Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs Ordinary meeting
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LIBE European Parliament
Follow its sittingsHenrik Nielsen
There the information flow and the information sharing is very suboptimal and doesn't really happen. In fact, between Member States they can of course access information which has been uploaded into our large-scale IT systems because all Member States have access. But if they cannot find the information there, there is no particular channel or system for Member States just to exchange information in bilateral between them. One Member State may have information relevant for a returnee which is in another Member State. There is no system or or any kind of digital channel to to facilitate that kind of exchange.
Secondly, a lot of of this process at the Member State level is still happening kind of semi-manually or through repetitive manual tasks. For example, the uploading of return alerts into the Schengen Information System as well well, the creation, the uploading and the updating of of these alerts sometimes need to happen manually. So the basic upload of of a very basic alert can sometimes takes up to 30 minutes. So kind of the automation or the lack of automation also leads to quite an excessive administrative burden at the level of Member States' administrations. We also lack quite a lot of statistics on the whole process, which also prevents us from better targeting our efforts and knowing where, you know, we need to step up, become more efficient and and where we need to prioritize.
Kind of part of the reasons of this is what I mentioned a little bit, it's very fragmented this, so basically we have three kinds of systems all used by most Member States, but each of the systems are kind of a bit at different levels of of effectiveness, different levels of of development and a lack of connection between them and a lack of connection between the Member States. So the picture is is kind of one of of an incomplete digitalization and a very fragmented digitalization in the Member States.
Also part of this fragmentation, a lack of interconnection between these national systems and the large-scale IT systems, so the EU systems, is also missing at national level, although in fact this connection could already be done. Some of these systems also at national level lack some of the crucial functionalities that would make them more efficient, for example the Readmission Case Management System, the RCMS, does not always allow for handling biometric data or for printing out emergency travel documents directly from the system related to the particular returnee. And then to a certain extent we lacked until recently a sufficiently clear legal basis for the sharing of data. This is now largely solved with the new Return Regulation once it enters into force in the autumn, so providing a clear legal basis both for the sharing of data between Member States but also between Member States and third countries. But still we lack a bit the tool to fully operationalize this new legal basis that we have in the regulation.
So basically on this basis we would like to come with a proposal that will allow us to move to a fully digitalized return and readmission case management system that would be sustainable and effective in the long term.
So we would aim to cover all the three components that I mentioned, so the return process in the member states, the readmission process in relation to third countries, the reintegration aspect, and to integrate all of them. Basically, the preferred option that we are considering for the moment is, let's say, not to redo what already exists, because once again, the situation is very fragmented in the member states, and by all means, while some member states' national systems are very weak, there are also some which are actually quite good. So instead of kind of to restart and say that every member state needs to do everything afresh, we would rather propose a solution that allows us to build on what already exists in the member states. So member states that do have, for example, an effective national RECAMAS, a return case management system, would be able to keep it and to improve upon it. If a member state finds that they have a very weak system, they could choose to develop a new one, and they will get guidance and kind of a reference document from Frontex that will establish a new model for a fully efficient RECAMAS, which will be kind of the objective for all member states to move in this direction, but each one in its own pace, so to speak.
We would also make sure that these three national systems would connect between them within the Member States but also allow them to connect them with Frontex where we also see this in the light of the upcoming Frontex proposal that we reinforce the overall role of Frontex to coordinate return operations between the Member States so this proposal would all allow to move in that direction. We would also foresee the possibility to exchange information directly between Member States so a new communication portal would be set up so notably to be used for bilateral exchange between two Member States in relation to a particular case a particular return case where a Member State see that there is information that they can receive from another one that would help them to manage the case. Also maximize the interaction between these national systems and the large-scale IT systems as mentioned so without changing as such the Schengen Information System or Eurodac it would allow Member States to more efficiently connect these national return systems with the EU IT systems to make sure that this is automated and simple and making use of the European Search Portal that is being set up in the context of interoperability but again without changing the large-scale IT systems just make sure that this runs let's say efficiently at Member State level. Then who will do all this?
Well, we would rely on the two agencies, in fact, both Frontex and eu-LISA. Current thinking would be that Frontex would play the major part due to its already existing involvement and then due to the kind of strong link between the operational coordination aspect of returns in general at EU level. So Frontex would be the main agency that would provide the technical guidance to the member states on how to improve their national systems and how to connect them between them. This will be supported by eu-LISA, who obviously has plenty of expertise in this area, and eu-LISA will also be the agency that would develop this new communication portal that will allow for the connection between member states for sharing information outside the IT systems. So this will all be accompanied, as mentioned, by the impact assessment that will also look into what are the data protection safeguards and interaction again with the IT systems that we need to have in place to make this all operational.
But now I'm over time, so I stop. Thank you, Chair.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you, thank you, Mr. Nilsson. And now I pass the floor on to Mr. Leijtens, the executive director of Frontex. You're connected remotely. Let us check. Good morning, Mr. Leijtens, welcome to the committee.
Can you hear us? Can you see us?
Hans Leijtens
Thank you, Chair, dear members from the LIBE Committee, and thank you for the invitation. And first of all, I think, of course, we are fully aligned with Mr. Nielsen's contribution. I think we share the ambition and the ideas, and I think a lot of it has already been explained by him, so I can be a bit briefer, perhaps. I've prepared a few slides, but only a few. Perhaps we can have the next one.
Yes, thank you. Well, as explained by Mr. Nielsen, it's an overall architecture, and it has both a more, let's say, systemic dimension and also an architectural dimension. I think it's important to remark that this is not just an IT issue we're talking about. It's really to make sure that we use the full potential we have in Europe, both on the national level and on the European level, to deliver. Because in the end, it's about delivering more returns with the safeguards on fundamental rights and data protection, because I think we have a real challenge in Europe right now.
And this architecture, this setup, I think, will deliver more bang for the buck, so to say.
For this and I will focus more on RECOMAS as a reference and also what might be the potential of this reference. First of all I think it's important that we have indeed this clear picture of what we already have, what we need and how we can combine both worlds because I think that is actually the main challenge we are facing and as depicted by Mr. Nilsson, Frontex sees itself as an important player, not the only player, as an important player to bring together all the national efforts and European efforts and streamline it and again deliver more than we are doing today. So it would be actually and you see this in the slide a layered architecture. So not redoing it and make it one big system I think this we should also learn from the current challenges we see in each... Just a bit slower, would you speak a bit more slowly please.
Oh yes, I can. Sorry. It's my enthusiasm I guess. So, okay back to the picture, what we see here is a architecture with not the intent to redo, rebuild because we can't and it would not be learning from the lessons from the past, but it's an overview of all the different layers of systems that would need to be connected, integrated, aligned, synchronized to deliver more in the whole return operations area both on the national level and on the European level and therefore this is indeed a layered approach, a layered architecture and not a new one-size-fits-all architecture.
The main issue for us is that we should have indeed a EU-level roadmap how to build this, and not build technically but build more systematically. How to make sure indeed that all the systems available are synchronized, are aligned, are connected to make sure that all the efforts on the national level and European level lead in the same direction. And as Mr. Nielsen said, what we see right now indeed that the differences between Member States are rather big, let's say on the scale depicted by him already from rudimentary to rather well-developed. And I think this is also something to take into account if we not only share but also implement the ambitions we are having right now. Perhaps we can go to the next slide, please.
So what is RECMAS? Actually it's a reference model.
It's a reference model we use and that we present and also use as input for the dialogue with the member states to make sure that we have the same objectives in mind, the same standards in mind, because I think the better the standards that we share and the better they are implemented, the more effective we can be together, not only again on the European level, but also on the respective national levels. And the intent of this RECAMAS model is first of all to improve the overall efficiency. I already mentioned more bang for the buck, to make sure that we spend every euro we spend in an effective way. Then secondly, to improve the awareness between member states, between member states and Frontex, to make sure that we know what would be a good way to perform return operations, but also, and that's also been mentioned by Mr. Nilsson, improve statistics, because in this, statistics are gold. Know what is happening in respect of member states on the European level and collect statistics and learn from them, I think is very important.
And that brings me to the next step, which is to adapt, both on the operational level, so day-to-day business, but also to learn from it how to improve the more systemic features of returns in Europe. And this adaptability, I think, if you know the statistics, if you know the standards, you can improve. And I think that is also important.
And last but not least, protection, and in this case protection means protection of fundamental rights, to be able to monitor them, to learn from them and to improve there. And I think for all these four objectives, this full digitalization is key, and again, not to digitalize this, but to make sure that we have a common shared European system in place and to make sure that we live up to the same standards and share as much as we can our practices. Can I have the next slide, please? So the current model is non-binding. So it is a reference model, like I said earlier.
So that means that it's up to the Member States to which extent they would like to implement the standards that are depicted in the reference.
We provide member states the possibility, and most of them do, but not all of them, to have a gap analysis, so to look at their practices from the reference model perspective and to define with them what could be done to fulfill the standards of the reference. And of course, I mean, it is fully in the hands of the member states. And Mr. Nielsen just informed you about the ambitions of the Commission, which we fully share and support, of course. But there I think is something to improve, because if it's fully in the hand of the member states, then some of the objectives I just mentioned will not be fully met. So the system builds on three key success factors.
They're also on the slide. First of all, the flexibility of the system, so it should not be sort of an inert system. It should also show and prove day-to-day business that it can be flexible and can be adjusted to tailor the needs of the member states. That brings me to the second point, that it also opens the possibility for a real collaborative approach, which I think is very much needed from our perspective. I think we're losing a lot of energy, time, and also I think money in all the different approaches we have.
And I'm fully committed and convinced that a more collaborative approach will deliver added value to the member states, but also I think to the European perspective and also to Frontex's perspective.
And last but not least, to learn by sharing best practices, by having a sort of common database, but actually more than a database, a learning system that enables both the Member States and Frontex to do better the next time. The last slide, please. So what we could imagine that the future RECOMA will have sort of two sides of the same coin. The first of all is indeed, more than we have today, binding requirements to make sure that we have European standards that deliver, that can be compared, that can be combined, also enabling Frontex and the Member States to deliver more in joint operations with Member States and on returns. And the second part could be indeed more the learning part of it, where we could provide Member States best practices, also of course with the intent to do better.
But for us, I think having these sort of two perspectives in one model would improve and would deliver more added value to Member States and also enable Frontex more than it does today to support the Member States, because that's in the end our mission, to support the Member States, in this case with return operations. That would be it from my side, dear Chair. Thank you very much, and sorry for speaking a bit too fast, but again, that's merely enthusiasm, I guess. Thank you.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you, Mr. Laitens. As you know, we don't want to have anything lost in translation.
That's why I ask the speakers to speak at a natural pace. Well, now let's start with the Q&A starting with EPP. There will be two minutes for questions and two minutes for speakers to speak, to answer the questions. Mrs. Düpont.
Lena Düpont
Thanks, Chair, and thanks to both of you for the explanation and the enthusiasm. I think it's sometimes very wonderful to see about what we can be enthusiastic. But indeed for that, for the topic presented, a bit of enthusiasm actually is very good because it is very technical. If it works, it will be detrimental in the support of the Member States. If it doesn't work, it would also be quite difficult actually.
So I think from the very outset, full support for that project as such, but of course there are a few questions connected to it.
Because I very much remember one of the, I think it was an ECA report about Eurosur, where the the report in itself says, well, Eurosur, one of the most important tools actually we have, very good for the member states, very good for the European level, but the time we are taking in adapting the data and in the information and the categories of information that member states are providing and actually translating it into the European systems had taken too much time. So the first question there would actually be, how can we make sure that the member states are ready, given the variety of actors at national level, databases at national level, and information and categories at national level that they actually feed into the European system? Second question connected to that, we now had gone through the experience with Entry/Exit and with ETIAS, with Eurodac, where I would say a variety of experiences and lessons identified, lessons learned we can take from there. So where is actually, do we integrate that already in the setting up of the system here? And I think both of you, but more Mr. Nielsen touched upon, let's say, the variety of digitalization as such in the member states, that can be a problem actually, because we've seen that also with other databases as well.
So is there an initiative connected to the return case management system that where we can actually support the member state in getting and becoming more digital also in that?
And of course last question because eu-LISA is not present today, but I assume that the cooperation with the agency is is not only good but very much needed again because someone needs to host the system in the end and needs to also make sure that it's safe in terms of not only data protection but of course also in terms of cybersecurity. Thanks.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you, Mrs. Eppink. Mr. Nilsson, I think those questions are addressed to you.
Henrik Nielsen
Yeah, thank you. On the first point, on on the readiness of member states and how quickly they can adapt, I think that will be a key role of of the regulation that we will propose to really define exactly the minimum requirements for the national systems that they all need to meet. They will be minimum once again because we will leave member states a bit of space to do their own thing building on on what they have. And that will indeed also include, you know, data categories and and so on to make sure that everything is comparable and shareable. So we will try to define that to avoid exactly those problems.
I think here we are still we have kind of the advantage also of building on what exists because we know what the data categories are and we know kind of what exists in terms of what you need to do to manage the return process. So I think the definition of that should not be too hard.
On lessons learned, yeah, that's a big topic. I will try to be brief, but I think we will for sure do our best to try to set out a realistic timetable for the rollout of this whole package, which for sure will last a few years to be sure, but also try to avoid too many, creating too many interdependencies, so to avoid that we end up in a situation where either all actors have done exactly what they were supposed to do and then we can switch everything on and until then we cannot do anything. So we will try to foresee a more gradual rollout and kind of make the availability of the different components to member states ready and usable as soon as they are ready, so that we can have more of a staggered entry into force of all of it. Then accompanying that, there will, as mentioned, be a budget allocated for the agencies and the work they need to do, but indeed member states can also benefit from the support that they can get through our home affairs funding programs, including under the new MFF. So if they wish to draw on those funds to do what they have to do at national level to do this, they will be able to do that.
Then on the hosting, maybe to clarify one point, so we are not creating any kind of new central database, which is also a big difference compared to the other large-scale IT projects. So there is no hosting per se to be foreseen by eu-LISA as is the case for the existing systems. So that makes for quite a difference and also a bit in that sense lighter work for the agency, both for Frontex and eu-LISA.
Birgit Sippel
Thank you very much and thank you for these two presentations. Following our two guest speakers, I have the impression this starting point will be a long journey to end up with a real European system. I remember that only a few weeks ago we were alerted that maybe by starting 12th of June with the European asylum system, not all member states will be ready to really enforce Eurodac. So having now learned that the level of preparedness within member states to use IT systems for returns, this might also lead to big challenges. And my question would be, do you have an overview to what extent member states are technically ready and prepared to, in case it's necessary, improve their systems?
And are they ready to do so regarding their financial contributions to that point? I also wonder how this then will affect the exchange of information between member states. And I just learned that Frontex might help both on financial and technical level.
So do you already from Commission or Frontex have an overview what kind of support, technically and financially, is needed, to what end will member states need to deliver, and do we need some maybe own resources to deliver on the requests that might come from member states? I also wonder when talking about readmission, what precisely will this new project bring? Frontex was also talking about best practices in return management. So I'm quite convinced you will not mention member states, but could you explain what are the criteria to decide if a management system is okay, bad, or really delivering best practice so that we can have some ideas to control it in all of our member states? You haven't said anything regarding reintegration.
So what kind of information is needed to help the process of reintegration and how will you control if reintegration really is taking place? Thank you.
Henrik Nielsen
Yeah, thank you. We will have a let's say a baseline or an overview in impact assessment on where member states stand. And speaking under the control of Mr. Leitens, I think Frontex also has more granular information on what is exactly the level of advancement, if you like, of the national, in particular the return case management system. So I think we do know that baseline. And we have tried of course to take that into account in defining the level of ambition in terms of where we want to go, but also the level of realism, so how quickly can we proceed.
So taking the bit the questions not in any particular order, but that will then be linked to how we define these minimum criteria in the regulation. So that will say what each member state needs to do in terms of the national system, what needs to be the performance of this system, what are the functions that this system needs to be able to do. Because that's simply a lesson learned. Without regulations, we get too much disparity between the member states in terms of what the national systems look like. So that we will define.
Then beyond that, because we will not fully harmonize this, member states might be wanting to add features if they are more advanced and have a more advanced national systems. And that's a bit where the best practices of Frontex can come in to again guide and share that between member states.
So in that sense, two layers, if you like, as indeed Mr. Laiten showed, the basic requirements in the legislation, the best practices on top, again allowing each member state to adapt a little bit to what they think is feasible and how quickly they are ready to proceed. So then we have also had quite a lot of consultations with member states at technical level. Do they see this as realistic? How much support indeed will they need, both technical support and financial support? So the whole development process foresees indeed that both Frontex and eu-LISA will work very closely with the member states to be there to support them and provide any advice that they may need.
And as mentioned, combined with the potential funding from the EU Home Affairs programs to the member states who feel that they need it. Now, the costs we will look into more in detail in the impact assessment, but just to give an idea, I mean, we are not looking at the kind of level of costs that we had for developing the large-scale IT systems because once again, we are not doing a central database. So the level of cost is in that sense lower. But that will also be a point to further discuss with the member states. Do they feel that, you know, the overall rollout schedule is realistic and do they feel that the necessary support is there?
