Committee on Industry, Research and Energy Ordinary meeting
Legend
Transcript markers
- text Sentence being played
- text Search result
- text Intervention cited by the link you opened
Click a sentence to play the video from that moment. Select text to quote it with the speaker, timestamp and link.
More options
Offset
Transcript offset
Export
Live capture
Versions of this video
Transcripts may differ slightly from one version to another.
ITRE European Parliament
Follow its sittingsMarko Mišmaš
For that, BEREC remains fully available to support the co-legislators throughout the legislative process. I will simply highlight a number of areas where BEREC sees potential challenges in the current proposal, as well as some high-level suggestions on how these could be addressed while remaining fully aligned with the objectives of the DNA and how these objectives can best be achieved in practice in the most effective, proportionate and future-proof way. We strongly support the ambition to strengthen the single market, to simplify the regulatory framework and to create a better condition, this is not working, ah, it is working, and to create the better condition for competitiveness.
So BEREC supports harmonisation when it delivers clear benefits for the single market, reduces unnecessary fragmentation and improves regulatory predictability. So operators increasingly face obligations stemming from telecom regulation, cybersecurity legislation, resilience requirements, consumer protection rules and other sector-specific frameworks.
So simplification should focus on reducing duplications, clarifying responsibilities and ensuring that similar information is not requested multiple times throughout different reporting channels. Instead of replacing the existing peer review mechanism with a much more formal Union single market procedure, BEREC believes that the existing framework should be allowed to evolve and be complemented by the common guidance, benchmarking methodologies and also best practices. This would support consistency and predictability while avoiding additional procedural layers. The proposed single passport mechanism is another example where simplification objectives
So good example is for instance spectrum management. Instead of replacing the existing peer review mechanism with a much more formal Union single market procedure, BEREC believes that the existing framework should be allowed to evolve and be complemented by the common guidance, benchmarking methodologies and also best practices. This would support consistency and predictability while avoiding additional procedural layers. The proposed single passport mechanism is another example where simplification objectives are understandable, but where the current design raises practical concerns. In its current formulation, the proposal does not sufficiently clarify the relationship between notification procedures, enforcement responsibilities and the respective roles of the authorities involved.
So a more proportionate solution could be: so first one, greater harmonization of authorization conditions.
The second is a binding common notification template across the whole European Union. Of course, digitalization of notification procedures and potentially, this is also BEREC's proposal, a single entry point for notification, for example, throughout the online platform managed by the Office of Digital Networks on behalf of BEREC.
So regulatory predictability is itself an important element of simplification. The objective should be a clear and stable framework that allows deregulation where markets become competitive, while preserving effective tools to address market failures where they continue to exist. Where essential aspects of the framework are left to future implementing or delegated acts, stakeholders may face uncertainty regarding their future obligations. The DNA should therefore provide as much as possible directly in the legislative text and avoid excessive reliance on future secondary legislation.
So ex-ante regulation is another area where simplification can be achieved without weakening the framework. The existing framework already contains built-in simplification mechanisms. Market reviews allow obligations to be withdrawn where competition develops and regulatory intervention is no longer justified. At the same time, the framework preserves the possibility to act where market power or barriers to competition remain.
Rather than limiting the availability of ex-ante regulation, BEREC supports simplifying procedures, improving consistency of methodologies, and ensuring that regulatory intervention remains focused on clearly identified competition problems. So BEREC believes that ex-ante remedies continue to be driven by market analysis and tailored to the specific competition problem identified, taking into account national and, where relevant, local market conditions.
The DNA risks making ex-ante regulation more rigid and more centralized by prescribing how remedies should be applied. So BEREC considers that greater consistency across Europe can be achieved throughout a common guidance and regulatory best practices, rather than throughout the prescriptive one-size-fits-all solution. So BEREC is also convinced that the harmonized wholesale access product... is not convinced that harmonized access wholesale product would deliver significant benefits.
Given the diversity of network architecture and market conditions across Europe, such products would be complex to define, costly to implement, and likely to have a limited practical use. So instead, harmonized access products could remain available as one option within the NRA toolbox, but they should not automatically take precedence over the other access remedies. In short, effective regulation requires flexibility. Remedies should follow the competition problem identified in the market, not the predefined regulatory model. Harmonized access products can be a useful tool, but they should remain one option among several rather than becoming a default solution across Europe.
Symmetrical regulation is an important tool for promoting fiber deployment and efficient infrastructure use. Rather than creating additional exemptions and administrative burdens, the framework should give the NRAs the flexibility to intervene where the bottlenecks persist and where intervention is proportional and justified. In many areas, particularly inside the buildings, infrastructure competition is simply not realistic. In those cases, symmetric cases can often be a most efficient way to promote competition, fiber take-up, and consumer choice.
In short, this is what I wanted to present here today. I hope the message were messages were clear, and of course, I remain available for any question questions that may appear. Thank you.
Christophe Grudler
Merci beaucoup, Monsieur Michmash. Il y aura des questions à la fin, ne vous inquiétez pas par rapport à ça. Monsieur Alexandre de Streel, je vous donne la parole. Vous êtes directeur académique du CER et professeur de droit européen à l'Université de Namur.
Alexandre de Streel
Merci beaucoup Monsieur le Président et merci beaucoup pour thanks for this invitation at this important hearing. If I were to summarize what I should what should guide the Digital Network Act in a single image I would use the metaphor of what should be the real DNA you know because I think it's interesting to speak about the DNA and the DNA as the molecule of course the fundamental molecule the real DNA of the Europe what it should be. And I think it should be a double helix with sovereignty as the ladder and competitiveness as the rung you know. Sovereignty require the ability and the incentive to invest. Competitiveness require sustainable competition efficiency and innovation.
I don't think that you can have competitiveness without competition you know.
So, this double helix for me has four implications for your work today. The first implication is that the DNA, sorry, the DNA should, that the DNA that you are building should be simple, predictable, and pro-innovation. And I'm very happy that your rapporteur often mentioned those three elements of what he wants to see as the DNA. So let me give me four suggestions in that regard. Regarding spectrum, I think the Commission proposal goes in the very right direction because Europe needs a more long-term approach.
Longer license duration provide greater regulatory certainty and strengthen incentive to invest.
But at the same time, of course, and I think that's also in the Commission proposal, the law should ensure that spectrum is used effectively and contribute to innovation and network deployment.
Christophe Grudler
Sorry, just a second. You need to slow down because interpretation, it will be easier. Thank you.
Alexandre de Streel
I am sorry. I was, I was respect your time. Oh yeah, but I mean, there is a trade-off as always in life, you know. Right. Sorry for and thanks a lot for the interpreter.
I'm sorry, I'm used to speak too quick. My student always told me that. So, on spectrum. On access regulation, I think access regulation should really be laser-focused on persistent local bottleneck. And the DNA should define what is bottleneck, what is the test for a bottleneck.
Third, on net neutrality. Net neutrality is a very important principle of the Europe on which we should be very proud of. But at the same times, net neutrality rule should not impede innovation and innovative services in 5G and tomorrow in 6G. So I think some improvement can be done there.
And finally, for this law which should be simple, predictable and pro-innovation, regarding consumer protection, we should recognize that Europe, and that's a good thing, has improved quite a lot over the year, the horizontal consumer protection. I mean, the EU consumer acquis has been improved quite a lot and therefore I think there are a lot of overlapping, as the previous speaker was saying, that could be removed in the DNA. So that's the first point.
The second point regard the fact that the DNA and also the cybersecurity law, you know, the sister law, if you can say so, should not increase, I think, the cost of operating network without considering its impact on investment ability. So this is, I think, particularly relevant where operator could, according to the Commission proposal, they could be required to, on the one hand, remove high-risk vendor equipment from their network or, on the other hand, to accelerate the decommissioning of legacy copper network.
