House of Lords

26 October 2026

House of Lords

Follow its sittings
02:48 - 04:18
Speaker 4
Charles the Third, by the Grace of God of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of our other realms and territories King, Head of the Commonwealth, Defender of the Faith, to the Right Reverend our right trusty and well-beloved Richard Lee, Bishop of Durham, greeting.  Whereas our Parliament for arduous and urgent affairs concerning us, the state and defence of our United Kingdom and the Church, is now met at our City of Westminster, we, strictly enjoining, command you upon the faith and love by which you are bound to us, that considering the difficulty of the said affairs and dangers impending, waiving all excuses, you be personally present at our aforesaid Parliament with us and with the prelates, nobles and peers of our said Kingdom to treat and give your counsel upon the affairs aforesaid. 

And this as you regard us and our honor and the safety and defense of the said kingdom and church and dispatch of the said affairs in no wise do you omit.  Witness ourself at Westminster the 23rd day of July in the fourth year of our reign. 
04:18 - 06:25
Speaker 3
I, Rick, Lord Bishop of Durham, do swear by Almighty God that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to His Majesty King Charles, his heirs and successors according to law, so help me God. 
06:25 - 06:28
Speaker 1
First oral question, Lord Sharpe of Epsom. 
06:28 - 06:33
Speaker 2
My Lords, I beg leave to ask the question standing in my name on the order paper. 
06:33 - 07:11
Speaker 8
My Lords, I would like to thank the noble Lord Sharpe for his interest in this issue.  It's timely because in response to his and other works today, the FCA has confirmed there should be no sustainability requirements and no FCA regulatory barrier preventing banks and other financial institutions from supporting the defense sector.  I have the publication here requiring good practice from financial firms and I hope that that goes some way to address the concerns that he has been raising. 
07:11 - 07:57
Speaker 5
Well, I thank the noble Lord for that answer and I'm very grateful to him for it because it is encouraging.  But the reason for asking this question again, it's the second time I've asked it in 18 months, is because I was recently contacted by two ex-army officers who've developed a novel counter-drone technology. 

They had secured a 700,000 pound grant from Innovate UK, but were in danger of losing that grant because they had nowhere to put it.  And the reason that the banks were saying that they couldn't open an account on their behalf was, quote, "because of the nature of your business."  So could I ask the minister to press home the importance of this new FCA report directly to the banks, perhaps invite them into the Treasury and explain that not only is defending the nation profoundly ethical, but it's also a moral imperative. 
07:57 - 08:36
Speaker 8
I think I'm in entire agreement with the noble Lord Sharp on this.  Look, to be absolutely clear, no legitimate company should be excluded from financial services solely because it operates in the defence sector.  I can confirm that as a first step, the FCA will be writing to all firms, all financial firms, today to make that expectation absolutely clear.  And again, would thank him and the many other people from all political parties who have been campaigning on this important issue for some time.  Thank you. 
08:36 - 09:17
Speaker 11
My Lords, we also have heard, I chair the Industry Committee, we're looking at defence at the moment, and we've heard from small defence companies with this problem.  So I ask two things.  One is that we ask, make sure that the FCA actually enforce the guidance, which they don't in the other area I deal with, as you know, politically exposed persons.  But secondly, that they are sympathetic to the sort of cases I think referred to.  These are often new companies, so won't have a long trading arm, and therefore they must be flexible to help in this way. 

09:17 - 09:52

David Pitt

I think again I'm going to be in total agreement on this. And the reason for the FCA and our encouraging the FCA to do this was precisely for that reason, and particularly to make sure that new start-up companies and small and medium-sized enterprises in the defence sector have access to the financial services that they need to be able to carry out their business and help in the protection of the nation. So I thoroughly agree with the comments made by the noble Baroness.

09:52 - 10:35

Susan Kramer

I asked for this action in an amendment to the Financial Services Bill, so you can imagine I'm very pleased we're going to get more vigour from the FCA. But I join others in insisting that vigour must be sustained. But there was a second issue which is equally important, which is a problem with the process of public procurement from small defence businesses, including by the failure by the government to protect SMEs' intellectual property. Given that these small businesses are vital for innovation, as others have said, vital for innovation in the defence sector, will the government seriously look at this issue, which also is undermining development in this area?

10:35 - 11:25

David Pitt

And indeed, I think the government sympathetic and putting its money where its mouth is. The Growth Guarantee Scheme, for example, from the British Business Bank, specifically focused on defence and other SMEs, 3.5 billion pounds a year. One example, for example, would be Kraken Technology in marine defence, and its aim not to be the sole lender but to crowd in private finance as well. The National Security Strategic Investment Fund for start-up companies, I would guess like the one that we've been talking about earlier, 100 million pounds by 29-30. So again, I think we have a full consensus and considerable action taking place on the issues that are being raised by this question today.

11:25 - 12:14

George Robertson

Can I refer to my entry in the register of interests, but also say to my noble friend that there are still financial institutions in this country who are resistant to the idea of investing in defence? And can I ask him to encourage them to read the strategic defence review of last year, in which they will see the good reasons that we have, especially in terms of the country being in danger, for investing in defence? And also point out that the word defence is the defence of this country, and this country is in danger, and they need the money, a lot of these companies need the money for the investment for the future.

12:14 - 13:06

David Pitt

And again, I'm in desperate agreement with the noble lord. The first communication I think that they're going to receive is a communication from their regulator, the Financial Conduct Authority, I have it here, which is going to be very, very clear that there are no sustainability requirements that prevent companies from serving defence firms. But when they serve defence firms, they should and consider the risks associated with them, they should do that proportionately and consistently across all the companies that they're funding. If this doesn't work from the FCA, I am sure I will have another round of questions in a few months' time.

13:06 - 13:52

Lucy Neville-Rolfe

My lords, like others, I've been appalled by this long-standing problem with finding bank accounts for the especially for the small and innovative defence companies that we really need at the current time. Now, on the 8th of June, the FCA said, our sustainability rules do not prevent investment in or finance for defence companies. So I'm not sure what today's welcome announcement changes, because banks continue to have their own ESG-style exclusions. And I know ESG is an area in which the noble lord the minister is an expert. So can he undertake to sort that out as well?

13:52 - 15:00

David Pitt

Yes, I think that also covered in the in the in the FCA letter. I think one can overdo how significant ESG disclosures and regimes have been in preventing investment in defence. I think at one time that was an issue and I think amongst those who are supporters of allowing ESG investment, there has been some concern and some reform there. My co-author Stephen Davis of Harvard Law School would be one of those who's been campaigning on this. But I would note that RUSI agree that ESG disclosure regimes generally do not prevent investment in defence.

And I think that the push that is now being given by the FCA is the right next step for us to take to make sure that defence companies are treated in exactly the same way as as as any other company that is seeking finance.

15:00 - 15:27

Lynn Ruth Deech

Can the noble lord the minister confirm that the sentiments he has expressed apply equally to any anti-Israel prejudice that is preventing proper investment in defence, and that the government should lead the way by not putting any obstacles in the way of the supply and cooperation with Israeli intelligence in our defence mechanisms?

15:27 - 16:28

David Pitt

So as I say, the FCA, and I would agree with them, are saying that there are no rules that exclude financial services from a company solely because it operates in the defence sector.

And if an individual company wishes to take that into account, it should do so proportionately, and it should do so consistently, and it should be clear to those who are approaching it about what those rules are. But for any noble lords that would like me to send them a copy of what it is that the FCA is asking that be done, I'd be really happy to do that. If you would like to drop me an email, I will make sure that my office sends it to you. I think this is really a significant step forward in what has been an important issue. And again, I'm thanking members of this house who have been raising it.

I think this is the right response and a solid one.

16:28 - 17:06

Speaker 27

My lords, I'm glad the minister mentioned the RUSI report because I attended the discussion of that RUSI report and he's exactly right. It did find that ESG constraints within banks was not specifically an issue. But what it also suggested was that perceived public affairs and public relations issues within the management of those banks was what was driving these behaviors. So there's something more than simply a regulatory issue. There's a cultural issue, and perhaps the minister could explain how we might go about addressing that.

17:06 - 17:30

David Pitt

Yes, and please ask for a copy of the FCA report because it addresses specifically that issue and that banks must be responsible for making sure, again, that they're consistent, proportionate, and that defense is not a reason ipso facto for refusal of funding for companies. But I'd be very happy to send him that report. Thank you.

17:30 - 17:33

Speaker 6

Second oral question, Baroness Belgrave.

17:33 - 17:38

Speaker 12

I beg leave to ask the question standing in my name on the order paper.

17:38 - 18:12

Jacqui Smith

My lords, the government is focused on ensuring technology used in education is safe and trustworthy through generative AI product safety standards, updated guidance, and a planned consultation on introducing safety certification for higher-risk products. Such certification would lead to a published list of child-facing generative AI tools which have been certified as meeting safety criteria, including data protection and safeguarding for use in education settings.

18:12 - 19:04

Speaker 13

My lords, EdTech is largely untested and we don't yet know the full impact of it on our children in our schools. A school choosing an AI tool can struggle to judge whether it's meeting that safeguarding and data protection standards. And there was a recent ICO audit of 28 EdTech providers that found around 70% of their agreements with schools lacked the legally required detail. The EdTech businesses could not provide evidence that the schools who use their platforms had authorized reusing student data for their own purposes. Can I ask my noble friend the minister, in light of her reply, what additional practical support the government can provide today to schools to ensure that children's safety is not harmed by these tools?

19:04 - 19:46

Jacqui Smith

Well, we have of course already updated the standards that apply to those tools. But I think my noble friend makes an important point that it needs, in a fast-moving market as the market for EdTech is, it needs more than that, which is precisely why we want to consult on the idea of actually certifying products so that it can be much clearer to schools at any given point in time which products are actually certified. And as I say, that certification would also take into consideration both data protection and other safeguarding issues.

19:46 - 20:25

Speaker 9

My Lords, the noble lady mentioned that the government plans to consult on the certification of EdTech and generative AI products. I wonder if she could give us a timetable for that consultation. And similarly, the government announced that there would be sovereign education benchmarks, but no timetable that I'm aware of has been announced. And I wonder if she could also confirm that AI products used in education will be independently assessed against those benchmarks.

20:25 - 20:44

Jacqui Smith

We're intending to launch the consultation and certification framework very soon this autumn. I will come back to her about the AI sovereign benchmarks because I understand that they're already operationalized, but I will respond specifically to that point.

20:44 - 21:18

Timothy Clement-Jones

My Lords, I declare an interest as an advisor to DLA Piper on AI regulation and policy. My Lords, a list of safe tools can tell us what to avoid. What is the government's vision for what AI in schools can actually achieve for children? Will the government adopt a human flourishing test for AI in schools? That would mean asking not just whether a tool avoids harm, but I suggest whether it independently improves children's learning, curiosity, critical thinking, and agency.

21:18 - 22:25

Jacqui Smith

Yes, can I wish a very happy birthday to the noble Lord. And he is of course right, that's why we need different elements of protection and, as he rightly says, promotion here. So the certification would of course enable schools more quickly and easily to be able to see those EdTech products that met the standard. But we also in January strengthened our product safety standards, both to reflect emerging risks and developments in AI technologies, but also to ensure that AI supports genuine learning and doesn't undermine children's ability to think, learn, and develop independently. The certification scheme itself, I think, enables the development by legitimate EdTech technology companies of the type of technology which will help to support children's learning.

22:25 - 22:58

Speaker 23

My Lords, a number of noble Lords have already asked questions about the regulation of AI in schools. And my question would be, would it be Ofsted who inspected schools and how they govern their use of artificial intelligence, including the safeguards they have in place to protect pupils and manage the use of personal data? And if so, what steps are the government taking to ensure Ofsted inspectors have the expertise and guidance necessary to make such assessments effectively?

22:58 - 23:48

Jacqui Smith

Of course Ofsted will have an important role to play in ensuring that the safeguarding responsibility of schools with respect to AI, as well as the appropriate use in the classroom, happens. But there's also a role for the Information Commissioner's Office here in terms of the protection of data. And as I've already identified, there's also, it won't be Ofsted, for example, wouldn't be appropriate for them to be the organization that is holding the certification process. So that will be another area where there'll be both support for ensuring what happens is right and safe and effective, and also a way of ensuring that schools are following that certification and the guidance that already exists.

23:48 - 24:18

Speaker 10

My Lords, we had a brilliant debate on this very subject on Thursday. And the PISA data is clear. It shows that pupils using the most technology throughout their school day suffer worse results, with those who use computers for over six hours in a day scoring 66 points lower than their peers who did not use the technology. So we need to ask, will the government act on this to ensure that children in our schools do not suffer through overuse of this educational technology?

24:18 - 25:28

Jacqui Smith

Yes, of course it is the case that what we need to ensure happens in our schools is that we harness the positive opportunities that come from AI and educational technology, and we avoid the risks that certainly need to be managed very carefully. That's the reason for the breadth of initiatives being taken by the government. It's the reason for the updating of the generative AI product safety standards, for example, which now particularly introduce or have, have specific protections relating to cognitive development, emotional and social development, mental health, and manipulative design, reflecting areas where children may be particularly vulnerable. I don't believe that there is anybody in this House who doesn't believe that there are opportunities that AI can bring into our schools for both our teachers and for learners. It's getting that balance right, which the government is working hard to achieve at the moment.

25:28 - 26:03

Speaker 24

My Lords, alongside their positive role within the education system, many parents and children will choose online and AI tools in order to support their learning outside of the classroom. My noble friend Lord Tarassenko has pointed out, though, that it's a bit of a minefield, with, it's very difficult for parents to assess which of those tools are likely to be the most efficacious. Are there any plans for the Department for Education to help those parents by perhaps rating those tools in terms of their effectiveness in supporting children who have particular educational needs?

26:03 - 26:37

Jacqui Smith

Well, of course, once the certification is in, in place, I suspect that that will be broadly available for parents to see. But we have, of course, already undertaken and are starting the process of developing screen use guidance for 5- to 18-year-olds, which will gather evidence from experts on how screen use affects children and young people, and it will make new practical evidence-based guidance available for parents in the coming months.

26:37 - 27:04

Joanna Penn

My Lords, what response has the Department for Education given to the 130 early years experts and educators who wrote to the Secretary of State in September raising concerns about the digital reception baseline assessment, including the fact that it's inconsistent with the guidance on early years screen time which the government has already developed and is building on with its work for over-fives now?

27:04 - 28:05

Jacqui Smith

Well, the reception baseline assessment doesn't contradict the department's screen use guidance. It's a short one-off assessment during which a pupil may use the screen for around 12 minutes, which of course is significantly less than the maximum hour per day recommended. The content is slow-paced and safe. It was tested under the previous government with experts in early years, SEN, and inclusion involved in its development, as well as extensive trials with thousands of reception-aged pupils.

And of course, it's not something that a young child would use on their own. It's administered by a teacher, and the pupil will never be alone with the device. And of course, what it provides is a more effective, well-tested way of getting that baseline assessment of where a child is when they come into school, which is so important to enable them to make progress whilst they're in school.

28:05 - 28:10

Speaker 19

Third oral question. Third oral question, Lord Redwood.

28:10 - 28:16

John Redwood

I beg leave to ask the question standing in my name on the order paper.

28:16 - 28:51

Sonny Liang

My Lords, on 16th of July, the government took decisive action to nationalise British Steel, safeguarding our sovereign steelmaking capability and skilled jobs. In September, we appointed Alan Lovell, an experienced business turnaround specialist, as chair. He and the new board are developing a credible transformation plan to secure British Steel long-term competitiveness and commercial sustainability. Key decisions are expected in the coming months, and we anticipate publishing the plan once it has been agreed.

28:51 - 29:05

John Redwood

So, the Minister, when will the two aging blast furnaces need shut down for deep maintenance, and what progress has been made with the development of plans for an electric arc furnace?

29:05 - 29:42

Sonny Liang

My Lords, maintaining safe and reliable blast furnace operations is an immediate priority. However, decisions on major maintenance and necessary shutdowns will be guided by detailed engineering assessments and by operational requirements. The new board is also assessing future steelmaking technologies, including electric arc furnaces, as part of its transformation plan. No final investment decision has been announced. Our priority is to preserve sovereign steelmaking capability while securing a commercially viable, competitive, and sustainable future for British Steel.

29:42 - 30:18

Speaker 28

The noble Lord is right to ask this question because a huge amount of public money is going out to British Steel every day. And it doesn't take a report or a plan to improve what the business is doing. Things can be done day-to-day. So I think it would be important for your Lordships to understand what is happening now and how it is happening. And I think it would behove the Minister if he could put a detailed report before your Lordships' House so that we can assess the progress and the thinking that's going behind British Steel.

30:18 - 30:57

Sonny Liang

My Lords, firstly, look, the government stepped in to preserve this strategic steelmaking capacity, but taxpayer support cannot substitute for commercial viability indefinitely. Britain needs its own steel industry to support defence, manufacturing, infrastructure, economic security, and skilled jobs. As I said previously, the new board under Alan Lovell must set out a credible plan to profitability with clear investment priorities, operational improvements, and measurable milestones, and we will publish his plan in due course.

30:57 - 31:38

Frances Lorraine Maria O'Grady

My Lords, after years of uncertainty, underinvestment, and unfair competition, steelworkers and their communities will welcome this government's strategy and its action. However, I have a specific question about whether my noble friend the Minister would consider strengthening the procurement framework to include private companies that receive government support, whether in the form of government grants, subsidies, or loans, include them in the procurement framework so that every penny of taxpayers' money, where possible, is used to protect jobs.

31:38 - 31:59

Sonny Liang

Well, my noble friend is absolutely right, and I will support her in terms of ensuring that our businesses have got a fair chance in procuring anything that is up for procurement by British Steel.

And we must ensure that our businesses up and down the country have a fair chance to securing those contracts.

31:59 - 32:44

Norman Lamont

My Lords, we all understand the wish and the need to protect jobs at Scunthorpe. But given that there are many more people employed in the steel-using industries than in the steel production industry, was it really wise for the government to try to boost British Steel by introducing protectionist measures, reducing quotas and increasing tariffs on products which are widely used by the wider economy in this country? And is it not extraordinary, as the Public Accounts Committee pointed out, that some of the tariffs actually apply to goods that aren't manufactured and couldn't be manufactured in this country and of necessity have to be imported? How does that help jobs?

32:44 - 33:13

Sonny Liang

My Lords, firstly, let me state this again. We must support British steelmaking while protecting the thousand of businesses that rely on competitively priced steel. Tariffs, CBAM, emissions policies should be proportionate, carefully calibrated and mindful of downstream manufacturers. Equally, taxpayer investment must ensure commercial sustainability and not permanent subsidy.

33:13 - 33:33

Speaker 34

My Lords, contrary to what's just been said, could my noble friend say something more about how the government can strengthen British Steel's position, particularly with regard to the flood of very, very cheap imports that's coming into the country at the moment, which threatens British jobs?

33:33 - 34:10

Sonny Liang

My noble friend is absolutely right, and British steelmakers must compete on a fair and level playing field. However, we must recognize the serious challenges created by global overcapacity, unfair subsidies and artificially cheap imports. The government will use all appropriate trade remedies in line with our international obligations to protect British industry from unfair competition. Strengthening domestic demand through infrastructure investment and procurement opportunities is equally important. Our ambition is therefore very clear.

34:10 - 34:14

Speaker 31

British Steel should have every opportunity to compete, invest and succeed.

34:14 - 34:29

Speaker 33

My Lords, isn't it the case that we had 14 years of no action by the last Tory government? And it's taken this government a few months to get a plan together that's credible. Isn't it a bit ironic that a party that did nothing for 14 years should criticize us?

