Good practices and ongoing initiatives on electoral resilience and integrity (with the European Parliament’s Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield)
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OTHER European Parliament
Anne-Sophie Dhiver
Bonjour madame la présidente. Merci beaucoup.
Bonjour messieurs, mesdames et messieurs les députés. En préambule, j'aimerais vous rappeler quelques constantes sur la menace d'ingérence numérique étrangère en contexte électoral telle que nous l'avons observée chez Viginum ces dernières années, qui va faire largement écho, madame, aux propos introductifs que vous avez eus. Depuis 2021 et la création de Viginum, Viginum a protégé donc sept scrutins électoraux ou référendaires, et aucun d'entre eux n'a été épargné par des tentatives de manipulation impliquant des acteurs étrangers. Ce constat préoccupant, il peut aussi être fait bien évidemment en dehors de la France et au sein d'États membres de l'Union européenne et au-delà, comme vous l'avez rappelé. S'agissant un peu des constantes de cette menace, de ce qu'on a pu observer depuis la création du service, on observe généralement quatre grandes stratégies qui vont être conduites et poursuivies par ces opérations d'ingérence numérique étrangère en contexte électoral.
La première stratégie, elle va consister à tenter de miner la confiance envers le processus démocratique lui-même ou les institutions chargées de l'organiser pour laisser à penser que le processus est frauduleux ou insincère.
La deuxième stratégie va consister à discréditer un parti ou des candidats, voire à promouvoir aussi un parti ou un candidat par des moyens inauthentiques. La troisième stratégie, qui elle n'est pas forcément circonscrite au contexte électoral, qui est aussi généralement observée, va être une stratégie qui va concerner plutôt les médias et tenter de dénigrer les médias pour miner la confiance du public envers les médias d'information. Et enfin la dernière stratégie, elle va généralement consister à tenter de polariser le débat public national en instrumentalisant des thématiques clivantes présentes dans le débat public. Et outre ces quatre grandes stratégies, on peut observer aussi des acteurs étrangers qui de manière opportuniste peuvent également chercher à exploiter, on va dire, la surface médiatique de l'élection pour promouvoir leurs intérêts propres. Donc j'organiserai mon propos en trois points.
Premièrement, je vous présenterai le dispositif qui est donc le réseau de coordination et de protection des élections que nous avons mis en place pour la première fois début 2026. Ensuite, je détaillerai un peu plus les tendances de la menace que nous avons observées lors de ces dernières élections et qui donnent aussi un aperçu de la menace à laquelle nous ferons face lors des élections présidentielles en France de 2027.
Et enfin, un enseignement donc à l'approche des prochaines élections et des discussions en cours. Donc je commencerai par vous présenter donc le réseau de coordination et de protection des élections que nous avons mis en place lors des élections municipales de 2026. Puisque c'était la dernière élection au suffrage universel direct avant les présidentielles de 2027, plusieurs facteurs nous ont amenés à considérer que le niveau de menace d'ingérence numérique étrangère qui pèserait sur ce scrutin serait élevé. Et nous ne nous sommes pas trompés. Et donc dans ce contexte-là, en se fondant aussi sur l'expérience de pays partenaires, notamment le Canada qui nous a inspirés, nous avons mis en place un dispositif national renforcé de protection de l'élection face aux ingérences numériques étrangères qui a donc été mis en place à droit constant entre plusieurs administrations compétentes en matière électorale.
Ce dispositif de protection, il a été organisé en trois temps. Les élections avaient lieu en mars 2026, il y a eu un premier temps de décembre 2025 à janvier 2026 qui a consisté à assurer des sessions d'information, de sensibilisation des partis politiques, aussi de concertation avec les présidents des chambres parlementaires, différents parlementaires au niveau national, également les associations d'élus et des représentants de partis politiques.
Le deuxième temps qui a constitué vraiment le cœur de ce réseau de coordination et de protection s'est joué de janvier à avril 2026 où nous avons organisé des réunions hebdomadaires entre plusieurs administrations compétentes et d'autorités indépendantes en matière électorale, notamment l'Arcom au titre de sa compétence sur la régulation des plateformes digitales et audiovisuelles, la CNCCFP, donc la Commission nationale de contrôle du financement des partis politiques qui est une autorité indépendante, le Secrétariat général du gouvernement au titre de sa compétence juridique, le ministère de l'Intérieur et au sein du ministère de l'Intérieur le bureau des élections politiques en charge de l'organisation de l'élection, Viginum et le comité éthique et scientifique de Viginum. Et l'animation et la coordination de ce réseau a été assurée par le Secrétariat général à la défense et la sécurité nationale. Ce réseau, donc mis en place à droit constant face au constat préoccupant de menace, il avait trois missions. La première mission c'était de consolider l'appréciation de la menace d'ingérence numérique étrangère de manière collégiale sur la base des détections et caractérisations notamment de Viginum.
De proposer les mesures de réponse appropriées, parmi lesquelles l'information des partis politiques, des personnes et des entités ciblées, mais également le partage d'éléments techniques aux plateformes. Et troisièmement, l'information régulière et transparente auprès des citoyens. Et à ce titre, pour la première fois, un bulletin d'information a été publié chaque semaine de janvier à mars 2024, qui était public et qui rendait compte à la population de l'état de la menace d'ingérence numérique étrangère. Au global, il y a eu donc onze réunions de ce réseau sur ces trois mois. Et enfin, le processus s'est terminé avec la publication en juin d'un rapport plus détaillé de ce réseau qui a fourni tout le détail sur les opérations détectées ainsi qu'un rapport technique de Viginum sur un mode opératoire qui avait été détecté à cette occasion.
Donc j'aimerais juste insister sur quatre principes, enfin quatre grands principes qui ont structuré chaque décision et chaque communication de ce réseau. La première chose, c'est l'impartialité et la neutralité. Impartialité dans le suivi d'une menace qui pouvait impliquer des acteurs exclusivement étrangers, susceptibles de viser tous les candidats. Et en l'occurrence, nous avons vu tous les bords politiques qui ont été visés. L'objectif étant la préservation de la souveraineté de notre débat national en contexte électoral.
Et neutralité puisque au sein de ce réseau ne siégeaient que des représentants de l'administration et d'autorités administratives indépendantes sans niveau politique.
Le deuxième principe c'est l'objectivité qui a été garantie par une approche technique de la menace d'ingérence numérique étrangère qui est basée donc sur l'approche de Viginum qui est donc articulée autour de l'analyse technique et technologique des modes opératoires mis en œuvre par ces acteurs pour propager de manière artificielle un message. Donc il n'y a eu aucune appréciation des opinions des acteurs ou des mouvements qui pouvaient structurer le débat interne. Le troisième principe c'est un principe de transparence absolue au regard des spécificités de la période électorale qui a été donc matérialisée par la publication de ce bulletin décrivant donc l'état de la menace. Et le quatrième principe qui est inspiré de l'expérience canadienne a été le fonctionnement précoce et routinier du dispositif avec la publication dès le mois de janvier de bulletins pour assurer non seulement la réactivité du dispositif mais aussi créer une forme de routine, installer le sujet dans le paysage et éviter tout risque de surréaction médiatique ou d'emballement au moment d'une communication. Et donc cette nouvelle approche qui a été fondée donc sur une exposition plus systématique des tentatives d'ingérence numérique étrangère de notre point de vue a eu trois vertus.
Premièrement de renforcer la prise de conscience du public. Deuxièmement d'encourager une meilleure réactivité des plateformes numériques dans la mesure où on expose les opérations et en l'occurrence la collaboration a été plus fructueuse qu'à l'accoutumée avec les plateformes.
Et troisièmement, dans certains cas, l'exposition publique a eu un effet dissuasif sur les acteurs eux-mêmes et a pu conduire à l'arrêt de certaines opérations. Donc le dispositif et ses principes ont été globalement salués par l'ensemble des parties politiques qui ont appelé à sa reconduction et donc nous avons reconduit le dispositif lors des élections provinciales en Nouvelle-Calédonie au mois de juin 2024. S'agissant maintenant, j'irai vite sur cette partie, mais sur la menace et les grandes tendances d'évolution de la menace d'ingérence numérique étrangère actuelle. Sur la période des élections municipales, nous avons détecté quatre grandes ingérences numériques étrangères, deux de modes opératoires connus de VIGINUM, deux de modes opératoires inconnus que nous avons découverts à l'occasion des élections. Trois principales tendances ont pu être observées et ces tendances sont toujours valables à l'heure actuelle.
