Committee on Security and Defence Ordinary meeting
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SEDE European Parliament
Follow its sittingsRadmila Šekerinska
So the numbers are really impressive. Allies are really providing concrete and credible plans on how to invest 5% of GDP in defense by 2035, because this was the Hague pledge. Remarkably, just one year after this 10-year trajectory, this 10-year project, European allies and Canada are already investing around 4% of GDP in defense and security. Very, very close to 4% just in the first year on a 10-year project.
Last year, they spent 20% more than the previous year. And looking at 2025 and 2026 combined, that's an extra 258 billion US dollars dedicated, invested in defense and security, a quarter of a trillion in just two years. This is not only an example how we are implementing the pledge in The Hague, but this is also an example of how we are rebalancing our transatlantic alliance for the better. And it's not a coincidence that the big motto, the big title of the summit in Ankara was a stronger Europe in stronger NATO. This is the so-called NATO 3.0.
So European allies and Canada really working with the United States are assuming greater responsibility for the alliance defense. We welcome EU's effort, you asked me about how can we work even better. We really welcome EU's efforts to support a more capable European defense, interoperable, compatible, complementary to NATO. And the contributions and capabilities of NATO's non-EU allies are of course also important. And this also has to be part of the equation.
They're indispensable for our collective defense. It is crucial that we all move in the same direction by ramping up also defense investments. And the EU plays a crucial role in strengthening this capacity. Second reason why we see the summit as tremendously successful is on the important issue of defense production, of defense industrial cooperation as well. In Ankara, we have had a separate but practically in parallel or together with the summit, we had a NATO summit defense industry forum.
This was really an impressive defense industry event showing the strength of Euro-Atlantic defense cooperation. New procurements in the amount of 50 billion were signed only at the event, at the forum. And many were from European industry with strong transatlantic ties as well. So what we have seen is really breakthroughs, really important multinational contracts, a lot of industrial cooperation in all of the domains that we considered a priority, like air defense, strike capabilities, intelligence and surveillance, space capabilities. All these things really came up very, very prominently.
It was a message to our industries, to our people, but also to our adversaries, that NATO is delivering and that we're all stepping up the production. It was also a concrete demonstration of how we turn our words and commitments into action, how we turn the cash in our budgets into real capabilities. And this is all necessary so that our military can do their job, safe and secure continent, safe and secure transatlantic. And what we have seen across the board interacting with different industry representatives is that we are seeing really a transatlantic industrial revolution. NATO and the EU have really a common interest in stepping up defense industry cooperation both in Europe, in the EU, but also with the non-EU allies.
The two organizations working together, breaking down barriers, is crucial to accelerate production and innovation of our defense industry base.
And what struck me the most, and you can go back into the events and you can see the signing, you will see really strong companies signing these contracts. And some of them, they will sound either European or American, but actually if you dig deeper into the product, into the project, you will see that they might be nominally American or European, but in essence the supply chains are so interconnected that they really, the cooperation element is already baked in. And this speaks really strongly in favor of a transatlantic industrial revolution. So we need less barriers, not, not more. And the third big takeaway, the third big success for the summit, was a very clear signal on continued support to Ukraine.
President Zelenskyy also came to the Ankara summit and he came there in a much stronger position that we have seen before even at previous summits. We see in the last months how Russia is struggling on the battlefield. We see Russia feeling the pressure with Ukrainian long strike successes. And this was very visible and all allies have really appreciated these Ukrainian successes. But let me be very clear here.
Russia's aggression is far from over. And just before the beginning of the NATO summit, it was very clear that the pressure on Ukraine from Russia continues to be incredibly, incredibly strong. So Moscow launched the most massive barrage of drones and missiles on Kyiv just the day before the summit, killing I think over 20 people. And very much the attacks are directed not only towards military sites, but very much towards critical infrastructure and residential areas. So Ukraine really needs a continued support from us, particularly with air defenses to make sure that they can defend themselves, to make sure that they can fight for their freedom, but also when the time will come to start negotiations from a position of strength.
And I think this was the big message from President Zelenskyy, that especially on air defense, they need our support now. They need interceptors now. PERL and other NATO mechanisms provide this urgently needed help, this urgently needed support because they are based on Ukraine's priorities.
And this support will contribute also to Ukraine's future deterrence. At the summit, allies pledged 40 billion euros in military equipment, in training and assistance for Ukraine in 2026. And what was equally important is that we have committed to contributing at least, and I repeat, at least the same amount for 2027. So it's a floor, it's not a ceiling in our commitment. Ukraine is one of the priorities on which NATO and EU cooperate the most.
And this is where we have even more in common. We have welcomed, as you have mentioned, the European Union's decision to provide multi-year funding to Ukraine through the Ukraine support loan. And this is, to be very clear, part of the commitment that we have expressed in the declaration. Furthermore, many allies sent a very clear message that Ukraine has become also a security provider. Our companies are investing more and more in Ukraine's defense industry and in their innovation.
So all of us, and NATO and the EU, are not only supporting Ukraine, but we are also learning from their experience, their knowledge, and their successes. I do believe that these three priorities that we have placed in front of us before the summit, they were our focus and we were able, with a consensus of all 32 allies, to have really meaningful results on three of them. But we have mentioned at the summit, we have shown that we can deliver, but we know that we cannot rest on our laurels because this effort will require a sustained effort from all allies every year in the future. And this is again how we keep our citizens safe. As the Secretary General has mentioned at the press conference, we are talking about a transformation of our alliance, NATO 3.0.
And it is really a two-way street.
What remains the same is our nature. NATO will remain a defensive alliance, but we need to invest in our strength so that we can keep our defenses and our deterrence as strong as ever, because the threats have become also more complex and more dangerous.
And let me use at the end the opportunity to thank you all for being very supportive not only for NATO-EU cooperation, but also for our goal to have a stronger Europe in a stronger NATO. Thank you.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
Thank you very much, Radmila, and we will continue. Salvatore De Meo already told us, and so we will now move to questions and answers in a ping-pong format. I will give two minutes for questions. So we start EPP, Wouter.
Wouter Beke
Yes, thank you for your feedback. The NATO summit was a success. In the conclusion, point three, we are building to the future, a stronger Europe in a stronger NATO, that's what it's all about and that's also our involvement that we have to talk about. What does it mean exactly? And I think that if we want to have a European pillar in the NATO, then we need some issues.
First is our own critical enablers. That's what the United States is asking from us, but that is also what we need from our European side by ourselves. My question is, how can we build on this critical enablers on a European way?
Second element, a rapid reaction force. There is the assessment of the Secretary of State of Defense Austin saying within six months we will have an assessment on what on on the American troops in the European Union. But nevertheless, we will need our own rapid reaction force. How can we build this in this NATO 3.0 and the European pillar? Third element is the European defense industry.
Of course, it's good that there is a ramping up of our budgets. The European budgets doubled in five years. We came from 200 billion, now we have 400 billion coming from the European member states. The question is not only ramp up the budgets, but also strengthen the European defense industry. And I think that there are elements for improvement.
If we talk about FCAS project, for example, this is not the best way to do it. So my question is, do you have propositions for a better real European defense industry starting from the European perspective and not starting from the member state perspective? Thank you.
Thank you very much. Next will be Sven Mikser from S&D.
Sven Mikser
Thank you very much, Madam Deputy Secretary General. You described the summit as a tremendous success. And usually when I hear such phrases, that awakens the skeptic in me. But I agree that in some aspects it was. I mean, obviously, there were big fears ahead of the summit and there were not very high expectations.
Yes, thank you.
Sven Mikser
And so the fact that it wasn't a failure was already a very significant success. But I agree that in some aspects it was a great success with regard to the progress on defense spending, the defense industrial commitments that you mentioned, also the very strong support for Ukraine. But I would like to mention there were also lingering topics like the situation in Greenland, like the ongoing fighting in the Strait of Hormuz and Iran that actually escalated again, full-scale fighting resumed virtually during the summit itself.
And these are issues that actually divide the allies. So how do you describe the political unity? Obviously, it's good that the ironclad commitment to Article 5 was included in the summit declaration, but what's the political state of affairs and temperature? And secondly, a very precise question. I think it was very good that at a time when there's a big shortage of different systems and inventory items on both sides of the Atlantic, but also in Ukraine, that the US President made a statement about allowing Ukrainians to start producing Patriots.
Do you have any information to share with us, what's the timeline of that, how it will actually play out? Thank you.
Radmila Šekerinska
Thank you very much. Let's try the ping-pong because there were quite a number of questions, so I'll try to cover them all. NATO 3.0 is about transformation. And for this transformation to succeed, we need the cash, we need the capabilities, we also need the change in the mindset. And what we have seen across the board is that we are moving in the right direction on all of them.
No, but this is why we said it's a process. And part of this process is actually getting the capabilities that European allies and Canada did not have, and they counted solely on the US doing the heavy lifting there. So what we have seen also during the summit, I've mentioned it when it comes to the defense industry, we have seen joint procurements or contracts or already an implementation of some of them focusing on these issues. Let me just come up with one example: air-to-air refueling. This is an area where European allies and Canada were always expected to do more: strategic lift.
Are we there?
And for example, one of the big contracts that was signed with Airbus actually deals with both. It's both increasing the fleet on air-to-air refueling, I think that we have now reached aircraft number 10, and we need two more. But it's also the other aircraft important for strategic airlift. So these things are happening, but these things do require some time.
But the focus is there: long-strike capabilities, air defense, strategic enablers, intelligence surveillance. We have we have had a big breakthrough on the GlobalEye capabilities, really a remarkable success. So we already are focusing on areas in which European allies and Canada needed to do more. And of course, if we are to balance our transatlantic relationship, we will need to do it also during this review process that the US has announced. So basically this is it.
This is why when we were talking about the NATO force model, you know, and the US has to plan also about the two-theater or multi-theater contingencies, European allies and Canada, because they're investing more in their security, they were able to come up with capabilities to replace US capabilities on which we have based our defense for too long. So this is something that is happening. And this is a process on which we focus now. And we are we have done it through the capability targets, but we will continue doing it with with the political guidelines of 2027 and and the reviews that you have mentioned.
