Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs Ordinary meeting
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ECON European Parliament
Follow its sittingsAnthony Whelan
And the aviation guidelines, which is again I think triggering a broad-based debate with sectoral stakeholders but also with regions in particular regarding support for connectivity. I'll leave it there but look forward to your questions. Thank you.
Aurore Lalucq
Thank you so much. So Q and A session, one minute and a half for the questions, three minutes for the answer and we will start with Markus Ferber from EPP.
Markus Ferber
Ja, vielen Dank. If you don't mind, I would like to speak in German. Vielen Dank, Herr Weyand, dass Sie bei uns sind und viel Erfolg in der neuen Aufgabe, die Sie übernommen haben. Wir sind ja froh als Ausschuss, dass die Stelle besetzt wurde, war ja doch ziemlich lange vakant und es ist doch ein sehr wichtiges Dossier. Sie haben gerade über den Zeitplan gesprochen, wann Sie die Fusionsleitlinien annehmen wollen, aber Sie haben ja den Schreibtisch voll mit Fällen, wo Fusionsleitlinien zur Anwendung kommen müssen.
Deswegen meine Frage: Spielen die Ideen, die in den Leitlinien skizziert sind, schon eine gewisse Rolle, nämlich dass Resilienz und globale Wettbewerbsfähigkeit hier stärker zu beachten sind, dass die Frage des relevanten Marktes anders zu bewerten ist? Also wie gehen Sie mit den Fällen um, die aktuell in der Kommission zu bearbeiten sind und irgendwo ja zwischen der Veröffentlichung und der Annahme beschieden werden müssen? Richtig um. Und das Zweite, was mich natürlich als Berichterstatter des MiFIR-Paketes besonders interessiert: Wir haben dort eine sehr breite Infrastruktur, insbesondere im Nachhandelsbereich, die ja nicht unbedingt zur Wettbewerbsfähigkeit beiträgt, weil sie nur die Kosten erhöht. In Amerika deutlich weniger Akteure im Bereich Nachhandelsaktivitäten.
Wie würde die Generaldirektion Wettbewerb eine Konzentration in diesem Bereich, also Clearinghäuser und Settlement-Organisationen, bewerten? Dankeschön.
Anthony Whelan
Thank you very much, Mr. Ferber. So on the first question, the guidelines even when adopted will not be hard law. They will at that moment bind the Commission because we announce them as our policy, but they are essentially an interpretation of the existing regulation, an interpretation that evolves in the light of a changing economy. And the economy is changing before we have adopted the guidelines. It has been changing visibly for some time.
So in so far as the draft guidelines represent our best attempt to encapsulate that approach to the regulation as of April last year or a further draft that will be developed in the coming weeks, I think we feel free to act on those approaches in the pending cases that are in our casebook at the moment. And companies, more importantly perhaps, should feel free and visibly do feel free to make submissions to us drawing upon the different concepts of efficiencies, resilience and so forth that are put forward in the guidelines. So that is in a way an evolving situation, not something with a hard stop on some date in December.
On the area of different financial infrastructures, such as clearing and settlement, this is an area where we do not act in isolation. I don't think we can look at this without looking at the broader agenda of the Savings and Investment Union and the various initiatives put forward there, because there is of course a certain history in one or other subsector of this area of financial infrastructures of deals that were or not possible in a market reality of I think ten years or more ago, maybe less. But when the facts change, our opinion changes, as Mr. Keynes would have said. So the approach to one or other financial or any other sector under the guidelines and in a hopefully more coherently organized single market also for financial services can of course evolve with that. It would be I think dangerous for me to venture further on detail, but that I think is the kind of tango we are dancing with DG FISMA and the colleagues who are active on developing the Savings and Investment Union.
René Repasi
Thanks, Madam Chairwoman. Thanks, Mr. Whelan, to be here in ECON for this exchange. My questions will also refer to the draft merger guidelines. I would like to start with the introduction of the theory of benefit in the guidelines and the efficiency tests that come with it. You applauded the more dynamic instead of the rather static approach.
Being a competition lawyer, I'm probably in the static camp than in the dynamic camp, whilst the economists come in when we talk about dynamics. Therefore, how do you want to ensure legal certainty and predictability that was the strength of decades of EU competition law in the past in that regard? And what is the relation between having now newly introduced the position on the global markets when we establish harm on the internal market? Do we then basically ignore the harms that we identified in Europe for the sake of having a monopolist being active on the global market? The second is around the innovation shield and the matter of killer acquisitions.
As we know, the Court of Justice has killed the previous approach of the Commission in order to look at killer acquisitions. Now it comes back somehow under the innovation shield. Very concrete, why do you only exclude DMA gatekeepers from those that can be protected under the innovation shield and not other big players, in particular on digital markets? And then more generally, how do you intend to evaluate the effect of innovation on mergers? Thank you.
Anthony Whelan
Thank you, Mr. Repasi. So on benefit efficiencies and legal clarity, that is one of the points that has come back also from the public consultation. Perfection is not of this world in this respect. I think from the point of view of companies which are emerging, the opportunity to make submissions on efficiencies, which was of course always possible, it is embedded in the regulation, in a more clearly delineated framework regarding how dynamic efficiencies can be identified is a positive and it has been greeted as such.
Of course, we as guardians of the public interest need to make sure, and the Executive Vice-President has been very clear about this, including I think in this committee, that claims are not demonstrations. So the fact that the evidentiary burden is still distributed to the Commission for harm, to the companies for benefits, is I think extremely important to ensure that this is not a case where the Commission is somehow under a duty to disprove the claims. The claims must be proven. I think that's a very important matter. And beyond that, in the specific drafting that we are working on now, of course we are trying where we can to introduce additional pointers on the types of evidence that might be particularly welcome or useful.
But as I said in the opening, this will not be a magic solution in a domain where our experience is still somewhat limited. On the innovation shield and killer acquisitions, now as you know, we are outside the framework of the guidelines pursuing other avenues on how these potentially harmful deals at a small scale might reach the Commission. As regards the substantive part and the role of gatekeepers, I think we need to just see this in the architecture of the guidelines, which must be clear. So there is one clear category, which is gatekeepers designated by a specific process for that purpose. That does not mean that all is fine for all other types of large companies.
