Committee on Security and Defence Ordinary meeting
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SEDE European Parliament
Follow its sittingsIglika Yakova
This is an initiative covering various fields such as industry, research, society, security, environmental protection and culture and it serves as a core delivery mechanism of the Ocean Pact. It positions the EU as a reliable global partner with its action firmly anchored in science. So our ambition is to coordinate the EU and Member States' efforts to establish an efficient, streamlined and sustained European ocean observing system in full respect of Member States' competencies.
As I mentioned, the Ocean Act will integrate the governance of Ocean-I, and this is a first step, literally the first step where the knowledge and data chain will help to make it strong, as reliable as possible. So first of all, we will strengthen and integrate Copernicus Marine Service, EMODnet and the Digital Twin Ocean into a European Digital Ocean System. We will ensure a seamless operational flow of information from observation to knowledge services, benefiting global research and industry. And regarding the industrial dimension, we aim to strengthen a competitive European industrial ecosystem for ocean observation technologies and user-centered services. We also aim to ensure a collective social ownership of the ocean and to develop a strong educational and cultural outreach dimension, which would allow us to bridge science, art, education and society and then to work more with the next generation.
Now on strategic autonomy, if I could focus on that. The Ocean-I is about strategic autonomy through knowledge, technology and operational capability at sea.
It strengthens Europeans' ability to observe, understand and act in the maritime domain, while reducing vulnerabilities that are linked to fragmented systems, to external dependencies, to gaps in data, to technology and infrastructure resilience. And it's no longer a niche scientific function. We wish to expand from this scientific function and to go more into strategic infrastructure, so that it underpins maritime security, defense, offshore and subsea infrastructure protection, safe transport, climate resilience, even food security. And of course, that would all mean that it would underpin the competitiveness of the European blue economy. Our ambition is to move from dependency to capability and to connect these observation systems with digital systems, with innovation, with industrial development, so that here in the EU we can generate trusted ocean intelligence and translate it to operational, economic and even security value.
You cannot protect what you cannot see, what you cannot understand and monitor. And that's why Ocean Eye strengthens precisely the knowledge and the situational awareness layer that will help us build our security capacity.
So why this matters now? Well, the maritime space has become a space for growing geopolitical competition, for hybrid threats, strategic vulnerabilities. And so also the European critical offshore and subsea infrastructure, shipping lines, energy assets, digital connections, they all depend on stronger maritime situational awareness and sustained ocean knowledge. The Commission makes clear that resilience of these critical maritime infrastructures is now a priority, a strategic priority, and that knowledge is indispensable to safeguard the European interests, the European resilience and also to ensure the leadership. So Ocean-I responds to this reality.
If Europe cannot observe the ocean reliably, then Europe cannot protect its interests in sea, in the sea, in the ocean. Then also strategic autonomy in the maritime domain is not only about equipment, it's not only about platforms and tools, it's also about having capabilities to observe and understand the process and share information about the maritime environment.
We also mean that we, our ambition is not to act alone. We wish to have the capabilities, infrastructure, industrial base to choose when, how and with whom we cooperate, when, how and with whom we are partners. You probably saw last week that the President of the Commission was at UNGA and together with the Canadian Prime Minister there was this important announcement on the international alliance on the Ocean Eye and the Ocean Observation Governance System. So that's an important also pledging effort on the side of the Commission and also building partnerships with Canada to go hand in hand. I think I will have to accelerate.
From the fragmented maritime information towards a more coherent and operational maritime picture, our ambition is to have in-situ observations and modeling in digital capabilities and also to have technology sovereignty.
If Europe is dependent on external providers for sensors, for autonomous systems, for data infrastructure, for analytical capabilities that are needed to understand how the maritime space functions, then this creates a strategic vulnerability. So we need to focus on this and that would mean that the resilience is also the resilience of our technological sovereignty. That would mean that maritime resilience should be also just as important as the resilience at land. And so we need tools that will improve our understanding of what happens for onshore but also offshore, for at sea, on the surface and subsea infrastructure. And there comes the industrial innovation and the efforts that the Commission wishes to put to develop deep tech startups, scaleups, develop breakthrough solutions in sensors, in autonomous systems, in value-added services, in AI, in digital twin.
And so the ambition is to support from research to market the whole line of transition to improve access to finance, help European innovators scale up technologies and deploy operational solutions. And for this we have important funding tools, hopefully to be put in place from the competitiveness fund through Horizon Europe. And that will allow us to bring the necessary funding opportunities to put in place the Ocean Eye. I would stop here and will be happy to further develop with the questions.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
Thank you very much. And now I give the floor to members for a first round of questions starting with the coordinators in ping-pong so you can immediately answer. Two minutes for question and we start with Pekka from EPP.
Perfect.
Pekka Toveri
Thank you Chair. Just to clarify, I'm not a coordinator but, but still. Yes, the maritime infrastructure and the whole maritime industry is extremely important. I'm coming from Finland. 96% of our trade goes by Western sea lines of communications.
So, and but overall I think when we look at the Europe, this is a global question because we have to be able to secure our trade with, with our partners globally and, and it happens through ships. And we see how it's more and more congested, the surface actions on surface, we see what's happening in Red Sea, we see what's happening in Hormuz, we are expecting that this may spread. So, so the security of the maritime traffic is a challenge. But, but even bigger challenge is under sea as you, as you mentioned, the undersea infrastructure, its protection.
And it's great to hear that we are creating capabilities to have a better situational picture and awareness what's happening to that infrastructure. But the fact is that if we have a perfect situational awareness and picture, but we don't have any means to intervene, stop, repair and punish those who attack our infrastructure, then it's just real-time view on how we're going to be beaten. So in the discussion, it's not necessarily in the scope of your work, but has there been discussion, you know, what else we should do to secure? Because as I said, the securing the infrastructure, the most important thing is to have the situational awareness. But that doesn't help if you don't have the means to protect it, to repair it and again, punish those who attacked our infrastructure.