In order for this to work, we need defense industry that produces at scale and the necessary speed. And I think one of the numbers that probably did not get enough traction during the summit, I find it the most striking, is that allies and industries have invested 37 billion to just upgrade, to increase their defense production capacity. 21 billion went to expanding existing facilities. 16 were used to open up completely new production lines. And this speaks of an answered call.
This is defense industry really ramping up production. So we have seen increased numbers in ammunition even last year. This time again it has gone up, but we see it now across the board, including in the domain of critical enablers. So the defense industry kept asking us in the course of last year, we have heard the commitment, but is the money really coming? And they have seen last year with the budgets of 2025 and this year that this actually commitments have translated into contracts.
And this is why it was really good to have 50 billion US dollars contracted at the NATO industry industry forum. We I mentioned it, I'll mention it again, the real successes were European defense EU let's say EU defense companies ramping up, but also the whole chain of companies coming from non-EU allies, also companies coming from the other side of the Atlantic. So if you if you see the Triton example, if you see the Airbus success, all they're all also transatlantic successes because you if you go into their supply chain, you will see a lot of cooperation there. And when it comes to should we use the the comments successful or not at summits, we're politicians, sometimes we we tend to be very cynical. But I do believe that in order to move forward, to continue the progress, we have to appreciate our successes.
And all allies have come forward with really increased defense investments. And this has to be appreciated. And you know, the success was visible in different metrics. You mentioned Article 5. I remember the discussions we have had last year.
Are we committed? Is everyone equally committed? Well, we have now this in the declaration very straightforward. And that commitment comes also with real steps in the right direction. So a commitment, but also action.
I remember questions that I got here in the Parliament last year about Article 5.
So I do believe that a quarter of a trillion investment by the whole alliance speaks volumes on how we have changed our mindset. And we have seen that if we don't invest in our security, we are in for a very, very unpleasant surprise in the future. So in order to meet the challenge of today, we have to continue investing in our security. Does this mean that we will agree on every single issue? No.
But I think we have had an agreement on the defense investment. We have had an agreement by all 32 allies on three very important enhanced vigilant activities just this year. We still have Baltic Sentry that focuses on the situation with critical infrastructure in the Baltic Sea.
We have the Arctic Sentry that deals with threats that have become now very visible to everyone and this is the threat in the Arctic from Russia, from the interests of China. But we we are also very vigilant on our eastern flank, the so-called Eastern Sentry. So on all this we had the full full backing of all 32 allies and they have all committed to Article 5 at the summit. And that was the strong message that I think our audiences need, but it's also a strong message to our adversaries because they have they always count on us not being united and we always see it as a success when we counter this with a very, very strong summit declaration. So I think that on this, when we have issues, we are open about the differences, but when we have unity, we should showcase this unity and we shouldn't be ashamed from showcasing it.
On the issue of interceptors, we have yeah, there was many positive news at the summit, the the takeaway from the bilateral meeting between the US President and Ukrainian President. We also had some decisions when it comes to production of interceptors also and sustainment in in Europe.
I think our focus is very much on interceptors now. We keep asking all allies who have interceptors in their stockpiles, this is the moment to come up with some support towards Ukraine from our stockpiles. We are asking industry to continue increasing their production. And we are still also going to allies and asking for support for the PERL, the Prioritize Ukraine Requirement List, because the key focus of PERL is air defense for Ukraine. And quite a number of allies have already announced that they will continue financing this arrangement because they see that air defense is the game changer, especially when it comes to civilian casualties and critical infrastructure damage in Ukraine.
And thank you very much and let me thank your capital also back home for the strong support in interceptors.
Pierre-Romain Thionnet
Merci Madame la Présidente. Madame la Secrétaire générale adjointe, merci cette présentation.
Puisqu'on est en format d'échange direct, je me permettrais d'émettre un désaccord assez important avec ce que vous avez déclaré sur le fait que le sommet soit un succès du point de vue où il a annoncé qu'il y ait moins de barrières et non pas plus de barrières au point de vue des du marché de l'industrie de défense. Car je pense que cette déclaration s'inscrit plutôt dans l'idée de maintenir le même état de renforcement de la base industrielle transatlantique. Or ici au Parlement européen, la plupart des nouveaux programmes que nous négocions, que nous imposons et que nous votons depuis maintenant plusieurs années vont dans le sens contraire, plutôt d'un renforcement du marché européen, renforcement d'une préférence européenne où clairement dans les dans les dossiers que nous négocions et que nous votons, nous excluons les les entreprises américaines ou les entités y compris présentes en Europe qui appartiennent à des entités américaines. Donc on va plutôt dans le sens d'un d'une discrimination assumée en préférence des des Européens. Donc c'est vrai que là il y a plutôt une voie contraire qui est empruntée en Europe.
Mais là c'est une deuxième partie de l'intervention, ce n'est pas forcément contradictoire avec l'OTAN 3.0.
Et c'est ça je pense qu'il faut qu'on arrive à découpler cette ambition d'OTAN 3.0 et la vision qu'on peut avoir d'un marché transatlantique ou d'une base industrielle transatlantique. Car le renforcement de l'autonomie stratégique européenne, le renforcement des entreprises européennes et donc la réduction des achats d'armement aux Américains, je pense d'un point de vue européen, c'est parfaitement compatible avec les objectifs de l'OTAN 3.0. Vous avez parlé avec un certain euphémisme que c'est l'OTAN de la transformation, mais c'est quand même une rupture. L'OTAN 3.0, c'est quand même les Américains, l'administration américaine. Ce n'est pas un objectif partagé initialement.
L'OTAN 3.0, c'est des gens comme Colby, comme les Restrainers américains qui ont imposé cette vision parce qu'ils estiment que la Russie n'est pas une menace d'importance pour les États-Unis. C'est la Chine. Et que la Russie est une menace plutôt régionale que les Européens peuvent gérer eux-mêmes. C'est quand même la grande logique de l'OTAN 3.0. Et donc c'est quand même une rupture pour les Européens.
Washington qui leur dit clairement que nous n'avons pas les mêmes priorités géopolitiques. Et donc je pense que c'est là où j'aurais un désaccord sur votre vision générale. Vous parlez dans un mot assez doux de transformation, mais c'est une rupture majeure. Et je pense que les Européens doivent en tirer les conséquences. C'est-à-dire pas seulement dépenser plus, pas seulement acheter plus, mais vouloir être plus indépendants et assumer qu'ils ont des intérêts divergents des Américains.
Merci.
Well, thank you very much for the question. Two points that I'll make.
Radmila Šekerinska
The first one is, are these things compatible? Yeah, we say NATO 3.0 means stronger Europe in stronger NATO. And we need both because what was agreed at the summit, and it's very visible in the declaration, is that we all agree that Russia remains to be the main threat to Euro-Atlantic stability. Of course, our US allies also have other global responsibilities and they do need to prepare also for the challenge of multiple theaters or threats in multiple theaters. And this is understandable.
But let me say the call for more appropriate burden sharing or burden shifting is neither new nor surprising. It has been there since the beginning of the alliance. It was a very clear position from President Eisenhower through every single American administration that European countries can invest and bear the burden of our joint security more.
And I think I've shared this with you maybe last time I was here, as a Minister of Defense, I have heard this plea or this call again and again. But we cannot change history. What we can change is what we do now. And there was a very strong call from the US, but also very strong response from Europe, saying, yes, we can do it, we can be stronger. And this will make the alliance even stronger.
We do believe that when it comes to our capability challenges, because people see that we are investing more in our security, they want to see this money translate into capabilities as soon as possible. We see the benefits of a stronger industry on both sides of the Atlantic, because the industrial production capacity is not satisfactory neither in Europe nor in the US or in Canada. And we see the value, and I think in Ankara we were really witnesses of the value of a strong industrial cooperation, which will be transatlantic. And it will make European defense industry stronger, but also our Euro-Atlantic industry much, much stronger.
And we don't see a contradiction in this. We have seen successful examples of European companies cooperating with European Union companies cooperating with Norwegian, with UK, with Turkish companies, but also with the US and Canadian. And some of these successful projects in Ankara were a real showcase of this. And I, unfortunately, most of the attention goes to the big political statements, but I would urge you to dig deeper and see really remarkable capabilities that we have managed to procure or create because of this cooperation.
Thank you very much. And the next will be for ECR, Alexandr.
Alexandr Vondra
Well, I could not be here from the beginning. We had a shadow, so I'm hesitating whether to raise a question. But maybe, you know, I was watching the summit from a very large distance in Southern Africa. But, you know, on the run-up to the summit, I was questioning myself, is Donald Trump coming or not coming?
It would be, you know... so just on the distance and given this uncertainty on the run-up before, so it looks like a peaceful gathering. But can you give us a bit more inside assessment, you know, how NATO staff, you, Margrethe, are evaluating the temper of Donald Trump departing back to Washington? Was he happy or what is... whether you can tell us a little bit more than what was in the media, but maybe, you know, it's a bit incorrect political question, but it's important, you know, the bedrock of the transatlantic bond.
Radmila Šekerinska
Well, we were observing it from Ankara, but we were also listening through all the press conferences that happened after the summit. And as several people have repeated the word success, yeah, I think this is why it is easy really to say that the Ankara summit was a successful one, a tremendous success.
And if you want a quote from the US President, I think he said there was a lot of love and unity in that room. And I think he said it actually while he was doing the press conference with the Ukrainian President Zelenskyy. And there was a lot of positive outcomes from that meeting and a lot of strong positive statements there. So you're absolutely right, sometimes it's also the final atmospherics that tells the story. And if we analyze all these press conferences and all the statements of the leaders while departing from Ankara, it was a big win.
And we have managed to ensure the consensus on all strategic things we needed, you know. What is the threat, what is our unified response, our solidarity, Article 5, support to Ukraine, strong industrial cooperation, all these things featured very prominently. And on all of them, we managed to have a consensus. And I know that many of you know how difficult it is to get through a consensus, especially on important issues.
Petras, you're in.
Petras Auštrevičius
Thank you, Chair. Some questions from my side. In fact, in NATO is built not to support defense industries. I mean, NATO's mission is a bit different. But at Ankara was a heavy focus on defense industries.
