Subcommittee on Human Rights Ordinary meeting
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DROI European Parliament
Follow its sittingsReem Alsalem
Much of the public discussion surrounding surrogacy begins with the assumption that those who commission children through surrogacy arrangements do so because they simply wish to create families. Now many undoubtedly do so. However, as independent human rights experts, we cannot base our conclusions on mere assumptions. And we simply do not possess today reliable evidence or information demonstrating why people commission children through surrogacy. Some indeed may do so because they want children.
Some may do so because of infertility.
Others may wish to avoid pregnancy or have different motivations altogether. And we have also some evidence that children are being commissioned in order to donate their organs, also for sexual abuse and onward trafficking in human beings and their exploitation. So what I'm trying to get at is that the evidence that we do have today points that motivations are diverse and in many instances also they may be unknown. And human rights law cannot evaluate a practice on the basis of presumed intentions. It must evaluate the practice itself.
It must examine the relationship that the practice creates, the inequalities upon which it depends, the risks that it generates and the consequences it has for the rights of those affected. And this is precisely what this report does. Because one of the central conclusions of the report is that surrogacy cannot be understood simply as another form of assisted reproductive technology. Its defining characteristic is not conception, its contractual programming of the separation of the child from the woman or girl who has carried and given birth to that child. And that feature distinguishes surrogacy fundamentally from every other form of assisted reproduction.
And for many years, discussion about surrogacy paid remarkably little attention to the relationship between the woman or girl carrying the pregnancy and the child developing within her. Today, this is no longer tenable. Scientific evidence has profoundly deepened our understanding of pregnancy. Pregnancy is not merely a biological process through which a child develops independently of the woman carrying him or her. It's a continuous biological, hormonal, immunological, neurological, and psychological relationship between mother and child.
And through it, the mother's body undergoes profound psychological, neurological changes in preparation for birth and caregiving. And the child also develops a very strong and deep bond with the mother. The other issue I think that we need to look at is the issue of consent. Because the report also addresses this argument that is frequently advanced, namely if we refuse to acknowledge surrogacy or allow it, we are actually ignoring the bodily autonomy or the decision or will of the woman or the girl involved.
Now, of course, consent is an essential principle of international human rights law. But consent according to international law cannot be justified for the exploitation, abuse, or committing violence against anyone. And so here we have to ask ourselves a question with regards to surrogacy. Who exercises power, with what end, who bears the physical and psychological harms and risks, who is making an economic profit of the exploitation and abuse of women and girls and the children born through surrogacy, who can genuinely refuse any violence that occurs through surrogacy, and what agency and bodily autonomy is lost? If consent could be used to justify every single practice, then we would allow consent to be used in order to justify trafficking in persons, exploitative labor, debt bondage, or the sale of children.
However, all these which I've just mentioned remain prohibited because consent is invalid and does not matter in these circumstances.
Now, surrogacy amplifies inequalities between the surrogate mothers and the commissioning individuals and also enables reproductive markets to operate across profound differences in wealth, legal protection, and opportunity, and that fuels human trafficking. I think these are issues that are profoundly relevant to the European Union, and I want to therefore come to my final remark about the solutions that I propose in my report, namely the abolitionist human rights model. It's important to understand what that means. An abolitionist approach is not synonymous with a simple ban, as many have also understood from reading the report. It's not directed against women who have acted as surrogates.
It's not directed against children born through surrogacy. On the contrary, it begins by recognizing both surrogate mothers and children as rights holders whose dignity and rights must be fully protected. Women who have acted as surrogates should never be criminalized. Many have entered these arrangements in circumstances of poverty, financial hardship. Similarly, children born through surrogacy must never suffer discrimination because of the circumstances of their birth, not to mention that they never consented to being born this way to begin with.
So their legal identity, nationality, family relations, and all rights guaranteed under international human rights law must be fully protected.
The abolitionist model seeks to criminalize the commissioning of surrogate children and also aiding, abetting and participating in surrogacy arrangements in order to address the demand for surrogacy. And we must also start raising awareness about the many pitfalls and problems associated with surrogacy in wider society and also impact the way the media speaks to these issues. I know I'm over time, so I will stop here. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
Mounir Satouri
Si peu, si peu, Madame la rapporteure, vous avez dépassé votre temps de 30 secondes. On est habitué à plus parfois. Merci. Tout le monde va intervenir, vous inquiétez pas. Je vais commencer par donner la parole à Isabelle.
D'abord parce qu'elle parle dans notre commission première comme rapporteure PPE, mais en plus elle est pressée. Et donc moi je suis ravi qu'elle ait le temps de s'exprimer parce que l'expression de tout le monde est importante dans cette sous-commission. Isabelle, tu as la parole.
Isabel Wiseler-Lima
Merci Monsieur le Président. Et merci pour vos explications. J'aurais voulu en fait...
Vous avez présenté un certain nombre de choses qui pour moi étaient beaucoup plus tout le temps des questions. Et en fait j'aurais voulu avoir l'une ou l'autre réponse justement. Quand vous parlez des femmes qui ont donc des enfants de cette façon-là, vous parlez des différentes situations. Est-ce que vous avez des chiffres ? Est-ce que vous pouvez nous expliquer aussi...
Donc vous parlez des intentions présumées. Quelles sont les conclusions que vous avez tirées après toutes les questions que vous avez posées ? J'aimerais beaucoup quand même aussi entendre plus de conclusions si c'est possible. Je vais rester un tout petit peu plus longtemps. Je ne sais pas si je vais pouvoir entendre la réponse ou pas parce que je devrais partir mais j'ai des personnes qui m'accompagnent dans mon travail et qui vont écouter et qui vont me faire un rapport en tout cas tout après.
En tout cas merci beaucoup pour ce que vous nous avez présenté et pour le travail que vous avez fait. Je crois que c'est comme vous l'avez dit au début un point qui est un vrai challenge pour les droits humains et très important à étudier. Donc merci beaucoup de votre côté pour le travail que vous faites. Je crois qu'il est essentiel. Il faut que nous soyons éclairés.
Merci.
Maria Noichl
Ganz herzlichen Dank, danke für den Bericht.
Und ich möchte vielleicht eine Bemerkung von meiner Seite aus machen und dann hätte ich noch zwei Fragen an Sie. Und zwar die eine Bemerkung von meiner Seite ist, Sie haben es angesprochen und Sie haben angesprochen, der Bericht würde es nicht beantworten und trotzdem finde ich es wichtig. Es gibt kein Recht auf ein Kind. Dieses Recht gibt es nicht. Es gibt nicht das Recht, dass die Gesellschaft irgendwas tun muss, dass ich ein Kind haben kann.
Und das, so schmerzhaft es ist, ich bin selber Mutter von zwei Kindern, habe fünf Enkelkinder und manche werden sagen, darf die dann so etwas sagen? Doch, ich darf so etwas sagen, weil ich einfach deutlich machen will, es würde der Gesellschaft schaden, wenn es ein verbrieftes Recht auf ein Kind gäbe. Das gibt es nicht. Es gibt aber ein anderes Recht. Es gibt das Recht von Kindern auf ihre Eltern.
Dieses Recht gibt es sehr wohl. Und ich glaube, das müssen wir auch sehen, dass wir vieles, was mit Leihmutterschaft zu tun hat, wirklich im Kontext sehen, wie sieht es auch vom Kind her aus. Und wie gesagt, das Recht des Kindes auf Eltern ist gegeben, aber nicht das Recht von Eltern auf ein Kind. Ich habe zwei ganz konkrete Fragen an Sie.
Die erste Frage ist: Sehen Sie nicht auch mit mir zusammen Parallelen zwischen dem Thema Prostitution, Leihmutterschaft und Organhandel? Denn Prostitution, Leihmutterschaft und Organhandel haben eines gemeinsam: Weder in der Prostitution noch in der Leihmutterschaft noch im Organhandel wird verdient, sondern an der Leihmutterschaft wird verdient. Das sind also externe Verdiener. Sie haben eines gemeinsam, dass man behauptet immer, alle wären ja freiwillig, und sie haben eines gemeinsam, und Sie haben's schon betont, dass die Nachfrage erst erzeugt, dass es überhaupt vonstatten geht. Das würde mich interessieren, wie Sie das sehen, denn wir haben hier im Europäischen Parlament sehr eindeutige Positionierung zum Thema Prostitution, dass Prostitution Gewalt ist, als Gewalt einzustufen ist und sicher nicht freiwillig zugestimmt werden kann.
Wir haben eine eindeutige Position zum Organhandel, dass ich, auch wenn ich in finanzieller Not bin, nicht einfach meine Niere verkaufen kann, weil wir das als Gesellschaft nicht wollen, auch wenn ich's der einzelnen Person vielleicht sogar zugestehen will, aber weil wir es als Gesellschaft nicht wollen. Und ich möchte mal sagen, in dieser Reihe Prostitution, Organhandel steht jetzt auch das Thema Leihmutterschaft, und deswegen würde ich gerne von Ihnen wissen, was sehen Sie als Parallelen und was sehen Sie vielleicht nicht als Parallelen? Und meine letzte Frage ist: Ich bin selber auch im Gleichstellungsausschuss. Gibt es auch ganz klare Aussagen, wie wirkt sich Leihmutterschaft auf die Gleichstellung insgesamt aus?
Denn wie wir mit bestimmten Themen umgehen, hat ja auf die Gleichstellung insgesamt auch Auswirkungen. Und das würde mich interessieren, wie Sie das sehen. Ganz herzlichen Dank.
Mounir Satouri
Merci, Madame Neichl. Je rappelle à ceux qui ne sont pas des habitués de notre sous-commission que c'est deux minutes maximum les interventions. Je n'ai pas voulu vous interrompre avant la fin. Monsieur Ruissen pour le groupe... Non, Madame de la Pisa pour le groupe PFE.
Je ne vous avais pas vue, Madame. Deux minutes.
Margarita de la Pisa Carrión
Muchas gracias. Muchas gracias a la señora Rosalin por estar aquí. Muchas veces vemos cómo personas que se oponen a la gestación subrogada, sin embargo, hablando de los derechos del menor, dicen que hay que buscar una solución para regularizar su situación, ¿no?
Incluso aquí en esta cámara, el mandato pasado estuvimos trabajando y todavía está a nivel de consejo, trílogos, el tema de la del certificado de filiación como una vía rápida para solucionar estas situaciones. Hay algunos que pensamos que esto puede ser una puerta a la legitimación o incluso pone más en riesgo a los niños, ¿no? Porque al haber una línea donde se puede legalizar o se puede registrar ese niño, pues va a fomentar el que esto suceda. También de alguna manera entiende de otra manera el vínculo entre entre padres o madre e hijo y empieza a ser una construcción y no se le da importancia a ese vínculo natural, ¿no? De alguna manera no solamente generando más gestación subrogada, sino que rompiendo esa idea de maternidad y de vínculo natural, ¿no?
El lazo natural como algo sagrado que no se debe romper. ¿Cómo ve usted este tema? No sé si está al tanto de que en esta cámara estamos trabajando este este reglamento. Gracias.
Mounir Satouri
Merci chers collègues. Monsieur Hoogeveen, c'est à vous pour le groupe ECR.
Bert-Jan Ruissen
Thank you very much, Chair. Thank you, Ms. Aselem, for joining us today here in the European Parliament. Your report is very clear. You write that surrogacy is not in the best interest of a child and that children are treated as commodities and that these practices resembles the sale of children where children are separated from their mothers immediately after their birth.
And you note that surrogate mothers are treated as modern slaves. So your report has very clear recommendations, and the most important one is that you argue that there should be an international ban on surrogacy. I would like to ask you three questions. My first question: one of the arguments in favor of regulating surrogacy is that altruistic surrogacy should be regulated, that there is no harm in altruistic surrogacy as the surrogate mother is not paid or coerced in any way. Could you perhaps elaborate on the scale of commercial versus altruistic surrogacy in terms of numbers, for example?
And why do you argue in favor of a ban for all kinds of surrogacy arrangements? That's my first question. So my second question: you have done extensive research into the international surrogacy business. Many people argue that this is an act of love, but I see no love in separating a newborn baby from its mother.
What do you think is the biggest misconception around surrogacy that should really be unmasked so that policymakers can act and take steps towards an international ban? And my third question, as EU, we can take steps towards a ban of surrogacy. The EU has recognized that surrogacy can be a form of human trafficking and therefore punishable. What are your recommendations for the EU? In what way can we play as EU a leading role to ban this phenomenon?
Thank you very much.
Mounir Satouri
Merci Monsieur Huissen, et pour clôturer le tour des rapporteurs, je vais donner la parole à Madame Bosdorf pour le groupe ECR. Et c'est deux minutes comme pour les autres.
Irmhild Boßdorf
Ja, vielen Dank Frau Reem Alsalem, dass Sie heute hierhergekommen sind. Ich weiß, dass Sie im vergangenen Jahr vom FEMM-Ausschuss ausgeladen worden sind zur UN-Konferenz in New York, weil Sie die kritische Frage gestellt haben nach einer geschlechtergerechten Auslegung der Scharia. Danke dafür, dass Sie dieses Thema mal angestoßen haben. Danke auch, dass Sie das Thema der Leihmütter hier anstoßen.
Meine Fragen zu diesem Thema der Leihmutterschaft: Wir befinden uns ja tatsächlich im Menschenhandel, sobald Geld fließt dafür, dass eine Frau ein Kind austrägt, das nicht ihres ist und das eben verkauft wird, dann sind wir eben im Menschenhandel. Sie haben in Ihrem Bericht auch ausdrücklich noch mal die Ukraine angesprochen. Haben Sie dazu vielleicht Zahlen? Denn gerade durch den Ukraine-Krieg meines Wissens sind da sehr viele Kinder einfach nicht mehr abgeholt worden, die eben bestellt worden waren. Wie viele Leihmütter haben darunter gelitten?