La première tendance, c'est la persistance de certains acteurs étrangers qui parviennent à s'implanter durablement dans notre débat public national à travers donc le pré-positionnement d'écosystèmes numériques, qu'il s'agisse de sites web, de réseaux de faux comptes sur les réseaux sociaux, de liens avec des influenceurs et la conduite continue d'opérations informationnelles par ces mêmes modes opératoires qui sont pour certains connus depuis plusieurs années.
La deuxième tendance, c'est la clandestinisation croissante des opérateurs, leur capacité à faire des opérations plus furtives en s'appuyant notamment sur tout un écosystème de prestataires techniques qui fournissent des solutions d'anonymisation de ces opérations ou d'amplification artificielle de ces opérations qui rendent et qui les rendent potentiellement plus difficiles à détecter. Troisièmement, c'est l'essor d'une véritable économie de la désinformation avec l'émergence non seulement de nouveaux acteurs de l'ingérence numérique étrangère qui poursuivent un but lucratif en diffusant des contenus polarisants, sensationnalistes sur les plateformes auprès d'audiences françaises pour gagner de l'argent par les programmes de rémunération des créateurs afin donc de générer du profit. Et donc cette menace devient très systémique et très intriquée avec le modèle économique et algorithmique des plateformes en ligne lui-même. S'agissant pour terminer donc du bilan et des enseignements de cette période, donc bien que le volume des opérations détectées lors des municipales est resté très limité avec une visibilité et un impact qui est demeuré faible grâce notamment aux mesures mises en œuvre. Toutes les opérations observées, elles confirment en fait une volonté persistante de la part de beaucoup d'acteurs étrangers de peser sur nos processus électoraux.
Et à l'évidence, l'élection présidentielle en France de 2027 sera visée de notre point de vue de manière inédite par cette menace de par le fait qu'elle est porteuse d'enjeux stratégiques majeurs pour l'avenir de la France et pour l'avenir de l'Union européenne. En l'espèce, Viginum observe déjà un niveau précoce et massif de menace pesant sur ce scrutin puisque nous avons déjà détecté une centaine d'opérations. Celles-ci sont à ce stade grossières, d'un niveau très médiocre, mais nous estimons que la menace pourrait s'accentuer à l'approche du scrutin, à la fois entre la persistance d'acteurs connus et l'émergence de nouveaux acteurs et phénomènes. Et donc dans ce contexte, et je terminerai là-dessus, un paquet normatif a été présenté en Conseil des ministres en juillet 2026 afin de créer donc par décret d'une part une commission indépendante d'information du public en cas d'ingérence numérique étrangère en contexte électoral sur le modèle de ce qui existe pour les élections présidentielles où nous avons ce type de commission qui s'appelle la CNCCEP. Et en proposant par ailleurs un projet de loi avec la création d'un nouveau référé contre les manipulations de l'information et une mise à jour d'autres dispositions existantes de notre code électoral.
Parce qu'en effet, les enseignements des derniers scrutins ont mené, enfin ont montré la nécessité d'une vigilance accrue et démontrent en fait la pertinence d'un renforcement nécessaire de tous les moyens d'action en réaction à cette menace. J'en ai terminé, je vous remercie.
Nathalie Loiseau
Merci beaucoup pour cette présentation. Je passe maintenant la parole à Madame Ingrid Klerkan, donc présidente de l'autorité électorale nationale estonienne.
Ingrid Kullerkann
Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for the opportunity to share Estonian experience with internet voting, cybersecurity and electoral resilience. Estonia has spent more than 20 years using internet voting in national elections. That may sound like a story about technology, but our experience has taught us that this is really a story about trust. And trust in internet voting cannot be built by technology alone. Our first lesson perhaps is most fundamental.
Internet voting did not begin with elections. In the years following of restoration of independence, Estonia underwent rapid digitalization.
The state developed digital public services. Today, Estonians use their digital identity to file taxes, sign legally binding documents, and access important public services. Internet voting is therefore not an isolated technology. It is built on the same digital ecosystem that people rely on every day. When we designed internet voting, we also made a fundamental choice.
The new way of voting should follow as closely as possible the principles of voting that people already know. Ballot secrecy is a good example. Many European countries use double envelope system for advanced or postal voting. Estonian internet voting is essentially applies the same principles digitally. The voter's choice is encrypted and linked to the voter through digital signature.
Before the votes are open, the voter's personal data are removed and only anonymous votes are counted.
The technology changed, but the principles of elections did not. Responsibility for the internet voting doesn't rest with one institution or one IT team. One is responsible for the election technology, the other protects Estonia's critical digital infrastructure, the third monitors our cyberspace and responds to potential incidents. This means that election cybersecurity does not begin during election week. It's a part of our day-to-day national cybersecurity.
Our aim is to minimize as far as possible the need to simply trust either the election authority or technology. The system must be verifiable. After voting, voters can use separate verification application to check that the votes received by the electronic ballot box reflects the choice they made. All key operations are logged and verified by certified IT auditor. The source code of the internet voting system is public and key procedures are open to observation.
We also provide dedicated training for election observers.
We also need to protect freedom of the voter. With internet voting, we cannot see who may be standing beside the voter when they cast their vote. A voter may therefore vote again online or later go to the polling station and cast a paper ballot. This means that someone attempting to influence a voter can never be certain that the internet vote cast in their presence will ultimately be the one that counts. Of course, more than 20 years of internet voting does not mean that everyone in Estonia trusts it.
Different aspects of internet voting have been challenged repeatedly over the years and many of those disputes have reached Estonia's highest court, the Supreme Court. In Estonia, election disputes have a short road to Supreme Court. We do not see judicial scrutiny as a weakness of the system. On the contrary, independent and timely judicial scrutiny is itself part of the trustworthy electoral system.
The court has examined different aspects of internet voting on numerous occasions and also identified areas where the legal framework or electoral procedure could be improved. Trust is not created by absence of questions. Trust is strengthened when those questions can be answered. But there is also a more fundamental question: why do we use internet voting at all? Our experience suggests that internet voting does not in itself significantly increase the overall turnout where the voters already have easy access to polling stations.
What it does, it makes voting more accessible, particularly for voters abroad, those living far from polling stations, and voters with disabilities. Our objective, however, has never been to replace paper voting with internet voting. Having multiple ways to vote itself is an important part of electoral resilience.
If the security or reliability of internet voting cannot be guaranteed, the National Electoral Committee can suspend or terminate internet voting and, where necessary, invalidate internet votes. The elections can continue using paper ballots. And finally, more than 20 years of internet voting, we do not regard our system as finished. Technology change, threats change, and the tools we use to safeguard elections change as well. We are already preparing for future cryptographic risks and the transitions towards post-quantum cryptography.
We are also looking at artificial intelligence not only as potential threat to the elections, but as a tool we can help to us protect them. We have used AI to analyze the source code of our internet voting system and look for potential security vulnerabilities. The security of internet voting is never finished as threat evolves, so must our safeguards and our method of verifications. And this brings me to the perhaps most important lesson from Estonian's experience. Trustworthy internet voting is not a single IT system.
It's an ecosystem. It requires strong digital identity, national cybersecurity capabilities, and clear legal framework, independent auditing, transparency, and preparedness for the unexpected. Technology alone does not create trust. Trust is built when technology is secure, but also verifiable and understandable, and where we remain willing to scrutinize it critically and continuously improve it. Thank you.
Tomasz Chłoń
Thank you. Dzień dobry. Madame la Présidente, honorable members of national parliaments, honorable members of the European Parliament. I served in Estonia as diplomat, and I remember long time ago, people were telling that there are two things you cannot do digitally in Estonia: getting married and getting a divorce.