It is just that in those cases we will have to make a countervailing demonstration that does not simply flow from source. So the presumptions that we create or the indications that we give can always be overturned in the light of the evidence. So a particular case can, even if it seems to be an innovation field case, be reconsidered if a very large company, non-gatekeeper, in a specific scenario is regarded as likely to undermine competition. But we can't go too far with that or we undermine the usefulness of the safe harbor in the first place. Thank you.
Pierre Pimpie
Donc c'est en français. Alors, alors donc on se souvient que le rapport Draghi relève que l'UE est assez faible dans le domaine des innovations. On est très bon en recherche certes, mais ça s'arrête là. Et je vois que si on prend le cas des États-Unis, donc ils ont mis en place une agence qui semble très efficace, c'est la DARPA. Donc je ne sais pas si vous êtes au courant de ce sigle, donc je présume que oui.
Et en fait c'est l'État qui prend en charge donc certains projets et puis ensuite c'est le privé qui prend le relais. Et en fait donc je voudrais savoir si ça rentre dans vos réflexions le fait que l'on intègre les aides d'État donc dans ce schéma donc qui vise à privilégier les innovations de rupture donc avec des aides d'État de sorte qu'après c'est le privé donc qui puisse reprendre la main. En fait donc est-ce que l'on peut donc concilier les règles de concurrence avec cette vision de long terme qui vise à favoriser les innovations de rupture ?
Je vous remercie.
Anthony Whelan
Merci Monsieur Pimpi. DARPA is a specific institutional approach, let us say, which is regularly invoked, DARPA and ARPA, and indeed, although I'm not a specialist here, I think has heavily influenced, among other things, work that the Commission has initiated in areas such as the European Investment Council or the European Scale-up Fund that has just relatively recently been launched and already has, I think, quite a good pipeline. I think it's also something that is more broadly being looked at more closely by the EIB, which historically hasn't been very close to equity financing, but I think discussions are ongoing on that. That's from the broader perspective. In the specific respect of state aid, in a way, our approach follows, in general terms, a very similar philosophy, namely, we are open to a sort of graduated public funding of research and innovation depending upon proximity to the market.
So fundamental research is generally very favourably treated. As and when research becomes innovation and becomes close to market launch, we are typically still supportive, in particular as regards startups and SMEs, and the general block exemption regulation is, I think, strong and will be stronger in this respect. But once you are dealing, for example, with larger firms and their innovation efforts close to market or actual launch of innovative products in the market, one has to, of course, be extremely careful that aid in one country does not disadvantage equally or more innovative firms in other parts of Europe who may not have access to the same public funding. One area where firms and member states can go further than, let's say, the norm is in areas of so-called pre-industrial deployment of new technologies, so very close to the market, data testing, trial production runs and things like that, but in the framework of an important project of common European interest, of which there are several in existence, from microchips to some new ones in the channel now on various areas of biotech. And there, in a way, the trade-off between long-term vision for our economy and the danger of distortion between member states is managed and allows us to let member states go a bit further in this area because it is done in a broad European framework.
You have collaborations between member states. We ensure that there are broad spillovers from this innovation support to other players across the EU. We're constantly seeing whether these approaches, of course, should be recalibrated. It's an ongoing debate in GBER, for example, but I think that scaled approach to accompanying companies towards the market is fundamentally sound.
Thank you.
Stéphanie Yon-Courtin
Merci Madame la Présidente. Merci Monsieur le Directeur Général. Bienvenue pour votre première audition devant notre commission ECON. La semaine dernière, Mario Draghi a lancé le Rhine Group avec Patrick Collison. Deux ans après son rapport, il s'agit plus de poser de diagnostic mais de faire en sorte que les institutions et ce que les institutions n'ont pas su faire, notamment la Commission, passer du constat à la décision et à l'action.
Sur 383 recommandations, une soixantaine seulement auraient été pleinement mises en œuvre. Alors ma question finalement est simple. Quand les auteurs mêmes du diagnostic créent une structure un peu parallèle, que dont certains appellent par un gouvernement parallèle ou une commission parallèle en dehors des institutions censées l'appliquer, quelle est votre réaction ? Deuxième petite question sur les lignes directrices. Au Parlement européen, on l'a adopté, on a adopté le rapport sur la politique annuelle du concurrence dont je suis la rapporteure et on a été très clair sur le mandat qui a été donné.
Et il y a quand même un risque de dilution. Vous avez dit tout à l'heure, vous avez répondu à mon camarade Ferber que effectivement les lignes directrices ne sont pas de la hard law mais sont de la soft law et il y a peut-être un risque de cohérence puisque et c'est d'ailleurs ce que disent les autorités nationales de concurrence qui utilisent ces lignes directrices comme référentiel. Comment on peut s'assurer qu'elles soient appliquées de façon cohérente entre toutes sans trop de contradictions ? Est-ce que le réseau européen de la concurrence va jouer un rôle ici ? Et troisième petite question, il me reste trois secondes, sur le DMA.
On peut se réjouir que de nouveaux gatekeepers soient nommés au titre du DMA mais quid du surcoût de travail d'une équipe, une task force qui fait bien son travail mais qui est au nombre de 75 personnes face à des géants de la tech qui en ont des centaines chacun, centaines de juristes internes avec des avocats. Merci.
Anthony Whelan
Merci Madame Yon-Courtin. On the first question, I think it goes to a significant extent beyond my competences to reply or my mandate. What I can say closer to the DG COMP shop, but more generally first, you know, there is more than one way of counting these things. The Institut Montaigne, which you certainly know, has adopted what I think is a more measured approach to calculating the level of delivery, which of course doesn't depend only on the Commission. So once matters are proposed by the Commission and go into the relevant legislative procedure, in many cases we of course try to assist but are not in charge, quite rightly.
But in specifically in relation to the competition area, I know that on virtually all matters where we have decided to follow the Draghi report recommendations, because that is not true of absolute all of them, we are progressing I think with alacrity. Perhaps with the advantage that in this domain the Commission alone has a somewhat greater liberty to proceed, but nonetheless we are I think keeping our side of that bargain. On the possible dilution or incoherence risk given the fact that the guidelines institutionally will only bind the Commission. Of course the merger regulation is only applied by the Commission, so this is really a matter of application by analogy by Member States under their respective national merger rules, which are often but not always modeled on the legal test of the merger regulation.