Was ist mit diesen Kindern passiert? Haben Sie dazu irgendwelche Erkenntnisse? Eine andere Sache, die Sie im Bericht nennen, dass eben gerade bei der Nachfrage nach diesen von Leihmüttern ausgetragenen Kindern vor allem rassistische und postkoloniale Stereotypen vorhanden sind. Das Wunschbaby soll dann also ja wohl eher blond und blauäugig und großgewachsen sein als schwarz. Haben Sie da irgendwelche Erkenntnisse, zum Beispiel wenn man weiß, das Kind, das die Leihmutter gerade austrägt, ist vielleicht behindert oder hat nicht die ganz passende Hautfarbe?
Haben Sie dazu irgendwelche Zahlen, was mit diesen Kindern passiert und wie hoch die Anzahl ist? Vielen herzlichen Dank.
Mounir Satouri
Merci, chers collègues.
On vient de finir le tour des coordinateurs, mais il y a deux demandes d'intervention supplémentaires que j'accepte. Madame Trochu, vous avez la parole pour une minute trente. C'est un peu moins que les coordinateurs, mais vous aurez le temps de vous exprimer.
Laurence Trochu
Oui, alors je suis coordinatrice pour la commission FEMM. Et je me réjouis que la commission JURI ait invité Madame Rim-Sarah Alouane parce que, de fait, nous n'avons pas réussi en FEMM à programmer cette audition. Donc un grand merci à vous de l'avoir initiée. Vous avez bien expliqué, Madame Rim-Sarah Alouane, à quel point finalement la GPA était un business dont finalement les femmes sont perdantes puisque vous avez mentionné que simplement 10 à 27 % des sommes étaient perçues par les mères porteuses.
Donc je pense qu'on a là la preuve que la GPA dite éthique n'existe pas puisque bien évidemment prospèrent autour de la gestation et de la grossesse des prestataires de services qui eux évidemment sont rémunérés. Il me semble que la difficulté que nous avons et je salue ma collègue madame Noichl d'avoir souligné le lien entre prostitution et GPA. La difficulté que nous avons c'est de poser une question qui de fait en commission FEMM est interdite au nom d'une sorte d'intersectionnalité qui fait que pour la discrimination il ne serait pas possible d'envisager une condamnation de la GPA là où il n'est pas problématique d'envisager la condamnation de la prostitution. Alors la question évidemment en deux secondes c'est comment pouvons-nous articuler les droits nationaux des parlements nationaux avec le droit européen parce que la GPA par définition n'a pas de frontières. Merci.
Mounir Satouri
Très bien. Merci cher collègue. Et pour conclure les interventions je vais donner la parole à madame Ivanovici pour une minute trente d'intervention.
Diana Iovanovici Şoşoacă
Mulțumesc. Eu sunt avocat și sunt din România. În România nu este legalizată o astfel de formă de a avea copii. Însă ca avocat am avut un caz, unicul caz din România în care mama de substituție a trăit în aceeași casă cu copilul și cu părinții care au adoptat copilul respectiv. Nu vă spun ce situație a fost s-a ajuns la divorț iar copilul a ajuns să fie împărțit între mama de substituție, mama adoptivă și tatăl care de fapt era și tatăl adevărat al copilului.
Copilul evident că are mari traume psihologice. Am ajuns să tranzacționăm copiii. Mie mi se pare inacceptabil. Noi în România suntem 98% creștini, credem enorm de mult în Dumnezeu și mie mi se pare că deja îl desființăm pe Dumnezeu, cel care a făcut această lume. Nu, am auzit aici că nu am avea un drept la a avea copii.
Ba da, drept de a avea copii avem cu toate și cu toți. Nu avem obligația să avem copii. Unele femei pot, altele nu pot, alți bărbați pot, alții nu pot. Dar să ajungem să constituim dintr-un copil o marfă pe care să o vindem, să știți că în mai toate țările și în România există un grup infracțional organizat de la cel care aduce fata până la medicul care își ia o groază de bani. În România am fost senator și am fost președintele Comisiei pentru cercetarea abuzurilor și corupției din România.
Un copil se vinde între 100.000 și 600.000 de euro în România.
Trebuie să faceți ceva și trebuie într-adevăr să interziceți o as- un astfel de comerț prin care se anulează efectiv umanitatea. Mulțumesc frumos.
Mounir Satouri
Merci, madame la rapporteure. Vous avez cinq minutes, mais je serai indulgent.
Reem Alsalem
Thank you very much for all these very important questions and I regret that we don't have enough time to really delve into the details because as I think we all recognize it's a complex issue it raises profoundly complex and fundamental issues and really they should be unpacked with more time. I want to perhaps get to the first question if I understood it correctly about the issue of data that we have. I think this is actually one of the problems that I also allude in my report. That a lot of what happens in surrogacy happens under- under the radar. We don't have the data actually most of the data we don't have.
The information that gets to us is really the tip of the iceberg. And that iceberg is- demonstrates that there's really widespread abuse that happens of the rights of the women and girls engaged in surrogacy of the children born through surrogacy. Very few actually commissioning individuals register the child officially or bring them in through let's say clear transparent procedures and there's no follow-up hardly any follow-up on children born through surrogacy.
Most states actually don't know what happens to the children born through surrogacy. And the little information we get, we get through journalistic, investigative journalistic reports that show in many cases horror stories that we hear about. Now, on the issue of altruistic surrogacy, I just want to clarify actually that I see no distinction between altruistic surrogacy and commercial surrogacy. For me actually it's very clear that even where it's called, quote-unquote, altruistic surrogacy, the payment is hidden and embedded in the amount that is given as subsistence maintenance allowance. And even where we have countries that, for example, legalize altruistic surrogacy but ban commercial surrogacy, we see that the structural problems associated with surrogacy do not go away.
And having altruistic surrogacy doesn't sort of magically eliminate the widespread abuse and problems that we see in surrogacy.
First of all, it's very interesting that in countries that only allow altruistic surrogacy and not commercial surrogacy, you will find very few women actually stepping forward to become surrogate mothers, as in officially or transparently. Because the payment factor is really, for a vulnerable, impoverished woman, the thing why she will get engaged in surrogacy. Now, I'm talking about the women who perhaps engage on it, engage in service in surrogacy, are not sort of trafficked or detained or arbitrarily placed in servitude to become surrogate mothers. So the absence of commercial payment also does not eliminate the transfer of control over the body of the woman and the child to the commissioning parents and the clinics. And this control is regulated through a contract, a contract that is extremely abusive, a contract where there is a huge inequilibrium of power that works against the surrogate woman or child.
And through this contract, she cedes away control over every aspect to do with her body and her life, including reproductive decisions.
This contract controls what she eats, who she has sex with, how many times she has sex, how she delivers the child. She has to agree to the decision of the commissioning parents regarding the child at any moment through the pregnancy until the very end, even after the delivery. So the commissioning parents may ask for the child to be aborted at any moment for no reason whatsoever, no valid reasons. The child might be abandoned. If she wants to retain the child she cannot, she will be sued, she will be harassed, she will be threatened.
So all these elements show you that actually no real consent can happen in such circumstances. And in the few minutes I want I have remaining, I just want to say that international law does not give a right to form a family at all costs using any kind of approaches as part of reproductive rights that you have. Yes, the right to marry and found a family is recognized by the Universal Declaration and other instruments, but it doesn't mean the right to found a family by all means, including buying children and women's body. So, yeah, can I continue? Okay.
I very much agree that there are very strong parallels between surrogacy and prostitution. I, in fact, I saw this parallel myself when I did the inquiry into this issue, because you have the same actors involved. You have in both prostitution and surrogacy the commissioning or the paying entity. So either the person or entity that pays for sex or in surrogacy that commissions, buys basically a child. And then you have the victims, which are also the same, which is the in prostitution, the prostituted woman or girl, and in surrogacy you have the surrogate mother, so the woman or girl that is exploited in surrogacy.
Both groups are engaged in either prostitution or surrogacy because they are impoverished, because they are vulnerable, because they come from countries or places that are torn by conflict, insecurity, because they need to feed their families and often this is the only means that is available.
And they have no power vis-à-vis the commissioning entities, actors or the buyers, whether it's sex buyers or those that commission children. And then you have the intermediaries that profit actually from this exploitation and abuse, which in prostitution is of course the pimps, but also other businesses that may profit from the exploitation of the bodies of women and girls. And in surrogacy it is the clinics, it is the intermediary companies and so on that put commissioning parents and surrogate mothers together. And the intermediaries are the ones actually that walk away with most of the profit. So yes, I agree, there's many similarities and this is why I also suggested the same kind of response, which is an abolitionist model.
And I wish to stress again that an abolitionist model is not a punitive model. It's not, we don't talk about ban when we speak about abolition because the point with abolition is to try to, to first of all also undercut or address or diminish or end the demand. So to end the demand, you have to first of all make it clear that there are very serious human rights violations involved through these systems, whether it's surrogacy or whether it's prostitution. You have to criminalize the demand.
You have to criminalize the buying. That's why you criminalize the buying of sex and in the model I'm proposing you criminalize the buying of, the commissioning of children. You criminalize also the activities of the intermediaries that profit from this, whether as we mentioned. But you decriminalize the victims. And the victims in both are the women and girls engaged in prostitution or the women and girls engaged in surrogacy.
And in surrogacy, the victims as well are the children born through surrogacy. As I said, they could never consent to this. They had no choice to the precarious situation into which they were born. And so to come then to another question that was asked, the guiding principle has to be always the best interest of the child in reaching any decision as to what to do with a child born through surrogacy. My proposal is to ensure that these children have full access to all the rights, including right to nationality, health, knowing where they came from, knowing their mother.
And the point is that this best interest may mean, may likely mean that they don't end up with the commissioning parent. Just like we are very attentive and rigorous when it comes to adoption procedures, we assess who is it that wants to adopt. I raise the question, why is this rigorous approach missing from surrogacy? There is zero rigor when it comes to surrogacy arrangements. Thank you.
Mounir Satouri
Bien. Vous aurez parlé deux fois. Vous aurez eu deux fois plus de temps pour vos réponses que ce qui était prévu. Madame Alsalem, je vous remercie pour votre présentation. Je l'ai dit tout à l'heure en préliminaire, le Parlement européen a toujours reflété la diversité d'opinions politiques et sociétales à travers l'Europe.
Et malgré nos divergences nationales ou politiques sur certains sujets, notre capacité à débattre, voire à être en désaccord dans le respect d'autrui, témoigne de la pérennité du parlementarisme européen et de la force de notre tradition démocratique. Donc les coordinateurs ont décidé qu'il était important d'avoir ce point. Nous l'avons eu et ça honore nos méthodes de travail au sein de la sous-commission DROIT. Voilà. Une petite pause et on reprend avec le sujet d'après, avec le panel d'après.
Et je vous souhaite un bon...
Installez-vous, chers collègues, on va poursuivre nos travaux avec le dixième point de l'ordre du jour. C'est un échange de vues sur le Liban et l'impact du conflit en cours sur les droits humains et sur la protection des civils dans le cadre du droit international humanitaire. Pour ce point, je souhaite la bienvenue à notre collègue Leoluca Orlando, vice-président de la délégation chargée des relations avec les pays du Machrek, avec qui ce point se tient en association, ainsi que Barry Andrews, le président de la commission DEVE, qui est en salle. Je le remercie pour sa présence. La situation au Liban continue de susciter de vives préoccupations à l'échelle internationale.
Les développements récents ont exacerbé les tensions et mis en évidence la fragilité de la situation. L'escalade des hostilités israéliennes au Liban depuis mars questionne le droit international et affecte l'ensemble de la région. Les attaques israéliennes infligent d'énormes souffrances à la population civile et détruisent un nombre d'infrastructures essentielles. Afin de mieux comprendre les implications du conflit en matière de droits humains, de protection des civils et d'application du droit international humanitaire, nous avons constitué un panel réunissant des représentants du Comité international de la Croix-Rouge, du Haut-Commissariat des Nations Unies aux droits de l'homme et du Service européen pour l'action extérieure. Nous entendrons les interventions de Monsieur Shawky Amine Eddine, coordinateur des affaires humanitaires au Comité international de la Croix-Rouge, ainsi que Monsieur Mazen Shaqoura, chef du bureau du Haut-Commissaire des Nations Unies aux droits de l'homme au Liban, tous les deux connectés depuis Beyrouth.
La représentante spéciale de l'Union européenne pour les droits de l'homme, Madame Kaja Olingren, ne peut pas être présente aujourd'hui, mais comme ce sujet revêt pour elle une importance capitale, elle a souhaité nous adresser un message vidéo que nous écouterons avant de donner la parole à la représentante du SEAE, la cheffe de la division adjointe pour le Moyen-Orient. Avant de donner la parole à nos intervenants, je souhaite donner la parole à mon collègue, Monsieur Orlando, vice-président de la délégation pour les relations avec le Machrek pour des propos liminaires. Cher Leoluca, tu as la parole.
Leoluca Orlando
Merci, grazie per questa opportunità di incontro. Io credo che il tema di questo incontro sia la tutela e il rispetto dei diritti umani. Il tema dei diritti umani è ormai per fortuna diventato un tema internazionale. Nel senso che ormai la sensibilità, il riconoscimento, la tutela dei diritti umani fanno parte più complessivamente della legalità internazionale. E tutto questo ovviamente però ha bisogno che ci siano degli stati al cui interno questi diritti vengono riconosciuti e promossi.
Perché faccio questa lunga premessa?