Thank you.
Allison
I was in Helsinki last week for the maritime security exercise which was focused explicitly on this issue. We had some excellent briefings from the Finnish Border Guard who are confronted with some very particular challenges right in front of Helsinki in the Gulf of Finland where you have a very narrow and difficult shipping channel with a very high volume of shipping, very shallow water, and a high density of critical maritime infrastructure. So it's a perfect storm of challenges that is quite distinct. It isn't necessarily exactly the same set of, you know, combination of challenges in other sea basins, but here in the Baltic Sea there are some real immediate challenges and it's very interesting to see the action that Finland has already taken, which has been to invest in the information sharing with Baltic partners. So very close cooperation through what I mentioned, the integrated surveillance mechanism, to understand what's happening, to have the capacity to respond, so to identify what is going on.
Thank you.
Also very close contacts with the private companies because of course most of this infrastructure is privately owned. So to have close relationships with the operators on monitoring cables, responding to damage to cables. Not all of it is sabotage, sometimes there are accidents. And also to facilitate cable repair.
So having a high degree of resilience and redundancy is the first way we can protect ourselves. So if a cable is cut, no data is lost, it's immediately rerouted, we all still have the ability to do our banking, our business, send kittens over the internet, whatever it is. So resilience and redundancy, and I think there's a high degree of this in Europe. There are a lot of measures that are being taken in the framework of the European Cables Action Plan to improve the resilience of cables, the better protection and monitoring of cables. So there's a lot that we can do there.
But I think your question is probably about the more robust end of the enforcement spectrum and what can we do when we see ships cutting cables in international waters, which are the difficult ones. And there this is a, this is an international reflection that has been launched and there's been quite a lot of exchange with international partners. We are governed by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which underpins all of our trade, as you said. Freedom of navigation is an absolutely essential piece of UNCLOS, so we work within that framework. But there's been increased support with international partners to, to see how we can better identify what measures we can take to improve enforcement.
So I don't have the silver bullet for you right away, but I can assure you it's something that's very high on the agenda, not only of the EU and its member states, but also many of our international partners as well.
Iglika Yakova
Maybe I could say a few words on the maritime industrial strategy that was adopted a couple of months ago, and where you have a very specific agenda on how to improve certain capacities, and also capacities that are dual-use. And I was thinking that recently we also announced the European Industrial Value Chain Alliance. So that is another project that will be put in place on certain key technologies and high-value capabilities, be it repair ships, be it icebreakers, be it ocean observation technologies or sensors. So we are now calling for industrial actors to express interest in sectors and capabilities that are of interest for the EU to be developed, to become the high-end sectors that would need our support, and then on this basis to develop the whole industrial cycle and to see what are the gaps, where we could improve the value chain. So that is one, I think, concrete example of what we have been doing.
And I think also related to your experience, there is a lot going on currently on icebreakers also to develop such a fleet for the EU and to support our efforts further north.
Lucia Annunziata
This is very close to my heart because I've been elected in the south of Italy and as you know, I mean in Italy we always thought that we in the south were the last piece of Europe and instead we start now to wake up and say we are the first piece of Europe. What I'm trying to tell you is that I consider the issue Mediterranean extremely a key point of development. And I wish besides that we would organize some of this big conference, you know, where you call all the institution because I think that in the south we have, are going to have the major impact on these things because the south, as you have seen, you know, was the place, the water between Africa and Italy was the place that really continued the big challenge that now have been stopped. This is one thing.
Second thing, we have a passage between Middle East and the exit toward the ocean that is extremely busy. Third thing, we have an industrial crisis all over Europe, like the industrialization, traditional industries are in big crisis, and this is true. They are going to have to rebuild continually the, our, our structure, you know, our system. And finally, I think that the entire economy of the Mediterranean, despite being so important, is going to change because we mainly live out of mass tourism. So, all nothing when we start to do, to take, you know, into consideration seriously that we are going to be a geopolitical area that is a key geopolitical area because it does, it collect crisis from the north, from the west, from the east.
Three continent are joining in the Mediterranean, three. And it's not by chance that this was the beginning of our civilization, sorry I have to say this. I just like it. So, the point is that this could be a great project.
There will be no harbor in the southern of Italy and in Greece and other places that will not be put under pressure for all the changes that will be going there. And there will be no area, industrial area, where you are not going to look at because we are going to need the change in the entire fleet. It's not just what we do. It's what type of navy will do this. In the south, we hear a lot of, you know, smaller boat, larger boat, dual use.
The dual use, you know what it is, Madame President. It's some boat, I consider this a little ridiculous, I'm sorry. But some boat who will be carrying tourists when there is no war and they will be perfect to carry military people when there is a war. You know, I still have to see these things. But, you know, what I'm trying to tell you is that the impact you will have in an area like the Mediterranean, which is the largest channel we have between the east and the west, you know, it has to be taken into consideration, especially the part that goes between Italy and Greece and North Africa.
It's an area of war, it's an area of crisis, it's an area where it's not going to be that easy to put on a different fleet.
I would like to hear something about my joke, or some criticism of my joke. Thank you.
Please.
Allison
Well, it's always a pleasure to talk about Mare Nostrum, I mean, and who doesn't enjoy spending time in the Mediterranean? I want to say from again, from my perspective at the External Action Service, so really the external policy and the security and defense end of the spectrum, and Ilka can talk about a lot of the other areas of business. We are very dependent on the contributions and the support from our Mediterranean partners for our work on maritime security. I don't think it's accidental that the operational headquarters of our three naval operations are hosted in Spain, Italy, and Greece. I think that's very much a reflection of the sorts of challenges that you've been talking about.