What we understand is that, without having taken a vote on this, the community of national competition authorities regard the guidelines as extremely important, if only by analogy, for their work in their respective legal regimes. And for that reason, they take very seriously the interactions that we are having with them on the drafting of the guidelines. They know that this dog will eventually bite them too. So, and that work has gone extremely well. I think the ECN members have been quite positive in their broad responses to the April draft, with, as everyone, their own points on certain specifics.
We will have a further important discussion with them on revised drafting in the coming weeks. And finally, on DMA resources, the Director General has not yet been born who thinks he has enough resources. So, of course, I'd like more, but we operate in a context which is defined by the principle of stable staffing. And we are, I think, regarded as an important priority within the Commission. In the most recent resource allocation exercise that annually takes place in the Commission, some additional resources were freed for DMA activity.
And after that, we just make sure we are more efficient than the armies that we confront in specific case discussions. Thank you.
Jussi Saramo
Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you for this very interesting speech. I will only take one example, since a lot of general answers and speech has been done, of mergers from an industry that I have followed closely. It's about telecom industries that was in one of the industries that Draghi report was speaking about. They always operate locally in the end. So for me, it was impossible to understand the idea of Draghi because if mergers are made in the industry, the result will be reduced competition, higher prices, and worst quality.
And that would weaken the competitiveness of the industries that are really in the international competition. And we know that in the United States, this industry is not doing very well. So why would we want to follow it? And when I'm reading the Draghi report, it doesn't actually make it clear where the ideas come from. We know that it's been a lot of research done, but we don't know why, where do these ideas come in the end.
I know that the industry, they are lobbying very hard, of course, because the profits here are not as big as they could be, like in the United States. So this idea of European champions, it works in some sectors, but then in other sectors, it would be a very bad idea. And I don't know if how good is the sector-specific analysis we have when we talk about this merger guidelines. And should there be a stronger precautionary principle in place? Because we know that cartels and monopolies, we cannot usually correct them afterwards.
Thank you.
Anthony Whelan
Thank you. Well indeed, Mr. Sarvamaa, to start where you finished, the structural character of mergers is something that makes merger control very important because once it has happened, it has happened. And that's why we take very seriously, as I mentioned a bit earlier, the distribution of evidentiary burdens. I'm not going to get into the origins of ideas in the Draghi report or to comment directly those ideas. I'll focus more on what we are doing now or the relevance of the guidelines potentially to that sector.
Indeed, a telecom network or whatever number of telecom networks are available in Helsinki will not be changed by the availability of telecom networks in Lisbon, for example. So in that sense it is local, in the same way as, leaving aside e-commerce, supermarkets, even if you have pan-European groups, end up with quite local analysis sometimes of the effects of one or other merger. I think this comes forward a little bit more in the area of telecoms simply because, unlike retail, it is currently a much more fragmented sector, organized largely nationally, whereas big-box retail at least is already probably substantially benefiting from the single market, which is why we have always said that enhancing the single market in sectors which are quite fragmented, be it financial services as I mentioned a moment ago or telecom, can only improve the prospects for analysis of transactions in these sorts of markets. For the rest, I mean, whether, which is an age-old debate, whether a given merger in a probably national market context is one where the possible price effects will be outweighed by effects on investment in better networks or innovation, this is something we have been confronted with, I think, for already some time. We hope that the new guidelines will help to frame those sorts of discussions in a way that the best possible evidence can be weighed on both sides, but as I was saying earlier, with rigor, with impartiality, and ultimately with an eye to the ultimate objectives of the merger regulation, which is to protect consumers and customers more generally, so including business customers, access to innovative, affordable, and high-quality services.
Thank you.
Fernando Navarrete Rojas
Muchas gracias, presidenta, señor director general. Le quería transmitir mi preocupación por el incremento del número de ayudas de Estado y del volumen de ayudas de Estado que ha pasado en los últimos años. Los números hablan por sí mismos. Hemos pasado una media histórica de que las ayudas de Estado permitidas eran históricamente del 0,6% del PIB de la Unión Europea y estamos actualmente en el 2,5% del PIB de la Unión Europea. La tendencia siempre últimamente es la misma: marcos temporales que acaban deviniendo en permanentes y se van solapando unos con otros.
Y ya el informe Draghi nos recordaba que este enfoque fragmentario a las ayudas de Estado desmantelan la cohesión europea y hacen una competencia de subsidios muy ineficiente. Usted es el encargado de mantener el mercado único europeo. ¿Qué piensa hacer para garantizar que en esta última ronda de mayor flexibilidad en ayudas de Estado es simplemente temporal y no se convierte en algo que erosione la principal arma que tenemos como europeos para ganarnos el futuro?
En relación a las adquisiciones, solo una pregunta. ¿De verdad cree que solo cambiando las guidelines es suficiente? ¿No hace falta cambiar la regulación europea? Muchas gracias.
Anthony Whelan
Thank you, Mr. Navarrete. So on the second point, it's a simple enough response. I have not yet been confronted with an argument that I agreed with to change the regulation or showing that the regulation as currently framed in obviously rather general terms could not allow an approach to a merger that we would regard as well-grounded in economics and in broader competition policy objectives. So the idea of a significant impediment to effective competition is a broad enough one to encompass the dynamic adaptations that we think are necessary. We do not feel frustrated by its terms from going to some area that we would have wished to go to but which were not possible.
That's certainly true for the guidelines as regards, let's say, substantive assessment. There has of course been a discussion in relation to killer acquisitions already raised about notification thresholds and so on, but it may very well be that we are on a good trend with other tools of national law that will allow us basically to be able to receive the tiny minority of concerning small-scale cases that the killer acquisition concept might be relevant to. So broadly speaking, we don't think we need to go there, and that's the decision taken by the Commission at a relatively early stage in this process. On the aid side, I would make two remarks, or three. One is that we have seen that temporary frameworks for one or the other crisis that we have been confronted with can be walked back.
So the level of aid that is possible for member states to grant now relative to the darkest days of the COVID pandemic has been radically walked back. Helicopter money type aid, if I can simplify excessively, as in aid to any sort of company in any sort of sector, has been stopped. The types of temporary aid that have been retained relate to very specific areas, largely dealing with the clean transition and clean tech, and very, very specifically, but this is only until the end of the year, to confront, let's say, a transition if needed to the knock-on effects of the Middle East crisis on energy markets for a very, very limited number of sectors. More generally, there was of course a very significant uptick in aid that you mentioned as a percentage of GDP, but we are now seeing that reverting, not completely yet, but reverting to more normal levels, not quite what you might call the old normal, but certainly far from its peaks.