Faccio questa lunga premessa perché oggi credo che parlare di quello che sta accadendo in Libano è il parlare di uno stato che rischia di essere un non stato. Io credo che una la conseguenza più rilevante di quello che sta accadendo in Libano accanto alla inaccettabile strage di civili e distruzione di intere centri abitati è costituito dal fatto che si stanno creando le condizioni perché il Libano sia un non stato. E in un non stato non è possibile affermare il principio dei diritti umani. Posso permettermi di dire che è esattamente lo stesso tipo di conseguenza che è stata prodotta da Israele nei confronti della Palestina? Oggi il vero problema della Palestina è certamente il genocidio, è certamente il massacro di vite umani, ma il vero problema di della Palestina è che si è sono create le condizioni per cui la soluzione dei due stati è assolutamente improponibile perché non c'è più la Palestina.
Abbiamo una landa desolata che qualche speculatore pensava di trasformare nella Costa Azzurra, parlo del presidente Trump e dei suoi contorni e soci in affari.
Cosa voglio dire? Noi abbiamo il Libano che è uno stato che voi sapete meglio di me, che io conosco e amo, ma che vive un equilibrio tra sciiti, sunniti e maroniti che a fatica è riuscito a fare in modo di essere uno stato e che oggi invece rischia di perdere la possibilità di essere uno stato. Devo dire non soltanto Israele, anche il cosiddetto Occidente è abituato a distruggere la legalità internazionale togliendo a popolazioni e a territori la dignità di stato. Che cos'è oggi la Libia se non un non-stato? Esattamente come la Palestina, esattamente come rischia di essere anche il Libano.
Allora è evidente che il Parlamento europeo non può restare indifferente rispetto a quello che sta accadendo e deve incoraggiare il Libano, intanto direi a ratificare lo Statuto di Roma per quanto riguarda l'International Criminal Court per poter in qualche modo perseguire i crimini di guerra.
Occorre ancora il Parlamento libanese incoraggiare a promulgare una legge che stabilisca e renda tipici i crimini di guerra, il genocidio e i crimini contro l'umanità e adottare sanzioni civili e sanzioni penali per chi di competenza nei confronti ovviamente del governo Netanyahu. Lo dico con molta franchezza perché se l'Unione Europea non dimostra di avere la schiena dritta e non dimostra di rispettare la legalità internazionale sarà certamente condannata ad un bla bla senza senso quando parlando con altri paesi chiederà agli altri paesi di applicare la condizionalità. Perché chiedete la condizionalità all'Egitto voi dell'Unione Europea se poi dopo consentite che Israele faccia quello che sta facendo alla faccia della condizionalità? Ovviamente nessuno si sogna, io meno che mai, di non considerare parimenti responsabili Hezbollah e Hamas per quello che hanno commesso e che commettono, ma noi stiamo parlando di uno Stato il quale ovviamente ha una responsabilità doppia rispetto a un gruppo politico organizzato e dico di più, di uno Stato che sta creando le condizioni per impedire che possa esserci mai la prospettiva del Libano che resti uno Stato.
E da questo punto di vista io credo che questo importo sia, questo incontro sia estremamente importante. Bisogna dire al popolo libanese tutto l'apprezzamento perché sta dimostrando una grande straordinaria resilienza e non sta reagendo come potrebbe in maniera inconsulta. Ma è evidente che la pazienza non può diventare condanna alla servitù alle volontà criminali di altri. Grazie.
Mounir Satouri
Merci chers collègues. Je donne la parole maintenant à Monsieur Chaouki Amine Eddine en ligne pour une intervention de sept minutes. Vous avez la parole.
Chawki Amine Eddine
Mr. Chair, honorable members of the European Parliament. Thank you for the opportunity to brief the DROIT Committee on the humanitarian impact of the ongoing conflict in Lebanon and on the protection of civilians through the lens of international humanitarian law. The International Committee of the Red Cross has been present in Lebanon since 1948, with a permanent presence since 1967.
This long-standing presence over decades of conflict and crisis has allowed us to build strong acceptance, maintain dialogue with relevant authorities and actors, and preserve access to people affected by hostilities. We work in coordination with the Lebanese authorities and in strong partnership with the Lebanese Red Cross, whose volunteers and emergency medical teams remain at the frontline of today's response. Guided by our mandate as a neutral, impartial, and independent humanitarian organization, the ICRC's work in Lebanon focuses on promoting respect for IHL, protection activities including detention visits, confidential dialogue, supporting families of missing persons from the conflict in Syria and Lebanon's civil war, strengthening the medico-legal system, and providing assistance in health, water and habitat, and economic security, again in cooperation with the Lebanese Red Cross. In this latest episode of conflict, the humanitarian situation remains deeply concerning. As of the 14th of July, the Lebanese Ministry of Public Health reported 16,545 casualties since last March.
These would include 4,324 deaths and 12,221 injured persons. The impact on healthcare has been particularly severe.
135 healthcare workers have been killed, 406 medical personnel injured, and over 170 incidents affecting emergency medical services, including two Lebanese Red Cross volunteers killed and seven wounded while rescuing others. 17 hospitals sustained damage, including three that have ceased operations. Behind each number, there is a family, a community, and a life permanently affected. Because when healthcare workers, ambulances, and hospitals are affected, the consequences go far beyond the immediate incident, and entire communities lose access to life-saving care. Displacement has also reached unprecedented level.
At the peak level of the escalation in March, we had approximately 1.2 million people displaced. That is one out of every five Lebanese, mostly coming from Southern Lebanon, Bekaa Valley, and the southern suburb of Beirut. These repeated waves of displacement and mass evacuation orders have placed heavy pressure on shelters, host communities, and municipalities. Despite the June ceasefire announcement, many remain displaced because the situation is still volatile and returns are not always safe or sustainable.
Damage to electricity infrastructure has disrupted power supply in several districts of southern Lebanon, affecting water pumping stations and other critical services, while roads, bridges, healthcare facilities, and public infrastructure sustained varying degrees of damage. This means that people may physically return to their towns, but they cannot rebuild a dignified life. At least 250,000 people may remain displaced in the long term due to the destruction in southern villages and the continued occupation. This will transform what began as an emergency displacement situation into a protracted displacement crisis. This conflict has also extensively affected livelihoods.
Farmers, daily workers, small business owners, and people dependent on seasonal income in agriculture or tourism have lost access to their lands, to their markets, to their productive equipment and facilities. For many households, the conflict is not only an acute security crisis, but also a critical erosion of economic survival that will have long-term consequences. Along this backdrop, the ICRC's immediate response is focusing on three priorities. First, protection of civilians through bilateral and confidential dialogue with all parties to the conflict and relevant authorities to address humanitarian concerns and promote respect for IHL.
Civilians must be protected, the wounded and sick must be cared for, medical personnel, ambulances, healthcare facilities must be respected, and civilian infrastructure essential for survival must not be targeted. Our second priority is preserving access to essential services, particularly water and healthcare, including in hard-to-reach areas such as south of Litani, through support of water establishment, emergency repairs, and health facilities. And finally, supporting healthcare system so people wounded by the conflict can receive timely quality medical care, including through war-wounded kits, medical supplies, support to emergency responders, and dignified management of the dead. This emergency response, though, is facing serious operational challenges. Access remains constrained by security conditions and notification requirements, including advance notification of up to 48 hours in many directly affected areas.
Such arrangements can enable access, but they also create delays when needs are urgent, particularly for the wounded people requiring medical care or communities suddenly cut off from assistance. Mr. Chair and honorable members, I would like to close with three main messages. First, we ask the EU Parliament and the EU institutions to continue to raise their voice in support of respect of international humanitarian law in Lebanon. IHL is not an abstract legal framework.
It is the difference between civilians being protected or exposed, a hospital functioning or closing, a family receiving news of missing relatives and loved ones or remaining in doubt and anxiety. Second, we encourage the systematic integration of IHL considerations in future resolutions, discussions, and policy positions concerning Lebanon and the region. Political and security debates may be informed by the immediate and long-term humanitarian consequences of military operations and by the obligations of the parties to the conflict. Third, we urge you to keep Lebanon on the EU agenda. The humanitarian consequences of this conflict are significant.
Assistance requirements for recovery will be extremely high at a time where other countries in the region have also been affected by conflict and faced immense needs. Continued diplomatic attention, funding, and principled engagement are essential to preserve essential services, prevent further deterioration, and protect civilians. Thank you.
Mounir Satouri
Merci monsieur pour ces propos. Je donne la parole maintenant, toujours en ligne, à Monsieur Mazen Shaqoura, chef du bureau du Haut-Commissariat des Nations Unies aux droits de l'homme au Liban. Vous avez la parole pour sept minutes, cher monsieur.
Chair, excellencies, members of the European Parliament, good afternoon from Beirut, and I want to apologize.
Mazen Shaqoura
This is particularly alarming given that as reflected in 2025 reports of the UN Secretary General on protection of civilians, Lebanon recorded the highest number of health workers killed in conflict globally on par with the occupied Palestinian territories. In the meantime, during the intense fight, indiscriminate rockets launched towards Israeli civilian areas. Displacement order and occupation. The breadth of the Israeli displacement order affecting large areas of territories and over 1 million residents raises serious concern that such measures may amount to prohibited forced displacement under international humanitarian law. Hundreds of thousands remain forcibly displaced from their towns and villages in the south of Lebanon.
According to the map published by the Israeli military, Israel occupies 620 km, which constitute almost 6% of Lebanon. An area composed of around 70 towns and villages. The Israeli army has warned people not to return. Such an order could amount to war crime of forcible transfer.
OHCHR express grave concern of a pattern of apparent violation of international humanitarian law and international human rights law reported in the Lebanese territories currently under effective Israeli military control. We are gravely concerned by the routine repeated demolishing of civilian housing, destruction of life-sustaining infrastructure and preventing civilian return, which may have effect of cleansing large parts of Southern Lebanon.
It is the operationalization of victim largely recognized right to know what happened to them, who was responsible, and what is being done to ensure it does not happen again.
Mazen Shaqoura
Before concluding, allow me to recognize the important work of our colleagues and partner in Lebanon. We are particularly acknowledged the work of the Lebanese Red Crescent and also in addition to this, the Lebanese National Committee for International Humanitarian Law under the leadership of the Deputy Prime Minister for its essential role in promoting and advocating respect for international humanitarian law.
Mounir Satouri
Merci beaucoup. On va maintenant visionner le message de Madame Holmgren. Ça va arriver, je pense.
Ce que je vous propose, c'est qu'on demande à Madame Matei de faire l'intervention et on va faire la conclusion, c'est ça? Oui, exactement. Comme ça on perd pas de temps. On essaie entre-temps de régler la question technique. Allez-y.
Mihaela Matei
Merci beaucoup. Dear Chair, thank you very much for having us today. I'm Mihaela Matei from the External Action Service. I will just want to brief you not only on the situation, the deep worrying situation of human rights and international humanitarian law breaches in Lebanon, which was very well presented by our previous speakers, but also on what the European Union has done, both the Commission and the External Action Service, and most importantly, what we plan to do in the future to address the situation and support the Lebanese authorities.
Of course, the situation remains deeply concerning and the recent conflict had devastating consequences for the Lebanese people, not only because of the tragic loss of life, but also because of severe long-term economic, social, psychological hardship in a country where this comes on top of years of political instability, economic collapse, corruption. So this conflict has came at a moment where it further weakened the resilience of individual, communities and state institutions, and also at a moment where European Union was welcoming the first strong reformist government in Lebanon, really committed to advance economic reforms, have an agreement with IMF and move towards, and we were planning and we were discussing with them moving towards a strategic and comprehensive partnership. So the moment the war started, everything was on a right track, let's say, on Lebanon and we had a lot of progress, also on Beirut port explosions, if you remember, all the scandals and what happened, the collapse of the banking system. And unfortunately, this all now is not put on hold, but has been slowed down because of internal situation.
We had ICRC mentioning that we had one in five Lebanese being an IDPs. I think if you count the existing Syrian refugees population and also the Palestinian refugees, now in Lebanon maybe one in four is either an internally displaced person or a refugee, which is huge for such a small country. And it plays a huge pressure on public services, local communities, state institutions, undermines access to education, healthcare, livelihoods, basic services, even policing has become extremely difficult and it leaving deep physical and psychological scars on affected community. We have been extremely worried about the risk of rising of sectarian tensions, given that a lot of Shia population in the south has been displaced and given that some of the population has been displaced in areas that were Christian or Sunni. And this is a trend that was for the time being well managed by the authorities.
I think Lebanese people has shown not only remarkable resilience but also remarkable support for each other. However, in a country that has come out of a civil war that it had, the risk of sectarian tensions is always there and can always be exploited by external intervention. And this is something we have to pay attention to.
Of course, the protection of civilians must remain at the heart of our collective efforts, and international humanitarian law is unequivocal, and all parties must respect their obligation and ensure protection of civilians, humanitarian personnel, peacekeepers, civilian infrastructure, medical workers, and journalists. Since the outbreak of the conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, the European Union mobilized 100 million in humanitarian assistance for Lebanon, delivering emergency food assistance, shelter, medical supplies, humanitarian air bridge, and activating the EU Civil Protection Mechanism. Furthermore, for the first time, the World Food Programme emergency response tool has been also activated to provide food support for hundreds of thousands of displaced people. Beyond the humanitarian assistance, and we have our colleagues from ECHO here in the room, so they can also answer more dedicated questions on their direct work on the ground, we have consistently reaffirmed our full support for the government of Lebanon led by President Michel Aoun and Prime Minister Salam, and for the Lebanese people. We have issued several statements calling for respect of international law, called Israel to avoid further widening of the conflict through a ground operation.
Mihaela Matei
Sorry. Thank you, sorry.