You elaborated more intensively on this issue. But do you see any new instruments to be developed or in the pockets of NATO as organization to support or to cooperate with defense industries apart from just bringing them together, signing contracts and ensuring something for long term? Is anything in this side? Because I see a certain competition with EU. We are now, for good reason, much focused on defense industries and programs associated with.
And here probably would be my question, seeing this strive from EU side, anything more in cooperation between EU and NATO in joint efforts for enforcing and bringing up defense industries? And my probably second point from my side would be, was anything discussed how NATO might, NATO member states might learn more in a more, let's say, comprehensive way from the military experience of Ukraine?
It's urgent. I mean old doctrine NATO 1.0 or NATO 2.0 is outdated. I mean we have to see NATO 4.0 probably in this regard. Anything in this regard? I mean any promise or good programs in initiative?
Thank you.
Radmila Šekerinska
Thank you very much. First comment on defense industry, what's the role? I mean we started with discussions about defense investments. And then we heard the call of many allies saying yes, we are willing, we increased our budgets, but actually some of these capabilities will arrive in 10 years. This is not acceptable.
And this undermines our security. So this is why the focus on defense industry, which was there even last year, was I think very logical and justified. But on the issue of defense industry, this is definitely an area where we cooperate very well with the EU because we know the capacity, the instruments, the financial means that are available.
We have had signing ceremonies which look like, you know, a nice thing to have, but actually there was a lot of work behind them. They all started with what we used to what we called high visibility projects, which were areas in which we saw that we have deficiencies, weaknesses, delays, the enablers, the the critical capabilities we need. And it's these high visibility projects that helped allies get to a situation in which they're signing contracts. But we are continuing our work with defense industry. We have announced the so-called NATO front door, which is basically a good a single point of access for the procurement.
It can be a single point to access for innovation events. So this is in a way helping allies, but also helping industry to understand. And we also initiated a so-called NATO engine. It will help us scale up production. So it's practically a platform open to industry so that they can search for partners in which, you know, scaling up production might be quicker.
So they don't start from scratch, but they use industrial capacities which are already available but could be now used for defense industry. And and on your second question, I can go on with the industry, but yeah, we we will keep this for for our next meetings.
When it comes to Ukraine, this has been a focus of ours for quite some time since the moment we started supporting Ukraine. Last year, beginning of last year, one of the first things, one of my first jobs as a deputy secretary general was the privilege to open up a separate center in Poland, JTEC, that focuses entirely on lessons learned from Ukraine. So we have Ukrainian officials, Ukrainian officers, Ukrainian military experts who work with NATO experts on actually considering lessons learned, revising doctrines, taking into account what happens at the battlefield, but also what new technologies can offer even as we speak. We also work very much with Ukrainian colleagues on inviting them to our military exercises. So we have quite a number of exercises throughout the year, and in most cases, we do have a Ukrainian team that joins us.
As you might know, we have a separate command that works on transformation. So although we talk about NATO 3.0, alliance like this, a military alliance needs, a political military alliance needs constant transformations. And we have a separate command under the leadership of Admiral Vandier that focuses on these things. This is where, these are the where the lessons learned go. And they they actually are reflected very much into our planning, they're very much taken into account when we develop capabilities.
And in that respect, Ukraine is really proving to be the security provider.
Okay, Mr. Neuhoff.
Hans Neuhoff
Ich werde Deutsch sprechen. Vielen Dank, Frau Siekierka, für Ihren Vortrag. Sie haben die deutliche Steigerung der Rüstungsausgaben der europäischen NATO-Mitglieder geradezu mit Begeisterung herausgestellt und mit Zahlen unterlegt. Ich würde das gerne zum Anlass nehmen, noch mal einen genaueren Blick auf die Rolle der Europäer in diesem Zusammenhang zu werfen. Der Kollege Thionnet hat das ja schon angesprochen.
Seit Jahren redet man in der EU von strategischer Autonomie.
Gleichzeitig ist eben festzustellen, dass die Abhängigkeit im Rüstungs- und im Forschungsbereich von den USA nach wie vor besteht und auch nicht etwa gelockert wird, sondern sogar zunimmt. Die Financial Times hatte ja im vorigen Jahr dazu eine Fünfjahresanalyse vorgelegt. Von 2015 bis 2019 betrug der Anteil der Importe aus den USA an Rüstungsgütern am Gesamt, an den Gesamtausgaben der europäischen NATO-Staaten 52 %. Von 2020 bis 2024, also dem nächsten Fünfjahresfenster, hat sich das auf 64 % gesteigert. Wir reden also von strategischer Autonomie.
Der französische Präsident hat gerade gestern noch zum französischen Nationalfeiertag herausgestellt, wie wichtig das doch ist, dass die Europäer endlich selbstständig werden. Auch Kommissionspräsidentin von der Leyen sagt immer wieder, wir müssen uns von den USA emanzipieren. Tatsächlich geht aber die Entwicklung genau in die entgegengesetzte Richtung. Und bei diesen Rüstungskäufen handelt es sich nicht nur um sozusagen kurzfristige Gebrauchsgüter, sondern eben auch um strategische Systeme. Ich denke nur an den Kauf der F-35-Jäger durch die Bundeswehr, an die Beschaffung des Aegis-Systems jetzt für die deutschen Fregatten.
Das sind alles jahrelange, jahrzehntelange Abhängigkeiten, die sich daran knüpfen. Daher die konkrete Frage an Sie, das wäre meine erste Frage: Ist strategische Autonomie nicht eine totale Illusion? Und ist das, was hier ein de facto Widerspruch ist und was von uns gewissermaßen auch von Ihnen eben sozusagen als Widerspruchsfreiheit dann versucht wurde darzustellen, nicht eigentlich eine Form des Selbstbetrugs? Die zweite Frage dann ganz kurz ist in Istanbul, in Ankara auch angesprochen worden, dass eben die Ausgaben für die Rüstungsunterstützung der Ukraine seit dem Amtsantritt Trump ausschließlich von den Europäern übernommen worden sind. Das Kieler Institut für Weltwirtschaft hat das ja sehr eindrucksvoll belegt.
Die gesamten Ausgaben, die die USA bis 2024 aufgebracht hatten für die Ukraine, sind jetzt von den europäischen Staaten übernommen worden. Ist das ein Thema?
I might not have received all of the translation, maybe only on the last sentence, but I think I can guess the question. Let me be very clear.
Radmila Šekerinska
I will not comment on, you know, statements and contributions by different leaders or the decisions that the EU makes. But let me say that what was clear in Ankara, what is also clear at previous meetings with defense ministers and foreign ministers, is that we are all very much aware of the threats that are around us. We have mentioned Russia as the long-term threat to our European and Euro-Atlantic security. We have mentioned the threat of terrorism that remains to be something that we focus on. But the world has become much more unpredictable.
Look at the developments in the Middle East. Look at the behavior of certain countries like North Korea, also the military buildup of China. We need to really focus on strengthening the alliance. And what we have said is that within the alliance, we do need a more appropriate burden sharing. And for this, we need a burden shift.
So a stronger Europe within a stronger alliance was the approach that Ankara summit really confirmed as the appropriate recipe. Which means European allies and Canada stepping up. And they are doing it. And this means also European allies and Canada stepping up when it comes to supporting Ukraine.
And they have done it. And it is also visible when you look at some of our activities on the eastern flank. The majority minus one of all the forward land forces are led by a European general, by a European-led force. We have seen really this mindset shift. And this is something that becomes an investment in our own security.
So our focus has been on a stronger alliance. And this stronger alliance can happen because also the US was observing us and saying that for many decades we were not contributing enough to our shared security. So with the burden shifting, with the burden sharing, with the increased defense investment by European allies and Canada, we are creating a more mature transatlantic alliance, which will bring a better security for all of us on both sides of the Atlantic.
What the Secretary General was clear was of course we need the US for our security, but it is also Europe that supports the security of the US and Canada on the other side of the Atlantic. It's mutual, it's mutually beneficial, and it makes our our joint security concerns answered in the best possible way. This is how we see it.
So I know you have to go. We have three more questions. Please colleagues, one minute, and we start with Pekka.
Pekka Toveri
Thank you chair. Thank you Deputy Secretary General for your brief. Just now we've talked, we've been talking about strategic level, but let's go to operational level. Putin is not stupid. He knows that the alliance is getting stronger and stronger and his window of opportunity to operate against NATO is is closing.
And we've got already warnings from our different intelligence chiefs that Russia will try to do something and and attack what is our biggest vulnerability is the unity of the NATO with the Narva scenario kind of kind of operation and well very well knowing that Putin's greatest strength is that he decides things whereas we have North Atlantic Council which is a committee and which always takes time. So have there been discussions about creating this capability to operate immediately without waiting for the politicians to make the decisions which always take a long, long, long time. Thank you.
Radmila Šekerinska
Well, thank you very much. We have seen Russia using, as you said, moments of weakness, but we are showing clearly a moment of strength. And this is the only way we can continue to deter Russia. What became very clear was not only that we are investing in our capabilities, in our defense budgets, but also we have really empowered our Supreme Allied Commander on doing what is needed in order to protect every inch of allied territory. And Russia knows it.
And Putin knows it. Because actually if you, you will talk to him, our plans, I mean, we just made also the decisions on our integrated air and missile defense. We have revised our, we have a more proactive deterrence and defense.
And it means that if Putin tries to challenge us in that way, this is a defensive alliance, but if challenged, our response will be strong. And there is no doubt about this. Our decision-making process has been made in order to meet the moment. This is why we have done a lot of work in the course of especially last year on how our defense plans are activated. And SACEUR has really the authority to activate these plans so that he can protect really every inch of allied territory.
So, very much an issue on which no single ally had any doubts. But I take your point that Russia sees itself as weak and that this makes the situation sometimes a bit more complicated. This is why our strength has to be very visible and our posture is always very, very strong.
Costas Mavrides
Thank you, Chair. I don't know how much I can ask you, Madam, within one minute right here. That's why I would concentrate on one specific issue. Maybe it's going to be an easy question, it depends on you.