And it's these member states with contributions obviously from others who are really the backbone of our naval engagement under the European Union flag in the Mediterranean. We're very grateful to their support and they make an enormously important contribution. And this is of course reflecting, as you said, the complexity of the challenges in the Mediterranean space and in the larger Mediterranean space, so the Mediterranean space and its extended regions, particularly as we look towards the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, the Horn of Africa.
And we are delighted to work with those three naval operations, extremely important. The Mediterranean is also really important from the perspective of maritime infrastructure. This is another area of real focus for us. I mean, there's been a lot of attention on what has happened in the Baltic, which has very particular circumstances. In the Mediterranean, the water is a lot deeper and there's always been an assumption really that depth was a protection.
But with new technology, depth is much less of a protection than it used to be. Our underwater infrastructure is more vulnerable than in the past as we see artificial intelligence, uncrewed vessels, drones and so on. They create new vulnerabilities. And we know that the underwater infrastructure, not only data cables, but the energy connections that the south of Europe has in the Mediterranean are also really important parts of the European security, energy security and European security in general. So this is why we're very happy that the Mediterranean countries led by Italy, Greece, Cyprus and Malta are also collaborating on setting up a second surveillance mechanism, cable hub, in line with the cables action plan for the Mediterranean.
And this builds on the extremely interesting work that Italy has done at its navy headquarters with its own dedicated national cable hub, which really very, very interesting work that they've done there. And I think there's there's already a lot of work going on in the Mediterranean and I can reassure you that at least from where I'm sitting, the Mediterranean is very high on the list of our priorities.
Iglika Yakova
Yes, there is a lot to be said on the Mediterranean. I I just because I'm from the Commission, I just need to remind of the the Pact for the Mediterranean that was put in place as a real partnership mechanism with the southern countries. And we are now in the process of putting of implementing the actions that have been agreed with those partners. And on our end in DG MARE, because we work on on maritime security, we focus very much on coast guard functions, different coast guard functions, but our main counterpart and reliable actor is Italy. Also they they host the secretariat of the Mediterranean Coast Guard Functions Forum.
The chair this year is is Spain, but Italy has the permanent secretariat of the Coast Guard Forum. And also they they they send to us a lot of experts from the Coast Guard and from the Navy.
We have all our national experts, they come from the Italian administration and they're a great value added to our work in terms of expertise and commitment to the European values as well. I'll stop here. We will be very much interested if you organize a conference on the Med to contribute to it and to participate. I know a lot of things are going on on the Mediterranean.
Lucia Annunziata
We should certainly do because I think that if we don't deal with those things right away, you know, we will do it indeed. There are still legends going to start, you know, you start to say this and this and then, well, we'll try. We will do. Okay, so Pierre Romain.
Pierre-Romain Thionnet
Oui, merci. Je m'exprimerai en français. Pas besoin de traduction, c'est parfait. Merci beaucoup d'insister autant sur le domaine maritime et de faire ce lien sur lorsqu'on parle des enjeux de puissance pour l'Europe, qu'il est inconcevable d'ignorer la mer et bien d'intégrer les visions terrestres, maritimes, mais aussi spatiales et cyber. Voilà, je pense que c'est dans ces quatre domaines où il faut avoir une vision commune et surtout, comme vous le faites, d'insister sur l'importance de l'autonomie stratégique.
Et c'est parce que ça faisait partie d'une de mes questions, mais vous y avez répondu, sur les instruments, les capacités pour voir l'océan et comprendre l'océan. Il est important que ces capacités, ces infrastructures soient pleinement souveraines, en tout cas voilà, peut-être avec des degrés de coopération ou évidemment de partage, mais il est important qu'il y ait cette liberté d'appréciation soit pleinement européenne car c'est la condition pour la liberté d'action dans les mers aussi. Ma question ou ma remarque, elle est portée sur les enjeux des régions ultrapériphériques et de l'outre-mer en général. Alors il y a peut-être un prisme français ici car évidemment l'outre-mer est fondamental dans la vision stratégique française, mais évidemment ces territoires et ces possessions d'outre-mer sont aussi ont aussi des statuts européens.
Donc que ce soit dans l'océan Indien, l'océan Pacifique, même Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon, on est plus proche de l'Arctique que du continent européen dans le cas de ce territoire en particulier. Comment vous intégrez ces régions ultrapériphériques ou les territoires d'outre-mer des pays membres dans cette vision-là ? Car ils donnent quand même à l'Europe continentale un regard et même une participation sur des mers très lointaines. Donc je pense que ça peut répondre à la question des mers qui ne sont pas seulement côtières ni bordières, mais voilà, c'est la place de l'Europe dans ces océans ou autres continents à travers ces régions ultrapériphériques et quelle place elles auraient dans l'Ocean Eye. Et enfin, autre question, question des ressources, car l'océan c'est aussi énormément de ressources.
Et quelle est votre vision sur la prospection ou l'observation et peut-être à terme l'exploitation de ressources des fonds marins ? Car certains pays, et notamment la France, une décision que nous on regrette, mais le président Macron a avancé l'idée d'un moratoire sur l'exploitation de toute ressource dans les fonds marins. Voilà, est-ce qu'il y a une vision propre aux ressources des fonds marins ? Est-ce que vous êtes dans une vision où peut-être il faut s'intéresser et répertorier ces ressources et ne pas s'interdire de les exploiter à terme pour la puissance des États européens ? Merci.