I think when public policy choice generates such a cost and it may be justified, my point is not it's not justified, it may be justified, but those costs should be minimized with policy which are evidence-based and at the maximum use market forces and also compensation mechanism should be established just as it is already the case for the net cost which is associated with universal service obligation. Okay, that's the second point.
I think the DNA should actively and very actively stimulate the internal market when it can be beneficial, but the DNA should not artificially create an internal market when there are few cross-country economies of scale and scope. So, in satellite, in satellite, I think a stronger European approach is justified, as the satellite services are inherently cross-border. And thus, there is a very strong case for a more centralized management of the satellite spectrum, and this management should strengthen European competitiveness and strategic autonomy, the double helix. But in contrast to the satellite, I think fixed networks to a large extent and mobile networks to some extent remain rooted in local infrastructures. And therefore, you know, the cross-country economies of scale and scope are probably smaller for fixed and mobile than for satellite.
And therefore, in those sectors, I think the objective should not be to manufacture a single market from Brussels or from Strasbourg with some EU access product. Rather, the European framework, the DNA, should ensure that national regulatory regimes are efficient, predictable and supportive of sustainable competition and long-term investment. Okay. And the last point, the fourth point, which is probably the most tricky one because it relates to the governance and the role of the institution and by experience I know that these in general are the most contested issue.
But I would say that the proposal that the Commission has to centralize additional power to itself should be approached with caution. Because, and that's what I said previously, most of the telecom network, fixed clearly local to a large extent, remain fundamentally local. And they are very different from digital services. I don't think that what we have done for digital services, which is a lot of centralization in terms of supervision, and I think that was justified because those digital services travel across country, but that's not the case of network, that's not the case of network.
And so therefore national authorities should continue to play an essential role. Now, this centralization issue becomes even more delicate as the Commission is increasingly acting as a geopolitical body. And for good reason, because the world has become what it has become. But therefore, there is for that reason any extension of the central power to the Commission should be accompanied by robust safeguard to ensure legal predictability. I think if we are going in that direction, I think then the DNA could ensure competitiveness and sovereignty, which I think should remain our compasses.
Thank you very much. Merci beaucoup Monsieur le Président.
Christophe Grudler
Merci Monsieur de Streel. La parole est maintenant à Madame Anna Pisarkiewicz, qui est maître de conférence à l'Institut Universitaire Européen.
Natalia Pizarkiewicz
Merci beaucoup, Chair, honorable members of the Parliament, it's a it's a great pleasure for me to to be here today and I very much thank you for the invitation. Let me begin with a short retrospect. Thirty years ago, regulation focused on former monopolists, copper bottlenecks, and symmetric traffic flowing mainly among dispersed users. There were no hyperscalers, no gatekeepers, streaming giants, no frontier AI models or cloud dependencies of the kind we see today. We regulated the sector we had and most of that regulation was justified.
But regulation is often path-dependent, history-driven, when it should be forward-looking. The DNA looks forward in important ways. My concern is that this lens is applied unevenly.
So my question today is, where does the DNA stand in terms of simplification, competitiveness, and technological sovereignty? Simplification. There is a legitimate case for it: merging instruments, simplifying reporting, clarifying institutional roles. But consolidating texts is not the same as reducing regulatory burden. A simplified text can preserve all distortions, duplicate horizontal rules, and even add procedures to manage to manage the consequences of earlier over-regulation.
So let me give some examples. The first is net neutrality. The distortion the DNA addresses, but not yet effectively enough. Its hardcore must remain. No blocking, no throttling, no discrimination undermining media pluralism, user choice, or freedom of expression.
However, our current regime is unidirectional. It restricts how operators may differentiate traffic, while the largest content providers are still treated as ordinary users and users in need of protection. The Digital Markets Act and the Digital Services Act discipline gatekeepers, but neither addresses the network-platform relationship itself. The DNA's proposed conciliation mechanism is revealing. A voluntary forum has clear limits.
Where bargaining power is asymmetric, incentives misaligned, or rules uncertain, it risks being ineffective. At worst, it becomes a procedural substitute for substantive simplification, managing tensions in the existing framework rather than resolving the proportionality problem at its source.
This Parliament is already struggling with it. The IMCO draft opinion would extend net neutrality duties to content providers themselves, allow operators to differentiate by quality of service, and have BEREC clarify rules on specialized services. These are useful signals,
but they remain partial fixes within the old structure. Let me be clear, I am not calling for repeal of net neutrality, but simply for a disciplined re-examination of the regime's underlying objectives in the ecosystem we now have. This means that we should avoid framing the question dogmatically and in binary terms,
but ask, what is the precise harm, what is the proportionate tool, and whether empowered users and effective competition could protect the same values better than broad ex-ante prohibitions from another era. Also,
the economics of net neutrality are subtle. Hence, the analysis could consider distinguishing between fixed and mobile networks, since the impact of net neutrality obligations may differ in each.
The second example is regulatory burden and the coexistence of horizontal and sector-specific regulation. Consumer protection, cybersecurity, data protection and privacy now operate through dense horizontal regimes. Yet electronic communications providers still face sector-specific layers which may overlap with them. In consumer protection, this can mean duplicative information obligations. In cybersecurity and resilience, it can create unrealistic, disproportionate and inconsistent obligations.
Consider Article 5 of the proposal.
In data protection, the interaction between the GDPR, ePrivacy and other rules can fragment compliance, restrict useful data-driven services and create asymmetries with actors outside the electronic communications framework. Here, the DNA should include a cumulative burden test. For every sector-specific obligation, the legislator should ask: is the interest already sufficiently protected by horizontal law? If yes, the sector-specific rule should be repealed, narrowed or sunsetted. If it remains, the reason should be explicit.
The DSA Agora model may be useful here, not as another portal for undertakings, but as an institutional template for secure information sharing among authorities instead of repeatedly asking firms for same data. This is proportionality in practice, it is also regulatory coherence.
A brief word on access. Consider giving priority to symmetric regulation through the Gigabit Infrastructure Act and the DNA symmetric access provisions, and treating asymmetric SMP-remedies, SMP-based remedies as a safety net only. Let me turn to competitiveness. Here, the test is not whether any single rule is fatal. What matters is cumulative regulatory burden, not each instrument assessed in isolation.
A framework can look reasonably rule-by-rule, but in aggregate still weigh far more heavily on European operators than on the global platforms using their networks.
And it is that asymmetry, more than any single provision, that leaves the ecosystem unbalanced. Finally, technological sovereignty. If networks are the infrastructure on which AI, cloud, cybersecurity, and industrial digitalization depend, then telecom operators cannot be treated only as regulated addressees, consulted on spectrum, coverage obligations, or compliance. They must be part of the strategic conversation on how Europe builds a more balanced digital ecosystem.
That strategic approach must also reflect geopolitics. The war in Ukraine and an unstable security environment makes spectrum coordination at the Union's external borders strategic. The Commission should have a stronger mandate to negotiate with third countries where national solutions are inefficient. So to conclude, Europe needs neither dogmatic deregulation nor dogmatic preservation of every inherited rule. Hence we should regulate proportionately and by function rather than by legacy sector, weigh the cumulative regulatory burden rather than isolated instruments, and have both the humility and courage to legislate for the ecosystem we actually have today.
Thank you.
Christophe Grudler
Merci Madame Pisarkiewicz, et sans plus tarder je donne la parole à notre dernier speaker, Monsieur Peter Alexiadis, expert en droit de la concurrence et en régularisation des télécommunications.