But may I have my first, yes, thank you very much. I'll speak today in my capacity as chair of the Council for Resilience against Foreign Disinformation, which advises Polish government. And the activities of the Council connect directly or indirectly to the topic of our today's debate, namely the integrity of elections. The Council was established almost a year and a half ago, its achievements exceeded our expectations. And I would like to present to you what can be considered as best practice.
The Council is also a tangible example of the return on EU investment in programs such as Horizon Europe.
Supporting research and civil society organizations pays off. Indeed, the idea for the Council emerged from SOFEX, a Horizon Europe project comprising entities from Poland, Polish Center for Technological Development, University of Warsaw, Polish Academy of Sciences, DROG from the Netherlands, Lithuanian Debunk, Finnish Faktabaari, and Ukrainian Osavul. Next slide, please. Let me continue by highlighting these three features of the Council work: its representative character, its ability to deliver results, so it's not only a talking shop, far from it, and its breadth of expertise. The last feature matters because there is no single solution to disinformation, there is no silver bullet.
The Council represents some 120 organizations directly or indirectly. And I'm going to show you examples of its practical impact.
Next slide, please. The Council meets in plenary sessions every month and works through the groups shown in this slide. In many respects, however, its work is on an everyday basis. It pays currently particular attention to disinformation and hate speech aimed, for example, at Polish-Ukrainian relations, including attempts to attribute hybrid attacks to Ukraine, to divide us, to weaken our support for Ukraine. And that is going to be a fundamental challenge in upcoming elections in Poland in a year to come.
Our members, for example, Pułaski Foundation or Center for International Studies, are active both domestically and internationally, including among global partners. We are carrying international cultural projects that strengthen cooperation networks across the Visegrad region with, for example, Temida Foundation.
This, I think, also contributes to stopping attempts to sow historical discord between Poles and Czechs before it could take hold. Another council member, the Zamenhof Institute, organized the first Information Security Congress at the University of Białystok in Poland. 500 people registered and just over 30 attended in person. We believe it will become an annual event. Our members are also highly active in national media, and that is the question of impact.
A journalist, author, and scholar, Grzegorz Rzeczkowski, makes dozens of appearances viewed by millions, including in mainstream media. Another member of the council, Demagog, member of the European Fact-Checking Network as well, reports even greater audience. In the first half of 2024 alone, its social media content received more than 50 million views.
Its social media channels have approximately half million followers in total. One member of the Council represents a global technology company that analyzes around one trillion security signals worldwide every day, and it's important also in the context of elections. We are, next slide please. We are particularly encouraged of the Council's educational work and its cooperation across generations. It's a long-term process in comparison to other instruments at our disposal that are short, short-term.
Educational materials developed through the Council are available on the Ministry of Education's integrated educational platform, which serves, mind you, 800,000 teachers in Poland. And this work supports the new school curricula introduced this year. As the saying goes in Poland, the first light, the first line of defense is a kindergarten teacher, and that is the approach that we experienced in, in Finland and we, we would like to follow the suit.
Our remarkable development is the Youth Resilience Council, established with our support at the third secondary school, Lycée in Gdynia, and its activities are spreading across Poland and internationally. So they are mushrooming. Young people help design educational programs and tools for younger generations, including games and comic books. So next slide, please. And next slide, please.
And next slide, please. Council members reach local and regional authorities through practical guides and direct training with particular emphasis on the train-the-trainer approach. And Wrocław municipality authorities are one example. They reached out to 300 communes in Poland already. Next slide, please.
Council's legal working group has prepared recommendations for state institutions. These cover legislative changes and better use of existing law. So not to wait that we enact something new, but to how we can use better the existing frameworks.
I will provide an English version of of the recommendations to the secretariat of this high committee. I would like also to address one concern directly. The suggestion that this work could lead to censorship. In fact, we want social media platforms to stop censoring users and violating their rights. We are now focusing on two immediate projects.
Together with another member of ours, InfoOps, we would like to launch two pilot projects in Poland. The first would examine how to prevent the circumvention of EU sanctions against individuals and entities spreading disinformation in the EU. The second would support people harmed by disinformation and online hate. This requires cooperation between authorities and private investors as well. The last slide, please.
Ladies and gentlemen, all of it needs resources.
And this forum, the European Parliament, understands it well given its resolution of 15th of September and calling on appropriate funds under present and upcoming MFFs. Money worth spending. So, all hands on deck. Merci, Madame la Présidente.
Nathalie Loiseau
Thank you, Ambassador, and our last speaker is online from Reykjavik. Ms. Jóhanna Jónsdóttir, you have the floor.
Ástríður Jóhannesdóttir
Hello, I'm very glad and honored to be here with you. If you could present the slides, please. And the first slide. Thank you. Since the time is limited, I will just briefly present our experience in organizing the referendum in Iceland last month on European accession.
I will focus on two initiatives that we believe that contributed to electoral resilience and integrity, especially the voter information campaign and the consultation group on election integrity. Next slide, please.
The National Electoral Commission is responsible for overall supervision of the conduct of elections and for the implementation of election legislation. I might add that the National Electoral Commission, as it is now, has only been working for about four years since the beginning of 2022. This was the first referendum under the grounds of the new Election Act, but it was also the first referendum in Iceland since 2012. The execution is quite similar what we are used to in presidential elections, and one could say that the mechanism or the election machine in Iceland was quite prepared because we had the municipality election in the middle of May this year. So the polling stations are situated in every municipality in Iceland, and they are organized by local electoral commissions, and the votes are counted in each of the six constituencies by senior election commissions during election night.
So we have pretty shared responsibility on the procedures and the execution of elections.
As I'm sure you all know, Iceland is not a very big country. We only have around 400,000 inhabitants. The electoral roll was around 272,000 people, but we had exceptionally high turnout, 82.6%. Next slide, please. So just very briefly on the information initiative.
The National Election Commission is responsible for providing voters with comprehensive and impartial information about the subject being voted on on the referendum, and this is based on the election law. We were faced with this referendum in a pretty short, with this pretty short advance, but we tried to keep it simple. So the main object being that voters must have the information they need to make an informed decision on election day.
So our objective was mainly to make sure that voters had access to clear, factual and neutral information to make an informed decision. And that is of course a pretty much challenge in our environment, social environment these days. In order to make the material as user-friendly as possible, it was decided to present it in a question and answer format. So and we provided short version, so we provided some questions and we provided short version of an answer and we also provided a more detailed answer to each question. We had independent experts from the University of Iceland to prepare the content and the draft versions were tested with focus groups to ensure clarity and accessibility and to make sure that the subject was being handled from as many directions or sides as possible.
Biggest challenge of course in the whole process being to maintain neutrality while presenting opposed views in a fair way and enough information to make, for voters to make their choice. Next slide.
A little bit about the practical arrangements. These are examples of of the channels we used to inform voters about the referendum. We decided and we we put a strong focus on consistency and simplicity. We provided election information on an off on an official website that belongs to the National Electoral Commission, it's called kosning.is. And on that website we also provided guidance on electoral commissions for electoral commissions and for voters.
So we both had information about the subject being voted on and on practical the practical side of elections. The voter information about where you can vote and and so on. We delivered a brochure to all households in Iceland. But we had accessible versions of the both of the website and the brochure on sign language and easy-to-read formats in order to try to reach as many voters as possible.
We used a neutral color palette throughout the process and we avoided, strictly avoided colors that could be associated with political parties or campaigns. We believe that this consistent design and messaging and visual identity across all materials helped voters recognize the information as coming from the National Election Commission and therefore reinforced their confidence and and trust. We had an structured communication plan that supported the campaign through online media, radio and social media advertising in order to ensure broad awareness and easy access to the information materials. Next slide.
For the last year, a consultation group with various stakeholders in regard to elections has been working together on a regular basis in the run-up to elections. The group is composed of representatives from the National Electoral Commission, from the National Cyber Security Team, the Center for Safer Internet, the Electronic Communications Office, the Media Commission, the Data Protection Authority, and the Analysis Department of the Police. This is an informal group, but it was founded in 2021 and has been working ever since, mostly in the run-up to elections, but this year it has been working on a more frequent basis and especially since the referendum came up, the group met even more frequently in order to prepare itself for what was coming.
