Committee on Foreign Affairs Ordinary meeting
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AFET European Parliament
Follow its sittingsDavid McAllister
Thank you Thijs for the good words. For the Patriots, António Tangier Corrêa, please.
António Tânger Corrêa
Thank you. Good morning. I speak in Portuguese. Bruxelas tem confundido a política externa com alinhamento automático, tem confundido diplomacia com moralismo e tem confundido interesses europeus com mais centralização, ou seja, mais Europa não quer dizer mais força diplomática. As consequências geopolíticas deste tipo de atuação implicam guerras prolongadas no continente europeu, instabilidade no Médio Oriente, energia muito mais cara, rotas comerciais ameaçadas, pressão migratória, maior dependência da Europa de decisões tomadas fora da Europa.
Ou seja, a Europa está cada vez menos no mapa das nações. Prioridade dos patriotas: defender os interesses das nossas nações, defender a segurança, defender a soberania nacional. No que toca à Ucrânia, Médio Oriente e relativamente ao relatório, é preciso procurar urgentemente a paz na Ucrânia, enfrentar o terrorismo e a desestabilização no Médio Oriente, proteger o abastecimento energético europeu, evitar novas escaladas cujos custos recaem sobre os cidadãos europeus. Isto é fundamental para que a Europa possa ter, de facto, voltar a ter um rumo positivo, quer socialmente, quer economicamente. Relativamente à soberania dos Estados-Membros, uma Europa forte não se constrói retirando aos Estados-Membros o controlo da sua política externa.
A diplomacia é uma expressão fundamental da soberania nacional. O que é facto é que os grandes países fazem-no e os pequenos países têm que estar subjugados a uma política externa comum na União Europeia. A questão central do relatório: a unanimidade. O relatório apresenta a redução progressiva da unanimidade como uma questão de eficácia. Para os patriotas, é uma questão de soberania.
Ou seja, a unidade é a força dos mais fortes contra a força dos mais fracos. O relatório defende a passagem para maioria qualificada em matérias de PESC, nomeadamente sanções, promove mecanismos que reduzam o peso do veto dos Estados-Membros. A eliminação ou redução da unanimidade em política externa é uma linha vermelha que nenhum Estado-Membro deve ser obrigado a seguir numa política externa que é a sua e contra a sua vontade do seu governo. Nenhum Estado deve ser obrigado a agir contra os interesses que democraticamente definiu. Ou seja, as imposições de política externa unificadas de Bruxelas não são aplicáveis relativamente às soberanias nacionais.
Mensagem final: uma Europa forte é uma Europa das nações capazes de cooperar livremente. A unanimidade em política externa não é um obstáculo, é uma garantia de soberania que deve e deve ser preservada. Muito obrigado.
David McAllister
Thank you. The ECR group is not present. I think they have study days, anyhow, that's why we've postponed the vote. For the Renew group, who would like to take the floor? From our side, it's not present.
Then for the Greens, I give the floor to Neela Ihle.
Nela Riehl
Thank you, Chair. Colleagues, we are living through profound geopolitical shifts. Old certainties are eroding. Alliances are being tested and the rules-based order we helped build is under pressure from many sides. In this moment, it is high time to make our common foreign security policy more coherent, more consistent, and also more efficient.
EU cannot act alone. We depend on our partners around the world more than ever. And nowhere it is clearer than, for example, in Africa. But partnership works both ways. Our partners rely on us to uphold multilateral standards and human rights and to do so consistently, not selectively.
Every time we apply double standards, we lose trust and others are quick to fill the space we leave behind. We are glad to see that the draft already makes first statements in this direction. As the Greens/EFA, we want to build on them and give them substance where it needs to be more pressing. First, we will expand on Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and also Sahel. These crises receive far too little political attention compared to their human cost and the EU must now show that it does not look away.
Second, we will strengthen the text on the Middle East, where our credibility on international law is being closely watched.
And third, we will focus on our direct neighborhood, where the stability of partners is inseparable from our own security. We look forward on working together with the rapporteur here and all shadows to a strong report. Thank you very much.
David McAllister
Thank you very much, Nela. For the Left, would somebody like to take the floor? That is not the case. For the ESN, that is also not the case. Then I can now give the floor to individual colleagues who would like to take the floor under the catch-the-eye procedure.
In the moment I have three requests: Mr. Gahler, Mr. Stier, and Mr. Brown. Okay, then we kick off with Michael.
Michael Gahler
Well, thank you very much, and thank you to you, David, as for the, as usual, excellent and forward-looking report. And indeed, as always, we will enrich it in order to overcome the limits of signs that are allowed in the first draft. So thank you for that. I would just once again, and I know the discussion is ongoing, come back to you what you said on the unanimity. What is the consequence if we retain unanimity?
If somebody has a veto, nothing happens. So the EU is not there. So instead, any of the individual member states, will Germany alone impress Putin? Will Portugal alone impress Putin? Will Latvia alone impress Putin?
Or you can take Xi, you can take Trump, you can take any issue where we have a problem. So the real question is, are we able to present a position on things that really concern us, or are we not? And I think coming from unanimity to qualified majority, I mean, it is not that anybody who doesn't like a majority position is helpless. You only need to organize a qualified minority in such a case. And if you find yourselves in this area of policymaking without anybody else who supports you, then you perhaps, whoever it is, and it could be any country, should perhaps think, is it possible that we are not right?
So my point is to say, let us become adult when it is about this policy sector and overcome possible blockades, because alone who are you, who is anybody of us alone? That is perhaps what anybody should reflect on. Thank you.
Davor Ivo Stier
I give the floor to Davor Stier.
Thank you, Chair, and thank you for your report. And I understand the focus will be, at least at the beginning, on the geographical aspects of CFSP, starting with the Eastern Neighborhood. And I also understand why Western Balkans is not singled out there, since it's more a completion of the integration, of the European integration, rather than a classical CFSP. Nevertheless, I will try to provide some amendments, not to make it an addition to the country reports, but rather to focus on the CFSP aspects, especially when it comes to security threats to the EU, where we see also an increased tensions in the region and also a sort of an arms race there that I think that should be tackled. So I will try to provide some amendments there, as well as to beef up a little bit also the part on relations with Latin America.
Having said that, again, congratulations for an excellent report.
Grzegorz Braun
It is pathetic because it is repeating your usual warmongering mantra, and this is more and more ridiculous in confrontation with reality. The reality is that your dearest dear Ukraine is a heart of darkness in this continent, with its human trafficking, with its corruption, with God knows, God knows what what horrible things are possible because you are so supportive of Zelensky's regime. And at the same time, Europe is going bankrupt because you are still the guardian of the iron curtain in the East, so that we cannot buy oil, gas, and that is why electricity, power is is so expensive all over the continent. And you obviously ignore this reality, and you take care about euro euro principles that have nothing to do with our nations, our people prosperity and and bright future. So, your report is a piece of propaganda intended, I'm afraid, only to to prolong this festival of illusions that we witness here in in this in this very center of the Euro-kolkhoz project.
Thank you, Chair. Obviously, I'm highly critical of your pathetic report.
Thank you very much.
Nacho Sánchez Amor
Thank you for your patience, David. Um, it's the um both things that we heard from Antonio and from Mr. Brown, probably in different tone, but I would like to make a moral point. Is for our colleagues from the extreme right any moral judgment about the difference between aggressor and aggressed or not? Because this is the question. We can do a lot of political elaborations on the stopping the war and so on.
But please, always remind, always have in your mind that in the beginning of this conflict, in the beginning of this horrible things happening in in Ukraine, as Mr. Brown signaled, there is an aggression against a country that at that moment didn't represent any threat to Russia. And what I'm calling to my to my conservative colleagues, especially to Antonio, is try to to refine, because everybody wants the peace, for sure. But the question is if there is any sense of justice of your party and your political thinking is simply to surrender to the right of the most powerful. Because that means many things. In the European Union you depicted, Antonio, your logic regarding Ukraine is let's abandon any possibility for Portugal to be relevant because it's less relevant than Germany.
This is the logic that you are transferring from the aggressor Russia to a peaceful uh neighbor to the European Union.
No rules, no votes, no unanimity, no veto. It's the powerful imposing the rules to any other one. And I would like that at least you, Antonio, I don't expect that Mr. Brown is changing his tone, review a little bit the moral aspect of this political thinking. Thank you.
David McAllister
Thank you, Nacho. We don't really have a tit-for-tat, but since we're good on time, please, Antonio.
António Tânger Corrêa
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My friend Nacho, I'd like to explain something very clearly. We are not taking one side on any other side on this matter regarding Ukraine and Russia. That's quite obvious for us. But we consider, I mean, we take the side of Ukraine.
We are not, when I say take no sides, it's meaning how do you get the peace? Because you know my party is very much favorable to Ukraine and everybody knows that. What I think and what we think is that some situations instead of being solved should be managed. Give you the example of Bosnia, for instance, who has been managed through the Dayton agreements through these years. Now it needs to be changed, but the management, like the Middle East, I think there would be a solution, a management solution, and not a definite solution for the time being, a transition solution.
That's what I probably said. I was not dissenting with you. I mean, there was an aggression, yes, of course, we recognize that. That's not the point. The point is we must end this aggression as soon as possible.
That's what I wanted to say. Okay.
David McAllister
Thank you. We're about to close this item. Could somebody from the EPP staff inform Lukasz Kohut that his item is on the agenda in roughly two or three minutes and he better start moving? Now, any other request to floor? Well, today I have my peaceful day, Mr. Brown, for a second intervention.