34:29 - 34:55

Sonny Liang

Well, I thank my noble friend for that. Firstly, let me say this again. A strong steel sector is essential for our economic growth, national security and for supporting the highly skilled jobs right across the country. So in March, we published the UK's first ever steel strategy, a long-term plan to stabilize and rebuild the sector, attract new investment and position the UK as a world leader in clean, modern steel production.

34:55 - 35:58

David Hunt

My Lords, our national debt has now exceeded three trillion pounds. And whilst this is happening, as the noble Lord, Lord Fox pointed out, the government have spent, on his own admission, 671 million pounds of taxpayers' money on British Steel. Yet there is still no credible published plan to make the company financially sustainable.

Would he please answer my noble friend Lord Lamont's question? Because the government have imposed a 50% tariff above sharply reduced steel quotas, putting jobs in our downstream steel-using industries at risk. So my question is simply this: when will the government finally produce a serious, costed plan for British Steel that protects both the taxpayer and jobs across the whole steel supply chain?

35:58 - 36:39

Sonny Liang

Well, first let me correct the noble lord. The government has actually provided 751 million pounds since April 2025 in working capital to support British Steel. And this funding has allowed British Steel to continue its operations right across its sites and maintain steel production and supplies to customers. And I said earlier, we've appointed Alan Lovell as chair, and I'm sure the noble lord will agree that Alan Lovell, together with his board of directors, who are known for their turnaround specialism, will produce a plan in due course, and hopefully that will address the noble lord's position.

36:39 - 37:08

Natalie Bennett

The UK exports 8 million tons of scrap steel every year. That's about 75% of the scrap steel generated in the country. Most of that is going to countries with far lower environmental standards than us. Does the noble lord the minister agree with me that that figure should be reduced to zero as much as possible for many reasons in terms of jobs, environment, and ensuring that we have the steel we need?

37:08 - 37:41

Sonny Liang

Well, look, let me address the point straight on. I mean, we have to reconcile the need to maintain primary steelmaking at the same time maintaining our net zero commitment. So the move to cleaner steelmaking presents a significant opportunity for British industries. But it must be commercially realistic and protect our strategic capabilities. So we want Britain to remain a steelmaking nation, producing the steel needed for our infrastructure, manufacturing, and clean energy in the future.

37:41 - 38:08

Speaker 37

Correct the record from the noble lord opposite, who suggested the Conservative Party did very little to help the steel industry. In fact, we put 500 million into the Port Talbot steelworks to enabling it to therefore transition to an electric arc furnace. And I'd like to correct the Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle as well to say that that electric arc furnace will reuse steel that's already secondhand steel, if you like, in order to preserve the steel industry for this country.

38:08 - 38:32

Sonny Liang

Well, I don't think I said that the Conservative have not supported British Steel. I did not say that. What I said, what I said was we've published our first-ever steel strategy, giving a long-term plan to stabilize and rebuild the sector so that we can attract inward investment and position the UK as a world leader in clean, modern steel production.

38:32 - 38:47

Speaker 36

Fourth oral question, Lord Redwood. No, no, Baroness Hayman. Sorry, I've said the wrong name. My lord, may I beg leave to ask the question standing in my name on the order paper?

38:47 - 39:57

David Pitt

My lords, the VAT retail export scheme, known as tax-free shopping, was withdrawn in 2021. The announcement of that withdrawal was made by Kemi Badenoch. The OBR estimated that the 2021 withdrawal, which was from non-EU citizens, would save the taxpayers 540 million pounds. However, a policy that was compliant with World Trade Organization rules would apply to EU citizens as well and be much more expensive. So it seems to me extraordinary that Mrs. Badenoch has not confirmed the reintroduction of this policy, but she hasn't told us how it's going to be funded.

Should any members of the party opposite know the answer to that question, I'd be most interested.

39:57 - 41:17

Speaker 36

Thank you, the Minister, for his answer. I think I should note that actually it was Rishi Sunak who scrapped the scheme. But the OBR estimate of 500 million a year is actually not agreed by many of the organizations and businesses who benefit from it. So will the Minister review the evidence, since many do not agree with the numbers, and consider a digital retail export scheme modeled on Germany and Italy, in which private operators refund and thus reduce administration costs to the government, because that was one of the reasons why the scheme was scrapped, because the government estimated that it was too expensive bureaucratically. And before Lord Watts says anything, yes, it was the Conservative Party who scrapped the scheme, but on the other hand, I think to myself, isn't this an irresistible opportunity for the Labour government to reverse something that would create jobs and growth in this country.

41:17 - 42:27

David Pitt

I'd like to thank the noble Baroness. In fact, the Conservative Party, you'll remember, did reintroduce this scheme in the Liz Truss mini-budget. It was withdrawn six weeks later by Jeremy Hunt when he became Chancellor, and when he withdrew it, he suggested that it would that that saved the taxpayer 2 billion pounds a year. Again, I would ask if there's anyone on the benches opposite that can tell me where that 2 billion is going to come from. As to the evidence that this would be tax-raising, there are some reports, I accept that from the noble Baroness, but the Oxford Economics report, of course, was commissioned by the Association of International Retail, and the Centre for Economics and Business Research by Global Blue, which is a company which provides VAT refund services.

42:27 - 43:35

Speaker 39

If we're going to have evidence-based policy, I think the numbers I've been quoting to you are rather better than ones that might be in danger of being policy-based evidence. It is worth pointing out that the VAT retail export scheme is the norm in the EU, and it was drawn here in the wake of Brexit. That loss has particularly affected the creative industries, including craft and fashion, as the British Fashion Council points out. So to take the wider view, will the creative industries be under particular discussion at the EU-UK summit on November the 20th. Look, I'm absolutely sure they will, but if I can be clear about the evidence here, if we look at the difference in spend by foreign visitors in the UK from 2019 to 2024 in the major EU countries and in the UK, there is no evidence that the withdrawal of this scheme has been negative.

43:35 - 43:52

David Pitt

Britain's actually a little bit above the average. It's not statistically significant because it's only five countries, but I really don't think that there is evidence that the withdrawal of this scheme has done great damage and it is at some cost.

43:52 - 44:58

Susan Kramer

My Lords, the Minister is someone who understands calculation. Now my understanding is that the Treasury and the OBR have not calculated the lost revenue from the higher visitor activity in the UK that would have resulted had this scheme not been withdrawn, have not calculated the potential revenue from the spend that those additional visitors would have led to revenue to the Treasury from those additional visitors, and that that number according to the industry is roughly two billion pounds a year. Now will he go back and try and understand why the OBR and Treasury do not include those calculations when they assert that they are saving money by scrapping the scheme, but it looks to everybody that at the worst it would be a wash and that if the industry is indeed even vaguely correct that Treasury is actually losing money this way?

44:58 - 46:02

David Pitt

So let me reassure the noble baroness that the 540 million pound figure that I gave, which is a Treasury figure, fully includes all the knock-on systematic effects. I can assure the noble baroness that the 540 million pounds includes all the knock-on effects of the introduction of the tax-free shopping scheme for non-EU citizens. The two billion pounds quote that I've given you, that if you remember was from Jeremy Hunt after Liz Truss's disastrous mini-budget. I can't tell you how that number was calculated because in the Liz Truss budget the OBR was not consulted.

46:02 - 46:42

Speaker 41

My Lords, I hear what my noble friend says and I certainly don't have any answers, and I remind noble Lords of my register of members' interests. However, it is the case, I know, that many visitors from far away overseas who used to come and spend say five or six days in this country, visit lots of wonderful attractions, do a lot of shopping and then go home, now come here for say three days, visit some attractions and they go to Paris, Milan and other places to do their shopping. Therefore, I would ask my noble friend to perhaps look again at this at some stage.

46:42 - 47:36

David Pitt

So if I can come back on that. I mean, I think we all understand that visitors can still reclaim VAT for purchases. They just need to have them shipped directly. And of course if they're shipped directly then they're caught by customs in the country to which they're shipped. But let me be clear about some of the statistics.

This is the 2019 to 2024 statistics. UK tourism receipts recovered to 111% of their 2019 levels after adjusting for inflation. In France 107%, in Italy 103%, 83% in Germany and only beaten by Spain for 117%. So the notion that there were loads of people who were coming here who are not coming here now is difficult to stand up on the evidence, I think.

47:36 - 48:07

Speaker 40

My Lords, I declare an interest in that my wife works for a British fashion house. My Lords, lost sales equals lost jobs. And one of the areas that hit hardest in the rising NEETs situation is retail and hospitality. So what is the government doing to improve sales in these areas and get young people back into retail jobs?

48:07 - 48:51

David Pitt

So, look, I think there's a number of things for the broader retail industry. I mean, in particular, I would note the new deal on business rates support. Retail and hospitality saving nearly a billion pounds a year covering 750,000 properties and the government continuing to review the wider business rate system. But of course if there is to be any change to that we need to wait for the budget.

48:51 - 49:04

Speaker 42

Private Notice Question on the Russian shadow fleet, Baroness Goldie.

49:04 - 49:24

Annabel Goldie

My Lords, I beg leave to ask a question of which I have given private notice. The question is as follows: to ask His Majesty's government what assessment they have made of the Russian shadow fleet vessel Leruo not being intercepted and the potential implications of this for Russia's ongoing invasion of Ukraine.

49:24 - 50:01

Speaker 43

Well, I thank the noble lady for that question. I'm not going to make specific comment I'm afraid on operational decisions or assessments as I'm sure the noble lady understands as to do so would only really benefit Russia. Any UK action to intercept Russian shadow fleet vessels is subject and would be subject in the future to strict legal procedures and comply with both domestic and international law. Potential targets are subject to assessment by law enforcement, military and energy specialists and of course we keep policy under review.

50:01 - 50:45

Annabel Goldie

My Lords, this country can be proud of the unstinting support given to President Zelenskyy and Ukraine by successive governments against the appalling illegal invasion by Putin. And part of that support includes a robust framework of sanctions against Russia and Russian associates. My Lords, sanctions without enforcement is weakness. And Putin like any bully exploits weakness, but he is afraid of strength. May I ask the noble lord the minister how does it indicate strength to look hesitant in enforcing our sanctions regime and will other potentially sanction-breaking vessels traversing our waters also be spared interdiction?

50:45 - 51:25

Speaker 43

Well, the noble lady's absolutely right to point out that it is a consistent policy and I would proudly say world-leading policy of support for Ukraine across different governments, across the last Conservative government and the previous Labour Prime Minister and the current Labour Prime Minister as well. It is a consistent policy which we should both maintain and be proud of. And the noble lady's also absolutely right that strength is important. And I'm slightly surprised to suggest that the UK in the noble lady's view has a reputation for weakness. I think that the UK is world-leading, it is acknowledged by friend and foe alike to be world-leading in the breadth, strength and seriousness of the support it offers.

51:25 - 51:25

Speaker 44

We have the Smertos currently detained by the Secretary of State for Transport under transport sanctions powers. It's easy to look at individual cases and say why don't we repeat it. I can assure the noble lady and the House that there is serious legal, operational, diplomatic and other concerns that go into the decision about interdiction and interception. But the idea that the UK is not leading with a broad-ranging, credible, strong policy on sanctions and cracking down on the shadow fleet vessels is not true.

And since 2024 we have challenged over 700 suspected shadow fleet vehicles.

51:55 - 52:25

Dominic Hubbard

My Lords, the, when we're dealing with this situation, we're surely talking about making sure that we make the, we affect Russia's capacity to keep waging this war. And can the government give us some assurance that their attitude towards the shadow fleet and inspection and possibly inspection and boarding is something that actually works in there? And could he tell us exactly how he sees that happening now?

52:25 - 53:25

Speaker 44

Well, the noble Lord is right that the, that the real test of the serious action that is taken is whether it changes the calculus and makes an impact. And I'm, it's clear that Western sanctions have denied Russia access, the estimate is to about $500 billion since February 2022. Russian's economy is stagnating. Russia slashed its economic forecast this year, growth forecast from 1.3% to 0.4%. It halved its forecast for 2027.

And it's estimated to be paying something like a 40 to 60% premium for imports for sanctioned goods. Now, sanctions obviously has been going on long much longer than the regime for cracking down on the shadow fleet. But we are galvanizing a, a group of countries who are taking this, this part of the sanctions action very seriously. And there is strong evidence, as I say, that it is actually having an impact on Russia's capacity to wage war.

53:25 - 53:38

Speaker 47

My Lords, no one country can deal with the Russian shadow fleet on their own. Could I ask the Minister whether there are any particular plans to work more closely with Germany on dealing with that problem? Work more closely with Germany on dealing with the shadow fleet.

53:38 - 54:16

Speaker 44

It is absolutely part of our, our approach to work in partnership as it has been on the sanctions piece as a whole, as it has been on assembling a coalition of the willing for support for Ukraine, as it has been assembling a coalition of countries to think ahead to what will be required to sustain the peace. It's an issue that has come up both in the Prime Minister's visit to Berlin recently. I had the pleasure of meeting the Chancellor, German Chancellor myself at the Berlin Process event in Montenegro where this issue was also discussed. So there is absolute partnership not just with Germany but with most of our European allies.

54:16 - 54:51

Speaker 52

My Lords, I would agree that the government has an, an excellent track record on sanctions implementation as did the previous government. And but while we're talking about Russian shipping, today's news that the Black Sea is becoming more murderous than even the Strait of Hormuz for Ukrainian ships and others transiting to Ukraine. Um, are we in discussion with the Ukrainian government about whether there's anything we can do to help tackle this latest manifestation of the Russians constantly changing their tactics to pile further pressure on Ukraine?

54:51 - 55:16

Speaker 44

Excuse me. Excuse me. Well, the noble Lord puts his finger on an, a very important issue which is that the response of the United Kingdom and other allies to the Russian challenge in Ukraine has to change with the methods and tactics that vary on the part of the Russians. Again, the, the Black Sea issue is something I discussed with my Bulgarian counterpart at this Berlin Process meeting. It's something that is of widespread concern.

55:16 - 55:40

Speaker 43

We are indeed in discussions with the Ukrainians. And as noble Lords will know, this is an issue not just about security of maritime transport but about grain supply for the rest of the world. So it's a humanitarian global issue as well as a regional security issue. And I can assure the noble Lord we are absolutely focused on trying to, um, get allies to provide the support that is relevant for this challenge.

55:40 - 55:51

Stephen Benn

My Lords, um, speaking of Russia's ongoing invasion of Ukraine, can my noble friend tell the House whether the government have reached a view as to who was responsible for the decision effectively to deny to Ukraine the use of Starlink Starburst resources on which they depend so heavily for their defense?

55:51 - 56:14

Speaker 43

Well, I thank my noble friend for that question. Let me quote what the Defense Secretary said on 15th of October, which was he was quote reassured directly by Secretary Hegseth that the service has been restored and that this is demonstration of the importance of the US contribution on intelligence sharing and our focus is now on ensuring that we together with Washington can provide support for Ukraine together in the future.

56:14 - 56:35

Anne McIntosh

My Lords, the noble Lord will be aware that many of the shadow fleet are potentially substandard vessels. They sail very closely to the Danish coast for onward journeys. How closely are they working with the Danish government to avert a potential environmental tragedy as well as fueling Russia's forces?

56:35 - 57:13

Speaker 43

Yes, the noble lady is right. By the nature of the concept of a shadow fleet, an organization of shipping which doesn't have normal regulation, inspection and processes applied to it, international law seems to have, they're trying to evade international law, that's the whole purpose of the shadow fleet. And that means that issues like standards and possible environmental side effects of substandard vessels is something of concern to all the neighboring countries where this maritime traffic goes through. It is something that we talk to our Baltic colleagues in particular and North European, Scandinavian colleagues about. And yes, it is a focus of our policy.

Thank you.

57:13 - 57:45

George Robertson

I support my noble friend the Minister in denying the accusation that in some way this country is being feeble in its exercise of the sanctions against Russia today. We have been in the forefront of the actions that have been taken against Russia in this regard and in support of Ukraine and that anybody saying to the contrary is simply underestimating the effect that we are having in the Kremlin.

57:45 - 58:32

Speaker 44

Well, my noble friend is right that for those who dislike British policy and those who support British policy, there is usually no doubt that we are a leading figure in the strong opposition we provide. Look, Putin has spent over we think about 14 billion dollars to establish this shadow fleet. We have now specified nearly 650 vessels under the sanctions regime, including over 600 oil tankers. We've sanctioned over three and a half thousand individuals, entities and ships under the regime, over 3,300 of which have been sanctioned since Putin's full-scale invasion. So this is a country that is proudly leading an aggressive but warranted response to Russia's continuing brutal attack on Ukraine and we should be proud of it.

58:32 - 58:51

Alexander David Hugh Hannay

My Lords, is the noble Lord the Minister able to say on the subject of feebleness whether what the effect of the United States unilateral decision to lift sanctions on diesel exports has been so far? Is this having any effect on the market at all?

58:51 - 59:25

Speaker 44

Well, I thank the noble Lord for that question. It is of course early days to look at any effects on the global price. The calculations made at the time, a couple of weeks ago, was that this would have a marginal impact, a negligible impact on global prices. As I've said before and other colleagues and ministers have said before, it's not a choice that we make, it's not a choice we would have made. But our challenge now is to work with the United States because without the United States there can be no long-run solution to a conflict which supports a peaceful, stable Ukraine.

59:25 - 59:44

Speaker 51

Can the Minister assure the House the decision not to intercept this vessel has nothing whatever to do with the policies of the President of the United States or indeed with representations made by the government of the United States?

59:44 - 01:00:07

Speaker 44

Decisions about all interceptions are made using criteria which sadly I'm reluctant to discuss for reasons I said at the beginning because advertising them, discussing them, discussing the complexities of them would only aid the Russians and the Russian war effort. But all decisions are made using these criteria, they are hard decisions, they're complicated decisions, but the criteria are used for all such cases.

01:00:07 - 01:00:35

Speaker 54

My Lords, as the NATO and British authorities have now found more than 500 incidents of Russian fishing vessels having tracked our critical undersea energy and telecommunications infrastructure, could I ask what further thought and actions the government are taking with our allies to provide further deterrence to these unwanted activities?

01:00:35 - 01:01:30

Speaker 44

Well, my noble lord raises a really vital aspect of hybrid warfare and I think it's fair to say anyone who is following both European politics, British politics and national politics across the European continent will know that there has been a very strong galvanized effort in the last two or three months to not just focus on hybrid attacks, including the challenge of undersea cables and the particular dependence we have on certain undersea cables, but also a strong attempt which I'm proud to say the UK is leading on sharing information across countries. President von der Leyen recently talked about the need to develop a Europe-wide capacity on disinformation but also on hybrid threats. We are working closely with our European allies on these things.

01:01:30 - 01:01:38

Speaker 43

My Lords, will the speed work on naval vessels that are in home harbors pending work on them so that we have more naval vessels available to police our seas?

01:01:38 - 01:02:05

Speaker 50

Well, we continue to do the maintenance, repair and support work that we need to do for our fleet.

My Lords, the focus of this question is how we continue to build the international coalition around tackling the Russian shadow fleet. But has the government made any assessment of where Russia might seek to replace the ships that are taken out of commission by these actions may come from so that we can try to prevent Russia from acquiring further ships in future?

01:02:05 - 01:02:36

Speaker 43

Well, my noble friend raises a very important point which is the supply of these often substandard vessels as the noble lady referred to earlier, which will be tomorrow's future shadow fleet. And we are doing a lot of work on that and we're doing a lot of work that cooperates with allies and third-party countries to try and assess that. You'll excuse me if I don't go into details of what that is, but my noble friend's exactly right that this is a forward-thinking way rather than just responding to the challenge day-to-day of trying to tackle this long-term problem.