The role of the group is to facilitate the exchange of information among relevant authorities in the run-up to elections, such as risks relating to privacy, disinformation, cybersecurity, and national security. Because there is no entity in Iceland that is legally responsible for all of these subjects, so the group combined has more opportunities to do something about upcoming threats. Main actions, besides the information campaign by the National Electoral Commission, consisted of a voter awareness campaign that was issued by the consultation group to voters about being informed and critical about everything about the online environment and about the information you see online. The Center for Safe Internet also provided voters education on disinformation, online threats, foreign interference, artificial intelligence, and more, and that was published and spread around.
And finally, there was an online reporting portal where citizens could report suspicious online activity to the authorities, in which case incidents could and would be referred to the relevant authority for further examination. Beside of that, the group itself or representatives within the group, within their power...
Ástríður Jóhannesdóttir
Of course. Next slide, please. The referendum was conducted in a successful way. The election authorities reported no indications of irregularities in polling or vote counting. It is important to keep in mind that integrity is about more than secure procedures.
It is also about ensuring that voters have access to clear, balanced, and trustworthy information to make an informed decision. Thank you.
Nathalie Loiseau
Merci beaucoup. Je vais maintenant passer la parole à mes collègues pour qu'ils puissent poser des questions. Donc je rappelle pour les députés des parlements nationaux qui souhaitent prendre la parole, nous leur demandons de remplir une petite carte et de la donner à un huissier.
Deux députés nationaux, un député européen à la suite. Donc je commence par Céline Calvez, ce n'est pas parce qu'elle est française que je commence par elle, mais c'est la première qui se soit manifestée.
Céline Calvez
Madame la Présidente, mesdames et messieurs, les ingérences numériques étrangères sapent le fondement de nos institutions démocratiques et en premier lieu l'organisation d'élections libres et régulières. L'annulation d'une élection comme en Roumanie en 2024 doit rester un événement rare, mais nous rappelle les risques liés aux campagnes de désinformation. Préserver la confiance dans notre système démocratique est un préalable car la confiance est une institution invisible sur laquelle repose l'ensemble de l'édifice. En France, la création de Viginum a apporté une réponse équilibrée, renforcée en 2026 à l'occasion des élections municipales. Anne-Sophie Divert vient de nous en présenter l'action.
Avant les échéances de 2027, le Parlement français examinera un projet de loi relatif à la lutte contre les ingérences étrangères dans la vie démocratique pour améliorer la réponse de l'autorité judiciaire, que ce soit en termes de saisine ou de sanctions. Mais il faut aussi renforcer les médias traditionnels, notamment dans leur modèle économique face à la dilution de valeur provoquée par le numérique et l'IA. Des initiatives législatives sont en cours en France. Le soutien à l'information doit aussi s'accompagner des moyens consacrés à l'éducation car un citoyen cultivant son esprit critique sera le plus à même de contribuer plus largement dans le débat public.
Je vous remercie.
Laurynas Šedvydis
Thank you, Mr. Speaker. I would like to highlight one key principle: electoral integrity cannot be protected by one institution alone. It requires a coordinated system that brings together election authorities, law enforcement, cybersecurity institutions, civil society, the media, and increasingly digital platforms. Foreign interference is a challenge to most EU countries. Like most European countries, Lithuania is vulnerable to cyber-enabled propaganda and disinformation disseminated by hostile states, for example Russia, which aim to influence political opinion, sow division, and destabilize society and the political system.
In recent years, the dissemination of hostile information has been observed to be deliberate, aimed at influencing, manipulating, and shaping the opinions of Lithuania's population, Russian-speaking communities in other European and other countries, and the citizens of EU and NATO countries.
But an important element to defend against that is a continuous cybersecurity preparedness. Citizens themselves are also an essential part of electoral resilience. Thank you very much.
Mika Aaltola
Thank you very much for very enlightening presentations. You know, what Russia is actually doing, and you need to know your enemy in the game, so the Russian tactic is to weaken the political center of Europe that supports Ukraine. It's clear, it's logical what they are doing and they have different gimmicks on carrying that out. Engineered misfortune is one of those. So candidates that take strong attitudes and critical stances towards Russia are undermined by machinery that is proven to work very effectively.
And the bad thing is that we are facing this one country at the time and we are not sharing much information when it comes to intelligence side of this.
So we should inform our voters who is hacking their elections so that the voters would have an ownership over the election process.
Panagis Kappatos
Ευχαριστώ κυρία Πρόεδρε. Κυρίες και κύριοι, η δημοκρατία δεν κρίνεται μόνο την ημέρα της κάλπης. Κρίνεται στο αν ο πολίτης πιστεύει ότι η ψήφος του είναι ασφαλής, ισότιμη και ελεύθερη από παρεμβάσεις. Η εμπιστοσύνη δεν είναι δεδομένη. Χτίζεται με θεσμούς που προλαμβάνουν, ελέγχουν και συνεργάζονται πριν εμφανιστεί η εκλογική κρίση.
Στην Ελλάδα, η εκλογική ακεραιότητα στηρίζεται σε ένα πολυεπίπεδο θεσμικό πλαίσιο, από το Υπουργείο Εσωτερικών και τον Άρειο Πάγο έως την Εθνική Αρχή Κυβερνοασφάλειας, τις ανεξάρτητες αρχές και τα ψηφιακά συστήματα που υποστηρίζουν την εκλογική διαδικασία. Η ενσωμάτωση της NIS 2 και η εφαρμογή του Digital Services Act ενισχύουν περαιτέρω αυτή την ασπίδα. Το επόμενο βήμα όμως είναι ευρωπαϊκό: περισσότερη συνεργασία, κοινές ασκήσεις ανθεκτικότητας, ταχεία ανταλλαγή πληροφοριών και κοινά πρότυπα προστασίας. Γιατί οι εκλογές οργανώνονται εθνικά, αλλά οι απειλές δεν γνωρίζουν σύνορα.
Και η απάντησή μας πρέπει να είναι εξίσου διασυνοριακή, συντονισμένη και δημοκρατική. Σας ευχαριστώ.
Norbert Tóth
Dear colleagues, dear Madam Chair. A demokratikus ellenállóképességünk megerősítése mindannyiunk számára elsődleges feladat. Pontosan látjuk, hogy milyen károkat tud okozni egy olyan hatalom, amely lebontja a jogállami garanciákat, saját magára szabja a választási törvényt, túszul ejti az Alkotmánybíróságot, az ellenőrző szerveket és a gazdaságot. Ellenségképet gyártva, látszatintézkedések mentén évekig fel tudta tartani azt a hamis képet, hogy az országunk fejlődik, miközben pont az ellenkezője történt. Trükkök százaival felkozmetikázott számok mögött lesújtó valóság áll.
Az oktatás kiüresítésével elvették a gyermekeink jövőjét. Az egészségügy lerombolásával elvették szüleink és nagyszüleink egészségben töltött éveinek számát. A közlekedés lezüllesztésével elvették a lehetőséget a környezetkímélő, biztonságos és kényelmes utazástól. A magyar emberek tudták, érzékelték, hogy nagy a baj, mégsem volt egy olyan egységes, hiteles és megbízható politikai közösség, amelyre jó szívvel bízták volna az ország vezetését.
No de mit csináltunk másképp? Tisztelt hölgyeim és uraim, a válasz egyszerűbb, mint gondolnánk. A dezinformációs kampánnyal szemben a mozgalom leghitelesebb vezetői, élén Magyar Péterrel, Magyarország nemrégiben megválasztott miniszterelnökével, talpon lejárták az országot. Elmentünk a legkisebb településekre és a nagyvárosokba is, és szemtől szemben elmondtuk az embereknek, hogy milyen helyzetben van az országunk, kik és hogyan juttattak minket ide, és erre milyen megoldások vannak. Szemben az árral, a fizetett influenszer-propagandistákkal és a százmilliárdokkal kitömött kormányzati hazudozással, a magyar emberek egységbe tudtak kovácsolódni, és úgy döntöttek, hogy soha többé nem hagyják, hogy befolyásolják és átverjék őket.
