Committee on Security and Defence Ordinary meeting
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SEDE European Parliament
Follow its sittingsStephan Klement
I'm sure you have been hearing about this. And here of course this presents a massive nuclear safety and security risk. We try to counter this by supporting the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency. As you know there are kind of the seven pillars of nuclear safety and security which have been established, but also the five principles how to protect the nuclear power plant during conditions of war. And we try to support these pillars in political terms, but also of course we have been contributing through CFSP money to IAEA.
And this year we have already contributed 5 million euros to this IAEA presence in Zaporizhzhia and in other nuclear plants in Ukraine. And of course we will continue in the next cycle of Council decision to support. So in the longer term what we're also doing, as you know, there's an ongoing conflict, there are many weapons, small arms and light weapons kind of in the battlefield. Once this war ends, hopefully soon, there will be the risk of diversion of small arms. And we're trying to help Ukraine through OSCE and other kind of entities to build up a system which takes very much accountancy and control of these weapons which could otherwise go loose after the conflict ends.
In your kind introduction, the chair mentioned emerging technologies, which is a very central subject. We see every day news about artificial intelligence, biotechnology, nanotechnology, and I think it's very important to find some way to regulate or control or at least establish some principles how to deal with this kind of developments because this kind of vectors or enablers can very massively influence nuclear or other arms races. I think it's very central that we ensure that this kind of technologies, if used, are in line or in accordance with international law and international humanitarian law. I mentioned the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons in Geneva, the review conference will take place later this year. We have already at the moment going the so-called Governmental Group of Experts and in this group, I think we promote very much a two-tiered approach, which basically means those weapons which cannot be made compatible with international humanitarian law, they should be prohibited, and others have to be assessed for their compatibility with the appropriate legal systems.
And of course there are many processes ongoing in this area. We had the REAIM process, which was a Dutch-Korean initiative to look at artificial intelligence in military use. What is very central and what is I think important to know, these technologies evolve very fast. Diplomatic processes are normally not so fast, so I think here we have to be very adaptive in what kind of ambition we put. Do we need to go for a full-fledged treaty or regulation, or is it better maybe in the beginning to establish some principles on how these technologies should be controlled and used to be fast enough to capture all this?
Through all the things I mentioned now, there's one important element which also relates to your work here in the Parliament, this is the CFSP budget, for which we are very grateful. We had in the last years a very kind of positive implementation rate of Council decisions which support capacity building, international organizations in the field of arms control and disarmament and non-proliferation. We support the IAEA, the CTBTO, OPCW, but also other kind of actors in this field. And these kind of Council decisions and the projects related to them, they have been proven very effective in first of all promoting the visibility of the EU, to achieving concrete objectives in terms of how to say addressing real concerns. One example is for instance the Assad-era chemical weapons in Syria, where we have contributed 2.5 million to OPCW and we see now the first results in dealing with this subject.
But of course there are many, many other projects and things to do in this regard. So I make a very strong appeal here and first of all many thanks to keep up this kind of pressure to keep the CFSP budget kind of at the same level or even at a higher level in order to address these issues. And of course we also use this in the context of our dialogues with partners. I think this is more important than ever nowadays in a situation where multilateral cooperation is at threat, to work closely with partners, like-minded but also countries like Brazil and others to see that they also together with us help us to support the multilateral system in this field. Maybe quickly before I come to the conclusion on some regional issues.
I cannot make a briefing on non-proliferation and disarmament without speaking on Iran. As you know on the Iran nuclear issue, there's a very difficult situation at the moment.
We had an agreement in place some years ago, which was also a very important achievement of the European Union. This agreement has been successively been dismantled or destroyed. We have seen now two wars with Iran, one maybe not even over. What is clearly the bottom line here is that the International Atomic Energy Agency, which is in charge to monitor the Iranian nuclear program, has lost the majority or maybe everything in the knowledge of controlling the Iranian nuclear program. So even if at some point there should be an agreement in place, it will be very difficult for the International Atomic Energy Agency to regain a sufficient level of knowledge to build a new baseline from the base of which future agreement, from which we are very far anyway, could be verified and monitored.
