the second question was about, or the second part of the questions from, from the S&D was about the Digital Service Act. I'm fully committed to have it fully implemented. Totally, totally agree with you, with you there. But of course it's always a balance between preventing and enforcing, um, but I think we really should, should do it. And then you mentioned the, the sharing of intelligence.
Yes, we are totally aware and that's why the, the new Europol mandate which we are going to present on, on Wednesday has a, um, sort of key, one key element of that reform is exactly the intelligence sharing because until now we got some intelligence from one member state, um, and it was sort of pushed into Europol, but then Europol had to go further and bring this information to another member state, so it was too complicated of course. And now what we try to, try to suggest and try to propose in this new mandate is that we share it in real time. And this is the, the complete difference from, from the past actually. So intelligence sharing to be quicker, to be faster, to be more efficient, effective is key and is one big part of the intelligence, of the Europol reform. And not only within the European Union, but also with outside the European Union.
Interpol also plays an important role there. We will have an Interpol agreement between Europol and Interpol hopefully by the end of the year where also intelligence sharing is, um, is becoming much, much more effective. Um, you were talking about the, the security strategy and how vague it is. Yes, a strategy is a strategy. Totally, totally agree with you there.
And now it's all about bringing it on the ground. We do that with new rules on organized crime for instance. We do it with the new ports alliance in the drug strategy part. So yes, you're right, a strategy is, is well that's, that's by itself a vague, a vague thing in a way, but it's a strategy and now it's all about bringing it sort of in practice and that's what we're doing with all these different, different also legal proposals we are going to implement.
Um, the, the Polish colleague, you were, you were talking about migration. And yes, of course, I mean migration and, and security is, is linked, of course, also linked. And that's why we proposed and, and presented our extremely huge reform on, on migration and asylum. And this is, well, not just a security issue, it's, it's a society issue altogether, of course. And this, and this huge reform, this huge asylum and migration reform, as you know, has turned everything, actually.
It's, 10 years ago we did take a lot of responsibility as a European Union, but we didn't have any rules, we didn't have a system. And now, to get control back over who can come to the European Union, who can stay, who has to leave also, you were discussing that last, last week when it came to the return regulation, for instance. But these are all pieces of, of the huge European migration reform. And it, it will, it will improve, of course, the situation dramatically, I would say. And we see that already when it comes to illegal migration, because you were mentioning, and I think this is always important to, to stress, it's about fighting illegal migration, where we have to fight the business of the smugglers and the human traffickers.
And then we have to differentiate that from the legal migration part, which we will need for our labor markets, of course. And the third part is the protection part, which is also important. But we will only have room for the protection part if we give the people the trust and the feeling back that we have control over what is happening. And that's what the whole, whole migration reform is, is actually about. And then you were talking about the, the religions and the, the Catholics, for instance.
Yes, religious freedom is for everyone, of course. And, and you are right, we sometimes focus too much maybe on, on others and not on the, well, on the religions which are present, to put it diplomatically, within the European Union. And that's why we just also appointed our new special envoy, Mairead McGuinness, former commissioner, for the, for the religious freedom part altogether. And we really have to focus on that as well, not just, just on, on religious, religions which are maybe not, well, too much spread in the European Union or in the European society. Um, the fifth question was about, ah yeah, state actors and, because I was, we, I think, yeah, it was you, sorry.
You are right, I mean the lines are always blurring and we, we really have to concentrate on the vulnerable groups, because you were mentioning the vulnerable groups, vulnerable people as well, and also the connection between DG CONNECT and, if I remember that correctly, DG CONNECT and Europol also. This is, this is key, and especially the social media companies. And that's why I was mentioning before our EU Internet Forum, where we try to concentrate exactly on that, on that matter, trying to, because you, you were saying they are not sort of trying to work together, to put it also diplomatically, the internet platforms or the, did you say that? Sorry, if maybe it's a misunderstanding, but if I got it correctly, you said they're not always very helpful in, is that, is that correct?
Alexandra Geese
Yeah, it's a little more complicated, but I mean the question was around stochastic terrorism.