And if member states feel that's not the case, we will see how we can further reinforce that.
Marieke Ehlers
Dank u wel voorzitter en dank aan de sprekers voor de toelichting.
Ik verwelkom de stappen richting een effectiever Europees IT-systeem voor terugkeer, maar wel slechts tot op zekere hoogte. Want voor ons is één woord cruciaal in dit proces: uitwisselbaarheid. Het moet inderdaad eenvoudig en veilig zijn om relevante gegevens uit te wisselen tussen de lidstaten en instanties zoals Frontex. Dat is ook nodig om effectief terugkeerbesluiten te erkennen als lidstaten dat willen. Wat we echter absoluut niet willen is één centraal Europees systeem waarbij nationale lidstaten hun systemen moeten opgeven voor een Europees systeem.
Want recente ervaringen hebben laten zien dat Europese systemen gewoon niet werken. Denk bijvoorbeeld aan EES. Er is inmiddels bijna tien jaar aan gewerkt en het is nog steeds een drama. En vanaf deze plaats wil ik dan ook alle mensen die deze zomer in een rij staan op Schiphol door dat EU-geblunder alvast veel sterkte toewensen. En dat drama moeten we zeker niet herhalen als het dan om terugkeer gaat.
En gelukkig lijkt het erop, naar aanleiding van uw uitleg, meneer Nilsson, dat het ook niet het voorstel van de Commissie is om een centraal systeem te creëren.
Kunt u bevestigen dat het inderdaad niet gaat over een overkoepelend Europees systeem, maar een soort API waarbij informatie in een geharmoniseerd format gedeeld kan worden? En dan aan de heer Leijtens, begrijp ik u goed dat u grondrechten zou willen opnemen in dit systeem? En dan is mijn vraag: wat precies is de meerwaarde daarvan? Dank u wel.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you, Mrs. Sellers. I will start now by giving the floor to Mr. Leijtens. Yes.
Hans Leijtens
Thank you, Chair, and thank you, Ms. Depons, Sippel, and Elas for the questions. Let me just briefly touch because I think most of it has been already explained by Mr. Nielsen. And the motto would be not only to rely on our enthusiasm, but indeed to have some safeguards in place. And actually, perhaps it's about time to under-promise and over-deliver, because I think we also need to learn from the current challenges we see in implementing bigger systems. But indeed, this is not going to be a big system, but actually this is connecting based on a common architecture and also on a common intent and objectives.
And also answering Mrs. Sippel's question, right now we have, based on this gap analysis, we know about 70% of the Member States what the functional part of their challenge is right now. And of course it's up to the Member States to define actions on their level, but with the implementation and the adoption of RECMAS as indeed as this mandatory requirement, I think this will indeed define also the roadmap, both functionally and technically, of course. On the fundamental rights, well, fundamental rights monitoring is an integrated part of return operations in Europe, so it makes sense to make this integrated part of the system too, if only to make sure that our obligations are met in terms of monitoring, both on the European level and on the national level. Overall, I think this, all the questions I think emphasize the importance of having a proper roadmap. And again, I think it's not just a matter of technical implication, what we see right now, that some challenges can be mixed of both operational and technical challenges.
It will be a long journey for sure.
So it's I think very good to take stock of all the lessons learned on all the systems mentioned by your members in the questions. So I think it is quite different from the ones mentioned on one hand, on the other hand we should not ignore any lesson that we can take from the past experience.
Thank you very much.
Henrik Nielsen
Yeah, briefly just to repeat again, indeed, based on the impact assessment, the option that we are working on as the preferred one is to build on national systems, so not to replace in terms of what exists at Member State level. What will of course be new by definition is the creation of the communication portal between the Member States that will allow for exchanging information. We haven't found anything, let's say, that exists that could be used for the same purpose, and it's obviously something that we do need to create at EU level to make it happen. On the fundamental rights, just to complement what Mr. Leitens said, I think there will be certain data protection aspects that we will need to integrate, while of course we will make sure that overall the existing legal framework, the GDPR as well as the provisions in the existing regulations such as the SIS will be fully applicable. But to the extent that we need to complement that with any particular data protection safeguards, we will do so in the proposal.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you. I have no speaker on my list from ECR, so I give the floor to Mr. Waitz, Renew.
Jan-Christoph Oetjen
Thank you, Chair. Thank you, Mr. Nilsson, Mr. Leitens.
I think the overall objective of digitizing the system and making communication among Member States and with the European Union easier and better is something everyone can share or should share. I have a couple of questions that are hinting towards implementation and the role of Frontex. So, as I understand, there will be a regulation with the basic requirements that Member States shall meet and with their national systems, so no European system. I totally got it. I would like to know a little more about the precise role of Frontex then.
Shall Frontex be the organization that monitors the implementation, that guides Member States, that trains Member States? So to what extent this is done by Frontex? What is the role of Commission in that situation? And what is the role of eu-LISA, maybe as a side question? So if you could distinguish the precise roles of the different institutions.
So basically will Frontex be the main actor in this field that puts the implementation or that guides Member States in the implementation? And how, but this is maybe more a technical question that comes throughout the process, how do you foresee an implementation in in practice if we see today that every that at EES, for example, Member States even though they declared readiness, they were not ready. So so how do you see this this from a practical point of view? And maybe another question on the scope of the data that is foreseen in this system. We have asylum seekers that have a negative asylum decision, but they are not automatically returnees at that moment.
From which moment on will you start to collect the data?
Hans Leijtens
Yes, thank you very much for this indeed very interesting question. I think our role is defined in more than one regulation of course. I think the main one would be the proposal from the Commission, but perhaps Ms. Nilsson can extend a bit more on this one on our future mandate.
And of course we have a current mandate that has some limitations on what we can, not how we can support, but how we can be more, let's say, of a, well, again, supportive to the member states. So that depends a lot. And right now with RECMAS and the status of RECMAS, and that's the second of course pillar under our role, is it's defined that it's only a best practice, a reference model. So if two of them change at the same time, I think we can combine and do more, but right now we are limited by what our legislators actually defined as our task in this specific. On the implementation part, the big difference is of course we have a shared intent and a shared objective, but we don't have a deadline.
So it does not need to be a big bang. Of course, the more the merrier, I would say, but in this case, if member states need more time, they can take it as long as we don't have a fixed deadline and we don't have this one yet right now. So again, on our role that depends on the mandate. It's clear right now, but we have two coming up and let's see how the combination of the two defines our future mandate.
And indeed, the implementation, I think the good news is, if we could speak about good news, is that we don't have a clear deadline, so we have more flexibility than we have in the system just mentioned. Thank you.
Henrik Nielsen
Yeah, thank you. Well, one could maybe say that the regulation will define what Member States have to do, and then Frontex will support them and help them in terms of how they're going to do it. So Frontex will do kind of the overall reference implementation framework or the guidance for all the national components, starting with the RECAMAS, the national system. And that will now also for the first time integrate the other parts, so the readmission case management and the reintegration assistance module. So they will all come into one and be part of the national RECAMAS.
And Frontex will effectively be the one who sets out for Member States exactly how should they do that. So how are kind of the minimum requirements from a technical point of view defined. Then in terms of the follow-up, I think that will be a bit joint by Commission and Frontex, but again, in terms of, you know, what Member States need to ensure that the systems can deliver will be an issue for the regulation and hence an issue for us to monitor and follow up with the Member States in case they do not meet those requirements. On the readiness, we do foresee, again in the regulation as well, a certain schedule of testing.
Again, we will try to draw lessons learned from previous experiences with testing, including at national level. So that's something that we will need to define a bit more in detail once we get a bit further down the line. But I think again useful to emphasize, and as Mr. Laitens also said, we will really try to avoid any kind of big bang scenario that every single little component needs to be up and running before anything can be up and running. So really try to define this more gradual rollout and allow Member States who might be quicker to go ahead quicker and without having to wait for the others.
Erik Marquardt
Yes, thanks a lot. I will speak in German. Also genau, der erste Punkt ist, dass es ja so eine gewisse Tendenz insbesondere in den Mitgliedstaaten gibt, dass man in dem Bereich der Migration vor allem große Pressekonferenzen und Big-Bang-Moments erzeugen will, während das in der Praxis dann doch alles vielleicht gar nicht so klar ist, welche Ziele man eigentlich mit den jeweiligen Vorschlägen dann wirklich erreicht. Deswegen würde mich auch bei dem Vorschlag noch mal interessieren, also warum ist es jetzt notwendig und also was genau, welches Problem wird da eigentlich gelöst? Zweitens, was hat denn der Europäische Datenschutzbeauftragte bisher zu den Vorschlägen gesagt?
Wurde der in den Prozess schon eingebunden? Gibt's da schon eine Stellungnahme?
Vielleicht können Sie dazu kurz etwas sagen. Drittens, also Herr Leitens, Sie haben ja gesagt, Grundrechte sind ein wichtiger Punkt, sie sollen respektiert werden. Ich glaube, man muss bei diesen Vorschlägen ja nicht nur gucken, dass sie respektiert werden, sondern dass die jeweils Betroffenen auch eine Garantie haben, dass ihre Grundrechte respektiert werden. Und da würde mich interessieren, was bedeutet das eigentlich konkret? Also wenn Sie sagen, Fundamental Rights are a big part, dann was heißt das eigentlich konkret?
Also wie wird das dann operationalisiert und wie kann ich mir das vorstellen? Und der letzte Punkt ist, also es geht ja offensichtlich auch darum, den Mitgliedstaaten klarzumachen, wo sie Schwächen haben, meinetwegen bei der Effizienz, aber ja vielleicht auch beim Respekt von Grundrechten. Wird das dann auch öffentlich sein? Also ist das Ziel, dass wir auch als Abgeordnete oder dass die Bürgerinnen und Bürger dann auch sehen können, wie der jeweilige Mitgliedstaat mit den Menschen umgeht oder was da für Probleme existieren oder welche Zahlen man erreicht hat und welche nicht, oder werden die Mitgliedstaaten versuchen, das sozusagen verschlossen zu halten oder was sind da die Vorschläge der Kommission?
Henrik Nielsen
Yeah, thank you. Well, the problem to solve, maybe to put it in a less technical way, is that we feel that Member States are kind of not able to actually apply the rules, so in this case the future Return Regulation, properly because they don't have the support of the digital tools that they should have. So they do simply a lot of administrative processes manually, and plus that they are not able to share information within the Member State and with other Member States. So it's about giving them the tools to actually do that and as a result to be able to apply the Return Regulation properly, including the safeguards. On the issue of the EDPS and safeguards more broadly, so indeed we have consulted EDPS when we were working on the impact assessment, so that input will be reflected in the impact assessment, and then as always when we come with a legislative proposal that concerns personal data, he will also be issuing an opinion on the proposal that would feed into the legislative process of the co-legislator.
And so once again, this particular proposal, remember, concerns only the digital tool, so it's essentially mainly about data protection aspects, not other fundamental rights aspects, which more belong to the overall acquis in the field.
Hans Leijtens
I think the only question unanswered so far from Mr. Marquardt is on the fundamental rights part. Of course, the regulation and the whole setup will not include new standards. They already are here in the system. What it will do is that it will ensure that all the safeguards in return operations are there. So that means that monitors are there, that we have sufficient best practices that we can share how to do this.
Yes, thank you, Chair.
Right now the practices are a bit different per Member State, but also because the Member States are responsible for applying the standards and living up to the expectations. And what we do, the layer we add, is to register, to deliver best practices, and in case there is a request from Member States, also to supply monitors to make sure that we have clear observations of how the operations are performed. So we will not add more safeguards, we will make sure that they are monitored and there is a report system underneath it.
Thank you. I had one question on transparency, if the weaknesses and all will be transparent to the citizens or not.
So what we see and if there's any violation, we have the serious incident reports as a way to report any misbehavior. And right now we already have to the European Parliament in our quarterly report the numbers. So it is already to a certain extent in the open with you at least, with the European Parliament. We will not report on every specific case. So there will not be an sort of external reporting tool in this RECOMA system to report in public for this.
No, I think, again, for this, already the current practices are there.
Isabel Serra Sánchez
Señores, esto es distópico y lo digo así. Me niego a aceptarlo como normal. Me niego a aceptar esto como la normalidad y a normalizarlo. Ustedes han aprobado el reglamento de retorno, que es la política, la legislación más inhumana que ha aprobado este Parlamento nunca. Y así vitoreaba la extrema derecha en Sendenbach.
Y es tratar a las personas peor de lo que esta sociedad trata a los animales. Y por lo menos Trump, bueno, pues como quiere hacer este show, pues muestra lo que hace. Pero ustedes lo harán por detrás y seguirán hablando de derechos humanos y de derechos civiles. Y ahora esto. Quieren digitalizar los retornos.
Quieren poner los avances tecnológicos al servicio de expulsar más rápido de forma más eficaz de forma más inhumana y por tanto digitalizar pues el maltrato la violación de los derechos humanos y la política de muerte. Yo señor Leijtens sinceramente me parece un horror que a usted una política tan inhumana le parezca algo que puede generar entusiasmo le genere entusiasmo. Yo creo que dentro de poco veremos cómo dicen que los Estados miembros si no quieren bueno pues tener que gastar presupuesto público en contratar trabajadores públicos si no quieren tener a trabajadores públicos que les genere algo de empatía expulsar a niños a otros países que no han cometido ningún delito bueno pues qué mejor que pues eso deportar más rápido mejor con todas las herramientas de la inteligencia artificial de la digitalización para que nada lo impida ¿no? Esto lo que significa es que las instituciones públicas van a dedicar millonadas millonadas a precisamente encerrar a personas en terceros países que no han cometido ningún delito esto es como seleccionar a personas gracias a la digitalización para mandarlas a terceros países países dictatoriales que tendrán centros y encerrarles ahí. Creo que es sinceramente hacer la deshumanización de forma más eficaz y más rentable que nunca usted mismo lo ha dicho con sus palabras.
Yo creo que los avances tecnológicos tendrían que estar al servicio de vivir mejor, no de cometer violación de los derechos humanos en esta Europa de la vergüenza y también de controlar datos que van a servir no solamente para perseguir a las personas migrantes, sino para controlar al conjunto de la población. Les quiero hacer una pregunta. Díganme, aparte de Frontex, que va a ser el brazo ejecutor de todo esto, aparte de Frontex, ¿qué empresa amiga de Donald Trump o amiga de Israel va a ser la que se dedique a hacer todo este sistema? Porque estoy segura que va a ser una de las mejores empresas pensadas precisamente para, bueno, pues para la muerte y para el control de personas y para la violación de los derechos humanos. ¿Y qué van a hacer con todos esos datos?
Porque son datos de población, son datos de seres humanos y esos datos no deberían estar nunca en manos de empresas que lo que tienen como objetivo es eso, violar derechos humanos y como objetivo la muerte. Así lo digo.
Javier Zarzalejos
Gracias, señora Serra. Entiendo que su pregunta va dirigida al señor Leijtens.
Hans Leijtens
Thank you. I have a colleague next to me who understands Spanish, so I hope we completely got the question. I think the question was mainly on how to do what we're doing. Actually, I think digitalizing in my case would not mean any change in terms of standards.
And I think it would continue to support a respectful and effective return operation, because I think in Europe we decided and we live up to the standards to do both at the same time. And I kindly invite Ms. Sanchez to come and visit us to see how we do this in practice, because I'm pretty sure that some of her assumptions might be different than she would expect. Thank you.
Juan Fernando López Aguilar
I would like again to raise the question of the actual delivery and workout of these return case management systems by mid-2026 and its compatibility, of course, with the fundamental rights obligations of all the member states and the European Union in all, because the Charter of Fundamental Rights still applies. So the thing is that how is it foreseen by the Commission, this guarantee of a strict compliance of the whole system of return case management system with the EU data protection rules and the Charter of Fundamental Rights, and of course when it comes to operational efficiency while maintaining governance structures, transparency and accountability safeguards. Thank you.
Fabrice Leggeri
Merci, Monsieur le Président. Je me rends compte qu'en fait ce dossier RECAMAS n'a pas avancé depuis de nombreuses années et comme l'ont souligné d'autres collègues, on se demande quand est-ce que de tels projets informatiques vont aboutir. Alors ma question est très simple. On voit une description très ambitieuse, on voit qu'il s'agit de faire de la réadmission, il s'agit de faire de l'exécution des obligations de quitter le territoire, il s'agit de faire de la réintégration, il s'agit de faire des droits fondamentaux, etc. Ma question est très simple : à quoi sert ce système ?
Est-ce qu'il sert à un travail collaboratif entre les autorités nationales et Frontex lorsque c'est nécessaire parce qu'il y a une intervention de Frontex pour aider à mettre en œuvre une expulsion ? Est-ce que c'est quelque chose qui sert à faire des statistiques ? Est-ce que c'est quelque chose qui sert à faire de la comptabilité budgétaire ? On ne voit pas très bien à quoi sert le système et je pense que pour mobiliser les forces et les énergies des États membres alors que les budgets de l'Union européenne et des États sont eux limités, il faudrait vraiment définir quel est l'objectif. Merci beaucoup.