Grzegorz Braun
Once again, you're presenting here the agenda of illusions. Climate change illusions, geopolitical illusions. And this is wrong because this is very costly for our citizens. And as far as peaceful Ukraine is concerned, I would like to draw your attention to the fact that the leader of Niger, a country in Africa, not that far from here, reported a few days ago that there is a strong concentration of army forces at his borders, northern borders. And Niger identifies French and Ukrainian troops about to invade his country.
So this is about, this is about your peaceful, just, dear Ukraine. Because you help to make war its crucial national business. Exporting war and trading on war on their own people's misery. Dying, being hurt, being deprived of their property. And this is Zelensky's and his butchers' business.
And you support it.
Thank you very much. Oh, Bucha again, tell me more about the international investigation of Bucha, because I can see none.
David McAllister
So Mr. Brown, you've had the floor twice. I think as a non-inscrit, you're treated more than fairly. Mr. Reuten.
Grzegorz Braun
Mr. President, I can hardly hear you. Could you please make something with the microphone, because I might be not the only one having problems with hearing you today.
David McAllister
Yes, Mr. Brown, sometimes with your inventions, interventions, I would wish not to hear you, please.
Thijs Reuten
Yeah, thank you, I hear you perfectly fine, Chair. And, sorry that I intervene again, but I wanted to ask tentatively if it's possible to postpone the deadline with a couple of days, since it's the Strasbourg week and we are already in a very busy week. It would really help a couple of days extra.
David McAllister
Right, thank you very much for your valuable comments. We will certainly have very fruitful discussions during the shadow meetings. Now, on your request, Thijs, last time we received 825 amendments. This year we are hoping for 1,000 amendments. And to make this possible, Perla, can we postpone the deadline?
Katarina? Okay, can we postpone it to the 8th of October, would that be helpful? 8th of October. Right, looking forward to all your amendments. Thank you.
We move on to item number seven, this is the consideration of the draft report on a European Parliament recommendation on EU-Norway political relations, prepared by our colleague Lukáš Kohut, who has now arrived. This report, dear Lukáš, comes at a particularly timely moment. Tensions in the Arctic and High North are rising. Hybrid threats against critical infrastructure are multiplying, and our partnership with Norway, already anchored in the EEA agreement and the Schengen Association Agreement, has never been more strategically relevant. The Norwegian role in Europe's energy security has been decisive since the phase-out of Russian gas imports, and its contribution to our collective response to the Russian war of aggression continues to matter greatly.
I now give the floor to you, dear Lukáš, to present your draft report. You have the floor for five minutes.
Łukasz Kohut
Thank you very much, dear Chair, dear colleagues. In recent years, there has been a significant change in the international order. We are living in a very uncertain world. Francis Fukuyama in his The End of History was not right. Russian aggression, the war in the Middle East, tough competition with China, and unpredictability of Donald Trump administration have all contributed to this instability.
Together, these developments have created an increasingly unstable geopolitical environment. The EU must address these challenges. It must become more integrated in both its internal and external dimensions. This is particularly important in our relationship with our closest partner and firm ally, the Kingdom of Norway. The main aim of this report is to reinforce European security.
Firstly, the EU-Norway security and defense partnership must be fully implemented. This will strengthen strategic dialogue between the EU and Norway on foreign and security policy, moving towards earlier and more structured consultations on matters of common interest, particularly with regard to Arctic and maritime security. We are exposed to many of the same security and hybrid threats from the East. One of the most relevant aspects of our cooperation with Oslo concerns security on and beneath the surface of water.
This includes protecting critical infrastructure such as offshore energy installations, pipelines, and submarine cables. This must be achieved through enhanced information sharing, cybersecurity, and resilience against foreign information manipulations and interference. It also involves coordinating responses to malicious activities in the North Sea, the Norwegian Sea, the Barents Sea, and the Baltic Sea region. EU programs have given us an opportunity to strengthen our collective defense within the NATO structure. The SAFE instrument and others relevant EU defense initiatives provide an opportunity to strengthen EU-Norwegian cooperation in defense capabilities and the European defense industrial base.
This can be achieved through joint procurement, defense innovation, military mobility, and integrated defense supply chains. These measures will enhance Europe's defense preparedness, industrial resilience, and a better cooperation between us. The Jelcz company in Racibórz can supply truck chassis for delivering air defense systems capable of countering drones. Polska Grupa Zbrojeniowa and Kongsberg Defence & Aerospace are engaged in joint defense industrial cooperation. These are concrete examples of fruitful European defense industrial cooperation.
However, security is a broader term. Prior to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia weaponized energy and exploited Europe's strategic dependencies. Europe must learn from this experience. Norwegian oil and gas supplies have been crucial in enabling Europe to phase out Russian energy imports and have gained further strategic significance in light of ongoing disruption to global energy flows. This is why we must develop joint initiatives in areas such as carbon capture and storage, offshore wind power, hydrogen production, and the electrification of offshore operations.
We also need to establish different forms of institutional cooperation. For instance, the Northern Dimension Parliamentary Forum could resume its role as a platform for parliamentary dialogue between the European Parliament and like-minded Northern Dimension partners, adapted to the new European security environment, and of course without participation of Russia. Dear colleagues, dear shadows, I look forward to hear your suggestions. It was a pleasure and honor to work on this report. Thank you very much, tusen takk.
David McAllister
Thank you very much, dear Łukasz Kohut, for your presentation. And now I give the floor to the shadows, and for the S&D group, it's first Nacho Sánchez Amor.
Nacho Sánchez Amor
Well, thank you, David. Thank you, Łukasz. I'm representing the colleague Schieder, who is the shadow in this report and has not been able to reach the meeting in time. We are happy with the draft report. It's a good starting point.
We are planning to cover some issues that we consider are not fully covered, and we are tabling the relevant amendments. Norway is a close ally. We share a broad range of convictions and priorities, including the fight for equality, the fight against climate change, and the overarching goal of having a secure and prosperous European continent. But Łukasz pointed to the different angle that the environment around is creating with our partners. The partners are there, Norway is there, the content of our relation is excellent, but it's the surrounding environment who put more value in the way we have to look for and to maintain our partnership.
And this is adding weight to the current international context. For that reason, the report is probably more relevant politically given this environment surrounding.
In the High North, we have to come close together with and strengthening the current alliance with Norway, Iceland, Greenland, and Canada. The Arctic is rightly in the center of the agenda, and we have to explore new ways in the relation with our broader northern neighborhood because it is about European security. We had the EEA, the European Economic Area, but now we have the EU-Norway Green Alliance, emphasizing the importance of the research on climate change, and this is another aspect in which we have to join efforts. Decarbonization, climate neutrality, and energy security are three main drivers of growth, and drivers of growth in both the region, European Union and Norway, because it's part of our strategic autonomy and reducing the dependency of other partner or former partners not as reliable as Norway is. The participation in the European programs, as Lucas signaled, Erasmus, Horizon, the Green Alliance, proves proves that the EU and Norway are already connected, and we hope that this report is bring us even closer together.
And my group is ready, and my colleague Sieder is ready to constructively contribute to this effort. Thank you.
Jaroslav Bžoch
Thank you, Chair. Dear colleagues, the EU and Norway already have a close and well-established relationship, based in particular on the EEA and Schengen frameworks. This gives us a solid basis for further cooperation in areas where our interests clearly overlap. But we should also look at this relationship in the context of the challenges Europe is facing today. Europe is under economic and energy pressure, with high energy and fuel prices affecting households and businesses.
This makes it increasingly important to diversify our partnership and build reliable long-term relationship with trusted suppliers and partners. This is where I see Norway as an important partner. In the discussion on this report, I would like therefore to focus on several priorities. First, security and defense. We should make full use of the EU-Norway security and defense partnership and focus on practical cooperation, including defense capabilities, joint procurement, military mobility, and defense supply chains, and joint projects with NATO.
At the same time, we should ensure that European defense cooperation strengthens our own European capabilities and industrial base. Second, critical infrastructure. Submarine cables, pipelines, and offshore installations are essential to our economies and our security. Norway has significant expertise in maritime surveillance and subsea infrastructure protection, so there is clear potential for closer cooperation. Third, energy security.
Norway is already an important energy supplier to Europe. Given the pressure on on energy prices and the need for secure and predictable supplies and reasonable prices, this cooperation remains highly relevant. And finally, the Arctic and the High North deserve our attention. This is increasingly relevant for European security, energy, infrastructure, critical raw materials, and maritime interests. We should strengthen cooperation with Norway and improve our risk awareness and reacting to threats in the area while continuing to work constructively with our existing partners.
David McAllister
Thank you, Jaroslav. ECR is not present, neither is Ormas Paet for the Renew group, so I now give the floor to Villy Søvndal for the Greens.
Jaroslav Bžoch
There are the priorities I would like to bring to the discussion, and I look forward to working with colleagues on this report.
Villy Søvndal
Thank you very much, chair. And to Mr. Kohut, thank you very much for the work you did. We very much agree in the approach you have to Norway as a very central partner country for Europe. And of course, when coming from Denmark, Norway is very close, not only as a neighbor and allied, but also as people very close to ours. EU and Norway are linked together and should be linked together, not least in the geopolitical situation we are in now with military and hybrid threats, but also what's concerning energy independence and the green transition.
We have to support and to strengthen the cooperation about the common security. And we shall remember that security is also, but not only, about threatening big powers of this world. Security is also about the safe future for our children and grandchildren, also without climate collapse and the consequences that follows. Therefore, a close cooperation not only about our common responsibility, but also on cyber criminality, on oil and gas extraction, also about the necessary transformation to renewable energy and protection of nature and environment. Because it's going very fast with the change of climate just now.
We have a nature which is in crisis and too much pollution is destroying the seas. We hope that this can have a bit more room in the good recommendations you have made, so we'll come with some proposals and we are looking forward to a very constructive working together. Thank you very much.