A munka viszont még csak most kezdődik. Fel kell szabadítani az országunkat az orbáni maffia megmaradt csápjaitól, és sorra le kell dönteni a bukott hatalmat kiszolgáló elit intézményi bástyáit. Köszönöm szépen.
Nathalie Loiseau
Thank you. Please stick to your speaking time and ask questions. Speeches are nice and we love speeches, but next is Vasile Dîncu from the European Parliament.
Vasile Dîncu
Thank you.
I speak in Romanian. Stimați colegi, un an și jumătate în această comisie și faptul că sunt sociolog, dar vin și din România, mă face să spun un lucru foarte important pe care l-am învățat aici. Trebuie să protejăm alegerile nu doar în ziua votului. Trebuie să protejăm mediul democrat în care cetățenii își formează opiniile. Cazul României este un precedent care ne pune o întrebare mai profundă: cine guvernează infrastructura invizibilă în care se formează opinia publică?
De aceea, cred că este nevoie de o carte albă europeană privind guvernarea algoritmică în procesele democratice. Deci problema nu este doar conținutul fals.
Problema este și amplificarea. Cine decide ce devine vizibil, de ce un mesaj ajunge la 1000 de oameni și altul la 10 milioane, cum putem identifica o amplificare artificială sau coordonată înainte ca să se afecteze procesul electoral? Nu trebuie să protejăm nici partide, nici guverne, important este însă să protejăm autonomia cognitivă a cetățeanului.
Nathalie Loiseau
Thank you. Before giving the floor back to our speakers for a first round of answers to your questions, I will try boldly to sum up what our colleagues just said to make their life easier. Support for media was raised by several of you as an important way to protect our democracies and the integrity of our electoral systems. The special need to protect, or the special targeting of pro-Ukraine parties and candidates throughout the European Union as something that has been witnessed in different Member States. The need to enhance cybersecurity and the importance of a European dimension in the fight in favor of democracy and against interferences.
The importance of protecting rule of law in general and the Hungarian experience to that extent. And the necessity of a European charter and how to focus on the speed of propagation of fake narratives and interferences.
That might be my attempt to sum up what you just said. So our guest speakers are free to pick up what they want to focus on in their answers and they will have just a few minutes each of them to provide these answers. So again I give the floor to Anne-Sophie Divert from Paris online.
Anne-Sophie Dhiver
Merci beaucoup. Peut-être je prendrai le point sur le rôle et la responsabilité des plateformes pour revenir sur l'état de la menace que j'évoquais. En fait, nous avons observé que cette menace était historiquement très liée aux réseaux sociaux et que désormais, en fait, elle est aussi très liée au modèle économique des plateformes, à leurs algorithmes, à leur structure technologique. Et aujourd'hui, donc nous avons le constat que ça devient un véritable business model de faire et de développer de manière industrielle des contenus de manipulation à destination d'audiences françaises.
Et donc les plateformes ont une responsabilité importante et il appartient à l'Union européenne de rester ferme sur ses positions vis-à-vis de la mise en responsabilité de ces plateformes. En pratique, le DSA est un texte qui est prometteur et qui dispose de beaucoup d'éléments pour protéger notre débat public numérique. En pratique, il est quand même toujours largement soumis à la coopération effective de ces plateformes. Et ce qu'on constate, c'est que quand bien même elles seraient réactives quand on leur partage des éléments techniques où elles peuvent mener, c'est leur décision propre, mener des actions de modération par exemple à l'encontre de faux comptes qu'on a vraiment caractérisés comme inauthentiques, il y a un vrai sujet de proactivité quand on constate que certains dispositifs notamment pro-russes par exemple sont sur ces plateformes depuis 2022 ou 2023 et qu'ils ont la capacité en permanence de créer de nouveaux comptes.
Et donc la la réaction et la la position forte européenne elle est essentielle. Et donc la France avait donc adressé un courrier à la Commission européenne pour inviter notamment à mettre à jour dans les meilleurs délais les lignes directrices du DSA en contexte électoral, notamment s'agissant de trois choses : s'agissant de l'interdiction des comportements inauthentiques, s'agissant de l'usage et des techniques en fait de viralité artificielle, notamment par des techniques qui vont consister à manipuler les algorithmes, et également s'agissant du respect des dispositions en matière de transparence publicitaire et au respect des règles européennes et nationales en la matière. Donc il apparaît essentiel de renforcer ces dispositions. Par ailleurs, le sujet de la transparence des algorithmes est effectivement aussi crucial. Et aujourd'hui on constate qu'en fait ces algorithmes jouent un rôle majeur dans la capacité de façonner finalement le débat public en promouvant des contenus sensationnalistes et trompeurs au détriment de contenus de manipulation de de contenus pardon d'informations fiables et vérifiées.
Et donc nous assistons à une forme très préoccupante de marchandisation de notre débat public qui peut avoir des effets dramatiques, y compris en contexte électoral.
Ingrid Kullerkann
Yes, thank you. Protecting the cyber environment is is shared responsibility.
No single institution can do it alone and effective cooperation between election authorities, cybersecurity agencies and relevant institutions is essential, especially during elections. Information must be shared quickly, the risks must be assessed continuously and everyone involved must know their role. Strong cooperation makes the whole electoral system more resilient. Thank you.
Tomasz Chłoń
Yes, thank you very much. Three things. Supporting the media. Well, I mentioned already the multi-year financial framework, please dedicate your attention to this. Media really need support, including financial support.
The second thing the media could do themselves is a coalition ahead of elections. The way that the France, France did, you know, the French media did in 2017 ahead of the presidential elections.
They established a consortium, let's say, of 40 French media, mainstream and others, and BBC by the way, so it was even multinational, called Check First. And it, I think it worked. For example, there was a leak of Macron files from the, from the campaign of President Macron and, and they refused, I mean the French media refused to publish them, you know, Friday just before Sunday's elections. And the third thing is that we should perhaps have a coalition of member states to, to monitor what's happening in the media when elections are coming, but not on the day of elections, but much more in advance. It's a paradox that the EU observes, monitors elections in non-member states, but doesn't have the capacity to do it in member states.
The cybersecurity aspect, VIGINUM is an excellent example. We have a, our Polish VIGINUM called NASK. It's a network of, it's a scientific academic computer network. And they are trying to catch up with, with VIGINUM and they are excellent in monitoring what's happening and they are under the Ministry of Digital, of Digital Affairs. And then regulation of platforms.
This is absolutely fundamental thing and the pressure on platforms.
Our Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Security... Minister of Digital Affairs recently sent a letter to the Commission to impose fine on Meta of 250 million for breaching the rules of the game. So, we have to be all more assertive to tackle this scourge. Thank you.
Nathalie Loiseau
Thank you. And finally, Mrs. Jóhannesdóttir, do you want to react?
Ástríður Jóhannesdóttir
I... I think we share your concerns as well and... and we agree on that we need much stronger legislation or rules in this field as the legislation is often, as it happens to be, a bit behind the development of society. I agree on... we need, especially now in Iceland, we need more strength to support the... the media and increased rules on, for example, financing on campaigns, not just political parties.
Looking back at the experience of of Iceland last month, I would like to add that we prepared extensively for potential disinformation and foreign interference. As it turned out, the level of activity was lower than expected, but I am also and we are quite aware that that is not necessarily the case in in other places in in Europe. Thank you.
Nathalie Loiseau
Thank you. Now it goes to a second round of questions or remarks by colleagues, and I will start with Cyprus and Georgios Karoullas.
Giorgos Karoullas
Ευχαριστώ πολύ. Καλωσορίζουμε αυτή την προσπάθεια την οποία αναπτύσσετε εδώ στο Ευρωκοινοβούλιο και να πούμε ότι η αδιάβλητη και αμερόληπτη διεξαγωγή των εκλογών και η δημοκρατική ανθεκτικότητα βρίσκονται στην καρδιά της δημοκρατίας μας. Στην Κύπρο οι εκλογές διοργανώνονται, διεξάγονται από την εκτελεστική εξουσία στη βάση του νομοθετικού πλαισίου το οποίο θεσπίζει η Βουλή των Αντιπροσώπων. Ακόμα και για τα προεκλογικά έξοδα, τις χρηματοδοτήσεις, με στόχο πάντα την ισονομία, τη διαφάνεια και τη λογοδοσία. Δεν έχουμε καταγράψει οποιαδήποτε ξένη παρέμβαση, αλλά η δημοκρατική ασφάλεια σίγουρα δεν είναι ποτέ δεδομένη.