And we need to add to that the fact that all aid is not equal, in the sense that of course all aid has a distortive potential, but some types of aid, such as to research, just to come back to Mr. Canfin's question, or aid for the energy transition, is clearly necessary. And while of course the ideal solution is always that necessary public investment can be most equally distributed via direct European instruments, the budgetary reality is a different one, and the member states remain important public investors in public goods such as the clean transition. So it is, I think, relatively normal, given the needs of the transition, that aggregate aid levels may be higher than they were 10, 15 years ago, without that necessarily showing that there is a major problem of fragmentation of the single market. Thank you.
Jonás Fernández
Thank you, chair. I will speak in Spanish. El pasado 16 de julio la Comisión hizo públicas unas guidance respecto a la implementación de la DMA en Google, referidas a la interoperabilidad de la inteligencia artificial de Google, de Android, y una segunda respecto a la transparencia o, en fin, el compartir los datos del buscador de Google con terceros operadores. En este segundo caso la propia nota de la Comisión adelanta una cierta tensión entre la privacidad de los datos, la necesaria anonimicidad de los datos y, por otra parte, la necesidad también de compartir esos datos para mejorar la competencia en el sector. Y en este sentido la propia Comisión establece que quizá en el futuro pueda revisarse este, en fin, en virtud de en qué medida los datos anónimos pueden o no compartirse, pudiendo también generar riesgos de ciberseguridad, como la propia Comisión afirma en su nota.
Mi pregunta tiene que ver con esta tensión, ¿no? La tensión entre la necesaria anonimicidad de los datos y, por otra parte, la necesaria, en fin, la necesaria publicación o compartir esos datos para permitir la competencia de terceros operadores. Una tensión que quizá no está del todo bien definida en la medida en que la Comisión también dice en la propia nota que quizá pudiera evaluarse en el futuro, y me gustaría que elaborara algo más sobre este asunto. Gracias.
Anthony Whelan
Thank you, Mr. Fernández. Indeed, that issue of a possible tension between competitiveness and fairness requirements, because these are the objectives of the DMA, and privacy requirements, was a matter of very extensive discussion and broad consultation and technical work with a view to adopting a sound and durable decision in the search data access case that you mention. And indeed, anonymization is the path by which you can reconcile them.
So there is a tension, but it is not an irreconcilable tension as long as you adopt the right safeguards. So in this case, the safeguards are in part technical, so that measures are put in place to avoid identifiability of people who have made certain types of searches, in particular, of course, sensitive searches on health or whatever it may be, religious views and so on. Now, most technical measures in this area are potentially retro-engineerable, at least if the data are to be useful in the first place. But what is important is that, and that was a very important pitch by the company in our discussions with them, but what is important to consider is that technical protections of privacy are not the only protections that are in place. We also have very substantial screening possibilities of the companies that can get access to this data.
We have very substantial contractual requirements on non-retro-engineering of the individual data users or providers, subjects, that are imposed on those who would get access to the data. The systems that those companies will put in place in order to have access are subject to independent audit. And I am probably missing a few points, but I just want to give the picture that it is a comprehensive, multi-faceted set of protections that are put in place in order to ensure that the search data in question is usable and useful for those who get access to it without any sort of possibility for them to retro-engineer it for other purposes that are remote from the actual objectives of the DMA, such as to then start doing personalized advertising based on the data or whatever it may be.
Kinga Kollár
Thank you, Madam Chair. I have a question about artificial intelligence. We haven't talked about it yet, which is surprising a bit. We know that a small number of companies already control the key inputs to AI: computing power, large datasets, and specialized talent. And I think this kind of concentration is not new.
We have seen in 2012 when Facebook bought Instagram, which was a very small company at that time, and at that time that merger looked harmless. In hindsight, we understand it removed actually a competitor which should have been quite important. Regulators have said openly that now they want to repeat this, and they don't want to, they want to avoid repeating this mistake with AI. So my question is, how the revised guidelines will help you in avoiding this mistake again?
Anthony Whelan
Thank you, Ms. Kollar. I mean, there are probably several arrows in our bow on this question. This appears to be a market where there is still an innovation and investment race going on, but where positions change, it seems, if not daily, certainly from time to time, but which probably has some potential, not least because of the huge barriers to entry that this level of investment entails. It has probably some risks of turning to oligopoly, if not even tipping into something worse. So it is certainly absolutely appropriate that we are attentive to how this market develops.
I'm I'm not certain that large players buying very small players is the chief danger given the way the market is operating at the moment. But I think the the concern with with killer acquisitions that is identified is you know it is not sector specific. The the types of tools about dangers to innovation to closing down of alternative possibly much less investment heavy paths to similar performance through through a merger can be can be applied to AI as it can be applied to pharma or or other innovative areas. But I would mention some other areas where we are pretty active on this. One of them is in fact the case just mentioned the the search data access decision under the DMA which was intended in fact to facilitate AI enabled search and therefore to keep that part of the AI market more fluid and and contestable.
I would mention the interim measures that we adopted also in July if I'm not mistaken regarding WhatsApp to to avoid a situation where access to WhatsApp by by third party AI assistants had been cut off and and afterwards put at at exorbitant prices. So merger control DMA enforcement antitrust enforcement they are all part of of the picture of trying to keep this market contestable and and free of tipping without even talking about state aid and and public investment more generally to the building of let's say European AI compute infrastructure capacities and and other things. Thank you.
Aurore Lalucq
Thank you and it was our last question and it was your first time in the ECON committee. So thank you so much for your time for this exchange of view and I'm quite sure that this is the beginning of a very fruitful cooperation with the ECON committee. So thank you again for your time Mr. Williams.
Aurore Lalucq
So we now turn to agenda point six the presentation of the draft report on the pan-European personal pension product. The rapporteur is Stéphanie Yon-Courtin so I will give you the floor for six minutes.
Stéphanie Yon-Courtin
Merci Madame la Présidente. Oui cette rentrée sera décisive pour l'union de l'épargne et de l'investissement et PEPP le produit d'épargne retraite européen dont je suis rapporteur ne fait pas exception. Et donc je ne vous apprends rien en vous disant que les les chiffres sont alarmants. Partout en Europe les États sont confrontés au même défi des populations vieillissantes et des caisses publiques qui sont vides. Rappelons-le d'ici 2070 les retraites publiques ne couvriront plus qu'environ 38 % des revenus d'un travailleur et il nous faut donc agir vite.