Speaker 22
Thank you very much, Villy. For the Left, I don't see a request to take the floor, and now I can give the floor to the ESN representative, Mr. Bystroň, do you want to take the floor?
Petr Bystron
Ah, thank you very much, Mr. McAllister. Panie Kohut, dziękuję bardzo. Popieramy was w pełni. I will continue in English, sorry. We are fully aligned with your point.
We also admire Norway as a fantastic country with fantastic people, and you just forgot to mention that they have a very good national team in football, so we are fully aligned. Thank you very much.
David McAllister
Thank you, Mr. Bystroň. Now I would like to give the floor to further colleagues. If that's not the case, we can firstly hear the representatives of the... we have one, Mr. Millán Mon.
Francisco José Millán Mon
Gracias, presidente. I'm going to speak in Spanish. Y quiero comenzar felicitando al señor Kohut por su borrador de informe. Coincido con el ponente en que Noruega es un socio muy importante para la Unión. Vivimos en un mundo crecientemente multipolar, fragmentado, en el que se cuestionan hasta las alianzas tradicionales y en este contexto tan complejo la Unión debe reforzar sus relaciones con los países que comparten nuestros valores e intereses.
Noruega es sin duda uno de ellos. Es ya socio en el espacio económico europeo, pero los ámbitos de cooperación mutua son muy numerosos. Pienso en primer lugar en seguridad y defensa, como se ha dicho, es un importante aliado de la OTAN y también ámbitos como la seguridad marítima, la protección de infraestructuras críticas, etcétera. También pienso en la energía. Noruega desempeña un papel fundamental para la seguridad energética europea y en materias primas críticas.
En fin. Pero yo, que también soy miembro de la Comisión de Pesca, presidente, quisiera detenerme en esta última cuestión. La pesca constituye un elemento muy importante de las relaciones bilaterales con Noruega. De hecho, este país es el principal proveedor de productos pesqueros al mercado de la Unión Europea. Sin embargo, lamentablemente, las relaciones en este ámbito han sido en los últimos años más complejas que en otras materias.
Han existido importantes diferencias sobre las posibilidades de pesca, sobre la gestión de determinadas poblaciones compartidas, estoy pensando como todos ustedes saben en la caballa, y también sobre las cuotas de bacalao para los buques de la Unión que acceden a las aguas del archipiélago de Svalbard. Por ello, yo creo que debemos aprovechar plenamente un diálogo de alto nivel que se estableció sobre pesca y gobernanza de los océanos establecido digo en 2024 para seguir buscando soluciones duraderas a las cuestiones que todavía están pendientes de resolver con Noruega y garantizar unas condiciones justas para nuestros pescadores. Y no debemos olvidar y voy terminando que el acceso al mercado de la Unión constituye una baza importante negociadora con Noruega, precisamente porque la Unión es como he dicho antes mercado fundamental para sus productos pesqueros. Por ello y termino con esto presentaré algunas enmiendas específicas sobre este asunto. Me parece importante que un informe que pretende abordar de manera amplia nuestras relaciones políticas con Noruega recoja también de forma adecuada la dimensión pesquera y los intereses de los pescadores europeos.
Deseo al ponente la mejor de las suertes y estoy seguro de que trabajaremos en un espíritu muy constructivo y eficaz. Gracias.
David McAllister
Thank you. If nobody else would like to take the floor, let me also say something and I'm especially already addressing Mr. von Lingen and Mr. Veyron-Réveillé who will take the floor in a moment. You will be aware that a small delegation of our committee went to Iceland last week and one of the top topics we discussed in Reykjavik was that there is a considerable backlog of implementing the necessary EEA rules and regulations, the legislation in Iceland. Now, I guess it will be the same in Norway. So could you perhaps provide us some information as Foreign Affairs Committee, what is the scale of the backlog in implementing EEA legislation in Norway?
About how many laws are we roughly talking? What are the reasons for the primary bottlenecks in Oslo? And thirdly, why does this matter and what is the European Commission and what is the European External Action Service doing to make clear to our Norwegian partners that this has to happen because if we are together in the single market, we can expect that all necessary legislation is implemented. These were my questions and having said that, I now give the floor first to Nicolas von Lingen for the European Commission.
Nicolas von Lingen
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, honorable members, and also thank you for these for these questions. This is one of the elements I wanted to address also in our intervention. So obviously we welcome this report. It reflects the closeness of the relationship and the challenges we face together. But some of the challenges, as you mentioned and another honorable member mentioned today, are already there.
And so we need to see how we address those. And that's why as we look into the future, we need to look how we're doing today.
I don't need to recall the central tenet of our relationship, closeness, deep integration, probably one of the deepest integrations we have with any third country. So let me perhaps start with the foundation of that relationship and a quick assessment of how it is working and how it can be used in the future. For over 30 years, obviously the EEA agreement, the Schengen agreement for a little less time, but still for over 20 years, have been the basis, the bedrock as you want, of our relationship. It has enabled extensive cooperation, access to the internal market, but also cooperation on other policy areas, on the environment, Union programs, and now also on space, defense, industrial capabilities. And also in return for a contribution to the Union's cohesion, which is essential if we want the internal market to function properly.
What we expect from this EEA agreement, because it's about the internal market, our internal market, is that the same rules apply in the same way at the same time to all its participants. That's the contract between the 27 member states, the promise when the co-legislator adopts an act, and it's also at the core of the EEA agreement, which means on the day an act enters into force in the Union, it should normally enter into force in the EEA. That requires a process, which is integration of those acts into the EEA agreement, but unfortunately over the years we have accumulated what has been coined a backlog, which means a mass of EU acts which have not yet been incorporated. The numbers are significant. We're talking about 500 to 650 acts, and we in September reached a new height at 677 acts waiting for incorporation.
And this is obviously worrisome. This creates a problem for homogeneity, for the level playing field in the area of energy, if we don't have the same rules, in the area of public health, if there's some rules which are more permissive. Still in the one recent example we had was on cadmium in onions, and all of these examples matter for the competitiveness of our companies, but also for the health of our citizens. What are we doing? We are working with the countries to ensure that both we can get the easy acts incorporated easier and that the politically difficult acts also are incorporated as they should have been, they should be under the EEA agreement.
And when we're looking at cooperation outside, because I think that's the second part of this report, we'll be looking obviously how is this working in the areas we are already working on. Let's say when we're looking at health, medical countermeasures, can we still use the same model or do we need to look at a model that is more effective, particularly when we're talking about public health. That to say we have already, we are using this framework in the area of space, defense, I mentioned that to do more together. Sometimes it will have to be in the agreement, sometimes outside. One last comment about fisheries.
I think that's an element that needs to be taken into account when we look at the whole picture. It is a geographic reality. It is an international obligation to cooperate. It's a political necessity when we look at the Northeast Atlantic and notably how we deal with activities by Russia. It's an economic reality, trade, livelihoods of coastal communities, and it's an environmental imperative to make sure that the resources are not overfished and we can continue fishing for the years to come.
So, with all relationship, and particularly a close one, we need to be demanding because it's worth it, but also we need to make sure that it delivers for the interests of both sides. Thank you very much.
David McAllister
Thank you Mr. Van Lingen, and I think that was an important information for colleagues: more than 600 legislative acts in Norway are pending to be implemented. I think this needs to be addressed in our report because it's about a level playing field in the single market. And now I give the floor to Mr. Veyron-Reville from the EEAS. Oh sorry, is it Madam? I'm very sorry, Madam Veyron-Reville.
Claude Veyron-Réveillé
Thank you Mr. Chair. I'm used to this confusion because of my first name Claude, but this is a mixed name in France. So, my first, my first message would be to express full support of the EEAS and from the High Representative in her capacity as Vice-President for the messages conveyed by the Commission. We are very close partners with Norway, but good partnership requires that both sides serve and respect their agreement. So it is essential that the backlog is addressed properly.
At the same time, the foreign policy and security aspect require also a look on themselves in their own capacity. And it is quite obvious that given the circumstances and also the sharing of principles with Norway, our relationship in terms of foreign policy and security requires to be further strengthened. So that brings us to my point where I want to congratulate this initiative to issue a report on EU-Norway relationship. I understand that last time around was 30 years ago, so it's very timely to issue a new report. It is indeed crucial to maintain and strengthen our relationship with Norway on foreign policy and security because, as I said, the EU and Norway share interests and values.
And we can always count on our Norwegian partners and their like-mindedness to work with us in locksteps, for example on multilateralism. We know that with Norway we have a strong ally and partner to plead for the multilateral system, for example lastly at the UNGA in New York. We know also that we can count on cooperation with Norway, for example in the Middle East, and I will mention the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee that we both chair. And there is of course Ukraine. And there is of course Ukraine where Norway has been a strong, steady and essential partner in the situation of this war of aggression by Russia against Ukraine.
This is why we have very close alignment with Norway on our statements, but also on sanctions against Russia. So the Russia war of aggression against Ukraine has changed the geopolitical context, and this has justified that over the last years we have strengthened our security and foreign policy cooperation with Norway. I can give a few examples and I will focus on the most important one: the fact that we signed a security and defense partnership with Norway in 2024, making Norway one of the first countries with whom we had a security and defense partnership.
Based on this security and defense partnership, we've been able to set up a new range of dialogues with Norway. I can cite a dialogue on space, a dialogue on peace mediation, on consular coordination and on hybrid threats. And of course, this adds to the very long list of geographical and thematic dialogues we have with Norway. I want to highlight also the joint statement on strengthening the EEA foreign policy and security policy cooperation that was signed between the High Representative and the three foreign ministers of the EEA last year as well. This is a very good basis for increasing our cooperation.