Javier Zarzalejos
Merci, Monsieur Leggeri.
Now I will give one minute to each of our speakers for the answers to the questions and final remarks. Mr. Leijtens.
Hans Leijtens
Yeah, thank you Chair, and to answer the question of Mr. Leggeri, all of the above I would say. But I think in the end it is of course to be more effective. I think that is also what is what is needed. And all the safeguards, of course they are on board, but it is indeed to increase the efforts and the results of the Member States' attempts to return people who are not in need of protection in Europe anymore. And of course Mr. López Aguilar's question, all these safeguards are already in RECOMAS.
So the reference model has all these safeguards on board, of course I would almost say. So implementing RECOMAS would implicitly mean also implementing all the safeguards that are in the European system by design. Thank you.
Thank you. Now Mr. Nilsson and then we conclude this item on our agenda.
Henrik Nielsen
Yeah, thanks. Now very briefly to complement what Mr. Leijtens said, I would say the key aspect of ensuring, you know, the respect for the fundamental rights in in returns flows from respecting the provisions of the Return Regulation. This is in the end a tool that doesn't fundamentally change the return process itself or the safeguards for the person in question. And second, to maybe put it more straightforward, you know, return is an administrative process within each Member State that each Member State national administrations needs to manage and to come to a return decision.
Now you can do this basically two ways. Either you do a paper file. You do it on on paper literally, or you do it digitally by using electronic tools. With the electronic tools, you will be able to share data with other national authorities who are concerned and you will be able to share data with Frontex for the purpose of getting Frontex support to return the person. So it's really a matter, the basic is really a matter of, you know, improving this efficiency which is already there but incomplete and to build on it and to make it better for all member states.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you. Now we conclude this point. Thank you very much for your contribution, Mr. Leijtens, while Mr. Nilsson stays with us for the next item, which is item number nine. And this will be an exchange of views on the external dimension of asylum and establishment of multi-purpose centers along the migration route.
The first long-term strategy, European asylum and migration management strategy, adopted at the beginning of the year, the European Commission indicated that it would continue to promote a whole-of-route approach to migration management as part of an array of actions identified to achieve the three main objectives of the strategy: preventing irregular migration, protecting people fleeing war and prosecution, and encouraging talent to come to the EU. As stressed by the Commission, close cooperation with relevant international organizations, in particular the United Nations Refugee Agency, is key to support the implementation of this whole-of-route approach. In the strategy, the Commission further referred in particular to the possible setting up of and strengthening of existing multipurpose centers along the main migratory routes to further implement the whole-of-route approach. Last July, the UN Refugee Agency adopted a guide on the establishment of such centers and hubs in countries along migratory routes. The setting up of these centers represents one of the concrete measures to achieve the goals of this approach, seeking to reduce dangerous journeys and related human suffering, offering effective rights-based responses to the challenges of mixed movements, and helping states to manage irregular migration in line with their international obligations.
So two guest speakers now will join us in this exchange representing the European Commission. Again, there will be Mr. Henrik Nielsen, the Director for International Affairs, Returns and Visa at DG HOME. And on behalf of the UN Refugee Agency, I am pleased to welcome Mr. Jean-Nicolas Beuze, which is representative for European Union Affairs of the agency. So without further ado, I'll give the floor again to Mr. Nielsen for up to 10 minutes.
Henrik Nielsen
Yeah, thank you, Chair. Well, quite a broad topic where I try to give you some insight into things that we are doing in relation to the external dimension on asylum and on multipurpose centers, but of course also happy to complement based on the questions. You rightly mentioned, Chair, the migration strategy presented at the beginning of this year, which I think is a good starting point with the link between what we do for the internal dimension with the external dimension, with the emphasis on that, you know, migration management and providing international protection is a shared responsibility, first of all between the Member States, but in fact also something that we see externally in applying the same logic to our partnerships with third countries, so with our partner countries.
In other words, what we try to develop in these relationships is responsibility sharing, not responsibility shifting. One key example which is frequent in many of our cooperation partnerships with third countries is indeed to develop the national asylum or migration and asylum systems of those countries. That can span a wide range of activities depending on the country. We support third countries to develop and eventually adopt their own national asylum legislation, to develop their processes and capacity to process asylum claims or to give international protection, the overall infrastructure, sometimes even the buildings of the national authorities, but also support with regard to services and support to individual refugees and asylum seekers. Just to give a few examples, this is what we have done recently in projects in relation to Chad and Mauritania as two examples, also since some time working with most countries in North Africa for the same purpose and very often in close collaboration with key partners, of course including UNHCR.
A further example just perhaps as a small anecdote, I visited Egypt myself a couple of months ago and saw the visited the UNHCR facility in Cairo, which was honestly deeply impressive in terms of the large number of Sudanese having increased over recent years and which were very efficiently processed by UNHCR in terms of registration, refugee status determination, and I'm glad to see that we are able to support that with funding from the EU for the center in Cairo. So those are some examples. Further examples would be also support for the migrant transit centers in Mauritania, in both Nouakchott and Nouadhibou, which help to screen disembarked people following rescue as well as identify vulnerable persons and those in need of international protection. Going maybe a little bit broader on support to third countries to note the substantial humanitarian aid provided by the EU as well as from our development budget in support of refugees, humanitarian aid a total of some 1.3 billion in 2025 and where roughly 15% of our annual humanitarian budget is allocated to protection interventions, while in terms of development funding we had last year around 270 million euro in support for various projects related to support of refugees.
Further example would be in fact also the support provided to Turkey in hosting between 3 and 4 million Syrian refugees. So a total of 12 billion euros have been allocated to Turkey since 2016 to support Turkey in hosting the Syrians in Turkey. Now, moving a bit more to the question of the multipurpose centers, a very broad topic because we do see a number of different kinds of centers in different countries, different types of projects, different types of actors. Again, I'm sure my colleague from UNHCR will say more about that from their perspective and the centers that they are running in various places. To give once again a few examples, I think we see a number of centers that aim to combine in particular information to migrants.
And that might be on the possibilities for legal pathways, it might be on possibilities for how to access international protection or resettlement opportunities. It might be information on the dangers of irregular migration and the, let's say, the risks to fall for the tempting messages of the smugglers and to try to dissuade people from going down that path.
But it can also be more supportive: first aid, temporary accommodation, basic services for migrants that can also be provided in these centers, again depending a bit on the setup. So again as a few examples, one key one would be the centers where again we work closely with UNHCR in both Niger and Rwanda with the so-called emergency transit mechanism, so evacuating the most vulnerable from Libya to either Niger or Rwanda and then trying to arrange for onward resettlement to Europe or also to North America, where I think both centers have been quite successful, but where regrettably following the coup d'état in Niger, the Niger center is now no longer operational, but the equivalent center in Rwanda is still ongoing and where also again EU is supporting that financially. Further example would be so-called migrant resource centers run by ICMPD in a number of third countries, examples being Iraq and Pakistan, doing also this information provision on the whole migration aspect and asylum aspects that I mentioned, also working on concretely helping to prepare migrants who are about to go on legal migration to Europe, so preparatory training courses and the like are also provided through those centers.
Now, these centers indeed, as as you mentioned, Chair, fit quite well in in the kind of all-of-route approach, I think recognizing the need to intervene upstream early on in the route as much as possible and and not in in the last transit country towards Europe. I would say it also helps us with this approach of the all-of-route to engage better with third countries. I think no third country wants to be the main transit country or the main kind of country where smuggling gangs and organized crime are operating. But at the same time, no third country obviously wants to be alone or be the one expected to solve everybody's problems. So to show that we engage with all countries along the entire route and and, you know, in an adapted way trying to adapt to the needs of that particular country and see what we can do together, notably on on fighting smuggling, I think has been proven very valuable and that's something that that we will continue to try to develop and again, looping in as much as possible international organizations, not only UNHCR but also IOM, UNODC, also very much involved in working on the all-of-route approach and where relevant also globally where we are working, for example, with ICAO as well to look at the issues related to smuggling by air or by legal means in a sense to see again how we can adapt and and integrate that in our whole-of-route approach.
But I think in fact I will stop there and be a bit short but rather give time to questions to see which particular aspects I could maybe develop further.
Javier Zarzalejos
I do appreciate that, Mr. Nielsen. Monsieur Vives, the floor is yours.
Jean-Nicolas Beuze
Thank you very much, Mr. Chair, and dear members of the LIBE Committee, very pleased to be addressing you this morning as part, indeed, of our engagement with the Commission and a number of Member States on the external dimension of the Pact, the external engagement of the Commission Member States to provide solutions and protection on route for different population groups. So let me start by really clarifying one point. We are many actors, as Mr. Nielsen mentioned, engaged in establishing those multi-purpose hubs or centers. We have IOM, ICMPD, but also the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, which has also humanitarian service points along the migratory route. One thing which is really important from the beginning is to distinguish the people that will seek services in those hubs.
On one side, migrants who are moving for better economic opportunities, family reunification, or educational opportunities, and really refugees, people who are presumed because of their specific profile and being persecuted individually, or because they come from a country at war, are presumed to be in need of international protection. And this distinction is really important because the type of intervention, the type of services that will be offered to those people differ radically in terms of what is their legal status. Let me also start by saying what the returns, the multipurpose hubs are not. They are not return hubs. They are for people on the move, but not for people who are being returned from, let's say, the European Union in the same country.
They're really for people who are moving from, in the case of refugees, places of harm to seek safety and protection. As Mr. Nilsson mentioned, we need to be careful in the way we craft those return hubs, but also the narrative around them politically, that they are not seen as an externalization of the responsibilities of the member states or the European Union. This is about responsibility sharing and not responsibility shifting.
UNHCR has published quite a few documents on making this distinction. I know well that it is rather a complex issue, at what point do you move from sharing to shifting, but this is one point that UNHCR will be monitoring and calling upon Member States to uphold the distinction. I think in terms of the engagement with the third country, what we also see is that the return, the, sorry, the multipurpose hub should not be seen just as a containment approach. This is really about providing protection and solution on the route, so that there is more predictable and safer routes and migration patterns. The solution on route, as mentioned by the Commission, is to make sure that people have solutions closer to the point of departure.
And here I'm speaking really about refugees when they escape war, conflict, individual persecution, what we know in all the situations is that people don't intend to move very far away from their place of origin.
They want to return at some point when the conditions will have changed. By providing services through the multipurpose hub closer to the point of departure, we also undermine the traffickers. We also reduce the risk of those people to seek any alternative to escape a situation of harm, including putting themselves in the hands of smugglers, including crossing the Mediterranean Sea or desert and so on and so forth. So the purpose of having multipurpose hubs is really to see whether we can in a way address the need of those people earlier on with actual protection and eventually solution outcome. We would suggest that in those multipurpose hubs we have a range of activities, from registering people on the move and determining who's a migrant and who may actually be in need of international protection, meaning a refugee.
refugee, that we can advise them about what are the asylum procedure in the country where they are to actually get this legal status and be recognized as a refugee and having a temporary residency permit linked to their protection status. We would suggest to have access to give them access to services, health, mental health in particular because the journey are extremely difficult and often they are subjected to a lot of violence, including torture or rape. So to make sure that we have adequate specialized services for rape survivors, torture survivors, mental health issues, for children, for older persons who are also on the move, specialized teams who can address their specific needs. As mentioned by Mr. Nielsen, the idea is to stabilize the population, but also to recognize that some of them will have a specific profile, which means that they will be good for labor mobility. And the Commission, the European Union has been engaged in the talent partnership, in different labor mobility schemes.
And among this population, whether migrant but also refugees, you will find people with the talents which are needed in the European Union. So those multipurpose hubs will be a way for us to give them the relevant information so that they can migrate to Europe through legal pathways such as labor mobility. But we can also think of educational pathways.
There's more and more scholarship being offered for foreigners, including specialized schemes in Europe, in Belgium, in Ireland, in Italy, for refugees to have access to higher education. It could be also for some of them family reunification, when they already have a member of their family established with a permanent residency or status in Europe, a legal status in Europe, and for them to be able to be reunited with their families without again having to risk their life by coming to Europe through irregular means. The multi-purpose hubs that we are proposing and our partners are also proposing are both physical entities but also virtual ones. So it could be a platform, it could be just having access at a given point to internet so that they can go onto the platform and see what are the different services in the country where they reside, but also eventually, as I was mentioning, third country solutions, including in Europe. We need to be very mindful that the migratory route changes all the time.
And therefore we need to have models which are very flexible. That's why we are not necessarily always thinking about a physical presence on the ground, but more a modular presence by which we can adapt to the migratory route and be at the service of the people wherever they are, because they are not going to do a detour to travel to our multi-purpose hub if they are, especially in the hands of traffickers or even smugglers, and they are on the way to a certain destination. The ownership by the local authorities, but also by the local communities, is extremely important in doing that, because we don't want to give a sense that we are privileging those who are on the move while the local population may be also in a very dire economic, social, cultural situation. We may have situations of internally displaced in the same country, and of course the type of services that we offer are completely different if you are a person in a foreign land as if you are a national citizen of that country. So the distinction also needs to be made.
One of the main aspects is really the counseling that we will be able to provide. And this is very human resources intense, because you cannot have AI having, for example, a ready-made solution and proposal to different profiles of people.
We really need to tailor the solution according to what is the profile of the person, what are their specific needs, but also maybe what are their specific wishes. So what we will do is really in those, in those hubs, self-service, but also tailored information, counseling and referral to the service provider or to the different, including from the host government in terms of, again, health, education, shelter and so on and so forth. Material support as I mentioned, including shelter, medical treatment, mental health treatment. But really the last point which is clearly what will make the difference in terms of mitigating those irregular movements is solution. And the solution can be return to their own country if they understand that it is in their best interest, inclusion in the country where they are currently, where the multipurpose hub is, so stopping the movement and helping people to be included in the public services with permanent or temporary residency in that country, but also as I mentioned, third country solution including in the European Union and its member states.
Thank you very much.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you, thank you, Mr. Vives. And now we start the Q and A procedure. There will be two minutes for the questions, two minutes for the answers. Please be as specific as possible and state to whom of our speakers you address your question. We start with EPP, Mrs. Teodorescu Mave.
Alice Teodorescu Måwe
Tack, jag ska prata på svenska. Jag har två frågor. Den första till herr Nilsson. Att delar av migrationshanteringen idag kan ske utanför EU:s territorium märks inte minst genom den nya återvändandeförordningen. Enligt vilken medlemsstaterna ges möjlighet att använda så kallade återvändandehubbar i tredjeland.
Men när vi nu diskuterar multipurpose centers längs migrationsrutterna så vill jag fråga om kommissionen delar bedömningen att det grundproblem som såväl återvändandeförordningen som dessa center syftar till att hantera är att betydligt fler människor vill migrera till EU än vad våra medlemsstater har kapacitet att integrera. Och jag undrar också om kommissionen delar uppfattningen att nästa logiska steg därmed är att EU övergår till ett system där asyl som huvudregel söks och prövas utanför EU:s territorium, exempelvis i EU-drivna center där EU:s asylrätt fullt ut tillämpas. Och om inte, vilken annan långsiktigt hållbar lösning kommissionen ser framför sig. Och min andra fråga till herr Böse, om EU redan accepterar att delar av migrationshanteringen kan ske utanför unionens territorium, finns det då något principiellt hinder mot att även asylprövningen under förutsättningar att EU:s asylrätt och övriga rättssäkerhetsgarantier fullt ut tillämpas som huvudregel då också sker i EU-center utanför EU. Om UNHCR ser hinder för en sådan externalisering av asylprocessen, hur anser då UNHCR i så fall att Europa ska kunna upprätthålla ett långsiktigt hållbart och rättvist asylsystem i en situation där migrationstrycket mot EU väntas öka.
Tack.
Henrik Nielsen
Yeah, thank you for the questions.
Maybe first to emphasize what was also mentioned by UNHCR, so we have seen various kinds of these multipurpose centers since quite some time. They exist since at least ten years, if not to say more. But none of those that exist and we have seen in the past have been set up as return hubs per se. They might have at times been acting also as part of their activities in supporting assistance for reintegration for returnees coming to that country, but they have not functioned as return hubs per se. Then indeed, we have now this possibility once the return regulation will enter into force.
I think my Commissioner has been quite clear that we will now see or leave it a bit to the Member States if and how they would want to negotiate any such arrangements for the setup of hubs with any kind of third countries. So we will see how that will work out, but once again, we need to see first the regulation entering into force to provide the legal basis for that. Then the return regulation does not go into the question of externalization of asylum per se. So that would rather be a question of if and whether to change the asylum acquis perhaps, but on our side, from the Commission side, we have no plans to make any proposals like that for the moment. I think the immediate focus will be notably based on the return regulation, but more broadly in terms of all its rules to ensure that we actually enforce the return decisions which are taken, so that we actually achieve what we are supposed to do, meaning returning those that do not have a right to stay in Europe.