Magnus Brunner
So, but it, it is, it is something where, as I said, where the lines are, are blurring and where we need, as you were mentioning the platforms, where we need the platforms, of course, to cooperate. And the EU Internet Forum is exactly that, that we're putting pressure on the platforms, on the social media companies to, to comply on the one hand, but also to cooperate on the, the other hand.
And also when it comes to state actors, because you were mentioning that as well, state actors more and more use organized crime to infiltrate the society. And that's what it is actually about and that's what we also focus on our Europol reform and the new, the new mandate there. And then you were mentioning also the sabotage from the Russian, from the Russian side in the end, whether we've discussed that with the member states. The clear answer is yes, of course. And you are right, we are not always very clear because it is not clear.
And you have to be, in a way, in that respect, I think you have to be 100% clear that, that the reason behind this attack is actually Russian interference. And it's not always 100% clear. Sometimes it's 80% clear and the intelligence services from the member states mainly think it is. And that's why you can't say precisely yes, it's 100% Russian interference. Sometimes you can.
We know that from the shadow fleet, we know that from the, from the, the critical infrastructure, from the, the cables in the Baltic Sea, we know that that was Russian interference if you can prove it. Sometimes you can prove it to 80% but not to 100%. And that's why some member states and also on the European level we are a bit reluctant to say it's 100% Russian, Russian interference. But do we discuss that with the member states? Of course.
Every day these hybrid threats especially, on the, there was just last week I think there was a, a ministerial meeting on that topic on the, the hybrid, the hybrid attacks in the north of Germany. That was in... Yeah, okay. The Baltic, it's called the Baltic Six, where Germany also takes part in a way because it's, it's on that, on that border. Yeah, the Muslim Brotherhood, the last question, an die, die Unterwanderung, das habe ich vorher versucht schon zu beantworten.
Ja, wir müssen ganz gezielt in die Finanzierung hineinschauen. Das tun wir seit einem Jahr auf der europäischen Ebene. Aus meiner Sicht, ganz offen gesagt, ist es auf der nationalen Ebene noch zu wenig. Hier könnte man wesentlich mehr tun und ich habe gerade heute Nachmittag mit zwei Innenministern ein Gespräch zu diesem Thema, wo wir versuchen auch zu unterstützen natürlich, wo Europol auch eine gewisse Rolle spielen kann, um hier zu unterstützen, dass die Finanzierung und was hinter den, hinter einer Gruppe oder hinter einem Verein beispielsweise steckt, das ist nicht immer, immer leicht zu herauszufinden, aber dort mehr Intelligence auch zu verwenden, um zu sehen, was hinter der Fassade auch ist, ob dort eventuell Muslim Brotherhood Institutionen auch stehen, das ist ganz, ganz, ganz entscheidend. Es kann nicht sein, dass wir Vereine, Institutionen finanzieren, wo die Muslim Brotherhood dahintersteckt.
Das kann es nicht sein. Das haben wir vor einem Jahr auf europäischer Ebene versucht zu ändern und jetzt brauchen wir die Mitgliedstaaten auch noch dazu, dass die auch tiefer hineingehen und besser hinterfragen.
Nathalie Loiseau
Thank you, Commissioner. Now there's a second round of questions, one minute per member, and I start with Vasile Dîncu.
Vasile Dîncu
Experiențele electorale recente din toate țările europene ne-au arătat că dezinformarea și operațiunile de influență strategică nu apar brusc în ultimele săptămâni ale campaniei. Sunt pregătite de luni sau chiar ani înainte prin acumularea de vulnerabilități informaționale, amplificare algoritmică sau construirea unor rețele de influență prin exploatarea neîncrederii sociale. Una din lecțiile pe care le-am învățat în Europa este că dispunem de instrumente de reacție, dar dispunem de puține instrumente de anticipare. Astăzi în domeniul securității clasice avem sisteme de avertizare timpurie, centre de analiză, mecanisme de monitorizare continuă, dar în domeniul securității democratice nu avem asta. Cred că în centrul de reziliență ar trebui înființat un mecanism european de early warning pentru amenințările adresa democrației și un observator european pentru reziliență democratică, capabil să monitorizeze în timp real aceste amenințări.