And the last point I want to highlight is our cooperation on the Arctic. We have set up an Arctic security dialogue with Norway last June and it is very important as we prepare for issuing a new joint communication on Arctic strategy as an opportunity to continue our cooperation in our northern neighborhood. Cooperation with Norway with other like-minded partners on maritime security, on military mobility, for example, will be essential. To conclude, I want to say that we look forward to Norway's continued and regular participation in CSDP missions and we also look forward to Norway's regular contribution to Ukraine's support through the European Peace Facility. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
David McAllister
Thank you very much and once again I beg your pardon, Madame, for addressing you incorrectly. Now, we have in the meantime a further request to take the floor, Richard Kols.
Rihards Kols
Yes, thank you and sorry for being late. I'm trying to prove that in this house MEPs can be in two places at the same time, which is I guess a challenge. Well, first of all, on this particular file, I would stress the cooperation with Norway belongs at the center of our security policy. Yes, indeed, with Norway we have the European Economic Zone for years, they're contributing to the budget, but I think the paramount target right now is security and defense in particular. So therefore, first of all, I want to thank the rapporteur for this draft.
I really support the direction of this recommendation and from my side the amendments will focus on three areas. First, as I mentioned, defense, as it also is proposed for the CFSP draft, NATO remains the foundation of collective defense when it comes to Europe. So the EU's job is to strengthen the industrial capacity that our armed forces need. Norway should have a meaningful access to joint procurement and defense industrial cooperation, excluding a capable NATO ally because it sits outside the EU would weaken us and we need ammunition, air defense and short delivery times. Second, the Arctic.
I was just a few weeks ago, actually no, last week, I lost the count of the time, last week in Ottawa in Canada in conversations with our Canadian colleagues and I stressed that we must name the threats when it comes to Arctic because right now for Canada is infrastructure and sovereignty, but we should name the threats in Arctic and that is Russia. So Moscow's military build-up and its cooperation with China demands a clear response.
This is directly relevant to the entirety of the EU. Reinforcements from North America must reach Europe safely. So security in the High North affects our ability to defend ourselves. And I will seek a stronger recommendation on maritime surveillance, protecting cables and pipelines, and rapid repair capacity. And we should also agree in advance who responds when infrastructure comes under attack.
So I think this is also in common with the relations with Norway. Third and last, Ukraine and energy security. Cooperation with Norway should tighten sanctions enforcement against Russia's shadow fleet and networks sustaining its war revenues. That must accompany continued military support for Ukraine. And Norway is Europe's largest gas supplier.
Our energy policy must account for that strategic reality as well. So regulatory requirements need to protect security of supply and avoid creating fresh dependencies on hostile states. I look forward to engage with fellow shadow rapporteurs and with the rapporteur, and I think we're going to have a good recommendation for fostering the EU-Norway relationship. Thank you.
David McAllister
Thank you, Rihards. Would anyone else like to take the floor? If that is not the case, the floor goes back to Lukasz Kohut.
Łukasz Kohut
Thank you, Chair. Dear colleagues, thank you very much for your comments and for your views. I believe our shared objective in this chamber is to strengthen European security in 2026. The interests of producers, including the fisheries sector, as well as environmental protection, are important and must be fully taken into account. At the same time, the security context is broader.
National egoism and narrow approaches should be avoided. A win-win outcome for both Brussels and Oslo will require goodwill and flexibility on both sides. Although Norway is not a EU member state, I believe that the word "we" should guide our approach. I look forward to a constructive discussion at the shadow meeting. Thank you very much.
David McAllister
Thank you. I encourage all shadow rapporteurs to continue working constructively with the rapporteur ahead of the amendments deadline, which is the 12th of October, 12 o'clock, so that this committee can adopt the report that reflects the true depth of our relationship with Norway, as mentioned, one of the closest and one of the most reliable partners of the European Union. The vote is scheduled on the 3rd of December. And with that, I can now move on to the next point on today's agenda. We are 15 minutes ahead of our schedule, which I welcome very much.
The next item on our agenda is the exchange of views on the draft opinion on the EU Gender Action Plan IV, priorities for gender equality and women's rights in external action. DEVE and FEMM are the lead committees on this file. I would like to give the floor now to Nela Riehl, who is replacing our dear Hannah Neumann. Please, Nela.
Nela Riehl
Yes, thank you very much, and Hannah's apologies, she cannot be here today as she has fallen sick. So in Hannah's name, I would like to thank the rapporteur Abir Al-Sahlani and Paulo Do Nascimento Cabral for their work. I'll be just reading out the text that Hannah sent to me.
David McAllister
Nela, just a moment. Could I ask all those who want to leave the room to now leave the room and perhaps continue their very important conversations outside the room? I'm actually addressing the Commission and the EEAS. As always, the Commission does not always listen to Parliament. Nela, the floor is yours.
Nela Riehl
Thank you David. GAP4 is being developed in a very different geopolitical environment than GAP3. Women's rights and gender equality are increasingly part of a broader geopolitical contest. Illiberal and authoritarian actors use gender equality, women's rights and the broader human rights framework as a political battleground. Organized anti-gender and anti-rights movements operate across borders.
Women politicians, journalists and human rights defenders are increasingly targeted through gendered disinformation and FIMI with new methods. AI-generated abusive content and deepfakes, surveillance and transnational digital repression. We see shrinking civic space and funding for women's organizations and wars, conflicts putting additional pressure on women and girls. At the same time, Europe is investing more in security and defense. The world in which we are designing GAP4 is not the world in which we designed GAP3.
Gender equality has increasingly become a geopolitical background. Authoritarian actors have understood that attacking women's rights can be a tool to polarize societies, undermine democratic norms and weaken those who challenge their power. Our foreign policy needs to understand that too. This is why GAP4 cannot simply be the next gender action plan. From the AFET perspective, it needs to be a foreign policy instrument for this new geopolitical reality.
Gender equality cannot be something we add to external action after political decisions have already been taken. It needs to shape those decisions. First, commitment to implementation. GAP3 established gender equality much more firmly in the EU external action. But implementation remains uneven, including between EU delegations and gaps remain on monitoring, results, impact and accountability.
GAP4 should therefore strengthen public reporting and qualitative and quantitative results and the mid-term evaluation and annual discussion with Parliament and accountability inside the Commission, the EEAS and the EU delegations. We should not ask whether gender has been mainstreamed but whether EU action actually changes outcomes. Second, responsibility where decisions are made. Gender focal points need proper mandates and resources. But implementation cannot remain the responsibility of gender specialists only.
Responsibility also needs to sit with senior management, with political and security teams, with economic and investment teams and with programming and contracting teams. Member states should also improve representation in EEAS and CSDP secondments. If gender equality is an EU foreign policy priority, responsibility for it has to sit where foreign policy decisions are actually made. Third, make WPS operational. WPS must be part of the EU response to the current geopolitical and security environment.
We need to systematically integrate it into CSDP missions and operations, mediation and conflict prevention, the EU security and defense architecture and risk and conflict analysis. This is particularly important while EU investment in security and defense is increasing. And it is not only about participation. Women need agency and influence in decision-making. More European investment in security and defense should go together with stronger, not weaker implementation of the Women, Peace, Security agenda.
Fourth, use the leverage the EU actually has. Gender equality cannot be confined to development programs. It also needs to shape political engagement with partner governments, Global Gateway, EU-backed investment, trade, private sector engagement and reconstruction financing.
This includes gender-responsive due diligence and procurement. The real test is whether gender equality also influences those areas where the EU exercises political and economic power. Fifth, protect those doing the work on the ground. Women's organizations and civil society are not simply implementing partners. We need to involve them structurally in programming and reporting, ensure sustainable funding, and make EU funding more accessible to new and smaller organizations.
We need stronger protection for women human rights defenders, women environmental defenders, and women peacebuilders through rapid response emergency support, digital security, and diplomatic engagement. Sixth, gender equality and democratic resilience. We need to recognize and organize anti-gender mobilization as part of the geopolitical environment in which EU external action operates. We need to strengthen EU capacity to identify and to respond to organized anti-gender and anti-right narratives and tackle gender FIMI and disinformation as part of the broader response to foreign interference and hybrid threats. To conclude, GAP IV should build on GAP III but also respond to what has changed since its adoption.
That means stronger implementation and accountability, institutional ownership, operational WPS, protection and involvement of civil society, use of EU political and economic leverage, and a response to geopolitical anti-gender mobilization, FIMI, and digital repression. Hannah is looking forward to working with the shadows on the amendments. Gender equality should not sit alongside EU foreign policy, it should shape how we conduct it. Thank you.
David McAllister
Thank you, dear Nela, for reading out Hannah's statement. I now give the floor to the shadow rapporteurs, and for the EPP, Željana Zovko, she cannot be with us, and she has asked me to read out her statement. So this is the statement of Ms. Zovko. As the EPP shadow rapporteur, I am pleased to continue the work we began under the Gender Action Plan III. I welcome the recognition that foreign information manipulation and interference has become a serious challenge to national sovereignty, democratic resilience, and human rights.
Women in public life and gender equality are increasingly targeted by coordinated disinformation and hostile interference. This new reality must be properly reflected in our external policies. At the same time, I believe the report should remain clearly focused on gender equality in the EU's external action. We should avoid combining it with separate policy debates that could broaden its scope and dilute its central objectives. During my work on this report, I will propose a stronger focus on preventive diplomacy.
Political, diplomatic, or military strategies alone are often insufficient to prevent conflict. We need to strengthen women's participation in conflict analysis, early warning mechanisms, mediation, preventive diplomacy, and peacebuilding. We must also look at our own parliamentary diplomacy. Through its delegations, the European Parliament can promote women's political participation and challenge gender stereotypes in partner countries. But we must practice what we advocate.