Jean-Nicolas Beuze
Just to start with the fact that according to the EU Asylum Agency, there has been a drop of 19% of asylum claims in Europe in 2025, and the first six months of 2026 see another drop of around 20% of asylum claims in Europe. Just to demystify the fact that there's more and more people trying to reach Europe to seek asylum. The data shows actually a drop since 2021. In terms of the possibilities for asylum claims to be processed in the multi-purpose hub, let me already start by reiterating what we had mentioned before, Mr. Nilsson and myself. There is a possibility from the multi-purpose hub to identify people who are in need of resettlement, who are in need of humanitarian admission, who are in need, like it is the case with the emergency transit mechanisms between Libya and Rwanda, to be actually resettled to a European country.
Where we have a problem currently is the number of quotas.
And you may have known that last year there was the adoption of the framework for the resettlement quota for the biennium, and the quota have never been so low in comparison to especially the need, but also in comparison to the previous years. So before thinking about externalizing the asylum processing claims in those multipurpose hub, I think it would be more useful to think what can we do when UNHCR or other partners identify people for whom there is no solution in the country where they currently reside, but potentially a solution in a third country like the European Union, for us to have more quota to get them through resettlement, humanitarian admission program, but also I repeat, those people have talent, they can come as labor or students.
Birgit Sippel
Thank you very much and thank you for the presentations. The Commission very often says that when talking to third countries and cooperate with them, it should be for mutual benefit and mutual interest. You also mentioned the point of responsibility sharing. To be honest, I don't see any of that in your presentation.
You mentioned that third country get development aid, but part of it shall be used for refugees, which in effect means we are lowering the money for development aid. How could that be in the interest of that third country? You also mentioned that people are brought from Libya, Niger, Rwanda. Oh, no longer Niger because the place is no longer operational, so it's only Rwanda. So the question would be, what are the criteria to create agreements and places in Niger, Rwanda, or any other country, and can we rely on the fact that the place in Rwanda is operational for long terms, and how can you ensure that fundamental rights for people is safe in that place?
Who will be there? Who will control? You also mentioned that, and I think this was also mentioned by the colleague from UNHCR, that we should try to start asylum systems in third countries. So obviously, for the time being, there are no asylum systems over there.
I also heard from UNHCR that we might identify people for employment that then can come to Europe, but again the question is what about responsibility sharing? Isn't it that we only talk about returns, that we talk about closing our borders, procedurally make it ever more difficult to ever arrive in Europe? And how do we ensure that resettlement is taking place, that we are giving protection to people in need of protection and not try to externalize everything what is what I heard from your presentation? So and on UNHCR, isn't it true that after the US decided to cut US aid, you are also dependent on European Union to finance your work and doesn't it make you dependent also to agree on things that in other situations you might have not agreed to? Thank you.
Jean-Nicolas Beuze
So the question of the funding, as you all know, over the last 18 months we have lost half of our funding. From an expenditure budget of 5.2 billion in 2024, we are probably going to be around less than 2 billion this year.
So it's actually more than a 50% drop. Yes, it is the US, but it is also a number of EU member states who have decreased a lot their funding to humanitarian and development partners. So I think we need also to reflect on what kind of leadership the European Union wants to have in the world and what kind of value we want to disseminate through our engagement in mutually benefit partnership with the Global South. The Commission has been stepping up in terms of support to UNHCR and a number of other UN and NGO partners, but almost all member states have actually decreased radically and drastically their funding to the humanitarian and development partners. So we are not more dependent on one or another.
We have a mandate which is very clear and we abide by not only international law, but also what we consider as the best practices due to 75 years of engagement in issues of refugee response and solution. So you can count on us to uphold those principle, whatever is the funding situation.
Yeah, thank you.
Henrik Nielsen
Well, first of all, on, you know, on whose interest it is, I think honestly it's a bit more complex than that because basically all of the third countries that we engage with are from their own perspective a combination of countries of origin, countries of transit, but also countries of destination. They are countries to which migrants go and may wish to stay. So in a sense they face the same challenges as us. How do you have a migration management system which is fair and effective and is functioning well, including protection elements, including migration elements? So they have an interest to develop that for their own countries, which we can support them in doing and there also have, I would say, a mutually beneficial agenda in terms of our partnership.
On the emergency transit, perhaps to clarify, so this, let's say, kind of center where you evacuate the most vulnerable out of Libya with a view to further resettlement, we have only done with Niger and Rwanda, no other country. In total, and I hope I get my numbers right, but you may wish to correct me, I think in total for Niger and Rwanda, looking back some seven, eight years, we are looking at around 10,000 people who were evacuated from Libya and then resettled either to a member state or, quite a large number, to Canada.
So this has honestly been a very effective mechanism run together with UNHCR and once again allowing for resettlement of the most vulnerable. The reason why the Niger center is closed is simply that Niger has basically cut off all cooperation with the European Union. So whatever project, this center or any other project, is basically more or less impossible to run, which is regrettable. The center in Rwanda, again for this purpose of evacuating from Libya with a view to resettlement, is still running. Then indeed I can only agree there is a challenge with the ever lower quotas on resettlement offered by the member states.
That's a challenge for running the center in Rwanda, but it's a challenge more broadly in terms of giving access to protection to those most in need globally and based on our resettlement policy. That's something we do our best to convince the member states within the limits of our powers. So higher resettlement quotas would be a good thing, as well as of course ensuring continued support for UNHCR, which not only on resettlement but also in many other parts do so many important things to indeed give protection in the region as close as possible to the country of origin, which is a little bit at stake, I think, with any risk of funding.
Marieke Ehlers
Dank u wel voorzitter en ook dank aan de sprekers. We hebben het vandaag over de externe dimensie van het asiel- en migratiebeleid en het is de hoogste tijd. Want voorzitter, laten we onszelf niet voor de gek houden, het Europese asielbeleid blijft één grote bende.
De voordeur staat wagenwijd open en de achterdeur zit op slot. En dat moet exact omgekeerd. Die voordeur moet dicht, want onze lidstaten zitten vol. En tegelijkertijd moeten we ervoor zorgen dat degenen die hier al zijn en niet mogen blijven, daadwerkelijk vertrekken. Het is allemaal niet zo heel erg ingewikkeld.
Maar het enige waar ik de heer Nilsson over hoor, is hoe we migratie kunnen faciliteren en meer legale migratieroutes kunnen creëren. En dan met betrekking tot terugkeer moeten we maximale druk uitoefenen op landen die hun eigen onderdanen niet terugnemen. Dat is niet raar, dat is gewoon het afdwingen van het internationaal recht. Laat ik u een concreet voorbeeld geven: Marokko, een land dat er notoir om bekend staat zijn eigen onderdanen niet terug te nemen. Toch vindt de Europese Unie het nodig om via de Investeringsbank ruim 350 miljoen euro in Marokkaanse trams en infrastructuur te investeren.
Mijn vraag aan de heer Nilsson is dan ook heel simpel: deelt u mijn mening dat dit volstrekt krankzinnig is? Persoonlijk vind ik dat we überhaupt geen trams in Marokko moeten betalen met ons belastinggeld.
Maar als we dat dan toch doen, dan moet daar toch iets tegenover staan. Gelukkig wordt deze conditionaliteit straks geregeld in een algemeen artikel in de nieuwe terugkeerverordening. Maar ik hoor het vandaag graag expliciet van u. Bent u ook van mening dat artikel 37a van de terugkeerverordening zich verzet tegen de financiering van trams in Marokko zolang Marokko terugkeer blijft frustreren? En tot slot, welke andere concrete voorbeelden kunt u geven van financiële of economische drukmiddelen die de EU daadwerkelijk gaat toepassen om landen te dwingen hun internationale verplichtingen na te komen?
Dank u wel.
Henrik Nielsen
Thank you. Now, look, certainly to improve the cooperation on readmission with third countries is one of our absolute priorities and also of my Commissioner personally. To give a few examples where I think we are in kind of improving our toolbox and creating more possibilities to ensure that we get the necessary cooperation, which is indeed an international law issue.
We have the so-called 25a mechanism, so under the visa code allowing to restrict issuance of visas to third countries who don't cooperate on readmission. We have recently had the Council deciding on such measures with regard to two third countries based on proposals from the Commission. We will come with the next report, again the so-called 25a report, that takes stock of what is the current state of the cooperation with key third countries where we have a high caseload of returnees. That will also include Morocco as well as other countries. And on that basis, we will continue to discuss with the Council should we take further such visa restrictive measures as a leverage, as a conditionality to improve that cooperation.
Beyond that, we also will have relatively soon the possibility of a certain trade leverage, so conditionality through trade measures, also adding to our toolbox. And we have proposed, while subject now to the co-legislator, to include a certain degree of conditionality in the new Global Europe funding under the next MFF. So the funding that we give from the EU to third countries would also include a link to satisfactory or not readmission cooperation. So I do think that we are trying to step up, improve our toolbox to have more leverage and then to push third countries to comply with their obligations. But it is an ongoing work in progress.
It's not easy to achieve from one day to the next.
Jan-Christoph Oetjen
Thank you, thank you Chair. Thank you colleagues for the presentations. I would like to follow up on the possible, how to say, outline of return hubs. And I would like to know from Mr. Nielsen if you have any, received any hints from member states that they're negotiating at the moment or discussing with third countries what kind of agreement or arrangement they start, they try to put in place. And if Commission is planning to give guidance on that in order to have a kind of harmonized approach between member states or from European level.
Jan-Christoph Oetjen
And I would like to know, because we're talking about returns from a third country to another third country, in what, to what extent you see a role of Frontex in that regard. And if you intend in the upcoming redrafting of the mandate of Frontex to address this topic.
And I have a question to the colleague from UNHCR, because UNHCR issued a press statement a couple of days ago that the return hubs should be limited to situations where return to the country of origin is not possible within a reasonable period of time and should serve solely as a temporary measure to facilitate onward return to the country of origin. And I would like to know on how the multipurpose hub that will be used as return hubs in the future will, how do you want to make sure that this is only for this sole purpose of a short period of time and not a kind of durable situation for people that have no intention to leave to their home country.
Henrik Nielsen
Yeah, thank you. Well, not too many secrets that I'm aware of from the member states, I'm afraid, to divulge what they are thinking or what they are discussing between them.
We know that there is a group of member states who are already reflecting on how they can make progress on this in the light of the new return regulation once it enters into force. I guess they are also reflecting on what kind of hub would it be. Would it be a hub which is, let's say, the final destination, or would it be a hub where a second return would take place to potentially the country of origin? But I honestly don't have more details on that, nor on exactly which third countries that they would intend to approach and then try to negotiate. We wait to hear that from the member states.
We hope that they will meet the information requirement which is also in the return regulation in terms of keeping us informed so that we can be in the loop and follow that. So I think at this stage we have no intention to provide any kind of guidance on what kind of arrangements that would be or how to do them. We would leave that to the member states. Then indeed, the overall role of Frontex on returns is certainly one of the priority issues that we are reflecting on, and that includes also a potential role for Frontex in relation to third countries. But that we have really not finalized our thinking at this point because it's a very, very complex question.
So it fits under the overall question: what should be the role of Frontex in returns in the future? So we will touch upon it, but afraid not finalized yet internally exactly the direction that we would propose, but it is likely to be in the proposal, yes.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you. Mr. Marquardt. Yeah, the Greens, who is taking the floor for the Greens? Ah, okay, yes. Go ahead, please.
Anna Strolenberg
Yes. You wanted to answer first? UNHCR wants to answer now, or should I go? Okay.
Thanks to both of you. And I have to say the idea that there's more centers where legal aid is offered, information about legal migration routes, healthcare services, that's that is that is great, something that is appreciated. However, you understand that with everything that is going on with the the fixation of on externalization of migration, the anti-migration narrative that we hear all the time, I am worried about what is going to happen in those multipurpose centers. And we got some confirmations today, okay, from UNHCR, so thank you, Mr. Beuze, that you said it should not be a return hub. However, how to how to make sure of this?
'Cause I I wonder if this will be if this promise can be upheld, 'cause at the end these centers will be placed outside of the EU, so there's no jurisdiction there. So how can we then first make sure that there's safeguards, that these centers are gonna be for information, for assistance, instead of that it's gonna be a detention center? As it is outside of the EU, how can we guarantee this? 'Cause it is a radical difference if it's for information or detention. The same goes for the money.
And I also wonder how, where will the money come from? Is it Global Europe or is it also AMIF money? If it's going to be AMIF money, I think it's a waste of money that we could spend better on facilitating better processes in the EU. Because this brings me also again about the topic that has been talked about before with return hubs, of course. Two weeks ago I was with MEP Strada and Strik, we were at the detention center from Meloni, it was my third time there.
How can we make sure that the money is not gonna be used for detention in these centers?
And it is, it is very depressing to see how people are being locked up there without any prospects. And we also see that the system isn't working. And now 600 million is, will be invested in this process that could have been invested in just quicker and better procedures in the EU. So how can we make sure that money is not being wasted on projects like this instead of being invested in internal capacity? And the Commission said that you cannot give us an update, I'm very quick, about return hubs.
UNHCR, I know you're also involved in this process, so maybe you could give us an update if you know.
Henrik Nielsen
Yeah, I will focus on the question of, you know, how can we ensure, let's say, compliance of any kind of multipurpose centers in third countries. I would say there are two angles where we as Commission can come in. One, if we are funding or co-financing those centers, that funding needs to be, you know, spent on projects that comply with EU law. So in that sense, we would have a possibility to control that. If they are entirely funded by national means, no, we don't.
Then we cannot control what an individual member state might wish to set up and fund with their own means in a third country. Then of course there is the other angle of ensuring respect for the acquis in terms of anyone returned from the EU to such a center, which would need to respect the return regulation in the future. So that would be the second angle. But once again, a center set up by a member state, paid by a member state, our influence on that will be very limited.
Jean-Nicolas Beuze
Thank you. So just to reiterate indeed that we make a clear distinction between the return hub and the multipurpose hub. And the two should not be conflated and the two, in our view, should not be the same physical space because we are speaking about totally different type of profile of people.
People on the move who may have a legitimate ground for refugee protection and people who have been deemed as not in need of refugee protection after a hopefully a fair and diligent asylum process in the European Union. And here comes to the point that we are making in the press release. We have concern about two things and one recommendation. The return regulation as adopted by the Parliament and the Council provide the possibility for people to be returned before their case have been assessed on the merits of their claim that they need the international refugee protection due to inadmissibility or because there is still an appeal which is pending at the time the person is eventually returned and returned to a third country or returned to a return hub because there is no automatic suspensive effect of the appeal in the regulation.
That is highly problematic because some people may be returned before we have assessed whether in that specific country, including a third country not their own, including in a return hub, they are not at risk of irreparable harm. The second point is that the regulation open, extended, and different grounds for detention. And that would be contrary to international law and European law where you cannot be punished for having arrived in the country through irregular means to claim asylum. And you should not be punished for and be detained without a court of law regularly revising whether indeed the detention is permissible under law and necessary and proportionate and justified by the circumstances. So those are two points which in our view in UNHCR, as it is in the press release, we think are not in line with international law.
The third point was a recommendation that we made at the point of the negotiation, which is if you want those returns to be sustainable and not have a revolving door effect, let's continue what was the practice in the past by the European Union, which was a hierarchy of the option. One, voluntary return with reintegration package to the country of origin. That's the best way that people will not go back on the migratory route or be enticed by traffickers to come back to Europe. Second, forced return to the country of origin.
As has pointed out, often it's not the individual who is refusing to return, it's actually the country of origin which is refusing. So here you have plenty of means, the visa, the trade, diplomatic relationship and better cooperation between member states. Because you are mentioning Morocco, for some member states they can return their nationals to Morocco, but for other member states it's more difficult. So why is there not more cooperation between the member states? And if all that doesn't work, why not the forced return to a third country?
But again, the return hub should not equate to a detention center and people must have been assessed in terms of their risk of irreparable harm in this third country.
Speaker 40
Thank you. Now who will take the floor for the group of the Left? Señora Galán, the floor is yours.
Estrella Galán
Gracias, presidente. Gracias, hablo en castellano. Voy, comparto plenamente la reflexión que ha hecho el representante de la ACNUR. Desafortunadamente la noticia es que ni la Comisión ni los negacionistas de los derechos humanos de este Parlamento tienen el enfoque que usted plantea y que realmente es el que respeta el derecho internacional.