Peter Alexiadis
Ah voilà, sorry, couldn't see that. Thank you Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me, and many thanks also to the 13th god of Olympus, the god of air conditioning. Thank heavens he's with us today. I tend to agree with many of the comments already made, but I will take a slightly different approach. My concern is not that there are many bad things in the DNA, but there are many disjointed things in the DNA.
It is not, in my mind, a holistic document. It has been drafted by many people dealing with specialist topics who either have not had the time or the inclination to join the different policy instruments.
And I will take you through what I think are some of my major concerns. I'm not surprised that we have ended up like this because if you have the four major sort of push-pull factors, A, the Draghi shopping list, B, very, very effective lobbying by incumbent operators, three, a tendency towards rash, sometimes geopolitical reactions, and B, and fourthly, a tendency over the last few years for encroachment of centralized regulatory powers. So let's look at seven points where I think the policies don't match. The first one, mergers versus regulation. The background music we're hearing is that the merger regime is going to be liberalized, made more soft to allow companies to have higher concentration.
What we find in the DNA though is less access regulation. And I implore you, the idea that you can have more concentration and less regulation makes absolutely no sense when it comes to access. If you are going to give with one hand the ability to have higher concentration, you have to ensure that competitiveness works and you have more hard-hitting access regulation.
To presume that you can lower both standards is folly. I think that's really quite clear. And the DNA is quite clear. It presumes no mobile access. It presumes minimal fixed access through the SMP route.
And it presumes fixed rigid access rules. Let me go to my second point. Harmonization against European markets. There's a big difference between saying that we are introducing more harmonization and saying that we are creating European markets. One does not lead to the other.
There are many instances all over Europe where companies are pan-European in their physical scope, but not servicing pan-European markets. They service German markets, French markets, Greek markets, Portuguese markets. And we should not confuse those.
And we must not confuse the fact that networks are national. They're national and they're re-they're local. Services are potentially pan-European. Absolutely. We should focus on services if we want to create pan-European markets.
And how do we get pan-European markets through services? We have access obligations which bite at the national level, which allow pan-European service provision. Don't pretend otherwise. And we go back to the concentration point.
If concentration is going to be internal to Member States, there's no nexus between that and pan-European operators. Do not be deluded that that is the case. There is no magic line between the two. Simplification is a good thing. But what are we simplifying?
Many of the things we're simplifying are cutting costs, and that's a great thing that the Commission has introduced, passporting, etc., etc. But we have to ask ourselves, is this just helping people who have already sunk costs to be pan-European in presence? So it doesn't really make that much difference. Is it going to help anybody new coming into the market? And if it does, even better.
But if it doesn't, you're already supporting a group of operators that have already sunk their costs. Fixed access standard product is being proposed. But we don't have a theory of harm for why we should give it and where it should be given. So again, that's not a pan-European solution. It's a common harmonized approach, but it doesn't create European markets.
And last but not least, given the role of the Parliament in fostering roaming and so forth, we do have a potential huge pan-European market. It's called the Internet of Things. But we won't get it unless we have access in the mobile sector.
That's the European market. It's there staring us in the face. Okay, third point. Do we need the same instrument to cover everything? Are we elevating security too high in the DNA?
Why do I ask that? You might say security, mother's milk. Security, however, is not sovereignty. What Europe needs is sovereignty. We're already covering security through two directives.
Let's make them better. Let's not put security at the heart of the DNA so that telecoms operators can do what digital operators do to regulators, which is namely to say, I'm respecting the GDPR, therefore please don't impose interoperability obligations on me. All the telecom operators will say is, I'm satisfying security standards, don't impose any access standards on me. That's going to happen. It's not a wild prediction, it's going to happen.
Do we want that?
If we want to cut back and simplify, do we need to add more consumer protection in the DNA, or should we just drop it all, or part of it at least, into the Digital Fairness Act? Let's deal with the fairness aspects of the digital world all together. Or let's give more powers to NRAs just to look at consumer problems. Fourthly, economic presumptions. Apparently we're lagging behind China, a market economy.
No, it's not. Let's not compare ourselves to China. We're lagging behind America. We're not. Our performance in telecoms markets is very, very good.
Telcos are suffering. No they're not, not all of them. Digital markets are suffering in America, but not telcos markets. Capex figures are low.
Look at post-2024 figures and you'll see a different story. Look at the benefits of technology and you'll understand why Capex figures might be low. The problem is demand. There is no demand from European consumers for expensive broadband and standalone 5G products. That is not something that can be solved by regulation.
Okay? And let's understand that. There are no incentives for incumbent operators to go up the value chain to get into the Eurostack. That's what we should be trying to do, but not through the DNA. Legal issues, I won't dwell on this.
Regulation, putting this legislation in the form of a regulation creates perverse outcomes. It means that you have to be very, very exact in certain areas and very fluid in others because you can't predict what's going to happen. That is potentially highly problematic. This for me looks and reads like a directive, but it's dressed up like a regulation. Copper switch-off.
If it's that important, why wait till 2035? If it's that important, how come our own predictions say that most member states are nearly there already?
If it's that important, why challenge the Charter of Human Rights and the Treaty, which gives the rights to property to member states? I think that's highly problematic and very risky. Appeals. The Commission is making the burden easier on NRAs to defend themselves. To what end?
They've taken away all their powers on the SMP front, so they're giving with one hand but taking everything away with the other. The parties covered. Yes, we should have OTT operators covered, but should they be regulated? That's a political choice. Should all private networks be regulated?
On the current drafting, it looks as if they will. Is that simplification?
Last point, spectrum policy. I'll gloss over. I don't agree with unlimited duration of licenses if there is no quid pro quo. Unlimited duration if you have access. Unlimited duration if it can be taken away.
Unlimited duration with no auctions when auctions are a good means of valuing the value of the license is important. And last but not least, governance. More responsibilities to NRAs, less power to NRAs.
Is that, is that what we want for networks which are local? Encroachment into the sovereignty at national level and encroachment into local problem-solving issues. Let's remember also that the Commission proposes to have, uh, power over, over remedies. Veto power. The reason we didn't have that in the original regulatory framework was because no one knew what the right remedy would be and you'd judge it in particular circumstances.
Pretending that we now know the perfect remedy is folly again. It depends on the national network circumstances. So, in conclusion, we have a grand buffet approach, but as with all grand buffet, if we eat too much, we might get sick. Thank you.
Christophe Grudler
Merci à vous. Merci à l'ensemble de nos quatre intervenants pour la qualité de leurs interventions. Vous allez maintenant écouter avec nous le rapporteur et les shadow rapporteurs du texte et après vous aurez l'occasion d'intervenir à nouveau pour faire vos commentaires. Alors tout d'abord, on va écouter donc le premier tour, le rapporteur et les shadow rapporteurs. Mais la parole est tout d'abord au rapporteur en chef du Digital Networks Act, Monsieur Michal Kobosko du groupe Renew.
Michał Kobosko
Thank you, Chair, and I understand I just have two minutes.
Okay, what can we do? So let me just start by thanking our experts for accepting our invitation and being here today. Let me thank Mr. Mischmasch, Professor de Streel, Professor Pisarkiewicz, and Professor Alexiadis for being here and sharing your rich comments, remarks.
I believe your comments also illustrate how broad area we are trying to cover, how big is the number of the real challenges that we are facing to make European connectivity a better system, securing connectivity for all of us and securing the growth and development of European players versus players from other continents. So yes, you mentioned this already, while working on the DNA, we do believe there are three key pillars that we need to concentrate and these are related to the simplification of rules, harmonization of rules, as well as creating real tangible incentives for European players to increase their investments for the future. This is our core thinking here, but here's my time is very limited. Let me just jump to three questions that I have.