01:02:36 - 01:03:02

Lucy Neville-Rolfe

The government has rejected my amendments to strengthen penalties for tampering with critical undersea cables, whether by Russian shadow boats or indeed by other operators. So I was very pleased to see the announcement by Ian Murray last week promising such action. But my question is, when will this actually happen?

01:03:02 - 01:03:30

Speaker 43

If I was in charge of parliamentary timetables, I'd be able to give you an exact answer, or whether I would is another question, but I could give you an exact answer. But it is a priority as Ian said in his statement. It's a priority not just because of the fact that the law needs updating, but because of the nature of the threat as the noble lord raised earlier. So it is a priority, I'm happy to provide more details on timing or my colleague will when more details emerge.

01:03:30 - 01:04:26

Speaker 62

My Lords, we seem to have come to the end of questions. This might be a suitable moment for members to leave the chamber if they wish, quietly and speedily please. My Lords, we now come to questions on an answer to an urgent question asked in the House of Commons on Thursday the 22nd of October on the deployment of RAF Typhoon aircraft to defend Saudi Arabia.

01:04:26 - 01:05:04

Annabel Goldie

My Lords, last year the government authorized offensive action against Houthi targets in response to threats to international security. Last week, the minister in the other place indicated that the RAF Typhoon aircraft will operate solely in a defensive role. I beg your pardon. May I ask the noble lady the minister why has the government reversed its position and does such weakness not encourage an escalation in Houthi attacks against Saudi civilian infrastructure with consequential risk to international security?

01:05:04 - 01:06:01

Speaker 57

It's very good to see the noble lady Baroness Goldie back in the chamber, so welcome back. You were referring of course to activities that took place. RAF jets conducted a small number of precision strikes between January and August 2025 alongside US partners, separate actually to the Op Rough Rider larger US campaign. The situation this time is that we are responding to what the Saudi Arabian government has asked us to help with. We are, as you say, providing defensive air support within Saudi Arabia to protect cities, populations, critical national infrastructure.

That frees up capacity for the Saudis to then prosecute their targets that are also there designed to prevent drones and missile attacks. So that is what has been asked for and that is what we have provided.

01:06:01 - 01:06:21

Dominic Hubbard

My Lords, can we just go a little further on that and just ask, can the government give us an assurance that if we have to do any more or commit more resources to this, the capacity under which they are doing will be discussed by both Houses of Parliament before any such before any decision is made?

01:06:21 - 01:07:09

Speaker 57

As the noble lord knows, in terms of how we have been discussing and updating noble lords and those in the other place, you know, the Prime Minister delivered a statement in the other place on the first day back after recess. He set out the strategic case for why the UK is supporting Saudi Arabia and answered dozens of questions on the matter. As you'll also know, the leader of the House of Lords and Lord Privy Seal repeated that statement in this chamber and she also took questions from noble lords. Following adjustment to that support last week, the Defence Secretary laid a written ministerial statement. The Minister for Veterans and People addressed it in the other place on Thursday and I'm delighted to continue to answer questions of your noble lords today.

01:07:09 - 01:07:47

Speaker 58

My Lords, how has the government arrived at arrangements over engagement, rules of engagement, I'm so sorry, over rules of engagement with the Saudis? I'm not asking for what they are, but I want affirmative assurance that they have been agreed.

And will the Saudis be paying financially towards the contribution that we are making?

01:07:47 - 01:08:38

Speaker 57

The noble and gallant Lord asks important questions. In terms of compliance with law, and as he said on specific rules of engagement issues, I can't comment. But we expect all partners receiving UK assistance to comply fully with their obligations under international law, including the protection of civilians. And we will continue to monitor and assess Saudi Arabia as part of our ongoing engagement. And in terms of cost, as apologies, in terms of cost, at the, I can't give him details, give the noble and gallant Lord details at the moment.

I can write to him afterwards, but there is of course the interest that this country has in how activities around the Middle East and destabilisation of the region does then impact costs and other price of living costs here in the UK as well.

01:08:38 - 01:09:35

Speaker 59

My Lords, my Lords, I declare my interest as a long-standing member of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Saudi and recently His Excellence the Ambassador gave us very full briefing of what's going on. And all our sympathies and prayers go out to all those who lost their lives in some of the incidents which occurred, including those who were there purely for pilgrimages. So I welcome the support that our government is providing at the moment on the understanding that we would, of course, our government would review it regularly basis. My question is very simple, which is that noble lady the Minister will know that US is supporting or having discussions with the Houthis at the same time. What discussion, if any, has taken place with our counterparts in the US with regards to our response here?

01:09:35 - 01:10:17

Speaker 57

I thank the noble lady for mentioning the impact that these attacks, these terrible attacks are having on Saudi Arabia. And we, as you know, strongly condemn them, hence our provision of support. And I think in terms of wider diplomatic actions, clearly being led more by the FCDO than by the MOD. But officials on both sides are talking with both allies in the region, but of course our allies in the United States and in other countries that are concerned. That action continues and I can confirm that both the Secretary of State for Defence and the Chief of the Defence Staff spoke to their Saudi counterparts within days.

01:10:17 - 01:10:38

Speaker 60

My Lords, once again, once again, the Iranians are causing havoc and supporting the Houthis. Now, it's heartening that we are supporting Saudi Arabia in this, but surely we can do something here at home and proscribe the Houthis.

01:10:38 - 01:11:09

Speaker 57

So the noble Lord asks me about proscription and proscribing. While we keep the list of proscribed organisations under review, it's the government's long-standing position not to comment on whether or not a specific organisation is being considered for proscription. Decisions to proscribe are taken only after a rigorous process in close consultation with operational partners, based on the best available intelligence and a careful assessment against the statutory test set out in the Terrorism Act 2000.

01:11:09 - 01:11:36

Timothy Kirkhope

My Lords, the alliance between this country and Saudi Arabia is a very important one, and all the training that goes on between our military units is important.

Can the minister comment in the at the moment discussing the deployment of Typhoon fighters, is there anything else in terms of the alliance that we would deploy if necessary to deal with these Iranian-backed terrorists?

01:11:36 - 01:12:35

Speaker 57

The noble lord is right to comment on the long-standing relationship between Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom. Indeed, I have served in the country myself and I'm you know, I was that was more than 20 years ago, so that's how old I am. But so I absolutely take his point. At the moment, what we've agreed to work with the Saudis in provision of is the Typhoons as we've discussed already, also an RAF A400M, which will support movement of defense material within Saudi Arabia. We've already deployed air defense equipment and UK personnel to help protect Saudi Arabia against earlier missile and drone strikes.

And there are, as the noble lord I'm sure will know, there have been military personnel embedded within Saudi Arabia for many years, but there are additional advisors being provided as we see appropriate.

01:12:35 - 01:13:02

George Robertson

My Lords, I register of interest entry, but also to support the minister in the sympathy that she expressed for the Saudi people who are under relentless attack from the from the Houthis. And also to commend the government on the proportionate support and help that it is giving at the moment to Saudi Arabia.

01:13:02 - 01:14:03

Speaker 57

I thank the noble lord Lord Robertson for adding his his thoughts for Saudi Arabia's predicament at the moment. And you know, our priority remains condemn the action of the Houthis, support our Saudi Arabian allies, help to protect the civilians on the ground. And of course, there are British nationals involved and at risk as well. And we're communicating with British civilians in the area and I would encourage any civilians there to ensure that they are registered for alerts. We will continue though, as well as this immediate response to a critical incident, which in many ways demonstrates, I would say this wouldn't I, the way that air power can react so fast to changing and moving situations.

But that there is a longer term need for diplomatic solutions. Military solutions won't mend this. And and those are all areas that have led to the reason that we've provided this support to Saudi Arabia.

01:14:03 - 01:14:24

Magid Magid

My Lords, still in terms of other defense partners with Saudi Arabia, in particular I talk about the MECCA joint defense agreement between Pakistan, Turkey and Saudi Arabia. How does the UK deployment interact and cooperate with that agreement and their deployment to also support Saudi Arabia in its defense?

01:14:24 - 01:14:58

Speaker 57

Well, as the noble lord probably knows, the MECCA countries have discussed and met, Turkey, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. And that that is obviously a completely separate alliance to our own. But our conversations, as I think I mentioned earlier, are with allies in the region, with other allies that are also offering support. There have been reports of both France and Italy offering support, though I can't confirm and it's not my place to what that will be. So the conversations are across different governments, different departments as well, and they will continue as you would expect.

01:14:58 - 01:15:16

Speaker 63

Time is now up for this question. So we now come report of the Cyber Security and Resilience Network and Information Systems Bill, Baroness Lloyd of Effra.

01:15:16 - 01:15:48

Speaker 67

My Lords, I beg to move that this report, oh, do I need to wait for you? I'll wait for people to leave.

01:15:48 - 01:15:53

Speaker 64

My Lords, I beg to move that this report be now received.

01:15:53 - 01:16:05

Speaker 63

The question is that this report be now received. As many as are of that opinion say content. To the contrary not content. The contents have it. Clause 2, amendment 1, Baroness Lloyd of Effra.

01:16:05 - 01:20:42

Feryal Clark

My Lords, I beg to move amendment 1, after which I will also speak to the other amendments in my name. As I said at committee stage, the decision to introduce these amendments has not been taken lightly. This government will act on matters of national security, which is what this package seeks to protect. When vendors with links to third countries with the intent and capability to cause harm put our services and the citizens who use them at risk. Through such vendors, a third country can gain access to or control of critical systems, cause disruption to UK national infrastructure, surveillance through access to data at scale, or espionage through access to sensitive information.

This package of amendments, supported by guidance and a voluntary referral scheme, provides operators and the government with the tools to mitigate these risks. This new power also supports the bill's existing powers of direction, enabling government to act before and after vendors become embedded in supply chains. I want to thank noble Lords for their valuable and productive engagement on this topic since the group of amendments was debated at Grand Committee. I also want to thank my officials and NCSC colleagues for hosting a technical briefing for peers. In response, I have made several updates to the amendments.

At committee stage, it was raised that the drafting referred to the Secretary of State and the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster. This was purely to recognize that a Crown Minister is not a Secretary of State, should they ever need to exercise the powers. Let me be clear, these powers will sit with the DCMS Secretary of State. The DCMS Select Committee can provide oversight and scrutiny of the use of these powers where appropriate. As such, we have revised the wording of the amendments to remove all reference to the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster.

Concern was also raised for parliamentary oversight in the government's exercise of these powers. After careful consideration, I have limited the procedure for bringing entities into scope of the national security powers. The committee stage amendments enabled these powers to be exercised through the made affirmative procedure in an emergency scenario. The revised drafting removes the ability to use the made affirmative procedure, instead relying on the draft affirmative procedure. This means both Houses must approve any regulations made under these powers before they take effect.

I have also heard noble Lords' representations on behalf of businesses and the importance of involving them in decision-making. And whilst the government does not intend to exercise the power to introduce a mandatory scheme, I understand the reassurance being sought around consultation and oversight. The amendment already requires the Secretary of State to consult in a manner they deem appropriate. But I am willing to go further and commit now to undertaking a public consultation ahead of any consideration to introduce a mandatory referral mechanism. Additionally, I would like to explain one further change I have made to the amendment since committee stage.

The amendments no longer include a statutory duty for regulators or the Secretary of State to notify an entity when they have been brought into scope of the vendor direction power. As part of the review of these powers, it's become clear that the statutory duty is not a helpful addition and could delay mitigation of a national security threat.

In-scope entities will still be informed. Ahead of making regulations to bring entities into scope of the vendor-related powers, the Secretary of State must consult relevant persons in so far as is practicable. This is likely to involve consultation with the regulators and industry groups before bringing forward regulations using the draft affirmative procedure. Once made into law, the government will encourage entities to make use of the non-statutory guidance and voluntary referral route. The Secretary of State must also consult recipients and the vendor before issuing a direction, unless doing so would be contrary to national security.

All of this means it is highly unlikely that an organisation would ever find out they're in scope of the vendor risk management framework by receiving a direction with no prior engagement with government. We intend to consult on the implementation of the wider vendor risk management framework in due course. This will include the criteria for referral and how the mechanism will work in practice. I hope noble Lords will support these amendments. I beg to move.

01:20:42 - 01:20:58

Speaker 63

Amendment proposed, clause 2, page 2, line 13, leave out from "direction" to end of line 15 and insert "in particular circumstances involving a risk to national security interests".

01:20:58 - 01:24:21

Timothy Clement-Jones

My Lords, can I thank the noble Baroness the Minister for setting out the government's revised framework on national security directions, and can I thank her too and her officials for their engagement since committee stage. In grand committee, when 65 government amendments were introduced at the 11th hour, on these benches we made it clear that while we fully recognise the acute geopolitical threats posed by hostile states and compromised supply chains, we could not countenance sweeping executive market interventions devoid of statutory safeguards and judicial oversight. Now, my Lords, I do welcome the genuine concessions the Minister has made following our cross-party discussions, specifically removing the emergency made affirmative procedure so that bringing entities into scope is subject to draft affirmative parliamentary scrutiny. But as set out in our amendments 117, 118, 119, 145, 146, 147 and 167, the government's revised framework still lacks the vital procedural guardrails needed to make these powers safe, workable and, in our view, compliant with the rule of law. Amendment 117 requires national security directions to rest upon a credible evidential base and an assessment of less disruptive alternatives and a strict test of necessity and proportionality.

Under amendment 118, affected suppliers must be given prior notice and a meaningful opportunity to propose risk mitigations before their technology is banned or ripped out, protecting essential services from sudden operational collapse. Crucially, amendments 119 and 146 introduce independent judicial oversight. Where an order imposes enduring or irreversible restrictions, such as stripping equipment out of live infrastructure, it must be authorised by a court with closed material procedures under the Justice and Security Act 2017, ensuring sensitive intelligence can be scrutinised safely. Furthermore, amendment 145 guarantees an ongoing right of review and renewal, while amendment 147 mandates aggregate parliamentary reporting on the economic and operational impact of these directions.

Under amendment 167, we ensure these safeguards take effect concurrently with the direction powers themselves. And we also strongly support amendment 164 in the names of the noble Viscount Lord Camrose and the noble Lord Lord Markham, creating a transparent register of hostile state actors. My Lords, national security and procedural justice are not opposing forces. An executive power to direct private entities to dismantle digital contracts or hardware backed by severe financial penalties and non-disclosure gagging orders is an extraordinary power. It will only command confidence and withstand legal challenge if it's anchored in objective criteria and independent judicial scrutiny.

And I do urge the Minister to incorporate these essential safeguards.

01:24:21 - 01:26:34

Speaker 70

My Lords, I too thank the noble lady the Minister for reintroducing this group of amendments and kicking off what I've no doubt will be a productive report stage. I will be brief, both in this and future amendments that I, future groups that I speak to, because I feel we've already debated many of these topics at length at committee stage. We do appreciate the intent to allow more flexibility to address cyber security concerns, and I am grateful for the reassurances that the Minister gave the House both at committee and since, particularly regarding the limited scope of the mandatory referral scheme. Therefore, we do not oppose these amendments. That being said, I do recognize the concerns raised just now by the noble Lord Lord Clement-Jones.

It is of course right that suppliers should be given notice, should the situation allow it, and the use of the powers should be both overseen and scrutinized, again where possible. I hope the noble Baroness the Minister will confirm that there are mechanisms for these concerns already in place come the implementation of the new regime. My Lords, turning to amendment 164 in my name and the names of my noble friend Lord Markham and the noble Lord Lord Alton of Liverpool. My Lords, we still consider the registration, monitoring, and management of foreign powers a central concern regarding cyber security. I won't revisit at length the arguments so clearly set out by my noble friend Lord Markham at committee stage, but I will once again note that foreign states are responsible for three quarters of attacks on our critical national infrastructure.

There is still an information gap regarding foreign threats, and this amendment would bring that much-needed transparency. For the avoidance of doubt, this would not require the publication of sources, substance, or method. Parliament would know simply that a designation had occurred and a subsequent review undertaken. I believe this matter to be of pressing importance, and therefore when amendment 164 is called, we will seek to test the opinion of the House.

01:26:34 - 01:31:50

David Alton

My Lords, I'd like to join with the noble Lord Viscount Camrose and the noble Lord Lord Markham. I have, as has been indicated, signed their amendment, but I echo also what the noble Lord Lord Clement-Jones has said about the way in which the Minister has gone about dealing with this bill. And I won't be speaking on other groups of amendments, you'll be glad to know, other than one. And that gave me a very good insight into the way that the noble Baroness Baroness Wade goes about things. We had three separate meetings in the course of the recess.

She's been exemplary, I think, in the way that she has tried to deal with the arguments and with members of your Lordship's House, and I just want to put on record my gratitude to her for that. So why am I signing this amendment number 164?

Well, part four of the bill rightly equips the Secretary of State with formidable powers to issue directions in the interests of national security. Yet, as the bill currently stands, those powers risk operating in a strategic vacuum. If we're to empower ministers to intervene decisively to protect our essential services and our critical supply chains, that intervention must be anchored to an objective, statutory assessment of who actually threatens us. We cannot defend what we value against an adversary whom we refuse to formally identify. So, this amendment 164 provides that essential statutory spine by establishing a clear, maintained register of foreign powers that pose an acute risk to our critical network and information systems, something that I think came home to us last week when so many of our systems nationally were attacked.

We don't necessarily know by whom, but we have can no doubt guess. We certainly know that in the past, everything from the National Health Service onward have been subjected to attacks, in that case by the regime in North Korea. Critically, my Lords, this is not a political blacklist, though. It's not subject to diplomatic whim. It's an intelligence-led mechanism rooted in the hard objective assessments of GCHQ.

Where our intelligence agencies have confirmed that a foreign state or its proxies has perpetrated attacks against our essential services within the last seven years, or where they issue clear warnings of imminent peril, then that state must be listed. That definition must be clear-eyed about modern authoritarian governance. In the People's Republic of China, for instance, the state, the military, and the Chinese Communist Party are inextricably fused. To assess state-backed cyber threats while ignoring the governing political party that directs them would be willful blindness. So this amendment closes that semantic loophole once and for all.

And furthermore, my Lords, amendment 164 demands that we confront our own domestic vulnerabilities. It requires the Secretary of State to review not merely attacks launched from across oceans, but the profound risks inherent in foreign-owned or foreign-controlled infrastructure situated on our own soil. For far too long, across successive administrations, our critical national infrastructure has been treated with commercial naivety rather than strategic discipline. By requiring the government to conduct this review and lay a coherent action plan before Parliament within six months, this amendment ends the era of bureaucratic drift. Let me end, my Lords, by referring to the inquiry that I chaired on behalf of the Joint Committee on Human Rights.

It was an inquiry into transnational repression. And I think that our domestic policies' failure is illustrated by the reluctance of the government to act on the recommendation that the committee made unanimously, that the People's Republic of China, which we found to be the state that was the most responsible for transnational repression in the United Kingdom, even more than Russia or Iran, but we have failed, unlike those two other countries, to place the People's Republic of China in the Foreign Influence Registration Scheme's top tier. And I'd be grateful when the noble Baroness comes to reply if she is able to give us any information about whether Mr. Dan Jarvis, who's responsible for security issues, who promised to continue to keep this issue under review, has done anything further to be able to act on our committee's recommendations and also the concerns that were raised by the Intelligence and Security Committee and which the noble Lord, Lord Beamish, has often spoken about in your Lordships' House. So, my Lords, strategic ambiguity, which is what I think has been the order of the day, doesn't deter authoritarian regimes. It merely invites opportunistic aggression.

If we're serious about building genuine national cyber resilience, we must replace vague administrative discretion with an empirical, transparent, and accountable framework. And I urge the government to embrace this vital measure and to accept amendment 164 in the names of the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, and the noble Lord, Lord Markham.