Por tanto, estamos ante una amenaza real de que esos reglamentos, esos centros de retorno no se van a convertir en lo que deberían ser, sino en lo que quieren que sea, que van a ser almacenes de personas que desechamos en la Unión Europea. Por tanto, ese enfoque de protección que usted plantea a lo largo de la ruta es el que debería ser, pero cuando escuchamos ese nuevo eufemismo de centros multipropósito, la sensación es que una vez más se va a utilizar esta nueva fórmula para externalizar fronteras y en este caso para algo mucho más grave, que sería externalizar el proceso de la solicitud de protección internacional, que desde luego a quienes conocemos bien los procesos de asilo sabemos que es un gran riesgo. A diferencia de lo que tratan eternamente en decir que ya que Europa no puede más, sabemos de sobra y usted son los expertos que casi el 70% de las personas solicitantes de protección internacional y que requerirían ser acogidas están en estos momentos en países del sur global. Por ejemplo, le pongo sobre la mesa los dos millones de personas que hay en estos momentos en Uganda sin apenas financiación internacional. Y ahora la Unión Europea está estudiando abrir allí un centro de retorno para, insisto, detener personas, familias, niños, menores que van a estar en agujeros negros de derechos.
Señor Nielsen, el riesgo es real. El reglamento de retorno permite, como digo, expulsar a personas a terceros países, y cuando digo personas me refiero en muchos casos a familias y niños que ya están pidiendo asilo, como decía el representante del ACNUR. Y aunque no tengan ninguna relación con ese país, los vamos a mandar allí porque este reglamento le ha dado cobertura. Y desde ahí nada impide que se porten a otros países. Y lo hemos visto en el mes de junio en Egipto, por ejemplo, con un periodista de Sudán del Sur que ha sido expulsado pese a que el ACNUR lo tenía reconocido como alguien de perfil de protección internacional.
Así que le pregunto, cuando hablan de cooperación multipropósito con ese título tan bonito, ¿se refieren a la posibilidad de examinar las solicitudes de asilo de protección internacional en esos mismos centros donde se van a hacer las deportaciones?
Estamos de nuevo ante un juego de palabras de los que últimamente parece que estamos jugando a ver dónde se esconde la bolita para colarnos de nuevo una vulneración más de derechos humanos? Y al representante de la ACNUR le pregunto cómo podemos garantizar, lo ha preguntado ya la compañera del grupo de los Verdes, que se va a proteger el principio de no devolución en estos modelos de externalización y si se van a incluir garantías para trasladar a personas inmediatamente a territorio europeo cuando veamos que hay perfiles de protección internacional, porque lo que está en riesgo es el derecho de asilo y el derecho internacional. Gracias.
Henrik Nielsen
Yeah, thank you. No, I'll be very brief, but I think overall speaking, in any case, our priority as Commission remains to push for the full implementation of the Pact in all its aspects. And that includes also in how we approach the external dimension. Then we will see what Member States may or may not negotiate on hubs, and then we will have a look at that, but again, for the moment, we don't have further details. Last point is just to emphasize once again, you know, the diversity of our engagement with third countries, which also reflected in the diversity of the different centers, which the colleague from UNHCR described well, which can serve different purposes, but also need to be adapted to the local context, to the third country in question, and which once again can bring a lot of benefits, including through resettlement if we have the necessary support of the Member States.
Javier Zarzalejos
Then we thank our speakers for their contribution to this exchange and we conclude this point. We take a break of five minutes. Sorry. No, no, I mean, one minute each. Just one minute and we conclude this point.
Yes, go ahead.
Erik Marquardt
Me first? Okay. Okay, dann vielen Dank, ich spreche auf Deutsch, da kann ich schneller reden. Also mir ist noch nicht so ganz klar, was jetzt eigentlich neu ist. Der Kollege vom UNHCR hat gesagt, es gibt weniger Geld für das UNHCR.
Die Kommission hat aber gesagt, sie wollen jetzt mehr in dem Bereich machen. Wie soll das aufgehen? Ich frage mich so ein bisschen, welchen Zweck haben, werden da jetzt neue Zentren gebaut? Erste Frage. Zweite Frage, werden diese Zentren irgendwie kontrolliert?
Und dritte Frage, hat die EU-Kommission, weil ich das jetzt aus den ganzen Ausführungen nicht verstanden habe, denn irgendein Interesse daran, dass diese Zentren so gebaut werden, dass die Grundrechte von Menschen dort respektiert werden? Haben die das Ziel, dass die Grundrechte dort irgendwie eingehalten werden? Geht es darum, dass es da den Menschen besser geht oder ist es eigentlich am Ende Migrationsabwehr? Und der zweite Teil der Frage geht an den UNHCR. Ich verstehe ja, dass Sie das alles sozusagen, ist ja alles sehr traurig, aber die Mehrheit in diesem Haus ist nicht dafür, dass da Resettlement stattfindet oder Family Reunification.
Die Mehrheit dieses Hauses ist dafür, dass das irgendwie Gefängnisse werden, wo man Leute davon abhält, nach Europa zu gehen. Und ich würde mir wünschen, vielleicht können Sie das noch mal sagen, dass Sie das auch klar ablehnen und sehr harte Worte dafür finden, dass wir hier gerade diesen Weg einschlagen.
Fabrice Leggeri
Merci Monsieur le Président. Nous avons entendu beaucoup de choses, mais peu de choses précises parce qu'on est en train de mélanger les questions d'asile, les questions de réfugiés, les questions de migration. Alors ma question est très simple. Nous avons, comme colégislateur européen, voté de nouvelles législations récemment qui permettent enfin de remettre la politique migratoire sur la bonne voie dans l'Union européenne. Nous avons voté le concept de pays tiers sûr.
Alors est-ce que la Commission va aider les États membres à financer cette dimension de pays tiers sûr? Ça c'est une question en rapport directement avec l'asile. Deuxième question, on a beaucoup parlé du retour, de centres de hubs de retour et cetera, on nous a dit que c'en était, qu'on ne pouvait pas en faire et cetera. Moi ma question est très simple. Dans le prochain cadre financier pluriannuel, il faudra de l'argent pour mettre en œuvre la politique de retour.
C'est une politique qui a été votée par le colégislateur européen, c'est ce que veulent les États, c'est ce que veut la majorité des représentants dans ce Parlement, c'est ce que veut la majorité des citoyens européens.
Alors oui ou non, la Commission européenne paiera-t-elle des centres de retour dans les pays tiers ?
Ilaria Salis
Si parla sempre di questi centri con un linguaggio tecnico e burocratico e si finisce per nascondere quello che è veramente importante, ovvero le condizioni disumane e degradanti in cui vengono trattenute le persone e le gravi violazioni dei diritti fondamentali che avvengono all'interno dei centri. Non credete che questa sia l'ennesima ipocrisia dell'Unione Europea ? Io vorrei chiedere una cosa molto semplice. La Commissione è disposta a interrompere immediatamente ogni cooperazione con tutti i paesi in cui sono documentate torture, detenzioni arbitrarie o altre violazioni dei diritti umani, oppure la tutela dei diritti fondamentali continuerà ad essere subordinata al controllo dei confini e alla riduzione degli arrivi in Europa ?
Henrik Nielsen
Well, on the, on the first and the last question, again, to say that, you know, any EU funding needs to be assessed based on, on compliance with fundamental rights and the EU acquis, and that includes also for the funding for any kind of multipurpose center. Now, I cannot tell you straight off like this, have we ever, you know, had doubts about the treatment of people in the center and therefore had doubts about the funding, because once again, these centers go back 10, 15 years, so, you know, we have funded or part-funded many of these centers over that time. So one would need to see that with INPI if there were any doubts of this kind, human rights concern that led to a withdrawal of the funding. On the safe third countries, indeed, this is part of the acquis. You could by all means also see that as part of, of the external dimension in that, you know, if we support third countries in building up their national asylum systems, that will also be relevant to whether they qualify as a safe third country or not, because the two questions are indeed fully linked, while for the Member States to assess, you know, whether a certain country is safe or not based on, on the acquis.
Then just to keep it brief, because the second question is very big, I think the Commission has made in its proposal for the next MFF quite an increase in the overall funding for home affairs, because we think that is a big political priority, and we hope that the co-legislators, the budgetary authority, will support that.
And of course, that funding in the MFF includes also giving support to Member States to fully apply the entire acquis, including the new return regulation. So this is in that sense foreseen. Then we will see what the budgetary authority will decide in its wisdom on the next MFF.
Juan Fernando López Aguilar
Thank you. I mean, thank you, thank you for that. Take it for granted that many of us, of course, have opposed when voting return, the so-called multipurpose centers and the return regulation in all, but it's been adopted by a majority. So the whole point of having you together, UNHCR and the Commission, is that UNHCR exerts some positive influence when it comes to human rights in those kind of situations. So I've got two questions.
One, first, you talk of resettlement. It's a form of legal pathways. How are you going to ensure that resettlement actually works as a legal pathway, at least as a chance? And for you, Mr. Beuze, I would like you to address the point of how are you exerting influence when it comes to human rights of most vulnerable people, like gender-based violence victims of trafficking or unaccompanied minors in those multipurpose centers? Thank you.
Cecilia Strada
Thank you very much, Chair. Yes, me too, I wanted to go back a bit on the monitoring mechanism because I'm really curious about how can you envisage to monitor the respect of fundamental rights in these centers while the Commission is not even monitoring the respect of fundamental rights within Member States in the actual centers. So, from Kos to Samos to the other center that Anna Strolenberg was mentioning, we see daily violation of fundamental rights, daily critical issues. I personally asked in a written question to the Commission why, how is it possible that Italy performed returns directly from Albania, which in our opinion is contrary to the EU law, and the reply was the next evaluation of Italy on the acquis Schengen will be in 2027. So, if the Commission is not actually able to monitor what is going on today inside Member States, how is it possible that you will ensure respect and monitoring mechanism for respect of fundamental rights in these centers?
Thank you very much.
Tineke Strik
Thank you, Chair, and thanks a lot to both speakers.
Mr. Nielsen, you tend to refer a lot to the Member States, but indeed the Commission also has an obligation to make sure that any external funding is in line with fundamental rights. But I think also as a guardian of the treaty, you must make sure that once Member States are applying the safe third country principle or concept, that this is also in line, that it doesn't breach the standards that we have on asylum. So I want to know from you, how is the Commission going to see if there are sufficient safeguards in that multipurpose center for a proper asylum procedure, including all the specifically the non-refoulement principle, including indirect refoulement if we send someone there, that someone is being sent further away? And on Frontex, you say we still don't know what to do. Now there is a prohibition to do returns from third country to third country for a good reason.
So please elaborate on the risk there.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you, Ms. Strik. Mr. Nielsen, and then one minute, Mr. Visser.
Henrik Nielsen
Yeah, on the first point on resettlement, I mean, we are applying in full the new resettlement regulation, including with the framework. So we are setting the priorities each year. We are collecting the pledges of the Member States. And it is happening still, resettlement. It's not completely gone, which is good.
But I'm just saying, you know, the pledging of the Member States have gone down. And this is a fact. And we don't have any legal means to force them to pledge. They decide themselves how much they want to take in resettlement each year.
So that's what we have to work with. But it remains important to us. On the second question, a very big one as well, I think I would need a bit of support from DG INTPA and others who are the ones who actually are responsible for the projects in third countries on exactly how concretely do we monitor compliance with the rights during those projects in third countries. So that's something that we do jointly. Third question, to keep it short, you know, I'm not aware of any multi-purpose center today which is actually used for processing asylum seekers under the safe third country concept.
Not saying I know everything, that's surely not the case, but I'm not aware of a member state having done that. So if that occurs, we would have to have a look at it to see indeed how those safeguards would be set out for the sake of applying the concept in the light of the acquis. But that's within one minute what I can say on a complex topic.
Jean-Nicolas Beuze
Yeah, let me reiterate one more time that UNHCR is not engaged into the operationalization of any return hub.
The discussion are happening between different Member States and we are advising those Member States in terms of what are the protection safeguards that needs to be put in place to respect international law. The second point is that we have called upon those arrangements or agreement with third country to be public and to have the description of those safeguards so that they can be also challenged before domestic and eventually European court. Third point, whatever is happening in any countries is subjected to a range of mechanisms within the United Nations, UNHCR, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the special procedures and so on and so forth, by which we will continue monitoring the situation, engaging privately and publicly on every time we see that human rights are being violated.
Javier Zarzalejos
Okay. Then thank you again to our speakers. We conclude this point and we take a break, five minutes break. Okay.
We resume our session now moving on to item number 10, which is an exchange of views on the state of LGBTQ+ rights in Europe and the importance of protection of minority rights in healthy democracies. As you may recall, this exchange of views was agreed by the LIBE coordinators at their meeting of the 2nd of June, and the aim is to discuss the state of LGBTQ+ rights in Europe and the importance, as I said, of protection of minority rights in healthy democracy. This exchange, which was agreed upon by coordinators, is linked to a very relevant ruling by the Court of Justice of the European Union on the 21st of April in the case Commission versus Hungary, following the infringement case that was brought by the European Commission against Hungary in relation to a 2021 law introducing stricter measures against individuals convicted of paedophilia and amending several national laws with the alleged aim of protecting minors.
The amendments introduced in this law prohibited or restricted access to content including audiovisual material portraying or promoting gender identities that differ from the sex assigned at birth, sex reassignment or homosexuality. The Commission argued that the law in question stigmatises and marginalises LGBTI+ individuals and that it violates EU law including internal market rules, fundamental rights and the EU values as set out in Article 2 of the Treaty of the European Union. The importance of this ruling is that Article 2 of the Treaty of the European Union is interpreted by the Court as the basis for a ruling as a standing-alone basis interpreting what the implications of the values contained or referred in the Treaty are.
I now welcome our four speakers for this debate: Mrs. Irena Moozová, Deputy Director-General of the Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers of the European Commission; Dr. Henry Nickels, Head of Institutional Relations and Policy Sector at the EU Fundamental Rights Agency; Mrs. Belinda Dear, which is which will be intervening remotely, Senior Advocacy Officer of the ILGA Europe; and finally, Mrs. Almudena Darias de las Heras, who is the Justice Counselor of the Spanish representation here in Brussels, as Spain is acknowledged by its performance in this in this matter. So, Mrs. Moozová, I'm glad to give you the floor for your initial presentation for five minutes.
Irena Moozova
Thank you very much, Chair, and honorable members, thank you very much for having me again in the sein of this honorable committee, this time for the exchange of views on the state of LGBTQI+ rights in Europe. And let me start by what the Chair referred to already, the court judgment, because as you know, Commission brought in 2022 an infringement case against Hungary in the so-called Child Protection Act, and 16 member states, including Spain and this house, the European Parliament, intervened in support of the Commission.
And we welcome at least here in April the landmark judgment of the Court of Justice in this case, because the court agrees with the Commission that the Hungarian law breached European Union's founding values as enshrined in the Article 2 of the Treaty of the European Union, making it also the very first time ever that the court reached such a conclusion. The court's conclusion reflects the seriousness of the severe violation of the fundamental rights as enshrined in the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union, including the right to the human dignity, right to private life, freedom of expression and non-discrimination. And the court also highlighted in its ruling the stigmatization effect that the Hungarian measures have had on LGBTQI+ individuals and found Hungary to have breached its obligation to uphold and promote the values of equality and fundamental rights on which our European Union is based. This is a truly landmark decision for the LGBTQI+ rights, the protection of the fundamental rights and more generally of the European Union values. And it is now for the Hungarian authorities to ensure the full and effective implementation of the court's judgment.
And as President von der Leyen stated after the meeting with Prime Minister Magyar at the end of the of the May, she said that regarding the child protection law, more steps will have to be taken, but we are on a good direction of travel. This has been reconfirmed during the visits of Executive Vice-President Virkkunen, Commissioner McGrath and also Commissioner Lahbib to Budapest, because they all underlined clearly to the Hungarian authorities that the compliance with the judgments of the Court of Justice is also the part of the rule of law. Now, on the side of the Commission, we of course stand ready to continue working with the Hungarian authorities to address any remaining concerns about the rule of law and fundamental rights and to ensure equal rights for the LGBTQI people. Let me recall that also this ruling is very clearly linked to the Hungarian freedom of assembly law. So we are acknowledging that the right to gather peacefully is also a fundamental right to be championed across the European Union.
And we welcome very much the recent drop of the charges against the organizers of the Budapest and Pécs Prides.
As you know, the measure of the anti-pride law that led to the ban on the pride parades in Hungary directly references to the child protection law, which is now being found as a violation of the law by the Court of Justice. We are honorable members also very proud in progressing with the implementation of the LGBTQ+ equality strategy. Following the recent one, which covered the period 2020-2025, 14 member states put in place their national strategies and data shows that social acceptance of LGBTQ persons has steadily increased. But despite this progress, hate-motivated harassment and violence against LGBTQ+ people is still on the rise and the findings of the 2024 LGBTQ survey of the FRA shows it rather clearly. Because there have been significant increase in hate-motivated harassment, with 55% of respondents experienced it, an increase of almost 20% since 2019.
So that's why so we have to continue our commitment as we have done in the current LGBTQ+ equality strategy, adopted last year October, covering until 2030, because we protect we aim to protect LGBTQ+ people from violence, empower them to live free and equal and engage stakeholders at all levels.