At the same time, of course, we also have seen in the last few years, and this has been proven by the two wars, a massive build-up of the Iranian missile program, which is also a concern for the region, but also for Europe as such. The DPRK, North Korea, also not a very pleasant story. We are seeing from reports of the IAEA, but also from other sources, that DPRK is on the one hand building up its nuclear program. A new reactor is going into operation. There are kind of suspicions about a new uranium enrichment plant being built.
So the number of nuclear warheads in possession of DPRK is increasing. DPRK is also increasing its missile arsenal. DPRK is very closely cooperating with Russia, as we see in its aggression against Ukraine, which on the one hand gives DPRK additional experience in using missiles in a battlefield, which of course is negative from an overall perspective. At the same time, also, we do not know exactly what Russia provides in return to DPRK, what kind of technologies. And there's a big risk that this technology which is provided by Russia in return is exactly closing those gaps which are still missing for the DPRK to complete its kind of operational nuclear arsenal.
And of course, the clear position of the EU and many like-minded is DPRK is not an official nuclear weapon state. We will never recognize DPRK as a nuclear weapon state or give the relevant rights. At the same time, we see some consolidation on the Russian side to kind of give some kind of status to DPRK in international fora and to prevent, for instance, the implementation of UN sanction monitoring mechanisms and other things. So I think there are many, many negative aspects stemming out of this Russian-DPRK cooperation, which are maybe not so visible at the first moment. I also mentioned Syria, where we had of course a change in government and have many positive commitments to address kind of residual problems from the former government.
And we see this, I mentioned the chemical weapons file, where we see the first steps of progress, which is very positive, but still there is still a long way to go. We have a concern on of course all the kind of uncontrolled small arms in Syria. And we are working in fact on a Council decision to address this issue, which hopefully should be adopted and implemented very soon. More recently, we also see a very limited progress, but at least some progress in closing the nuclear file between the IAEA and Syria. In fact, a report came out yesterday from the IAEA which confirmed that there have been some first steps to address this issue.
And I think in this context, it will be very relevant to move fast and also to convince Syria to really adopt the highest possible safeguard standards, which is safeguards agreement and additional protocol to address this issue. Maybe in conclusion, and more than happy to take some questions. I think more than ever, the EU's strong support for the international organizations, in particular the IAEA and the OPCW, is necessary to maintain the role and function of these important organizations.
EU unity is very central. I think to support non-proliferation and disarmament norms and this has been of course there's a Russian attempt to undermine this unity so we have to be vigilant on this. I mentioned already cooperation with key partners, very central. I mean one of our key part former key partners is not as reliable as before so I think we have to extend also to work more closely with other partners in particular middle-sized countries. And then of course last but not least I may sound like a broken record the CFSP budget I think this is a very central element to address many issues in concrete terms and to show to the kind of international partners that the EU is not only talking about things but is also walking the talk.
So I may stop here and happy to take questions. Thank you very much for your attention and sorry for for overspeeding maybe a bit.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
No, it was okay. It was speedy, but it was okay. It's definitely more speed than the European Union's decision are. So, Sven.
Sven Mikser
Yes, thank you very much. An enormous amount of information compressed in a very short time. I started to feel a little bit sorry for the interpreters but anyway thank you so much. First on NPT review conference, I think that historically more or less every other conference has failed to produce a final agreement but it has become a bit more of the rule recently I think and that's obviously of some concern. And I think that we are all all feel the frustration of the CTBT not coming into force and the the fissile material cutoff treaty not moving ahead and things that but on the other hand I think that one can also look at at the NPT as as a glass half full in that in that even though you mentioned all the outliers but but this sort of explosive geographical proliferation has not happened.