C'est justement là que l'Union européenne peut avoir une valeur ajoutée parce qu'aujourd'hui l'offre d'épargne retraite reste profondément fragmentée en Europe. Si elle existe dans certains États elle est très limitée dans d'autres et l'objectif est clair offrir un choix aux Européens là où des solutions existent déjà mais surtout apporter une solution là où il n'y en a pas. Comme vous le savez le PEPP n'a pas encore tenu ses promesses. Aujourd'hui 76 % des Européens n'en ont jamais entendu parler et ce chiffre est révélateur et chers collègues on a un énorme travail devant nous. Les objectifs sont clairs mais on doit aussi être très clair sur ce que le PEPP ne doit pas être.
Il s'agit pas de remplacer les systèmes nationaux ni de remettre en cause les responsabilités des États membres dans l'organisation de retraites publiques dignes et stables. Le produit européen d'épargne-retraite ne remplace pas les systèmes publics, il vient les compléter. Il ne doit pas imposer un modèle unique, mais il doit ouvrir le choix. Et avec mon projet de rapport, je propose huit grands ajustements à la proposition de la Commission européenne, huit priorités politiques avec un objectif : faire du PEPP un produit qui fonctionne pour tous les Européens. D'abord, premièrement, renommer le PEPP.
Il faut être honnête, PEPP ne veut rien dire pour la plupart des citoyens européens et donc moi je propose de renommer le PEPP de base Europe Pension Product, un produit de pension européen. Ça peut sembler être un détail, mais ça n'en est pas un, l'accessibilité d'un produit pour le consommateur commence par son nom. Deuxième chose, donner davantage de potentiel au PEPP de base. Le PEPP de base repose sur une approche dite de cycle de vie, la stratégie d'investissement évolue avec l'âge de l'épargnant et avec une exposition aux actifs de long terme, notamment ceux qui contribuent à financer l'innovation européenne, qui diminue progressivement à mesure que l'échéance de la retraite approche. Des seuils chiffrés rigides ne sont pas compatibles avec cette approche qui doit pouvoir évoluer dans le temps.
Dans ce contexte, je considère qu'il est préférable de s'appuyer sur l'approche du cycle de vie en combinaison avec le principe de la personne prudente plutôt que d'imposer des limites quantitatives rigides à l'allocation de ces actifs. Troisièmement, il faut faciliter l'accès au conseil mais pas le supprimer pour le PEPP de base. Le conseil doit continuer d'être proposé pour le PEPP de base sous une forme plus accessible et interactive pour le consommateur. Ce conseil devrait par défaut être délivré par voie numérique tout en laissant au consommateur la possibilité de demander un conseil en personne. Quatrièmement, il faut soutenir le Work PEPP.
Je soutiens les PEPP proposés par l'intermédiaire des employeurs et les mécanismes d'inscription automatique sous certaines conditions. Par exemple, pour les mécanismes d'inscription automatique, il faut faire une distinction claire selon que le dispositif de pilier deux existe déjà ou non. Et donc je propose que l'inscription automatique au Work PEPP soit possible uniquement lorsqu'aucun produit du pilier deux n'existe dans le pays ou dans le secteur concerné. Et lorsque des produits du deuxième pilier sont déjà disponibles, alors le Work PEPP pourrait être proposé par l'employeur au salarié uniquement comme option. Il ne viendrait pas remplacer les dispositifs nationaux existants mais ajouter une source de revenus supplémentaire.
Cinquièmement, il faut assurer un régime cohérent avec les législations existantes. Il est crucial selon moi de garantir une cohérence entre les textes, qu'il s'agisse du principe de la personne prudente qui figure à la fois dans IORP, je salue ma collègue qui est rapporteure, et dans PEPP, ou encore du principe du value for money présent dans la RIS et dans PEPP. Sur ce dernier point, il n'est pas nécessaire de rouvrir la discussion sur la value for money. On a déjà trouvé en termes de négociations difficiles un équilibre sur les règles applicables dans la RIS et il serait donc ni cohérent ni souhaitable de créer pour le PEPP un régime de value for money différent de celui qui s'appliquera avec la RIS. L'objectif, je le rappelle, doit être de construire un marché européen, un seul, cohérent et pas plusieurs régimes parallèles.
Sixièmement, il faut renforcer la disposition fiscale proposée par la Commission. Les traités fondateurs de l'Union européenne sont clairs : aucun État membre ne peut par sa fiscalité discriminer directement ou indirectement les produits provenant d'autres États membres par rapport à ses produits nationaux similaires. Et c'est sur cette base que je propose de réécrire l'article trois du règlement PEPP en proposant également de prévoir des leviers d'action en cas de non-respect parce qu'il ne suffit pas d'affirmer le principe de non-discrimination, il faut aussi le faire appliquer.
Septièmement, il faut rendre le registre public en ligne PEPP plus compréhensible. Dans son format actuel, il affiche des informations peu pertinentes et peu lisibles pour le consommateur. Et je propose de repenser ce registre pour qu'il soit orienté vers le consommateur, plus lisible, plus informatif et plus facile à consulter. Et je propose qu'à la suite des tests menés auprès des consommateurs, le fameux consumer testing, les informations soient limitées à l'essentiel et d'exploiter la digitalisation pour rendre le site plus interactif. Et enfin, huitièmement, il faut faciliter la portabilité du PEPP dans certains cas.
Comme le propose la Commission, la possibilité de changer de produit d'épargne retraite doit rester possible. Bien entendu, il faut éviter des changements fréquents qui pourraient ne pas être dans l'intérêt financier du consommateur. Et mon rapport ici clarifie deux points. La portabilité devrait être facilitée entre les différents PEPP, y compris les PEPP professionnels, mais aussi entre un PEPP et un produit d'épargne retraite national. Je vous remercie et je me réjouis de ce premier échange avec mes collègues négociateurs.
Aurore Lalucq
Merci Madame la rapporteure. I now give the floor to the EPP shadow rapporteur, Ms. Doherty.
Regina Doherty
Thank you, Chair. And I want to welcome the draft report and indeed the work done by Stephanie, our rapporteur. I'll just make a few general comments on the basis of where the proposal is at this stage. The aim of the original PEPP were genuinely laudable, but I think we all recognize the limitations of that proposal and the evidence that the take-up has obviously been extremely limited, to say the least. So encouraging Europeans to supplement their retirement savings by investing in a private pension product, I think, is absolutely vital.