Women need to be present and influential in the parliamentary dialogue through which we deliver these messages. I will therefore call for practical guidelines to strengthen their role. I will also propose amendments addressing the role of women in the armed forces. As Europe significantly increases its investment in defense and security, we must promote the recruitment, retention, and advancement of women at all levels of military leadership. Just yesterday, I organized a conference, The Role of Women in the Armed Forces, in the European Parliament, at which many of these issues were raised and discussed.
I look forward to constructive cooperation with the rapporteur and the other shadows in developing a balanced, focused, and ambitious text. That was Ms. Zovko's statement, and now I give the floor to Evin Incir for the S&D group.
Evin Incir
Thank you very much, chair. I think, I mean, I can subscribe to what the both, what the both, the other colleagues have already said. But a few things that are important for us in the S&D group. First and foremost is the feminist foreign policy that, that we will be pushing for, and that has been actually a success. I'm unfortunately, I'm a bit sad that my own government, last mandate at least, decided to abolish a important priority that the government before that introduced and other governments after that in, in different part of Europe but also beyond have adopted.
So feminist foreign policy with focus on representation, resources and rights. And then of course also the women's, women, peace and security agenda. We know that when women are included in peace processes, the, the peace is also more lasting and there is also a bigger chance that, that a solution is being founded, founded. In addition of also of course that it's, we need to ensure that those who are being affected are also included in the, in peace processes. And we know that women and children are affected to a big extent.
So that would also be a priority. And then of course also civil, the support to civil society organizations, both politically but also financially. We live unfortunately in a time where we see a backlash, unfortunately within the EU also, but when focusing on the EU gender action plan, sorry, the, yeah, on the external action plan, then we also see the same pattern beyond our own borders. So we need to take leadership for it both internally but also of course externally. So with this said, very short summary, we have quite a lot to do and I look forward to working with Hannah as rapporteur and the other shadow colleagues.
Thank you.
David McAllister
Thank you, Evin. For the PPE group, no request to take the floor, neither for the ECR, neither for Renew. For the Left, no. The ESN, Mr. Bystron.
Petr Bystron
Ja, danke schön, ich werde auf Deutsch sprechen, Frau Uriel, komme ja auch aus Deutschland. Männer und Frauen sind gleich. Wir haben eine Gleichberechtigung erreicht in Europa, in allen Mitgliedsländern, in allen Mitgliedsländern der Europäischen Union. Das ist eine große Errungenschaft und wir können stolz drauf sein. Die Chefin der EU-Kommission ist eine Frau.
Die Bundeskanzlerin der Bundesrepublik Deutschland war über Jahre, lange Jahre eine Frau. Wir haben Präsidentinnen der Parlamente, die Frauen sind. Wir haben hier Frauen in führenden Positionen. Also warum dieser Backlash? Wir müssen deutlich sehen, dass wenn man den Bogen überspannt, dass man damit Reaktionen provoziert, die negativ sind.
Die, der berechtigte Kampf für die Gleichberechtigung der Frauen, den wir schon längst abgeschlossen und gewonnen haben, hat sich leider fortgesetzt zu einem Kampf um die Quoten, um die künstliche Durchsetzung einer, einer Quote für Frauen auf die Kosten der Qualifikation.
Und das ist sicher etwas, was wir nicht exportieren sollten. Wir sollten mit einem guten Beispiel vorangehen. Die anderen Länder sollten sich freiwillig Beispiel an uns nehmen als ein Erfolgsmodell. Und wir sollten denen auf keinen Fall etwas aufzwingen und schon gar nicht versuchen, Quoten aufzuzwingen, die auf Kosten der Qualität gehen. Danke schön.
David McAllister
Thank you. Are there any other colleagues who would like to take the floor? That is not the case. Then I will now give the floor to the representative of the European External Action Service, Ms. Sandra Gründgards. She is policy officer in the EEAS Task Force for Equality.
Madam, the floor is yours.
Sandra Gringras
Thank you so much, Chair, honorable members of the European Parliament. Thank you so much for this opportunity to exchange and discuss on the next Gender Action Plan in external action. Also thank you to the rapporteur, MEP Neumann, for the draft opinion and for the committee's leadership and guidance on this matter. As also recognized by the rapporteur, the geopolitical and security environment has changed profoundly since GAP III was adopted, and so has the political space for gender equality. We see a growing and well-funded coordinated pushback towards women's rights and gender equality, and from the EEAS side, we therefore see that GAP IV must be an ambitious and forward-looking political response to this new reality.
EU has remained steadfast in our commitment to advancing gender equality and women's rights as part of our foreign and security policies, and GAP IV must help us not to just defend this progress made, but also continue to advance in gender equality in an increasingly difficult environment. GAP III has demonstrated that progress can be achieved when robust policy frameworks are matched with consistent resources and implementation across EU external action. The current geopolitical and security environment calls for a reinforced Women, Peace and Security agenda. When implemented fully, this agenda prevents conflict, enhances stability, prosperity, democratic resilience, and it also makes our operations more efficient. It helps sustain peace.
Today, WPS priorities are embedded across EU's common foreign defense policy. For example, in all our 12 security and defense partnerships, we have WPS commitments integrated. Also in our CSDP missions that all have gender advisors. We are also supporting women's rights organizations, and the EU recently launched a project with specific support to peacebuilders. EU has been also on the frontline navigating pushback in multilateral settings and succeeding in safeguarding important global norms.
EU's current WPS Action Plan ends next year, and we will at the EEAS launch consultations for the new action plan this autumn, with the view of having it adopted before the end of next year. And in this revision, as has also been recognized by several members, we aim to align the WPS agenda to the EU's broader peace and security defense priorities and emerging security threats, and that includes cyber threats, foreign information manipulation interference, amongst others. And we welcome the Parliament's engagement and recommendations in this regard.
The WPS action plan and GAP IV will remain closely interlinked as it has been under GAP III. They are complementary instruments with distinct but mutually reinforcing objectives. To conclude, one of the key strengths of GAP III has been its joint nature, bringing together EEAS and the Commission, and we are building on this for GAP IV, and this partnership will be key to delivering results across the EU's external action. I thank you, Chair.
David McAllister
Thank you, Ms. Gringarts, for your brief statement. And now, Nela, would you like to conclude?
Nela Riehl
Yes, I'll do it in German. Auch wenn Herr Bistron gerade gegangen ist, glaube ich, wäre es auch sehr in Hannas Namen oder Sinne, wenn ich darauf einmal ganz kurz eingehe. Es gibt auf der Welt kein Land, in dem wir Gleichberechtigung erreicht haben. Das ist unbedingt wichtig, hier noch mal festzustellen, das muss auch in dem Bericht stehen. Gleichzeitig finde ich, war es in meinen Ohren fast ein Oxymoron, davon zu sprechen, zu sagen, es könne bei Gleichberechtigung der Bogen überspannt werden.
Entweder etwas ist gleichberechtigt oder nicht, ein Bogen überspannen gibt's dort gar nicht. Möchte einfach diese Worte eines AfD-Politikers hier nicht so stehen lassen. Ansonsten bedanke ich mich in Hannas Namen sehr, ganz herzlich bei den Schattenberichterstattern und ja, freue mich für sie auf eine zukünftige Zusammenarbeit. Vielen Dank.
David McAllister
Ja, vielen Dank, liebe Frau Kollegin. Please be informed that the deadline for amendments is set for the 8th of October at midday. The amendment should as usual be tabled by AT4AM. Let me remind you that this file falls under the new Rule 57 of the Rules of Procedure on delivering opinions to reports of committees responsible. The procedure entails tabling amendments to the draft report of the lead committee and not amending AFET draft opinion as it used to be in the past.
Let me also underline that the amendments shall deal solely with those matters that fall within the area of competence of our committee. Now, I would love to come to the next item 11, however, our guest speaker, the Under-Secretary-General from the United Nations, Mr. Jorge Moreira da Silva, is not present yet, so I will adjourn this meeting for exactly 11 minutes, we continue at 11 o'clock.
Roughly minutes. The adjourned meeting will now be continued. Dear colleagues, we now come to item number nine. At a time when geopolitical tensions are placing increasing pressure on the international system and on the principles that underpin it, maintaining our commitment to multilateralism and to a rules-based international order is more important than ever. This European Parliament has consistently underlined its commitment to effective multilateral cooperation and to the central role of the United Nations in addressing global challenges and upholding international law.
Against this background, Parliament adopted on the 20th of May this year its recommendation on the European Union's priorities for the 81st session of the United Nations General Assembly. Our committee is also currently working on a report addressing the situation of international law and challenges facing multilateralism. All these efforts reflect our shared responsibility to consider how the European Union can contribute to strengthening the rules-based international order, defending international law, and supporting a multilateral system that remains capable of delivering meaningful results. It is therefore a great pleasure to welcome Mr. Jorge Moreira da Silva, the United Nations Under-Secretary-General and head of the United Nations Task Force for the Strait of Hormuz to the AFET Committee today. And as Mr. Moreira da Silva just told me, it's also for him kind of coming back to a place where he himself was engaged.
Our guest speaker was a member of this European Parliament from 1999 to 2003. So welcome back home. This exchange of views will provide us with an opportunity to discuss the current challenges facing the multilateral system, the role of United Nations in navigating an increasingly complex international environment, and how the EU and the UN can continue to work together in support of international law, peace, and effective multilateralism. I will now give you the floor, dear Mr. Moreira da Silva, for 10 minutes, and then we'll have, as usual, an exchange of views. The floor's yours.