First one starting with Professor Alexiadis, I want to ask you what would you do, what would be your concrete, very concrete solutions to improve pan-European competition in mobile sector? How would you do that? Mobile market is obviously highly deregulated now. Second question to Mr. Mischmash, I want to stop by the last moment you mentioned in your statement, that is the universal service obligation.
In BEREC's opinion, you suggest to bring more flexibility to Member States and reintroduce the option of industry sharing mechanisms. Right now, according to the Commission's proposal, only public funding would be allowed to finance this policy, but industry sharing only exists in a few countries. The designation process is cumbersome and the burden is only put on the telecom operators. How would you suggest to reform this process so it can be much more efficient? Do you think it could be fair that other industry players beyond telecom operators, for example interpersonal communication services OTTs, are also part of this burden sharing?
And thirdly to Professor Pisarkiewicz on the net neutrality. You mentioned net neutrality is one of the areas where simplification can be introduced without harming net neutrality principle. I would be interested to hear even more concrete recommendations on this matter.
What do you think would make the biggest sense? Should we make allowed reasonable traffic management measures more flexible, or maybe keep the net neutrality rules only in relation to consumers? And when it comes to specialized services, is it smart that optimization is such an important element of the assessment whether specialized services allowed? One may argue that it forces the operators to craft specialized service for one concrete service or a particular company. Shouldn't we rather have specialized services for certain categories of traffic, for example, social media, music, banking or streaming, allowed when proven that it doesn't cause a detriment to general internet access?
Speaker 13
Thank you, Mr. Kopeček. Now the floor is to Ms. Pilar del Castillo Vera for EPP.
Pilar del Castillo Vera
How many, how much time do we have? Two minutes as well? Okay, thank you. Well, first, thank you to you all.
I think you very properly raised the many different problems that is in the dossier. And I would say that all in all, you are quite convergent. I don't see big differences among the different approaches you have told about us. Well, I think the two main points or three main points that we will have in this dossier in terms of Parliament, it is not exactly COPPA, it is not exactly the voluntary conciliation mechanism, because here we very much agree that the difficulties for going further what Commission has proposed is my opinion, of course, I mean, no doubt that it's the Commission the one that has to come with different ways of going on, because do it in Parliament, it seems that we don't have the tools necessary for develop further this proposal, but it is, I would tell you, single market.
But it is, I would tell you, single market. I fully agree with you. We don't have a single market. We cannot create a single market by law, and we are not in the process of developing a single market. Then you can push from legislation.
It is not the case. The market is fragmented. It is national markets.
Pilar del Castillo Vera
And then things like the single passport and the harmonized wholesale access product, it is, you know, very difficult to think about that just put it in the scenario, these proposals, you will find the magic solution and then we have appear the single market or to some extent. This is other question that I have that I think I am very interested in is the net neutrality because net neutrality can be one of the points. I think the net neutrality should be taken as it is in terms of the core of the design. But in the same manner that when you look at other actors, let's say the platforms, they have developed. Initially they were for distribution.
They were for searchers, you know, to get information and so and so forth.
But now they are in all sectors. In that sense, we cannot deny to the telecom sector that they can develop other kind of businesses. So the B2B means through slicing technologies or so means that at least I would like to know your vision needs to be present there. They can as much as they do not damage the general principle of net neutrality as it is now.
And so in terms of centralization is also interesting very much what you have been saying to what extent it is better. I think the remedies are local since the local the market is local. But I think we have debated so many things in that that we find or at least I find so many convergence what you main issues that is difficult to ask for anything else. But in terms of net neutrality and access again I should like for you to develop a little bit more please. Thank you.
Matthias Ecke
Vielen Dank, Vorsitzender, diesmal in meiner Muttersprache. Ich bin heute mit der Bahn nach Brüssel gefahren und bin dem DNA begegnet in gewisser Weise, denn wir hatten gestern Abend in Deutschland einen Zusammenbruch des Bahnfunk und deswegen sind keine Züge mehr gefahren. Und gleichzeitig, wenn man über die Grenze von Deutschland nach Belgien fährt, merkt man das Funklöcher sind, wie eigentlich an jeder europäischen Grenze. Und man sieht, dass noch nicht mal in so einer wirklich gut zu greifenden Art ein europäischer Binnenmarkt existiert.
Aber wir wollen ja über andere Dinge sprechen, wie wir wirklich einen europäischen Binnenmarkt für Konnektivität schaffen können. Und hier gab es auch einige ernsthafte Zweifel daran, dass das überhaupt mit dem DNA gut möglich ist. Und deswegen wäre meine erste Frage vielleicht an Herrn Destreel, Sie hatten ja ein Stück weit in Zweifel gezogen, dass es überhaupt zu Cross-Border Geschäftsfeldern kommen kann. Und wie würden Sie denn die Voraussetzungen dafür beschreiben?
Also wo gibt es eigentlich den Business Case dafür, dass Telekom-Anbieter über die Grenzen hinauswachsen? Wenn wir sagen, dass wir aus guten Gründen, Wettbewerbsgründen gegen Mergers sind, dass sie sich intern konsolidieren, wie könnten sie über Grenzen wachsen? Welche Voraussetzungen müssten dafür auch regulativ geschaffen werden? An Herrn Mischmasch, Sie hatten dargelegt, wie DNA auch sich schon von BEREC funktioniert und der Regulator. Nun ist es ja so, dass es mit dem neuen Vorschlag auch eine Abfolge von Handlungsmöglichkeiten gibt, also Order of Remedies, die DNA vorschlägt.
Ist es denn überhaupt nötig aus Ihrer Sicht? Oder sind am Ende doch die nationalen Regulatoren am besten geeignet zu sagen, welche Handlungen bei Marktzugang an welcher Stelle geschehen soll?
Oder wo sehen Sie Vorteile, die so eine Abfolge von Handlungen ergibt? An Frau Piskarewicz würde ich gerne fragen: Sie hatten erwähnt dieses Spannungsverhältnis von horizontaler Gesetzgebung im Cybersecurity, bei Konsumentenschutz mit den Sachen, die sektorspezifisch im DNA sind. Welche Beispiele würden Sie denn sagen, da geht der DNA zu weit? Hier in diesem Bereich konkret könnte man vielleicht auf die sektorspezifische Regel verzichten und da genügt vielleicht die horizontale Gesetzgebung.
Und schließlich an Herrn Alexiadis, ich habe mich auch stark gefragt, wie können wir eigentlich mit verlängerten Lizenzen sicherstellen, dass der Wettbewerb noch effektiv funktioniert, dass auch neue Wettbewerber in den Markt eintreten können? Nun, die Kommission schlägt vor, die Lizenzen unbegrenzt zuzugestehen und gleichzeitig hat sie Sicherheiten, Safeguards, installiert. Sind die aus Ihrer Sicht, so wie sie im DNA vorgeschlagen werden, eigentlich effektiv genug? Oder wie müssten effektive Safeguards aussehen, dass auch bei verlängerten Lizenzen noch ein effektiver Wettbewerb stattfindet? Vielen Dank.
Mélanie Disdier
Oui, merci Monsieur le Président, chers collègues, je m'exprimerai en français. Donc l'ambition de ce projet de règlement sur les réseaux numériques est claire : basculer d'une logique de fragmentation nationale vers un véritable marché unique de la connectivité. Cependant, ce saut fédéral soulève des questions institutionnelles et techniques cruciales que je souhaite donc adresser à nos experts. Ma première question sera sur le chevauchement entre l'ENISA et l'ODN. Le DNA confie aux nouveaux organes de réseaux numériques, l'ODN et au BEREC, la corédaction du plan de préparation de l'Union pour les infrastructures numériques.