01:31:50 - 01:38:37

Feryal Clark

I'd like to thank the noble lords for their interventions and constructive debate on this group. Let me start by addressing the amendments from the noble Lord Lord Clement-Jones and the assurance sought by the noble Viscount Lord Camrose. On the question of safeguards and guardrails, I would say the noble Lord and I are coming from the same place. The vendor-related amendments I have tabled have clear statutory tests. The Secretary of State can only give a direction if two conditions are met.

First, they must consider that a risk to national security arises or could arise from operators' use of vendors' goods, services, or facilities. And second, the direction is necessary and its requirements are proportionate. The Secretary of State must consider whether other less excessive measures would address the risk. Other regimes work the same way. We have designed the framework so that risks are managed early through non-statutory guidance and voluntary referral routes.

We want to avoid, so far as is possible, costly interventions such as replacing embedded vendors. On the question of notices and representations, I agree that operators and vendors should have a say before a direction is given. That's why my amendments require the Secretary of State to consult both the operator and the vendor before giving a direction, unless doing so would be contrary to national security. I do not think a fixed period for representations in primary legislation is the right approach. Instead, my amendments include a delegated power for the Secretary of State to set statutory timelines in secondary legislation for deciding whether to give a direction.

Under this approach, we must consult operators, vendors, and all other stakeholders on what those timelines should be before regulations are made. And it gives us the flexibility to amend the timelines through secondary legislation should we assess this is necessary. On judicial authorization, I must be clear: the government cannot accept a requirement for a court to authorize a direction before it is given. These are national security judgments informed by advice from the intelligence community. They are rightly made by the Secretary of State who is accountable to Parliament.

That does not mean there is no judicial oversight. Operators and in most cases vendors will be able to challenge directions and enforcement decisions by judicial review in the High Court. On review and renewal, I understand the noble Lord wants directions to expire after a fixed period. I do not think this is wise. A direction must be necessary and proportionate when it is given, and the same applies when it is varied.

But businesses also need certainty and not frequent reviews. This approach follows established precedent under the Telecoms Security Act 2021 and the National Security and Investment Act 2021. The requirements on what a direction must contain also limit its scope. In practice, this means directions are likely to be tied to specific procurement decisions and mitigations, not ongoing reporting requirements. And on reporting, I agree that Parliament should be able to see how these powers are used.

I am proposing that the Secretary of State must lay an annual report before Parliament setting out how the powers have been used. The Secretary of State must also publish a notice when the direction is given, varied, or revoked, unless this would unreasonably harm national security or commercial interests. This follows the National Security and Investment Act model. For these reasons, I hope the noble Lord and the noble Viscount will feel reassured that the safeguards they seek are built into this framework and that the noble Lord will not press his amendments.

Turning to amendment 164, let me be clear: this government is serious about protecting our essential services from hostile states. It is a central tenet of this bill and the amendments I have tabled to tabled. But I disagree with the noble Viscount Lord Camrose that a register of foreign powers aids us in that objective. Indeed, this House had this debate during the passage of the Telecoms Security Act when it was agreed that a country-specific approach is not appropriate. A register can create false certainty.

National security threats do not come solely or consistently from a fixed group of foreign powers. For example, a company acting with hostile intent may have close ties to a hostile state while being registered elsewhere. Hostile actors evolve and adapt, so we must focus on identifying and mitigating the risk itself, rather than maintaining a list of countries. Our assessment of risk will always be led by expert security advice and it should not be constrained by an arbitrary list. However, I understand the important points made on clarity and information of where our threats are coming from.

And the NCSC annual report highlights the risks posed by foreign actors and we work with NCSC to mitigate those risks. The report clearly articulates the cyber effects from Russia, China, Iran and North Korea as well as cyber criminals, which I hope addresses the point raised by the noble Lord Lord Alton. And I also take the noble Viscount's point about providing information and the noble Lord Lord Clement-Jones' point about addressing the information gap and providing businesses with information. That is exactly why the vendor risk framework will be underscored by guidance. This will support businesses to conduct an informed risk assessment of their supply chains rather than cutting out countries on a list.

Doing so would have economic impacts without actually addressing the national security risks, the worst of both worlds. There is and always has been a delicate balance between national security and economic and diplomatic cooperation. An arbitrary list cuts across this. A case-by-case risk assessment using guidance and based on expert security advice is the only sensible way to do this. To address Lord Alton's, the noble Lord Lord Alton's direct question to me about further deliberations by the government on his committee's report, I will need to write to him with an update on that following this debate.

I am grateful to noble Lords for this debate. I believe we share the same aims: decisions about vendors should be evidence-based and proportionate and they should be open to proper scrutiny. I hope I have provided reassurance that the vendor risk management framework provides these safeguards through its statutory tests, the duty to consult, judicial review and reporting to Parliament. I beg to move.

01:38:37 - 01:38:51

Speaker 24

The question is that amendment 1 be agreed to. As many as of that opinion will say content. The contrary not content. The contents have it. In clause 9, amendment 2, Lord Clement-Jones.

01:38:51 - 01:42:34

Timothy Clement-Jones

My Lords, I rise to move amendment 2 standing in my name and in doing so to open the debate on this group addressing quite a wide range of issues: regulatory scope, implementation machinery, workforce capability and corporate governance across the bill. Amendment 2 tackles a vital question of regulatory proportionality, the definition of a managed service under clause 9. On these benches, we fully support bringing managed service providers, MSPs, into the NIS regime. Third-party IT suppliers frequently hold deep interconnected access into critical networks, making them prime vectors for supply chain contagion.

But as clause 9 is currently drafted, the definition remains a regulatory dragnet. Amendment 2 provides a clear pro-enterprise statutory boundary, and I made the case for it on Grand Committee, and I will not repeat the case here. But to blur the lines risks swamping the Information Commissioner with compliance paperwork while diverting supervision from genuine systematic vulnerabilities. I also welcome amendment 3 from the noble Lord Ravenstale and amendment 62 from the noble Baronesses Lady Morgan and Lady Kidron, ensuring that size alone is not treated as an arbitrary proxy for risk. We must not fall into the false sense of security of the amendment the noble Baroness Morgan secured on the Online Safety Bill.

Turning to the implementation amendments in this group, effective resilience requires far more than statutory assertion. It requires capability and accountability. On the workforce deficit, I pay tribute to the advocacy of my noble friend Baroness Northover on amendment 64, 81, and 107 in the form in which they were tabled in Grand Committee and now retabled alongside my own amendment 105. Over 50% of cyber professionals cite skills shortages as their greatest hurdle to compliance. Regulation needs competence.

These amendments mandate that covered entities place primary system responsibility in the hands of accredited professionals registered with UK Cyber Security Council and properly define an independent skilled person under clause 43. I also commend my noble friend Baroness Northover's amendment 90, establishing a free digital safety net for SMEs, as well as her amendment 84, which requires the Secretary of State's review to assess duplication and divergence with EU NIS2 requirements for UK businesses trading across borders. On corporate governance, amendment 69 from the noble Baroness Lady Morgan of Cotes, supported by my noble friend Baroness Ludford, is indispensable. On future-proofing and statutory review, I welcome the government's amendment 82, which concedes our committee arguments by reducing the clause 40 review period from five years to three years. But in a threat landscape moving at machine speed, three years, my Lords, is still a long time.

Amendment 83 in my name and that of the noble Lord Holmes tests whether the government will commit to a two-year review cycle, while the noble Lord Lord Ravenstale rightly embeds post-quantum cryptography migration timelines under amendments 58 to 60. My Lords, this group gives the bill both its proper boundaries and its operational teeth. I beg to move amendment 2.

01:42:34 - 01:42:44

Speaker 24

Amendment proposed, clause 9, page 9, line 20, at end, insert the words as printed on the marshalled list.

01:42:44 - 01:47:06

Speaker 72

My Lords, I'm a chief engineer working for AtkinsRéalis, and start with my amendment 3. My Lords, very briefly on this amendment, the central problem here remains that if I'm a small or mid-sized firm, an SME, I can't currently tell with any confidence whether I'm in the scope of this bill as a critical supplier. And my Lords, that uncertainty does create a cost because firms delay investments, firms can over-prepare, or even walk away from public service contracts altogether because they don't want to fall within the scope of this legislation. And I would go back, my Lords, to the impact assessment, which could not say how many SMEs would be designated within the powers of this bill.

So, my Lords, I would simply ask the Minister as to whether she can provide any further clarity on SMEs, on critical supplies, and who exactly will be within the scope of this bill, because that would be tremendously helpful for all of those small and medium-sized businesses out there who are concerned about whether they will fall within the scope of the bill. My Lords, I'll come on to my other amendments 58, 59 and 60, which all relate to quantum computing, quantum cryptography. Now, my Lords, noble Lords have quite rightly focused on AI within the scope of this bill. That is the zeitgeist, the issue of the moment. But AI doesn't fundamentally change the rules of the game in terms of protection of our information, but quantum computing fundamentally does change the rules of the game.

We're talking about a technology that can potentially break the public key crypto that we rely on across financial services, across energy, across telecommunications. And, my Lords, this is a technology that really is advancing tremendously quickly. I brought up the case in the example in committee of the Willow chip that Google have produced. Industry are now analyzing or have come up with a fully compiled end-to-end resource estimate for a 20,000 qubit system. Now, that's the class of system that can really break the 256-bit encryption that we use across many of our services.

And, my Lords, we look across this more broadly in terms of what organizations, in terms of what governments are doing. So Google is now saying that by 2029 they are going to complete transition to post-quantum crypto. And in fact, the USA earlier this year brought forward an executive order that brings forward their federal migration timeline by four to five years. So that was from a previous 2035 target to now a 2030 target. So, my Lords, this really indicates from all of those organizations who are cited on how fast this technology is advancing, the case for action.

Now, the Minister will point to the NCSC and the timescales we have published within the UK. But there is a very good opportunity within this bill, or within the guidance to this bill, to ensure, firstly, that regulators are aligned, they're aligned in the approach they're taking on post-quantum crypto, but secondly, that the priority of post-quantum crypto migration is set out within this bill. So really, my Lords, I'm after some confidence from the Minister on how it will work towards those objectives within the framework of this bill. My Lords, quantum really is, I believe, the elephant in the room when we're talking about specific technologies, the conversations we've had with AI. So I would welcome some comments from the Minister on how the government and on how the supporting documents within this bill will work towards this objective of really protecting our most sensitive information against these threats.

01:47:06 - 01:49:45

Speaker 73

My Lords, it's a pleasure to take part in this report stage. In doing so, I declare my technology interests as set out in the register as advisor to the Crown Estate and Simmons & Simmons LLP. My Lords, I support all of the measures in this group. They're practical, proportionate, and as a package will make a real difference, not just to the bill, but to all those working in cybersecurity and all of us who they seek to protect.

To quantum first of all, does the minister believe that the current NCSC timetable now still looks right in the face of the threats we're now up against, and indeed the speed of advancement of quantum compute? To the workforce issues that my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones referred to, we know there is a significant, a chronic, a worrying shortage of cyber professionals. Is the government satisfied that the measures within the bill will do everything required to address this? We'll come on to other ways to protect those who seek to keep us safe, who work in cyber, on later amendments, but the workforce question is more than pressing. My Lords, my amendment five in this group goes to the heart of so-called data poisoning.

The bill has much in it to commend it in terms of cyber events, but what about where the data itself has been interfered with, has been poisoned, and there's no reporting requirements on the face of the bill? So if there's an interruption in service, that is critical, and we've seen plenty of those sadly in recent history. But what about situations, circumstances where there's no interruption in service, but the data itself has been corrupted, manipulated, poisoned? So imagine those who seek to work or invest in financial markets, those who seek to work in education or health, or indeed any sector of our society or economy. If they can't rely on the data which is being presented to them because data poisoning is not set out on the face of the bill, then is that not as serious, perhaps in some ways more serious than the more obvious circumstances when there is a break, a breach, or interruption in the service itself?

01:49:45 - 01:49:48

Speaker 74

I look forward to the minister's response.

01:49:48 - 01:50:50

Morgan

My Lords, I want to speak to amendment 62 and 69 which I've tabled in this group, and also to amendment 78 to which I've added my name. I think the noble Lord Lord Clement-Jones is quite right to say this is quite a disparate group, but I think that just shows how complicated the issues are in this bill, also how fast-moving this area is, which the minister will know extremely well. And I would like to thank the noble lady the minister for her engagement on these amendments and the conversations that we have had. If I start with amendment 62, which is about not just being guided by the size of a provider, but really the risk that it presents. I move this, this reflects an amendment that was discussed at committee stage, and I moved it to clause 29 at the suggestion really of the minister because she pointed me to that clause.

01:50:50 - 01:54:10

Speaker 76

And actually I hadn't really spotted, but the noble Lord Lord Ravensdale amendment three is perhaps another way of looking at this, which is actually I totally understand the point he's making, which is that SMEs need to know whether they are caught by this bill and similar provisions in the future. But the issue has to be, and it may not be quite as easy as telling them whether in or out, but the issue really has to be when we're talking about cyber security and resilience, about the risk that these services pose to our essential or national infrastructure. Because the reality is, even as we've seen just last week the PHP attack, it might be the smallest element of software that causes some of the greatest harm. And I'm going to return to these issues, amendment 62 and 69 capture, because I don't think any governments have yet actually worked out how to legislate on the basis of the risk posed by these services.

It's exactly the same as Noble Lord Clement-Jones said in the debate we had on the Online Safety Act about categorization of platforms, which is an issue that is not going to go away, we'll return to later on this week. Because actually you can have the smallest platform or service that presents the greatest risk and we have got to work out a way to legislate or pass regulations that reflect this. So the regulations under clauses 29 and 30 could bring in smaller providers, but the power is discretionary, there isn't a risk test, and it comes with no commitment to use it. So I'm interested to hear the Noble Lady Minister's response to that. The government's revised part four does extend national security directions to persons beyond regulated persons regardless of size.

So risk-based reach does therefore exist in the bill, but only for national security and not for wider resilience risks. If I move then on to amendment 69, which is about corporate governance, which might not seem the most exciting of subjects, but this bill is about the regulation of essential activity. And in clause 24, essential activity is defined as activity essential to the economy of the United Kingdom or the day-to-day functioning of society. I don't think you can get much more essential than that. And I think we'll know about it if those activities and services are somehow massively undermined because of a lack of cyber resilience.

And therefore I think it's only right, and again this is an issue that I will return to, I don't intend to necessarily to test the will of the House on this today. But I think it is now impossible for the culture of organizations to change or for senior level accountability to exist, and I've discussed this both with the Noble Lady and also with the AI Minister, without there being board level accountability for the services being provided by the companies those boards are responsible for, and a clear understanding of the risks that those services might provide. Now, I mean the Noble Lady suggested when we spoke that perhaps there could be governance addressed in codes of practice. I'm not sure that goes far enough, but it could be a start, or is a general duty of board oversight sufficient? I'm very happy to discuss this further both with the Noble Lady and with ministerial colleagues, but the government has indicated that it thinks that clause 29 already allows regulators to address governance in codes of practice.

01:54:10 - 01:54:54

Morgan

It won't accept an individual fiduciary duty, but a general duty of board oversight as I say may be acceptable. So I'm interested to hear what the government's position is, but this is going to be relevant for all related tech or cyber resilience legislation. And very briefly let me just talk to amendment 78, which I've added my name. I support the principle that large businesses should report on cyber security and resilience plans. I'm not sure that it goes far enough, but I think it starts the point where actually boards and senior managers take responsibility for what their services are doing.

And I think that it would be a welcome step forward and that's why I've been pleased to add my name. But I would look forward to hearing the Minister's response, Noble Lady, on these issues and I would very much welcome further conversations with her on these because these are issues that are not going to go away.

01:54:54 - 01:58:40

Lindsay Northover

Speak to amendment 64, 81, 84, 90 and 107 in my name. And these are all about the implementation of this legislation, including the standards that are now urgently required as my Noble Friend Lord Clement-Jones laid out. All these amendments came out of the evidence given to us on the National Resilience Select Committee and I thank the various expert organizations for their submissions and subsequent assistance. Given what has emerged in the last week or so, who can doubt the urgency of what they recommend? Amendment 64, 81 and 107 seek to drive up standards in terms of skills and companies being able to rely on skilled people in this complex field.

A great deal of effort needs to be put into ensuring that we have an adequate number of people being suitably trained and registered.

Amendment 64 would ensure that the entities covered in this bill place primary responsibility for their systems in the hands of registered, ethically accountable professionals. Amendment 107 would provide a definition of a skilled person in the context of clause 43. Amendment 81 would require the Secretary of State within a year of this bill becoming an act to make regulations to establish an organisational cyber resilience framework and to recognise professional competence, a professional competence benchmark maintained by the UK Cyber Security Council. The noble lady, the minister, placed great emphasis on the council at committee stage, and this seeks to ensure that it can drive and secure the necessary standards. We need skilled professionals, we need them urgently, and it's vital that they are properly accredited and regulated.

Amendment 84 addresses another area. We were told by experts in the field and businesses that it was important for the UK to align with the EU, and the then relevant minister, Minister Narayan, in the other place, pointed out that the EU was significantly ahead of us while we, as I quote him, lag behind. We need to assist businesses that operate across both the UK and the EU to reduce duplication and divergence. This amendment would require the Secretary of State to assess and report on any duplication with, or more particularly, divergence from the EU network and information security requirements for businesses which operate in both the UK and the EU. Again, on another issue in relation to implementation, there has been considerable concern about the position of SMEs, and this we raised last week in the light of the information that was emerging then.

They are, of course, very important in the supply chain, but we also know that it isn't a matter of if an organisation will undergo a cyber attack, it's when. But that for SMEs suffering such attacks, over 60% can find that this is existential and they can go under. Therefore, amendment 90 would introduce a new clause which would require the Secretary of State to ensure that there is a free cyber security advice and incident response service for relevant small and medium-sized enterprises, and the Secretary of State should report annually to Parliament on its use and effectiveness. All of the provisions in these amendments are designed to strengthen our ability as a country to withstand cyber attacks, and I commend them to the house.

01:58:40 - 02:02:56

Sarah Ludford

My Lords, I just wanted to back up the noble lady, Baroness Morgan of Cotes, in her amendment 69 on board oversight of security and resilience of network and information systems. There was a recent data breach at the retailer ASOS. It reportedly began not with a sophisticated technical exploit, but with someone impersonating a trusted contact to obtain an employee's login credentials. From reporting last year, although there's always coyness about exactly what has happened in these scenarios, I believe that the breach of data at Marks and Spencer happened in a similar way.

And this does seem sort of bit elementary, my dear Watson, that employees have not been sufficiently trained and made aware of the absolute necessity not to fall for scams, especially as, you know, as consumers, we get these warnings all the time. I noticed that just last week, the top regulator in the City of London, the Prudential Regulation Authority, the CEO there, Katherine Braddick, said that the PRA would significantly increase its focus on firms' operational and cyber resilience. And she said that the PRA and the Financial Conduct Authority would consult to clarify our expectations of firms as we develop our experience and understanding. And that, of course, comes in the wake of disruptions and breaches in websites and apps of businesses including Lloyds, HSBC, and Revolut on card payments and cash transfers and so on. So I think the what what I would be looking for, and I think Baroness Jones is looking for from the government, is a bit more of a specific focus on the responsibility of boards.

After all, all the various duties they have under the Companies Acts of promoting the success of the company as a whole, exercising reasonable care, skill, and diligence, and so on, stress the need to maintain a reputation for high-standard business conduct, think of the company's operations on the community, fostering the company's business relationships with suppliers, customers, and others. So, of course, a good board should be doing that anyway. But a statistic that I quoted at committee was how the government's own cyber security breaches survey had revealed that board-level ownership of cyber risk in the UK had actually declined from 38% to just 27% over the last three years. So this issue needs to zoom up the attention, if that's not an awful pun, up the attention of companies and inevitably, of course, the board. So I think we're looking for a little bit more than a rather generalized response from the government, which claims that all this will be dealt with under the security resilience requirement regulations.