I would like to conclude that the Union is a Union of freedom and equality. Everyone should be able to be who they are, live and love freely. And that's why so we as a Commission adopted a very comprehensive set of the equality strategies in the areas of gender equality, anti-racism, protection and and involvement of the Roma and also strategy renewed strategy for the rights of the person with disability. So this is our way to make the Union of equality the true future of the Europe. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you. Thank you very much. Now I give the floor also for five minutes to Dr. Henri Nickels, who is the head of institutional relations and policy sector at the EU Fundamental Rights Agency. Dr. Nickels, floor is yours.
Henri Nickels
Thank you, Chair, honorable members. Thank you for the opportunity to contribute to this exchange of views. I will speak more about the situation of LGBTQ+ people as we have observed it through the survey work and other research we have done at the agency. So over the years, the agency has collected comparative evidence on the on LGBTQ+ equality across the European Union.
This evidence covers people's experiences in the areas of education, work, healthcare, housing, safety, and participation in society. And overall, one can say the picture is mixed. So while many LGBTQI people today benefit from stronger legal protection compared to and greater visibility and wider social acceptance compared to some years ago, because we also see that more people are able to live openly and participate fully in society. So this is the positive side. But at the same time, we also see that discrimination, hate-motivated harassment, and exclusion remain part of everyday life.
These experiences occur in schools, workplaces, healthcare settings, housing, public services, and the public space. Our findings show that trans, non-binary, and intersex people often face particular challenges, although difficulties affect all parts of LGBTQI communities. We have already mentioned the case Commission versus Hungary, and it's actually very important, this case, also in the context more broadly. And the Court of Justice confirmed that measures which stigmatize people because of their sexual orientation or gender identity can violate fundamental rights and the values of the Union, as we heard extensively.
One of the clearest findings of FRA's evidence base is that many LGBTQ people face discrimination when looking for work, accessing services, renting accommodation, receiving healthcare, or dealing with public services. This shows that rights on paper do not always lead to equal treatment in everyday life. Safety is another important concern. Many LGBTQ people experience harassment, intimidation, and hate-motivated violence, as we've already heard. This affects their sense of security and their willingness to participate openly in public life.
Many incidents are never reported, which means that the problem is often larger than official figures suggest. And young people are also particularly affected, and these experiences can have serious consequences for their well-being and mental health, which I'll come back to. The online world is also increasingly part of this picture. Many people encounter hostility, abuse, and negative stereotypes online. Digital platforms can provide support and a sense of community, it's true, but they can also expose people to hate and intimidation.
Education also remains an important area of attention. Many LGBTQ people experience bullying, ridicule, or exclusion during their school years. And at the same time, we see that supportive school environments can make a real difference.
So evidence collected by the Fundamental Rights Agency suggests that discrimination tends to be lower where LGBTQI equality is more visible and openly discussed in society. And this evidence also points to challenges in healthcare, housing and social inclusion. So some people simply avoid healthcare because they fear negative reactions or unequal treatment. Mental health is a serious concern, particularly among trans and non-binary people. Very high numbers of them consider committing suicide.
And housing insecurity and homelessness disproportionately affect trans and intersex people too. But it is also important to remember that LGBTQI communities are not all the same. Experiences of people differ according to their age, their disability, their ethnic background, their migration status, their income and other factors. So people who face discrimination for several reasons often find it hardest to enjoy their rights in private life, and everyday life, sorry. So the way ahead points to several priorities that could be addressed.
First, protection against discrimination should be effective across all areas of life. Second, more should be done to encourage reporting, excuse me, and improve responses to hate crime and harassment. Third, online hate and disinformation require continued attention.
Fourth, schools should provide safe and supportive learning environments and teachers should be supported in promoting equality and respect. Fifth, access to quality healthcare, including mental health support, should be strengthened. And sixth, equality should be reflected in housing and social policies, particularly for people facing multiple disadvantages. Coming to my conclusion, it should be noted that continued commitment will be important to ensure that the progress achieved so far is sustained in practice. FRA's evidence also shows that progress is possible.
Outcomes for LGBTQ people tend to improve where equality is visible, where people feel safe to report discrimination and violence, and where institutions act consistently to protect rights. The challenge now is to build that progress, excuse me, the challenge now is to build on that progress and ensure that all people can enjoy their rights, participate fully in society, and live with dignity across the European Union. Thank you.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you, Dr. Nickels. Now we have Mrs. Belinda Dear, who is senior advocacy officer at ILGA, which stands for International Lesbian, Gay, Trans and Intersex Association, who will be intervening remotely. So, welcome and I am glad to give you the floor for five minutes.
Belinda Dear
Good morning, thank you, thank you for inviting me today. I'm here to speak a little bit about ILGA Europe's assessment of LGBTI rights in Europe at the moment. Just to introduce us, we are a not-for-profit civil society organization, we're membership-based. We have over 700 member organizations across Europe and Central Asia. And you might know one of our annual monitoring products, which is called the Rainbow Map.
So we produce this every year, it's a ranking of 49 European countries based on laws and policies. And if you want a complementary assessment as well, we also have an annual review of the lived reality of LGBTI people in all of the countries that we cover, so in Europe and Central Asia.
And so the map is ranking the European countries based on seven criteria. So that is equality and non-discrimination, hate crime and hate speech, family, legal gender recognition, intersex bodily integrity, asylum, and civil society space. We have an index and the country ranking on an interactive website, so you can always look at the website if you would like further information on the data and the details. And we verify this data with our member organisations and a network of over 200 country experts. And our assessment this year is that we're still seeing regression of rights, in particular when it comes to anti-LGBTI laws.
But we're also seeing some political courage. So the big story this year was that Spain is for the first time on the top of the ranking. Malta was on the top of the ranking for the last 10 years, but Spain is now at the top. The top countries are Spain, Malta, Iceland, Belgium, and Denmark, and the lowest EU countries are Lithuania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Romania.
In terms of Spain, why it managed to move up so high was that the government implemented reforms that have been undergoing for some time. So the adoption of national LGBTI action plans, full implementation of the international standard of depathologization of trans people in healthcare and the establishment of an independent authority for equal treatment. Also we have seen something that's very important and I believe very linked to democracy is that where governments or politicians have tried to roll back on rights, the courts have been holding the line. So a number of advancements that are recorded in the map are thanks to the implementation of constitutional or supreme court judgments. And also as has been mentioned earlier, we've seen this year at the EU level at the Court of Justice a number of groundbreaking judgments to protect LGBTI people.
So there is the one against Hungary as we all know related to what I would call censorship of LGBTI people, also known as anti-LGBTI propaganda laws.
And then there is a judgment that was rendered in March this year related to legal gender recognition and in November 2025 related to same-sex marriage. And so this is very important to take into account when we're thinking about the EU's priorities, the EU's values, and where and how the EU funds various projects, including civil society. And it's important to make sure that the EU is focusing its attention on organizations, projects that are in line with EU values and bolstering democracy. So of course, ILGA-Europe is also very in line and agreeing with the Parliament's proposal to increase the foreseen budget for the Agora EU program in the next MFF that would bolster civil society working on democracy, fundamental rights, rule of law, media, and the creative sectors, which are very important for democracy. I am now out of time, so I will end.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you.
Thank you and thank you for sticking to the allocated time. And now I give the floor to Mrs. Almudena Darías de las Heras, who is a justice counselor of the Spanish permanent representation here in Brussels. Mrs. Darías de las Heras, the floor is yours.
Almudena Darias de las Heras
Muchísimas gracias, señor presidente. Voy a aprovechar la oportunidad que me da el Parlamento de hablar en castellano. En primer lugar quería darles las gracias por la invitación y por permitir que podamos desde España compartir nuestra experiencia en materia de igualdad y de no discriminación de personas LGTBI. Mi intervención por razón de limitación de tiempo se va a limitar al marco jurídico más reciente adoptado en España a través de la Ley 4/2023 para la igualdad real y efectiva de las personas trans y para la garantía de los derechos de las personas LGTBI. Al terminar, por supuesto, quedo a disposición de las preguntas que me puedan formular.
Sí les advierto que hoy estoy aquí en sustitución de la consejera que lleva más en profundidad los asuntos de igualdad, por lo cual si no tuviese yo hoy toda la información conmigo, estaré encantada de tomar nota de sus preguntas y hacerles llegar la información en un momento posterior si así lo consideran.
Eh, centrándonos ya en el contexto y la evolución del marco jurídico español, eh, bueno, España cuenta ya con una trayectoria relativamente larga de reconocimiento de derechos de las personas LGTBI. Entre los hitos más relevantes podemos destacar la adopción en el año 2005 del matrimonio de personas del mismo sexo, fuimos uno de los primeros países del mundo en adoptar una ley de este tipo. Eh, también en 2007 se, eh, reguló el procedimiento registral para el cambio de sexo y también ha habido diversas leyes autonómicas sobre igualdad de trato y no discriminación a lo largo de las últimas décadas. Pero hasta 2023 no existía una ley estatal integral que abordara de forma conjunta la igualdad de trato y la protección frente a la discriminación y el reconocimiento jurídico de todos estos colectivos. Y esto es lo que ha pretendido hacer la ley 4/2023, cubrir ese vacío, superar esa fragmentación y lograr un enfoque transversal, transversal, eh, centrándose en distintos ámbitos como el, el empleo, la educación, la vivienda, el deporte o la asistencia sanitaria.
Voy a destacar algunos hitos de esta, de esta ley de 2023, por un lado, uno de los pasos más importantes ha sido, eh, la derogación de esa ley de 2027 de rectificación registral de la mención relativa al sexo.
La ley ahora establece un procedimiento administrativo ante el registro que se basa en la declaración personal de la persona interesada. Es decir, ya no va a ser necesario aportar informes médicos o psiquiátricos o haberse sometido a ningún tratamiento para proceder al cambio en la mención de sexo en el registro. Es un sistema que varía en función de la edad y así los mayores de 16 años ya tienen plena autonomía para solicitar esa rectificación registral. Los menores entre 14 y 16 años van a tener van a necesitar la asistencia, perdón, de los de sus representantes legales y los menores entre 12 y 14 años van a requerir una autorización judicial previa. Se trata así de combinar el reconocimiento de los derechos con una serie de garantías específicas para las personas menores de edad.
Otra medida importante se adopta en el ámbito laboral.
La ley exige a determinadas empresas, y en concreto a las empresas de más de 50 trabajadores, que dispongan de planes de igualdad para personas LGTBI y de protocolos contra el acoso y la violencia. Esta ley además va a prohibir por primera vez de forma explícita a nivel estatal cualquier terapia de conversión, es decir, terapias de aversión, de conversión, de contracondicionamiento que estén destinados a modificar la orientación o la identidad sexual o la expresión de género, incluso si se cuenta con el consentimiento de la persona interesada. También introduce cambios en la ley reguladora del derecho de asilo y así prevé que se establece expresamente que la condición de refugiado pueda reconocerse a quien sufra persecución por motivos de género, orientación sexual e identidad sexual, además de los motivos que ya se incluían en la legislación. La ley presta una especial atención a determinados grupos vulnerables dentro de la comunidad LGTBI, como son los jóvenes, los migrantes, las personas mayores o las personas trans que sufren exclusión social. Y además promueve mucho la sensibilización pública, la formación y la recopilación de datos para poder comprender mejor y abordar mejor las desigualdades existentes.
Además establece que el gobierno debe de adoptar dos estrategias estatales: una estrategia estatal para la igualdad de trato y no discriminación de las personas LGTBI y una estrategia específica para la inclusión social de las personas trans.
Estas dos estrategias ya han sido adoptadas. Por tanto, para concluir, yo creo que podemos decir que el nuevo marco jurídico combina por un lado ese reconocimiento jurídico de derechos con una serie de procedimientos administrativos mucho más accesibles, mecanismos de protección frente a la discriminación en distintos ámbitos e instrumentos de política pública, intentando así pasar de una igualdad formal a una igualdad efectiva en la vida cotidiana. Muchas gracias.
Javier Zarzalejos
Muchas gracias, señora Darias. And now we move to the round of political groups, starting with EPP, Maria Walsh, floor is yours. There will be two minutes for your interventions and then two minutes for the reply. Please indicate to which of our speakers you address your questions because we have four speakers, it would be impossible to allocate two minutes to each of them to answer.
Maria Walsh
Thank you very much, Chair, and thank you very much to all the speakers. As an Irish MEP, in the fact that we're about a week, if not two weeks into our presidency, I think it's worth reflecting on one lesson from our own history: progress is possible, but it's never permanent. And I heard elements of that in all your speeches. For instance, Ireland only decriminalized gay men, but this year my government agreed to overturn those convictions, showing that strong democracies do not hide from past injustices, they correct them.
But that is why what we are seeing across Europe should really concern all of us. Attacks on LGBTQI+ people are rarely just about our rainbow community. They're often the first sign that the rule of law and the fundamental rights of people are not thriving or being chipped away at. We see this in Slovakia, for example. We see it in the continued failure to agree to the parenthood regulation, leaving rainbow families without legal certainty.
We see this in member states like my own not wanting to ban conversion therapy. And we see it in the rights of women and girls who are being used as a shield to justify targeting the trans community. It was recently remarked that in a world where democracy, human rights, and freedom of expression are under growing pressure, Europe remains a light, but it is a light we cannot afford to let fade. So my question is directly to Commissioner or any speaker who wishes to come in on this. What practical steps will you take to ensure that Europe's light does not go out?
How will you respond when member states roll back minority rights, restricted fundamental freedoms, or use vulnerable communities as political scapegoats, which we're seeing not just across Europe, but as a bluebook across the world? At what point does the Commission and even ourselves here in the Parliament move beyond expressing concern and demonstrate that Europe's values have to be backed by action? Thank you very much.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you, Mrs. Walsh.
I think the Commission should answer that.
Irena Moozova
Thank you very much, honorable member. Indeed, I think that the path towards the full equality is not easy. That's why so it is so important to learn from the sometimes painful experiences of the individual member states on their path towards full protection of the equality and fundamental rights and the values as enshrined in the in the treaty. From this perspective, so as I mentioned in my introductory statement, so we are having already many member states with the specific country strategies. Spain has actually two strategies even in order to enhance the rights of the people LGBTQ+.
Let me comment as well Irish presidency for being able to support us by organizing a conference on equality LGBTQ in Dublin later in October because what matters is the commitment, but what matters as well is a peer pressure and what matters as well is the good practices that can be embraced in the totality of the Member States. That's why we are supporting them and if the we see that clear backsliding on the side of the Member States as also referred to, so we as a Commission will not stay shy to use all the tools we have at our disposal to protect the rights of those that need it most in Europe.
And we are working very closely also with the presidencies.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you. S&D, who's taking the floor? Mr. López Aguilar. Two minutes.
Juan Fernando López Aguilar
Yes, thank you Chair. First of all, let me say it's a relief after a round of discussion on the externalization of migrants and asylum seekers and the detention centers and the return centers outside the EU, which is so divisive, that now we're touching upon an issue which is so keen to the agenda of us S&D that I'm only proud that they let me do this first round considering that they would happily fill two minutes on behalf of the S&D core interest on LGBTQ+ rights.
And my first question would go to Mrs. Belinder Deir and of course to Almudena Darias as to is there anything in the Spanish experience, in the Spanish example, that could be successfully replicated in other member states, leading by example? Particularly you touched upon the latest law for 2023, but you didn't mention the so-called Zerolo law, which is a kind of equal rights directive legislation in Spain. It's equal rights directive. So I would like you also to comment on the possibility of extending that Spanish experience when unblocking the blocked equal rights directive for much too long. Then a question as to Henry Nickels, because it's only obvious that hate speech against all categories, including LGBTI, is spread in the online in the in the in the online business model.
So the question is how do you foresee the possibility of adding value with new legislation, considering that every time we touch upon digital services we encounter so many difficulties? And finally, as to the Commission, of course, hate speech, making it finally a criminal offense.
We have made a case insistently so, time and again, from the European Parliament. And of course, the Commission is to take the lead by getting the unanimity in the Council, because it takes unanimity when it comes to putting in place new criminal legislation on behalf of the EU Article 83 of the Treaty of the European Union. Thank you.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you. So you have not wrong, there is a first question addressed to Belinda Dear, which I hope is still on. And then Mr. Nickels and finally the Commission. Belinda Dear, are you there?
Belinda Dear
I'm here. I was just waiting for the connection. Okay. Thank you for the question. And for the purposes of what's important is we're seeing that where there is political will, there is a way.
So for those who are interested, those countries and those politicians that are genuinely interested in improving equality for LGBTI people, our website of the Rainbow Map is very useful. And when looking at Spain, because you can select by the country, you can see that Spain scores 100% when it comes to the criteria related to family, related to asylum, related to civil society space, and almost 100% on equality and non-discrimination.
There's still a bit, a bit more to go on legal gender recognition, hate crime and hate speech. But within all of these categories, you can look and you can see the exact law. So our index on the website, you can actually see how, you know, which criteria was achieved and what law it is. So that's helpful for countries who want to replicate it, let's say. But the main message we have is that in the face of far-right attacks, Spain's government stood strong and showed courage.
And so that's a message for all member states from us, to take courage. Thank you.