If PEPP is to be a success, we need to see it in the context of the savings and investment union. So PEPP should be part of a solution in terms of opening up access to finance that's currently not being used productively in across the EU. Europe lacks an effective channel to turn our savings into productive investments, and I think PEPP 2 can create a genuinely pan-European pool of long-term capital connecting people who want to save for their retirement with the European capital markets. But in order for it to be a success this time, we do need to be ambitious and recognize certain realities about the nature of the market, whilst recognizing subsidiarity and the important existing member state competencies, particularly in the area of taxation. So firstly, I agree that it is vital that we make PEPP attractive for providers to offer to customers by use of the carrot and not just the stick.
And this means that we do need to see reform in terms of fees, advice, and reduced red tape. When it comes to advice, I think we should ensure maximum flexibility and not imposing unnecessary costs. And so for the basic PEPP in particular, mandatory advice can add an undue cost to the product, particularly where there is a standardized design and default investment options. We should also look at ways to increase flexibility, diversification of assets, and adaptability in respect of the PEPP offerings to allow for products that are designed with the customer in mind and that also can invest widely in a diversified way. So it should also be possible to integrate PEPP with other pension products too.
I welcome the interesting idea to improve the visibility and the availability of information to PEPP for our citizens. I think there are certainly proposals that should be built upon, ideas such as the single market portability, digital distribution, and making investment attractive, accessible, and rewarding. But we should also be more open about the possibility of crossover between occupational pensions and personal pensions and the role that PEPP can play here. A number of years ago, I served as Irish Minister for Social Protection in Ireland where we launched the work on our automatic enrollment pension scheme. So member states have different approaches to occupational pensions, but we should be able to look at ways where we integrate PEPP with those approaches, I believe.
And finally, Chair, when it comes to the value for money framework, I agree that we should be skeptical of new benchmarks and systems. We should not take an approach that increases costs and bureaucracy without gaining benefits for the consumer at the end of the day. And they're, I think, just some of my thoughts at this stage, but I look forward to the work ahead and contributing to an ambitious text to the benefit of all our consumers.
Jonás Fernández
Thank you, Chair. Francisco Assis cannot attend to this meeting this afternoon and he asked me for reading a note. Dear colleagues, first of all, I would like to thank the rapporteur for the work carried out on this first draft report. As we have repeatedly stressed, the S&D group rejects a catastrophic narrative regarding public pension systems. We don't ignore the challenge faced by pay-as-you-go systems, but these systems should be reformed, not replaced.
The PEPP should instead serve as an instrument to better channel Europeans' long-term savings towards productive investments. In this regard, we will table amendments to reinforce some of the characteristics that we consider essential. In particular, the basic PEPP should be a voluntary, simple, portable, accessible, and low-cost product that ensures an adequate return for savers. To ensure that the product remains simple, it's key that the basic PEPP primarily invests into listed assets. Allowing investments into alternative assets or unlisted equity introduce issues related to opaque valuation, high fees, and lock-up risks that directly undermine the affordability and capital protection guarantees of the basic PEPP.
In our discussions with stakeholders, we have identified taxation as probably the main challenge for the success of the PEPP. We know that this is a competence of the member states. However, if we genuinely want to create a European personal pension savings product, it should benefit from tax conditions equivalent to those granted to comparable national products. We have some reservation about the direction taken by the Commission proposal, which identifies a lack of supply as the main problem. This is why it combines measures aimed simultaneously at significantly reducing operators' cost, potentially increasing their revenues through the removal of the fee cap, and significantly increasing the scale of the market through auto-enrollment.
The cumulative effect of these three changes could result in a very substantial increase in operators' margins without sufficient guarantees that the gains will actually be passed on to the consumers. We cannot support these three changes simultaneously. We are, however, ready to discuss measures that can reduce costs without weakening consumer protection, provided that the savings are clearly and measurably reflected in better conditions and higher return for savers. We also believe changes are needed to the supervisory framework. Giving EIOPA direct supervision powers could help to reduce operational friction and ensure a level playing field for providers looking to scale their product across all 27 EU member states.
We also believe that EIOPA should be mandated to develop a centralized, user-friendly comparison tool to allow future PEPP savers to transparently compare products and make more informed retirement choices. Finally, I would like to state on behalf of the S&D group that this reform must not be used to weaken collective bargaining in the design of the second pillar pension products. Thank you so much.
Aurore Lalucq
Thank you. I think there is no one for PfE, nor ECR, nor the Greens. You want to take the floor? Yes.
Damian Boeselager
I cannot take the official role of the shadow of the Greens, but I just want to say that we are considering adding some amendments when it comes to how the PEPP can be invested to mirror maybe some of the ideas of more innovative investments that we are trying to also introduce on the IORPs side to basically enable, let's say, or incentivize investments in startups and SMEs, but specifically innovative startups also on the investment side of the PEPP.
Thank you.
Aurore Lalucq
Thank you. So, I will now give the floor to the EESC rapporteur, Ms. Maria del Carmen Barrera Chamorro, for one minute.
Maria del Carmen Barrera Chamorro
Sí. Sí. Gracias. Una vez más agradezco su invitación. Es un placer ver que muchos elementos de vuestro draft report están en línea con nuestras recomendaciones y dan respuesta en cierto grado a nuestras preocupaciones.
Me gustaría resaltar los siguientes mensajes. Es esencial mantener las pensiones ocupacionales como preferenciales en el lugar de trabajo y evitar que el pilar tres las perjudique en detrimento de los ciudadanos y trabajadoras y trabajadores europeos. Además, un producto paneuropeo debería tener una supervisión armonizada y unos elementos lo más homogéneos posibles como claves para su éxito. Es esencial además un enfoque holístico observando los tres pilares en su conjunto como prerrequisito para cualquier reforma. El diálogo social, la negociación colectiva y no considerar estos productos como un producto financiero cualquiera deben prevalecer siempre.