It does need to be a lot more targeted on the board, as cyber health is such an important factor in the success of a company these days. I mean, eventually, customers might well pass their verdict on a company which has poor cyber health. Perhaps the government should help avoid that having to be a marketplace solution.

02:02:56 - 02:08:03

Francis Nicholas Markham

Well, I would like to thank all noble Lords for their contribution. And every time it reminds me how fortunate we are in the Lords to have experts such as Lord Ravensdale and Lord Holmes, who can talk to us as well about the next level of threats around the corner and made the points very strongly around quantum. And of course, that we have Lord Clement-Jones here today on his, I think, his 49th birthday, is it? And he's here to join us.

But I would like to actually start by also thanking, adding my thanks to the constructive approach that the noble lady, the minister, has brought to the whole process and the way that she really has listened and engaged and looked to make changes, and that is much appreciated, I know, from myself and all my colleagues as well. And thank her for meeting us at least partway on clause 36 and 40 in terms of the timings of the intervals of the NIS regulations, although I still, you know, this is such a fast-moving environment, I do have some sympathy for Lord Clement-Jones' suggestion that maybe rather than three years it should be two. I'd like to move mainly to my amendment, amendment 78, supported by also in the names of my noble friends Viscount Camrose and Baroness Morgan, and very much similar in intent to Baroness Morgan's amendments and her speech, which is very much looking at companies to encourage accountability on their side and really using the board reporting and annual reporting mechanisms to allow both the board and the shareholders to hold them to account. Because whilst a lot of what we've been talking about today is obviously government moves, actually we all have seen the cyber security disruption in the private sector, and actually making sure that any CEO is, frankly, embarrassed if they haven't, you know, they can't report in their annual report that they have got good plans in place so their own shareholders and board can hold them truly to account, I think has got to be a sensible way ahead. I think also if I move to amendment 160 in my name and Viscount, my noble friend Viscount Camrose, really looking to again see how we can use the information sharing and analysis centers to play their part in it.

These are again voluntary bodies and really trying to be on, cyber security is everyone's job, really, and it's really trying to use not just the government institutions but the wider institutions as well to play their role in cyber security. I'd also like to finish up on my amendment of amendment 162, also in the name of my noble friend Viscount Camrose. And whilst I, as I said earlier, I appreciate the constructive approach taken by the noble baroness, the minister, I must admit I am slightly disappointed that we haven't heard anything on my amendments on data minimization and anonymization. I spoke about it in committee, so I'll be brief, but again, as the health minister at the time, many lords will remember the massive disruption in the summer of '24 to our London hospitals in terms of, you know, the operations and, you know, critical operations being cancelled and the impact that had on the health of the capital. And when I dug into it, I found that actually it was all due to an attack on one of the suppliers of diagnostic tests who had loads of patient data that they never needed to hold in the first place.

All that data could have been anonymized and so there would never have been a target for the company to be attacked in the first place. So of course, always in these things, if you don't create a juicy target for people to attack, then there's nothing, and that's got to be the first rule of cyber security. But I mentioned it then, I've mentioned it all the way through now, I really cannot find anyone in the NHS to really take this issue seriously. It's something that we will return to again in the health bill, because of course the single patient record proposals, whilst again I think are very, very good proposals and I completely support them in terms of patient benefits and patient health, they potentially create an even juicier target for hackers.

And so I think we really need to look at what data are held by the different public and private sector bodies involved in the health service and government institutions and really make sure that they are doing an audit to minimize all the data that they hold so they don't create a target for hackers in the first place. At that I look forward to hearing from the noble baroness the minister.

02:08:03 - 02:21:18

Feryal Clark

I thank noble lords for the constructive debate we've had just now and I heartily concur with Lord Markham not only on his happy returns to the noble Lord Lord Clement-Jones, but to the valuable contributions made by noble lords who brought their expertise, their experience to this wide variety of points today. These amendments all touch on a key point: the bill's potential will not be realized at Royal Assent but through effective implementation and clear measures of success. Let me begin with a key principle: the regulations must be durable and equip regulated entities to respond to any threat or hazard now and in the future. Neither the bill nor its implementation should narrowly focus on specific technologies or risks. These will soon become outdated and would undercut a holistic approach to risk.

Through the security and resilience requirements, or SRRs, we will take this purposeful all-technologies, all-threats, all-hazards approach to protecting regulated services. And as I've set out, these requirements will be introduced in secondary legislation and will be mandatory. We propose they will cover amongst other topics data security, risk management, board governance, and incident response and recovery. We will be consulting on SRR proposals in the coming months and I thank the noble lords who attended the roundtable I hosted on them in Grand Committee. As such, I caution against singling out specific risks like data poisoning, as highlighted by the noble Lord Lord Holmes, as it does not reflect the full risk range of risks that each entity manages.

In respect of incident reporting that the noble lord raised, that is already designed to capture incidents that have a significant impact on the authenticity and integrity of data. So that is already within the scope of the reporting framework. So the SRRs will further touch upon a number of topics raised by noble lords which I will address in turn. On data retention, UK GDPR requires public organizations to implement appropriate measures to ensure the security of personal data. The Information Commissioner regulates the data protection legislation independently of government.

And under the existing NIS framework, service operators can and do assess their data retention. For example, the health sector assesses compliance against a tailored cyber assessment framework objective on using and sharing information appropriately. This includes principles on transparency, using and sharing information and records management. But as a result of the focus on this that noble lords, in particular the noble Lord Lord Markham has brought, I will ensure the SRR proposals in the upcoming consultation cover data underpinning the provision of regulated services and include minimizing unnecessary data collection and retention. Turning to the points on governance raised by the noble baronesses Lady Morgan of Cotes and Lady Ludford, I agree that boards and senior leaders should have clear sight of the cyber security and resilience risks their organizations face and be able to hold people responsible.

The government's cyber governance code of practice sets expectations for formal reporting on a quarterly basis at a minimum, setting suitable metrics to track cyber strategy and agreeing tolerances for risk appetite. Additionally, the UK's corporate reporting framework is undergoing wider modernization efforts. We are seeking views as part of the current consultation on whether the existing risk reporting framework produces sufficient reporting on cyber risk management. If introduced, this would also cover some businesses not in scope of this bill. But we are going further and propose to introduce mandatory SRRs on governance and risk management to the point made by the noble baroness, Lady Morgan of Cotes.

These will ensure clear board-level accountability for risk management arrangements. This includes proposals for boards to establish and oversee their organization's security and resilience framework, alongside requiring skilled and accredited individuals with senior accountability. So whilst I agree with the amendment's objective of strengthening accountability and transparency, I believe the approaches we are developing via this bill and in the modern corporate reporting framework consultation provide a more continuous means of achieving this. Noble lords, turning to the question of skills, I agree that effective governance must be underpinned by the right skills, both at the board level and at management level. We have committed to funding the UK Cyber Security Council over this spending period as it becomes self-sustainable, working closely with stakeholders across both the profession and our wider workforce.

And the SRRs will take this even further. We propose they require skilled and accredited individuals with senior accountability for security and resilience, alongside role-appropriate staff training and relevant up-to-date accreditation. Again, the requirements will be mandatory and regulated entities will be required to maintain evidence demonstrating compliance with these requirements, with the cyber assessment framework as the government-recommended method for assessing cyber security and resilience. On amendments 105 and 107, let me emphasize that a skilled person appointed under part four of the bill is defined, but with intentional flexibility. A skilled person would be appointed to assist with actions that are necessary to protect the UK's national security.

There is no limit to what threats could emerge to threaten our national security. It is therefore right that we do not restrict our options to mitigate these threats, and that the Secretary of State instead should appoint skilled persons on a case-by-case basis on the expert advice of officials and our intelligence community. On the statement of strategic priorities, let me reassure the noble Lord Lord Ravensdale that our intention is to designate the statement as soon as possible following consultation with regulators and due consideration of Parliament. I expect this to be within a year of commencement. The noble lord makes valuable points around post-quantum cryptography.

The government will shortly publish guidance to support organizations to manage migration to post-quantum cryptography. This reflects the NCSC guidance on quantum and deadlines for migration. Later this year, we will test this guidance with organizations across the CNI sector. We also have worked with international partners in the G7 to produce a joint call to action statement. I intend for the statement of strategic priorities to address risks posed by emerging technologies.

This could include quantum to drive consistency between regulators. We will consult the regulators to identify risks from emerging technology in their sectors.

entities to manage the risks posed to their systems by new technological developments. Turning now to points raised about business support by the noble Baroness Lady Northover. There are a wide range of free tools available to SMEs, including the Cyber Action Toolkit providing tailored cybersecurity advice with NCSC-certified cyber advisors, the Report Phish service which offers free business incident reporting, and regional cyber resilience centers which offer SMEs guidance on incident response and business continuity. These resources are available to all businesses, whether they are regulated under this regime or not. It's worth noting, though, that very few small and micro organizations will be regulated under this bill and benefit from the support service proposed under amendment 90.

But this question of coverage is a key point raised by the noble Baroness Lady Morgan. While we must be mindful of undue burdens on small businesses, I do recognize there is a potential gap where small and micro DSPs and MSPs do not directly provide services to other regulated entities under this regime, but that nonetheless may be critical or risky. That is why I proposed to introduce a mechanism to enable the Information Commissioner to bring individual small and micro DSPs and MSPs into scope where they are high risk. This would be made using the bill's delegated power under clause 29, subject to consultation, and may be similar to the mechanism already in place for OESs. This approach complements the critical supplier measure, which already enables small and micro DSPs and MSPs to be brought into scope.

Any such mechanism would be risk-based, targeted, and developed in consultation with industry and relevant stakeholders. I thank the noble Baroness Lady Morgan for her engagement on this matter, as well as the topic of board oversight, and as these areas are taken forward, I will be more than happy to meet with her to discuss them in more detail. Turning to the amendments from the noble Lord Lord Clement-Jones, I can offer reassurance that my officials have engaged with the Information Commissioner on the definition of an MSP. There are two limiting criteria which must be met for an MSP to be in scope that are particularly relevant in these cases. First, the provider must have access to the network and information systems relied upon by the customer.

Secondly, the service must be provided under a contract for ongoing management for IT systems for that customer. As a result, the types of services the noble Lord raised as a concern, IT consultancies, training providers, software licensing agents, and basic help desks, are not expected to meet both of these characteristics. Turning to amendment 3, let me emphasize that there is a high bar clearly set out in the bill. Only suppliers whose disruption could have a significant impact on the economy or society can be designated. The noble Lord's amendment would limit designation to suppliers posing a systemic risk and prevent designation if a supplier serves only a single regulated entity.

I do not agree with this point. The key consideration should be the impact of disruption rather than the number of regulated entities served. We will consult to the question the noble Lord asked on critical suppliers in 2027. Regulators have already started their necessary analysis and will begin working with the sector next year. Turning to amendment 160 on ISACs that spoken to by the noble Lord Lord Markham, I caution noble Lords against the risk of government intervention in what has usually been a voluntary scheme.

This could undermine trust and their wider benefits. ISAC initiatives already exist and many are supported by public authorities such as the NCSC.

A statutory approach would undermine the success of the existing voluntary scheme and we must be careful not to complicate the regulatory landscape by conferring powers on organisations that are not regulators. Noble Lords, I agree the success of this regime must be closely measured. And I heard Noble Lords' concerns that the five-year reporting cycle was too long and I have tabled an amendment shortening this to three years. I believe this now strikes an appropriate balance between ensuring the report is both meaningful and timely. On amendment 84 tabled by the Noble Baroness Lady Northover, I disagree that placing this stringent requirement on the report in the bill will help us assess the effectiveness of this regime, largely because each EU member state has implemented the NIS 2 directive in a different way and so a report would not only have to identify and assess the divergence between the UK and the EU, but the divergence within the EU itself.

And finally, let me turn to the three final amendments in this group tabled in my name. The first amendment will remove the ability to change the procedure for issuing a code of practice via regulations. Should further changes be required, these would need to be made through primary legislation. The second amendment will limit the Secretary of State's power to change the matters to be covered in a report required under clause 40. In short, matters can only be added to, not removed.

This will strike the right balance between preserving transparency and accountability while ensuring the report remains comprehensive as both the regime and cyber security practices develop. With these assurances, I hope Noble Lords will not press their amendments and support the government amendments in this group.

02:21:18 - 02:21:43

Timothy Clement-Jones

My Lords, before the Noble Baroness the Minister sits down and I have to stand up, I wonder if she could just confirm, she's mentioned I think on two occasions in her speech consultation. Is that essentially consultation on the SRRs or is there another form of consultation taking place as well as that consultation, my Lords?

02:21:43 - 02:21:55

Feryal Clark

The consultation I was principally referring to was the consultation on the SRRs. There is a separate mechanism for consultation on the statement of strategic priorities.

02:21:55 - 02:23:24

Timothy Clement-Jones

My Lords, can I thank the Minister for her response. Having listened to the debate, I was more convinced than ever by the amendments from around the House, my Lords, which are all about the implementation of the new regime, my Lords. But I also thank the Minister for her very careful and detailed response to the points that have been made. Can I thank her also and the Noble Lord Markham for their birthday greetings. Not the ideal place to be celebrating, my Lords, but nevertheless needs must, my Lords.

In the ideal world, we would be pressing some of these amendments, my Lords, because it is all about the SRRs. It'll all be alright on the night, don't worry your heads about this, it'll all be contained in the SRRs or in secondary legislation, my Lords, always a rather unsatisfactory position to be in. But the Minister has given quite a lot of assurance today and we've got in the habit of looking at the implementation of bills, particularly digital bills of late, my Lords. So we will be on the case and we will be taking part in the consultations, I've no doubt. So my Lords, for the moment, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment 2.

02:23:24 - 02:23:31

Speaker 24

Is it your Lordships' pleasure that the amendment be withdrawn?

Amendment is by leave withdrawn. Amendment three, Lord Ravensdale.

02:23:31 - 02:23:33

Speaker 83

Not moved.

02:23:33 - 02:23:39

Speaker 82

We come now to the group beginning with amendment four, Baroness Lloyd of Ephra.

02:23:39 - 02:25:56

Feryal Clark

My Lords, I beg to move amendment four, after which I will speak to the other amendments in my name. These amendments all concern small technical changes and corrections in the bill's text, which I hope noble Lords will be content to accept. Turning to amendments 45, 46, 47 and 48, which amend the international sharing of information by NIS regulators. I want to thank, I want to begin by thanking noble Lords, particularly the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, for their time and constructive engagement on the issue of overseas information sharing. I have heard the concerns which noble Lords have expressed about regulators sharing information with overseas authorities where the right to a fair trial is not guaranteed.

While I am reassured that such risks are unlikely to materialize in practice under the bill's information sharing provisions, I want to put that issue beyond any doubt as part of the government's commitment to safeguarding the rule of law and fundamental liberties. That is why these amendments will restrict the overseas sharing of information by NIS regulators to Switzerland, our Five Eyes partners of the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, and countries within the European Economic Area, which consists of EU member states, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. Maintaining these gateways is essential for preserving overseas cooperation against cyber threats. The bill's delegated powers will enable the government to add to or amend the list of permitted countries if this is considered necessary. I can assure noble Lords that changes to this list will be subject to existing safeguards, such as parliamentary approval under the affirmative procedure and consultation requirements.

I remind noble Lords that regulators are under no obligation to share information overseas under this bill, and the bill adds explicit safeguards that information must only be disclosed if it is relevant and proportionate. Nevertheless, information sharing remains an essential part of both the NIS framework and our international cooperation. It's important that we and our regulators can share the best practice and information needed to defeat cyber threats, which have no respect for national borders. I beg to move.

02:25:56 - 02:26:09

Speaker 84

Proposed clause 12, page 13, line 19, leave out paragraph 2b and insert paragraph 2.

02:26:09 - 02:32:12

David Alton

As I said earlier in our proceedings, I want to speak if I may to government amendment 45, and in doing so, I reiterate my thanks to the noble Baroness, Baroness Lloyd of Ephra, for the diligent way in which she has engaged with those who were concerned about data sharing with hostile states. My Lords, this amendment had its origins in another place, where Sir Iain Duncan Smith moved an amendment concerned that data might be shared with countries that don't have a judicial system which would ensure that, for instance, extradition requests would stand up to scrutiny. And particular examples were given of things like the national security law in Hong Kong and how data might be shared that would allow young people who've been involved in pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong to then be removed from the United Kingdom and have to stand trial in a place like Hong Kong. During our proceedings, which I referred to earlier on, on the Joint Committee on Human Rights, we had a remarkable young woman who waived her anonymity to come and give evidence to her, to us. Chloe Chung was just a young teenager when she took part in pro-democracy demonstrations in Hong Kong, and she, like many others under our BNO scheme, came to live and to claim sanctuary in the United Kingdom.

At the age of 19, she was told that a one million Hong Kong dollar bounty would be placed on her head.

She wasn't alone, there were several others including Carmen Lau, who was a legislator in the Hong Kong legislature. And one of their great fears in giving evidence to our committee was that they would be subjected to all sorts of intimidation in the UK, including potential removal in due course. They'd seen the incident that had occurred outside the PRC consulate in Manchester, they were fearful about the new embassy, super embassy being created in London, and all of us who were on that committee, we unanimously signed a report saying that we felt we had to go a lot further in dealing with transnational repression. So, having had its origins in the House of Commons, the amendment was supported by a number of organisations across the non-governmental organisation sector, and in particular, I pay tribute to the work of the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China, and notably Luke de Pulford and Jaya Pappek, who participated in the very constructive and helpful meetings which we held with the noble baroness the minister. Here in the House of Lords, the amendment was recast and it was retabled by myself with the noble lord Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, with the noble lord Lord Markham and the noble baroness Lady Ludford.

And in my unavoidable absence at that moment in the committee, I was extremely grateful to each of them for their important remarks and support. Now that unity of purpose has resulted in a shared, unyielding conviction that in an era of unprecedented systematic competition, our sensitive regulatory and enforcement data must never under any circumstances be exposed or gifted to hostile authoritarian regimes. So in the best traditions of your lordship's house, the noble baroness carefully listened to the grave concerns which were raised and recognised the fatal vulnerability in the bill as originally drafted, and she has acted decisively. By closing the loophole that would have permitted disclosure to authorities in any foreign country with a strict closed list of trusted democratic partners, so our Five Eyes allies, our friends across the EEA as the noble baroness has told us and Switzerland, the government has closed a dangerous statutory void. And for that constructive engagement and for bringing forward these amendments today, I am profoundly grateful.

Let me refer again to the brave dissidents and diaspora striving to live in peace on these shores of ours, despite intimidation from regimes like the CCP, what Lord Robertson has memorably described as the deadly quartet of China, Russia, North Korea and Iran. It's outrageous, my lords, that people resident in the UK have been subjected to intimidation, harassment and coercion as political targets, some of it utilising data and cyber availability in CCP-orchestrated extensive and sophisticated campaigns of transnational repression. Hostile states routinely camouflage political persecution as legitimate, as they behave exactly as we heard in the Joint Committee on Human Rights with the systematic abuse of Interpol red notices, for instance. Network and information systems data such as IP addresses, server logs and digital fingerprints is not neutral administrative information. In the hands of hostile states and their security services, it can become actionable intelligence used to unmask, to geolocate and to surveil individuals on British soil.

What we desperately need, my Lords, is a comprehensive cross-departmental strategy to prohibit such actions. And I think that government amendment 45 is a step in that direction. And for that, I am extremely grateful to the noble Baroness and felt no need, therefore, to bring back an amendment in any kind of hostile way today.