Εφαρμόζουμε αυστηρά τη νομοθεσία για τη ρητορική του μίσους και τα προσωπικά δεδομένα. Η ψηφοφορία γίνεται μόνο με φυσική παρουσία, με αδιάβλητο πλαίσιο και για τους ΑμεΑ, με έμφαση στην προστασία των ψηφοδελτίων και των αποτελεσμάτων. Άρχισαν να γίνονται συζητήσεις για την επιστολική και την ψηφιακή ψηφοφορία, πάντοτε με ισχυρή θωράκιση της εμπιστευτικότητας και του αδιάβλητου. Και είναι εδώ ακριβώς που πρέπει ως Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση, μέσα από ανταλλαγή απόψεων, να οικοδομηθούν πρωτόκολλα στη βάση αρχών για την εφαρμογή, την καθολική εφαρμογή σε όλη την Ένωση της επιστολικής και της ψηφιακής ψηφοφορίας. Οι ψηφιακές υπηρεσίες, η αρχή ψηφιακής ασφάλειας συντονίζονται μεταξύ τους με άλλες υπηρεσίες για την προστασία της δημοκρατίας και στόχος μας πάντοτε είναι να διαφυλάξουμε την εμπιστοσύνη των πολιτών στη διαδικασία και στους θεσμούς με τη συνεχή ενδυνάμωσή τους.
Ευχαριστώ.
Daniela Ternullo
Grazie Presidente. Parlo in italiano, ma ho comunicato che interverrò nella prima sessione.
L'ho detto adesso ai commessi, non intervengo adesso. Grazie.
Nathalie Loiseau
All right. So next is Csaba Dömötör from the European Parliament and Hungary.
Csaba Dömötör
Thank you Chair. Szeretném kiegészíteni a magyar képviselő felszólalását, aki bátran csontig hízelgett itt Magyar Péternek. Miről nem beszélt? Az új kormány Magyarországon eltávolította a köztársasági elnököt, alkotmánybírókat és a legfőbb ügyészt. Egy 12 éves mandátumkorlátozással eltiltják az ellenzéki képviselők jelentős részét attól, hogy újrainduljon a választáson, a volt miniszterelnök sem indulhat újra.
Ha az önök országában lenne ilyen szabályozás, akkor sokan önök közül nem indulhatnának újra, és itt az Európai Parlamentben 164 képviselő nem indulhatna újra. Ez az új Tisza-kormány demokráciája. Ami az ülés témáját illeti, a tényellenőri rendszerről szeretnék kérdezni. A magyar választást megelőzően élesítették az úgynevezett gyorsreagálású rendszert, amelyek alapján, amely alapján a tényellenőrök megjelölhettek bizonyos közösségi médiatartalmakat.
A nyilvános adatok szerint a magyar választások előtt 99 000 Facebook-tartalmat töröltek, 207 000 esetben a tényellenőrök jelzései alapján. Nem tudjuk, hogy melyek ezek a tartalmak. Nem tudom, hogy az önök országában ez hogyan működik, ezért azt szeretném kérdezni, hogy támogatják-e, hogy nyilvános legyen az így törölt tartalmak listája, mert hogyha nem nyilvános, akkor az sajnos a politikai cenzúra gyanúját kelti életre. Köszönöm. Thank you, Chair.
Nathalie Loiseau
Thank you. Still from the European Parliament, Mr. Cavazzini from Italy.
Anna Cavazzini
Thank you, Chair, and thank you for to all the speakers and welcome to all the members of the national parliaments. I would like to speak in Italian. Grazie, grazie ancora ai relatori. Io ci tengo a portare un contributo rispetto a quello che non solo viene fatto ormai da decenni in Italia, ma anche quelle che sono le i campanelli di allarme che possiamo vedere sentendo anche dagli altri colleghi europei e grazie davvero per la vostra presenza. Abbiamo due momenti da quello che vediamo.
Il primo è quello del voto e l'altro è quello del dibattito pubblico, che può essere campagna elettorale o comunque lo spazio di opinione pubblica. La domanda che io volevo porre è sul voto.
Siamo convinti che i sistemi elettronici digitali possano essere sostitutivi del voto in presenza? Perché devo dire che almeno in Italia siamo arrivati dopo diversi anni a ottenere un sistema di voto in presenza che è particolarmente rigido e particolarmente funzionale. Addirittura per evitare che ci fossero alcune forme di contraffazione di singole schede o di votazioni riconoscibili, siamo arrivati a immaginare un sistema dove sulla singola scheda di voto si strappa, viene numerata singolarmente e dopo aver espresso il voto viene strappato il talloncino della numerazione per avere un'idea che quella scheda effettivamente sia stata consegnata, effettivamente sia stata votata, però poi dopo non sia riconoscibile effettivamente il singolo cosa può aver votato. Sul voto in corrispondenza direi che, insomma, abbiamo già diversi casi anche nazionali, ma soprattutto internazionali di rischio di contraffazione. L'altro momento è quello, e quindi volevo chiedere se si può pensare, ecco, a un voto digitale che sia davvero sicuro, perché alla fine c'è sempre una persona che gestisce un sistema.
L'altra domanda è invece riguardante il il il tema di come poter controllare in qualche modo non solo la diffusione di notizie false, ma anche farlo evitando di danneggiare la libertà del singolo, perché nel momento in cui il singolo va effettivamente a votare sulle sue gambe con la sua mano, la sua scheda elettorale, non possiamo ledere in qualche modo la sua libertà d'espressione. È il motivo per il quale, come tutti sapete, noi siamo e chiudo presidente, noi siamo come gruppo dei conservatori fondamentalmente d'accordo all'attivare pratiche tra i singoli paesi membri per limitare le interferenze esterne, ma siamo contrari alla creazione di un unico centro per la resilienza democratica controllato da qualcuno a livello europeo. Grazie.
Sandro Gozi
Merci, merci Madame la Présidente. J'aurai deux questions pour Madame Diver et une à tout le monde. Madame Diver, vous faisiez référence à la mise en œuvre du Digital Services Act qui prévoit notamment pour les questions du processus électoral une coopération étroite entre Commission, Digital Service Coordinator, autorités électorales, plateformes. Il nous semble que cette coordination rencontre plusieurs difficultés, plusieurs obstacles. Qu'est-ce qu'il faudrait faire de votre point de vue pour améliorer cette coordination ?
Et vous faisiez référence aussi à la transparence publicitaire. Comment le nouveau règlement sur la transparence et le ciblage de la publicité politique est en train d'améliorer et de prévenir les interférences dans les processus électoraux ?
The last question shared to everybody. With the growing algorithmic intermediation of electoral information, the key risk in our view is no longer the creation of fake content, but the deliberate poisoning of underlying information ecosystem which search engine recommendation system and generative AI models rely on. So I would like to know to what extent it is currently possible to detect these manipulation attempts upstream, which kind of specific and new protocol are necessary with the platform to prevent before the damage happen instead of sanctioning afterward. Thank you, Chair.
Evin Incir
Thank you very much, Chair, and I must say that it's been very interesting to listen both to the invited speakers and other colleagues from national and European Parliament. And many questions and many important issues have been highlighted, both online, offline, internal and external threats.
I have actually two questions. One concerns the... also what my colleague Sandro just asked, the digital platforms, but rather on that we all talk about enforcement, but we also know that our so-called partner across the Atlantic is not keen on putting pressure on the platforms to ensure that there is enforcement when it comes to legislation and do not really always care about our legislation. How do we ensure that the platforms take us seriously when our friends do not do that? And it is a challenge, I must say, with the Trump administration acting like they're doing. The second is that we all here are talking about importance of democracy, but we also have, as political parties and legislators, a responsibility.
And unfortunately, we have colleagues here in the European Parliament and in national parliament attacking free and independent media. And that doesn't really lead to strong democracies. And as I said in the beginning, there has seemed to be cooperation between internal and external factors when it comes to undermining our democracy. Thank you.