Iglika Yakova
C'est vraiment des questions importantes et très pertinentes, mais je préférerais les répondre en anglais for the vocabulary I'm used to the English language. So, in terms of strategic autonomy and how we are planning to put this ambition into place, it's something new for us to think in terms of strategic autonomy when we think research and innovation. So for us, the first need is to have this overall picture and then to ensure that we are resilient and in a controlled, secure way. So, there was recently a public procurement procedure that will be used as a tool to stimulate the demand and accelerate the deployment. And there will be a use of regulatory sandboxes to enable innovation, and that will be done in a controlled way, in a practical, controlled way.
The other sensitivity that we have now, and that's a big difference in terms of how we've been thinking previously, is the like-minded, the selection of like-minded partners that we will be working with. And you clearly see it with Canada. You saw it also in the speech of the Commission President two weeks ago when she elaborated with which partners the Commission intends to work in the future.
And we clearly identify who are the like-minded partners with whom to develop this ocean observation initiative. On the outermost regions, this has been a very important aspect and a new aspect that was put in place in the new communication on outermost regions that was published, I think, also very recently, early September. And there we explicitly focus on those outermost regions as critical strategic points at the forefront of maritime security for the EU. And we have a specific reflection that we are currently elaborating within the coastal community strategy on how to ensure the resilience and strategic aspects, strategic use of the outermost regions for the coastal use, for the island use, and how this could bring forward for the benefit for the ocean observation community.
So this is work in progress, and this is also something new because a couple of years ago these strategic uses of the outermost regions was not clearly identified as an asset for the EU, and we do realize that there is much more to be done there. On the on the how, on the resources, right? You you saw that there is there was at the UN General Assembly a big call for international donors to secure funding for the international community. This is one important step, but what we wish to ensure here within our European budget for the for the next multiannual financial framework is this continuous link between the the whole research and research innovation and investment cycle for technologies and capabilities, and that could only be done if we put in place Horizon Europe closely linked to the future competitiveness fund.
And I believe there we will have a full system that could allow us to fund the ambitious program that we have. And not to forget that we are also working with member states and therefore within the national and regional plans there will be specific impetus for putting in place technologies and research project innovation on those topics that could also serve on the one hand ocean observation but on the other hand this security dimension that is so important. In terms of the seabed mining, I think that's what you were referring to, the Commission's stance remains unchanged and this has been also endorsed through the Council conclusions on the international ocean governance and on this I think we are aligned that for the moment we abide by the precautionary principle.
Allison
Perhaps I'll just add very, very briefly because overseas territories are nevertheless as you said part of the European Union and I'm the External Action Service so we deal with the common foreign and security policy and the common security and defense policy so with non-EU partners. But of course a number of our member states, principally France, have territories in other parts of the world and as I said at the beginning our oceans are connected and we are affected by what happens in maritime spaces around the world.
So from our perspective, this is a huge asset in terms of expertise, experience, knowledge, capabilities. We rely very heavily on those member states who are represented in other regions of the world to share with us their experience and their knowledge. We are very engaged, for example, in the Western Indian Ocean in support of regional maritime cooperation there, particularly the Djibouti Code of Conduct, but not only. And this is a region where France, for example, plays an extremely important role and we are very closely coordinating with them in those international frameworks. But from our perspective, we really do see this as a strategic asset and we're very grateful to those member states that share their expertise and their knowledge, their contacts with us as we develop also our foreign policy initiatives in these regions.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
So we have two questions more, Francesco and afterwards Tommaso. Francesco.
Francisco José Millán Mon
Decía que siendo miembro de la Comisión de Exteriores y también de la de Pesca, lógicamente veo con mucha simpatía esta iniciativa, conocer mejor el estado de los océanos, saber lo que está pasando con el cambio climático, las actividades económicas, asegurar y promover las actividades económicas europeas en este océano global. La pesca aquí juega un papel muy importante, lógicamente. Contribuir a la seguridad marítima me parece clave en un continente como el europeo, tan dependiente del comercio internacional, cuando ahora tenemos estas amenazas a la libertad de navegación, etcétera. O sea que yo, desde luego, me parece una gran iniciativa. Pero creo también que los océanos son globales y que necesitamos ayuda de otros.
Se lanzó esta iniciativa hace unos días en Nueva York. Creo que Canadá es el primer país que ha dicho adelante y que va a ayudar a la Unión Europea. Me quería preguntar qué eco hemos tenido con otros países. Estoy pensando en China, por ejemplo, que es el gran comerciante del mundo, cuyos productos están por todos los por todos los océanos. Supongo que tendrá interés en la salud del océano, por lo menos desde el punto de vista del transporte.
También, desde luego, Estados Unidos, que iba a decir que es la potencia indispensable, o lo sigue o lo venía siendo. Y me gustaría saber por eso cuál es el eco de esta iniciativa.
Y en el plano interno, le acaba de contestar a la representante de la Comisión, si entiendo bien esto va a seguir proviniendo sobre todo el funding del Horizon Europe, si lo he entendido bien. Estoy pensando en el nuevo marco financiero plurianual, quería que me confirmara eso. Es lo que me pareció entender, aunque también quieren de la parte de competitividad, ¿no?, del segundo gran heading. Pero esto es lo que yo entiendo, sin perjuicio de las contribuciones de los Estados miembros. Gracias.
Iglika Yakova
Yes, the question on, on, on China first I would like to reply to that. So, of course my objective here was to come and present to, to the committee defense and security aspects, so I put aside what is important for the social, social cohesion, society, fishermen and also the livelihood of the coastal communities, but of course no doubt that these are interconnected.
I do agree that we cannot say one without the other. You rightly pointed to China and of course China is an important ocean observation partner as well, and also we should not be naive there that there are also challenges and pressures and tensions that could be easily seen, not only in terms of monitoring what happens under sea, and we have many exchanges in the past years on what is to be shared and what is not to be shared and how secure we could work securely with China. That's on the one hand. But also in terms of ocean health, be it ocean exploration, be it rare earths and raw materials, be it on the natural resources and the way China acts in certain parts of the world in terms also of strategic autonomy on food security, China is putting a lot of tension on our fishermen and on our economic operators. So this is a double sword.