Do you know of any member of NATO which occupies part of an EU territory? Do you know of any member of NATO that occupies part of Syria? Do you know of any member of NATO that has a threat of war against another member of NATO? Do you know of any member of NATO which, based on our latest report here in the European Parliament, is not a democratic but more an authoritarian Islamic regime? I'm done.
To make it easy, the answer is the same to all those questions. And you know what I mean. And given that I might have three more seconds, I would say that a day is coming when those who feed Erdogan will regret it, but by that time we will pay as Europe a very heavy price.
Radmila Šekerinska
These were rhetorical but not really questions. And of course you will understand, we have 32 allies and this is an alliance of democracies where decisions are made with a consensus.
And we were able to protect the 32 allies now, previously even a smaller number, by providing citizens with the security that they need. And of course this is where I will finish.
Kostas Papadakis
Thank you, Chair. I will speak in Greek. Οι επικίνδυνες για τους λαούς Νατοϊκές αποφάσεις στην Άγκυρα σηματοδοτούν κλιμάκωση σε όλα τα μέτωπα του ιμπεριαλιστικού πολέμου από την Ουκρανία, τα στενά του Ορμούζ μαζί με τα αμερικανοϊσραηλινά εγκλήματα σε Παλαιστίνη και Λίβανο, καθώς και αναβάθμιση της πολεμικής βιομηχανίας. Ομολογείται στις αποφάσεις σας διάχυτη αστάθεια, ανταγωνισμοί και στο εσωτερικό του ΝΑΤΟ που εξελίσσονται σε μια κανονικότητα από ό,τι παρατηρούμε. Στο έδαφος αυτό το τουρκικό κράτος λαμβάνει εύσημα και ανταμείβεται με νέες πολύπλοκες εξοπλιστικές συμφωνίες, ενώ διατηρεί το casus belli σε βάρος της Ελλάδας στο Αιγαίο και επιχειρείται αυτό να ξεπεραστεί ως ένα ασχολίαστο διμερές ζήτημα σύμφωνα με τοποθέτηση του Γενικού Γραμματέα του ΝΑΤΟ.
Παράλληλα δημοσιεύονται νέα διχοτομικά σχέδια για την Κύπρο με μοχλό τη νατοποίηση του νησιού και τη συνεκμετάλλευση.
Δεν νομίζετε λοιπόν ότι οι αποφάσεις του ΝΑΤΟ ρίχνουν τους λαούς στη δίνη αβάσταχτων εξοπλισμών και στις φλόγες του πολέμου, ενώ το γεγονός ότι δεν αναγνωρίζει σύνορα ανάμεσα σε συμμάχους ανοίγει την όρεξη σε απαράδεκτες αξιώσεις, αμφισβητήσεις συνόρων καθώς και των συνθηκών που τα προβλέπουν;
Radmila Šekerinska
As you said, we will not and we have never commented on bilateral issues. But you have mentioned also the question of how the world has becoming is becoming a more dangerous place. And you know, we were confronted with an Iranian missile that was approaching allied our territory as an alliance. And we were able to protect against them. And I was just reminded by my colleague à propos the previous question that back in 2022 SACEUR was able to activate defense plans on the morning of the invasion.
So there are instruments. And now we have even more capabilities. And this stronger alliance provides for a stronger Euro-Atlantic. This is what we try to focus on.
And of course we don't have the ambition to solve all the problems, but our focus is really in times and a world that is more dangerous to really do our utmost to invest in our future security. And this is how we are approaching every single issue: more security, stronger Europe in a stronger NATO.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
Radmila, thank you very much. So we are many countries and the colleague from Cyprus and Greece have different views, it has historical reasons and reality. So thank you very much for your open words. I think it's really very, very important that we work together. We have different jobs to do, but I think it's really a good idea.
I mean, we are both in Brussels and we have to change a lot and so we could do what we have to do. And thank you very much for your open words and congratulations for this moment in Ankara. I think we need good news and I think the atmosphere you could even, as my colleague said, realize. And I think this is very important not only for us, also to show Russia that we are working together. Thank you very much for your time.
I hope you are still okay, always running, and I hope you'll come back.
Thank you very much. So colleagues, and we will continue. We just wait a few minutes, seconds. Okay, perfect, we could continue immediately. That's wonderful.
Hi, good to see you, welcome. So, please. Wonderful. So, dear colleagues, the next item on our agenda is an exchange of views with Mr. Rodrigo da Costa, Executive Director of the EU Agency for the Space Programme, on the challenges of space for EU security and defense.
So, please, could you sit down, please. Thank you very much. First of all, welcome to SEDE. Space is a key enabler for the EU defence readiness. The Commission's announcement on the space proposal as part of European defence projects of common interest underlines this.
The services delivered by the agency will play a crucial role in enhancing our joint space capabilities for security and defence. Therefore, I would be grateful if you could share your views on how the agency can help with the challenges of space for the EU security and defence. You have the floor for 10 minutes and then we will continue with questions.
Rodrigo da Costa
Thank you very much, Madam Chair. It is a pleasure to be with you this afternoon here in the SEDE Committee and to discuss with you and exchange on the space, on the role of space for the security and defense of the European Union, and in particular how our agency, the EU Agency for the Space Programme, is already playing a role on that and how that role could evolve in the future. Maybe before entering into the details, let me just give you a quick highlight on what are the key activities of the European Union in space today. And they are across a number of areas, of course all of them with a different history and a different length, but they all come together to form what today is the EU Space Programme. And that includes, of course, satellite navigation, where we have, for example, our global satellite navigation system Galileo, today providing services to more than 4.5 billion users.
We have in the dimension of Earth observation Copernicus, the world number one provider of space data and information on our Earth.
We have secure communication capabilities, starting with the already operative GOVSATCOM that is providing secure satellite governmental capabilities to EU Member States and in parallel developing the new secure connectivity constellation IRIS². Also here I highlight activities on space situational awareness, which are becoming more and more important, more and more critical to understand what is happening and what is going on in space, because space is not only a very important resource, it is also a place from which we provide critical services and capabilities to our society, to our economy and to our security. Our agency is certainly very proud to contribute to all these efforts, and our mission is focused in three main dimensions. First, of course, we are an operator of space assets, we exploit space assets. Today we are operating Galileo and EGNOS successfully, 24/7, providing services to our citizens in very different domains where positioning, navigation and timing is crucial.
We are also, and this since more recently, developing and operating the GOVSATCOM hub, providing secure satellite communication capabilities to EU Member States. Initial services have started in, operations have started in January this year, initial services have started in June and we have seen a high uptake of Member States, several Member States are already today using this pooling and sharing possibility that the Union is offering.
It started back in February with utilization by Cyprus, who was our first user, but then certainly other member states are interested and are using GOVSATCOM capabilities. Last but not least, of course, in addition to working on the preparation of our secure communication, the Union secure communication constellation, we are also operating the front desk for space surveillance and tracking. Certainly the dimension of security is very important. We look at security of space, but we also look at space for security. I will park this for a moment here because I would like to go a little bit deeper since I think these are the areas where this committee may be most interested, the work that we are doing on both these dimensions.
The last dimension of our work is related to utilization.
Utilization means bringing space to the people, means bringing space to the businesses, bringing space to our governmental users, either of civil or military nature, because space only creates real value, or the real value of space is created when its data, when its signals are used and are used for very different purposes. Here just a quick highlight, because it was mentioned, it was mentioned before, for us in particular the work with entrepreneurs, the work with startups, SMEs from all across the European Union plays a fundamental role. I will spend the last part of my introductory talk indeed focusing on the security dimension. And I would, as I mentioned before, I would like to address to you two main aspects of how security plays a role in space. First is how do we secure space.
I think probably the first question is why do we need to secure space? Why do we need to secure our assets? Well, by many different reasons, certainly first and foremost because the assets that we have in space, in navigation, in earth observation, soon in secure communications, they provide services that are critical, services that are valuable, and therefore when we have something that we need, we certainly need to protect it, we need to secure it. But also because we see as time is evolving that space is becoming more and more a contested environment, and therefore this element of protection plays a fundamental role. Few highlights on some of the dimensions that we do that.
First, of course, we do security operations in our agency.
What does that mean? Well, that means that we are the security monitoring structure for several elements of the EU space program. For our satellite navigation programs, so with Galileo and EGNOS, also now for GOVSATCOM and IRIS². And certainly we are ready to expand to more of those. Being the secure monitoring structure means being able and capable of observing the security of those systems.
And this is what we are already doing today, and today, by the way, since more than 10 years for Galileo, where we have been operating 24/7 our security monitoring capabilities of Galileo. Now, practically, what does this mean? Certainly, this means physical security. Physical security in particular of our ground systems, of our antennas, of our different installations. It also means cybersecurity.
Cybersecuring systems that are, in addition of being space systems, they are equally very complex IT systems that need to be secured, that need to be protected.
And certainly an area where we are using with looking with more and more interest is the protection of the associated radio frequencies, radio frequency spectrum, because radio frequencies are important for space among other things. Certainly we have a well-established chain of command where through a Council Decision 2021/698, we are responsible for execute Council security instructions towards the space program. This is in certain events and in certain circumstances the High Representative can issue instructions to us to implement on the space systems. And certainly this is something that not only we are ready to do, but also that we demonstrate and test with the necessary frequency. We are connected to all EU Member States through secret networks to share data.
We are also providing expertise and capacity to Member States knowledge on how to use space systems, space data for security use. And last but not least, as I mentioned, radio frequency interference is a topic of growing attention.
And therefore, we have developed a prototype monitoring capability demonstration for radio frequency interference that today we are operating in a demonstration mode. In addition to that, we are also doing space surveillance and tracking, meaning that together with the EU partnership of member states, the so-called EU SST, where in our role as agency, we are providing front desk services for collision avoidance services, so avoiding collisions in space, re-entry risks, if old pieces of satellites re-enter our atmosphere and that may pose a risk to populations, but also services in the area of fragmentation analysis, if a satellite explodes, what are the fragments and what type of risks those fragments may put to other satellites. The second part and my last two minutes are to focus for a moment on what already today EU space is doing for security. And when I talk about security, I would like to highlight very clearly that we are talking certainly for civil but also for military security.