Avem observatoare de risc climatic, financiar, de sănătate, dar cred că e timp și pentru asta. V-ați gândit la așa ceva? Aceasta este întrebarea mea.
Fabrice Leggeri
Merci, Madame la Présidente. Monsieur le Commissaire Brunner, vous avez souligné vous-même les risques que font courir les Frères musulmans. Vous avez été ministre en Autriche, un pays qui a déclaré que les Frères musulmans étaient sur la liste des organisations terroristes. Alors ma question est la suivante : lorsque vous vous apprêtez à réformer le mandat d'Europol et à lui donner davantage d'outils, pensez-vous qu'il serait utile de soutenir la demande qui a été formulée par plusieurs groupes politiques au sein de ce Parlement, à savoir d'inscrire les Frères musulmans sur la liste de l'Union européenne des organisations terroristes ? Est-ce que cela permettrait de faciliter les investigations financières ?
Est-ce que cela permettrait à Europol d'avoir davantage d'outils pour surveiller, faire de la prévention, y compris terroriste, mais y compris en termes d'influence ? Et cela m'amène à ma deuxième question, c'est le rôle d'acteurs étatiques extérieurs. Je pense en particulier à la Turquie qui a été la première en 2020 à utiliser, à instrumentaliser l'immigration illégale comme menace hybride, et nous savons aussi le rôle que jouent les autorités turques par leur proximité idéologique avec les Frères musulmans. Donc ma deuxième question porte sur la législation européenne en matière de menace hybride et d'instrumentalisation de l'immigration à des fins de menace hybride. Pensez-vous qu'il faille aller encore un peu plus loin, sachant que nous connaissons aussi le rôle de la Russie et de la Biélorussie en la matière ?
Merci beaucoup.
Stefano Cavedagna
Thank you, Chair. Thank you, Commissioner. I would like to speak in Italian. Grazie, Presidente. Grazie, signor Commissario.
Parlerò di un tema già ampiamente affrontato, che è quello dell'immigrazione, già affrontato dalla collega Schizlo e soprattutto il tema delle minacce legate al fondamentalismo islamico nella nostra Europa. Io cito sicuramente anche il caso italiano. Abbiamo visto una recrudescenza delle azioni di singoli soggetti, spesso minori, cosiddetti immigrati di seconda generazione, che in alcuni casi hanno anche acquisito la cittadinanza del Paese membro, che spesso non hanno mai neanche vissuto nei Paesi di loro origine, ma che spesso vengono adescati tramite il web, forse per una mancanza di identità, e adescati tramite il web finiscono per compiere atti violenti di terrorismo islamico.
La domanda che le volevo chiedere è un suo parere su questa situazione e quali azioni può mettere in campo il cosiddetto European Democracy Shield rispetto a quello che possono già fare e stanno facendo gli Stati membri, perché di questo dobbiamo parlare, cosa l'Unione Europea può fare in più e quali strumenti può mettere in campo. Grazie.
Nathalie Loiseau
Thank you. And finally, I will use the opportunity to ask a question myself. We have observed that more and more foreign interferences, disinformation, sabotage are implemented not by state actors, but by criminal gangs paid by state actors throughout Europe. And I was wondering whether the new mandate of Europol would take it into consideration, would also try to help law enforcement agencies work better on cryptocurrencies and shadow channels of financing of these networks. And I was also wondering whether the training of the judges throughout Europe is sufficient to understand and face these new realities that they have to navigate and whether you consider that something could be done at the European level on all this.
Commissioner, the floor goes back to you for answers. Thank you.
Magnus Brunner
Yeah, thank you, thank you very much for all the questions, Madam Chair. Also here, try to, try to of course answer the question, even some questions of course I'll link, I'll link to each other. The disinformation part you were mentioning in the beginning, I think we were quite successful actually to help some member states, but also third countries in their, in their, well, in their campaign against disinformation campaign, I would say. So we saw in all the elections, well, not all the elections, but in some elections that there was some interference from outside, to put it also politely and diplomatically. And Moldova, Romania also, other, other member states also.