Or, l'ENISA et le réseau Cyclone pilotent déjà la cybersécurité des infrastructures critiques sous la directive NIS 2. Comment vos administrations respectives peuvent garantir une articulation juridique claire pour éviter les doublons administratifs et les conflits de compétences en cas de crise majeure sans diluer l'expertise technique de BEREC ? Ma deuxième question concernera la subsidiarité et le rôle des autorités de régulation nationale. En transformant le code de communication électronique en un règlement, la Commission restreint drastiquement la marge de manœuvre des régulateurs nationaux au profit d'un guichet unique européen.
En tant que garant de l'ancrage local des marchés, comment le BEREC appréhende-t-il ce risque de centralisation ? Quelle est votre vision de l'équilibre institutionnel entre l'échelon européen et la préservation des compétences de terrain des autorités de régulation nationale indispensables face aux réalités géographiques et économiques des 27 pays membres ? Et pour finir, je souhaite aborder le sujet de l'évolution de la neutralité du net. Le DNA intègre le règlement sur l'internet ouvert et impose un reporting biennal obligatoire sur la neutralité du net pour les fournisseurs d'accès.
En parallèle, la gestion des cogestions et le découpage de réseaux liés à la 5ème et la 6ème G interrogent l'écosystème. Beaucoup d'opérateurs se questionnent sur la frontière entre la neutralité du web et la liberté du marché des services de l'interconnexion. Le durcissement réglementaire du reporting vous semble-t-il nécessaire ? Et enfin, comment réconcilier le strict respect de la neutralité du net avec les besoins d'investissement et de flexibilité technique nécessaires au déploiement des réseaux du futur ? Je vous remercie.
Francesco Torselli
I'll switch in Italian.
Il DNA nasce con due obiettivi per noi estremamente condivisibili, quello di semplificare il sistema delle comunicazioni in Europa e quello di rendere l'Europa attrattiva per gli investimenti. Ci piace anche il differente approccio della Commissione sintetizzato da Mr. Nimash in quel del BEREC in quell'espressione evoluzione non rivoluzione che ci convince molto e siamo convinti che per arrivare a questi obiettivi servano almeno tre step: superare la frammentazione normativa che oggi abbiamo in Europa, offrire infrastrutture digitali moderne e soprattutto performanti e garantire tutela a chi oggi sceglie di investire in Europa.
Vengo alla parte interrogativa e vi chiedo se questo obiettivo della semplificazione, che è un po' la parola d'ordine che tutti ci chiedono quando oggi parliamo di comunicazioni digitali, possa convivere, sia allineata con il tentativo, la volontà di trasferire quanto più potere autorizzatorio possibile nelle mani della Commissione rispetto agli Stati membri. Vi chiedo dove secondo voi stia quella semplificazione che è rappresentata dall'evitare la sovrapposizione normativa, che è un altro tema che ci è sollevato dai territori, dai nostri Stati membri.
Nessuno ci chiede meno regolamentazione, nessuno ci chiede deregolamentazione, ma tutti ci chiedono normative non sovrapposte e soprattutto chiare. E l'ultima domanda, vi vorrei anche chiedere se il voler regolamentare, tentare di regolamentare quei rapporti che il mercato da sempre regolamenta con leggi non scritte della competitività tra soggetti privati non sia un appesantimento anziché un tentativo di semplificazione. Grazie.
Thank you very much, Chair, and thanks to the distinguished panel I'm here. I have three questions. The first goes to Mr. Misch-Masch.
Alexandra Geese
Until now BEREC and national regulatory authorities provided an established and effective framework for regulatory coordination across the Union. And this proposal would significantly expand the Commission's enforcement role and create while creating also a new office for digital networks. Now we all know that in particular the network fees have already been subject by political interference in the US trade deal. And I have to say as somebody who has worked on the Digital Services Act my experiences with giving so much enforcement power to the Commission have not been good because it is subject to particular political geopolitical foreign influence a lot more than national regulatory authorities or BEREC.
So how do you see that danger that there will be strong political influence in that case? How do you see the governance model? The second question goes a little bit to to everybody on the panel who has ever has any evidence. It's on voluntary conciliation and dispute resolution. In your view, what is the impact on smaller application providers, content providers, or innovative European digital businesses which would find themselves in a weaker position?
I think we think of this as something like the big telcos on one side and the big tech companies on the other side, but there's third actors in this game. So where would they stand in the voluntary conciliation and dispute resolution mechanisms? And my third question's also to all, but in particular maybe to Professor Alexiadis. What do you think about the expansion of the scope to private networks that are connected to public networks, for example, content delivery networks? How do you see the impact of the DNA and what do you think about that?
Thank you.
Jussi Saramo
Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you all the speakers, excellent speeches, and you answered almost all my questions. So actually I have only one. I wonder what kind of logic Europe uses to catch up with the US in digital services by imitating the US in networks, which clearly don't work as well as in many European countries. And we have both very good and very bad examples in Europe in building networks, and I think we should learn from those and not try to not obey the wishes of the largest operators.
These large operators, they tell us that by actually reducing competition, they get bigger profits, which they then invest in the faster digital transformation, transition. But my question is, what reason do we have to assume that the growing profits will be transferred to investments and not to dividends? Wouldn't that require a huge amount of new regulation? And it would be very difficult to make it work. And for me, this sounds quite strange on this world of omnibuses where we are trying to do less regulation all the time.
So yeah, this is actually my question, how big is the threat of reducing competition and and growing profits? Thank you.
Christophe Grudler
Merci. Alors je vais maintenant me tourner vers nos nos speakers pour leur donner un temps de réponse à chacun. Répondez effectivement aux questions qui vous ont les plus interpellés. J'insiste vraiment sur l'importance de respecter cinq minutes chacun de temps de réponse. C'est vraiment important pour qu'on puisse tenir notre notre timing et que nous puissions ensuite laisser la place aux autres collègues qui auront des questions.
Merci. On va commencer par Monsieur Mischmasch.
Marko Mišmaš
Thank you very much for the floor, Chair. So, I will first answer on the questions of the MEP Kubosko. So the question was regarding universal service, if we brings back the industry funding options, how the designation process can be simplified. So BEREC believes that the designation process should remain proportionate, predictable and as simple as possible.
Member states should retain sufficient flexibility to choose the mechanism that best fits their national circumstances, while ensuring transparency, legal certainty, and effective delivery of universal service objectives. So, the focus should be on achieving digital inclusion efficiency rather than on creating additional administrative procedures. So, on the second part of the question regarding on industry funding and OTT NICs contributions. So, as regards the industry funding and the possible contribution of NICs or OTT providers, BEREC has not yet adopted a specific common position on this question.
It is clearly an important issue that requires careful assessment of its economic, competitive and legal implications. So more generally, BEREC believes that any financing mechanism should be proportionate, technology neutral, competitively neutral and should not create unintended distortion in the market.
So we would be very happy to provide the committee with a more detailed written assessment following the consultation with our experts regarding the second part of the question. So regarding the question of Pilar del Castillo, net neutrality and more about the access. So I think I was quite clearly already on the access provisions on my speech. So what Commission is proposing is let's say the pyramid of remedies. And this gives away the flexibility and efficiency from the regulators because we need to assess the first part, if the first part is not effective, then the second remedy, if the second remedy is not effective, then the third remedy.
It means that we cannot effectively intervene on the market if there is anomaly.
We should intervene fast, as fast as possible. Regarding the net neutrality, in our assessment we already provided that some of the recitals are missing when Commission implemented the net neutrality regulation into the DNA.
What is especially important that the work of BEREC shouldn't be duplicated here. And I have to, let's say, put on the table that BEREC is very promptly, let's say, accepting and preparing the guidelines for the net neutrality implementation. We already adopted for the public consultation the guidelines for the 5G slicing. So we are very in line with the technological development with the guidelines of the net neutrality.