So certainly some of these capabilities, the capabilities I will exemplify next, they are both valid in the area of the civil use but also in the defense use. And I start probably by what is the best known of those, which is our Galileo Public Regulated Service, definitely the Galileo signal that is for member states and authorized users by member states where we are the access provider. What does that mean being the access provider? We are the institution that is providing to the competent authorities of the member states the ability of using the signal, so receiving the right elements if you want, the right keys in order to decrypt this highly secure, highly resilient but also encrypted signal that has been built with the requirements necessary to serve governmental applications and in particular in the domain of security and certainly in the domain of military security. We have tests going on.
We are planning to soon enter into the initial operational capability and then certainly see this capability being used across the European Union by EU member states. The second service that goes also in a similar direction where we are providing access is GOVSATCOM, I've mentioned. GOVSATCOM is operational since the beginning of the year. It is available to the EU27.
It functions on the basis of a pooling and sharing mechanism. A group of EU member states has satellite communication capabilities that has decided to make available to the EU-27 spare capacity. And what we are doing is of course linking this availability or these available resources to the needs of the different member states. And this we do through a facility that we operate, the so-called GOVSATCOM hub. So also here our agency is the access provider for GOVSATCOM services.
Also this one is being operated, is being used and as we can see so far on the first six months of operations, I can consider it already being a success with a use that largely, largely surpasses the expectations that we had. Certainly GOVSATCOM will continue to evolve. We are looking forward to connect SATCOM to more resources, to more providers, but ultimately we want to connect GOVSATCOM to IRIS², the secure communications constellation of the European Union. I think I'm right on my time, so I would stop here. Thank you.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
Thank you very much, on time. I will now give the floor for members of the first round of questions, starting with the coordinators in a ping-pong, so you could answer immediately. And I will give two minutes for question and however your reply is, quick and nice, not dirty. And so, Wouter, the floor is yours, or Pekka. Sorry.
It's okay.
Pekka Toveri
Thank you, thank you Chair, thank you for your briefing again, as you emphasized the importance of space, space to our security, and I really don't have any disagreement on that, on the contrary. But then again, others know it too, the challengers know it too, and we know that Russia has been creating long-term anti-satellite capabilities, and lately it has changed some of these satellites to a threatening posture close to European Union member state satellites.
So, what are your actions to have a more detailed and better situational awareness of what's happening in space? And on the other hand, are you looking, how are you looking and how to secure our own satellite constellation and make it more resilient so if we start to lose part of it, that we can still continue operating and sending replacement where I understand that the payload capacity is one big challenge we have. Thank you.
Rodrigo da Costa
Thank you very much for the question, and it is certainly a complex question. I'll try to address some of the points. And maybe I start by the end of what are we doing and how are we making our systems more secure and more resilient. Because in the end, security space systems, if I take the example of Galileo, a highly complex system, many satellites, many ground infrastructures, but as it is always the case, the system is only as secure as its weakest link. And therefore our approach to security has to be holistic.
We have to look at the physical security, not only the physical security of the satellite, so looking what is going on around the satellite, which by the way we do through our space surveillance and tracking angle, but also what is happening on the ground. We have in Galileo, for example, we have control centers, two control centers in Europe, two other security monitoring centers, we have antennas all across the world, and this is something that we need to be continuously monitoring and continuously protecting. And here we may be starting from very simple protection measures such as fences and guards to more complex ones, such as a continuous triggering and monitoring of any alarm situation. Then we are certainly more and more looking at the cybersecurity of the systems, because these systems are interconnected and the cybersecurity of our systems is of utmost importance. Through our security operation center, the one we are operating 24/7 since more than 10 years, we are monitoring real time the security of the system, so preventing and reacting to any potential intrusion, but also updating the systems continuously in very close coordination also with other cybersecurity actors not only from the space sector, and certainly this is also this is also an element.
Then when it comes to space overall and what we see going on in space, and I think you are absolutely right, space is becoming is a challenging environment.
It's a challenging environment by many reasons. First of all, there are plenty of satellites. So the risk of collision and the risk of an accident in space is not something small. We tend to think space is certainly infinite, but the space that we use is actually quite finite, is actually quite limited. And we need to protect that space against collisions, unintentional, but also against potential intentional collisions.
And we have seen, we have seen other countries demonstrating those type of capabilities. You've mentioned one, there is another one, but this is something where we need to be extremely aware. Certainly through the surveillance of what is being happening in space, this is a fundamental element. And here the partnership of EU member states that is working on SST and that is operating telescopes, radars, etc. to monitor what is happening in space is extremely important. But then this information also needs to be passed to the right actors in the member states, in the Council, in the External Action Service in order to do, if you want, their intelligence analysis that comes on top.
But certainly it's a point that is where in the community there is a very, very high awareness and that is being monitored very, very carefully. And I don't want to be too long on my answer, but I hope I touched on your main points.
Sven Mikser
Yes, thank you very much. My question is actually going in very much the same direction.
One can periodically read from public media reports about alleged Russian anti-space and anti-missile, sorry, anti-satellite systems being developed. But these are mostly sort of circumstantial and speculative stories with little hard evidence. What is your assessment, how active are these programs and how advanced they are? And many of these reports actually allege that the Russians are developing certain systems specifically to target US systems such as Starlink. But obviously, I mean, what can be used against US systems can with slight modifications possibly be used against our systems.
We are also competitors with the US when it comes to certain space technologies. But how closely are we coordinating or sharing information when it comes to ensuring the physical safety and security of our systems? Is there a sort of sufficient intelligence sharing, but also sharing of whatever defensive measures can be used to make sure that our systems are able to keep on going under duress in critical situations?
Rodrigo da Costa
Thank you very much for the question. So when it comes to anti-satellite capabilities and beyond any news or eventual capabilities, as was mentioned before, there has been demonstration. So here it's beyond any type of speculation, there has been demonstration of anti-satellite capabilities with the destruction of a satellite from the ground. So this capability exists, others may be under development, they may become more complex, they may become more elaborate and more efficient, but today we are not talking about eventual capabilities, we are talking about real capabilities. And I think this is very important.
And it's not only, by the way, in order to disrupt a space system, it is not only about disrupting the satellites. It is a way of doing it, but we are seeing it as well, for example, through very high radio frequency interference all across the eastern border of the EU and in particular on the navigation signals that is affecting Galileo, is equally affecting GPS. And for example, it is creating on civil aviation, there are frequent news on civil aviation of how civil aviation is being impacted by this type of interference. Now, concretely what are we doing?
I will tell you an example what are we doing concretely on a certain type of of satellite navigation interference. We have developed at an accelerated pace and very recently a new signal from Galileo that is it is against spoofing. Spoofing is that mechanism that tricks the user and makes the user think that he or she is in another place than the place where the user really is. So this signal exists, it functions a little bit like a watermark in a euro coin or in a euro paper bill. It functions the same way in a satellite signal, but it assures the user that that signal that the user is receiving is a Galileo one and it has not been faked.
It's proving very helpful. We are right now it's being deployed in trucks all across Europe, for example, but we have done a very good and very interesting demonstration with our colleagues from Frontex last year together with the Romanian border patrol on a boat convoy between the port of Constanta in the Black Sea all the way to Italy, where we have been monitoring the environment and how a receiver equipped with this new signal works vis-à-vis a traditional one.
And this has demonstrated excellent results, such that we are in dialogue with our colleagues of Frontex to have this further deployed and further used. The other element which I think is very important is the EU space program is built on the principle of autonomy, the strategic autonomy of the program. So these systems I am mentioning, they are systems that are autonomous, but certainly autonomy means being independent when we need to be independent. It also means to collaborate. And certainly there is a higher level political frame of a space dialogue between the European Union and the United States.
This is held at the level of the Commission, but as an agency working very closely with the Commission, we are part of the working groups in interaction with our technical counterparts on the other side. And there I can tell you, for example, that there is a fluid technical dialogue on the things that matter to both of us between my team that is working on Galileo and the US Space Force team that is working on GPS. And the reason is exactly what you mentioned. There are times where actually the threats and the risks are similar for one and the other, and therefore this dialogue is important. It's certainly a dialogue that always protects the independence of our systems, it protects what has to be protected, but also done in a spirit of collaboration.
Thank you very much, Pierromain.
Pierre-Romain Thionnet
Merci monsieur le directeur. Je poserai une question en français qui ne portera pas sur les enjeux opérationnels plus opérationnels que les collègues précédents ont évoqué. Mais j'aimerais avoir quelques informations. Le 7 avril dernier, la Commission a adopté un projet de règlement pour modifier l'encadrement juridique en passant du programme spatial pardon excusez-moi de l'Agence européenne pour le programme spatial à l'Agence des services spatiaux de l'Union européenne. Et il a été dit dans un certain nombre de commentaires que la Commission européenne aurait plus de un rôle plus important au sein de cette agence, notamment dans le conseil d'administration.
Est-ce que vous pouvez nous détailler un petit peu au point de vue de la subsidiarité quel sera le rôle de la Commission ? Est-ce que ce nouveau règlement donne un poids plus important à la Commission par rapport aux États membres ? Voilà, comment vont se répartir un petit peu les compétences et voilà, est-ce qu'il y a une plus grande ambition en termes de compétences de la Commission et comment ça se traduirait dans un nouveau règlement ? Merci.
Rodrigo da Costa
Thank you very much for the question. Indeed, earlier this year in April, the Commission has published their proposal for the so-called EUSPA regulation, the regulation for the EU Agency for the Space Programme, eventually if approved renamed to EU Space Services Agency. And we have seen that, and we have seen, we have read, we have analyzed that regulation with utmost attention. Certainly, the legislative process is ongoing. It is under discussion in the European Council, also in this house.
The nominated rapporteur, shadow rapporteurs are doing their work in preparing positions of both the Council and the Parliament for the trilogues that will come later. I can make a few observations from our side. Certainly, and I will make three, if I may. The first observation that I will make is that from an agency perspective, we are very thankful and appreciate that the Commission is proposing a dedicated regulation for the agency. If this is approved in this form, this will give us stability, it will give us the long-term perspective, and not anymore as in the current financial framework where we are an agency associated to the space programme itself.
So to have a long-term regulation for us is of utmost importance.