02:32:12 - 02:36:45

Sarah Ludford

My Lords, I congratulate the minister on having listened, with the result that we have amendment 45 to limit disclosure of information to our allied countries, which are liberal democracies. But most of all, I would like to congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Alton, and indeed Sir Iain Duncan Smith in the other place and other parliamentarians who've taken this up, and NGOs. One that I have worked with is the Committee for Freedom in Hong Kong, which I know the noble Lord, Lord Alton, is closely worked works with. But my my thanks and congratulations are accompanied by a certain surprise that the government did not originally limit information sharing in this way. The noble Lord, Lord Alton, ended with a plea for cross-departmental working.

And I think one of our concerns is the Home Office, which is refusing visas to Hong Kongers who have been convicted in Hong Kong of offenses such as rioting, as classified under the Chinese Communist Party's sort of criminal code, which you and I would call legitimate protest. And some of us find it absolutely extraordinary that brave Hong Kongers are being denied refuge in this country for what is obviously something which would not be a crime in this country. I only mention that because there there is a worry that the government as a whole does not seem to be sufficiently sensitized to the dangers of the transnational the national in Hong Kong and the transnational repression which is emanating from China and and to a large extent via Hong Kong. I mean, the noble Lord, Lord Alton, on an earlier point mentioned that China was not designated in the highest tier of the foreign registration scheme. And it all adds up to a rather puzzling picture from the government.

Now, I hope that this particular episode about information sharing under the NIS regulations was a an oversight of some kind, though a worrying one if it didn't occur to anyone drafting this bill that actually there could be some rather undesirable regimes out there which we would not want to share information with. But anyway, it's been hauled back, it's been pulled back. So I hope that that will result in a somewhat better alert system within government about the dangers of information sharing with dodgy regimes, but also hopefully the start of a cross-departmental, cross-government assessment of what exactly the needs are of our relationship with China and its tentacles, both in Hong Kong and indeed in this country.

Now, I think I saw that the noble Baroness Winterton was on a trip to Hong Kong. I'm afraid I can't now remember the details, but I hope that she is able to take up with the authorities in Hong Kong, which means China, the need, the guarantees indeed that China has given in the past, which of course are not being complied with, but that she will fly a very strong British flag for freedom and democracy and against the kind of repression that unfortunately is being targeted, including at British citizens in Hong Kong. But that was a bit longer than I meant, but welcoming amendment 45, but wish it hadn't had to be an operation mounted to pull the government back.

02:36:45 - 02:37:27

Francis Nicholas Markham

I will be brief because there's not much to add to the powerful speech made by Lord Alton earlier. I would like to thank the noble Baroness for introducing this group of amendments. I was very happy at committee to support Lord Alton's amendments and, you know, I think it was a fantastic example of the whole of the House with all parties from all sides coming together to make sure we do something that is right. And I'm very pleased that the government and the noble Baroness, the Minister, took up the cause and thank her for her work on that.

02:37:27 - 02:37:39

Feryal Clark

I thank noble Lords for their contributions to the debate and for providing the important context into which these amendments are placed. With that, I beg to move.

02:37:39 - 02:37:53

Speaker 84

Question is that amendment 4 be agreed to. As many as are of that opinion will say content. Contrary, not content. The contents have it. After clause 12, amendment 5, Lord Holmes, not moved.

02:37:54 - 02:37:59

Speaker 84

Clause 15, amendment 6, Baroness Lloyd.

02:37:59 - 02:43:16

Feryal Clark

I beg to move amendment 6 in my name, after which I will also speak to the other amendments in my name. I thank noble Lords for the constructive engagement I have had since committee stage, in particular with the noble Baronesses Lady Harding and Lady Neville-Jones. Incident reporting is a critical pillar of the NIS regime and it's essential we get it right so that the regulators and NCSC receive early information so they can step in to help, so government builds a comprehensive picture of the threats we are facing, and businesses are not overburdened by too many requirements. Noble Lords, I've listened carefully to the views from across this House as well as from industry and regulators on the incident reporting regime. In response to feedback, I've tabled a number of amendments.

Let me start by addressing concerns about the need for consistency in the incident reporting regime. I agree that as far as sectoral differences permit, we should be asking regulated entities to take a similar approach to how they assess whether an incident is significant enough to be reported. That is why I have tabled an amendment to bring parity between factors operators of essential services must consider and those of relevant managed and digital service providers. Under this amendment, operators of essential services must consider the impact of an incident on users' network and information systems and on the economy and society more broadly, in addition to the existing factors specified in the bill.

This creates greater consistency across the regime and ensures regulators receive visibility of the full range of significant incidents. I've also heard the challenges around data center operators having broader reporting duties. This approach was taken to reflect the unique and systemic nature of a data center and the services they provide downstream. The key difference was that the requirements to report certain near-miss incidents to their regulator Ofcom. I have now tabled an amendment to remove mandatory near-miss reporting by data center operators.

I have also tabled an amendment to bring the overarching definition of an incident in regulation 1(2) in line with these changes. The bill now makes clear that an incident is an event which has had an actual adverse impact on the security and operations of an entity's system. The revised definition still covers the key types of incidents we want reported under the bill, including ransomware and prepositioning attacks that have successfully compromised a security system. Instead of mandating near-miss reporting, I'm committing to establish a voluntary near-miss reporting mechanism for all regulated entities under this framework. This is in line with the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness Lady Harding.

However, we can establish the voluntary framework without primary legislation. As we design the voluntary regime, we'll engage and consult with industry regulators and others on the full spectrum of measures that could encourage meaningful disclosure, including the role that legal or regulatory protections, trusted reporting arrangements, and information sharing mechanisms may play. I'm confident this approach strikes the right balance between minimizing burdens and ensuring the regime delivers meaningful improvements to our cyber resilience. I'm also strengthening the regime with regards to consumer information, and I thank the noble Baroness Lady Harding for her amendments in this area. I agree that customers should receive timely and useful information regarding incidents that affect them for however long those incidents remain ongoing.

That's why I've tabled amendments to strengthen the duty on data centers, relevant digital and managed service providers to ensure they keep any affected customers updated with timely and appropriate information while an incident is ongoing. This obligation is subject to the same enforcement and compliance rules as the current notification regime, with regulators able to issue penalties for failures to comply. However, amendments 29, 32, 34, 39, also tabled by the noble Baroness Lady Harding, place a prescriptive requirement on entities to advise customers on specific mitigation measures within these updates. We do not agree with this approach. The nature of incidents affecting customers and relevant mitigations can vary considerably, and regulated entities may not be best placed to provide tailored cybersecurity advice to each affected customer.

Instead, providing timely and relevant information to customers will enable affected organizations to determine their own mitigation options based on their respective cybersecurity controls and protocols. I'm confident the amendments I have tabled deliver a more coherent, proportionate, and resilient incident reporting regime. They ensure regulators, the NCSC, and affected customers receive the information they need to understand and respond to significant cyber incidents, while avoiding unnecessary burdens on businesses and ultimately working to deliver on our shared objective of strengthening the UK's cyber resilience. I look forward to the contributions from noble Lords, and I beg to move.

02:43:16 - 02:43:23

Speaker 84

Amendment proposed, clause 15, page 21, line 25, leave out paragraph A.

02:43:23 - 02:48:57

Diana Dido Harding

My Lords, I'd like to thank the noble lady the minister and her officials for their detailed and extremely helpful engagement between committee and this report stage. And apologize to the House as I have been rather greedy in having 25 amendments in this group, but I promise I will try and be as brief as I possibly can to explain them. The amendments that are in my name and the names of my noble friend Lord Holmes and the noble lady Baroness Kidron are in three subgroups, which I will just briefly go through as the noble lady the minister has alluded to. The first group begins with amendment 7 through 9, 10, 11, 18, 19, 21 to 25, strengthen the staged reporting requirements on the three different groups of regulated entities set out in the bill. These amendments would require regulated entities to produce a final report 28 days after they first reported an incident to their relevant regulator.

My experience, my Lords, and sadly it is very real lived experience of going through a cyberattack, is that in the first 72 hours, you don't know what's happened. And if we really want to learn from what's happened in cyberattacks, you have to let the dust settle just a little bit to know who attacked you, what data was actually accessed, what was really going on with the systems. And so I think it would be much more sensible in addition to the 24 and 72 hour reporting requirements to have a 28 day final report. That's completely consistent with the NIS2 directive as well, and I do think it is just common sense. At the committee stage, the noble lady the minister said that she didn't think it was necessary to put this on the face of the bill because regulators could choose to request a report from a regulated entity.

Again, in my experience, my Lords, actually this is the worst of all possible worlds. When you are in the midst of one of these cyberattacks, the last thing you need is people making up the rules as you go along. The more that you can have certainty on what the reporting requirements are from each of the different regulators that undoubtedly, and it will be more than one, undoubtedly you're having to report to, the more that the limited cognitive capacity that everybody has in a cyberattack can be focused on actually fixing the problem. So while of course you want to retain the ability for regulators to intervene in the midst of this 28 day period, I think having a very firm final report stage will give real certainty to the regulated entities and the regulators themselves that this is a regime that will actually aim to learn and share that learning as I'm afraid we have more and more of these incidents. So I really ask the noble lady the minister to reconsider the view that she set out in committee stage because I do think my amendment in this subgroup would both help victims of cyberattacks, those regulated entities trying to grapple with the fog of these attacks, but also ensure genuine proper learning from the incident.

The second group of 12 amendments I have in this group, my Lords, concern the reporting to customers, as the noble lady the minister has just addressed. Amendments 26 to 29, 31 to 34, 36 to 39 require regular reporting to customers. The noble lady the minister has tabled similar amendments 30, 35 and 40. The only difference, as she has just alluded, is that in my amendments, the regulated organizations would be required to advise on any measures or remedies that customers are able to take. I would hope, my Lords, that good service providers should be trying to help their customers when their customers have been caught up in a cyberattack.

But I do accept the noble lady the minister's argument that they might not always have the appropriate skills to give good advice, and as such I would like to thank her very much for her constructive engagement and will, when I get the moment to in the process, withdraw my amendments in favor of the government's in this group.

And then finally, my third group or single amendment in this group, amendment 42, which the noble lords Clement-Jones and Baroness Kidron and my noble friend Lord Holmes have also added their names. This amendment would allow regulated persons to report incidents, cyber threats and near misses voluntarily, either to the NCSC or their regulators, again in line with Article 30 of the NIS2 directive. This reporting would not increase their liability or impose any new obligations on them. Again, I really welcome the constructive discussions that I've had with the noble lady the minister and her officials on this and welcome her statement at the dispatch box as she introduced this group. I would just ask her if she could, when she sums up, confirm why it is that the government doesn't need to put this on the face of the bill, when a voluntary scheme will be developed and how she intends to consult on it.

But I'm sure that she will have good answers to those questions and again, I repeat my grateful thanks for the positive collaboration in this group.

02:48:57 - 02:54:33

Pauline Jones

My lords, I rise to talk about the amendment in my name, 16, which is also concerned with reporting. And reporting, I think the government agrees, is a general proposition that this lies at the absolute core of a successful cybersecurity and resilience regime, getting that, getting that right. In the course of the work on the bill, we have been able to agree on what constitutes the trigger for reporting. And I'd like, like many other colleagues, to thank the minister for the way in which she reacted to the comments made by colleagues and the amendments that she has made to make the system, I think, actually more, more operational and reduce, reducing the liability to have unnecessary reporting of a kind which overloads the system without actually increasing the level of security that it brings. Where we have not yet, I think, succeeded in entirely agreeing is on the question of the factors which operators should take into account when they actually are making their report.

Operators not located in data centres have in fact been given guidance. They know what they need to put in their reports and what they need to cover. But for data centres, the bill contains no guidance at all on the relevant factors. And I think while the government has said, and I believe it, that it wishes to increase the consistency of treatment between operators, that's to say in different locations, it is odd, I think, that those in data centres, where we hope people are going to be willing to and indeed want to occupy data centres, it's hard to see why they are the people who are left in the dark about their duties. If you look at the numbers, operators of essential services in locations other than data centres have seven factors that have been identified as necessary for reporting.

And the government has recently added a further two without actually feeling the need for consultation. Relevant digital service providers have seven factors and managed service providers who hitherto have not been regulated now have seven factors to take into account. So you can see, and I think it's perfectly sensible, that a list of topics and aspects that must be reported on is very clearly set out, except, except for those who work in, those who operate in data centers, who are left in the dark, and left in the dark as to what in the trigger "significant impact" is meant to mean, because that's what they have to focus on. So one doesn't, they don't know, you know, what the regulators would identify as constituting significant impact. Now the great advantage obviously of factor lists being on the face of the bill is it gives operators time to prepare for the regulatory regime before it comes into effect.

And knowing, as I say, what the definition of what significant is, is absolutely key to being able to make proper, a proper report. And so my amendment inserts into the bill ten factors, ten factors that data centers operators should, should have regard to. And they're drawn from the bill's own definition of the functions of a data center and they've been developed with TechUK, which represents over 90% of data center operators in, in the United Kingdom. These thresholds will still be set up and they will still be done through secondary legislation along with other, and for data centers on the same basis as other categories. But without the factor list, the data centers will be the last to get going with preparations and the security that the bill is designed to deliver and which we all want will arrive later too.

I think given the high penalties involved in failure to report properly, up to 17 million pounds or 4% of turnover, legislative differentiation between data center operators and the rest could have unintended, and I hope, and I was concerned, it would be an unwanted, you know, discriminatory element. So I do hope that the minister, you know, can look for, can accommodate the notion of bringing the data, the bringing the factors into the bill. And I look forward to the minister's reply.

02:54:33 - 02:55:23

Speaker 73

My Lords, I rise briefly to support all of the amendments in the name of my noble friend Baroness Harding in this group to which I've added my name. My Lords, there are many things that are in short supply when somebody finds themselves on the end of a cyberattack, but surely one of them is clarity. And that is something that this bill can address as the first block of amendments in my noble friend's name do. So I'd ask the minister to reconsider many of the issues set out in those amendments to potentially bring other elements at third reading to further clarify the procedures within the bill and to make the bill even sharper while we still have this somewhat unique opportunity. Clarity and learning is at the heart of all of the amendments in this group.

02:55:23 - 02:55:29

Speaker 89

I look forward to the minister's reflections.

02:55:29 - 02:58:43

Timothy Clement-Jones

My Lords, this group goes to the operational heart of the bill, namely incident reporting. Can I too welcome the government's amendment 6 and amendment 12? In Grand Committee and across industry, there was strong backing for the noble Baroness Neville-Jones when she raised serious alarms that drafting clause 15 to catch anything capable of having or could have a significant impact would drown the NCSC in thousands of false positives and routine fishing attempts. Reporting is not resilience. By removing "could have had" and narrowing the definition of an incident to events having an actual adverse effect, my Lords, the government has conceded the noble Baroness's core argument, and I welcome that.

However, we must ensure that operators have objective clarity, and I pay tribute to the noble Baroness Lady Neville-Jones, whose amendment 16 sets out the clear physical criteria: power loss, data compromise, and duration for assessing data center impacts. And I also pay tribute to the work of the noble Baroness Lady Harding of Winscombe, whose amendments 7, 9, 10, 11, and 42 I have signed in part. Amendment 42 is important. It establishes a statutory regime for the voluntary notification of incidents, cyber threats, and near misses, modeled directly on Article 30 of the EU NIS2 directive. Threat intelligence thrives on early detection, but operators will only report near misses if they're protected by an ironclad statutory safe harbor, ensuring that voluntary reports cannot be weaponized against them in regulatory penalties or civil litigation.

Furthermore, noble Baroness's customer notification amendments 26 to 39 introduce a duty of customer care. When an OES cloud provider or managed service provider suffers an incident, notifying the regulator within 24 hours is only half the battle. They must keep their customers informed without undue delay, provide continuous updates as circumstances change, and advise on actionable mitigation measures. Finally, my Lords, amendment 159 standing in my name requires an annual report on incident volumes to be laid before Parliament. We need transparent aggregated data on the sectors attacked, the frequency of significant incidents, and the principal root causes so that Parliament and industry can track systemic vulnerabilities.

My Lords, the noble Baroness Harding has given us, I think, advance notice of her intentions to accept the voluntary scheme, but we do believe that in the best of all worlds, with these amendments, we could ensure that incident reporting is proportionate, actionable, and focused on collective defense.

02:58:43 - 03:02:23

Speaker 70

My Lords, I thank the noble lady the minister for introducing this group of amendments. I am grateful for the concessions that the government have made on incident definition following my noble friend Lady Neville-Jones's amendments at committee stage. I would, however, also like to press a little bit on the point that my noble friend made regarding her amendment 16. The government has expanded the number of factors determining whether an incident involving essential services is significant and also widened the reporting requirements for data centers without outlining a similar list of factors for them.

Surely if consistency between data centers and other regulated services is the goal, then widening the discrepancy in lists of factors constituting significance is, or must be to me, counterintuitive. I do hope that the noble lady the minister will be able to consider my noble friend's amendment 16, at least in light of the need for consistency for all of those affected by the bill. My Lords, I'm also grateful of course to my noble friend Lady Harding of Winscombe for retabling her amendments to the reporting regime. I think she's raised a number of really important points that we should be taking very seriously. She is, as far as I know, she is the only one among us today who has led a sufficiently large organization to be impacted by this through a very serious cyberattack.

And I, and hopefully everybody else, must take her input to this extremely seriously, that she has set out not just here today but in her very good opinion piece, if I may say so, in this morning's Financial Times, which I commend to noble Lords. But I hope the government will at the very least keep her suggestions under review. My Lords, amendment 86 in my name and those of my noble friends Lord Markham and Lord Holme is a slightly reworked amendment from committee stage. That would require not only a consultation into amnesty-based reporting, but also confidential reporting. My Lords, a great many ransomware attacks go unreported because victims choose to avoid public knowledge.

This hinders our efforts to protect others against falling victim to the same attack. Now there is a balance to be struck, governments must strike this balance between encouraging reporting of these attacks and penalizing those who do not adhere to their security duties. Of course I understand that a poorly designed amnesty risks letting those off the hook who should be penalized. But I'm also aware that the threat of either a penalty or merely public knowledge of a breach often works to deter reporting. We do think it's well worth making a, conducting a consultation into this balance that collects appropriate data about these very serious events in a way that does not prejudice the outcomes for any of the victims of these attacks.

So I do hope that the noble baroness will urge her officials to carry on considering this and to, to come back with proposals in the future.

03:02:23 - 03:08:54

Feryal Clark

I, excuse me, I thank the noble Lords for their amendments tabled in this group and the continuing discussion and positive intent. It is clear we all share the same objective: a functional and proportionate regime that balances timely and relevant information for regulators, NCSC, and customers without placing undue burden on business. I will start with the amendments tabled by the noble baroness Lady Harding, which seek to add an additional reporting requirement at 28 days. I am grateful to the noble baroness for the discussion we have had on this point and appreciate the constructive spirit in which these amendments have been tabled. However, I still do not think that a further stage of mandatory report is needed to ensure that regulators and NCSC have the necessary information.

In our view, the bill's existing provisions already strike the right balance in this regard. The two-stage reporting model ensures that regulators and NCSC have sufficient information to start assessing what has occurred, what support may be needed, and what wider risks may be posed, without imposing additional blanket reporting obligations on all entities. I agree that learning lessons from incidents is crucial for resilience.