Jorge Moreira da Silva
Thank you, Mr. President, Mr. Chairman, distinguished members. As Mr. Chairman said, it's a pleasure to be back home. I was member of the European Parliament and at that time I was rapporteur on climate change and authored at that time the emissions trading scheme, so many, many years ago. Now at UNOPS, as Mr. Chairman mentioned, in addition to my own role leading UNOPS, which is the UN agency for operations, infrastructure, project management, I was asked by the Secretary-General to lead the UN Task Force for the Strait of Hormuz. It includes UNOPS, UNCTAD, International Maritime Organization, and the International Chamber of Commerce.
And the objective is to find an exceptional, limited, time-bound mechanism to prevent a massive humanitarian crisis. I'll try in my intervention to describe what is the mechanism, what have been our diplomatic efforts, and where the difficulties are being tried to be addressed. Starting by the fundamentals. We know that the Persian Gulf, and particularly the Strait of Hormuz, represents a fundamental element on the global supply chain. 38% of crude oil, 33% of fertilizers, and 20% of gas are coming from the Gulf.
So obviously the disruption in the Strait of Hormuz has caused, is causing significant harm into energy security, but also food security. And I think that the food security has been somehow overlooked in this conversation. We tend to look more into the energy. Obviously the energy dimension is critical, but it's very important to take in consideration that some of the most dependent countries from fertilizers from the Gulf are at the same time some of the most vulnerable economies in the world. For instance, Sudan, Somalia, Mozambique, just to mention a few, Tanzania, just to mention a few countries that have a dependence from fertilizers coming from the Gulf that is between 50 and 60%.
So we saw the immediate consequences when the crisis started with the dramatic surge on the prices of fertilizers, the decline of the use of fertilizers and due to that, both the prices and the scarcity, it will trigger, it is triggering a lowering of the agriculture productivity and as a consequence we will likely see massive impacts on food security with according to World Food Programme 45 million people being very likely forced into food acute food insecurity and 30 million people forced into extreme poverty. Unfortunately, there is a time lag. Contrary to the grain when we see the immediate consequence when there is a disruption on the grain as we have and we have now as well in in Ukraine in the Black Sea, you can see the impact, the direct impact on the prices of food. When it comes to fertilizers there is always a time lag. But the fact that there is a time lag shouldn't allow us to overlook.
That's why the Secretary General António Guterres asked us to try to develop a mechanism that would create the conditions to enable an orderly, safe and predictable transit particularly of fertilizers. Of course, if we succeed on fertilizers we can also expand this to other commodities depending on the interest of the parties. This mechanism is based on as I mentioned the assumption that there is a humanitarian crisis looming if we don't fix this crisis and it's based on inspiration from our work namely in Gaza when UNOPS is managing the 2720 mechanism to in a transparent manner monitor, verify and approve the consignments of aid into Gaza. UNOPS, my agency, is daily distributing, procuring and distributing the fuel in Gaza and we are managing this mechanism to ensure that all aid that goes into Gaza is going through a mechanism that is not first come first served, is based on predictability, stability, prioritization. Then in Yemen, all vessels as you may know, all vessels that go from to Djibouti, from Djibouti to Yemen to the Houthi controlled areas in Yemen are based on a monitoring verification mechanism from UN managed by UNOPS.
So we have a team in Djibouti. So all vessels that go to Yemen go first to Djibouti where we monitor, verify and inspect those vessels. More than 3,000 vessels in the last 10 years. And then you have the Black Sea Grain Initiative. So these three experiences, UN 2720 in Gaza, UNVIM in Yemen and the Black Sea Grain Initiative shows that UN, if the conditions allow, are ready, is ready to support through this kind of mechanisms the transit of commercial and humanitarian aid.
Based on this we consulted extensively, as you imagine I consult extensively with Iran, with US, United States, with the Gulf countries but also with other countries, namely EU member states, EU as an institution but also EU member states. And based on these consultations and our own work we designed a mechanism that is basically a way not to overcome freedom of navigation but to ensure that while we wait for the full restablishment of freedom of navigation and while we wait for the full restablishment of the Strait of Hormuz, we still manage to have in the short term in a limited and exceptional manner a solution to prevent a humanitarian crisis.
And this, Mr. Chairman and distinguished members, is very important. We are not presenting this mechanism as an alternative to freedom of navigation. We are basically letting the parties know, please continue your negotiations because you are negotiating a very comprehensive package that includes everything, but don't wait for the full negotiation to allow at least the fertilizers to flow. How would it work? We would register the request from shipment agents.
A company that wants to go to the Gulf to pick some fertilizers in a port would register this request. We would approve based on the regulation this request. Then we would, in a joint coordination center in Salalah in Oman, we would enable the deconfliction with the parties in the conflict and with other member states. We would enable the deconfliction and offer the vessels a safe route with the GPS coordinates. The vessel enter the Strait of Hormuz, would go to the port of call where our monitors would be there doing monitoring and verification, and in case it's needed and requested, it could also include inspections.
We would track the transit with the GPS, with the transponder on the AIS system. We would track the transit of the vessel and then we will report on the result. So you can see it's basically a confidence-building mechanism. It's a mechanism that I insist is not replacing freedom of navigation, but it offers an element of trust between the parties to allow the transit of these vessels. How many vessels are we talking about?
Not the 130 vessels that were passing the Strait of Hormuz before the disruption. Those 130 vessels were covering everything: fertilizers, energy, petrochemicals. If we check the numbers before the war, it were about three to seven vessels a day on fertilizers. So it's important, very important, distinguished members, that we understand that we are not asking something that is rocket science or extremely difficult. The mechanism is pretty simple and we are not talking about a significant number of vessels.
That's why it's important that we focus on the consequences of inaction and we try to mobilize the two parties in the conflict to an agreement in this area. I've been, as I mentioned, Mr. Chairman, members of Parliament, I've been engaging with all parties in the conflict. For the time being, we have been able to have an overwhelming support of United Nations member states. There is a significant number of member states that in the General Assembly, in the Security Council, they are clearly asking for this mechanism to be operationalized. However, we have not yet secured from the two parties in the conflict the mandate that is needed to put this in place.
We continue to engage weekly. I continue engaging weekly with all parties, with the Gulf countries, trying basically to explain that there are consequences in case we don't put this in place. The consequences are a tragedy for developing countries, that the consequences are even worse because now we also have the Black Sea disruption and the Bab-el-Mandeb.
And finally that UN is ready. I would need, my team would need seven days between the moment we get the political mandate. We need seven days to put the monitors on the ground and to ensure the transit of fertilizer. So you can see that from a operational point of view we are ready, but we are still dependent on the political will of the parties and I hope that diplomacy can prevail because the planting season and the diplomacy don't have the same cycles. Sometimes negotiations take long, but we shouldn't wait until everything is fixed to at least allow the transit of fertilizer.
Thank you.
David McAllister
Well, thank you very much, Mr. Moreira da Silva. Now I give the floor to colleagues, coordinators as always have the first right to speak. Who would like to take the floor for the EPP? For the time being, no one. Davor Štier, please, two minutes.
Davor Ivo Stier
Well, thank you very much, Chairman, and let me also thank our former colleague Moreira da Silva for not only for what he has said here, but all the efforts that the UN is doing here. I think that we are finding ourselves in a situation where the UN system as a collective security system does not have the medicine to cure the most systemic problems that we are facing with the world order. However, it can provide some pain relief and this is also something that needs to be valued. So it's not all the solutions or nothing, there are nuances of things that can be done and you are trying your best in order to at least solve an acute problem that can cause an even more bigger one and have humanitarian consequences. In this sense, of course, my question would be if you could go a little bit more precise in what are the topics particularly that you are working on now in order to bring the two sides together and get the deal done and to conclude successfully the negotiations or what eventually we in the European Parliament can do in order to support it.
Thank you.
Nacho Sánchez Amor
Thank you, David. Muito bem-vindo, senhor Moreira da Silva. Vou falar em português porque falei em português agora com o colega. Muito obrigado. Eu compreendo que as Nações Unidas estão a fazer tudo o possível.
Eu gostaria de saber qual é a atitude e o grau de relação que as Nações Unidas têm com os contendentes. Qual é o grau de colaboração com o Irão? Qual é o grau de colaboração com os Estados Unidos? E saber como é que se processa essa relação porque há mesmo diferentes expressões de se o estreito está aberto ou não. E então eu compreendo que é muito complicado gerir, mas sobretudo qual é o grau de relação com as autoridades iranianas.
Obrigado.
António Tânger Corrêa
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'll speak in Portuguese. Senhor Subsecretário-Geral, bem-vindo a esta sua casa, basicamente. Como disse o senhor Subsecretário-Geral, um terço dos fertilizantes e quase 20% do comércio mundial passa por Ormuz. Mas interessante para a Europa é que a maior parte dessa energia nem sequer vem para a Europa.
E naquilo que se passa no crude, menos de 4% do crude vem para a Europa. Mas nós pagamos como se viesse. Ou seja, nós, eu sei que os preços são fixados globalmente, mas não deviam ser, porque nós só devíamos pagar aquilo que compramos. Nós sabemos há décadas que o Ormuz era um dos pontos mais vulneráveis da economia mundial e de passagem, e chegamos a 2026 sem ter um sistema e um mecanismo de prevenção. É evidente que agora é tarde, já passou 1622, que foi a data que Portugal saiu do controlo do estreito de Ormuz, dificilmente voltará atrás esse período entre 1515 e 1622, se calhar tinha sido melhor.