And I think to have this democratic resilience is, that is really key for elections, of course. And I think we did quite a good job, as we know from, from the results also, when, when the pro-Europeans, I'm not talking about party politics now, but pro-European or anti-European competed in elections and mainly the pro-Europeans fortunately, well, didn't win, but, but of course we, we helped these member states and third countries to, yeah, to fight, to fight back, I would say, against this interference and electoral disinformation campaigning. The second question, Monsieur Leggeri, of course when it comes to, to putting Muslim Brotherhood on the, on the list or not, can be, could be added, but on a, on a national, on a national level. I know France is pushing, I think, for them on. We look, we look into that, what, what sort of, what is the possibility on the one hand, but also what are the, the organizations composed, how are they composed.
So we will see what the French outcome will be. We are ready to take the next steps definitely. So I would see it rather positively if there is enough evidence also, and of course talking about the Muslim Brotherhood we don't have to talk about evidence because that's pretty evident, but it all depends on the member states of course and their sort of approach to that. But you were also mentioning the, in that respect of course also Europol, the new Europol mandate plays an important role. We don't want to push everything to Europol, of course not, they can't do everything, but of course when it comes to intelligence sharing, when it comes to cooperation between the member states but also outside, of course that has to be an important part of the Europol mandate and the reform altogether.
And you were mentioning also the Russia-Belarusian part in the end and Turkey. Yes, Russia we know that, we are totally aware that Russia, and this is a classic hybrid war they're leading against the European Union, also using religion from time to time but also people. I saw that at the Belarusian-Polish border myself, they're actually pushing people across the authorities are pushing people across the border. And we see also flights from Minsk to Libya for instance where they're pushed on boats towards the European Union. So we definitely see that and that's something we try to tackle also of course with our migration reform, but also with our migration diplomacy where we have to work together with third countries along the route also, and of course Russia is Russia at the moment and Belarus is part of it.
That was the same part with the migration I think if I got that correctly. The answer is our migration reform, our huge European migration reform which actually changes I would say hopefully everything. We see that already when it comes to numbers, we saw a decrease of illegal migration by 55% in the last two years, some routes even minus of 90%. So it's going in the right direction. The next step is, and this what we did in the last weeks and months was putting our European house in order, all the rules within the European Union, and now it's about the external dimension.
Now we really have to work together and push also third countries to cooperate. And in my view we have to use all the leverage we have as a European Union, visa policy, trade policy, development policy, to put some pressure and use the leverage we have as a European Union to make third countries cooperating with us. And then the last question on the Europol mandate also and cryptocurrency you were sorry Madam Chair. Yes, this is also something because it's about innovation also. So Europol in my view and when we present the mandate this is part of it, has to put one focus also on innovation.
Europol I think has to become more and more an innovation hub also and that's where cryptocurrencies come into play.
We also when it when we talk about the new organized crime rules, which we're going to present in in autumn as I said in the beginning, also there should be a focus on follow the money. Definitely, follow the money is one key aspect of the of the new organized crime rules because we we know that also in the in the normal economy, the normal economy is more and more infiltrated by organized crime and that's where follow the money and also cryptocurrencies come into play.
Nathalie Loiseau
Commissioner, thank you very much for your very clear answers to our questions. I think we have in common, despite a diversity of opinions in this special committee, the opinion that security and democracy go hand in hand and mutually reinforce each other. So we hear your message about your efforts. We hear your warning about access to data, and I think we have to reflect on this on the work of different standing committees because I know it's still a controversial issue in many important files, but it's important that we hear your voice saying if there is no access to data, we cannot fight criminals. So thank you again for being with us today.
We will stop for 20 minutes and then we'll vote at 10:30. Thank you.
Colleagues, please take your seats. Je vais parler en français. Donc vous avez deux choses à faire pour commencer, c'est prendre vos écouteurs et trouver vos cartes de vote. Chers collègues, d'après nous sommes au point six de l'ordre du jour, le vote sur le projet de rapport de notre collègue Thomas Tobé. D'après les informations communiquées par les groupes politiques avant le début de la réunion, les membres suppléants suivants vont prendre part au vote.