However, I am not persuaded that a mandatory 28-day report is the right mechanism, noting that regulators can request more information when they need it. Effective resilience works best when organizations engage openly and constructively with regulators throughout recovery. Given the variation in cyber incidents, a fixed reporting requirement risks prioritizing compliance over meaningful engagement and may not produce information of sufficient value to justify the additional burden. This approach supports a collaborative relationship between industry, regulators, and NCSC focused on recovery and resilience outcomes. Turning to the noble baroness Lady Neville-Jones's amendment, which adds a list of factors for data center operators to consider when determining whether an incident is significant.

I agree that proportionate and workable factors will be important for the sector. Data centers are one of our newest designated CNI sectors. They've rapidly become a fundamental part of the infrastructure underpinning our economy, while our understanding of this infrastructure and how best to regulate it is still developing. This makes consultation particularly important. I have committed to giving industry, academics, technical experts, and Ofcom the opportunity to inform the development of these factors, drawing on their operational expertise.

We will draw from the proposals in amendment 16, and the noble baroness will see these factors reflected in the consultation, but it is right we do not preempt a full open consultation. Operators will have an appropriate period to prepare for the new requirements before they take effect, ensuring they have time to understand and adjust to the final framework. I turn now to the noble viscount Lord Camrose's amendment regarding a consultation on amnesty-based reporting for ransomware. I thank him for our discussion since committee on this amendment. However, I'm still not persuaded there is a case for consulting on a protected route for ransomware reporting.

On the contrary, I believe that regulators must be able to access ransomware reports if they are to assess whether organizations have taken the necessary steps to secure their systems. This is particularly important in the context of the NIS regulations, which have been put in place to ensure the security and resilience of the UK's most essential services. If NIS regulators are denied the ability to scrutinize how ransomware attacks have succeeded in compromising these services, there is a real risk that the regulatory framework will not work as intended. In saying this, I'm not rejecting the idea that safe harbors can play a role in facilitating some types of reporting. I've already said the government will examine the role that legal protections may play in voluntary reporting, but I cannot endorse the noble viscount's proposals given the challenges it would create for existing regulatory regimes.

Turning to the question the noble baroness Lady Harding posed to me on the next steps for the voluntary scheme. Significant work is required to design a voluntary reporting regime that can meaningfully deliver engagement, avoid duplication with existing reporting routes, secure industry participation. We therefore intend to take this further work on the design of the regime. And the mandatory obligations under the bill apply to entities within the regulatory scope, and the primary purpose of the voluntary regime would be to increase the reporting of cyber near-misses by regulated entities. However, this would not automatically preclude participation by other organizations, and there may be value in receiving information from other organizations outside the regulatory parameters, particularly where this can contribute to wider cyber resilience.

So we will take that consultation forward in due course as part of the implementation of the bill.

Finally, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for his amendment and agree with the principle that visibility and transparency of the reporting regime is important. Parliament, regulators and the public should have confidence that the regime is operating well. However, I am not persuaded that placing a statutory duty in the bill to publish incident volumes is the right approach. The bill already provides mechanisms through which the government and regulators can provide oversight and transparency on the operation of the regime. In particular, and subject to consultation, I expect the statement of strategic priorities and wider engagement with regulators will provide opportunities to share insights on how incident reporting obligations are being implemented in practice.

For this reason, while I support the objective of transparency, I do not consider that prescribing these reporting requirements on the face of the bill is the most appropriate or proportionate approach. Once again, I would like to thank noble Lords for their collaborative approach. Your scrutiny and expertise have been hugely valuable and resulted in the amendments to this group tabled in my name, which I agree have improved the bill. I beg to move.

03:08:54 - 03:09:33

Speaker 84

Amendment 6 be agreed to. As many as are of that opinion will say content. The contrary not content. The contents have it. Amendment 7, Baroness Harding, not moved.

Amendment 8, moved formally, Baroness Lloyd. The question is that this amendment be agreed to. As many as are of that opinion will say content. The contrary not content. The contents have it.

Amendments 9, 10 and 11, Baroness Harding, not moved. Amendments 12 to 15 inclusive, moved formally en bloc. Moved formally en bloc. The question is that these amendments be agreed to. As many as are of that opinion will say content.

The contrary not content. The contents have it. Amendment 16, Baroness Neville-Jones, not moved.

03:09:33 - 03:10:50

Pauline Jones

I would like to respond to the minister's comments on my amendment. I think that the substance of what she has said, in that she will in the course of the consultation take account and indeed ensure that the amendments in my, the detail in the amendments of my amendments will be reflected in the discussion that takes place, is a very helpful response. I hear what she says about her desire to have a full and open consultation on how data centers, which are new in our regime, will be developed. And so I accept that their development should take place separately from other operating centers. So I would like to, on the basis of that, will withdraw my amendment in favor of the government's proposal.

03:10:50 - 03:12:24

Speaker 84

Is it your Lordship's pleasure that the amendment was not moved? Not moved, sorry. Was not moved. I think we'd better agree that the amendment is not moved. Right.

Amendment 17, Baroness Lloyd, moved formally. The question is that amendment 17 be agreed to. As many as are of that opinion will say content. The contrary not content. The contents have it.

Amendments 18 through to 29, Baroness Harding, not moved. Amendment 30, Baroness Lloyd, moved formally. The question is that amendment 30 be agreed to. As many as are of that opinion will say content. The contrary not content.

The contents have it. Amendments 18 through to 29, Baroness Harding, not moved. Amendment 30, Baroness Lloyd, move formally. The question is that amendment 30 be agreed to. As many as of that opinion will say content.

Content. Contrary not content. The contents have it. Amendments 31 to 34, Baroness Harding, not moved. Amendment 35, move formally.

The question is that amendment 35 be agreed to. As many as of that opinion will say content. The contrary not content. The contents have it. Amendments 36, 37, 38, 39, Baroness Harding, not moved.

Amendment 40, move formally. The question is that amendment 40 be agreed to. As many as of that opinion will say content. The contrary not content. The contents have it.

Amendment 41, Baroness Harding.

03:12:24 - 03:17:53

Diana Dido Harding

Thank you, my Lords. My Lords, there are a lot of amendments in this group that are all attempting to fill the AI-shaped hole that is in this bill. And I think I would probably be speaking for everyone who engaged in Grand Committee that we were all intensely frustrated by the absence of AI in this bill, and it's in danger of proving what those that don't think, those people who think you can't regulate AI, we're proving them correct because we're not even trying. So I think this is going to be quite a complex group. I would like to extend my support to the amendments in the names of the noble Lord Clement-Jones on last resort powers, number 65, amendment 66 in the name of the noble Lord Tarasenko on AC audit powers, and amendment 67 in the name of the noble lady Baroness Kidron on AI red lines.

I'm not going to speak to them because I know everyone wants to move at pace. I will focus my remarks only on amendment 41. So my amendment 41 is not techy or complex. It is actually very simple. It would require frontier labs to report to essential services and their relevant regulator if one of their AI agents or models gains unauthorized access to UK essential services and or their data.

The reporting requirements would be similar to those imposed on the essential services, the 24, 72-hour piece that we've just been discussing. So by way of example, if a frontier lab's AI agent accessed NHS data without permission, the frontier lab, once they became aware of this, would be required to report the incident within 24 hours, update within 72 hours, and issue a final report within 14 days. This is currently not happening, as witnessed in Australia quite recently. OpenAI accessed Australian Medicare data in June of this year. They didn't inform the Australian government until September via an unmanned email address, such that the Australian Prime Minister was at the UN General Assembly actually rallying support for the innovative growth potential of AI while OpenAI knew that they had accessed his country's health data and he didn't.

Other countries are already requiring this very basic thing. So in New York, the RAIS Act requires AI frontier labs to report within 72 hours if one of their agents has gone rogue. In California, within 52 hours. The EU AI Act requires it without undue delay. And actually, the AI labs themselves agree that clear reporting requirements would be helpful.

In front of the Business, Innovation, Science and Trade Committee in the other place only last week, representatives of OpenAI and Anthropic, including my noble friend Lord Booth-Smith, who was representing Anthropic, supported the idea of required reporting, at least in principle.

That is an important at least, I suspect. I know there is concern that this could be seen as international overreach and that all AI regulation needs to be global. That's one of the favorite tropes of tech companies. Don't do anything locally, it has to be done globally. Those of us who have campaigned for regulation of social media have been fighting that battle for more than a decade.

But actually, this really is an instance that does not need to be global. This is about UK services and UK data being illegally accessed. It doesn't matter that it might be an American company that is doing the access, accessing, they are accessing our data illegally. This surely should be the purview of this House, my Lords. I believe actually that the noble lady the Minister does agree with me.

I think that the AI, the government's AI Minister in the other place also agrees with me. In fact, I think he's actually said so in public, that it is important to have these reporting requirements. But I really can't see it in this Bill. I do support the government's amendment 70 in this group, but that just puts even stronger requirements on the essential services that might have had their data's data hacked, not on the companies whose AI agents would have done the hacking. So I am very much hoping that the noble lady the Minister can explain to me and to all of us in this House when she responds how the government actually intends to require AI labs to report incidents and when this is likely to come into effect if it is not through this amendment.

My Lords, it's simple common sense that if these agents access our data, they should be under a legal obligation to tell us. We shouldn't be leaving that to chance, we should be making it the law. I beg to move.

03:17:53 - 03:18:04

Speaker 84

Proposed after clause 16, insert the new clause as printed on the Marshall's list.

03:18:04 - 03:24:28

Speaker 13

My Lords, I have added my name to amendment 41 because it identifies and addresses a very significant gap in our approach to cybersecurity. It's the growing capacity of frontier AI models to interfere with systems on which our essential services depend. And this amendment ensures that there's a corresponding duty on their developers to report such incidents and to do so in a timely fashion. This has been put forward as a cross-party amendment because technology is advancing so rapidly and the security of our critical infrastructure really is a shared responsibility. This amendment demonstrates that by working together, we can address what is a very serious emerging risk.

My Lords, if it wasn't already clear, the urgency of this issue has been brought into sharp focus by recent events, even since we last met in Grand Committee to scrutinize this Bill. The past month, noble Lords may be aware, has been named as Black October after advanced AI models accelerated the discovery of critical long-standing security flaws, most notably in the PHP programming language, triggering global emergency patches and widespread server shutdowns. It was on the 22nd of October that the government confirmed that 32 government services had been taken offline as a precaution following the discovery of critical vulnerabilities in PHP, which is a programming language underpinning an estimated 70% of the world's websites.

These vulnerabilities were identified with the assistance of frontier AI, and cybersecurity companies have subsequently reported millions of attempts to exploit them. To be clear, the government has said that these precautionary shutdowns didn't mean that those websites had been hacked. But this incident demonstrates how AI can help uncover long-standing vulnerabilities at unprecedented speed, but also how quickly that discovery can trigger a global security crisis. Cybersecurity experts are warning us of a new era of AI-enabled hacking. There is both the dual nature of this technology.

AI can strengthen our defenses, but it can also lower the barriers to finding and exploiting weaknesses in systems on which we all depend. And this is not a theoretical concern. In July, AISI, the UK AI Security Institute, identified an incident during frontier AI testing in which AI agents took sustained unauthorized actions against real people and real organizations. In the most serious case, an agent attempted a software supply chain attack, submitting malicious code and creating fake accounts to pressure a software maintainer into accepting it. And although no real-world harm resulted, the incident demonstrates exactly why we need effective safeguards and clear reporting obligations when AI systems behave in unexpected and potentially harmful ways.

My Lords, we already know the consequences when our digital systems fail. The cyberattack on Synnovis disrupted blood testing and forced the cancellation of hospital appointments and operations. The ransomware attack on the British Library caused extensive disruption to its services, with recovery requiring a prolonged effect. These attacks predated the latest developments in frontier AI, but we must take seriously the possibility that AI will make future attacks faster, more sophisticated, and more damaging. The question before us is therefore straightforward.

If a frontier AI model gains unauthorized access to or interferes with a regulated organization's systems, who ensures that that incident is reported promptly? Especially as we know, hearing the example set out and the extraordinary the Australian government experience with OpenAI, it took them 84 days to inform the Australian government about their model breach. And just now over the weekend, Anthropic has slipped out an announcement to let us know that Claude has accessed publicly available voter data without any human authorization. These events are taking place on a daily basis. The organization affected may not know that AI was involved.

The developer, meanwhile, may hold crucial information about the model's behavior, the nature of the threat, and the steps needed to mitigate it. And without a clear reporting obligation, that information is not reaching the people who need it when they need it. This amendment addresses that gap. It requires an initial notification within 24 hours, a fuller account within 72 hours, and a final report within 14 days. And it ensure, sorry, it ensures that the affected organization, its regulator, the relevant cybersecurity incident response team, and the AI Security Incident receive information essential to containing an incident and preventing its recurrence.

These are practical and proportionate requirements. They don't prohibit innovation; they establish a basic principle of accountability. Those developing powerful technologies must at the very least take responsibility for reporting serious incidents involving their models and when an incident has occurred.

And without meaningful penalties for non-compliance, these obligations risk being little more than words on paper. It was during last Thursday's cross-bench debate on AI and children where a point was repeatedly made that is worth repeating here. AI is currently less regulated than milk. The risks to children and the risks to our critical infrastructure and government systems are of course different, but the underlying principle is the same. Our regulatory frameworks must keep pace with increasingly powerful technologies.

We are already at the point where harm has become widespread. We need to establish reasonable safeguards, clear responsibilities, and effective oversight.

03:24:28 - 03:26:49

Speaker 90

I'll also declare my interest as senior advisor to the Alan Turing Institute. I wish to speak in support of amendment 41 in the name of the noble baroness Lady Harding, to which I have added my name, and then briefly about my own amendment 66 in this group. We heard during committee not only about the out-of-control behavior from evasions for running AI models from OpenAI, Google, and Meta, but also about the unacceptable delays before the incidents were reported. Contrast that with our own AI Security Institute. When it found unsanctioned agent behavior during its testing this summer, and this was confirmed to us by Henry de Zoete at a meeting in Portcullis House today, it immediately declared a security incident and contained it within an hour of the alert being raised, with all relevant machines isolated within that time.

That is the standard we should be expecting. With amendment 41, the developer must notify the affected organization and its regulator within 24 hours. The duty applies where the developer is aware or ought reasonably to be aware, so no company can avoid it by not looking. And the report must say whether the model acted autonomously or was used by someone else. My lords, on 12th of October, the government said that they would look at strengthening this bill so that serious AI incidents are reported.

Their amendment 70 gives the Secretary of State powers to investigate where control of an AI agent is lost. But no one can investigate an incident they've not been told of. Amendment 41 is what makes amendment 70 work. I would therefore be very interested to find out whether the noble baroness the minister will be minded to accept amendment 41. I turn now briefly to amendment 66 in my name, to which the noble lords Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Holmes of Richmond and noble baroness Lady Harding have added their names.

03:26:49 - 03:27:55

Speaker 92

This amendment would require the AI Security Institute to audit frontier AI products before they are used in the network and information systems that run our hospitals, our energy networks, and our water supply. Developers would submit their evaluation results using methods and thresholds set by AISI, with evidence of a tested means of suspending the system in the UK. Where the institute found a serious risk that was not mitigated, the Secretary of State would have to decide within 14 days whether to act and give reasons.

As I've already said, I welcome the government's amendment 70, which accepts that loss of control of an AI agent is a risk to essential services that belongs in this bill. But it operates after the event and does not mention the AI Security Institute. I would be grateful, therefore, if the minister could tell the house what role the government sees for the institute, AC, in assessing frontier models before they reach our critical systems, and whether the power in clause 29-1 could give it that role.

03:27:55 - 03:28:54

Speaker 93

My lords, I too rise to support amendment 41 in the name of the noble lady Baroness Harding, and to support amendment 65, 66, and 67, to which I've also put my name. As the noble Baroness Lady Harding said, to have a bill titled Cyber Security and not mention AI seems to have been a huge error. The government does seem to have recognized the great lacuna in some of its amendments in this group, which is most welcome. And as other noble lords have said, and also we must welcome the Chancellor of the Exchequer's low-key announcement over the weekend to invest 120 million pounds into the Artificial Intelligence Security Institute. But surely this bill should be an opportunity to ensure that AC investment is used as effectively as possible, and that just as this country recognizes the importance of AI in keeping our technical leading role, it is a new, this new, incredibly powerful technology, which which has new frontier models which need to be investigated prior to release.

03:28:54 - 03:29:21

Speaker 94

Amendment 41 is an important step forward in ensuring that AI developers notify the relevant authorities when things go wrong. So if the noble lady decides to take this amendment to the vote, I will be supporting her. And I'm surprised that all parties don't think that the measures in this amendment need to be supported. AI frontier models have proved to be a threat, and we need to face up to it. The AI provider's own safety report tells us of the threats posed by new models.

03:29:21 - 03:32:18

Speaker 93

Google wrote that a person outside the company had attempted to use its AI tool Gemini to obtain, and I quote, complete step-by-step technical guide for synthesizing weaponized biological agents. An Anthropic report found that there were five case studies of actors using their models in a way that could support biological weapons development. There are also reports of the terrorist group Boko Haram using frontier AI, including ChatGPT, to plan attacks and design explosive devices. Surely these concerns should encourage the government at least to look at my noble friend Lord Tarashenko's amendment 66, which will have safety against terrorists and biological attacks, amongst other things, built into new AI frontier models, and put AC in a stronger position to be a third-party evaluator of frontier models. I had such hopes that when the 2023 Bletchley Park summit announced that AC and the model providers would work together and voluntarily submit their new models to the directorate, that this would, that this would increase, but this is increasingly not happening.

The Anthropic's Claude Mythos 5.1 was withdrawn from AC last month. There are other cases, like the Claude Opus 5.1, which was reportedly withdrawn from AC's pre-release evaluation in September, as was the OpenAI and GPT-6 Lumini models. They were also withdrawn. I hope that your lordships will listen to the chair of the Business, Innovation and Science Committee in the other place, who this month, during evidence gathering with AI leaders, announced that AC lacks compulsory access to models and a power to stop new models coming to the market. I call on the noble lady the minister to address these concerns.

This brings me to amendment 67 in the name of my noble friend Baroness Kidron.

As many other noble lords have said during the passage of this bill through the House, this is a defensive bill. My lords, surely the best way to stop new frontier models from going rogue is to be proactive in putting guardrails around their design. Otherwise, we're just going to play a game of whack-a-mole. The principles in the Online Safety Act, which try and install safety by design into the algorithms the online content providers, surely the same needs to be done to happen to AI frontier models. Amendment 67 sets out to provide guidelines for how the design of AI models might be kept in check.

I ask His Majesty's government to ensure safety is built into new AI model designs and that the highly respected AC is given sufficient power to ensure that they're safe. The noble lady the minister must know that the world would be grateful if new models are safe by design and properly evaluated before release.

03:32:18 - 03:33:46

Speaker 73

My lords, there's a huge hole has already been identified through all stages of this bill, and that is the absence of AI. As we've gone through each stage of this bill process, that hole has just got wider and deeper. As we've gone through this process, external events have only highlighted how that hole has got deeper and wider. Amendments 41, 66 and 67, which I support in this group, do something practically and effectively about this. Specifically on AC, can I ask the minister, does she think that citizens up and down the United Kingdom are in a better situation now that AC is the security institute rather than the safety institute?

More than just the question of a change of word, a change of emphasis and a change of impact in terms of every citizen in this country. My lords, as has been rightly mentioned, milk is more regulated than AI. With this in mind, would the minister not agree that when it comes to cross-sector, cross-economy AI legislation, the government needs to discover the bottle to bring forward a bill?