Y para evitar que las reformas se vuelvan a presentar sin una evaluación de impacto y sin un enfoque transversal, proponemos la creación de un comité de seguimiento con gobernanza social para evaluar el impacto de las medidas en la adecuación y sostenibilidad y analizar los impactos del desarrollo de cada régimen de pensiones sobre el otro para evitar que las pensiones públicas se vean afectadas por las privadas. Consideramos además por último esencial la posibilidad de recibir asesoramiento y que los fondos proporcionen información sencilla y accesible, así como recursos básicos de educación financiera que bien podrían estar producidos por entidades supervisoras. Muchísimas gracias y quedamos a su disposición.
Aurore Lalucq
Thank you. Thank you so much for your intervention. I will now give the floor back to the rapporteur, Stéphanie Yon-Courtin.
Stéphanie Yon-Courtin
Merci, Madame la Présidente. Je remercie mes collègues pour ce premier échange. Je me réjouis des échanges que nous aurons dans les prochains mois pour négocier ce texte et j'ai pris note de vos commentaires. On les analysera avec attention. On verra notamment les amendements que vous déposerez à la fin du mois.
Et je voudrais vraiment rappeler pour conclure l'ambition qui guide ce rapport. Il s'agit vraiment pas de créer un produit pour créer un produit, en fait, mais de donner du choix au consommateur européen et puis aussi de l'espoir pour sa retraite. Le PEPP peut vraiment faire une différence dans les pays ou les secteurs où l'offre nationale est inexistante ou limitée. Et là où l'offre n'existe pas, le PEPP doit pouvoir créer du choix. Et j'espère que nous pourrons avancer ensemble dans un esprit de compromis et de coopération pour proposer davantage de choix justement aux Européens au niveau européen et répondre à ce défi qui, au-delà de nos différences nationales et politiques, nous concerne tous.
Merci.
Aurore Lalucq
Thank you. Thank you to all of you for the discussion. The deadline for amendment is the 21st September and the vote in ECON is scheduled for December the 1st. So, we now turn to agenda point seven, the consideration of amendment for IORP, Directive on Occupational Pension Funds.
The rapporteur is Damien Boeselager, and you have the floor for six minutes.
Damian Boeselager
Yes, colleagues, I will actually not use the six minutes because I think we have exchanged quite a lot on this. I'm very happy to have seen all your amendments. We are of course in the phase of drafting compromises that we will then discuss at the technical and then the political level. I'm actually very happy that there are amendments also from members who are not shadows, which go in multiple directions. So I see, for example, Mr. Ferber sitting here.
We have amendments from Mr. Fernandes, from Mr. Navarrete, and others. And I think that's good also maybe for you to have a chance to voice your thoughts behind the amendments that you've made, so we can maybe hear from others as well if possible. In general, I can just underline again that our priority is of course to increase transparency for those who are actually using these occupation pension schemes. We want to increase also the diversification and incentivize investment in innovation because we need to, as you know, fill the Draghi gap. I hear a lot of talking about Draghi and it's fantastic that we have identified a gap, but we also need to fill it somehow.
And this is I think one of the ways how we can basically both deliver for better outcomes for the pensioners, the members, and also support our European economy to move forward into a more modern economy. And of course we try to increase the simplification in order to allow a bigger uptake of the second pillar because we all know that pillar one can't be replaced and is extremely important, but is under a lot of stress at the moment because of the demographic developments that we have. So we really also hope that there is an uptake of pillar two and of course also of PEPP and pillar three. So this is where we're at. I'm very happy to listen again to your priorities.
Again, we're in the middle of the work of actually drafting the compromises and I'm very interested, yeah, to go into the actual weeds of the negotiation soon.
Aurore Lalucq
So I will give the floor to the shadow rapporteur and I will start with EPP and Dirk Gotink.
Dirk Gotink
Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you, Damien. Actually, I have more or less the same perspective. I mean, the talks are very constructive and good and we're now diving into the content. A very few people in this room know how exciting IORPs are.
So I would say we just keep it silent, yeah, don't talk too much about it. But the key issue is that there are massive differences between member states. We shouldn't try to make one system out of it. We're putting framework in place. We should allow good functioning systems to function well and continue, and mostly create space for the development of pillar two.
Because I think it's not a question if countries should do it, but when they're going to do it. And in the end, it's going to be the financial situation that's going to force all of them, all of them, to sooner or later adopt a capitalized system because, especially if we look at simply the middle and long-term evolution now of interest rates, good luck with refinancing all that in your national budget. So space for national systems that work. And I like your approach on trust and transparency and sort of the key issue is that you like to talk, Damien, about the Draghi gap. Pensioners like to think that they have put their money in their future income after they stopped working.
And they are not investing in Europe, they're not investing in the Draghi gap, they're investing in a dignified pension. And that is somehow something we need to bridge. Their interests, the members' interests, have to be central and their transparency also about investment decisions and all kinds of things that relate to what we're talking about should be discussed.
You know what I think about the investment mandates. I think you'll see that investment funds, at least the Dutch ones, are probably the biggest investors in especially everything that has to do with green and future. So in that sense, they are leaning more forward into the future than any other institutional investor that I would know. So I would say no investment obligations or VC mandates, but you know that. And in general, I think we can actually make some progress here and create somehow an environment where member states feel that inside that very complicated political decision to do pillar two, that actually the European framework makes it easier for them to do it and not more difficult.
Thank you, Damien.
Adnan Dibrani
Thank you for the S&D, Adnan Dibrani.
Thank you for this, chair, and thank you, Damien. I think I can more or less say hear, hear to both of you in a lot of senses. We have had some good talks until now and I really feel that we will be able to solve this very, very important question. My starting point is simple: workers have to contribute or have contributed throughout their working lives deserve security and decent pensions. Making second pillar pensions more accessible and attractive can help deliver better pension results that we all agree on.
Building trust is an important part of that. I have therefore tabled several amendments on the S&D group to improve transparency and make second pillar pensions easier for people to understand and engage with, because even though Dirk said a lot of people love pensions and this IORP, there's a lot of people that also feel IORPs are not my way of thinking or spending my money into European capital markets and so on. But we that know how important this is really, really love IORPs. If this revision can also help channel more investments into capital markets, we will do that. That would be a very positive outcome.
But I see clear risks in introducing requirements on how pension funds should invest. Investment quotas could shift the risks of political objectives onto pensioners. Instead, I propose that IORPs report data on their investments to EIOPA. This would allow EIOPA to carry out an EU-wide analysis of how IORPs invest. Better and more comparable data can help us identify good practices and areas for improvement across the Union without putting pensioners' savings at risk.