And at the same time, we have strongly reaffirmed, including at EU 27 and the European Council conclusions, our support for Lebanon's sovereignty and territorial integrity and our support for Lebanese authority efforts to disarm Hezbollah. The EU-Lebanon Association Committee in December 2025 was followed by the visit of President Antonio Costa and Ursula von der Leyen in January 2026 and sent a strong political signal of EU support for Lebanon reform agenda, and this commitment remains unwavering. We continue to work with the Lebanese people. Tomorrow, we have a subcommittee on energy, climate, and transport. We want to finish all the subcommittees' technical work with the Lebanese government still this year, following the Association Council.
So it is not a country that is failing. It's a country where the government remains committed to pursue reforms, to pursue engagement with the European Union, and this is visible on a daily basis and daily engagement with them. We have welcomed the US-brokered trilateral agreement of 26th of June between Lebanon and Israel, hoping that this agreement, even if the implementation will be complex, can pave the way for the establishment of those mentioned pilot areas, withdrawal of Israel IDF forces from the south, return of refugees and return of IDPs, and reconstruction of the destroyed villages.
Looking ahead, I think the main and core objective of European Union and the External Action Service for Lebanon is strengthening the Lebanese state. A strong, accountable, effective government is the foundation for protecting human rights, restoring public confidence and supporting the Lebanese citizens. They are resilient, but they need security, justice and essential public services. We have also strongly mentioned our commitment to a strong UN presence after UNIFIL withdrawal from south of Lebanon. End of this year, the UNIFIL mandate will end and we hope UN will still have a strong presence on the ground, being able to observe the situation in the south.
Finally, for the future, we are focused on advancing preparations for a future Common Security and Defense Policy mission, a CSDP mission in Lebanon, the first of its kind in the entire Levant area, except for the two missions we have in Palestine. And this mission will provide the needed support for the Lebanese Armed Forces, but also for the Internal Security Forces. And we have increased and provide an additional 100 million in support of the Lebanese Armed Forces through the European Peace Facility, providing critical equipment, including anti-drone equipment for the Lebanese state.
I want to mention at the end something that also I think our EUSR wanted to mention. It is remarkable to notice that in spite of the dire conditions on the ground, Lebanon retains a very vibrant civil society, diverse media landscape, space for peaceful activism, and has taken a strong stance to abolish the death penalty. We are hoping that in the coming days, maybe even tomorrow, the Lebanese Parliament will vote for the abolishment of the death penalty for all crimes, including its retroactive application. And this is a significant move as it is the first country in the Middle East to abolish the death penalty, setting a powerful example in a world where many others continue their executions. So I think the people of Lebanon have shown this extraordinary resilience in spite of repeated crises, and this should be something that we can build upon, but it cannot be a substitute for long-term peace, security, and functioning institutions.
And this is where the European Union has to continue its support for the Lebanese authorities, the Lebanese state, and the restoration of state authority. Thank you.
Mounir Satouri
Bien, merci pour cette intervention, et je pense que le problème technique est réglé et qu'on va pouvoir écouter Madame Olangren.
Kaja Olingren
Honorable Chair, distinguished members of the Human Rights Subcommittee, I want to thank you for bringing attention to IHL in the context of Lebanon, one of my priorities since the beginning of my mandate. And today, I want to first reflect on the results of my mission in November. And second, I want to reflect on the facts on the ground today. And finally, I would like to deliver some recommendations based on a recent event I convened on human rights and IHL in the context of Lebanon. So during my mission, I focused on both human rights and IHL.
It became very clear that human rights are completely intertwined in anything related to the future of Lebanon. The fact that many human rights issues from civil war times were left unresolved has also led to impunity in other sectors. Resolving the banking and the socio-economic crisis, electoral issues, and to re-establish a monopoly of arms in Lebanon must be done by addressing all generations of rights. Progress on accountability for emblematic cases, including the Beirut port blast and political assassinations, can also increase trust in the institutions and help attract investments.
Progress has been made, although much of it continues to be hampered by the ongoing conflict. Addressing socio-economic rights and the sense of injustice related to this is also essential. A key attestation to the commitment of this government to human rights is the fact that the bill to abolish the death penalty is indeed advancing to its final stages, a significant development which sends a strong signal in this region in particular. I also made a point about visiting the south of Lebanon, shedding light on violations of IHL that continue until today despite the ceasefire. The consequences of this conflict have left Lebanese people economically even more vulnerable.
Over a million Lebanese have been internally displaced since March this year. Half of them remain in displacement today. Under IHL, the people should be able to return to their places of residence as soon as hostilities end. The destruction of civilian infrastructure is also illegal once the civilian population has been removed. And today, in the so-called security zone, daily demolitions by the IDF with bulldozers and tanks, indicating that this is not just collateral damage, are undermining the practical possibilities for return.
The spread of chemicals to threaten food security and livelihoods is unacceptable.
I have also made several statements regarding the killing of medical workers and journalists who should be protected under IHL. And with the government, I regularly discussed intentions to ratify the Rome Statute or, alternatively, temporarily accept the jurisdiction of the ICC under Article 12.3. There are difficult issues at stake here, including the implementation of the framework agreement with Israel. And most importantly, for peace to be sustainable, the people of Lebanon from all communities, especially those in the south of the country, but also in other parts like the Bekaa or the north, need to know that the government is there for them and that they are able to seek services and security from them. Special attention should be paid to the reconstruction and restoration of livelihoods.
International support and funding is key for the re-establishment of a monopoly of arms as well as physical, social, and psychological reconstruction. Hezbollah must disarm while Israel must withdraw from the Lebanese territory. The looming departure of UNIFIL continues to be a source of concern for many Lebanese.
And when considering future EU CSDP support, I believe it is key to ensure that the security sector related approaches are complemented with support on human rights, rule of law, justice and accountability. Of course, the government must also do its parts. Reforms should be finalized to the extent possible before the next parliamentary elections. Thank you very much.
Mounir Satouri
Voilà, je pense que c'était important qu'on donne la parole même via cet enregistrement à Madame Hollangren. On va donc passer à l'échange avec les membres et c'est Anna Jalul qui commence pour le groupe socialiste.
Hana Jalloul Muro
Thank you very much, chair. Well, I mean, I had an, we have Mr. Mazen Shauki there online, I guess, no? So, Marhaba bikum Mazen Shauki, I know that you're there and thank you for your job. I mean, I was quite surprised by the intervention here in the podium because, you know, Israel was not mentioned at any time and UNRWA has not been mentioned, refugee camps have not been mentioned, as a country that have more than 500,000 Palestinians plus the Syrian refugees, nobody have mentioned this. It's quite shocking for me why people are asking the Lebanon to commit reforms when the country is under occupation and it's funny when they say the situation in the south is undermining the return.
Of course it's undermining the return because the country is under occupation. So we have two main problems, the country have two main problems, which it is the disarmament of Hezbollah. Hezbollah has been not mentioned no one time, as I think maybe I was wrong here. I said militias, no, we need to talk by names. Hezbollah needs to be disarmed if government of Lebanon wants to be reinforced.
But at the same time, you need Israel to withdrawn from southern Lebanon. And then something very shocking too. So the special envoy for human rights was saying now that they want Lebanon to sign Rome Statute. So we want them to have an ICC, to be part of the ICC, signing the Rome Statute, but we have the ICC under threat and under sanctions and we are not able to activate the Rome Statute in the European Union, in the Parliament. I mean, I need to be critical of this because I think this is unacceptable that we're talking about these issues in this Parliament and it's the European Union when we do nothing to enable the, you know, the blocking statutes in order to forbid the sanction to the ICC members.
So I mean, we cannot ask countries, demand countries to do things that we do not do by ourselves.
And apart of that, I think we need to be much more practical in the sense that many times in history, Lebanon has been given a lot of money. This doesn't work anymore. So we need specific projects related to sanitation, all the, it has not been mentioned here today, also the many projects that have been destroyed, European Union projects that was financed by the European Union and has been destroyed in Southern Lebanon where there is nothing, nothing there. You know, so how the humanitarian access also has been guaranteed for the localities subjected to control of demolitions? Is there any registry or documentation mechanism for damage to civilian property and heritage for possible future claims or reparations?
So we need things that are very specific on this and we need to have specific projects that are practical for the reconstruction and for the living of people. And last but not least, we are not talking about the issues of the displaced people that is more than one million in cities like Beirut where, you know, we have a lot of problems between, this has been mentioned, you know, some of the religious communities and a lot of conflicts between them because people doesn't have a place to live and they are occupying houses and things like this. So it's sometimes at the bridge of a civil war situation, it's very difficult and I think we need to address the situation from another point of view and much more realistic.
Thank you very much.
Barry Andrews
Thank you. So this this afternoon, earlier this afternoon in the DEVE committee, we heard from the Ukrainian Health Ministry. In Ukraine there have been double tap attacks on health workers, on health rescue staff, rescue workers coming to relieve the effects of bombing. Double tap attacks in Ukraine. We have seen a huge increase in the killing of healthcare workers in Ukraine, in the occupied parts of Donetsk and around Kharkiv and elsewhere.
We have seen the deliberate targeting of healthcare facilities in Ukraine. And thankfully, the European Union has been consistent in its pursuit of sanctions against Russia for these war crimes. In fact, there have been 20 sanctions packages of sanctions against Russia and a 21st in preparation. There are also double tap attacks in Lebanon, which was called out in our humanitarian resolution in the plenary last week. There have been the killing of healthcare workers as the gentleman from the Red Cross just pointed out, deliberate killing of healthcare workers.
And there has been the widespread targeting of healthcare facilities by Israel. War crimes. Exactly the same. No difference. No moral difference, no ethical difference, no legal difference.
The only difference is that there have been zero packages of sanctions in relation to Israel. So my question to the gentleman from the Red Cross, Lebanese people are highly educated, sophisticated readers of international media. What is their impression of the European Union's differentiated approach to these two situations?
Speaker 21
Qui s'exprime pour les écologistes? C'est Erik Marquardt, j'imagine. Erik.
Erik Marquardt
Yes, okay. So first of all, thank you very much for the contributions and information. I mainly attended the meeting to learn a little bit more about the current situation in Lebanon.
But of course, I also have some questions. The question Barry just asked to the Red Cross is pretty interesting, but I would also like to ask two questions to the EEAS, Matthias. First question is, like, of course we can talk about how much money we send to Lebanon, and then we can send another 100 million, and everybody in this world knows that this will not end the suffering. The suffering will be ended when the conflict ends and reconstruction begins, so to say. And I would just like to understand which instruments do the member states of the European Union have, or the European Union and the EEAS have in theory to increase the pressure on Israel, and which of them will be used in the near future and which not, and why?
That's my first question. And second question is maybe more a little bit general remark, because, like, we attend lots of these meetings and we learn that 100 million, pretty straight number, 100 million is spent for humanitarian aid and other stuff. But we never learn if it's efficient, effectiveness, and like, I would like to understand a little bit more how the action of the European Union on the ground really looks like. Not that I assume that we don't, like, put just money there, you know, like.
So that would be also be interesting for me.
Mounir Satouri
Merci Eric. Est-ce que Madame Fermanish qui est parmi nous souhaite prendre la parole ou pas ?
Speaker 24
Thank you very much. I would just like to to ask the the people that have talked about the situation and the dire situation, what to their mind who to their mind is most responsible for the situation as it is and in what way is the general outlook, the dire outlook concerning the the global situation and with the ongoing war in the concerning Iran also affecting affecting the situation and having an effect as as to the to the consequences the people in Lebanon are facing.
Mounir Satouri
Ok, je crois qu'on a fait le tour de toutes les demandes de prise de parole des membres. Je vais donner la parole à Monsieur Shawky Amine Eddine pour trois minutes de réponse et avant de redonner la parole à Monsieur Chakora. Allez-y Monsieur. Allez-y.
Chawki Amine Eddine
Thank you. So, addressing the first question regarding the perception of the EU. Before I address that point in specific, it's very important to highlight that overly permissive interpretation of IHL's exception must not be allowed to undermine its fundamentally protective effect. IHL, again, it's not just an abstract legal framework. It's there to make the difference between the protection of civilians who are directly affected by the conduct of hostilities.
And with that being kept in mind, I think it's very important to ensure consistency in the way IHL is being addressed and to ensure that IHL remains credible. When we ensure consistency in how we advocate for IHL, when we ask EU as well as all states to raise their voice, to speak up on IHL, this is exactly what we are trying to request. We are requesting consistency in advocating, in ensuring that the rules of the law are really applied so that we can maintain and ensure that the IHL, the international humanitarian law, remains a credible legal framework. Now regarding the the second question, it's also important to highlight that these hostilities in Lebanon come on top of years, as as was mentioned earlier, of compounded crisis. So the essential services were already stretched to a breaking point.
The economic situation was already dire and and the countless families were struggling to cope and to recover from from rounds of of economic crisis, COVID, the Beirut port explosion, as well as a previous round of escalation. Many of the families that have been displaced were displaced for second, third, and even fourth times in less than two years. So in line of the the current regional and global situation, it's very important to highlight that communities in Lebanon cannot really endure another cycle of of violence.
And in line with international humanitarian law, civilians must be protected and every effort must be made to spare them from further suffering. Thank you.
Mazen Shaqoura
Thank you, Mr. Chair. And thank you for the questions. And I apologize in advance, some of them I'm afraid that it has a political connotation that I'm not a politician. I'm international functionary that I will reply or try to elaborate based in my mandate.
I'm afraid that for external and internal reasons among them is the issue of sanctions being the entire government under sanctions by those who are not respecting the multilateralism those who are where the reasons behind the eroding of respect of human rights and IHL in the region. So I'm afraid we are not very close to the ratification of the Rome Statute and that's why in my intervention previously I raised the issue of the IIIM could be an accountability mechanism and this can be also linked with the departure of UNIFIL on November this year because the last renewal by the Security Council an unprecedented in the Security Council resolution was mentioned extension for the last time. So meaning there is no UNIFIL after November this year. So any forces in the future whether the Americans or others to replace UNIFIL will not have the mandate for monitoring the situation and reporting.