So regarding the questions of Matthias Ecke, I don't think I understood it very good. I think it was regarding the new negotiation proposal, so regarding the voluntary conciliation. A hierarchy of remedies. I think I already answered that part.
So regarding the questions of the resilience and security. So I was very clear in my speech that the most important is that the different legislations are not providing and giving the end users, not the end users, but let's say the telecom operators additional burdens which are duplicated. And it should be very precise that we as regulators are experts on the markets.
So regarding the resilience, we know the local markets, we know the local networks, and we are the best, the best knowledgeable people who knows how those networks are working. So and that's why we are the best for providing the appropriate resilience solutions on specific markets. Better than for instance an European agency, because they does not know the specifics of specific market.
Alexandre de Streel
I have five minutes and I have five points, so let's try to be quick. On internal market and on your question, which is of course a difficult one, I really think, as Peter was saying, that we should distinguish the infrastructure part and the service part. On the infrastructure part, in particular for fixed and mobile, I'm not sure that there is a lot of cross-border externality, except on the back end of managing those networks. And that is beyond the DNA. I mean, those are laws regarding data retention, security, and so on, which probably should be more harmonized so that it is possible to manage a local network with the same back end.
Okay, thank you.
But I'm not sure that on the front end much can be done. Then on services, I agree, that's probably where more can be done.
But it would be very important that the way we try to build this European market for telecom services do not undermine the investment to invest in local infrastructure. I think that's where the remedy should be well calibrated to alleviate that there is some form of cream skimming, which could be done by the way by the US big tech. So I think there we have to be very careful. That's the first point. On the second point, I fully agree with you.
I mean, competition is at the core of the system. And I fully agree with you, if there is no competition, there may be ability to invest but not incentive to invest.
So I fully agree with you, no competitiveness without competition. And this is why, as your colleagues were asking also for simplification, I think we need a simpler access regime, you know, focusing on the bottleneck. Because if there is a bottleneck, I mean, this bottleneck needs to be open, needs to be open, otherwise you will never have competition. So I think that's where you can reconcile competition and simplification by focusing the regulation on the bottleneck. The third point is on net neutrality.
I think what is very important because all of you mentioned this, what is very important is that it is not prohibiting innovation or impeding innovation. And I think what the different suggestion that the rapporteur has mentioned, I think most of them could be implemented. And I we will see what BEREC will propose, but I'm not sure that all your suggestion, the three suggestion you had, will be in the BEREC guidelines. If they are, that's great. If they are not, I think then we need to we need to work on the law or on some complementary complementary guidelines.
On the universal service way of financing, it's funny because I was at the Commission 25 years ago and we had the same debate, you know, whether because the Commission again in 2002, you can go back to the proposal of 2000, the Commission was proposing a financing only through public fund.
The Member States didn't want it, and I guess it will be the same this time. So I think an extended fund is probably the way, the way to go. And finally on governance, I fully agree with what Alexandra Geese says. I mean, I think the Commission is not anymore an independent body. And indeed, we have seen that in the DSA and the DMA.
Speaker 27
Sorry, you need to speak slowly please for position again. Thank you very much. You have five minutes, don't worry.
Speaker 28
I think that, you know, I'm slow to learn, you know, I'm slow to learn. But I'm so enthusiastic about all of this, you know.
Alexandre de Streel
Sorry for that. No, but I mean, I fully agree that the Commission is is less and less independent. And there is, you know, an increasing tension between on the one hand a Commission which is more and more geopolitical and according to the very word of her president. And that's good because the world is what it is.
But then I mean you cannot be at the same time a regulatory authority. And you know there is something of an irony by criticizing the Trump administration saying that they that the FTC or even the the Fed is not anymore independent and in Europe you know our own federal institutions are not are political. So I think the solution and it's also a way to address the other point about coordination between the network authority and the security authority. I think the solution is to do what we have done in monetary and and and financial supervision. To have a European system of digital regulator including including the telecom.
So you would have a bit like you have for monetary and financial supervision a European an independent European authority at the top like the ECB and then a network of national authority in the Member States.
I think the model we have there and which seems to work quite well, we should implement it here in digital, telecom included. Thanks.
Natalia Pizarkiewicz
Thank you very much. I think most comments to me were about net neutrality, but before that I would like to say something very briefly on resilience and cybersecurity. I do not have the text of the article in front of me, but I believe that Article 5 of the proposal says something about the obligation to provide continuous connectivity, to take all the measures to provide continuous connectivity and to anticipate and prevent all types of crises. Is it really realistic? Is it proportionate?
Wouldn't due diligence be built into this article to make it more meaningful? Because if we have an article that looks great on a paper but simply is not enforceable because a company can do many things, but at some point you can always find something that it hasn't done. So what it would mean to take all measures to ensure continuous connectivity? So that was my response on the resilience. Now on net neutrality.
I think it's pretty easy to agree that it's mostly a political choice. It has, the open internet regulation has been created in the spirit of consumer protection, but we should not forget that it is really also an economic regulation, because it very much, it has a huge impact on economic incentives and what companies can and cannot do. And it is, if it is an economic regulation, then it has to respect certain principles, such as proportionality, but it should also take into account whether a specific company has both the incentives and the ability to do a specific thing. Now, the telecom operators for sure have the ability to degrade traffic and implement various measures that can be discriminatory. But do they have the incentives today?
These are not the same incentives that we have seen in 2008. From this perspective, it can be quite interesting to note that one of the first things that Ofcom has done when UK has exited the EU was actually to review net neutrality obligations, and Ofcom very clearly said that European rules on net neutrality can restrict investment. Now, in 2015, Joshua Gans has written an article on weak and strong net neutrality, and what strikes me as an academic is that whether I look at consultancy papers or policy papers or academic articles, they have very binary views and they are very contradictory.
So I think it's very important to understand the nuances because economics of net neutrality are very nuanced. And from that perspective, it would be really important to understand whether the impact of net neutrality is the same in fixed and mobile networks because my understanding is that it doesn't have that huge an impact in fixed networks because of flat rates, whereas it might have a bigger impact in mobile networks because of average revenue per connection actually drops down.
So therefore the impact of revenue dilution in mobile is far stronger than potential increases of fees from bundling. Now, what is important also, what is the impact of net neutrality on the value capture? Depending on the rules that we have, the value can be captured by consumers, by CAPs and by ISPs. Now if we have a choice on who is capturing it, maybe it's not also a question of consumer protection, but of technological sovereignty today, because if we consider the whole ecosystem, who captures the value is very much at the core of technological sovereignty debate today. Okay, then on specialized service.
Do I speak too fast? Okay. On specialized services, I think what should be clarified is that these rules are not for a specific entity, but for a specific type of activity.
So that type of clarification would be useful. Now, if open internet regulation, which is funny that we call it open internet if we think about the fact that the internet today is not very much open, which is why we also have the Digital Markets Act.
But we have provisions on what are specialized services and one of the requirements for that is that it is not an access to the internet. And then we have still quite a lot on that, so isn't this too disproportionate to talk about services which are actually not access to the internet? Now, if specialized services are to remain in the DNA, then the question is how to incorporate them so they do not end up as zero-rating rules, because if I remember correctly, initially it was foreseen by BEREC that they were actually, they should be allowed, but the Court of Justice has decided otherwise. And of course, guidelines cannot precede the case law of the Court of Justice.
Last but not least, there's a question of legal certainty. So the fact that there is a case-by-case approach adopted by the BEREC guidelines can create possibly, it remains to be seen what will happen with specialized services depending on what type of interpretation will be given to the four requirements that are mentioned and in particular to the fact that, to the part to the detriment to availability of general quality of internet access services. And I think that it would be very useful to speak more to engineers because traffic management versus specialized services is a distinction that may seem very clear on the paper, but not so much in practice. So I hope that I have at least partially answered some of the questions that I have received. Thank you very much for all of them.