Henri Nickels
Thank you. Well, new legislation, maybe not. I mean, there's a Digital Services Act which needs to be enforced and implemented. So in that way, the hate speech would also be covered under that. So it's maybe also about implementing the legislation and also the responsibility of the platforms to address systemic risks.
So the new legislation, I'm not sure where you're going to, but it's about implementing the legislation that is existing now, because there is a framework in place that really needs to be strongly implemented as a means of fighting this online hatred.
And it concerns, of course, LGBTI hatred and other forms of hatred. But I don't want to pass the ball back to the Commission, but for the legislation, we have the guardian of the treaties, so I would say that. Thank you.
Irena Moozova
Okay, I can then kick the ball in the soccer terminology for also seeing the tonight important date, yes. Indeed, we are operating so in the margins of the DSA through the code of conduct on countering illegal hate speech online, which is already integrated. So it's mandatory now under the Digital Service Act. The first monitoring exercise brings rather positive results in terms of the removal, but I agree with honorable member that of course criminalization would be step forward in our ambition to really protect LGBTQ+ people as enshrined in the strategy. Honorable member mentioned the difficulties on the Council level.
I can only commend this House for the continuous and strong support to both Eurocrime extension, but also equal treatment directive because European Parliament is strong player and is helping us to keep the ball in the court.
If despite of the efforts of the continuous presidencies including the current Irish and the future we cannot move, so we are preparing the second best as already announced. So we are preparing a study to eventually support the impact assessment for the possible new legislative initiative aimed at harmonizing definitions of online hate offenses under the already existing legal basis covered by the 83 article. So with that, so we could prepare for the, okay, not the first best, but the second best if even despite of the support from the Parliament and the Commission, the Council could not move forward in the current unanimity framework. Thank you.
Susanna Ceccardi
Grazie, Presidente. Noi tutti concordiamo sulla necessità di garantire uguali diritti, possibilità di della tutela dei diritti fondamentali rispetto a qualsiasi sia l'orientamento sessuale. Se un giornalista che fa un report va in qualsiasi Stato dell'Unione Europea a chiedere fuori da un bar a dei cittadini europei quale sia il sentimento nei confronti delle comunità LGBTQI o degli individui LGBTQI, sentirà in un'assoluta maggioranza pensieri di tolleranza, di inclusione, di rispetto.
Beh, è un po' diverso invece rispetto ad altri tipi di comunità. E io credo che questo sia l'elefante nella stanza di cui quando si parla di questi temi troppo poco spesso si parla, anzi si nasconde. Se lo stesso giornalista andrà fuori da una moschea in gran parte abusiva, in Italia le moschee irregolari sono pochissime, ce ne sono 1200 abusive, sentirà invece nella stragrande maggioranza pensieri di odio, di intolleranza. E questo mi scrivono tanti cittadini omosessuali in Italia di grande preoccupazione rispetto al fatto che l'Europa sempre sul principio della tolleranza sta importando invece un pensiero intollerante e non dice niente e non fa niente per combattere questo pensiero di intolleranza o almeno così appare ai cittadini che mi scrivono. E devo dire che in gran parte condivido questo pensiero.
Anche oggi nessuno prima di me ha citato alcuni rapporti, per esempio dei rapporti di alcune associazioni come ILGA-Europe sull'odio all'interno delle comunità islamiche in Europa.
Ecco, che cosa sta facendo, e mi rivolgo alla Commissione europea, che cosa sta facendo la Commissione europea rispetto all'intolleranza delle comunità LGBTQ nelle comunità islamiche europee?
Irena Moozova
Thank you very much, honorable member. I think that what you have put as a core of your question and the comment is the respect. Here I'm referring not only towards the respect about the individuals, but the respect towards the founding values, fundamental rights and also the Charter, which speaks radically about what are the values that we have to protect. And this is of course the way how the Commission is acting. For your information, we are supporting those policies across the religions, because the hate and the crime doesn't have a border which would be stipulated by certain faith, for example.
From this perspective also we have a very active coordinator working in the area of anti-Muslim hatred, which is working very closely again with the member states and the relevant authorities. We are promoting the tolerance and the respect through the law enforcement institutions, bringing good practices into the understanding of the police, judges, the whole law enforcement structures. And last but not least, we are working very closely also with the civil society organization in order to build this kind of the respect enshrined in the lives of the citizens on top of what is being done by the member states.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you. Now the ECR is going to take the floor. No speaker from ECR then Ms. Stollenberg. Are you Ms. García Hermida? Ms. García Hermida, van de Valle.
Raquel García Hermida-Van Der Walle
Gracias presidente, necesitamos todos verano. We all need summer. Thank you so much. Thank you to the speakers. Thank you for presenting the situation.
Before I go into my question, I would like to remind colleague Ceccardi that you might talk about tolerance among the majority of the population in Europe, and I believe that's the case. When it comes to intolerance, I would like to remind you that there are colleagues in your own group in this Parliament who refer to trans people as transformed men or women.
So I think that before you start talking about religious groups or minorities, you should look at the behavior and the language that your own colleagues use in this house. And now onto my question. We are very happy that the Commission has taken bold steps against the Orbán regime for its attacks on LGBTQI+ people, including its anti-LGBTQI+ propaganda law. But unfortunately, I do have to be critical about your stance against Bulgaria. Because Bulgaria has a very similar law.
This law has banned promotion of ideas and views related to non-traditional sexual orientation and determination of gender identity other than biological in education. This law passed almost two years ago, by the way, with big support from colleagues from the EPP group here and in Bulgaria then. And we're wondering why the Commission has not taken the same steps against Bulgaria, taken them to court as it did with Hungary.
And I would also ask you, dear representative of the Commission, not to say that we're still monitoring or analyzing the law, because this is only leaving LGBTQI+ people in Bulgaria out in the cold and out to hang. So when can we expect concrete action? To go back on your football metaphor for today and the importance of today, then I would like to ask when is Bulgaria getting a red card from the Commission and the Member States, by the way? Thank you.
Irena Moozova
Thank you very much, honorable Member, for acknowledging progress made and also so speaking with the football terminology. So we are not yet at the red, but we are already, let's say, showing clearly the orange card, because we have, we are clearly engaged with the dialogue with the Bulgarian authorities to get not only information about this law, but also specific clarification on the scope and the consequences in case of breach. So we are preparing in a way. We sent two letters to the Bulgarian ministers of education and justice to ask for clarification and express also intention of the Commission to also not only monitor, but also to warn them about the need to ensure full compliance with the EU values and EU law, including the Charter.
We understand that there is a recent development because new Ombudsperson was appointed on the 18th of July and shortly after that civil society organization in Bulgaria have filed a request to the new person to seize the Constitutional Court in order to check the constitutionality of the amendments to the Preschool and School Education Act. So they have been some movements and as I said previously, we will not think it twice when there is a moment to really raise the red card as well.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you. I think that our speaker connected remotely wanted to step in. Belinda, are you there?
Belinda Dear
Yes, can you hear me? Great. Yes, thank you. Sorry, I raised my hand because I just wanted to very quickly clarify because there was some false information shared by the MEP from PfE. There is no report by ILGA-Europe about Islamic intolerance towards LGBTI people.
There is no report in which there is an assessment per religion on intolerance towards LGBTI people. So this is this is the kind of disinformation that we see all too frequently online, in the media and also in this house, just to flag it. And it would be good to see more reaction from the European Parliament when these kind of incidents happen. Thank you to Raquel also for naming the incidents that you have also heard in the house.
It would be good to see more reaction as per rules of procedure. And yes, that's everything for me. Thank you.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you. I think that we'd rather speak of inaccurate rather than false information brought by a member of the committee. Now, it's Ms. Strolenberg.
Anna Strolenberg
Yes, now it's my turn. Thank you. Thanks to all the speakers for addressing the topic and thanks also to ILGA-Europe, to Belinda. The Rainbow Map is, is very useful. And what we can see is that the situation is unfortunately not very much improving in Europe.
We see that pride events are being restricted, civil society organisations work on LGBTQI rights are facing growing pressure, funding cuts. So it's not looking good. So I'm worried about this, especially the fact that the Commission had a good opportunity to respond to this European Citizens' Initiative on the ban of conversion therapy, which I think was a great opportunity. But then the reaction was that we get recommendations for countries. And I know there's also Member States' competence there, but I do hope from the European Commission to see a bit more in this case to really show what we stand for.
And based on this, already my first question.
We now have this landmark judgment about the situation in Hungary, but I'm a bit afraid that we'll tell Hungary, "Okay, you should implement the outcome," but that's about it. So I want to ask the Commission what you will do to really pressure for this, to withdraw the Child Protection Act. And also knowing the fact that in Pride there's another, sorry, in October there's another Pride coming up in Hungary. For now, it's not going to be legal yet, so how can we ensure that this Pride will be legal? And then a second point that I want to look at is refugee status for LGBTQI people, especially in the US.
Because again, we talk about maybe religions that are not tolerant against LGBTQI people, but we also have to look at Trump. Now in the US, he installed already under his presidency 474 anti-LGBTQI laws, which is massive. And I get more and more concerns for people from there who want to ask for asylum. So knowing this, can the US still be considered a safe country in light of these developments, or should we review this, is something I want to ask. Thank you.
Irena Moozova
Thank you, Mrs. Stollenberg. Commission.
Thank you very much, honorable member. You put several things into one question, but I will start obviously by the way so how we expect that Hungary will comply with the ruling. I have mentioned already the visit of the president, the meeting with the president and visit of the three commissioners urging Hungary very quickly to, very quickly to act. As you know, so this is not only about the law, but also the amendments which are linked to the law, including the one so prohibiting the Pride. It has been a good occasion for Commissioner Lahbib actually to be present at the recent Pride in Budapest.
Now, while we have legal tools in our hands, we have also financial instruments because currently as a consequence of not complying with the Charter, so 500 millions of the euros of the cohesion policy funds were suspended. And of course, so unless Hungary will comply with the ruling of the European Court of Justice, so these conditions will not be met. So we have legal tools and we have of course also the financial tools. And I'm afraid I'm not qualified to answer the question of the President Trump, but I share your concern.
Estrella Galán
Gracias, presidente.
Como ya se ha dicho aquí, la condena a Hungría por prohibir el orgullo es claramente un aviso a navegantes. Esta sentencia deja claro que la protección de los derechos del colectivo LGTBIQ+ son intocables y es una condición básica para formar parte de la Unión Europea. Sin embargo, ya lo ha dicho la compañera de ILGA-Europe, hay una protección muy desigual entre los diferentes Estados miembros. En particular, ya se ha hablado del caso de España, mi país, en cabeza y estamos muy orgullosos de ello y orgullosas, en cabeza el ranking arcoíris, como se decía, y acabamos de penalizar las terapias de conversión, una práctica que la ONU califica claramente como torturas.
Tengo que decirles que desafortunadamente esa ley salió con el voto en contra de Vox, que veo que están muy preocupados por lo que hacen otros pero sin embargo no condenan las torturas, y también con la abstención del Partido Popular, que está sufriendo un retroceso en todo lo que tiene que ver con materia de derechos humanos debido a la imposición de sus socios de gobierno. Y es que lo que estamos viendo es que en esos lugares donde están gobernando juntos Vox y el Partido Popular están retirando las banderas del arcoíris justo en la semana del orgullo, están incluso recortando las políticas de igualdad y eso hoy por hoy es muy grave porque precisamente ese mensaje y esas políticas incrementan el odio contra el colectivo y la federación del colectivo LGTBI de mi país ha puesto sobre la mesa datos que son muy preocupantes y es que los delitos de odio contra el colectivo se están incrementando. Este Parlamento lleva años pidiendo al Consejo incluir los delitos de odio en la lista de eurodelitos y aprobar la directiva de igualdad de trato, como ya se ha dicho también hace un momento, que prohíba la discriminación del colectivo en todos los ámbitos de la vida, pero ambos están bloqueadas por falta de unanimidad. Una pregunta a la representante de la Comisión: ante este bloqueo, ¿qué medidas prevé la Comisión para garantizar una protección mínima de las personas del colectivo LGTBIQ+ en todos los Estados miembros y qué alternativas se contemplan cuando parte de esta cámara, que además tiene mayoría, gobierna junto a quienes alimentan los discursos de odio y tienen como diana en la diana al colectivo LGTBI y pretenden retroceder en el reconocimiento de sus derechos? Gracias.
Irena Moozova
Thank you very much, honorable member. Indeed, so as I mentioned already in my previous reply, so we are pursuing the legislative path through the instruments that I've been mentioning in my previous replies already. I have been mentioning the tools under the Digital Service Act. We are working also through the funding of the projects like the one with the Council of Europe, which is precisely focused on the combating anti-LGBTIAQ violence and the hate speech and strengthening awareness-raising and fact-based narratives about LGBTIAQ persons. This is a project that we have already funded in the past years and it is foreseen for the upcoming two years again.
We have adopted earlier this year in May a new cyberbullying strategy also, oh sorry, action plan against cyberbullying in order to focus on the prevention, awareness raising and strengthening by focusing on the children and young people in general, but this action plan recognizes the specific and disproportionate exposure by the LGBTQI+ people. And indeed we are looking on the other ways how to support these groups through the funding, dedicated funding that we have planning also for the next period.
Speaker 68
Thank you chair. I would like to thank the FRA and Legal Europe for their respective annual reports. The evidence is clear: Italy continues to fall behind with persistent discrimination against LGBTQI+ people. And it's not true, as my colleague said, that there is tolerance and inclusion throughout Europe. And when governments dismantle fundamental rights, attack trans people, deny families recognition and tolerate hate, they are not defending society.
They are saying that some rights are conditional and that there are citizens who have more rights than others.
And we have already seen this pattern in other countries, a pattern with one clear aim: weakening democracy. And my question is what concrete action is the Commission and Fundamental Rights Agency taking to address the regression of fundamental rights in countries such as Italy? Thank you.
Henri Nickels
Thank you, honorable member. The, so the Fundamental Rights Agency, I mean, in terms of concrete action that we can take, I mean, we can support the EU and the member states with the evidence to show what the situation is on the ground, to provide the evidence base from which actions can be developed and can be taken. In terms of enforcement, we do not have any enforcement powers, but we can be there to show and help to show what the situation is, to help monitor the implementation of legislation and policies, whether the extent to which they're successful or not, and where action would need to be taken. In terms of the other aspects, I leave it to the Commission. Thank you.
Irena Moozova
Thank you very much.
Enforcement powers indeed lies in the hands of the Commission. I could refer to my previous replies, but maybe on top of that, since you mentioned the protection of the democracy, let me refer to the recently adopted last year initiative on the democracy shield with this democracy center, which has precisely certain activities which are also aimed not only at the protection of the democracy in general terms, but also in terms of those harmful ideologies trying to erode the democratic basis, fundamental rights and the freedoms on which the European Union is enshrined. So this is the concrete reply to the concrete challenges that we are facing inside of the Europe and we hope to count also on the support of the European Parliament in that. Thank you. Ms. Stincel.
Evin Incir
Thank you very much, Chair. I have two questions. The first regard or is regarding the enforcement of the laws, the rules that we have put in place and also the strategies that we have adopted because we see at one hand many good initiatives being taken. On the other hand, we also see a backlash in our Member States. So my first question is how is the Commission seeing this and especially on the enforcement part?
Does the member states do enough to ensure that this backslide doesn't continue and what could be done more of? And the other is on hate speech and hate crime targeting LGBTQI people since as I said it is being increased. What additional EU actions is needed to ensure that we that we strengthen prevention, prosecution and victim support? Thank you.
Irena Moozova
Thank you very much honorable member for two questions which are partially also relating already to what I've been replying to the previous questions so I will refer to that in terms of the enforcement powers. I think that the clear case of the Hungary shows that when there is a clear breach so we are not shy of using these tools. We are also working on top of that so with the enforcement enforcement structures in the member states. And indeed the backslide is something that we are very much aware. The gendered ideology so has been something which has been a core also as a part of the FIMI which I referred on the democracy shield.
And indeed, so we are working very closely with the member states on several projects inside of the Democracy Shield, Democracy Center, in order to make sure that we have robust tools in the place. We have made the best out of the good practices like in Sweden or in France in order to make sure that they are not taken us unprepared.
Evin Incir
Thank you very much. Thank you for the answer. What I'm thinking about also partially is that we see a backlash. In some member states we see a clear attack. And in others we see a subtle, in a way, subtle way.
You mentioned Sweden, for example. The last years we have seen decrease in support to civil society organizations. From everything from youth organizations, but to civil society organizations and NGOs working on with vulnerable groups, as for example LGBTQI rights. So one hand is to, to say that one respect the laws, but on the other hand we see the member states undermining the possibility for the civil society organizations to actually do their job.
So maybe this is a follow-up question to the Commission, but it would also be important, I would say, to hear from ILGA-Europe on this. Thank you.
Any further remark on this?