Nathalie Loiseau
Thank you.
The last colleague who will take the floor is Fabrice Leggeri.
Fabrice Leggeri
Merci Madame la Présidente et merci aux quatre orateurs. J'aurais deux questions. Ma première question pour Madame Divert. Je souhaitais savoir si elle pouvait nous en dire davantage concernant les quatre acteurs qui pendant les élections municipales françaises ont essayé d'interférer et qui sont apparemment, si j'ai bien compris, des acteurs étrangers. Deux qui étaient connus et deux qui étaient inconnus.
Donc j'aurais souhaité savoir dans quels pays ou quels gouvernements étrangers ont été identifiés par Viginum. Ma deuxième question est pour la représentante islandaise. Le Premier ministre d'Islande avait demandé aux autorités de l'Union européenne, aux institutions, je cite, de ne pas interférer dans la campagne du référendum en Islande.
Par ailleurs, je suppose que la situation géographique de l'Islande devait beaucoup intéresser de nombreuses puissances géopolitiques, peut-être la Russie, peut-être les États-Unis et d'autres. Et je voulais savoir dans ce contexte où on vous demandait d'être vigilant face aux interférences de Bruxelles, mais aussi d'autres contextes géopolitiques, comment est-ce qu'on se préparait dans votre rôle et dans le rôle de votre institution à traquer les éventuelles interférences qui seraient venues fausser le jeu démocratique de ce référendum en Islande. Merci beaucoup.
Nathalie Loiseau
Thank you, and the floor goes back towards speakers and Sophie Dievert to begin with.
Anne-Sophie Dhiver
Merci madame. Oui, donc je vais répondre à la première question s'agissant des dispositions au niveau européen. Aujourd'hui, il nous semble que nous sommes à un moment, une période charnière à l'échelle de l'Union européenne puisque nous le voyons dans les débats aujourd'hui, que ce soit à l'échelle de l'Union ou au niveau des États membres, il y a une structuration en place de dispositifs européens ou nationaux spécifiques de protection contre les ingérences numériques étrangères. Dans ce cadre-là, pour nous, l'optimisation de l'action individuelle et collective, elle se situe à deux niveaux.
Le premier niveau, c'est le niveau opérationnel où nous allons mettre une forme de langage commun, de grammaire commune sur la manière de nommer, d'écrire cette menace et de lutter contre elle. Aujourd'hui, on constate qu'il y a une grande variété dans les cadres conceptuels ou méthodologiques auprès des différents États membres sur cette menace. Au niveau français, nous avons fait le choix de circonscrire la menace sur un périmètre technique centré sur les acteurs étrangers et sur l'usage de moyens inauthentiques ou artificiels de propagation de ces messages. Et donc une approche qui ne juge en aucun cas et qui s'occupe finalement très peu des contenus ou des narratifs qui sont diffusés. Cette approche pour nous, elle a deux vertus.
Premièrement, elle va permettre d'avoir une action qui se situe à un niveau plus stratégique puisqu'on va être en mesure de comprendre et cartographier les acteurs qui sont derrière cette menace, de en source ouverte aller le plus loin possible pour établir toute la chaîne et l'origine de cette menace dans la mesure de ce qu'on peut faire en source ouverte. Et deuxièmement, elle va nous permettre aussi de mieux l'anticiper.
Good morning, everyone.
Tout le système était là.
Anne-Sophie Dhiver
Good morning everybody. Hello. Good morning. Hello everybody, are we ready to start? I'll go.
Okay, hello everybody. Good morning, distinguished members of the European Parliament. Can you not hear me? Is that on? Yeah, yeah.
Representatives of the European Commission, Secretary General of the WMO, Professor Saulo, permanent representatives to the EC, colleagues from across the European meteorological community and honored guests.
Speaker 28
It's a great pleasure to welcome you today to our high-level dialogue, from weather and climate risk to strategic resilience, Europe's meteorological capability in policy delivery, security and competitiveness. On behalf of Met Éireann, I would like to thank you all for joining us and contributing to what I hope will be a valuable and interesting discussion. I would also like to extend our sincere thanks to our co-hosts, members of the European Parliament, Billy Kelleher and Seán Kelly, for their partnership, support and leadership in making this event possible. Met Éireann is delighted to coordinate this dialogue on behalf of the European meteorological and hydrological services community. Ireland is pleased to facilitate this engagement as part of our EU presidency activities, bringing together senior leaders from across Europe's institutions and meteorological community to discuss how Europe's meteorological capability can be made even greater contribution to the policy delivery, climate resilience, preparedness, security and competitiveness.
Today builds on a momentum established during the Danish presidency in 2025 and reflects a growing recognition that reliable, authoritative weather and climate intelligence is essential in many of Europe's important priorities.
As climate risks intensify and as Europe strengthens its ambitions on resilience, preparedness, digital sovereignty and security, the need for trusted operational capabilities has never been greater. Today's discussions will explore how, as a national collective, European capability can contribute more effectively to the delivery of the policy objectives and how engagement between EU institutes and national Met services can become more structured, predictable and strategic in the years ahead. We look forward to two two-hour sessions today. The first, from weather and climate risk to policy delivery, national meteorological services as Europe's operational climate resilience interface, will run from now at 10:30 until 12:30. We'll then break for lunch from 12:30 to 2:00 p.m., 14:00, during which we will have some lunch and we will be addressed by Professor Saulo and introduced by the director of Met Éireann, Eoin Moran.
And then at 2:00 o'clock, we will take on our second session, European security and competitiveness in a climate risk world, the strategic role of national Met services, and we will close today's event at 16:00, 4:00 o'clock. We thank you again for being here today and I wish you a productive and engaging dialogue. I look forward to the discussions ahead. Just very briefly some housekeeping.
If anybody would prefer not to have their video or photography taken, can you please let Rebecca know if you prefer not to be involved. We will have Slido in use for our question and answers, so you will see a QR code on your agendas. If you want to scan that, then you can put your questions onto the Slido. We'll also ask questions from the floor as well. And yeah, at when we break at 12:30, I'll come back to you again and give you directions, but you can follow us to where the luncheon event is.
So now without further ado, I would like to introduce MEP Billy Kelleher. He is a member of the European Parliament for Ireland since 2019. He's a deputy leader of his political group, Renew Europe. Prior to entering European politics, Billy was a member of Dáil Éireann for over 20 years. During this time he served as Minister for Trade, Commerce and Industry and as Minister for Labour Affairs.
Whilst in opposition, Billy also served as Fianna Fáil's national spokesperson on business, enterprise, innovation and previously as spokesperson on health. Within the European Parliament, Billy sits on the committees on economic and monetary affairs, taxation, public health, environment and climate, gender equality.
Billy Kelleher
Go raibh míle maith agat, Josephine. Agus tá fáilte romhaibh go léir chuig Parlaimint na hEorpa agus go n-éirí an t-ádh libh inniu. Just, I suppose, to first and foremost, thank you very much for the kind introduction. I think you should introduce me more often. I don't even recognize myself with that introduction.
But just, you're very welcome here today, and I know that you've a very elaborate and exciting program ahead of you. What you're doing on a daily basis impacts on people's lives. Clearly, it is critically important that we've accurate weather forecasting, that we've accurate meteorological capabilities, and that that is interoperable across the European Union and beyond. Weather does not respect borders, and neither do the climate changes that are very evident upon us. So the accuracy of same is fundamentally important.
So what you're doing does feed into broader policy in terms of how the European Union and national member states respond in the years ahead. You probably saw recently, and obviously you're more aware of it than anybody else, we saw forest fires raging across Europe this summer.
We see consistently increased floods, greater storm events, and just changing weather patterns beyond what we would have considered normal only a few short years ago. There are varying views as to why this is happening, but from our perspective in the European Union, we are very serious about addressing the underlying issues of climate change and making sure that we address this in a meaningful way with policies reducing fossil fuel emissions and carbon that are causing some of the, or causing the main causes of global warming and climate risk. In doing that, of course, it takes time to address the harm that we've done to our globe and our atmosphere, and equally in the meantime, we have to build in resilience into our systems and how we underpin them in terms of policy as well over the next number of years. And of course, without resilience being built into what we do, well then we're going to undermine our competitiveness further. We're going to see greater movements of people across the globe.