The second element is the regulation highlights, the proposal of the regulation highlights a number of elements that are related to an increased operational dimension of the agency. And this is for us equally very important because as I was mentioning in some of the services and applications I was presenting before, these are services and applications that will have to be used in situations of crisis. And therefore all the elements and observations that are related to business continuity, to reaction to crisis situations, it's for us something that is of utmost importance. The third element I would focus is indeed the proposal for regulation includes proposals for tasks of the agency. We see a lot of continuity.
Continuity is good in this domain. Space needs continuity. So certainly continuity in the governance, continuity in the activities of the agency for those activities that exist today. But it also shows ambition, ambition for more tasks. And this is reflected of course in the European Competitiveness Fund for new activities of the Union in space.
And there we appreciate the element of the continuity of the competences of the agency. Certainly the tasks are new, but the agency wants to apply the competences that it has developed on Galileo, EGNOS, GOVSATCOM, SST to other dimensions of the program.
And I think the proposal in that sense goes in that in the right direction. Then certainly about the mechanics and the functioning of the bodies of the agency, the administrative board or other boards of the agency, it is not for an executive director to comment. Also because again, the legislative process is at its earlier stages and certainly most likely the regulation we will see in the end, it will be an evolution from the initial proposal of the Commission.
Alexandr Vondra
Yes, thanks. I'm the Czech MEP. And when I was a minister in the Czech government, you know, 2006, 2012, I have developed a significant effort to convince the European partners to have the headquarters of this in Prague. We succeeded. Since then the agency has changed the name, as it extended the scope, size of its work substantially and is more important than ever before in the current circumstances.
So, there is this process of finding a new building in Prague because the current one is not good anymore. And my question to you, because you know, the original plan has somehow failed with the new building, so there is now a dialogue with the Czech government on the solution of that. And can you provide me with some kind of a assessment, you know, where is there any light on the horizon to find a solution or where we are?
Rodrigo da Costa
Thank you very much for the question. Dobrý den, thank you. So, you highlight an important point because the agency, as many other agencies, the agency was based in Brussels long ago. And when there was with the Treaty of Lisbon and the decentralization, we were one of the many agencies that delocalized and we delocalized to Prague, the Czech Republic.
And in our regulation, indeed, the seat of our agency is in the Czech Republic, the current one, and by the way, also for the future proposed regulation, that is the case. And we operate our headquarters from the Czech Republic. We also have centers in other areas. I've shown in my image our security centers, one is in France, the other one in Spain. We operate one center as well in the Netherlands, yet another center in Spain.
So the agency is headquartered in Prague but has operations in different areas. Now, when it comes to Prague and to our building, indeed the agency grew, grew in terms of staff, but also grew in terms of activities that require security-related measures. And in particular, handling of highly classified information on the space program and associated data requires infrastructure, and requires today already infrastructure that was not the case five years ago, and even less 14 years ago when we moved to the building where we are today. And therefore, back in 2021, we initiated a dialogue with the Czech government, where we explained our requirements and how these requirements were evolving and were planning to evolve in the current financial perspective. And indeed, the Czech government is looking for an alternative.
Now, on the internal process, of course, of the Czech government, there is not much I can say.
As part of the hosting agreement we have with the Czech Republic it is the responsibility of the Czech authorities to provide us with the building. We are looking forward. We continue a dialogue. We are now in a phase where we are not anymore at top level requirements but we are discussing concrete requirements in terms of size of rooms and desks for people in the secured areas in the normal working areas etc. etc. And then I do hope that very soon the Czech government will be able of announcing formally what will be the solution for our future establishment.
The next will be Ville.
Villy Søvndal
Thank you very much for your presentation. I was in Kyiv in March last year just after the Americans had pulled both the economic support, the military support but also the intelligence, the Starlink system. I think that enforced the discussion in Europe what do we do if that happens again.
It happened to my knowledge without anyone being informed about their decision, neither in Europe nor in Ukraine. So there was a discussion at that time, can we replace the capacities that Starlink had on European level? Both not only a European system, but also a European system that matches in rapidness, that matches in the capability to move great number of data. So my question is, are we at a point now where we could, I do not say we should, but just to know, where would there be a possibility to replace the capacities at the same level that the Americans had? Thank you.
Rodrigo da Costa
Thank you very much. So when it comes to the telecommunication capability, and of course Starlink is about that, is about connectivity. From, well, from earlier than that, but from 2022 it became very clear that secure communication capability is crucial in such an environment. And by the way, at that time, first the European Commission, but then also the Parliament and the Council were very fast in, I would say almost record time, in approving the secure connectivity regulation that created the basis for the work that is going on today as we speak on the creation of IRIS², the EU secure connectivity constellation.
And this work is ongoing. Now, certainly it is not something that can be done in one year or two years, and therefore the process is in development and IRIS² is in development. We expect and we hope to have it in operations the sooner the better because it is important and it is key and crucial. But it is also important to say that we didn't stay not doing anything else. And this was very important because whereas developing a new capability takes time, at the same time at EUSPA and together with our colleagues of the Commission, we looked, okay, but what can we do with what we have now?
And this is how GOVSATCOM came to play. Certainly, and it came to play by looking at capabilities that exist in individual member states and asking those member states, are you willing to make those capability available to others, to the EU-27? And certainly some of those have responded positively, and this is how we created GOVSATCOM. And it is operational since the beginning of the year in a record time.
We are talking about a relatively complex system which within a couple of years is now already providing services. And today the mandate that exists is providing services to EU member states. Everything that goes beyond that, that is of course a political question to the European Commission. From our side, we are, I would say, extremely proud that we were able of developing this system so fast, and if you want to a certain extent also bridging a time awaiting for IRIS², the secure connectivity constellation that will provide capacities at least, if not better than other private constellations. We have a bridging solution at this moment.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
Mr. Neuhoff. Okay. Are there more questions? No. Thank you very much for coming.
And I think it's a good idea always to answer immediately, so then everything should be clear. And Mr. Da Costa, thank you very much. I mean, you are in SEDE, it's the Security and Defence Committee, and we are responsible for common procurement and the space. So looking forward that you come again and explain everything for us.
It's very helpful for our work and thank you very much for your job. So colleagues, before we continue, we have just a short break and then we will continue with the European defense project of common interest with Tomas Husak, Director for Defense Policy at DG DEFIS.
So colleagues. I think we could continue because our guest is already here. And the next point of the agenda is an exchange of views on the role that European defense projects of common interests can play in the strengthening the military capabilities of member states. For this item I welcome Toma Husak, director for defense policy at DG DEFIS. On the 3rd July the Commission proposed five European defense projects of common interest to help EU member states strengthen their defense capabilities by developing key military systems together.
The five projects focus on priority areas including drones and counter-drone systems, maritime and seabed defense, space, air and missile defense, and strengthening security along the EU's eastern flank through the Eastern Flank Watch. They come in response to a call to member states to submit proposals for possible projects under the EDIP program. Mr. Husak, I will therefore invite you to explain in greater detail how this proposal will translate into urgently strengthening European defense industry and delivering joint capabilities for member states. You have the floor for 10 minutes and then we have the colleagues will ask you and then you could immediately answer the questions. The floor is yours.
Tomas Husak
Thank you very much, Madam Chair, honorable members of the European Parliament, ladies and gentlemen. It's an enormous pleasure for me to be here today with you and thank you for inviting the European Commission for this session of SEDE committee. It's a pleasure for me to brief you about the Commission proposal for a Council implementing decision on the identification of the European defense projects of common interest. As you are aware, on the 3rd of July, the Commission has tabled its proposal identifying five EDPCIs, delivering on the commitment made under the EU Defense Readiness Roadmap 2030 and to meet the ambition of the European Council.
EDPCIs are a tool introduced by the European Defense Industry Program regulation that will continue as part of the upcoming European Competitiveness Fund regulation. EDPCIs are very ambitious collaborative industrial projects aimed to benefit a broader part of the EU, open also to Ukraine and Norway, and fully in line with the EU and NATO capability priorities. Regarding the, I don't know, can I move the agenda? Yeah. So, regarding the agenda, I would like to focus on five points.
First, recall what the EDPCIs are about. Second, to give you some context of how the Commission came to the preparation of the proposal process-wise together with Member States. Thirdly, to give you some insights on the nature of the Commission's proposal and the related projects proposed therein, without prejudice, of course, to the deliberations of the Council. Fourthly, I will explain how the Commission foresees to finance them at this stage.
And finally, we'll brief you about next steps in the adoption of the process. So, IPCEIs, as you know, consist of pan-European collaborative industrial projects aimed at... There's a technical problem. Sorry. Okay.
So, IPCEIs consist of pan-European collaborative industrial projects aimed at reinforcing the competitiveness of the European defense technological industrial base, while contributing to the development of Member States' military capabilities. It is important to note from the outset that IPCEIs are a tool for and driven by Member States.
In that respect, the EDPCIs follow a top-down approach to boost results-oriented cooperation, complementing the bottom-up logic of other industrial defense programs and tools like research and defense actions under EDF, industrial ramp-up actions under ASAP and EDIP, or support to common procurement under EDIRPA and EDIP. EDPCIs will serve as a backbone to structural large-scale defense cooperation under in the medium and long term. And the implementation of the EDPCIs is articulated into two distinct phases: an identification phase followed by a funding phase, as you can see this on the slide. The identification phase is pretty much advanced following the Commission proposal I mentioned in my introduction and will be formalized through a Council implementing decision expected by end of this summer. Once EDPCIs will be established by the Council, not only will they be given high political visibility, but they will also get access to streamlined EU financial support in the current MFF thanks to EDIP and the future MFF, namely under the ECF.
Two possibly cumulative types of EDIP financing will support EDPCIs and be directed to the participating Member States: the so-called big tickets to kickstart the deployment of the EDPCIs in terms of common procurement of defense products, adjustment to structural changes of the production capacity of defense products, industrial development of new defense products or upgrading of the existing ones, and development and procurement of necessary infrastructure. The small tickets will be there to support preliminary activities in view of the further deployment of EDPCIs under the next MFF.