Bom, mas de qualquer forma, aquilo que eu gostaria de perguntar ao senhor subsecretário de Estado é porque é que, sabendo-se que o estreito de Ormuz era extremamente sensível em termos de comércio internacional, porque é que só agora, só uma vez em que a crise aconteceu, é que se montou um dispositivo de construir, portanto, um dispositivo que de alguma forma pudesse ajudar a resolver o assunto. E sobretudo, como é que vamos fazer agora para que na próxima crise o cidadão europeu não volte a pagar estas vulnerabilidades estratégicas que são conhecidas antecipadamente. E já agora, uma última pergunta, o senhor subsecretário de Estado mencionou a ajuda humanitária quer em Gaza, quer no Iémen, e eu gostaria de saber se de facto há dados sobre possíveis aproveitamentos dessa ajuda humanitária quer pelo Hamas, quer pelos Huthis. Muito obrigado.
David McAllister
Thank you. For ECR, no request to take the floor. Renew, that is also not the case. For the Greens, nobody. For the Left, Marc Botenga.
Marc Botenga
Merci, Monsieur le Président, merci, Monsieur le Secrétaire général adjoint. Vous avez été très diplomatique, mais en réalité, vous avez esquissé un bilan accablant de la politique étrangère européenne. Parce que comme vient de le dévoiler le Secrétaire général de l'OTAN, les pays européens ont pleinement soutenu, beaucoup d'entre eux, pas tous, mais ont pleinement soutenu cette guerre des États-Unis contre l'Iran qui a causé la fermeture du détroit d'Ormuz. Il y a eu, selon le Secrétaire général de l'OTAN, 5 000 avions qui ont décollé d'aéroports européens pour aller soutenir cette guerre. Donc ce que vous nous dites, c'est que non seulement ça a poussé à la hausse les prix à la pompe chez nous, les citoyens maintenant craignent de devoir payer 3 euros le litre à la pompe d'essence, on n'arrive plus à la fin du mois, mais qu'en plus, comme il y a plein de fertilisants, il n'y a pas que le gaz et pas que le pétrole qui passe par le détroit d'Ormuz, il y a plein de fertilisants, ça va aussi, ça risque aussi de causer la faim dans des pays comme le Soudan, Mozambique, la Tanzanie.
Donc c'est vraiment un rapport accablant, c'est que la politique étrangère européenne telle qu'elle est aujourd'hui, et des pays européens, en fait, pénalise non seulement les citoyens européens, favorise évidemment les profits de quelques grosses multinationales du pétrole, du gaz, ça on le sait, mais affame aussi les peuples du monde. Donc moi je trouve que c'est vraiment, je vous remercie pour cette intervention parce que ça ouvre vraiment les yeux en fait sur la criminalité de la politique de certains de nos gouvernements européens. Et alors j'ai une question concrète. La question diplomatique dont vous parlez, le problème fondamental n'est-ce pas tout simplement qu'on doit dire aux États-Unis ne bombardez plus parce que le détroit d'Ormuz avant la guerre était ouvert, s'il n'y a plus la guerre, il sera ouvert, non ? Merci.
David McAllister
Thank you, Marc. For the ESN group, no request to take the floor. Then we can move on to individual colleagues and first is our vice chair of our committee, Hanna Jaloul Muro.
Hana Jalloul Muro
Hello, indeed a very interesting conversations and about this mechanism, thank you, sorry because I just arrived from another meeting but I think this is essential to us, this registration mechanism, if this can be implemented in other areas like now the Red Sea, the one of Hormuz, the registration that you have been mentioning, which is I think is linked one thing to the other. And also is linked to what the word that Mr. Motenga was mentioning in the sense that of course there we have a huge issue now in the Red Sea with the Houthis that are being backed by Iran. So, you know, the influence of Iran is still very big there and I think that we need to have a control over that. We have called in this Parliament, I recall it every time that I have the chance, to put the Houthis under the terrorist list, we should go to that. But now just I wanted to ask you if you think this mechanism can be extended also to the to the Red Sea, not only to the Hormuz Strait.
Thank you.
Malika Sorel
Merci Monsieur le Président. Je vous remercie pour votre exposé Monsieur. Vous avez beaucoup parlé de ce laissez-passer. Est-ce que vous pouvez nous dire quelles en sont les conditions, le coût, qu'est-ce qui est discuté pour avoir un laissez-passer navire par navire ? Quelles sont les contreparties ?
Parce que moi je n'ai pas très bien saisi, je suis persuadée qu'il doit y avoir des choses. Vous avez dit aussi que vous avez discuté avec plusieurs pays de l'Union européenne. Est-ce que vous pouvez nous dire lesquels ? Quels sont les pays de l'Union européenne selon vous qui peuvent avoir un rôle accru à jouer et dans quelle carte diplomatique elles ont dans leurs mains, diplomatique ou autre hein, parce qu'on a vu que la France a récemment envoyé des avions pour aider l'Arabie saoudite face aux Houthis. Donc ça peut être aidé.
Vous avez beaucoup parlé du fait que vous discutiez avec les pays du Golfe et je rejoins certains de mes collègues, ce sont les États-Unis qui sont les premiers responsables. Donc par exemple sur la guerre déclenchée par l'Ukraine par la, excusez-moi, par la Russie contre l'Ukraine, nous avons su mobiliser un certain nombre d'outils dont le gel d'avoirs et puis un certain nombre de mesures de représailles contre leurs des hauts placés dans leurs institutions. Qu'est-ce que nous pourrions faire contre les États-Unis ? Parce que là, vu les la gravité des conséquences au plan mondial, je ne pense pas que ce soit bien pour tous, y compris pour les Américains, que l'on reste impassible devant ce qui se passe. Quels sont les tribunaux vers lesquels on peut se tourner ?
Que peut faire l'Union européenne selon vous ? Dites-nous le franchement, quels sont les leviers que nous pourrions actionner ? Je vous remercie.
Irene Montero
Gracias presidente, I will speak in Spanish, sorry, if it's possible. Bueno, muchas gracias por su intervención. Mire, Donald Trump tenía 46 millones de dólares en petróleo y gas antes de bombardear Irán. Ahora sus acciones valen 61 millones. O sea, inicia una guerra ilegal y gana 15 millones y medio.
Repsol, ¿sabe usted lo que gana una empresa como Repsol con las guerras, con el aumento de precios? 2.201 millones solo en el primer semestre de 2026, un 265% más que el año anterior, un récord. ¿Y sabe de dónde sale esta millonada?
Pues sale de que el litro de gasolina está a 2 euros en España, a 2,40 en Francia, a 2,50 en Alemania, en Dinamarca hasta 3 euros por litro. Entonces, quizá Europa debería estar echando a Trump de Europa y crujiendo a impuestos a las grandes energéticas. Pero lo que están haciendo es pedirle a las familias que paguen y a nuestros hijos que se alisten al ejército. Mi pregunta es cómo van a bajar los precios y cómo van a parar las guerras si con ellas están haciendo negocio.
David McAllister
Thank you. I see no further requests to take the floor. Then I can go back to you, dear Under-Secretary, please.
Jorge Moreira da Silva
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I would like to thank all the comments and questions from members of Parliament. As you imagine, there are some elements that I can't address as those embody a political dimension. Of course, not that I don't have an opinion, of course I have an opinion, but a fundamental element for the UN to operate is to ensure that neutrality, independence is always addressed. Which doesn't mean that we don't call for impunity to be addressed in all conflicts. One of the things that Secretary-General António Guterres has been saying often and often is war is not a fatality.
We shall do whatever is possible to prevent war, and when war comes, to do whatever we can to get ceasefires and lasting peace. It's important that Security Council decisions are full respected. It's fundamental that international humanitarian law is full respected. It's fundamental that civilians are not being targeted, that infrastructure is not being targeted, and there is no impunity. That statement that I just made is applicable to all conflicts in the world, not only the one that we are discussing now.
With this in mind, and going directly to some of the questions, starting with Mr. Steer and if you allow me also the member Nart-Sánchez Amor, because the two things are somehow connected, if you don't mind, I will try to bring the two together. You were asking me how to bring the two parties together, how are we engaging with the US and with Iran, what would be the way to overcome the impasse. One fundamental element, I think, is the perception about the consequences. I know and other distinguished members mentioned already that there are massive implications of food and energy security in Europe. But if you don't mind, I think it's very important to understand that the worst consequences will happen in the developing countries.
And this element is crucial. We need to, of course, protect everyone in the world, but please never forget that for the 2 billion people that have no access to water, the 1 billion people that goes to bed with no decent meal, the 700 million people without access to electricity, that this conflict is causing significant harm, particularly when the choice is about getting food or go to starvation. So I would say that the negotiation, and you know this very well, the success of the negotiation, in my opinion, depends on two things. One is everyone understanding the consequences of a no-deal, particularly what will be the massive implications on food security globally, but also in some of the most vulnerable countries.
And second, it's to everyone understand that operationally the UN is ready. And we are not dealing with something that is extremely complex. So it's just a matter of political will. So this is the way that we have been engaging. And that's why the voice of some countries have been extremely important, namely African countries, but also some countries in Latin America and Southeast Asia.
So the more those countries express their concerns about the lack of access to fertilizers, namely, I think the greater will be the chances for the parties in the conflict and the parties in the region to understand that a humanitarian crisis is approaching and it can be prevented. And if it is not prevented, there is scrutiny. But I think it's also important to, beyond these voices, particularly from the Global South, it's also important that the parties in the conflict also understand that this is a matter of a stepping stone on a trust-building exercise. If we get something on the fertilizers, I'm deeply convinced that then this could be expanded to other areas and it can help on the negotiations. Because we know that Iran and US are obviously engaging in conversations that are very comprehensive.
And in my opinion, as a person that has been just on the fertilizers and on the mechanism for the Strait of Hormuz, in my opinion, if we get something positive on this initiative, it can be a positive contribution to other discussions that are taking place. So this is somehow the way that I see the engagement. As I said, I met with more than 100 countries during these last seven months. With Iran, with US and with the Gulf countries in an almost weekly manner. We continue making the case for this deal, for this solution.