I mean the when we think back a quarter century to the A.Q. Khan network and these nightmare scenarios have not materialized so I think that NPT still performs a very important function. But my question is more to the expiry of the New START treaty earlier this year and and you mentioned also China whose arsenal is very quickly quickly expanding. So do you see any perspective you mentioned that that Russia is obviously not very willing to talk about any any follow-on treaty at at this moment in time. But do you see any pathway to to actually resolving this impasse and and in that context also of involving China because I think in any future sort of follow-on treaty to to do the trick China should be part part of that. And finally how much leverage do we as as the European Union have here because we are not a nuclear power as an organization and I think that that those nuclear powers have have kept this sort of these issues very close to their their chest and have not really welcomed historically non-nuclear powers to to the table to seriously discuss this architecture.
Stephan Klement
Well thank you very much, very good points and questions. On the NPT I fully resonate with what you said. The NPT is a successful treaty. If you look at the perspective from the negotiating history the NPT was negotiated in the 60s and at that time the kind of negative scenario was in a certain way to have in 20 30 years later meaning by the change of the millennium 20 30 nuclear weapon states.
And maybe four to five kind of outliers as you called them. I don't want to go in so in this sense it's a successful treaty. I agree with you that the trend that now we have since 2010 not any successful outcome is concerning. But I think we have also been warning often that the fact that the review mechanism and the review conference do not produce results which they should of course, this should not be used to undermine the treaty or to put the treaty in question because I think there's still a lot of value for many countries in the treaty and its three pillars. As you know the first pillar on non-proliferation which often in a regional context is very central in many regions, but also the second pillar in terms of safeguards and the third pillar in terms of applications of nuclear technology which is actually the most relevant area for many, many countries in the developing world and so on.
So here and here I think we are also trying to step up a bit our contributions because from a Western perspective we often look very much at pillar one and two, disarmament and non-proliferation, but not so much on the technical applications. And I think this becomes also more challenging and important now where we see this kind of nuclear energy and applications to become more kind of common purpose in terms if we look at small and modular reactors while of course the energy choice is a national matter but many countries show interest in this and here the European Union can definitely also also play a role. On you mentioned CTBT of course it's the 30th year of opening for signature of CTBT this year. I was there at the negotiations. Even at that time to be very fair the expectation was not that it would enter into force soon but the understanding was a bit it's better to have a norm in place even if not fully kind of legally valid than to have nothing.
So and at the moment of course with the Russian de-ratification, the US approach to nuclear testing which is a bit unclear I would say, the chances are not good but we as EU of course we keep our commitment to defend and strengthen CTBT and CTBT the FMCT very difficult to make progress at this point where China is massively building up nuclear material and its nuclear arsenal. More complicated question you answered your question about nuclear arms control in general and the US-Russia game which is also of course it's fully logical that with this massive Chinese increase it's very difficult to close the eye to a nuclear power which may have very soon close to 1,000 nuclear weapons while the others are at maybe 1,800 or something. So I think China has to come into this exercise. While China is refusing to participate in this type of discussion in spite of US efforts, I may see some more signs a bit very careful signs by China that at some point they may be ready to do so. You can imagine for yourself what are when this point is reached which is not ideal but I think it could happen.
The EU role it's true EU is not a nuclear power. We had we have still one nuclear power. I think what is very central and what I sensed in the NPT review conference through this EU common position which was adopted in form of a Council decision, I think we strongly influence the discussions. If you look at the kind of the development of the EU Council decision, Council position, Council conclusions on on the NPT, it's like often I explain like a mini review conference because as you know EU has different member states with different priorities, different sensitivities. So what goes into this kind of document is already kind of could form an embryonic basis a very fertile ground for further consensus.
In so I think EU language and I could see this in my discussions in New York, EU language is often seen as some basis for more consensus and compromise. I'm not saying that EU can solve everything. So in this sense the EU is injecting some kind of intellectual input I would say in the discussion even if the EU is not you said not necessarily at the table, not a power, but a very strong influencing entity for the exercise. This would be my my answer.
Villy Søvndal
Thank you very much for your intervention. If you look at the countries you mentioned, it's it's hard to be optimist in these days. You mentioned Russia, you mentioned Belarus, you mentioned China, you mentioned Iran, you mentioned North Korea. And the one light in it all was Syria. Is that also the situation as you see it?