As you can see as well on the slides, such funding of EDPCIs will be enabled thanks to the budget of 325 million euros earmarked under the EDIP work program. I will deliver more in the next slides. So, the timeline. So, how did we did that did we get to the Commission proposal? The process leading to the Commission proposal was that on the 16th of February, the Commission launched this in the context of EDIP program committee with a call for expression of interest to set up EDPCIs.
A preliminary submission deadline was set to the 16th of March allowing Commission to gather first proposals of forming projects for possible EDPCIs. Seven preliminary proposals were received. From March to May, several EDIP program committee meetings and one technical workshop with Commission, EEAS, military staff, and EDA were held to support Member States' efforts to finalizing the proposals. On the 29th of May, Member States submitted nine project proposals for possible EDPCIs. Throughout early June, the Commission verified the compliance of the project proposals against the EDIP regulation criteria.
This led the Commission to finalize the proposal and on the 3rd of July, the College adopted the proposal for a Council implementing decision identifying five EDPCIs and it was transmitted to Council on the same day.
Since then, a first presentation was held with the Council Defense Working Party, which brings us today to the SEDE Committee meeting. The outcome of Commission proposal assessment and proposed approach. So the final outcome of the assessment led the Commission to consider that five projects met the eight criteria that are established through the EDIP regulation Article 35.2 and to propose to the Council those five projects to be established as EDPCIs. First is Drone and Counter-Drone European Resolve, the so-called DECODER, the Integrated Maritime and Seabed Defense, IMSD, Space, EU Federated Integrated Air Missile Defense including early warning, EU FIAMD, and the Eastern Flank Watch. We think that by selecting these five projects, we strike a right balance between setting a real ambition, since these projects displayed the highest standards on each of the eight criteria, and maximizing the impact by focusing the limited available resources on a reasonable number of projects.
I think what is important to go through different the five important projects. The first one is the CODER. In a critically important domain this EDPCI enables coordinated development scaling and deployment of European unmanned drone and counter-drone systems operating across all domains. The CODER addresses technical complexity will coordinate diverse operation and industrial activities and help delivering a long-term strategic ambition. It will also support joint procurement of necessary unmanned systems and counter-unmanned systems capabilities expand relevant industrial production capacity and establish a European network of drone technology hubs to facilitate testing accelerate innovation and rapid force modernization.
As you see, it involves 26 member states plus Norway plus Ukraine. The next is the EU Federated Integrated Air and Missile Defence, including early warning. We need to strengthen Europe's protection against all types of aerial threats, and this E-IAMD will contribute to the creation of a federated system of systems that will provide critical military capabilities, namely collective and integrated air missile defence to the member states and the required quality and quantity to ensure that diverse national solutions can effectively be combined and jointly employed, including sensors, effectors, command and control environments. It strengthens EU resilience through enhanced air and missile defence, improved protection of critical infrastructure, increased operational coordination of armed forces, and the reinforcement of industrial capacities in critical sectors related to air and missile defence. So you see here 14 member states plus Norway plus Ukraine.
The next one is related to Integrated Maritime and Seabed Defence. In the maritime domain, where readiness is essential, this IMSD project will enhance common maritime domain awareness by creating an interoperable and integrated EU information-sharing infrastructure and supports the coordinated industrial development, scaling up, and common procurement of naval platforms, underwater systems, unmanned systems, ISR tools, and underwater warfare capabilities. It will improve cross-border cooperation, reduce fragmentation within the European maritime defence market, and generate positive spillover effects over the civilian sector. It involves 15 member states plus Norway and Ukraine. The fourth one is space.
Here we have as well 15 member states plus Norway, while member states and Ukraine have been informed recently that the promoters of the project of the willingness to join. Here we understand that space is a critical enabler for defense readiness, and space aims to transform as well mature R&D into European operational capabilities and to reduce structural dependencies in the field of space. This EDPCI proposes full complementarity with the EU space program, bolstering your space capabilities in space-based early warning, satellite communication, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, space domain awareness, positioning, navigation and timing, responsive space systems and the development of multi-mission constellation. Finally, we have the Eastern Flank Watch. Here what is crucial again, 13 member states plus Norway and Ukraine.
Our ability to guard and defense the eastern flank of Europe is a condition for EU readiness. This EDPCI addresses in a coordinated way critical capability areas around six different areas.
The first one is ground combat. The second one is integrated military command, communication, intelligence and surveillance system, so the so-called C4ISTAR. Air and missile defense, drones, counter-drones, as well as military mobility. And this project foresees the common procurement of products, services and infrastructure in support of such capabilities, as well as the expansion of relevant production capacity and facilities. Testing, validation and training for relevant operational platforms in support of the Eastern Flank Watch initiative is also expected.
The proposal is structured as a multi-domain capability development initiative, and while it is geographically focused only on the EU eastern border, it benefits all member states against concrete security threats and is open to extend its geographic area of interest. One word about financing. I think it's very important. As previously mentioned, the EDIP work program already earmarks 325 million euros for EDPCIs. So five EDPCIs will receive 60 million euros each, so-called big tickets as I mentioned, to immediately kick-start their deployment, while in parallel will be given a complementary 2.3 million euros each to support member states' work in defining the roadmap for further deployment during the next MFF.
The four projects that were not retained as EDPCIs will receive 3.37 million euros each to support their further maturation towards possible future EDPCIs in 2027.
Finally, what are the next steps? We continue the discussions with within the Council. We hope that we will conclude those discussions and the adoption by the Council will take take place by the end of by the end of the summer. We hope as well that the Council that in we in parallel as well we are preparing the amendment of the EDIP work program on all EDPCI-related aspects, notably in terms of budget allocation and while being fully aware that this will ultimately depend on the content of the final Council act. I take this occasion to inform you that relevant press material and resources including access to the Commission proposal can be found at the following links as well that we can provide, but of course I stand ready to take any questions and of course if there is any additional document which is necessary to share, the Commission is ready for the discussion.
Thank you very much. And I will give the floor to the member for first round of questions. I will give you two minutes and then you have the possibility to answer. And we start with Christophe Gomart.
Christophe Gomart
Thank you, Chair. First of all, let me congratulate the DG DEFIS for launching the European Defense Projects of Common Interest. This is an important initiative to strengthen European defense cooperation, improve industrial integration and enhance our collective security. I would like to ask four questions. First one, what criteria will the Commission use to designate a project as a European Defense Project of Common Interest?
And how will you ensure that this designation does not primarily benefit large-scale programs led by only a few member states? Second question, how does DG DEFIS intend to ensure that small and medium-sized enterprise, SMEs, and mid-size companies can genuinely participate in EDPCIs, rather than leaving these projects largely in the hands of major prime contractors?
Third, today the European Union has several defense cooperation instruments such as the European Defense Fund, PESCO, SAFE, and the EDPCIs. In your view, sorry, what remains the biggest obstacle to building a truly integrated European defense technological and industrial base? Is it primarily a question of funding, governance, or political will? And fourth question: how will the Commission ensure that the EDPCI framework delivers faster capability development without adding unnecessary administrative complexity? Thank you.
Tomas Husak
Yes, thank you very much, Mr. Gobat, for the four very pertinent questions.
For the first question regarding the criteria, we took the criteria as it is described in Article 35.2 of the EDIP regulation. Basically, by observing what is the capacity for cross-border cooperation, what are the positive spillovers for the internal market, how we can significantly as well contribute to the market integration, how we can contribute to interoperability and interchangeability of defense products, and how as well to reduce strategic dependencies. There were some additional as well elements that were taken from Article 45.2. At the end, we had eight different criteria that helped us to decide that the five big projects that mentioned here are today giving the biggest opportunity to bring a pan-European perspective for projects that cannot be delivered by any Member States alone. So that was as well for us the most important because issue, because what is the main objective as well behind the EDPCIs is to bring this strategic perspective to all those bottom-up approaches today that we have developed through EDF, through EDIRPA, through ASAP, and to connect the dots as well between Member States and the industry for projects that started to be financed through the bottom-up.
So EDPCIS is coming from the top-down in order to give this strategic perspective and to bring meaningful projects that will engage the majority of Member States in that regard. SMEs as well are part of this equation because as well this is in the criteria that we have as well looked, it was important for us to make sure that innovation coming from SMEs is a part of them. So during the whole process of establishment of the EDPCIS, would it be as well between the Member States, but as well on the industrial cooperation, the Commission as well will continue to make this point with the Member States to make sure that an active engagement of SMEs is here ensured. But we believe that the way how we have constructed the system, and most probably one of the crucial elements of the system will be as well to bring the structure for European armaments programs as the core element of how the EDPCIS will be developed. Here we have as well through EDIP as well a very strong incentive for SMEs to be part of the projects.
Question number three, what are the biggest obstacles to make sure that we have a European defense and technological industrial base? We had recently several files on our plates, Defense Omnibus just recently. I think that it's a little bit a combination of different elements. I think that following the war in Ukraine, we have the political will today to go forward. And if you observe the processes from the EDF 2016-17, the first areas where the Commission started to present initiatives in that regard towards today, the process has been significantly advanced and the role of the Commission and the Parliament in that area was I think extremely meaningful.
So we see that this political will of course has considerably changed. And we are moving forward and I think figures are self-telling. But of course national interest and especially national competences in defense are there and it's up to the member states to decide about what kind of capabilities they need, what kind of capabilities as well entering into their national doctrines.
So it's where the Commission cannot, let's say, say anything else than to express support to what member states are delivering. Where the Commission can, of course, potentially bring more attention is for common procurement, common collaboration. This is where I think we can move forward with defense projects in Europe and to make sure as well that all the investments, all the supportive measures are properly addressed and absorbed by EU defense industry in order to ensure the right effect of scale and the capacity for the European industry to ramp up. That's the focus as well of our actions. Your question number four, how to make sure that all the processes are taking into account all the countries and not only the biggest ones with the biggest industries.
I think that the first mapping of the EDPCIs is showing a quite wide geographical area. So and here we are very positive today, maybe not surprised, we are very positive in that regard that member states from different parts for different projects have addressed such a will to participate.