And I had, it's public, I had, as you know, a long discussion last week with Iran during UNGA with the Minister of Foreign Affairs. But I also had frequent conversations with US and I mentioned with also the Gulf countries. There was a question, I think that from several members of Parliament, namely Mr. Bütikofer, but also Ms. Sorrell, on what is the EU, how is our engagement with EU, what is the EU position. Of course, it's up to the Parliament to make this kind of scrutiny, but what I can say from a factual point of view, without entering into any kind of interpretation, is the European Union has been very, very supportive of this UN mechanism. And this has been voiced publicly by the European Union as an institution, but also by individual member states.
Individual member states with whom I've been meeting often. I met with all EU ambassadors immediately when I was appointed. I've been meeting with heads of state and government and Minister of Foreign Affairs from the EU member states, with the commissioners. I'm meeting today with Vice-President Kalas again. So the EU has been very, very supportive of this UN initiative and EU member states individually have done so.
And this is important because it's important that that multilateralism is supported by the European Union and particularly the role of the UN. Member of Parliament, Ambassador Tânger Corrêa, you asked about prevention and of course I can't comment in some of the points that you have made, but also about what have we learned from this crisis to prevent future crisis, what's the alleviation approach versus remediation, prevention.
Somehow this was also mentioned in other interventions, namely by Ms. Muro. We have learned from our experience that everything that can be done on transparency helps. So the this kind of UN mechanisms that bring transparency, accountability is helping. It has helped in Gaza. Now if you go to UN2720.org, you know exactly what is approved, what is rejected by Israel, for instance.
Before you didn't know, we didn't know. So there was a dual-use approach and we knew that some things were approved and some things were rejected. The moment the United Nations was asked by the Security Council, can you put a mechanism in place to monitor, verify and approve aid, now everyone knows what is approved, what is rejected and we have this kind of accountability and transparency. And in my opinion, this is very helpful. That's why in Yemen with the UNVIM and also I hope now in Hormuz, this can help.
So one key element I would say is confidence-building mechanisms. I really believe that in this kind of crisis, when it's impossible sometimes to fix everything immediately and to have lasting peace, that should not be a reason not to allow at least to prevent humanitarian crisis. So this is for me a fundamental element is even in the middle of the war, it's possible to ensure transit of humanitarian aid and commercial aid, and I hope that in Hormuz it will be also the the the case. Also to prevent any misuse of ODA, any approach that is first come first served. I think it's it's a way to ensure that aid being provided reflects the real the real priorities.
If I may now go into Mr. Botenga, you were talking about again, I can't comment on everything you you mentioned, you have made a political statement as well, but you said that the end of the war would fix everything. And I think it was something that was also mentioned by Ms. Matarogil in the at the end of of the intervention. It's true that that the most important effort should be about peace, lasting peace. And that's what the Secretary-General has been asking is not only a ceasefire, is about peace, de-escalation and peace. But we are being put very often into a dilemma which is we have to wait for peace to start having something.
And the idea of this mechanism is precisely to ensure that even in the middle of the war, we can still allow some transit of fertilizers, but if parties in the conflict and in the region want, it could also include other commodities including including energy. You mentioned the global impact. And this is something that I forgot to mention, Mr. Chairman, in my initial intervention. What we saw on the fertilizers market, and again, this is not so much on the news as it is the energy, but what we saw on the fertilizers market is it started with a regional implication, then impact on the countries that are most dependent from those imports, namely in Africa and in Southeast Asia, and then the entire fertilizer market is disrupted. Why?
Because even the countries that are producing fertilizers still depend on the raw materials coming from the Gulf. So the issue is not only the fertilizers, the final product coming from the Gulf, it's also the raw materials that are fundamental to other countries that are producing fertilizers. And the third consequence was the countries that are producing started allowing exports. So this was the three, you see the domino effect: first decline of fertilizers from the Gulf, then decline of fertilizer being produced elsewhere due to the lack of raw materials, and finally the entire supply chain disrupted. So the impact is global and we are not yet factoring in completely the impact of the Black Sea in this equation.
And this allows me to go into the question asked by Member Salul Moro on could this be replicable in other places? Yes. I think that this kind of confidence building mechanism, which is about monitoring, verification, approval, it's something that is about trust building, confidence building, and it could be, if the parties in conflicts agree, it could be applicable in other conflict, it could even be applicable in the Black Sea as well. And I want to mention the Black Sea why? Because if you put in combination the impact of the Black Sea disruption in the last few weeks on grain, on fertilizers, on energy, if we put this with the Strait of Hormuz disruption plus the Bab-el-Mandeb, we are witnessing a unprecedented impact on the entire supply chain of fertilizers, food and energy.
And we have not yet seen the consequences. So when some members were asking me about prevention, remediation, lessons learned, we have not yet witnessed the total impact. And I know that in Europe, in some Member States, in other countries, people are of course very worried and very concerned with the impact that the crisis is having already now. But I kindly ask you to consider that we are just looking into something that is growing and I'm particularly alarmed, that's the word, I'm particularly alarmed on the food dimension. Because when the World Food Programme has projected this 45 million people forced into starvation in the next few months, it did not yet include the impact of the Black Sea disruption, particularly the grain and the fertilizers.
If we bring everything together, we may be witnessing an unprecedented impact on food security, particularly in developing countries, in the same year of the super El Niño. I'm not coming here to play the alarmist, I'm just bringing the trends, the facts, the evidence and why in our opinion, Mr. Chairman and Members of Parliament, it's so important to find a solution. Finally, because I think that I tried to answer to all questions, a final point about energy, there was a reference from I think Ms. Montero Gil about the energy dimension.
What have we learned since the 70s with the oil shocks? Three things always happen: diversification, efficiency, and greening. So the diversification element is critical, not only on energy, but I think also on food. And that's why it's important that European Union institutions and European Union member states also support developing countries in their own capacity on the production of fertilizers, as this is in everyone's interest. So diversification of the supply chain of fertilizers, not only energy, but the fertilizers, is in the best interest of everyone to avoid that we are dependent on just one region, just one gulf, just one strait, and we can increase resilience also in the European Union.
I guess, Mr. Chairman, I tried to respond detailed to all questions. As I mentioned, I couldn't go into some of the comments, but I hope that I was able to answer to most of the questions. And we are at your disposal. I see this opportunity coming here to the Parliament as an accountability exercise. I strongly believe on the role of parliamentarians on multilateralism.
So we are at your disposal, not only in this crisis, but in any other crisis where UNOPS plays a role. As you know, two-thirds of everything we do is in fragile contexts. We work on infrastructure, procurement, project management, with a high concentration in the conflict-affected countries. I know how important this is for the AFET committee, so we are at your disposal. Thank you.
David McAllister
Thank you, Mr. Moreira da Silva. Thank you, dear former colleague. These were valuable insights, and I think I can say on behalf of our committee, we wish you all the best success in your challenging role. For our committee, your input comes certainly at a timely moment while we are preparing our report on the situation of international law and the risks to multilateralism, which will be adopted in our committee on the 26th of January. We come to an end of today's meeting.
Is there any point under any other business you would like to raise? If that is not the case, please be informed that we will have now our joint meeting with our colleagues from the DEVE committee in the 5B1 room here in the Spaak building. The meeting is closed. Thank you.
Speaker 40
Vous m'entendez ? 1 2, 1 2. Ouais, c'est bon, OK. Juste pour être sûr que vous m'entendiez. On peut ouvrir les HF ?
C'est ouvert, ouais.
Speaker 49
Et 1, oh. Et, et, et. Bon, ça, ça sort pas très fort, mais bon. Ça module bien. Hello, ça module bien.
1 2, 1 2, 1 2. Si, hey, hey, si. 1 2, 1 2. 1 2 3.
Speaker 50
OK. Et y a ça. 1 2, 1 2. OK. HF 2.
Et ça c'est HF 1. 1 2, 1 2. Si, et hé. OK, je pense que c'est bon, non ?
Speaker 51
Du récepteur ? Du récepteur là, il est là. L'alimentation. Ah, pardon. Tu l'as mis là.
Non mais si tu vas plus vite que moi, ça va pas. Excuse-moi. Tu vas trop vite.
Speaker 47
Donc si tu peux prendre un câble patch Ghilmetti. Et alors dans le, dans le patch Ghilmetti, tu prends la Floorbox 2. La sortie Floorbox 2. Patch Ghilmetti dans les câbles patch dans le tiroir derrière toi là. Normalement ils sont dans le tiroir noir qui est dans le rack.
Tu dois avoir des patchs, des câbles patch Ghilmetti derrière toi dans le rack. Y a un tiroir noir.
Speaker 42
Oui oui, c'est possible. Et le 5, 6, 7. Tu dois avoir un patch Ghilmetti, câble patch Ghilmetti, tu vois le câble audio. Si on met un dans les deux. Un dans les deux, non ?
Non parce qu'eux, ça on va leur envoyer le Floor. Donc on va travailler sur le 6. Si tu me mets dans ce que tu veux en fait. Philémon ?
Le téléphone ?
Quoi ?
Le téléphone ?
Speaker 46
Oui. Non mais j'ai pris l'adresse. Ouais ouais, c'est naturel. Bien. Non, je pense pas là pour le moment.
Dans, dans le rack.
Speaker 48
Alors ce sont des câbles patch donc avec triangulaire comme ça avec des contacts dorés pour aller dans le patch Ghilmetti. Ouais, c'est ça.
C'est ça ?
Speaker 47
Et alors dans le rack à ta droite. Attends, je vois, ouais. Je branche où ? Tu vois le patch audio Ghilmetti ? À ta droite, dans le rack à droite.
Ouais ouais.