And about China, just to follow up on what Sven was asking as well. Mr. Blinken, the former American foreign minister, stated as he had finished his job, that China was the country keeping Russia away from any consideration about using nuclear weapons in the war. Do you have is that also your point of view, that China is playing a very important role in that aspect? Since we have that troubled picture, and we also have the international organizations more or less lamed, not only from the countries you mentioned, but also from the present US administration. Which path could be taken to find some way to make agreements for the countries who still want a rule-based order?
Mr. Carney, the Prime Minister of Canada, made a very interesting speech, I think, in Davos, about making some kind of alliance between the countries believing in rules of order, believing in strong international institutions. Do you see any way forward where EU could together with countries, not only Canada and European countries, maybe also some of the South American, Latin American countries, some of the African countries, some of the Asian countries, to make an initiative to try form not an alternative to the UN, but just some countries who could push forward for agreements, negotiations on non-proliferation, on weapon control and on yeah. Thank you.
Stephan Klement
Thank you. On your first point, I think unfortunately you're right, it's very difficult to be optimistic. I mean Syria is for sure some at least some we see some concrete some positive momentum. There is still a very technically difficult tasks which have to be achieved on chemical weapons because it seems that the Assad-era chemical weapons program was much more sophisticated than we or many people had been thinking until recently. The nuclear program as such, while we see first steps, there's still many open questions which have to be addressed.
And of course the small arms issue is a huge challenge. What we see at least is some very positive engagement from Syrian authorities and readiness to cooperate, but a lack of capacity maybe sometimes to work on all the issues together. I think your most important point was on China, I think. I mean I think it's very important to look at China differently than from Russia, because China is an actor of course which needs the international system functioning already for trade and other issues. So China is very conscious and aware of the need to maintain the international order, also in the non-proliferation disarmament field.
Of course, and this is legitimate, China is trying to influence this order in its own interest. And I think this is how we have to try to work together with China to find compromises and to basically shape this order in a way that it we reach some global stability. I cannot comment on this issue how much China has been influencing Russia in a certain way.
I can only say that for sure China has an enormous influence on Russian behavior in many aspects. To your third question, I will be very careful to answer in this environment. I think of course there is always potential for more cooperation. In particular, I think from our Western-oriented perspective, maybe there is a need to look more to, I would say it's even wrong what we call the Global South. I do not like this expression, but countries, middle-sized countries, emerging countries, emerging economies.
At the same time, of course, we have to take into account those countries who have the major capacities and arsenals. So I think it is not an either-or initiative, but we have to expand. And this is what we are trying through our dialogues with other countries.
Lynn Boylan
Sorry, I don't have my microphone. No, thank you, Ambassador, and thank you for your presentation. I was trying to keep up with the speed at which you speak, but I have a number of specific questions. And first is just around the cluster, Convention on Cluster Munitions. I'm not sure if you're aware that in December 2025, the Irish legislator Oireachtas Committee on Finance and Public Expenditure, Public Services Reform and Digitalization, they published a report where they outlined their very significant concerns regarding that funds available under the SAFE regulation can be used to procure cluster munitions or anti-personnel mines.
And we've also seen now a number of member states withdrawing from the Convention on Cluster Munitions and the Ottawa Convention. So I suppose my specific question for you, Ambassador, is what are you doing to ensure that the EU and its member states are complying with the CCM and the Ottawa Convention? And then the second question is specifically because, and forgive me if I missed you at the start, but just in respect of Israel's nuclear weapons program, it's one of only five countries in the world not to have ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. They haven't accepted the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on its nuclear activity. So what engagement, if any, have you had with the Israeli authorities on this issue and even allowing for some sort of level of inspection?
Stephan Klement
Thank you very much. Maybe I take your last question first. I mean, there's a very clear EU position, which is to push for the universalization of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. And this is a point which is also regularly made with Israel. In addition to this, I can really not say anything on the Israeli nuclear weapons program.