So, we still advocate, and this is the possible venue for the time being, for the IIIM that can use the universal jurisdiction in the area when it comes to accountability. But the best case scenario definitely is joining the Rome Status. But we have to bear into, to take into consideration that also Israel is not party, party to the Rome Status. Maybe it's time to call for the Swiss government, Switzerland as a depository of the international humanitarian law, the Fourth Geneva Convention, to convene a meeting for the high contracting party to conclude in the issue of the occupation in South Lebanon. So this is something also to take into consideration.
Disarm, not to disarm Hezbollah, this is something internal. And I would just focus on one issue when it comes to this, because this is a polemic issue and this is also again, this is internal, external and has a regional dimension and also beyond the region.
But inclusivity is a key.
Mihaela Matei
Je vais essayer d'être courte. I think there have been no EU statements, be it EU 27, HRVP spokesperson, European Council conclusion, where European Union has not asked for Israel to withdraw from the south of Lebanon, respect sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon, and for Hezbollah to disarm. So I think that's something that is consensual and has always been reiterated and I think I mentioned it clearly. I would tend to disagree with the idea that Lebanon government should not be put under pressure to commit to reforms. It is not under pressure, it is their commitment towards reforms because they need to replace Hezbollah.
Mihaela Matei
Hezbollah is not just an armed group, it's also a group who provides assistance and provides services to certain villages, to certain areas. If you want a long-term plan to disarm Hezbollah, you need a strong state and you need a strong state that continues its reforms. What Hezbollah would want is a state that stops reform saying I'm under occupation, I do nothing.
So I think this is our duty to support them and to strengthen them, not only from the perspective of the security forces and the Lebanese Armed Forces that I mentioned, but also from the perspective of a state that is able to provide to its citizens. I mentioned the refugees, but I did not mention that European Union continues to strongly support the Syrian refugees. And we have a durable solution project for the return of Syrian refugees to Syria to try to alleviate the pressure on Lebanese authorities. Prime Minister Salam in Foreign Affairs Council was very clear. They remain committed to advance on all fronts.
And the stronger the state, the better it will be able to also be stronger in negotiations and to have the power to advance, to put the Lebanese Armed Forces in the south and to convince Israel, I mean, to convince IDF to withdraw. Whatever this is possible or not, that's a different question. On the question about what can we do, what EU can do to increase pressure on Israel. As you know, the trilateral agreement in Washington, neither EU nor the member states were part of it. However, we used to have a military coordination, military technical committee for Lebanon with UNIFIL, with France represented.
And this is still a tool that was a tool to monitor the ceasefire of 2024.
It still meets. It still has the representative of Israel and Lebanon there, and it still plays, hopefully will play a role also in monitoring what's happening in the south. We think, we still think that post-UNIFIL, UN should have a very strong presence, continue its monitoring and reporting. And a strong UN presence there as a neutral player will also be a pressure because that will be documented. There was a long speech about accountability.
Accountability for crimes should be towards everyone. And UNIFIL soldiers killed, we condemn it, but it was also clear that the killing came from both sides. So I think accountability is a key area. For that one, we need UN. We need monitoring and we need reporting.
Sanctions were mentioned. I do not have an answer to that from the External Action perspective. I think that the usual answer that we always have, it takes EU 27 member states to agree on sanctions. And unfortunately, in spite of several discussions in the Council, there have always been member states who did not agree on imposing sanctions. And indeed, I agree with you, it's a situation in which we can be accused of double standards, but this is how the situation is.
So I can't say more than that, I think. And on the situation, on what European Union does on the ground, maybe if we have one minute only, I can ask the colleague from ECHO to maybe say a few words.
She just returned, Béa returned from the field. She was working in Lebanon, so she can give you an account on what the humanitarian aid is, how humanitarian aid is dispersed and what it is used for. Thank you. Unless there is no time.
Mounir Satouri
Oui, de toute façon vous avez raison parce que l'intervention de Béatrice Miège au nom de la Commission était prévue, donc allez-y.
Béatrice Miège
Merci merci Monsieur le Président. So I will just one minute. Yeah, I'm in fact in fact did indeed back from Lebanon for a week and what I can tell you is that and I was there by the way with the ICRC delegate online to the south, to the front line and to see the level of destruction and in particular the attacks on the health structures, on the health workers, ambulances and so on. What I can tell you is that one single euro which is put on humanitarian aid in Lebanon is well spent. And you may know that the way we work, we don't work directly with the authorities contrary to the development, but of course we work with our partners, so being the UN agencies, being the Red Cross and the Red Crescent movement and the international NGOs.
We are identifying the needs together, so just to be sure that we are prioritizing the right things. I would like to confirm that for ECHO, we are speaking about responding to the needs of the Lebanese vulnerable population, including of course the displaced people, but also the Syrian refugees. And we should not forget that we have a new caseload in Lebanon with the new arrivals of people who have been basically attacked right after the change of the regime in the Alawite area in Syria. And we are also supporting UNRWA for the Palestinian refugee caseload also in Lebanon. We have colleagues on the ground.
They are people who have been recruited because they used to work as implementing partners. So they are monitoring every single project we are doing. I had really a chance last week to be able to go to the south, south, but also to the north to meet with all the Syrian refugees. I also visited the Palestinian refugee camps and a lot of other projects which are prioritizing health, water, food. But we are speaking here about cash assistance in Lebanon.
Again, there is a big, big possibility to do cash assistance in Lebanon.
And this we are doing in collaboration with our colleagues from DG NEAR. So, I mean, again, I would like really to reassure you that the accountability of what we're doing in Lebanon is ensured. Thank you.
Mounir Satouri
Merci. Merci à vous toutes et vous tous. Cette assemblée, ça a été dit, a toujours rappelé sans relâche au respect du droit international humanitaire. Nous continuerons à le faire. Et pour notre part, à cette sous-commission, nous continuerons à suivre avec la plus grande attention le développement de la situation au Liban et au respect de ces principes dans l'espoir d'une désescalade durable pour le pays.
Merci. Et bien on va passer au dernier point de l'ordre du jour, le temps que le panel puisse évoluer.
Je vous propose, chers collègues, de reprendre nos travaux avec ce dernier point à l'ordre du jour. Nous allons terminer cette réunion aujourd'hui avec un point de suivi sur la résolution du Parlement sur la protection des défenseurs des droits de l'homme contre la répression transnationale, adoptée en plénière en novembre 2025 sur la base du rapport de notre sous-commission dont notre collègue Chloé Ridelle était rapporteure. Cette résolution adoptée à 84 % des députés faisait un constat alarmant des dangers et des menaces découlant des pratiques en matière de répression transnationale, mais contient également de nombreuses pistes pour faire davantage pour la protection des défenseurs des droits de l'homme et la lutte contre la répression transnationale. Nous avons donné immédiatement suite à cette résolution par un dialogue politique et un atelier d'experts en décembre 2025 qui ont fourni des recommandations concrètes supplémentaires et assurant un suivi constant des travaux sur ce phénomène avec toutes les institutions de l'Union européenne concernées, l'organisation internationale et des organisations non gouvernementales.
J'ai récemment envoyé des lettres de suivi à la haute représentante vice-présidente Madame Kallas et à la commissaire Sikela, les remerciant pour notre coopération et les invitant à nous communiquer dans quelle mesure les recommandations et la résolution sont suivies par l'exécutif européen. Par ailleurs, le Parlement européen a adopté en juin une autre résolution sur la répression transnationale dont Hannah Neumann a été la rapporteure pour la commission des affaires étrangères que je salue également pour la qualité de son travail. Nous nous prêtons donc aujourd'hui à un véritable exercice de contrôle parlementaire et de scrutin démocratique tout en faisant le point sur l'évolution de ce phénomène que nous combattons et avec les représentants de Freedom House et de Human Rights Watch. Je donne la parole tout d'abord à notre collègue Chloé Ridel puis à Hannah Neumann, les deux rapporteures sur ce sujet avant de poursuivre avec nos autres invités.
Chloé Ridel
Merci beaucoup Monsieur le Président. Huit mois après le vote de mon rapport sur la répression transnationale, je suis très heureuse que vous puissiez organiser aujourd'hui cet échange et je remercie également les services de la commission.
Je salue également ma collègue Hannah Neumann pour la grande qualité de son rapport sur le même enjeu. La répression transnationale, c'est devenu un véritable enjeu de sécurité pour l'Europe, de souveraineté, de démocratie. Et je crois que grâce à nos rapports qui se complètent vraiment bien, nous approchons enfin d'une définition commune de ce qu'est la répression transnationale, qui désigne donc des attaques, des menaces menées par des États tiers directement ou par l'intermédiaire de relais contre des opposants, des journalistes, des défenseurs des droits humains ou des membres de la diaspora au-delà de leurs frontières et donc chez nous en Europe. Cette répression, elle prend des formes multiples. Ça peut aller jusqu'à des assassinats, des enlèvements, des demandes d'extradition abusives aussi, mais de la surveillance numérique également, du harcèlement, de l'intimidation, de la répression administrative et judiciaire.
Alors depuis la publication de mon rapport, j'ai été contactée par de nombreuses personnes qui subissent ce type de répression transnationale et qui expriment tous le même sentiment d'avoir été entendus par le Parlement européen, parce qu'il faut savoir que cette forme de répression isole considérablement ses victimes et les pousse souvent à se demander si ce qu'elles vivent est réel, si elles ont des droits, si on les croit, si elles seront protégées.
Et elles m'ont décrit, ces victimes, des formes de répression parfois très discrètes mais toujours destructrices. Des victimes qui n'osent même plus aller renouveler leurs papiers auprès de leur consulat, d'autres qui évitent de voyager, de participer à des événements publics, d'autres encore qui limitent les contacts avec leur propre famille restée au pays de peur de représailles contre elles. Des défenseurs géorgiens notamment qui m'ont parlé des menaces qui visent leurs proches restés au pays, des Ouïghours qui m'ont raconté les pressions exercées par les autorités chinoises ici en Europe, des opposants turcs qui décrivent le harcèlement administratif et financier permanent dont ils sont l'objet et qui les poursuit même après leur arrivée dans l'Union européenne. Donc voyez bien l'ampleur du phénomène et son actualité. J'aimerais revenir sur les recommandations portées dans mon rapport qui, si elles sont suivies d'effets, je le crois, pourront considérablement améliorer la situation de ces personnes, de ces victimes de répression transnationale sur le territoire européen.
Il y a d'abord l'enjeu de mieux documenter le phénomène et je me réjouis que Freedom House soit présent aujourd'hui mais qu'on puisse élaborer une vraie base de données européenne sur le phénomène qui permettra ensuite de construire une stratégie appropriée. Donc améliorer la collecte de données et le suivi des incidents. Créer aussi des mécanismes européens de surveillance de ces de cette répression pour échanger des informations sur les cas recensés et mieux pouvoir protéger les défenseurs. Utiliser les instruments diplomatiques de l'Union européenne, nos délégations, nos missions à l'étranger pour aborder systématiquement la question de la répression transnationale dans les dialogues politiques avec les pays tiers. Former les professionnels de sécurité, de justice, dans l'administration à ce qu'est la répression transnationale.
Sanctionner les responsables. On pourrait examiner l'utilisation du régime européen de sanctions en matière de droits humains dit régime Magnitski contre les auteurs de répression transnationale. Encadrer aussi les technologies de surveillance, les fameux spywares qui sont utilisés aujourd'hui à des fins de répression transnationale et limiter l'exportation de ces spywares quand ils sont produits par des entreprises européennes et qu'ils veulent être exportés vers des États tiers dont on craint qu'ils s'impliquent qu'ils les utilisent derrière pour mener des actes de répression transnationale.
Et puisque Interpol est aussi présent aujourd'hui et je m'en réjouis, je voudrais également évoquer la question des notices rouges et la question de l'utilisation abusive des notices rouges d'Interpol. Dans mon rapport, je proposais qu'Europol puisse se saisir du sujet de la répression transnationale, puisse être compétent contre la répression transnationale, donc on élargisse le mandat d'Europol et qu'on lui permette d'évaluer la pertinence ou le caractère abusif ou non des notices d'Interpol. Bientôt, il y aura une réouverture du règlement Europol et ce sera là une bonne occasion pour rendre effectives ces mesures qui encore une fois, vous l'avez rappelé Monsieur le Président, ont été adoptées par 83 % de notre Parlement européen et qui bénéficient donc d'une légitimité forte. Voilà, donc la répression transnationale, elle est devenue un instrument assumé des régimes autoritaires pour étouffer toute voix critique jusqu'en Europe et je crois que notre Union européenne a vocation à rester un refuge pour toute personne qui veut rester libre et combattre pour la liberté. Merci beaucoup.
Mounir Satouri
Merci Chloé et la parole est à Anna, la rapporteure sur le rapport de la commission AFET.
Hannah Neumann
Thank you Chair and also thank you Chloé and I think you have already seen that with Chloé's report the Parliament has done its job in recognizing and describing transnational oppression and saying what needs to be done and now we really need to speed up implementation. I would like to highlight four priorities of EU institutions in this regard.
First, I think the European Commission, Chloe said everything on the definition and the data gathering. The other aspect would be to identify and close the loopholes in our own systems that are at the moment abused basically as Trojan horses for transnational repression. Because there's transnational repression that is purely criminal acts, like murdering someone. But there's a lot of transnational repression that is basically abusing legal, financial, whatever banking systems. To give you maybe three examples.
First of all, Russia, for example, when people are on the Russian blacklist, they are not served by Russian consulates or embassies anymore. So they run out of passports. Why don't we provide them with alternative documents that work at least in the European Union? People are reported to financial systems, they don't have bank accounts anymore all of a sudden. Why don't we provide them with means either to contest this or with a European bank account?