Pour le PPE, Monsieur Martusciello sera remplacé par Monsieur Vavrikevicius. Monsieur Bogdan sera remplacé par Monsieur Kollar. Et pour ECR, Monsieur Terheş sera remplacé par Monsieur Kaminski. Il n'y a pas d'autres annonces de vote par des suppléants, non ça n'est pas le cas. Je constate que le quorum qui assure la validité du vote est atteint.
J'espère que vous avez vos cartes de vote et je vous engage à les mettre tout de suite dans les machines parce que nous allons procéder par vote électronique sur l'ensemble du vote. Ce seront évidemment des votes électroniques qui ne seront pas en vol par appel nominal, sauf pour le vote final. Mais cela donnera de la clarté aux résultats de chacun des votes que nous allons effectuer. Je crois que Monsieur Demeter veut prendre la parole, c'est pour un point d'ordre ?
Csaba Dömötör
Yes, Madam Chair, on a point of order, I would like to draw your attention to a serious procedural concern. Our group tabled 215 amendments. We asked for, firmly asked for separate vote on 30, yet only four are put to vote today. We were told that the amendments are allegedly covered by the compromise package, which is simply not true.
It is important to highlight that these amendments are amendments follow a different logic compared to the compromise amendments, therefore they cannot be treated as being covered by them. Such procedures lead to the impression that the so-called compromise amendments are not used to build compromises but to silence alternative voices. Just one example, we tabled an amendment on the transparency of NGO financing. You do not even let a vote happen on this important matter. This is deeply troubling.
So, if you cite principles of democracy and a shield, please do not block alternative voices. A shield indeed exists here, not for democracy, but for the ruling coalition. Thank you for your attention.
Nathalie Loiseau
Monsieur de Motter, je voudrais répondre à cette accusation qui, si elle était vraie, serait grave. Mais je trouve qu'elle est totalement déplacée. On le sait, les listes de vote en commission parlementaire sont préparées par le secrétariat en conformité stricte et précautionneuse avec le règlement du Parlement et sous mon autorité. Et je tiens à vous dire que nous avons regardé très précisément quels amendements avaient une chance de pouvoir être votés séparément et que sous mon autorité, il y en a plus qu'il n'y aurait dû en avoir au départ. Le règlement du Parlement européen contient des principes.
Nous savons aussi que les pratiques des commissions parlementaires peuvent avoir évolué avec le temps. Et nous savons que Dieu merci, la commission des affaires constitutionnelles AFCO a élaboré une explication très claire des règles que nos commissions doivent respecter. Et donc le secrétariat et moi-même nous y sommes tenus avec beaucoup d'attention dans la préparation de cette liste de vote. Et je le rappelle, mais je sais que tous mes collègues le savent puisque vous votez dans d'autres commissions. Je le rappelle, un vote séparé n'est possible que si l'amendement est compatible avec l'amendement de compromis.
Il faut qu'il soit compatible avec l'amendement de compromis et qu'il n'a pas été intentionnellement exclu de l'amendement de compromis lors des négociations. Et vous le savez, Monsieur de Motter, et votre groupe le sait, parce que vous non plus vous ne votez pas seulement dans cette commission spéciale. Alors précisément, faisons en sorte de protéger la démocratie et la démocratie représentative de notre Parlement en ne prétendant pas à l'avance que les règles n'auraient pas été respectées quand elles l'ont été scrupuleusement et je tiens à remercier à nouveau le secrétariat pour son travail. Je passe maintenant la parole à notre rapporteur Tomas Tobé pour deux minutes.
Tomas Tobé
Thank you, Chair. Dear colleagues, European democracy is not only built on institutions and procedures, but on trust, resilience and our shared ability to defend the integrity of our election. Today, that foundation is under pressure from coordinated disinformation, foreign interference and the erosion of confidence in democratic processes. This report recognizes that defending democracy in Europe requires a more systematic and coordinated response.