Irena Moozova
Yes, I can only refer to the civil society strategy, the first ever strategy that we have adopted last year together with the democracy shield, precisely in order to boost the the resilience and the capacity, competences, experience jointly with the civil society. As a follow-up maybe reply as well, so we are aware of the decreasing financing, for example, for the civil society organizations, and that's why we have proposed quite an ambitious envelope in order to be able under the next MFF to honor our duties. I understand that this house is also looking at this matter very closely, and we have already looking into the safeguards to make sure that even in the countries where the civil society support is declining, to make sure that through the cascading grants, so we can still reach the field organization which are so needed and sometimes also in difficulties in terms of sustaining their activities.
And there are many other things, but in view of the time, I will stop here.
Javier Zarzalejos
Any further remark by the ILGA-Europe representative following Mrs. In 't Veld's question?
Belinda Dear
Um, hi. I didn't catch all of it, but I think it's about funding. So I will say something. Indeed, when we're thinking about bolstering democratic resilience and trying to improve tolerance across society, that is a really important work of civil society organisations, independent media, and the cultural sector. So once again, I will mention Agora EU.
Actually, today, we will be putting online a joint statement of civil society organisations regarding increasing the funding for Agora EU in the next MFF. Just one note for those who are working more on the national level. MEP In 't Veld is right, like there is a reduction across the board in this kind of funding for soft kind of work, you know, working with societies, improving understanding between different communities, between different people, getting offline, becoming more connected. And that's really important for reducing hatred against all minority groups and actually against everyone, and improving the well-being and the health of our democracies and societies. So encouragement for funding for civil society across the EU.
Thank you.
Henri Nickels
Thank you.
I think the exchange of views has shown that, somebody said it, no progress is possible, but it doesn't stay forever. So this is also the commitment that I was referring to earlier on, and I think it's a question of like making sure that we see what the situation on the ground is for people and then seeing where it is that we need to intervene. And our findings show very many areas where interventions are needed. The discussions we had today also show very many areas where intervention are needed. So equality is not a state of affairs, it's something that is always ongoing.
I think it's a fight that always needs to be fought and always needs to be done. Thanks.
Almudena Darias de las Heras
Sí, muchísimas gracias. Bueno, simplemente agradecerles de nuevo mi la invitación a este foro. En España estamos muy orgullosos de haber estado este año primeros en ese ranking del Rainbow Map. Seguimos comprometidos, estamos comprometidos en seguir avanzando en políticas de de igualdad de trato y reconocimiento de derechos de las personas LGTBI. Tenemos los instrumentos y vamos a seguir con estos instrumentos para lograr esa igualdad real.
Muchas gracias.
Javier Zarzalejos
Muchas gracias, Señora Darias. Well, we conclude this item on our agenda.
We thank our speakers for this very informative and useful and fruitful exchange. And then we move to our next item on the agenda, reporting back to the committee on the negotiations. Thank you.
Well, in this item on our agenda, we will have the update by the rapporteur of the digital travel application, Mr. López Aguilar, on the state of play of this file and the prospects for the ongoing discussion and negotiations with the Council. So, Mr. López Aguilar, you have five minutes to report back to the committee.
Juan Fernando López Aguilar
Oh, thank you, Chair. I won't use five. I thank you for the opportunity to update you on the state of the play of this file regarding the EU digital travel application and EU digital travel credential. And first of all, I would like to appreciate the cooperative work that's been carried out by the negotiating team on your behalf, European Parliament LIBE Committee. Shadows, I thank you for the cooperation with me as your rapporteur on this file, which actually has turned out to be more challenging, both in technical and political terms, than expected.
But the thing is that we have managed to improve, to begin with, the initial initiative by the Commission. And of course, we have borne in mind all the way what it is about.
It is about making it smoother and faster border checks so that there would be reducing waiting times at airports and borders while strengthening, by the same token, security at external borders of the Schengen area. That is the idea we have borne in mind. And of course, we have tried to come to terms with the Council after the first agreement we had as European Parliament by adopting this file. And we thank also the Cypriot presidency, which has done some efforts in order to have it completed, although we are not there yet. So we are waiting to have it completed through the Irish presidency.
And I'm summarizing the three points that we have made. First, let me reassure you that the idea is adding value as to the status quo. Added value to the status quo, so there would be some improvement as to the status quo, not leaving it as it is, because then it would be a file with no practical sense at all. The first point is making it an obligation for the Member States to provide nationals with a digital travel credential based on newly and already existing passports. That is the first point.
So there should be an obligation, there should be a shall and not a may. That is the first point we have made.
Second, we have established EU-wide minimum age for the use of digital travel credential. And we have discussed where that minimum age should be and actually we have come to an agreement with the Council that it should be initially 18 year old, but still the European Commission will empower the adoption of delegated act to lower that minimum age as technicalities do allow it. The third point is that we have also succeed in securing robust data protection safeguards, such as data retention period and a clearly defined purpose, purpose limitation for the processing of personal data, meaning that 12 hours after the external crossing of the external borders of the European Union, entering the Schengen area or exiting the Schengen area, the data should be deleted, but for purposes of security and fighting organized crimes, there should be an extension up to 24 hours for security reasons, which is relevant for the Member States. And then we have accepted three points that have been made by the Council.
Third, interoperability with entry-exit system. Second, the creation of an interface in the mobile application to redirect the traveler to ETIAS, VIS, which is Visa Information System, and entry-exit system, the usual interoperability thing. And third, the possibility for the traveling of use a so-called EU identity wallet to send the digital travel credential for the purpose of preliminary border checks. I'm only counting on the cooperation and goodwill of the shadows so that we finalize this file in the early days of the Irish presidency. As soon as we get back from holidays, from the summer break, we are expecting to have a trilogue which should be final.
Thank you.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you, Mr. López Aguilar. We all hope that this file would be finalized, as you say, in the early days of September under the Irish presidency.
Well, any member wishing to intervene following the update by Mr. López Aguilar? Okay, Mr. López Aguilar, we support your efforts, and then we move to point 12, General Budget of the European Union for the financial year 2027. So now we have the exchange on the budgetary amendments proposed by our rapporteur, Mr. Jaroslav Bžoch, and I would like to remind you that in accordance with our decision, LIBE will provide its contribution in the form of budgetary amendments and there will be no accompanying opinion to the EP position on general budget for 2027. Also, due to treaty-based deadlines, the timeline is very tight and we have agreed to submit the amendments in English only. So and now I give the floor to Mr. Bžoch for three minutes.
Jaroslav Bžoch
Thank you very much, Chair. I'll be really brief because we had the shadows meeting last week in Strasbourg, so I'm pretty sure that we all know where the groups stand for the budget. So let me briefly introduce you the budgetary amendments that I tabled as LIBE rapporteur to the general budget of the EU for the financial year 2027. As discussed during the shadows meeting that took place last week in Strasbourg, my main focus is to further support the work of law enforcement agencies. Therefore, I propose to increase the budget for Europol, Eurojust, Frontex, eu-LISA and CEPOL for the next year.
Those agencies need further resources to properly carry out their duties and support the national authorities within their mandates. Given the rising costs, the increase in budget is also needed to satisfy their operational and administrative demands. On the other hand, given the lack of transparency on EU funding that was raised by the European Court of Auditors in its report, I decided not to allocate further resources for the following programs: Equality and Rights, Daphne and Union Values. Therefore I propose to keep their budget at the 2026 levels until transparency in funding is fully ensured. Finally, I would like to thank the shadow rapporteurs for their engagement and constructive work on this file and I'm looking forward to further cooperating with you.
Thank you.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you, thank you to our rapporteur. And now I give the floor to shadow rapporteurs starting with Mr. Tarczyński, two minutes maximum.
Tomáš Zdechovský
Thank you, Chairman. Let me be very clear and very short. Every year we heard the same message: Europe must be more to fight organized crime, migrant smuggling, cybercrime and fraud against the EU budget. If we want a safer Europe, we must properly fund the agencies that keep our citizens safe.
We should also make better use of what we already have. Europe already has strong law enforcement agencies and highly qualified experts. We should use their knowledge and experience to the fullest. We do not need to create a new agency every time a new challenge appears. We should first strengthen the agencies that already deliver results.
That is why I support reinforcing Europol. We have given Europol many new tasks under the anti-smuggling regulation, Digital Services Act, and other legislation. We cannot keep giving Europol more responsibilities without giving it the resources to do the job. The same is true for the EPPO. Every euro recovered by EPPO is money protecting the European taxpayer.
The requested increase is modest, targeted, and fully justified.
We should support it. And let me say that words about CEPOL. For years, CEPOL has been the forgotten agencies of the JHA family, but yet discussion in this committee ends with the same conclusion. We need better training police officer. We need stronger cooperation.
We need the better preparedness for new security threats. Also last year LIBE recognized this is the support of additional 2 million for CEPOL. Now the Commission propose to cut its budget by almost half a million euros. I do not understand this. Training is not any luxury.
It's very smart things also. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. I have it still my speech for two hours, but I cannot continue also. I will stop here.
Evin Incir
Thank you very much. I will not have a speech for two hours, but a bit shorter. So, I'm very much pleased to once again be the shadow rapporteur for the S&D group on the opinion to the budget. And most of the people maybe have their eyes on the MFF, the upcoming MFF, but this budget of course for 2027 is equally important since it is also the last year of this MFF period.
We all know that financial margins are extremely limited. Nevertheless, even in a constrained budgetary environment, we must ensure that the European Union continues to invest in the institutions and programs that uphold our values and protect our citizens, which unfortunately some of the important agencies has not been mentioned by my previous colleagues until now. That's why we will be able we will table targeted amendments to reinforce in a financially responsible manner the resources of key EU agencies. First and foremost, the European Union Agency of Fundamental Rights plays an indispensable role in promoting equality, combating discrimination, racism, xenophobia, and anti-LGBTQI rights, which we just heard in the last exchange of view that we had, and and supporting access to justice across the EU. Its work has never, I would say, been more important, yet its resources remain insufficient.
We believe that FRA deserves stronger financial support to fulfill its growing mandate. Then, second, we support responsible increases for Eurojust, Europol, CEPOL, and EPPO also.
These bodies are on the frontline in combating organized cross-border crime, financial crimes, corruption, and money laundering. Investing in their capacity means investing in the security of European citizens and in rule of law at a time where this is under attack. In times of limited resources, every euro must count. That is precisely why we should invest where the European added value is greatest: protecting fundamental rights, strengthening justice, and ensuring security for Europeans in the European Union. Thank you.
Geadis Geadi
Thank you, Mr. Chair. Allow me to speak in Greek. Ένας αυξημένος προϋπολογισμός της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης αποτελεί επιπλέον βάρος για τα δημοσιονομικά των κρατών μελών και τελικά βάρος για τους φορολογούμενους. Εξετάζοντας την πρόταση προϋπολογισμού για το 2027, διαπιστώνω αυξήσεις σχεδόν παντού. Αυτό δεν είναι βιώσιμο.
Πρέπει να κάνουμε λιγότερα και καλύτερα, αν θέλουμε να ανταποκριθούμε στις προσδοκίες των πολιτών σε θέματα ασφάλειας, διαφύλαξης συνόρων, μεταναστευτικής πολιτικής και καταπολέμησης της διαφθοράς.
Επομένως η ομάδα μας θα προτείνει περικοπές, μάλιστα μαζικές περικοπές σε ορισμένα προγράμματα, ιδίως στο Ταμείο Ασύλου, Μετανάστευσης και Ένταξης, καθώς πολλά από τα χρήματα μένουν αδιάθετα εδώ και χρόνια. Τα χρήματα που θέλουμε να εξοικονομήσουμε, ένα μέρος τους θα πρέπει να διατεθεί για την ενίσχυση όσων είναι πραγματικά χρήσιμα για τις χώρες μας και για την παροχή βοήθειας, κατά προτεραιότητα στην επιβολή του νόμου, την προστασία των χερσαίων και θαλάσσιων συνόρων και την επιστροφή των παράνομων μεταναστών. Κλείνοντας, κύριε Πρόεδρε, οι Ευρωπαίοι πολίτες δεν ζητούν έναν μεγαλύτερο προϋπολογισμό, ζητούν έναν αποτελεσματικότερο προϋπολογισμό, έναν προϋπολογισμό που θα προστατεύει τα ευρωπαϊκά συμφέροντα, θα ενισχύει την ασφάλεια και θα υπηρετεί τα πραγματικά συμφέροντα των κρατών μελών, αντί να χρηματοδοτεί αποτυχημένες πολιτικές. Αυτή είναι η Ευρώπη που θέλουμε να χτίσουμε.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you. Now, Renew shadow rapporteur is Mrs. Al-Sahlani, she's not here. Then the rapporteur from the Greens is Mr. Freund. I don't see him here either. Ah, okay.
You're taking, you're replacing Mr. Freund. Okay. Yes, go ahead Mr. Orlando.
Leoluca Orlando
Yes, on behalf of the colleague Freund, I just wished to announce that before tomorrow we'll present two amendments. One just to increase the fund for the EPPO and the other one just to increase the fund for the Fundamental Rights Agency. Thanks a lot.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you, Mr. Orlando. Mr. López Aguilar, any concluding remark following the round of rapporteurs?
Juan Fernando López Aguilar
Sure, sure, I just, I just thank in advance the cooperation of the shadows.
Javier Zarzalejos
Sorry, sorry, I don't have the file complete. We all need, we all need summer, as one colleague said. Mr. Vioț, please, any further remark?
Jaroslav Bžoch
I was just curious what's happening, but okay. Thank you. Yes, I can, I can agree to most of my colleagues and I'm happy that everyone can see that we need to raise the, raise the budget for law enforcement agencies because having the, having the time where we are now with the security risks and everything else, so I'm happy to hear that.
I also agree what my colleague from ECR just mentioned, that also it's not just about the increasing the budgets, but it's also about to find any savings. So if there are programs or the agencies they can't hardly spend the budget and they are asking still for more, then we can also need to look at it if it's proportional or not. Thank you.
Javier Zarzalejos
Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Vondra. It's clear that you're the rapporteur. Then, yes, let me remind you that the deadline for amendments has been set for the 15th of July at 6:00 in the evening, so tomorrow is the deadline for amendments. And now we move to our voting session.
Well, I think it's clear that we have the quorum, but before we proceed to the votes, I would like to inform of the following LIBE non-LIBE members who will participate in today's vote. For EPP, Georgios Saftias will replace Elisabeth Bossenberg-Prionidi, and Monica Hohlmeier will replace Mr. Ioan-Rareş Bogdan. No replacement reported in S&D, PfE, or ECR. In Renew, Mr. Vasconcelos will replace Mr. Azmani, Mr. Hojsík will replace Veronika Cifrová Ostrihoňová, Ms. Salimas will replace Sophie Wilmès, and Mr. Otjen will replace Michael McNamara. No replacement reported in the Greens or the Left, ESN.
So we can proceed to the vote.
The vote on the measures to facilitate consular protection for unrepresented citizens of the Union in third countries has been postponed. So we proceed now to the vote of the first file, which is the conclusion of an agreement between the European Union and the Swiss Confederation on the transfer of passenger name record data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist offences and serious crime. We vote on amendment one. Vote is open. Vote is closed and it is rejected.
So now we go for the final vote. Vote is open. Vote is closed and it is adopted. Now we move to the second, now we move to the second, we vote on the second file, which is the upcoming EU anti-corruption strategy. Yes, we vote on the draft question for oral answer.
Yes, sí, señor Buxadé.
Jorge Buxadé Villalba
Sí, había pedido un punto de orden a propósito de esta votación. Adelante. Voy a hablar español para invocar el artículo 189 del reglamento. Miren, esta es la lista de voto de la última resolución que se aprobó en este Parlamento al amparo del artículo 136. El artículo 189 dice que salvo que se disponga expresamente de otro modo en el presente reglamento, los textos presentados al Parlamento se votarán conforme a un procedimiento que incluye la posibilidad de votar enmiendas cuando, como es el caso, se trata de resoluciones.
Ni el artículo 142 ni el artículo 136 que ha invocado el secretariado para impedir la presentación de enmiendas y la votación por parte de este grupo permiten lo que se ha hecho. A pesar de ello, a mi grupo se le ha negado la posibilidad de votar ninguna enmienda de las que presentamos, particularmente las relacionadas con la corrupción de las ONGs, pero tampoco las peticiones de eliminar las críticas a las comunicaciones encriptadas y la condicionalidad del presupuesto. Por esta razón, por supuesto, debo estar obligado a solicitar que se suspenda el voto para que se resuelva esta cuestión de acuerdo con el reglamento.
No vale invocar el estado de derecho y luego hacer exactamente lo mismo de lo que hacen quienes vulneran el estado de derecho. Es un derecho del parlamentario a plantear enmiendas, es un derecho de los parlamentarios a votar las enmiendas que se plantean. Gracias.
Speaker 82
Entiendo que lo que pides la your requesting the postponement of the vote. If that is the case I put that request to the vote. Sorry. We vote on the draft question for oral answer and the vote is closed and it is adopted. And then we vote on the draft resolution.
Vote is open.
Speaker 83
And now it's closed. It is closed and it is adopted. We conclude the vote. Thank you.
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