Or contracting of translators for asylum processes.
Usually the contract needs to go to the cheapest agency, which is why some of these countries basically have mushrooming cheap agencies that provide translation services and then they sit in the middle of where all this vulnerable information is being exchanged. So we really have to identify and close these loopholes and to connect internal security, justice, migration, external action instead of treating them as separate policy fields, all basically addressing transnational repression without referring to each other, which is why I think it is very crucial that we include transnational repression as a distinct phenomenon in the upcoming European security strategy that aims to exactly do this kind of links. And it would also have a very strong signaling effect, I think, to these countries that we recognize this phenomenon and we don't allow that anymore. EEAS, here as well, Chloe has made a lot of valid points. I think EEAS also has a crucial preventive role in systematically monitoring transnational repression in partner countries, because we also have, I mean, basically one country like China doing transnational repression in a neighboring country where also we can monitor that, engage with civil society, diaspora organizations, integrate transnational repression to human rights dialogues and political reporting and really increase sanctioning under the human rights sanctions regime for transnational repression.
We have seen some in the case of Iran, but there is much more that can be done. Third to the Council, and I'm very happy to have some Co-Hom representatives sitting behind me.
And we really need to get member states engaged in all of this because a lot of these topics fall under either shared or member states' responsibility. I have high hopes on the Irish Council Presidency based on this two-way approach to get things started. I think one easy way to get it started is just a best practice exchange between member states to develop then a roadmap on necessary changes and projects, for example, on the closing of loopholes that they all can commit to, to implement the definition and the data gathering on national level. I think that would be crucial first next steps for the Council and, I mean, just overall improve the protection and support to those affected by transnational repression. I think on Interpol, Chloe has said everything.
The Parliament has provided the roadmap, we now need the institutions to translate these recommendations into operational practice. And also, frankly said, not to do utterly stupid things. And I'm just referring to news that I received today that the European Union member states, we don't know yet which ones, agreed to accredit six more Taliban to provide consular service in the European Union. We already have two Taliban accredited in Germany, and let me be very clear what is happening there because this is basically delivering the transnational repression on the golden tablet. Because what happens when we accredit Taliban as counselors in consulate is that we are handing them over the list of the addresses of all Afghans living in the respective country, living in the European Union.
And why are they living in this country or the European Union? Because they were under death threats from the Taliban, which is why we gave them visa to come to safety to the European Union. And now we allow the Taliban to get access to all their addresses, and we force them to have their paperwork done to go to the Taliban. I mean, that is the most brutal recipe on ensuring and giving them all opportunities to do transnational repression. And this is what I mean with closing loopholes and not doing utterly stupid things.
And this is one example where I think there is just not enough awareness on how transnational repression works, because I hope no one does this on purpose. The regimes, and I mean just not just the Taliban, we have more than 50, I think Freedom House will report on that in a second, they cooperate to send a very clear signal to all the people opposing them that they are nowhere safe.
And I think it has to be our role as the European Union altogether, all the institutions, including member states, to work hard to stand our ground, that we don't accept such kind of repression on European soil and ensure that everybody is safe now and here. Thank you.
Mounir Satouri
Merci Anna. Merci mesdames. Je l'ai dit tout à l'heure, c'était important de donner la parole à deux ONG dont le travail depuis de longues dates sur le sujet a été essentiel pour notre travail. Et je vais commencer par donner la parole à la directrice de recherche en stratégie de Freedom House. Yana, vous avez la parole pour cinq minutes et merci pour vos apports.
Yana Gorokhovskaia
Thank you for extending an invitation for me to participate today. I'm especially grateful to MEP Chloe Ridell and MEP Hannah Neumann for their leadership on this issue. The work of the European Parliament has brought much needed attention to the threat posed by authoritarian governments that reach far beyond their own borders to threaten, intimidate, and harm dissidents and exiled activists and members of diasporas, of course, this phenomenon of transnational repression. Despite this attention, autocrats have not been deterred. Freedom House maintains the world's most comprehensive database of direct physical incidents of transnational repression, which now includes 1,375 cases recorded since 2014.
Unfortunately, every year we add at least 100 cases to that database, and we uncover evidence that more governments are using tactics of transnational repression. As of the end of 2023, we have found evidence that 54 governments, so that's more than a quarter of all the world's governments, have attempted to silence exiled activists abroad. These include really powerful countries like China and less wealthy and powerful countries like Afghanistan. Even more worryingly, in recent years, we have found that more governments are acting together to commit transnational repression. While so-called authoritarian neighborhoods like the former Soviet Union, the Mekong Delta, and the Middle East have always been dangerous for dissidents fleeing repression at home, recently East Africa has become a region where both individual and groups of activists advocating for democracy have been attacked, detained, and returned to their home countries.
And of course, we are reminded often that people who have relocated to democratic countries in Europe, as well as North and South America, remain vulnerable to transnational repression, both directly via surveillance, intimidation, and even physical violence, but also indirectly when democratic governments act on spurious extradition requests, faulty Interpol notices, and deny asylum claims because evidence has been provided by autocrats.
Some democratic governments have adopted policies that have helped to track incidents of transnational repression, support communities targeted by it, and implement measures of accountability. In the US, for example, the FBI records incidents of transnational repression that are reported by the public and investigates these incidents where that's appropriate. To make this possible, the Bureau has trained staff at a reporting center to recognize transnational repression and has made materials about the issue and how to report available in many different languages. The Canadian government, through its Public Safety Ministry, has conducted outreach with at-risk communities, spreading awareness of the threat and informing the public on how they can contact the government and law enforcement. Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, the UK, many others have offered people experiencing transnational repression police protection and prosecuted cases.
The European Union, Canada, and the US have also issued sanctions to push back on acts of transnational repression.
Mounir Satouri
Il y en a, excusez-moi de vous interrompre, si vous pouviez parler un peu moins vite, ça serait plus simple pour les interprètes.
Yana Gorokhovskaia
Okay, I will try and slow down, although I see I have less than a minute and a half. As I was saying, the European Union, Canada, the US, others have issued sanctions and other diplomatic measures to push back on transnational repression, although I'll note that this has been done on an ad hoc basis and often only highlights the actions of certain pariah states, whether that's Iran, Russia, or Belarus, and often doesn't mention many other countries that engage in transnational repression. All of these responses are good, but most countries still lack a codified definition of transnational repression in law, which limits their coordination and policy responses. Police protection is limited to high-profile targets, it's also very expensive. Reporting mechanisms, where they exist, sometimes create unrealistic expectations about government responses and can lead to disappointment among members of diaspora and discourage their use.
In short, no government has yet solved the problem of transnational repression. To conclude, I want to highlight a couple of the recommendations that are in these two resolutions from the European Parliament that we think could be very effective. The first has already been mentioned, member states need to adopt a definition of transnational repression, the one being used by the OHCHR is a good model. There needs to be a method established of collecting data on transnational repression.
There needs to be training for law enforcement and asylum and immigration authorities because they are the ones encountering this phenomenon the most. The EU guidelines for human rights defenders should be updated immediately to account for transnational repression, especially digital acts of transnational repression, coercion of family and denial of consular services. Those are the biggest threats faced by people who've relocated to Europe. And finally, because the only way to truly prevent transnational repression is by raising its costs for perpetrator states, the EU should examine including transnational repression under the existing human rights sanctions regime, other relevant conventions, the EU external action plan and any forthcoming agreements, human rights dialogues and cooperation frameworks with countries outside the EU. I want to thank you for your time.
Mounir Satouri
Merci à vous et je vais donner donc la parole à Philippe Dam, directeur du plaidoyer auprès de l'UE de Human Rights Watch. Cher Philippe, tu as la parole pour cinq minutes.
Philippe Dam
Merci, merci pour l'invitation de la part de la sous-commission et puis merci aux rapporteurs Glucksmann et Neumann pour les deux importants rapports qui ont été adoptés récemment. Je vais passer en anglais et je vais essayer de parler relativement lentement. Imagine that you in Brussels feel targeted by proxies of a government which is known for jailing or even killing its critics.
On top of that, you're a national of this very government and your life is potentially at threat as well. And on top of that, you're not finding protection and remedies from the government of the country you live where. This is what transnational repression is about, when governments extend their repression beyond their borders and leaving the victims in a gray zone, no protection, no remedies and no accountability. The reality is that today you cannot do any human rights work without coming across thousands of cases or hundreds of cases of transnational repression. This is a feature of the authoritarian playbook.
And that's why the two reports that this Parliament adopted can give hope to the victims. The Parliament is not alone. At the global level, you have action at the UN Human Rights Council, reference to in reports of special procedures, references in a text of resolutions and work by the UN Human Rights Office. In other European contexts, you have the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and in the Foreign Affairs Council's conclusions also making references and work on TNR. Awareness is now here, but now we need to translate into concrete steps.
The first challenge as colleagues mentions is is the one of definition. It's not TNR is not defined in international law.
There is great convergence between the EP and the UN definitions, but we think that a legitimate, effective, and non-Western-heavy definition of TNR is required to make a change globally. And we continue to insist as well on the importance of the work of the UN Human Rights Office in this regard. The second challenge is of course of implementation. Both DROI and AFET reports come with a very solid and ambitious roadmap to the Commission, EEAS, delegations, Council, and even Member States. So now it's time perhaps for the Parliament to set up scorecards for all actors concerned, prioritize actions, monitor areas of progress, and where there are still gaps.
The third challenge is exactly what you mentioned, not filling the vulnerabilities. And I want to insist on the need to really prevent complicity in the context of extradition requests and unlawful returns that may put European governments at risk. We have repeatedly documented deportations, for example, of Tajik opposition activists after their claims to asylum were denied, but they were immediately arrested when landing back home. We've documented the recent case of Asadullo Boboev, deported from Germany, a country which otherwise is one of the best equipped and aware about the phenomenon of TNR.
He was arrested when landing in Dushanbe. This is the fourth similar cases, the fourth similar cases since 2023, despite Tajikistan's well-known dire human rights record, its participation in TNR in Europe, and many warnings made by civil society groups. The fourth challenge, as discussed earlier, is the one of mapping and documentation. For transnational repression within the EU, it could be done by an independent structure which could collect reports of all forms of TNR, from the physical attacks, which are the tip of the iceberg, to the most vicious forms of TNR: harassment by proxies, online, denial of consular services, reprisals against relatives at home, with a view to inform policies and protection. At the global level, the EU's footprint makes it ideally placed to map the patterns, identify the states responsible, the states where it takes place, and who are the targeted communities.
And of course, funding for CSOs which document TNR is key. They are the best placed to document hidden forms of TNR. They are the first-line defenders for victims, and given the US cuts, the EU should step in for documentation, but also to expand protection for defenders.
And of course, fifth challenge, the use of the full diplomatic toolbox. Colleagues mention it, but the EU and its member states must denounce cases publicly when safe for victims, reflect TNR in human rights dialogues and higher level bilateral meetings, include TNR human rights-based assessments before any engagement with countries which are responsible of TNR. This is essential in the context of migration, extradition, security and justice. I want to insist on the need to raise concerns on TNR with governments of the countries where TNR takes place, not just with the countries which are practicing it. The key tests, I think, have been kind of mentioned by Yana.
It's important, for example, to raise the cost for governments like Kenya or Thailand where we see really expanding the practice of TNR within those countries. And finally, of course, the use of sanctions and lead of initiative at the UN level. I'll conclude by saying that the leading thread of EU's and its member states' response to TNR must be to meaningfully listen to civil society groups and community of the diasporas organizations in the policy making and the actual prevention measures which are needed. I'll stop here. Thank you.
Mounir Satouri
J'invite vraiment tous les orateurs à tenir compte des conditions de travail des interprètes et à ne pas parler trop vite. Généralement, on vous informe du temps qui vous est alloué. Vous ne réglez pas le problème en parlant vite, mais en parlant moins.
Donc faites attention aux conditions de travail de nos interprètes. Est-ce que Jan-Christoph Oetjen souhaite prendre la parole ? Allez, vas-y.
Jan-Christoph Oetjen
Oui, je veux bien, merci Mounir et moi aussi je remercie Chloé et Hannah for the good work and I realize I switched to English. So, I just want to say that I think the reports are a good basis and I thank Freedom House and Human Rights Watch as well for doing an important work on it because I think one sentence Hannah said is really important. It's a phenomenon that is not enough known and people are not aware of it. So making it public, speaking up, bringing it to media is an important part of this awareness raising on transnational repression.
And I think that the hook to start putting it into official EU documents so that Council then has to look at it and work on it and so they can then mirror it with their capitals. I think this is a good way of bringing it onto the table of member states as well because we know, and we discussed this when we worked on the reports, that there are some member states that are quite aware of transnational repression and that transnational repression is happening on their ground as well, and some are not. Some are not at all, and some even don't care so much. So I really think that this is the best way of putting it forward. And I think here in DROI Committee, Mounir, maybe as a follow-up we could hear then as well from the different actors that we address with the reports about the implementation of the steps that have been taken as a follow-up because indeed, I mean, a report in European Parliament is the one thing, but translating it into action by member states, by authorities is the more important part.
And so I just think that we need to keep on working on the topic, bring more colleagues to the table that can spread the word as well. And in that sense, yeah, let's try to make people move on it. Thank you.
Mounir Satouri
On ne pouvait pas mieux le dire, Jean-Christophe, parce que l'objectif aujourd'hui, outre le plaisir de réécouter nos collègues rapporteurs et d'écouter le point de vue des ONG, c'était de donner la parole à nos partenaires de l'UE, membres des autres institutions. Ils sont nombreuses et nombreux à être présents. Alors je vous remercie évidemment d'être là et pour la coopération habituelle qu'on a ensemble. Mais vous avez compris que l'objectif aujourd'hui était de vous entendre sur les suites qui ont été données à nos recommandations et examiner les possibilités de renfort de notre coopération et notre coordination sur ce sujet important. Je n'ai pas besoin de redire ce que les collègues ont déjà dit.