Another priority for me is to respect the nature of this directive as a minimum harmonization framework and nothing else. There is no one-size-fits-all model for supplementary pensions. Member states have different systems and traditions. Much of the work to expand occupational pensions and strengthen trust must therefore be done at a national level. This revision should not undermine national occupational systems that already work really well, for example in Sweden.
This is particularly important for systems based on collective agreements and social partnership, where workers and pensioners are strongly represented. So with this, once again, I really feel that we have good talks and I'm looking forward to the continuing of this issues. Thank you.
Aurore Lalucq
Thank you so much. I think that there is no one for PfE, no one from ECR neither, so I will give the floor to Renew and Anouk van Brug.
Anouk Van Brug
Yes, thank you very much, chair, and thanks rapporteur for the work we did so far. I think we've, I mean, echo what was said before, we had constructive negotiations so far.
And when I look at the amendments, I think it's a solid basis to go further with those negotiations in the way we did before. Our priority is to ensure that the proposal respects the diversity of national pension systems and does not undermine arrangements that already work well. And we are therefore pleased that there have been a lot of amendments post in this direction, also by a lot of political groups. And I think this gives us a very strong base to move forward with the IORP legislation. And we look forward to constructive negotiations to finding solutions that strengthen pension provision while respecting national competences.
Thank you very much.
Speaker 36
Thank you so much. And I will give the floor to the EESC rapporteur, Ms. Barrera Chamorro.
Maria del Carmen Barrera Chamorro
Gracias de nuevo. Reitero hoy que el CESE quiere un sistema de pensiones complementarias exitoso, que no sirva únicamente para movilizar ahorro a la economía, sino que ponga el beneficio de los y las personas trabajadoras. Su éxito dependerá de ello. Consideramos esencial un enfoque holístico, como ya dije, con un comité de seguimiento a nivel europeo. Preservar el rol de las pensiones ocupacionales en el lugar de trabajo.
Fortalecer y primar el diálogo social, la negociación colectiva y respetar la participación y autonomía de los agentes sociales a través de la negociación colectiva y el diálogo social. Apostar por la reducción de las brechas de género, algo que es esencial porque en los sistemas privados estas brechas de género son muy, muy elevadas y no podemos fomentar ningún tipo de sistema que promulgue la desigualdad. Aunar flexibilidad para adaptar la directiva a los sistemas nacionales con una suficiente armonización que genere escala, transparencia y confianza. Y esto es todo. Muchas gracias y como siempre quedamos a su disposición.
Speaker 34
Thank you so much. I will give the floor back to the rapporteur, Damien.
Damian Boeselager
Yes, I think your interventions were not too surprising. I'm very much looking forward to the negotiations. I just want to pick up on this one misconception, Dirk, that you also mentioned, which is that diversification could somehow undermine the members' benefits. And I think this is really an important point for me. If you look at more diversified portfolios, they can lead to the situation that members will have, both when it comes to risk and return, a superior outcome.
And this is something that I've seen in conversations with many of pension funds, not only IORPs but also others, that there is a misunderstanding, a misconception really about the fact of when am I playing with pensioners' funds. And I just want to say that, you know, having a minimal diversification is beneficial to the pensioners. And actually, if you under-diversify, you could come to a situation where pensioners do not get the same amount that they could actually get when it comes to their pensions. And this is all. I'm talking about the basically, I mean, basic investment theory, basic portfolio diversification theory.
And I think it's really important to keep that in mind when we discuss what is the best outcome for pensioners, that we don't weigh diversification against pensioners' outcome, but that we see that they actually contribute to each other. And if there is a misconception, I think it's important to address this. But I'm sure that having heard also the different shadows, we will have fantastic negotiations to discuss this in detail. And I very much thank you for your very constructive interventions, but especially also your amendments. Thank you.
Speaker 35
Thank you to all of you, and the vote in the ECON is scheduled for October 15th. So next item will be the voting session. It will be in 30 minutes, so you have some time to grab some coffee if you, if you want. Thank you.
Aurore Lalucq
This is a test vote. And I close the vote. Okay, everything is working well. Perfect. So, we will move to agenda item 8 regarding the vote on the appointment of Mr. Carlo Comporti as the Chairperson of the European Securities and Markets Authority.
This is a vote by secret ballot. I open the vote. And I close the vote. And the appointment is approved. Congratulations to Mr. Comporti.
We now pass on to agenda item 9 regarding the vote on the appointment of Mr. Thomas Čechner. Thank you so much, Markus. As Executive Director of the European Banking Authority. We will proceed with a vote by secret ballot. I open the vote.
And I close the vote. And his appointment is approved. Congratulations. Yes, I think he deserved it too. We now pass on to agenda item 11 regarding the vote on the budgetary amendments to the draft budget of the European Union for the financial year 2027.
The rapporteur is Mr. Afteas. By showing of hands.
By showing off hands, amendment 1, who is in favor? Who is against? Who abstains? Adopted. Amendment check?
You want a check? Okay, let's check. I open the vote. And I close the vote. And the amendment is adopted.
Amendment 2, who is in favor? Who is in favor? Who is against? Who abstains? Adopted.
Amendment 3, 4, who is in favor? Who is against? Who abstains? Adopted. Amendment 5, who is in favor?
Who is against? Who abstains? Let's check. I open the vote. And I close the vote.
And it is rejected. Amendment 6, who is in favor? Who is against? Who abstains? Let's check.
I open the vote. And I close the vote. And it is adopted. Amendment 7, 8, 9, who is in favor? Who is against?
Who abstains? It is adopted. Amendment 10, who is in favor? Who is against? Who abstains?
Adopted. Amendment 11, who is in favor? Who is against? Who abstains? Adopted.
Amendment 12, who is in favor? Who is against? Who abstains? Adopted. Amendment 13, who is in favor?
Who is against? Who abstains? Check. I open the vote. And I close the vote.
And it is adopted. Amendment 14, who is in favor? Who is against? Who abstains? Adopted.
Amendment 15, who is in favor? Who is against? Who abstains? Check. Sorry, quite divided today.
Okay, I close the vote. And it is adopted. Amendment 16, who is in favor? Who is against? Who abstains?
Adopted. Amendment 17, 19, who is in favor? Who is against? Who abstains? Rejected.
And we move to the final vote. No final vote. So congratulations to the rapporteur. And the next ECON committee meeting will take place on September the 10th. Thank you to all of you.