Peter Alexiadis
Hopefully I can stick to my time.
Trying to go through your individual questions. The first one was on mobile. What should we do? I think what the NRAs were doing already, which is in the 5G licensing process, obliging the holders of those licenses to give to grant MVNO access, is already a good policy. You do that, then you can be softer on allowing concentration in country because you've got this pressure point on price.
But secondly, if you allow it also for international interconnection, you then get the potential for a European market for the Internet of Things and so forth. So I think it can kill two birds with one stone.
Secondly, extension for permits. Was that your question or somebody else? Extension for permits. If we're going to have unlimited, unlimited duration for authorizations, what do we do? Again, the answer is access.
If you have unlimited, you must grant access. Currently the safeguards are, which are very good by the way by the European Commission, a use it or lose it. Okay, but it still presumes that you could be, you know, a quasi-monopolist in that area. So I think we need a bit more.
And last but not least, let's not poo-poo auctions. Yes, they do drive up prices, but they do oblige operators to use the spectrum efficiently. Okay, so we shouldn't lose sight of that. A third question was on subsidiarity and governance. I'm going to, I might sound a bit fatuous now, but I'd say the following.
Create a European market and then centralize competence in the Commission. It's worked in the DSA, it's worked with the DMA.
It's not working in telecoms because they're not pan-European markets. So once we do put the access conditions in place which allow European markets to foster and grow, then we can think about a pan-European solution. Simplification. One of the great benefits of the current regulatory regime was through the SMP process, we could upgrade the regime periodically through soft law. I think soft law is very, very important in moving forward and taking into account technological change and political shifts in enforcement strategy.
The point about political influence I take from my friend Alexandre de Streel. The worst nightmare for a US president is not dealing with the European Commission but dealing with 27 member states all of whom have slightly nuanced policies. That is difficult to deal with. In terms of private networks, a very good question, unfortunately a very difficult question. So the honest answer is that's something we really have to consider.
I mean, the biggest concern I have is that when we're meddling in the content space above physical networks, we're getting into a position whereby compliance costs could be very, very high for small European companies. Because if we don't apply the rules to them, then we are accused of discrimination against larger players. So we have to have a rational basis and we shouldn't underestimate the costs of compliance, because I remember very well when Mark Zuckerberg went before some standing committee in America, he was all about regulate, please regulate us. Why? Because we can afford it but others can't, and we should bear that in mind.
And last but not least, a question came from your neighbor on investment.
My biggest concern about investment, if we relax merger policy, okay, again, it's good, but think about the implications of that. If I were an investor, I would be holding back my investment to have the merger approved to then put the investment that I would have done anyway. So investment is all about two things. The Schumpeterian school says if you're a big fat monopolist and you've got a lot of spare money, you're going to invest money in improving. Yes and no.
Depends on the, depends on the sector, depends on the maturity of the sector and depends on other economic circumstances and shareholder pressure for, for dividends.
So there's no one answer fits that. Most markets work on the basis that fierce competition leads you to need to invest because because you invest, you get ahead of the opposition. But once you get stuck in ossified markets where everybody knows that more or less I'm going to have 32 to 34%, that incentive disappears. And it's the pressure on regulators to sort of create those incentives.
Christophe Grudler
Merci beaucoup.
Nous allons pouvoir attaquer rapidement le deuxième tour de de de parole pour les les députés. Une minute chacun s'il vous plaît, essayez vraiment de de respecter le temps, sinon nous risquons de ne plus avoir d'interprétation. La parole est tout d'abord à Madame Angelika Winzig pour le PPE.
Angelika Winzig
Danke, ich spreche Deutsch, bin ich schneller. Ein starker europäischer Telekommunikationssektor braucht Investitionen und Wettbewerb. Wettbewerb sorgt für bessere Preise, mehr Auswahl, letztendlich für bessere Netze für unsere Bürgerinnen und Bürger. Genau deshalb sehe ich die vorhergesehenen sehr langen bzw. teilweise unbefristeten Frequenznutzungsrechte skeptisch.
Die Frequenzvergabe war in der Vergangenheit auch ein wichtiges Instrument, um Wettbewerb zu sichern, Markteintritte zu ermöglichen und Fehlentwicklungen zu korrigieren. Wie können wir einen funktionierenden Wettbewerb im europäischen Telekommunikationsmarkt langfristig sicherstellen, wenn Frequenzlizenzen für 40 Jahren oder noch mehr vergeben werden? Und welche konkreten Voraussetzungen braucht es, damit ein Sekundärmarkt für Frequenzen tatsächlich funktioniert und nicht nur auf dem Papier existiert, sondern neuen Marktteilnehmern auch eine faire Chance ermöglicht? Danke.
Elena Sancho Murillo
Muchas gracias por esta hearing. El Digital Networks Act se enmarca en el debate europeo sobre cómo reforzar la competitividad del sector de telecomunicaciones en un contexto de creciente presión internacional. Como se ha comentado antes, es verdad que tenemos muy buenos telcos a nivel europeo, pero la realidad es que son los grandes teleoperadores de Estados Unidos y Asia los que se benefician actualmente de una mayor escala de mercado.
Por eso, uno de los dilemas centrales es cómo compatibilizar los objetivos de competencia de la política europea con la necesidad de impulsar operadores con mayor capacidad de inversión y dimensión internacional.
¿Cómo puede el marco de la DNA equilibrar la necesidad de mantener una competencia efectiva en el mercado europeo de telecomunicaciones con la necesidad de permitir la escala de los operadores europeos para que puedan competir en igualdad de condiciones con los grandes grupos de fuera de la Unión Europea? Muchas gracias.
Mélanie Disdier
Oui merci, en français donc j'ai une dernière question. Le DNA reconnaît que la compétitivité européenne dépend de réseaux performants mais ne prévoit aucun mécanisme contraignant pour faire contribuer les grands fournisseurs de contenu qui génèrent une part majeure du trafic. Comment justifiez-vous que le financement des réseaux continue de peser presque exclusivement sur les opérateurs européens et à terme sur les consommateurs ? Je vous remercie.
Nicolás González Casares
Autonomía es una de las palabras más repetidas, da igual el sector, energía, defensa, materias primas y, por supuesto, digital, pero exige inversiones masivas y, según la Comisión, la brecha es muy grande, asciende a unos 200.000 millones de euros hasta el año 2030, esto calculado antes de la explosión de la inteligencia artificial y de los centros de datos necesarios. Y necesitamos respuestas para saber cómo vamos a movilizar esta inversión, aunque en el marco financiero plurianual se ha mejorado mucho el presupuesto dedicado.
Me gustaría saber a la vista de los expertos del panel y de la propuesta de Digital Network Act si el incremento de tráfico que va a provocar el uso intensivo de herramientas de inteligencia artificial, no tanto en lenguaje como en contenido y vídeo, cómo responde la DNA en esto y si no entienden que hay una falta de mordiente de la propuesta en cuanto a fair share al dejar a un proceso de conciliación voluntaria la participación de los grandes consumidores en la financiación de las redes de banda ancha. Y me gustaría también saber su opinión en relación a los cambios propuestos en la política de espectro. Esto es muy importante.
¿No ven ustedes riesgo de que los estados, digamos, adelanten, anticipen sus adjudicaciones para evitar tener que regirse por las normas de la DNA, teniendo en cuenta que la propuesta de la Comisión solo afectaría a licencias que expiren hasta siete años después de su entrada en vigor? Muchas gracias.