This is a situation that we need to keep in balance, but here for ocean observation, what we wish to engage is to work together, to cooperate in a cautious and also reliable way.
And let's not forget that we also work a lot with China in the multilateral area, for instance in the FAO, in the especially for aquaculture. And there we are pushing forward to put in place sustainable practices for aquaculture. Of course, this is a long road. It takes a lot of time, but it's the way to go ahead, to work multilaterally with partners where we all agree on the same sustainability standards so that we move forward. And of course with China, in terms of economic security, our colleagues in DG Trade on the trade agenda, they have also a robust mechanism for investment screening and for trade relations beyond the usual dialogues, regulatory dialogues on IUU, on maritime affairs that we do with China.
So I take note and I fully share with you that we should be cautious and that probably China is a very very big actor that we need to take cautiously into consideration.
In terms of the funding opportunities, we count a lot on the multiannual financial framework, which is of course under negotiation and we are working with you on the next step. So let's see where we go and what happens. Of course, here what was important for me is to give you the links between research and innovation funds and the competitiveness funds and how these should go together and not separately in two directions so that we ensure that the full investment cycle is ensured. Thank you.
Thomas Bajada
Good afternoon and thank you for this discussion. I am here as a member of the PECH Committee, but also as a marine biologist. I welcome the efforts being done on the Ocean IT. I think this is very important. There aren't five oceans and a hundred seas, it's one ocean and everything is interconnected.
So the efforts being done internationally are extremely important.
But I'm here to speak about one concrete practical example where the Union can with its efforts, especially now where it comes to defense and security aspects of the Ocean-I, bring Europe closer to our people. Fishers across the Mediterranean are facing issues of illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, especially from third-country fleets. This is a major maritime security threat declared by the United Nations, so this is really important that is taken into consideration. And my question, or better my remark, is how can the Ocean-I, apart from focusing on science, which it should be the objective of the Ocean-I, I came here because now I'm seeing the Ocean-I going onto defense and security, which it shouldn't be the main, but if it's coming, I want it to be also defense and security for our fishers on the ocean that are alone in the middle of the sea facing aggression and illegal fishing by third countries. So investment of infrastructure that will actually help our fishers in monitoring the illegal fishing that is being done.
And I will give a practical example and close there, Chair, so that I don't take too long. Fishers are sending us photos and videos from the high seas of aggressions by third countries.
I will not mention countries, but who knows, I speak very well about two countries in the Mediterranean. We cannot help them because we have only one patrol vessel of EFCA for the whole Mediterranean. We used to have it for a couple of weeks a year, now we have one for the whole sea for the whole year. With a patrol vessel and a reporting fisher in the middle of the sea reporting an aggression, the patrol vessel will never arrive in time and the illicit activity will be running away and we will never be able to apprehend it. With the use of drones, that is something that is being done already by Frontex, to actually deploy assets in order to be able to track these illicit activities is something which is very much more effective and could be one of the observation, security and defence mechanisms that we can do to protect our people who are alone in the sea.
So my question is very simple: is this a possibility? Thank you.
Iglika Yakova
Thank you. I'm well aware of what situation you're talking about, which countries, and unfortunately I don't have the line from my services simply also because most of the time we clearly make the distinction between the maritime security activities and the IUU-related infringements and threats. So I guess you have also received other debriefings from the Commission services that they must have replied to you, but I can give you some very practical answers on what we do on drones and we could even continue exchanging on that later on. So we have been working on coast guard cooperation between the three agencies: EFCA, Frontex and EMSA.
Frontex and EMSA, and they are very complementary, but of course each agency has their own mandate, and EFCA of course focuses on fisheries control and Frontex on on border control. With the use of technologies and what we have been trying to put in place in the past couple of years, we wish to use more drone and unmanned capabilities, aerial assets, and each of the agency has been doing so for their own particular activities. For instance, EMSA, they could also lend it to member states upon request, so they could use it for observation of environmental pollution, damages, accidents, and so on. EFCA is using more and more, and they have actually even more need for drones now for certain observation activities. Of course, the issue is the the range of I think motion of the of the drones, how far they could get.
And indeed, in on Frontex, the challenge is that of course they have a wider wider range of observation. But but the exchange of information sometimes doesn't go as quickly as we would have wished. And also that's why we have put in place, you've probably heard about the common information sharing environment for the maritime domain, that is still trying to gain speed.
The idea there is that this kind of information from a vessel, from a drone, from an operator could be quickly shared with the other users of the other maritime functions, maritime surveillance functions, be it for pollution, be it for border control, be it for fisheries control, so that they could be used by other actors. And this has been put in place through what we call multi MMO, MMO, MMO, multi maritime operation, multi-sector operations requested by certain member states in cooperation with the agencies. There are practical exercises where they combine, the idea is that assets are limited, we have to combine assets so that we engage differently and increase the impact. And then there have been a couple of exercises in the Mediterranean, in the Baltic, very successful on cables in the Mediterranean, on border control, not so much on fisheries in the Med. I think fisheries was rather in the North Sea, but still there have been actions where the agencies exchange information and join forces.
And I think that's the solution is how to support member states through action and cooperation of the agency and the agencies have the assets to make it available to member states. Sorry, I was long, but it was very technical and I wanted to explain further.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
Okay, we have four minutes left, so one question, the last one, Andre.