On the other questions on, you mentioned CCM, and here of course we are very much engaged in the preparation of the review conference, which will take place in Laos later this year. And I think there's a clear humanitarian objective which we are trying to promote, and all EU member states are behind this activity. The Ottawa Convention is a very difficult question because, as you know, some kind of developments have taken place over the past two years. Some countries have left the Ottawa Convention, which was mainly explained due to the Russian aggression and the very difficult security environment which has been created. What we have been able to do in this context is to find some commitment as EU-27 that still the humanitarian objectives of the Ottawa Convention are fully supported by the EU and that also some projects for demining, and here again I refer to CFSP budget, will continue.
So I think while maybe you may look at this what has happened as an anomaly due to created caused by extraordinary circumstances, the overall objective of the Ottawa Convention has not been put into question. Thank you.
Marc Botenga
Thank you, thank you, Mr. Ambassador, as well.
You're obviously an important player in this as a special envoy for non-proliferation, disarmament. I think in the current world, that's one of the most important positions and responsibilities one can have. So I'm gonna ask you two questions out of personal curiosity. First, and this is a little bit, you have indeed mentioned Iran's alleged nuclear program, but what about Israel concretely? What are you doing concretely to put pressure on Israel hiding these nuclear weapons?
You have mentioned the Russian attacks on the nuclear power plant in Zaporizhzhia very briefly, but you have not mentioned the attacks of the United States on nuclear installations in Iran, which have also, you know, been called out by the International Atomic Agency as extremely dangerous and violations of international law. You mentioned the chemical weapons in Syria. Israel's accused of using white phosphorus in the south of Lebanon, potentially also in Gaza. You have not mentioned that either. And so I wonder why.
Is that not in your mandate? Are you banned from saying it? Are you afraid of saying it? What is it? Why don't you highlight that, right?
Because these are our allies using these weapons and hence undermining it. And secondly, when you're at the table of these negotiations, how has the credibility of the EU evolved over the last years? Because obviously we can complain about other countries increasing their weapons expenditure, but NATO countries amount for what, 55, 60% of all arms expenditure. The United States, our main ally, is going to increase to 1.5 trillion, I think, dollars, so the biggest defense budget ever. EU member states, it's been said, are withdrawing from not just the cluster munition convention, but also from the anti-personnel mines convention, which is essential to protect civilians because they're horrible weapons for civilians.
So we're in this situation where we're also now launching this thing, anti-ballistic missile project as EU countries or a number of EU countries. How can we credibly ask others to disarm if we ourselves are in a massive armament drive, are sponsoring basically an arms race? What has that done to your position at the negotiation table? Thank you.
Stephan Klement
Thank you for your comments and what is in your question. I think I have to say first of all, I started by saying the environment is very difficult in the past years, in the past few months. So it's not that I can claim that we are fantastically successful in all things. What we also said that we try to maintain this multilateral system against all the stress factors and the tension which exists. And it's not a kind of a secret that EU is often accused of double standards.
And in spite of these accusations, and I will not comment in detail about this, I think we are still quite committed to try to preserve the framework, the conventions. And I think we're pretty successful with this. And of course in a practical way, we direct our efforts to those issues where at least we still believe that we could make some difference and achieve some concrete results. We've also limited resources and do not necessarily focus at this point to other things which have not been resolved. We are for instance also working on a project which is on the WMD-free zone in the Middle East, which is a long-term vision of course, which is supposed to address all weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems in the Middle East.
So I think this answers at least partially your questions, I hope. But I think if as a general principle, by not working on everything at the same time, or if you cannot work on everything at the same time, I think it's not correct to say we should not work on anything at all. So you see, I try to answer this question in a quite difficult environment here. So I hope we can continue this discussion maybe afterwards, but this is what I can say here.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
We are not in camera. Any other questions? Thank you very much, Mr. Clement, normally for all this information we need one hour more. So thank you very much, it's really very, very important and your job is very important, that Mark just said. That's the reason why he's here.
So thank you very much, good luck. I think this is really special times, but a little bit optimistic let it be, I mean. Thank you very much.
Thank you.