Christophe Grudler
Merci. Nos speakers ont maintenant une minute chacun seulement pour répondre à tout ou partie des questions des collègues. Monsieur Mischmash, please.
Marko Mišmaš
Thank you very much. So, the first question was regarding the frequency secondary market.
So in general, BEREC has serious concerns that the DNA spectrum proposal will adversely affect competition and market contestability by introducing unlimited license duration and automatic renewal. So there is actually no robust empirical evidence, for instance also the Ofcom study, suggesting that longer license duration induce more investments. Instead, such measures essentially amount to the expropriation of and privatization of the public radio spectrum.
So generally speaking, spectrum and infrastructure sharing subject to the competition law should be encouraged where possible, and it offers many benefits. Firstly, it is beneficial for operators as it leads to more efficient investment, and secondary, it contributes to environmental sustainability. So in general, regarding the spectrum management, BEREC has opinion that we should reject the 40 years minimum and unlimited duration and use investment recovery as a criteria for license duration.
Alexandre de Streel
Yes so for scale up for having good infrastructure for AI I think I mean as we said before I think the issue is that they have the ability and the incentive to invest and so that means rules which are simple. It's interesting to note that in its proposal the Commission has removed some articles which were not used because they were too complex. So I would really urge this Parliament to not make the proposal even more complex than it is now but to go into simplification which is not always the case when we go to legislative negotiation unfortunately. So I think that's important.
And so simple, predictability, and then access rules which are based on bottleneck. On the contribution of big tech, I think they first should pay their tax, you know. I think that would be the first thing I would say before going to a specific contribution to the network because basically, you know, what also the big tech are doing is rendering those network more interesting for the consumer and so that's why they are willing to have fiber or 5G. But I think the bigger problem, I think, is that their tax in general is not enough.
Thank you.
Natalia Pizarkiewicz
On net neutrality, I am very sorry not to have a very specific solution to the problem, but I think this is why we can see that it is so highly debated. I believe it is really important to avoid undogmatic to have undogmatic discussion on that. And a very good example, South Korea is a place where there is a specific regulation. And if you read what is happening in South Korea, you actually get very opposing views again as I have mentioned earlier. So for example, there only five companies are subject to traffic specific rules and payments.
And those rules take into account how many what is the percentage of the traffic on the internet and how many users a specific company has. So that smaller companies are not affected by that.
On the conciliation mechanism, as I have mentioned, because of a number of imbalances, instead of voluntary conciliation, maybe mandatory conciliation would be, would be better. And on mobilizing investment, my understanding is that at least in terms of 5G coverage, the issue is not so much about investment and coverage, but about monetization. And monetization, monetization is very much linked to what somebody has mentioned here, which was lack of demand for expensive services in the EU. So what is the problem?
And I think that it is a message that maybe politically very hard to pass, but maybe in Europe we have been a little bit spoiled as consumers. Thank you.
Peter Alexiadis
In response to the question over there, what could we do additional to what I said before? I think if we all turn to the energy sector, we might have a solution. The energy sector was the quintessential national sector until we thought Europe needs a pan-European policy. So all the action went to the borders, the interconnectors and so forth.
But what did we do? We created a reserve pool of X percent of every producer's capacity had to be available for resale. So if we did that with all the mobile operators and say 20% of your spectrum needs to be available to be resold to MVNOs, other operators and so forth, suddenly we could have a real possibility of a secondary trading market. And that's something we should take into account, and that's something which will also assist us in creating something at a pan-European level. The last point about scale, I remind everybody that during the early days of liberalization, we had many European companies going outside the territory of the European Union and buying assets overseas.
Nearly all of them, except for Deutsche in the United States, have retreated. Okay? Have retreated. So scale possibilities were there on a global level, but they were not taken. So let's be careful about scale.
Count the numbers of subscribers we have, you'd be surprised how big some of the European companies are in terms of scale.
Christophe Grudler
Merci. Merci à tous.
Alors nous, vous savez que sur le DNA, nous avons deux commissions qui peuvent donner un avis, les commissions IMCO et LIBE, qui n'ont pas leurs rapporteurs ni de représentants présents aujourd'hui. Donc je vous propose pour conclure notre intervention de peut-être donner la parole deux minutes à la Commission européenne, Madame Kamila Kloc, qui est directrice générale des Communications Networks, Content and Technology à la Commission européenne, si vous voulez nous dire un mot en deux minutes maximum s'il vous plaît. Merci.
Kamila Kloc
Oui, bien sûr. Merci beaucoup. Thank you very much for allowing us to intervene very shortly. Two minutes probably is not enough to respond to all the issues, but I will try to be very short and precise. I will start with single market dimension because there is a lot of, there was a lot of discussion which I had a little bit of impression are chicken or egg type of discussions.
So how to build the single market and if the single market is necessary. I will start if it is necessary.
Yes, it is. I also would like to remind everyone that we are talking about future connectivity and here the satellites and D2D will play a role. So we should also not rest within the discussion on the telecom networks which is only based on the current model.
On the issue of fragmentation, on the networks versus services, I strongly believe in order to have European services you need to harmonize the way the networks are operating and you need to harmonize access rules and you need to harmonize the conditions how the telecom operators can operate, which is a general authorization and passporting. So basically what we are trying to do in the DNA, we are trying to make sure that we reduce fragmentation through the reduction of the barriers and this is what the DNA is very much about. From the single market I very quickly would like to move to governance because a lot was said about the role of Commission and centralization. I want to clarify two things. Commission according to the treaties is protector of the treaties and this is our role in the system.
One of the principles of the treaties is building single market and this is what we are trying to do.
On the issue of centralization and role of Commission versus BEREC and NRAs, I would like to clarify that BEREC is not agency, cannot make decisions. We would be very happy if BEREC would like to be agency like in energy sector, but unfortunately this is not the case. Hence, anything what BEREC is issuing can be only guidelines, and this is why the Commission in certain aspect related in particular the single market takes on ourselves the responsibility for issuing, for example, implementing acts. Very importantly, we are also not reducing regulatory tasks of NRAs, quite to the contrary, we add whenever we can the issues which can be dealt by them from the single market as well perspective.
Access regime and competition, I think we do very much based on the previous access regime which we also think is very efficient. SMP concept is very important, but we are very much simplifying it and trying to harmonize it, very much also referring to the symmetric rules which I think also were referred to in the context of the bottleneck regime, but what we are proposing here is very much similar under symmetric rules with economic replicability test which is basically very much the bottleneck regime.
So access regime is very much based on competition and harmonization only refers to certain aspects that can be harmonized with the help of BEREC. And I think that is what I can say with this short intervention, but there is much more to be said and clarified from what had been said before.
Christophe Grudler
Merci à vous. Et voilà qui va conclure notre public hearing. Bon, pour une fois que le Parlement européen laisse la parole à la Commission à la fin, c'est assez rare. On peut le souligner ensemble. Donc merci en tout cas à la Commission.
Merci à nos quatre intervenants pour la qualité de leur intervention. Merci aux députés européens qui ont pris la peine de suivre l'ensemble du débat qui était d'excellent niveau.
Je n'oublie pas de remercier nos équipes, l'équipe de nos députés européens, l'équipe du secrétariat d'ITRE. Je vous rappelle que la prochaine réunion ITRE se déroulera... Pardon, j'ai oublié les interprètes, c'est pas bien, merci de me le rappeler. Merci à nos interprètes qui ont su agir, des fois on a parlé un peu vite mais on a fait tout ce qu'on pouvait pour améliorer la chose. Prochaine réunion du comité ITRE, c'est lundi 29 juin.
Bonne fin de journée à tous et à très bientôt pour de nouveaux événements.
Ask anything about this video — I analyse its transcript to answer.