We're going to see increased migration based on climate events, based on desertification, and based on many of the other issues that are very real in people's lives across the planet because of global warming. Firstly, I'd like to thank Met Éireann for organizing this. I'd like to thank Met Éireann for being part of my life.
All my life I woke up, I was born on a farm, so the weather forecast was critically important to me from a very early age. We listened to the radio and would hear first-hand the forecast of Met Éireann and what we would do for the next number of days was very dependent on those weather forecast broadcasts. And obviously they were always accurate. And but if we did fail to do make make the right decision, we blamed the weather forecasters rather than maybe the management systems on the farm at the time. But anyhow, however, that was that was the case.
But as part of the Irish presidency, I very much want to wish you well today in your discussions and to say that Met Éireann is promoting the concept of preparedness, but also most importantly, cooperation, that interdependence that is critically important in the whole area of meteorological services and ensuring that we have accuracy and that scientific endeavor that is required to improve our capabilities in assessing into the future what is going to happen. So it is it is fundamentally important. I'd like to acknowledge Deputy Kieran Mulooly from Ireland as well who is here. And I know that Seán Kelly will be here in the afternoon as as co-host as well. But just to wish you all well.
Now when you read fine, when you read the fine print, you should always read it in detail. And some time ago I saw on my screen in my office in the European Parliament, I saw a debate on the importance of meteorology to modern economies. So I saw it, I glanced at it quickly, and I said, "I think I'll speak on that in the European Parliament." So I ran down to the European Parliament, not a note in front of me, and I was making it up in my head as I was going along. So just before I was going to the podium, I had one more look to the screen to realize it wasn't meteorology they were talking about, it was the science of metrology.
So I was going in talking about the weather, but then I had to pivot and talk about measurement, but equally it was scientific in guise. But just to say from an Irish perspective, this presidency is very much about promoting the concept of competitiveness, security, and values. And of course the meteorological services across Europe and the science that underpins it will be critically important to promoting those concepts. Because competitiveness is about making sure you anticipate into the future, that you can plan for the future, that you can take actions to prevent potential problems into the future as well.
And the science of weather forecasting and meteorological services is critically important to that. And you can see that in the whole area of, for example, the grid development. We had a very catastrophic event in Ireland a short period of time ago where we had a massive weather event which had profound implications on potentially life of people due to fallen power lines and the delay and just the sheer volume of destruction and the time it would take to build resilience into the grid. So these are real issues that are happening on a daily basis. So in planning, we have to obviously cooperate, work together across the European Union and our partners more internationally as well.
I know that we have the head of the meteorological society here from Buenos Aires in Argentina. Oh yes, you're here, yes, my apologies. And very, very welcome.
And just to say that, you know, over the next number of years, you will see a strong commitment, I believe, from the Commission. I don't speak for the Commission, but in terms of what was outlined in President von der Leyen's State of the Union speech to the Parliament in September's plenary, the commitment to be prepared, to anticipate, to invest in the future by building up resilience in our forecasting, in our capabilities, but also in ensuring that when we identify risks, that we address them in a meaningful, quick manner. So they're some of my thoughts on the issue. So you've two themes. You've session one, weather and climate risk to policy development, national meteorological services as Europe's operational climate resilience interface.
And I've alluded to that already. And the second session then is European security and competitiveness in a climate risk world, strategic role of national meteorological services. And you know, Europe is at a crossroads, I say very often, in terms of its direction of travel, how we work together as 27 member states. And of course, we have to make decisions in the European Parliament not only from a national perspective, but also looking out for the good of the European Union per se. And in the last number of years, we have seen real challenges, real challenges to Europe, to its institutions, and more importantly, questions asked by citizens.
Well, can Europe respond to events? Can Europe respond to the energy shocks? Can Europe respond to the increase in the cost of energy? Can it respond to the housing crisis?
But equally, can it respond to weather events? Can it coordinate and work together to ensure that we limit the impact of catastrophic weather events, but in the event of them happening, can we respond in a timely manner? And of course, the only way you can really make sure you can respond to these events is if you can accurately forecast them. If you can accurately forecast them.
Speaker 30
Hey, hey, hey, hey. Um, okay. So, during the opening session, I want you to move from constantine to here. No, you will have to give the speech after, after the opening session. Yes, I think it will be after the opening session, you will move from constantine to here.
Okay, so you have some time. Yes, after they step out, which is here, in the place of the, you move this and then they move from here. But this is the group, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6.
Speaker 31
Hello, this is a test of the speech to text application. Hello, this is a test of the speech to text application.
Esteban González Pons
So, please take your seats.
Good morning, dear colleagues. Welcome to this pre-session of the EU Parliamentary Democracy Forum. Today we will talk about the safety and political candidates of political candidates and elected representatives. First, some political some practical information. Interpretation is available in German, English, French, Italian, Greek, Spanish, Portuguese, Hungarian, Polish and Romanian.
You can listen and speak listen and speak in any of these languages. After our speakers, we will start the exchange of views. As far as possible, I will give the floor to two members of national parliaments and then one member of the European Parliament per time following the list of speakers. Members of national parliaments wishing to speak, please complete the speaking form and give it to the ushers so that we can prepare the list of speakers.
Members of European Parliament, as usual, you can raise your hand to ask for the floor. I also want to thank the European Commission and DG JUST in particular for organizing this session with us. Dear colleagues, violence, threats, and intimidation against politicians are growing. It is becoming an urgent problem for our democracies. When people leave politics because of violence or fear, our democracies lose voices, ideas, and leaders.
Our political debate gets poorer. Therefore, protecting those who participate in political life means protecting democracy itself. At our first forum, we identified violence against politicians as one of the major challenges to democracy, together with polarization, disinformation, and declining trust. As elected representatives, we experience this reality directly. This is why we are here today, to share our experiences and help shape a European response to this challenge.
I am very pleased to have with us elected representatives from the European, national, and local levels. This mixed perspective is our strength today.
We will begin with two keynote speakers from national and local levels. It is my honor to give the floor to our first speaker, Ms. Verona Murphy, speaker of the lower house of the Irish Parliament. Speaker Murphy is the first woman to hold this office. She has spoken very clearly about the rise of threats and online abuse against members of the Irish Parliament of all parties and none. Verona, I can tell you, is a strong European speaker.
I've heard her sometimes and I can tell you. Verona, please, the floor is yours.
Verona Murphy
Thank you very much. Honorable Vice-Presidents, fellow speakers, Deputy Speakers and distinguished national parliamentarians, colleagues and friends. I am very pleased and honored to be asked to address some opening remarks to this special program in advance of the formal Parliamentary Democracy Forum later this afternoon.
The issue of safety of parliamentarians is one of particular interest to me, and I am anxious to hear from colleagues and experts over the course of this morning's session. By way of background, I was first elected to Dáil Éireann, the lower house of the Houses of the Oireachtas, the Irish Parliament, in 2020 for the multi-seat constituency of Wexford, which is situated on the southeast coast of Ireland. I was re-elected to a second mandate in the general election held in November 2024, and I was deeply honoured to be elected the first female Speaker of Dáil Éireann the following month in December of 2024. As such, I've been in this role almost two years. I am an independent member of the Parliament, unattached to any of the political parties in the Irish Parliament.
Since entering national politics in Ireland, I have seen an increase in the volume of online abuse on Irish politicians. Such abuse can intimidate politicians and create an environment which is hostile to elected representatives on all sides and create conditions for threatening and other serious actions towards us.
Physical violence against Irish politicians is quite rare, though not unheard of. Just two weeks ago, one of our most recognizable parliamentarians was assaulted as he was sitting in his car while stopped in traffic. An assault on an elected representative because they are an elected representative is an assault on democracy. In 2023, my predecessor commissioned research through the European Centre for Parliamentary Research and Documentation, the ECPRD, which surveyed national parliaments of the European Union. A number of survey questions were asked which focused on the measures being taken by parliaments to address harassment, abuse, and intimidation of members of parliament.
Ask anything about this video — I analyse its transcript to answer.