We need stronger preparedness, clearer tools to address hybrid threats, and a sustained effort to protect electoral integrity and the information environment across our Union. That also means acknowledging that democratic resilience cannot be taken for granted. It must be actively maintained through cooperation between Member States, EU institutions, and civil society, so that our democratic systems remain robust even under pressure. With this report, our message to Commission is clear. We need a stronger European Democracy Shield.
And our message to the Russian troll factories in Saint Petersburg is equally clear. We will defend our democracy whatever it takes. Finally, I would like to thank of course my team, but also the shadow rapporteurs and their teams for a very constructive cooperation throughout this process. I genuinely believe that the sum of our differences has created a better final product than any of us could have achieved individually. Thank you.
Nathalie Loiseau
Nous allons maintenant procéder à un test pour le vote électronique pour vérifier que tout est en ordre. Et donc je vous propose de voter pour la fin de la canicule à Bruxelles ou contre la fin de la canicule à Bruxelles. Et pour ceux qui sont isothermes de vous abstenir. Donc j'ouvre le vote de test. Le vote est fermé.
Nous avons une différence là. On a 30 votants sur 31. Bon. Et bien nous allons pouvoir passer au vote lui-même. Et nous allons d'abord voter sur l'amendement de compromis numéro 12.
Et donc je le rappelle nous votons par vote électronique. Le vote est ouvert. Le vote est fermé. Il est adopté. Nous passons au compromis numéro 3.
Le vote est ouvert. Le vote est fermé. Attendez on vote encore. Il est adopté. Nous passons au compromis numéro 5.
Le vote est ouvert pardon. Le vote est fermé. Il est adopté. Amendement de compromis numéro 8. Le vote est ouvert.
Le vote est clos. Adopté. Amendement de compromis numéro 9. Le vote est ouvert. Le vote est clos.
Adopté. Amendement de compromis numéro 7. Le vote est ouvert. Le vote est clos. Adopté.
Pardon adopté pardon.
Je regarde deux choses à la fois. Amendement de compromis numéro 11, le vote est ouvert. Le vote est clos. Adopté. Amendement de compromis numéro 2, le vote est ouvert.
Le vote est clos. Adopté. Amendement de compromis numéro 4, le vote est ouvert. Le vote est clos. Adopté.
Amendement de compromis numéro 6, le vote est ouvert. Le vote est clos. Adopté. Amendement 1540, qui est donc voté séparément, le vote est ouvert. Le vote est clos.
Rejeté. Amendement de compromis numéro 1, le vote est ouvert. Le vote est clos. Adopté. Amendement 1562, le vote est ouvert.
Le vote est clos. Rejeté. Amendement 1570, le vote est ouvert. Le vote est clos. Rejeté.
Amendement 1571, le vote est ouvert. Le vote est clos. Rejeté. Amendement de compromis numéro 10, le vote est ouvert. Le vote est clos.
Adopté. Amendement de compromis numéro 13, le vote est ouvert. Le vote est clos. Adopté. Et nous passons maintenant au vote final sur l'ensemble du texte, le vote est ouvert.
Par appel nominal, pardon, le vote est ouvert. Le vote est clos. Et il est adopté. Félicitations à notre rapporteur. J'ai été informé du souhait de Monsieur De Meuter de déposer une opinion minoritaire, je vous donne donc la parole pour la lire.
Monsieur De Meuter, vous avez la parole.
Csaba Dömötör
Thank you, Madam Chair. Bearing also in mind that most of our amendments were not let put to vote today, Patriots will table a minority opinion to this report. We find it essential to highlight that the Democracy Shield program, under the guise of combating external interference, seeks to transfer competences from Member States to the Commission while introducing instruments that risk restricting freedom of expression. We find the privileged role of fact-checkers especially alarming, as well as the lack of transparency regarding the funding of NGOs.
We firmly reject the report. This is a shield not of democracy, but of the ruling coalition here. We will submit the exact wording of the minority position to the secretariat as soon as possible. Thank you.
Nathalie Loiseau
Merci. Le secrétariat a également reçu une demande de Madame Szydło et de Monsieur Kamiński qui souhaitent déposer une opinion minoritaire. Je donne la parole à Madame Szydło si elle souhaite lire cette opinion.