André Franqueira Rodrigues
Thank you, I will speak in Portuguese. Quero começar por saudar naturalmente o lançamento da iniciativa Oceanai e de modo muito particular o objetivo de reforçar a autonomia estratégica da União Europeia, a segurança marítima e a resiliência das infraestruturas. Como é sabido, Portugal tem uma das maiores zonas económicas exclusivas da União e tem nos últimos tempos sido alvo de um aumento significativo de avistamentos e apreensões de lanchas rápidas, conhecidas também como narcolanchas, que se têm tornado numa das principais focos de alerta para as autoridades marítimas e de segurança marítimas nacionais e europeias. O policiamento destas embarcações de alta velocidade tem colocado uma enorme pressão sobre os meios da Marinha Portuguesa, sobre a Polícia Marítima e a GNR.
Devido a este cenário, vários especialistas e sindicatos têm alertado publicamente para a sofisticação tecnológica dos criminosos e para a necessidade de reforçar os meios de fiscalização e de perseguição na zona económica exclusiva nacional. E por isso gostaria de perguntar em que medida é que o Ocean Eye e as capacidades que estão a ser desenvolvidas podem já hoje ajudar neste combate. Muito obrigado.
Allison
Thank you very much for the question and I will give the floor in a moment to Ilka to speak more on the Ocean Eye. And again, Portugal is a very strong supporter of EU maritime security policy. One of the members of my team, I should say that more than half of my team are seconded national experts from member states and they come from Portugal, from France, from Italy, from the Italian Navy, from Romania and I feel I've forgotten somebody now, now I'm going to be in trouble. But anyway, we're very dependent on our member states and particularly the maritime member states who, Finland, that's the one I forgot, particularly maritime states who have a lot of experience and knowledge of the reality of the challenges that they're facing. So Portugal are important supporters of ours.
We work with them very closely. There are a number of mechanisms already in place for navies and coastguards to share information to respond to some of the criminal activity that you're talking about. I visited MAOC-N in Lisbon, which is really very, very interesting work. It's not an EU body of course, but many of our member states are engaged in that and the EU helps to contribute to financing.
And this is building that information sharing, that analysis, that understanding of the patterns of some of these kinds of activity where we can respond. Maritime domain awareness beyond the Ocean Eye is also a big piece of the work on the European defense capabilities that I know you've discussed in this committee before and will certainly discuss again. But understanding what's happening, having the access to information and to support to support the coastal states with exactly these questions is also a big piece of our work from from that perspective, including with the European Defense Agency. But on Ocean Eye, I'll leave it to Iulica.
Iglika Yakova
I don't think I could say much on the Ocean Eye. I think there is a there are a lot of answers in the implementation report of the European Maritime Security Strategy. The report will be presented, adopted in October, and then there will be Council conclusions to be prepared by the current presidency.
One thing that I think it's important and I didn't mention is that we prepare a strategy on unexploded munitions at sea, on remediation, what to do with the unexploded munitions, but also think of the sea basins that are particularly vulnerable, be it the Baltic and then in the future the Black Sea and how we tackle it there. And we would be interested in also presenting and hearing views here and participating more into this discussion with you. Thank you.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
Thank you very much. You could see how important this topic is, not only for members of SEDE, also for other members. That was the reason why we invited all of us, all of you, because this is really a big topic and it's true, it's a big challenge now. So thank you very much for your time coming to SEDE committee and we will continue. And we will continue here just in two minutes.
So we are waiting for the shadows, so we have four minutes left.
Speaker 13
It's really interesting. And when I am on tour to explain to public opinion people what's going on, I always start with this maritime challenge honestly.
In the, in the Baltic Sea, and the Mediterranean Sea, and the North Atlantic, and then I go to the Red Sea, and then to the Gulf of Aden, and then the Strait of Hormuz, and the Strait of Malacca.
Speaker 15
Strait of Malacca, and then we've got the South China Sea, which is so many different ways.
Then the China Sea, and then the Taiwan Strait, and people are totally, they are, yes, oh shit, what's going on?
Speaker 14
Yes, oh shit, exactly, and then they go and fill them up at the pump and they say... Yes, but everybody is so interested because then they, and of course the Arctic and...
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
So, colleagues. Now we move, please take your seats. Please, please, please. Please take your seat.
Thank you very much. Now we move to the consideration of the draft annual report on the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy. The rapporteur is Nathalie Loiseau. In 2026, Europe's security environment deteriorated further with Russia's escalation in its war of aggression and attacks against Ukraine's civilian infrastructure as well as hybrid attacks against EU member states. The EU has responded, but there is still significant scope for the EU to do more to address the current threats, not least to give Ukraine missile defense capabilities to protect its population.
The CSDP annual report allows us to take stock of these developments and to provide guidance on the way forward, including on where more action is needed. Before giving the floor to the rapporteur, let me remind you of the timetable. The deadline for amendments is the 2nd of October at noon. The consideration of amendments will follow on the 3rd of November. The adoption of the report in SEDE is scheduled on the 30th of November.
And the debate and vote in plenary is foreseen for February 2027, together with the annual reports on the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy and on human rights drafted in parallel in AFET. I give now the floor to the rapporteur, Nathalie, for eight minutes.
Nathalie, the floor is yours.
Nathalie Loiseau
Thank you, Chair. I will switch to my mother tongue, so grab your headphones. Madame la Présidente, chers collègues, le projet de rapport annuel sur la PSDC que je vous présente vise à ne pas être un rapport comme les autres ou un rapport de routine. Il s'agit pas seulement de dresser le bilan de 2025 en matière de PSDC, il s'agit de nous demander si nous tirons enfin les leçons de ce qui se passe de cette année encore davantage que les précédentes, les leçons que nous avons apprises. Le fil rouge, c'est le souhait d'un saut qualitatif que nous passions d'une Europe qui bavarde à une Europe qui décide et qui agit.