Et donc, Monsieur Matthews, vous êtes un habitué de la sous-commission Droits. Je vais vous donner la parole pour cinq minutes et ne peux que vous inviter à faire attention à la qualité du travail de nos interprètes. Voilà.
Elis Matthews
Thank you very much.
Let me begin by expressing our appreciation for the European Parliament's strong and sustained engagement on this issue. I'd like very much to acknowledge the important work led by MEPs Ridala and Neumann through their respective reports and resolutions, and they've really helped to sharpen the EU's understanding of transnational repression. It's not an isolated or marginal challenge. It's systemic, it's a growing phenomenon. Human rights defenders are amongst the primary targets, but it also affects journalists, lawyers, academics, students, and artists in exile.
There are some important principles which you bring out in your reports and resolutions, and I think we agree with those. So first of all to say, transnational repression is something that undermines fundamental values and democratic principles, but it also threatens both national and EU sovereignty and security. No state should seek to intimidate, harass, or silence individuals beyond their borders, and all states need to be held to account in terms of upholding their international human rights obligations, which includes making sure that individuals who've sought protection in their territory are able to live free from cross-border threats, coercion, or interference.
That logically means that we need to strengthen protection and emergency assistance. It also means that cooperation is essential with host states, with civil society, with international organizations to prevent, protect, and respond. There's an accountability dimension, reference was made to sanctions as well. There is a dimension related to technology and export controls on digital technologies that can too easily be abused, and we need a comprehensive kind of all-of-government, or in this case all-of-EU response, which is looking at the bilateral, multilateral, and domestic levels and combining all the elements that I've mentioned. So what have we done so far?
It's an evolving field, but some examples include, firstly, that the EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy, the current one, already strengthens the protection of human rights defenders. We've addressed this, as was said clearly, in the latest Council conclusions on EU priorities in multilateral human rights fora, and we are looking in the next action plan, valid from 2028, to be much more explicit about transnational repression.
Secondly, the EU guidelines for human rights defenders continue to provide a practical framework for identifying, supporting, and protecting defenders at risk. We've seen an increase in the number of cases of transnational repression affecting human rights defenders, and we have to respond, and we have had to respond. There are good examples to both individual cases and to broader country patterns, and your recent hearings, including, for example, on Vietnam, have been an important part of that. And thirdly, we are investing in boosting our own awareness and capacity. So we're training EU diplomats to recognize and to respond to transnational repression in close cooperation with member states and with partners on the ground.
And for instance, in April, we held a dedicated training with OHCHR, with members of the Trust Secretariat, and with Human Rights Watch. We do regularly raise transnational repression in our political and human rights dialogues. A recent example would be two weeks ago with Vietnam. At the multilateral level, we're advancing this agenda in fora such as United Nations and the G7.
We're committed to continuing our cooperation with the European Parliament, which I think has been vital in terms of the awareness raising that you've been making and the doing and the and the recommendations that you've been making and also drawing out the broader dimensions of sovereignty and security and making the links there. There are examples of using the existing global human rights sanctions regime to sanction individuals responsible for transnational repression. The example of Iran was given and we think that that framework already allows further designations to to be made. We do support stronger international safeguards against the misuse of Interpol mechanisms, for example, and I'm sure we'll hear from the Interpol colleagues. And I just want to say that the most recent EU strategy for civil society adopted by the Commission, that was last December, reaffirms the EU's commitment to tackle transnational repression in its external action and it includes important commitments to ensure the protection of human rights defenders, including against transnational repression within the Union itself.
We're making efforts also to collaborate with partners to bring the issue to the table of the Council and that needs to be in a way that cuts across silos. We'll hear from others about that. So in conclusion, I would say, as I said, it's an evolving domain.
We're doing better, or trying to do better, at bringing together the necessary partners and resources. We need a principled, sustained, and collective response, and we look forward to working closely with everybody represented today to strengthen the EU response in this area and to make sure that those who defend human rights can do so in safety, wherever they are, and including within the European Union. Thank you.
Mounir Satouri
Merci, Monsieur Matthews. Je vais donner la parole maintenant à Mohamed El Azzouzi, chef du secteur droits de l'homme à la DG INTPA. Cinq minutes d'intervention.
Mohammed El Azzouzi
Merci beaucoup, and thank you for the invitation. Indeed, and as mentioned as well, the Commission welcomed the Parliament's effort to keep TNR high on the agenda. The Commission has taken careful note of the recommendation in the resolution on addressing transnational repression of human rights defenders, and steps have been taken to address some of them in the implementation of the external action, but also some elements in the internal dimension.
We continue to to provide support to human rights defenders at risk and working in the most repressive environment worldwide through this through the human rights defender mechanism protectdefenders.eu. The flagship initiatives allow for the EU to to provide a specific support to human rights defenders to protect them from the risk and consequences of of transnational repression, offering them holistic support in the form of wide range of services such as emergency grant, temporary relocation, capacity building on safety and security measure. Transnational repression will also be more explicitly embedded in the new phase of protectdefenders.eu. It is today in the current initiatives already covered. It it can cover support to human rights defender victim of transnational repression, but we will make it more explicitly featured in the in the new in the new phase that will start next year in May 2027 and that we are currently negotiating for an additional 15 million euro.
With this new phase, we will also ensure that information, data collection on human rights defender victims of transnational repression is foreseen, those that benefit from the support through the initiative, so as to better understand the scale of the phenomenon in the country where ProtectDefenders acts. Since the adoption of the resolution, we have as well, as was mentioned, regularly exchanged with and collaborated with the EEAS. It was mentioned that we have as well organized human rights and democracy seminars with EU delegation colleagues to raise awareness on the transnational repression phenomenon, which allowed as well to have a dedicated discussion on the topic. And we engage with OHCHR community of practice for Europe, which aimed at providing a space for engagement and collaboration among organizations working in this field, including with our colleagues from DG JUST. More broadly, besides the support via protectdefenders.eu, DG INTPA provides a multifaceted support, including through different initiatives like the Digital Democracy Initiative that provide digital resilience and security for pro-democracy civil society actors in the world, in the neighborhood and also in third countries.
An additional element, we will soon launch a call for proposal where we will foresee more explicitly again support to address transnational transnational repression. On the on the internal dimension, as was mentioned, the EU strategy for civil society was adopted in in December and recognized the growing threat faced by civil society and human rights defenders, highlighting the growing phenomenon of TNR. And this strategy is also backed by by action. Transnational repression was included as a possible area of action under the CERV program, the Citizens, Equality, Rights and Values program, under different call for proposal where it was specifically explicitly mentioned. And as a result of this of this call, some of the partners that implement the protectdefenders.eu received a grant to implement an action called Protect EU.
This new project to protect civic space and human rights defenders in Europe has recently started, like 1st of July, so it's really new. And it is foreseen that the project will be delivering report and information on transnational repression, the scope of which is still to be defined by the organization, by the civil society. And we'll be providing as well holistic capacity and resilience building to support human rights defenders in Europe, including tailored training that integrate physical, digital security and psychosocial support. So we have taken already some steps thanks to this resolution to make it more explicit in different elements, whether in our call for proposal, whether in the new action we are developing. And there has been as well specific funding for civil society organizations to work on that in the EU.
It's first steps, more work is necessary and more cooperation as well with our colleagues in DG JUST and others, but that's the first step we have already taken. Thank you.
Mounir Satouri
Merci, Monsieur El Azouzi. Je vais maintenant donner la parole à Monsieur Peter O'Connor, qui représente la présidence irlandaise.
Peter O'Connor
Mr. Chair, colleagues, thank you very much for organizing this hearing today. I would say in terms of the Council, we are beginning to talk about TNR. We raised it actually, Ireland, a couple of weeks ago, encouraging member states to attend this committee meeting today. And I'm delighted to say we managed to double the number of COHOM delegates from one to two.
But, you know, from small acorns. And I'd like to pay respects to Germany, my colleague who is here today, who are the leading voice on this at COHOM and in the Council, and probably the most consistent in terms of that across-all-of-government application that's needed, and we're all learning from Germany on that. We would agree that Parliament has done its job, and it's over to us now. In terms of our presidency, we have been approached, as you can imagine, by many different actors and CSOs about priorities. So we decided to focus on kind of really deep nuts-and-bolts parts of the human rights.
So, for example, the EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy is going to be a major priority because, as Alice points out, by getting a good message on TNR into that document, it will become a consistent part of EU foreign policy. We are also making the protection of human rights defenders one of our priorities, and there's a clear connection there. And also on civil society space, we see this kind of wedge where civil society space in some countries is completely wiped out. In places like New York and Geneva, it's been limited. And even here in Brussels, we could give more space to civil society.
So we're going to try and get access for civil society to all the working groups here in Brussels.
And that's my first kind of question is which working groups do you need access to? For COHOM, for example, obviously we look at the external action, so things like the human rights defender guidelines is exactly for us and the sanctions regime. And I would always remind, as I always do in these meetings, that under the EU global human rights sanctions regime, CSOs can propose to the HRVP listings, which I think is unique about this regime. But then in terms of what we can do in terms of external action, I'd be interested to hear a little bit more about what the EU can do to improve its response to threats faced by victims of TNR in non-EU countries. And then in terms of threats faced by victims of it within EU countries, who do we need you to be talking to?
We have, you know, the FREMP working group, we have justice working groups. We need to get people who have suffered this into those groups to tell them about it because that will make the connection that we need. And Ireland will help you with that, I'm sure Germany will as well. But one just to leave on a slightly positive note, there's no voice in the Council against this. There's no member state that thinks this is not a problem or that thinks, you know, TNR is a good thing, which is rare to be honest in human rights field that we don't have any member state pushing against it.
So when we had the sanctions on Iran, there was no opposition, it flew through. So that's something to be positive about. The more we can raise awareness in the Council, the more that can be done.
Mounir Satouri
Moi je suis ravi, honoré de vous mettre en débat. Alors c'était pas prévu mais je donnerai la parole tout à l'heure à Monsieur Matthews pour vous répondre en direct puisque vous avez interpellé le SEAE. Je vais maintenant pour finir les interventions donner la parole au représentant d'Interpol. Mais avant j'aimerais saluer d'abord le travail d'Interpol sur les réseaux criminels transnationaux et sur la coopération constructive que nous menons. Je pense principalement au quotidien à saluer Madame Roriana Anna Andreani.
Vous êtes la représentante auprès de l'UE et les contacts avec notre secrétariat se passent très bien. Donc merci pour ça. Et donc je vais donner la parole à Yaron Gottlieb. Je suis désolé si j'écorche le nom. Vous êtes directeur, chef de la cellule notices et diffusions.
Et donc je vous donne la parole pour cinq minutes.
Yaron Gottlieb
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairperson. Good afternoon. It's a pleasure to be here.
We very much welcome the engagement with civil society, with organizations such as the EU and with other organizations because of a number of reasons. The first reason is that we share the same objective. Now, for some human rights defenders and advocates present here, it might sound as counterintuitive: human rights on the one side, police on the other. But let me reassure you and restate from the outset that we share the same objective. Interpol was created over a hundred years ago with a very clear mandate, which is to assist member countries in combating ordinary law crime, in making sure that pedophiles, mafia bosses, murderers do not find safe haven.
We were not created and we do not operate on a regular basis for the purpose of assisting countries in persecuting journalists, critics, and political dissidents. And this is also derived from our legal framework, specifically in Interpol's constitution, very clear statements in Article 2 and Article 3 of our constitution, which are part of the mandate of Interpol. We are obliged to adhere to the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and we are also obliged to refrain from any activity of political, military, religious, or racial character. We take these obligations very seriously.
So we share the same objectives in that we do not want to have notices and diffusions issued for individuals because they criticize the government or because they are political dissidents, etc. That's one aspect. The second reason for which we engage in such discussions is because, notwithstanding the fact that Interpol has been operating for over 100 years, there's still a lot of misunderstandings, misconceptions, and wrong reports about what we do and what we do not do. Quite regularly, we see in the media reports about arrests attributed to Interpol notices. We check them.
We always do. And very often, in fact, we realize there's never been a notice for this individual and the attribution to Interpol is simply a wrong statement by the media or by other organizations, for example, by regional organizations where the information is circulated completely unrelated to Interpol. There's also misunderstandings about the process of review of notices and diffusions before and after publication.
It has been suggested, for example, I believe within the context of the EU Parliament work, that silver notices and purple notices are not reviewed by Interpol or not properly reviewed and there are no remedies for them, while in fact we review them similar to all other notices and we would not publish a silver notice or a purple notice for an individual who is sought because he criticized or she criticized the government. The third reason for which we are here and for which we have engaged in recent years quite heavily with bodies such as the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, with NGOs, is because of the partnerships which are absolutely essential to combat TNR. And specifically for Interpol purposes, for us what is key at the point in time in which we review incoming notices and diffusions or later on when we review on a regular basis existing notices and diffusions, what is key for us is to have information. Is to have information about a situation in a country or to have information about the specific individual who's now being subject to a notice or diffusion sent by a certain country. You spoke here, I have heard a number of speakers here mention databases with information about cases of TNR.
If you keep this information only for you or for your own networks of human rights defenders and we do not have this information, we might find ourselves in an undesired situation where we publish a notice for an individual because this individual criticized the government, but the government is now seeking a red notice for the individual for a different crime and we are unaware about this background and you are aware of that.