Beata Szydło
Dziękuję, panie przewodniczący. Europejskie demokracje stają w obliczu zagrożeń ze strony firm szpiegostwa, sabotażu i innych wrogich działań, zwłaszcza ze strony Rosji i Chin. Nasza grupa ostrzega przed tymi zagrożeniami od 2014 roku, kiedy inni nie potrafili ich dostrzec. Odporność demokratyczna musi zaczynać się od szacunku dla samej demokracji. Tarcza demokracji nie może być wykorzystywana do wpływania na procesy polityczne w państwach członkowskich i stać się pretekstem do ograniczania wolności słowa lub pluralizmu politycznego.
Powinna wzmacniać i chronić oba te aspekty. Hipokryzja i podwójne standardy instytucji Unii Europejskiej wobec państw członkowskich w zależności od tego, które siły polityczne sprawują władzę, są oczywiste, w tym wykorzystywanie funduszy Unii Europejskiej jako narzędzi presji politycznej i nieprzejrzyste finansowanie organizacji pozarządowych. W niniejszym raporcie ignoruje się obawy dotyczące demokracji walczącej w Polsce pomimo naruszeń konstytucji i praw człowieka. To wybiórcze podejście ujawnia stronniczość polityczną i podważa cel, jakim jest obrona demokracji, dlatego zgłosiliśmy liczne poprawki i my w delegacji polskiej odrzuciliśmy ostateczny wynik, natomiast cała grupa nie może poprzeć tego raportu, ponieważ tak jak powiedzieliśmy, idea jest słuszna i potrzebna. Trzeba wzmacniać demokrację, ale żeby to nastąpiło, trzeba zacząć od samych siebie.
Dziękuję bardzo.
Nathalie Loiseau
J'ai également été informé du souhait de Madame Anderson de déposer une opinion minoritaire. Je lui donne la parole si elle souhaite lire son opinion.
Christine Anderson
Thank you. This report is not about defending democracy. It is all about centralization, censorship, and narrative control. Under the pretext of foreign interference and vague buzzwords like resilience, information integrity, hybrid threats, the report sets out to tackle political opposition, public criticism, and dissent. Even though the report repeatedly claims to defend freedom of speech, it calls for the exact opposite: stronger platform intervention and censorship.
The report does not reflect a fear for democracy, but a fear of democracy. With this report, you seek to protect yourself from the citizen, and by doing so, you might quite likely find yourself in precisely what you're trying to prevent: a totalitarian regime. That's why I want to submit this minority opinion. Thank you.
Nathalie Loiseau
Peut-être que notre rapporteur, Thomas Tobé, voudrait prendre la parole à ce moment précis. Merci.
Tomas Tobé
Well, thank you, chair, and thank you, colleagues, for the broad support. But let me also say that I take note and also appreciate that there can be different views. That is part of democracy, and that is exactly what I want us to protect here in Europe. However, of course, I disagree with colleagues that do not support the report. Defending democracy against foreign interference is not about limiting debate.
It is actually about safeguarding the integrity of our democratic institution. For me this is about standing up for Europe and our democracy. Thank you.
Nathalie Loiseau
Merci. Je suis fière que ce matin encore nous ayons pu dans cette commission spéciale faire vivre la démocratie européenne. La démocratie européenne c'est à la fois donner la parole à toutes les opinions quelles qu'elles soient aussi diverses soient-elles. Et je n'ai pas eu le sentiment qu'il y ait une seule seconde de censure ni dans le fonctionnement de cette commission spéciale ni ce matin dans la manière dont les uns et les autres ont pu s'exprimer bien au contraire. Et défendre la démocratie c'est aussi accepter le résultat d'un vote et la détermination d'une majorité qui très clairement cette majorité a soutenu votre rapport monsieur le rapporteur.
Je vous en félicite donc chaleureusement. La séance est close et notre prochaine réunion de la commission spéciale se tiendra le jeudi 16 juillet à Bruxelles et j'espère qu'il fera moins chaud. Bonne journée à tous.
Ask anything about this video — I analyse its transcript to answer.