La guerre d'agression russe contre l'Ukraine s'évit toujours. Vis-à-vis de nos propres pays de l'Union européenne, la Russie conjugue sabotage, cyberattaques, manipulation de l'information pour essayer de nous intimider et de nous décourager de soutenir l'Ukraine. Un drone chargé d'explosifs désamorcé à l'aéroport de Leipzig, des violations répétées des espaces aériens polonais ou roumains, un drone armé venu du Bélarus abattu au-dessus de la Lituanie.
La guerre hybride n'est plus une menace, c'est une réalité. On se demande même si elle est encore hybride. Le rapport demande que l'Union la reconnaisse comme telle et en tire toutes les conséquences. Dans le même temps, l'intérêt de Donald Trump pour la sécurité de l'Europe est pour le moins variable. Si nous voulons à la fois mieux protéger nos concitoyens et que les États-Unis nous respectent davantage, nous devons faire plus.
Dans cet environnement à la fois brutal et instable, l'Europe ne peut plus se contenter de sous-traiter la paix, la sécurité et la protection de ses concitoyens. Elle doit d'urgence assurer sa propre défense et l'Union européenne peut y contribuer en l'aidant à se réarmer. Mais pas au rythme d'avant, pas avec les moyens d'avant ou les méthodes d'avant et surtout pas avec la fragmentation d'avant. Nous avons commencé à dépenser davantage, tant mieux, mais nous ne savons pas encore suffisamment dépenser ensemble, produire ensemble et agir ensemble. Le premier axe du projet de rapport, c'est évidemment le soutien à l'Ukraine puisque c'est le moyen le plus direct d'assurer la sécurité de l'Europe.
Mon projet de rapport demande donc davantage d'aide militaire, en particulier pour la défense aérienne et les capacités de frappe à longue portée. Au-delà, il faut commencer à protéger les civils ukrainiens et les infrastructures civiles des régions où ils résident en protégeant le ciel de ces régions par l'engagement d'une coalition d'États européens volontaires pour déployer un Sky Shield européen. Je n'ai pas de doute qu'il y a dans ce Parlement une majorité d'entre nous qui soutient l'augmentation de notre soutien à l'Ukraine, qui demande à l'Union européenne et aux États membres d'accroître aussi la pression sur la Russie parce que c'est le plus sûr chemin vers la paix que nous souhaitons tous. À ceux qui disent que nous n'avons pas les moyens de soutenir davantage l'Ukraine, je rappelle que dorment sur le sol européen 210 milliards d'euros d'avoirs russes gelés qui peuvent être utilisés.
C'est en sentant notre détermination que la Russie sera conduite à négocier, pas en mesurant mois après mois notre mollesse. L'Ukraine n'est pas seulement un bénéficiaire de notre aide. Après plus de quatre ans et demi de guerre de haute intensité, plus longtemps que la Première Guerre mondiale, elle dispose d'une expérience opérationnelle et d'une capacité d'innovation qui sont un atout stratégique pour toute l'Europe. Nous devons apprendre d'elle, produire avec elle et l'associer pleinement à notre architecture de sécurité, c'est notre intérêt. Le deuxième axe de ce rapport concerne les missions et les opérations de la PSDC.
Une mission n'a de sens que si elle dispose d'un mandat crédible, de moyens suffisants et de l'agilité nécessaire. Le rapport appelle à adapter les mandats et les capacités de nos missions aux réalités actuelles, qu'il s'agisse de la guerre hybride, des cybermenaces, des infrastructures critiques à protéger, de la sécurité maritime dont nous venons de parler, et en évaluer sans complaisance les résultats. Cela vaut partout, de l'Ukraine à la Moldavie, en passant par les Balkans occidentaux ou la mer Rouge, ou bien pour la mission lancée en juillet en Arménie et celle qui peut se préparer au Liban. Le troisième axe de ce rapport concerne notre architecture de sécurité.
La nouvelle stratégie de sécurité européenne sera utile si elle conduit à l'action. Elle ne doit pas empiler une couche supplémentaire sur les textes qui existent déjà, en commençant par la boussole stratégique. Demandons-nous d'abord s'ils ont été pleinement mis en œuvre. Il faut donner à l'Europe les capacités qui lui manquent : défense aérienne et antimissile, drones et anti-drones, transport stratégique, espace, cyber, guerre électronique et mobilité militaire. Le Schengen militaire doit devenir une réalité.
En situation de crise, nos forces et nos équipements ne peuvent dépendre d'autorisations administratives. Tout cela nous le savons, alors faisons-le plutôt que de faire une nouvelle stratégie ou un nouveau rapport supplémentaire. Notre ambition est une défense aérienne, européenne pardon, non pas séparée mais séparable de l'OTAN, capable de planifier, de commander et d'agir quand cela est nécessaire, et sans dépendre pour les équipements essentiels, les composants, les licences ou les logiciels de la décision d'États tiers. Dans cette architecture de sécurité, le Royaume-Uni, la Norvège et l'Ukraine ont toute leur place.
Quatrième axe, les moyens. La défense, la sécurité et l'espace sont une nouvelle priorité du prochain budget pluriannuel européen, elles doivent le rester. 131 milliards d'euros proposés par la Commission pour la défense et l'espace dans le futur fonds européen pour la compétitivité, c'est un socle, il faut le préserver. Mais cette enveloppe ne clôt pas le débat. Le rapport Draghi a mis en évidence le coût du sous-investissement et de la fragmentation européenne.
Annoncer des montants ne suffit pas. Nous devons les transformer en commandes, en lignes de production et en capacités livrées. Il faut aussi orienter l'investissement privé vers la BITDE et garantir aux PME et aux entreprises de taille intermédiaire l'accès au financement avec le soutien de la BEI. Mais le volume des dépenses ne nous protégera pas s'il accroît nos dépendances. Si les États achètent chacun dans leur coin, nous aurons davantage de matériel non-interopérable et nous serons plus que jamais tributaires d'États tiers.