And I think it's not over because many member states are still reflecting how potentially they could reinforce some EDPCIs. So it may happen and this is the rule of the EDPCIs is that they can join at any time if they feel that they can be a part of the process and they will be the most welcome. And let's not as well forget that we have some additional four EDPCIs that are not mature enough and that potentially with the next round of EDPCIs next year where the Commission will as well finance this part of their maturity, it may appear that there will be some new capacities for member states to be integrated.
Sven Mikser
Yes, thank you, thank you very much for the presentation. Many of the instruments and initiatives that we've launched actually serve multiple purposes or goals that are not contradictory but still somewhat separate, at least in bit meeting the capability needs of the member states and of the Union or incentivizing joint procurement or then boosting our European defense industrial capacity and competitiveness.
Initially there will be EDIP money used for launching these initiatives and and there will be obviously member states budget money. In the next MFF there will be ECF money hopefully. We know that the next MFF is still very much an ongoing negotiation and including when it comes to the the for example the issue of European preference in the defense part of the of the competitiveness fund. So what are your expectations with regard to the outcome of the MFF talks to the degree that it affects the EDIP, ECI's and and more broadly perhaps given that considering that the EDIP, ECI's are just being set up, how important it is to ensure continuity of the legal framework in the next MFF?
Tomas Husak
Thank you Madam Chair and Mr. Mikser as well, thank you for your question. EDPCIs have for us an extremely important projects which may be decisive for the future how we will handle as well defense projects in Europe. And as we could see with space project in Europe that have been developed at European level, the potential is great. If we manage to cross this border of having strategic European projects that European member states will integrate into them, I think that will be the biggest success of the whole defense measures that so far in Europe we tried to coordinate. Therefore for us of course the EDIP in terms of financial means is modest for today because as I pointed out in my presentation, it's roughly 60 million euros per projects.
So it's really for the start, we could imagine that's for the start, but I think as well for a rational start. So I think it it brings as well the idea as well to mobilize member states for their contributions in this process and as well to see what kind of buy-in and ownership as well they can bring. But of course this is a bridge towards the ECF. And the ECF is already taking into account as well the EDPCIs.
So there will be continuity that definitely will be ensured. And what is today the most important is to make sure that this budget in the next MFF remains as ambitious, if not even more ambitious, that would be the, I think, even better situation as the Commission has proposed. So that's for us today the most important. And because if we manage to secure the buy-in of member states for the EDPCIs, then this financing through the ECF will be of course crucial. But of course given as well different aspects of related to the discussion of European preference or other issues that are related to the MFF, I think that at this stage it's difficult for me to prejudge any discussion.
What we should today focus on is really to make sure that this budget remains as ambitious as possible because that will mean that EDPCIs will continue to have their meaning and as well for EDIP as such and all the instruments that were created around it. As I said as well, SEAPs are an important part or as well the whole security of supply as well regime which is created there will have the sense for further development and existence.
Pierre-Romain Thionnet
Merci monsieur le directeur. Je passerai mes questions en français. Tout d'abord merci pour les clarifications, toutes les informations que vous avez pu nous fournir et également sur l'enjeu de la répartition des compétences. Il me semble que la formule d'EDPCI de notre point de vue, pour notre groupe en tout cas, est une bonne formule dans le respect des compétences de chacun où la Commission est à sa place, les États membres maintiennent leurs compétences. J'aurais une question.
On a pu voir ces dernières années se multiplier certaines initiatives intergouvernementales, le projet ELSA sur la frappe de longue portée, il y a hier ou avant-hier cette nouvelle coalition de plusieurs États anti-balistiques. Donc on a quand même plusieurs initiatives qui ont fleuri entre plusieurs États sur des enjeux capacitaires vraiment stratégiques et qui semblent correspondre aussi à la portée d'EDPCI que vous avez présentée.
Alors est-ce que justement ces EDPCI vont avoir vocation un peu à rationaliser tout ça, à rassembler ces propositions, à les remplacer ou est-ce que tout ça doit cohabiter et voir finalement que le meilleur gagne au final dans ces différentes initiatives ? Enfin une question sur les... vous avez en effet rappelé que ce sont les critères EDIP qui s'appliquent et dans le texte EDIP qui avait été adopté, il y a des dérogations jusqu'en 2033 et notamment sur les enjeux sur les missiles. Or dans les EDPCI, il y a un projet qui porte précisément sur la défense aérienne et sur les missiles. Et donc est-ce que dans les EDPCI choisis ou retenus, est-ce que cela va financer donc des capacités que les Européens ne maîtrisent pas pleinement en termes de propriété intellectuelle, d'autorité de conception, puisque précisément il y a une dérogation EDIP sur ce sujet ? Merci.
Tomas Husak
Merci beaucoup et merci beaucoup pour votre question. Pour nous, n'est pas un problème.
Nous sommes très contents qu'il y ait des initiatives qui fleurissent dans tous les domaines que j'appellerais aussi dans le domaine de capacités prioritaires qui ont été développées par les États membres. C'est vrai qu'on peut avoir à un certain moment un peu le problème aujourd'hui de connexion entre les différentes initiatives, mais je pense que c'est là aussi que les projets EDIRPA viennent amener cette plateforme un peu d'intégration d'idées. D'un côté, nous avons eu tous les processus qui ont été financés par le Fonds européen de défense, par les questions par d'autres instruments aussi qui ont été approchés. Les EDIRPA viennent ici du au niveau top-down pour venir et d'apporter une cohérence entre les différents processus. Mais c'est aussi une certaine cohérence vis-à-vis les domaines des priorités capacitaires qui ont été développés par l'Agence européenne de défense qui qui ont été qui sont l'expression aussi des États membres comment couvrir les problèmes capacitaires dans les différents domaines.
Et encore une fois, EDIRPA peut ici apporter une solution. Je pense que ce qui ce qui est important aussi ici à fournir, ce sont les États membres qui sont venus à fournir les projets pour les EDIRPAs.
Donc s'il y a une volonté du côté des États membres dans le domaine de la défense anti-aérienne de constituer un EDPCIS, je pense que pour la Commission, il ne reste qu'à soutenir ce projet, vu encore tous les problèmes qui peuvent apparaître, vu le problème aussi que ce sont des capacités qui ne sont pas totalement développées. Mais il y a une chose qui est primordiale avec l'EDPCIS, c'est qu'en fait l'EDPCIS couvre tous les différents aspects et toute la chaîne de valeur et aussi toute la chaîne d'innovation dans ces processus. Donc la logique par la suite, surtout après l'établissement du Fonds européen de compétitivité, sera de fournir aussi tout le soutien pour l'innovation dans la partie qui n'est pas aujourd'hui encore totalement dans les mains des Européens.
Thank you very much, Petras.
Thank you, Chair.
Petras Auštrevičius
The recent announcement that two major European attempts to develop so-called jointly the European tank and European fighter jet have failed, or at least, I mean, countries which took part initially in those projects, I mean, they withdrew. I mean, on which elements your optimism is based that EDPCIs will succeed if those two countries which had probably most of the potential to develop a fighter jet and a tank jointly, they decided not to go further on? So, my reasonable doubts are probably have to be, you know, removed by something else than just a good wish, I mean, to succeed in five attempts if two so needed have failed. And once I take a look into the timeframe to implement five priority projects, it varies from 2033 to 2045 and more. How you can explain, I mean, this difference in timeframes to implement these projects?
I mean, for example, Eastern border protection and security, it's 36, 2036. I might imagine, although I think it's a very priority project, it should be next year if we wish, I mean, to be well and sleeping well. But I mean, in general, what is the principle behind to have such a, you know, disbursement of timelines? And maybe I missed your presentation and I'm sorry for this in the beginning, but to my calculations, I mean, the overall five of them are well above 300 billion overall estimates. How this split, budget split will look like?
I mean, why is that?
I mean, how much from what source it will come finally, or your expectations are about? Thank you.
Tomas Husak
Sir, honorable member, thank you very much as well for this approach, which is a very realistic approach on the problems that we are facing. European cooperation, as we know from as well previous times, is not always easy.
And you mentioned two particular projects that finally did not appear as successful. But this is as well which is linked today with industrial capacities of member states, their objectives, which is linked as well to national doctrines. It's difficult for the Commission as well to comment this particular issue. Where we try to be active is in support of the needs that member states do express. And this is where the five EDPCIs have been proposed.
Why there are some divergence in terms of timing? Because from the outset, EDPCIs are considered as long-term projects. This is as well from our experience that the framework for any cooperation defense in Europe to bring industries together takes a lot of time. So that's definitely one of the reasons. The second one is that we want as well to calibrate the EDPCIs with the multiannual financial framework.
That's another area that it's difficult to not completely be aligned.
What we tend as well with the ECF is to have more flexibility in that regards in terms of possible actions. And we hope very much that the ECF will be helpful in that regard and that some parts of the capabilities will be developed faster than the MFF framework. But this is something that is very difficult today to foresee. As it's difficult as well at this stage to say what will be the source of financing of different elements. What can I agree and this is as well what I mentioned in my initial intervention, we fully understand that 60 million euros per project, it looks for the time being modest.
But as I said again, it's important to set the base for this cooperation and to look how member states in the new context can cooperate. That's the most important element.
In those five areas, and I would even say that in those additional areas that have finally not been fully awarded because they need additional maturity, that are projects that cannot be achieved by one or even two or three member states together. And that's why our optimism is there, that we can with current as well stronger will and political will to engage in defense to bring some projects that may have sense to the majority of the member states in Europe. And this is today our approach that we'll continue to support, that we'll continue as well to see what are different options to make sure that member states cooperate together.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
So colleagues, any other, any more questions? Thank you very much for coming. And I'm sure we will meet again. I mean, it's really interesting what's going on and thank you very much for your time to explain and to react immediately. Thank you very much.
So colleagues, the next item first is in camera. We are now, we are a little bit speed up. So we are waiting for Charles Fries, the Deputy Secretary General at the European External Action Service, and it would be his last visit because then he will move.
Where?
We don't know. Okay, nobody knows where, but definitely he has to say goodbye. So, but we are waiting for him at 5:30. We try to reach him to speed up a little bit, but I think it would be very nice and polite to wait to say goodbye.
Okay, so we will continue immediately, but latest 5:30. At 5:30. Okay, maybe five minutes earlier.
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