Sharing information with us is absolutely essential and can prevent the TNR cases to begin with, at least in the context of Interpol's work. Encouraging those individuals subject to TNR that you are engaged with on a regular basis through your day-to-day work is also important in terms of applying to Interpol and seeking a remedy to prevent publication in the first place or, if a notice or diffusion have been published, to remove them from the from the databases of Interpol. We have for that purpose a dedicated independent Commission for the Control of Interpol's Files, the CCF, which reviews those cases, those applications from individuals and decide on compliance with Interpol rules. And if the case is not compliant with Interpol rules, for example, because it's a TNR case, they instruct us to cancel the notice if we have published a notice and we do so. So because of those three aspects, the same objective, the need to establish partnership, the need to exchange information, and the need to explain what we do, we're here.
We very much welcome questions. Madame Andreani sitting next to me is the head of the Brussels office. She's here if you need day-to-day interaction.
I'm here also after the session if you want to engage and have questions, or during the session. And we look very much forward to continuing the engagement in order to make sure TNR is not become, does not become a worldwide phenomena. And at least from the Interpol perspective, that the cases that we have are good cases and not TNR cases. Thank you for your time.
Mounir Satouri
Merci Monsieur Gauthier. Il nous reste un peu de temps. Donc ce que je vous propose, c'est que les uns et les autres on reprenne, vous repreniez la parole en faisant le plus court possible parce qu'il n'en reste pas beaucoup, mais ça permet de se répondre et mieux se comprendre. Donc Anna et Chloé dans l'ordre que vous voulez. Ensuite les représentants des ONG, les collègues, les partenaires.
Voilà, profitons des vingt minutes qui nous restent pour que la parole circule. Anna.
Hannah Neumann
Thank you chair, and first of all I would like to thank all of those that are here and engaging in the discussion. My key concern or my key thought while listening to all of you was we are still having this discussion as foreign and human rights policy people. These are the kind of people and institutions that understand the phenomenon.
If we would sit in LIBE and have DG HOME here and not the council formation on the COHOM one, but we are still trying to figure out actually which one is the one that we would have to deal with, which is part of the problem if we want to talk about transnational repression, the discussion would be totally different. And I think this is the key challenge that all together we need to pick up now. This is why I referenced the European Security Strategy because it's the one document where now these different aspects are brought together under security framework. But I'm happy to hear of other ways and means to engage with the internal security people about this issue because they are the ones that need to have an understanding and then implement the majority of things actually.
Chloé Ridel
Yes, I very much agree with what Anna just said. Security services will be the one collecting data, speaking in priority to victims, helping them. And foreign external services would be those studying sanctions and making sure that there is appropriate dialogue with countries that are committing transnational repression. But the urgency now is to coordinate better security services under, I believe, the coordination of Europol. Not to be too long, I would have a question for the representative of Interpol.
I thank you very much, sir.
Sorry, you're in my back, to be here today. I think Interpol is a very important institution. We need it dearly. And you recalled that you were created a hundred years ago, but it is an institution that has to adapt to a new world order and to a new reality of transnational repression. So I would just have a question for you.
How do you review notices, notably red notices, blue notices? How can you refuse to put on such notices? What's the procedure and how can you actually say no when you think this is abusive? Yes, thank you.
Mounir Satouri
Merci Chloé. Jean-Christophe? Non. Je vais peut-être demander à Yana en ligne si elle souhaite reprendre la parole.
Yana Gorokhovskaia
Yes, thank you very much. I also have a comment to the representative from Interpol.
I appreciate the attention to data. I think that framing the responsibility to counteract malicious notices and diffusions from Interpol as the responsibility of the targeted individual may not be the right way to look at this. This is sort of a David and Goliath situation. It should be the responsibility of the organization and member states to prevent as much as possible abuse of notices. One way to do that, first of all, we're happy to share the data set that we maintain.
One way to do that is to add extra vetting for known perpetrators, the 54 governments that are known perpetrators of transnational repression, including Russia and others, so that the notices put in by those member states already receive more vetting before they go out into the world. That is something that Interpol can implement now without having people who are targeted by these notices reach out and without putting the responsibility on those people to prevent their own targeting. Thank you.
Philippe Dam
Yes, to respond to Peter first. Yes, I mean absolutely the working parties, the working groups dealing with internal issues relevant to the TNR are the ones for which we do not have access, right? And this is where perhaps your presidency, since you will chair many of these working groups, can help creating a space to discuss it jointly or not with COHOM and create a practice, you know, which would mirror many of the recommendations, some of the recommendations made in Hannah and Chloe's report, meaning to have a whole-of-government approach, which we call for at the national level, which we call for at the EU level, and which is really hard to put in place here because of the complexity of the architecture. You also asked how to better protect victims in non-EU countries. Perhaps thinking about four areas of action.
So I'm Human Rights Watch, so I'll start with that. Speak up, speak up, speak up, and engage in diplomatic démarches when cases emerge in order to remedy them as if it was about dealing with human rights activists or others which are national of that country. Engage really proactively with governments which may be complicit of TNR because of their lack of preventive action.
I mentioned the examples of Thailand and Kenya, but many others prefer to close the eyes because of course it might be irritant for their relations with neighbors, with their big neighbors who may practice TNR. More positively, support and provide some capacity buildings and share best practices with countries which would be ready to tackle it domestically so that they are better equipped to do it. And finally, of course, the need for legal pathways are essential, right? Don't leave, don't let victims of TNR where they are vulnerable. It's important to provide them with ways to accede to the EU territory with a view to find protection.
A quick question to Yaron, in fact it's been asked, what kind of due diligence is in place for the countries which practice TNR? And just a concluding note, again, double efforts to confront EU's bias and selectivity. It's really important to of course engage very squarely on Iran, China, Russia, Belarus, but we call on all actors of course to address TNR when it's also coming from Rwanda, Bahrain, Egypt, India, Vietnam, Saudi Arabia and others.
And some of the migration policies which are in place tend to close the eye on the record of some of those countries that do practice TNR. And finally thank you to EEAS. Your team, Alice and colleagues, is very open to discuss this issue and your support is essential.
Mounir Satouri
Bien, peut-être Monsieur Matthews puisqu'une question lui a été posée tout à l'heure, si vous souhaitez redire quelques mots, allez-y.
Elis Matthews
Can I just check, Mr. Chair, which question? Was it the one on sanctions?
Speaker 40
La question du représentant de la présidence, il peut peut-être vous la reposer.
Peter O'Connor
Sorry, I didn't ask a question of Mr. Matthews. I was making the point that under the sanctions regime, CSOs can propose sanctions to the HRVP, which would not be so much a question to Alice here, it would be a question that you guys would make to the HRVP yourselves, but I would very much encourage it.
Elis Matthews
Okay.
So I think it might be worth, I thought it was in the sanctions direction just to make sure that I'm saying something relevant. Look, sort of two broad points on this. So first of all, as I say, we've been trying so far to deploy a broad toolbox, so to raise it systematically bilaterally in multilateral fora, to support human rights defenders. And then sanctions, I guess, is a very general term with wide meanings, some of which fall within the scope of EU restrictive measures, so for instance visa bans would be, would be part of that. Some of the phenomena that have been mentioned imply things that would be national prerogatives of member states, such as taking decisions under the Vienna Convention to expel diplomats, that kind of thing.
There are member states that have taken such measures, actually quite, quite recently, and they've, they've been widely covered in the, in the press. So specifically on the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime, it's our view, I alluded to this in my initial intervention, that transnational repression is already actionable under the current regime and that acts constituting transnational repression, again examples were given, would be grounds to activate sanctions. The very specific example that was given of Iran was in July 2023 and that was eight individuals and it was specifically related to transnational acts of, of various kinds.
So the regime has been used for that. I guess if it were to be used in the future, what needs to be taken into consideration is that it's not a justice mechanism, but there is a high evidentiary threshold, so they've got to be legally robust, court-proof evidence packages. That would imply, given some of the phenomena that have been described, information also that would be available mainly at the national level. So I think there's that factor and as has been alluded to in terms of consistency and political choices, sanctions require unanimity, but I just wanted to bring those additional points to the debate. Thank you.
Mounir Satouri
Est-ce que la Commission ou la présidence irlandaise souhaitent ajouter un mot ? Vous pouvez reprendre la parole si vous le souhaitez. Et si ce n'est pas le cas, je vais donner la parole pour répondre et conclure nos échanges à Monsieur Gottlieb.
Yaron Gottlieb
Thank you very much and thank you for the questions. So I would like to start with a comment from our colleague from Freedom House.
If there was ever a doubt, the engagement in this context is not with a view to shift responsibility from Interpol to the individual concerned, but rather to encourage those engaging with individuals to exercise their rights and bring to our attention those cases and their concerns. Most individuals don't know about the way Interpol functions. They don't know about how to exercise their rights. They don't have the capacity. They're afraid of sharing information.
They don't know that we treat this information in a confidential manner. So this is not at all with a view to shift the responsibility, but rather to work together. How do we review notices? What is the due diligence exercise that we conduct at Interpol? First, because we have limited time here, I'm going to answer this question, of course, but if you want to know more, aside from asking us, in recent years we have significantly enhanced the transparency in relation to our work.
On our public website, there's a lot of information about the process of review by the team, about the rules, about the interpretation and application of Article 2 and 3 of the Constitution, which I've mentioned and so on. But nonetheless, because the question was asked, it's an opportunity to explain. The Notices and Diffusion Task Force, the NDTF, reviews all incoming notices from all member countries.
We have structured, restructured the NDTF, the task force, based on geographical clusters, which enables us to have dedicated teams focusing on specific countries. In turn, we better understand the concern from particular regions and particular countries. The issue is not only the 50-odd countries that you have in mind that quite regularly, unfortunately, practice TNR. In some cases, we have countries not on your list, but in the context of upcoming elections, they try to undermine the opposition by trying to issue notices. In the context of a failed coup d'état, we often see as a follow-up, requests for those individuals, including from other countries.
With the way that we currently function, we have a very good understanding of what happens in the country. If there's an upcoming election, we monitor very closely, a coup d'état and so forth and so on. Now, every notice that is being reviewed, we have three sources of information. We have the notice itself and the information is provided there. And if, for example, the individual is wanted based on an offense which is to criticize the government, we can decline it from the outset, straightforward, it's utterly clear that it's not in compliance with our rules.
But in addition, there might be situations where a country may try to mask, to hide the fact that they are persecuting individuals.
These are the most challenges, the most challenging cases for us. To that end, each and every notice is also checked against open sources and the information we find there. And the third source of information is information provided by other countries. And this is the essential, the key element here that I would like to share with you in your advocacy to EU member countries. Please include also the call to share information with Interpol about these cases.
I'll give a concrete example. In 2017, Interpol General Assembly adopted a resolution in relation to refugees. It's a landmark resolution for us because according to the resolution, if an individual is a recognized refugee, we would not publish a notice or diffusion for this individual from the country of origin, the persecuting country. But we need to know that the individual is a refugee. And if we don't find in open sources and the individual is wanted for fraud, we might be publishing a notice that we don't want in the system.
However, if a country where the individual is located is aware of the upcoming notice or if they see a notice that we wrongly published, they share with us this information, we are able to prevent the case in the first place or to remove it otherwise.
So this is extremely useful for us. Some of your member countries respond regularly to our requests and confirm the refugee status, some still do not do so. So it's a call for you as a European Parliament, the European institution, please make sure this, this takes place. In addition to what I described in terms of the review before publication, which is the role of the Notice and Diffusion Task Force, my team, we also regularly review existing notices and we focus on those countries that you have mentioned here because we know that that's where we may find additional information later on that may justify reconsidering a notice or diffusion previously issued. So again, it's an opportunity to call for sharing of information that can trigger reopening the review and a revision of a case that we previously published.
And then, what I've mentioned before, but again to give greater clarity to this process, each and every individual has the right to submit free of charge an application to a commission which is in a way equivalent to the data protection units that you have in your countries, to submit an application and layout the arguments why a notice or diffusion, if published, should be removed because it's a violation of the individual human rights, political persecution and so on. The commission engages, it's an independent body, it engages in the review and it decides what to do with it. So there is a remedy also if we publish a notice or diffusion that should not have been in the system, there is also remedy for those individuals to know if there was a notice to begin with, and if there was, to remove it. All of this is, I believe, quite a robust system. I've been working at Interpol for over 20 years.
The way we review notices today is completely different than what I've seen when I joined Interpol. There's still always room to improve and we welcome your support on that. We have a very good training project now in countries where we engage also the judges and prosecutors for them to understand why we act the way we act, for them to understand why there was a question here, why we deny a case, because when we send the response, it goes to the police. The judges don't necessarily understand. Now that we have established this project, the judges understand and they refrain from sending the cases in the first place.
So that's another aspect in which we've improved.
Many safeguards have been put in place, but again, always an opportunity to engage in discussion and very much welcome your views on that. Thank you.
Mounir Satouri
Merci beaucoup. Merci pour ces réponses. Merci à toutes et tous. Je tiens à vous assurer que notre sous-commission continuera de suivre de près cette question et travaillera sans relâche à améliorer la coordination de la réponse de l'UE et la réponse des réponses internationales. Et donc c'est un sujet qui est très important à nos yeux.
L'idée c'est de protéger des gens qu'on doit réellement protéger. Et donc peut-être qu'il y aura dans quelques mois à nouveau une réunion de suivi. En tout cas, merci d'avoir joué le jeu pour chacune et chacun et d'avoir apporté les réponses aux questions qui ont été posées. Grand merci aux interprètes. Grand merci aux interprètes pour leur soutien tout au long de cette journée.
Notre prochaine réunion aura lieu le 2 et 3 septembre 2026. Je vous souhaite de bonnes vacances et un bel été à toutes et tous. Profitez-en pour vous reposer, pour revenir en forme. À bientôt.
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