En 2025, seuls 24 % des achats d'équipements de défense ont été réalisés en coopération, très loin de l'objectif de 40 % fixé pour 2030. La préférence européenne n'est pas du protectionnisme, c'est la condition pour équiper nos forces au moment où nous en avons besoin.
Elle doit irriguer l'ensemble des instruments européens. Cela implique de pousser plus loin l'harmonisation. L'Omnibus Défense était un premier pas, mais il est insuffisant. Nous devons rapprocher les règles relatives aux transferts intra-européens, à la certification, aux autorisations des sites industriels et à la passation des marchés. La souveraineté nationale ne peut devenir le prétexte d'une impuissance organisée.
Quand nos règles nous empêchent d'agir ensemble, elles affaiblissent la souveraineté qu'elles prétendent préserver. Le contrôle des exportations, lui, reste naturellement une compétence nationale. Enfin, une Union qui investit davantage dans la défense doit rendre davantage de comptes. Le Parlement, notre Parlement, doit exercer pleinement ses prérogatives législatives, budgétaires et de contrôle, être informé des missions et opérations et dialoguer régulièrement avec la Haute Représentante et le Commissaire chargé à la défense. Voilà ce que contient le texte que je vous présente aujourd'hui.
Je me réjouis de travailler prochainement avec les rapporteurs fictifs. J'apporterai moi-même certains amendements de mise à jour à mon projet, tant la situation internationale évolue rapidement et a évolué depuis le mois de juillet.
J'espère que nous parviendrons à un texte de compromis cohérent mais aussi que nous saurons refuser un texte de consensus mou ou de plus petit commun dénominateur où chaque phrase éviterait de choisir. Le contexte sécuritaire, l'ampleur des retards européens et la gravité de nos lacunes ne permettent ni un rapport convenu ni un rapport à l'eau tiède. Je vous remercie.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
Merci beaucoup Nathalie. I will now give the floor to the shadow rapporteurs for two minutes or rather on behalf of so for EPP Pekar.
Pekka Toveri
Thank you chair. I would like to thank the rapporteur for her draft. On the essentials we see eye to eye. Russia remains the primary threat to European security. Hybrid attacks against our societies are intensifying and the Union must continue its shift from crisis response towards genuine defense readiness.
We also welcome the attention given to our missions and operations and to the principles that mandates, means and results must match. From the EPP side our amendments will seek to enrich the text in three directions. First, on the transatlantic relationship, we would like to report to reaffirm that NATO remains the cornerstone of collective defense and that a stronger European pillar is best built within the alliance.
We will also propose language on European command and control, including a strengthened role for the MPCC, because credible autonomy begins with the ability to plan and command. Second, on financing, we believe the report can recognize more fully the effort member states are making, with 418 billion euros invested in 2025, while keeping its rightful focus on what still holds us back: fragmentation, with only around a quarter of procurement done cooperatively, as mentioned earlier. Delivering the joint procurement targets and European preference that keeps the door open to our closest partners will be at the heart of our proposal. Third, we will suggest a fuller reflection of the 360-degree approach, so that the report speaks to all our flanks, from the east to the south and the Atlantic, and to the missions that serve them. We look forward to working constructively with the rapporteur and all groups towards a broad compromise.
Thank you.
Lucia Annunziata
Yes, thank you very much.
And I'm here to convey the opinion of the, sorry. Okay. I'm here to convey on behalf of José Cepeda this proposal that has been in the comment for the rapporteur Nathalie Loiseau. We would like to thank the rapporteur Nathalie for presenting this draft report. We are very much aligned with its main underlying messages and believe it provides a solid basis for us to work together on an important report for the SEDE committee.
We particularly share the ambition to strengthen the European defense architecture, move towards a greater European capacity to plan and act, strengthen the European pillar of NATO, and develop stronger and less fragmented European defense technology. We also agree that this effort must be accompanied by sufficient financing, a clear European preference in defense investment, and greater democratic and parliamentary oversight as the role of the Union and the volume of European resources devoted to this policy increase.
I'm shortening while I'm reading the text that is much longer. From our side, we want to contribute in particular to strengthening a number of elements: a more integrated European Defense Union, greater operationalization of the mutual assistance clause under Article 42.7, stronger European intelligence capability and more systematic information sharing, and a more coordinated and effective European response to hybrid threats in close complementarity with NATO. At the same time, we want the strengthening of European defense to preserve social cohesion and our social model, and for public investment in defense to also generate European added value, quality employment, and opportunities for SMEs. We will be very happy to work constructively with the rapporteur and with the other political groups. Thank you very much.
Sorry for my blanking out at the very beginning.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
No problem, could happen. So, now for the Greens, Martins.
Mārtiņš Staķis
Thank you, Chair, and thank you, Nathalie and your team, for the solid draft.
It gives a clear picture of the threats we face and we'll be happy to table our ideas for how to address these challenges. But we should also be clear about where the real problem sits at least one of the problems. And it's the national capitals. Almost every major proposal from the Commission right now gets watered down in Council. This is what happened with the defense omnibus.
Now we see the same thing with the military mobility regulation. So member states say the threat is real and then they act as if it's not. And I hope that we can also acknowledge this problem clearly in the report. Thank you good luck and looking forward for for cooperation.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
Thank you very much finally I give the floor back to the rapporteur Natalie for short final comments.
Nathalie Loiseau
Well being the last obstacle between you and your evening I will make it short and and say I'm looking forward to working with my shadow rapporteurs. Thank you very much.
Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann
Thank you very much colleagues any other business? No okay and the next meeting will take place on the 1st October here in Brussels. Thank you very much bye bye.
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