03:33:46 - 03:38:38

Timothy Clement-Jones

My lords, as the noble Baroness Harding and other noble lords have mentioned, this group confronts what has been termed in Grand Committee the AI-shaped hole in our national cybersecurity architecture. At second reading and in committee, the government maintained that AI sat outside the scope of this bill, yet recent events have shattered any illusion that AI is merely an emerging hypothetical threat. Frontier general-purpose models and agentic workflows are supercharging offensive cyber capabilities, discovering zero-days and exploiting vulnerabilities at machine speed. Indeed, we've seen this unfold directly in front of us, and the noble Baroness Harding, the noble Baroness Burger and the noble Lord Tarasenko have all described extremely cogently what has been happening over the last few months. I welcome the government's amendment 70 and 74, which introduce provisions addressing loss of control of an artificial intelligence agent.

It's an important concession, a first acknowledgement by the government that it is not enough to be technology-agnostic, that agentic AI risks must be addressed. But the government's approach remains entirely reactive and diagnostic, gathering information only after the horse has bolted. The cross-party and cross-bench amendments in this group, which I've been pleased to sign, establish a comprehensive, forward-looking governance framework.

First of all, the noble Baroness Harding's amendment 41, which was so brilliantly introduced by her, which I've signed and places a direct reporting duty on developers of frontier AI models to report to regulated persons, the NCSC and the AI Security Institute within 24 hours whenever an AI model gains unauthorized access to or interferes with critical systems. My Lords, we must close the loophole where victim organizations bear all the reporting burdens while frontier developers remain unaccountable. And my Lords, on these benches, we will support the noble Baroness if she push, if she presses her amendment to a vote. Secondly, amendment 66 in the name of Lord Tarasenko and which I've signed and amendment 79 in my name empower the AI Security Institute. Some of us had an impressive presentation today about the work of AISI.

But my Lords, it's time now in principle for the institute to be placed on a statutory footing with powers to conduct pre-deployment audits of frontier models before they're deployed in critical infrastructure, set safety standards and recommend that the Secretary of State restrict or suspend unsafe deployments. And my Lords, I would ask the Minister, what is the government's response to a very clear set of recommendations in this respect from the Joint Committee on Human Rights? And I recognize that the government's response is due in a few weeks' time, my Lords, but I think it would be useful if the noble Baroness could give us an indication of the government's approach. Third, amendment 67 in the name of Baroness Kidron and myself establishes clear statutory red lines against autonomous AI systems executing cyberattacks, evading human shutdown or self-replicating uncontrollably. And finally, amendment 65 standing in my name, also tabled on committee, provides the ultimate indispensable emergency backstop statutory last resort powers for the Secretary of State to direct the shutdown of data centers or large-scale AI deployments during a catastrophic AI emergency.

My Lords, as former technology secretary Liz Kendall rightly noted, true digital sovereignty requires the means to contain an emergency on our own soil. But crucially, amendment 65, the so-called kill switch amendment, wraps this emergency power in rigorous constitutional safeguards: a 24-hour continuous necessity review reporting to Parliament within seven days, pre-tested emergency communication protocols and an immediate right of appeal to the High Court with power to cancel orders and award compensation. My Lords, we must empower the AI Security Institute, hold frontier developers accountable and equip the state with court-supervised emergency backstops.

03:38:38 - 03:41:27

Speaker 70

My Lords, I'm grateful for the government's amendments and for the clarity that they've given us following, I think, some confusion at committee stage. My Lords, none of us can be blind to the need to ensure that AI is made safe by appropriate safeguards, regulations. And we support any activity that moves us towards the global implementation of AI safety rules, whether via national routes or not, but in the context of always driving economic growth and maintaining our attractiveness as an investment destination. We have to recognize the challenges of designing such rules that govern technologies rather than products and do so in a rapidly changing environment.

For the effective development though of AI regulation, a necessary if not sufficient condition will be continuing to have direct conversations between the government and industry. Those conversations are evidently taking place as I hope the noble lady the minister will confirm when she gets up to speak. Given these government amendments and given the words of the AI minister over the past few weeks, we feel on these benches it may not be helpful on this occasion for parliament to impose policies as they are in the process of being formulated, although I think I'm not alone in wishing they could be formulated a little bit faster. Let me turn briefly to the government's amendment 70 granting the Secretary of State the power to intervene in a loss of control incident. Tech UK and others have raised a number of concerns about this, including a lack of definition of the terms used, the lack of transparency to third parties and the frankly odd decision to name agentic AI as a specific technology on the face of the bill.

I do urge the noble lady the minister to take these concerns seriously and to see what can be done to address them while retaining the amendment's intended results. Finally, my lords, there is a really important conversation to be had surrounding the role of the AI Security Institute as as the noble Lord Tarasenko and others have have very compellingly pointed out. I'm grateful to the AC for their briefing to noble lords earlier today. The evolving direction of AC is a difficult question. We would support this being reviewed, which is part of the reason why we support amendment 163 in today's final group and I look forward to it being debated then.

03:41:27 - 03:52:24

Feryal Clark

I thank noble lords for their engagement on the important issue of addressing AI cyber risks. I share the concerns raised by this house and the public. The government takes the safety of the British people incredibly seriously. AI risks are transnational threats. The best response to a global issue is a global response.

At the UN General Assembly in September, the Prime Minister set out that the UK will work towards agreeing a single set of global principles and standards to ensure AI development is safe and make AI a central focus of our G20 presidency next year. It's important to situate this bill and its important yet targeted role within the government's broader approach. We will legislate where necessary alongside all the other tools at our disposal. I will set out how the NIS regime currently covers AI risk and applies to some AI digital services. The bill takes an all technologies, all threats, all hazards approach to protecting regulated services.

This means that essential services need to manage cyber and physical risks associated with AI systems underpinning their services and protect themselves from threats. Many digital and managed services within the scope of the regime are enabled by, deploy or help to deliver AI capabilities. This includes cloud computing services which provide software, platforms and infrastructure services that many organisations across the economy rely on. Commercial AI services are often delivered under similar digital service models and so are likely to be in scope. This includes AI assistants delivered via software as a service models, AI platforms and infrastructure used for AI workloads.

Where an AI digital service falls in scope, the provider will have to take steps to manage the security and resilience of their service and the systems that underpin them just like any other regulated entity.

I have met with the CEO of the Information Commissioner. We agree on the importance of guidance to provide industry with clarity on these definitions. The regime is not designed to provide a comprehensive framework for AI governance, including frontier AI capabilities which have not been released to customers or wider safety or societal impacts. These are important issues which need addressing at the global level as well as through the AI Taskforce and regulation at the appropriate point of use in the UK. Where AI-centred digital services are in scope of the NIS regime, for example registered as cloud computing, our national security powers of direction could be used to direct those regulated organisations subject to meeting strict legal tests.

The direction power allows government to take directed regulated organisation, allows the direction power allows government to direct regulated organisations to take specific action where a security operational compromise or threat to their NIS creates a national security risk. Directions must be necessary and proportionate. Where the legal tests are met, the direction powers enables the government to require certain actions in an AI loss of control scenario. This could include actions such as isolating systems, restricting data flows or suspending automated actions being taken by an affected AI system. AI models are often distributed across different data centres and jurisdictions.

A broad power to shut down AI systems could have implications for investment, growth and our digital sovereignty. It must be very carefully thought through. If there is a loss of control scenario which compromises a regulated entity and poses a national security risk, directing the entity to take certain actions is more proportionate and likely more effective in containing the risk. This address this addresses the underlying risk raised in the amendment tabled by the noble lord, Lord Clement-Jones, amendment 65. Turning to amendment 41 raised by Baroness Harding and spoken to by noble Baroness Lady Burger, the noble Viscount Lord Colville and the noble Lord Lord Holmes of Richmond.

Where AI digital services are regulated under the NIS regime, the providers of those services will have to report incidents that have affected the security and operation of their systems. This includes incidents where there is a loss of control of an AI system used to provide a regulated service and where that loss of control disrupts the provision of that service, compromises user systems or has other significant impacts on the functioning of the UK society and economy. We will bring forward a consultation setting out further detail on how the incident reporting regime will work, including how the regulated organisations should assess whether an incident is significant. This will consider how the framework applies to emerging technologies such as AI. However, I would like to reassure noble lords that the bill's reporting requirements already provide the underlying framework for identifying reporting significant incidents involving AI systems used in regulated services as well as other cyber incidents affecting those services.

Indeed, these requirements do place the onus for reporting on the regulated entities which have been affected by an incident. This is in keeping with the overall principle of the NIS regulations, which are about how the UK's most essential services can manage risks to their systems. It is also one of the reasons why I cannot support the noble Baroness Lady Harding's amendment 41, which would place the onus for reporting on developers of frontier models rather than regulated entities. Regulating the developers of frontier AI is a different question and I do not believe this bill is the right legislative framework in which to answer it. The government will of course continue to take action where necessary to keep the UK safe.

But these risks and technologies are global. Placing duties on developers operating in the UK will not by itself keep us safe from developers of models elsewhere in the world.

Noble Lords, turning to how we plan to strengthen the bill and the NIS regime to better understand and protect against AI cyber risks to our essential services, the government has tabled an amendment to the delegated powers in the bill. Clauses 30 to 35 list examples of what provisions in particular may be made under clause 29 and set out certain requirements and restrictions. Amendment 70 expands this to clarify that future regulations may enable the government to use in-house expertise, such as AISI, and gather information on why agentic incidents in our essential services have happened. Our intention is for the information to then be shared with relevant stakeholders to help prevent similar incidents. Detail on how this function could work will be consulted on.

I will also bring forward three further measures in secondary legislation to manage the risks posed by agentic AI. These will be consulted on, and I have, to the question raised by the noble Viscount Lord Camrose, seen the questions raised by TechUK and undertake to continue to consult with industry on these matters. The measures are: first, to include technical and organizational requirements within the proposed security and resilience requirements to reduce the risk of agentic incidents affecting regulated services. Second, to preserve information regulated entities hold on incidents that stem from agents' malfunctioning, so that others can use that information to understand what incidents happen. And third, to require regulated entities to tell other organizations, for example suppliers, if agents used by the regulated entity are negatively impacting those organizations' operations when an incident is occurring.

Finally, the changes I mentioned today on developing a voluntary framework for regulated entities on near-miss reporting will also be a meaningful step to developing our understanding of why and how this type of incident takes place. These commitments I'm making today are an example of us responding with speed and precision to address potential harms to the UK posed by novel AI risks. I strongly consider this to be the right approach. I understand there are diverging views on how fundamental AI regulation should take place and there is a debate to be had on this, but this bill is not the place for it. Speaking to the amendments tabled by the noble Lords Lord Tarasenko, Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble Baroness Lady Kidron, these amendments would provide the AI Security Institute with a statutory role to regulate the deployment of frontier AI models in the UK.

These amendments would not be effective in making our essential services safer. AI is a dual-use technology. Malicious actors could use frontier AI capabilities to attack the UK, but defenders can use the same capabilities to protect it, as my noble friend Baroness Burger pointed out. Delaying essential services' access to the latest tools would leave them less well-defended, while attackers would face no such delay. These amendments could hold back adoption for up to 10 weeks in a field where new models come out every few weeks.

The scope of this bill is also not right for AISI or the regulation of frontier AI models. In particular, a regulatory role for AISI would also undermine its voluntary partnership with leading AI developers, which gives it early access to the most advanced models and which its vital work to inform government depends on. This is in contrast to the EU's regulatory stance and lack of access to frontier models. Finally, as I've said, the risks from frontier AI do not respect borders.

We believe the most effective response, as the Prime Minister committed to, is to agreeing international standards. This government remains committed to making sure AC is equipped to fill its vital role and will keep the House updated on its work. In response to the question from the noble Lord Clement-Jones, I will not preempt the government's consideration or response to the Joint Committee on Human Rights, and the response will be published in due course. I want to thank noble Lords for their contributions. Through the commitments I have made today and the commitments made by the Prime Minister, the Chancellor, and the Minister for AI in recent weeks, which critically seek to build UK capability and through our sovereign AI fund and other measures, I hope I have been able to show the government is absolutely committed to ensuring we will do whatever it takes to keep the British people safe.

03:52:24 - 03:54:26

Diana Dido Harding

My Lords, I would like to thank the noble Lady Burger, the noble Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble Baroness Kidron for their support, and also the many people who spoke from across all benches in this debate. I had really wanted to hear something from the noble Lady that would give me comfort that the government really is going to address this issue, but I am really quite concerned I haven't. I do appreciate that she's tried very hard to set out why she doesn't agree with my amendment. But as I understand it, her argument is that this should be tackled globally. And yet in the EU it has already been resolved, as it has in California and in New York.

So it seems a strange position to go to the G20 to say we're going to lead the world by catching up with where some of you have already got to. So I do not accept the argument that this is a global issue. Not all tech regulation needs to be global. We have absolutely learned that in social media, my Lords. A number of us in this debate have spent the best part of the last decade campaigning for stronger regulation of social media, and I have to say I've been having flashbacks in this debate as the same arguments have been used again and again.

And the awful truth is that 10 years ago, when a number of us tabled amendments to regulate social media, both front benches told us we were wrong. And I used to joke that when both the government and opposition front benches are not on your side in tech regulation, you're probably in the right place. And I do fear that I'm in the same place again tonight. So although I am not optimistic in this vote, I do believe that we as a House will be debating these issues for quite a long time to come, and it will require national action, not just global talking. And so with that, my Lords, I would like to test the opinion of the House.

03:54:26 - 04:02:58

Speaker 24

The question is that amendment 41 be agreed to. As many as are of that opinion will say content. The contrary not content. The question will be decided by a division. I will advise the House when voting is over.

Voting is now over. Clear the bar.

Order, order. The question is that amendment 41 be agreed to. As many as that opinion will say content. The contrary not content. The contents will go to the right by the throne, the not contents to the left by the bar.

The question is that amendment 41 be agreed to.

04:02:58 - 04:03:00

Speaker 95

The contents will please say content.

04:03:01 - 04:03:03

Speaker 96

Not contents, not content.

04:03:04 - 04:03:04

The contents have it.

04:05:19 - 04:06:44

Speaker 24

The have voted. Contents 95, not contents 165. So the not contents have it. My Lords, amendment 42, Baroness Harding of Winscombe. Not moved, not moved.

Amendments 43 to 57 moved formally en bloc, Baroness Lloyd. Moved formally en bloc. The question is that amendments 43 to 57 be agreed to en bloc. As many as that opinion say content. The contrary not content.

The contents have it. Amendments 58 to 60, Lord Ravensdale. Not moved, not moved. We come now to amendment 61 in the name of Baroness Kidron.

04:06:44 - 04:11:10

Timothy Clement-Jones

My Lords, I rise to speak to this group and in particular to move amendment 61 on behalf of the noble Baroness Lady Kidron, alongside speaking to amendment 158 standing in my own name. Amendment 61 requires the Secretary of State to prepare, maintain and lay before Parliament a comprehensive digital sovereignty and resilience strategy. In modern cyber defence, we must know not just how we will defend our networks, but whose technology we are relying upon to do so. The strategy establishes a statutory digital sovereignty dashboard. Developed in consultation with the NCSC, the Competition and Markets Authority, the ONS and the AI Security Institute, this dashboard would monitor foreign state dependency, supply chain bottlenecks and the security of core sovereign data assets including NHS records, BBC archives and meteorological data.

It will provide the evidence base needed to reform government procurement, promote resilient UK developed technology and safeguard critical open source software. We cannot build genuine cyber resilience upon borrowed or vulnerable foundations. The government cannot continue to substitute a disparate list of commercial partnerships and piecemeal initiatives for an overarching statutory digital sovereignty strategy. True digital sovereignty is not merely a question of data residency, of where servers happen to be located. It's about decision rights, operational agency and jurisdictional immunity.

When key public functions, policing databases and essential national infrastructure are underpinned by foreign owned platforms subject to extraterritorial levers such as the US Cloud Act, the UK exposes itself to acute single point of failure vulnerabilities and sudden regulatory hostage taking. Relying on the good intentions of overseas boardrooms or transient administrative commitments is a fragile foundation for our national resilience. Amendment 61 provides the clarity and coherence we currently lack. It requires ministers to audit our strategic dependencies, benchmark foreign ownership across critical systems and ensure that Britain retains the statutory levers, open technical architectures and domestic capability needed to control its own digital future. This amendment mirrors the amendment so powerfully championed in another place by my hon friend Victoria Collins alongside our hon friend Freddie van Mierlo.

As she warned, in an unstable world, true cyber resilience cannot exist without a statutory strategy to confront foreign supplier dependence and build sovereign capability. And in that same spirit of transparency and digital integrity, I warmly welcome amendment 165 tabled by the noble Lord Morris. I turn next to amendment 158 which stands in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond. This new clause places a statutory duty on the Secretary of State to review within 12 months whether a statutory defence under section 1 of the Computer Misuse Act 1990 should be introduced for legitimate good faith cyber security researchers and threat intelligence practitioners and to report the findings to Parliament. My Lords, I made the case as strongly as I could on Grand Committee.

Competitor jurisdictions including the United States, France and Belgium have already updated their laws to provide legal certainty for ethical research. Sir Patrick Vallance's pro-innovation regulation of technologies review explicitly recommended introducing a statutory public interest defence. Amendment 158 does not write that defence into law today. It simply places a statutory obligation on the government to conclude its discussions with the CyberUp campaign and industry within 12 months and lay concrete proposals before Parliament. It's time to untie the hands of our cyber defenders.

04:11:10 - 04:11:12

Speaker 97

My Lords, I beg to move amendment 61.

04:11:12 - 04:11:24

Speaker 24

Amendment proposed, after clause 28, insert the new clause as printed on the marshalled list.

04:11:24 - 04:13:34

Speaker 70

My Lords, I will begin by once again reiterating the opposition's support for amendment 158, the review of good faith cyber security researchers. Creating self-improving systems is one of the most effective actions a government can take. Permitting the work of good faith researchers has that potential. It doesn't cost the taxpayer but can organically improve the security of both the private and public sector.

I really see no reason why the government shouldn't at least review the possibility. My Lords, our amendments 161 and 166 would require the government to publish the national cyber action plan. I think it's fair to say I've said this a few times over the course of the passage of the bill, that we are frustrated and perhaps even baffled by the lack of a holistic strategy from the government. Cybersecurity can most effectively be applied if all parts of the system are both considered and acted upon together. That is what the ever-eminent, never-arriving national cyber action plan should be doing.

I'm an optimist by nature, I cling to the hope that the noble lady the minister can maybe give us some good news in her response. My Lords, amendment 61 in the name of the noble lady Baroness Kidron would require the publication of a digital sovereignty strategy. While we are concerned that in practice this may act as a protectionist measure and thus reduce our competitiveness, we absolutely support the aims of the noble lady in ensuring that the United Kingdom's network and information systems are both self-sufficient and secure. That goes hand in hand with developing our domestic technology sectors and becoming a more competitive international market. We therefore support the underlying principles.

04:13:34 - 04:15:09

Morgan

My Lords, I want very briefly just to rise to speak to amendment 61. I wasn't sure before if the Lord Holmes of Richmond was going to speak or not. Just for two reasons. Firstly, because the noble lady the minister in her response to the previous amendment talked about the critical role of the government in keeping people safe in this country. And I think that we've already heard in this debate the growing threats in relation to digital security and safety.

And therefore it seems extraordinary that there isn't an overall digital sovereignty strategy in place already, and that's what this amendment highlights. But I also want to return very briefly to the debate that we had a little earlier on my amendment 62, which I suppose could have sat in this group. Because this amendment says that the strategy must set out the government's assessment of the risks. And the noble lady the minister said very clearly in relation to that amendment that actually she accepted I think the argument about the risk posed by services is not just related to size, and that the government would inform or help regulators to make up or to arrive at their assessment of risk. And therefore actually this amendment, which would as part of the strategy mean that the government had to set out their assessment of the risks, would help to inform regulators in relation to deciding which services provided a risk to essential activity in this country.

04:15:09 - 04:15:26

Speaker 76

And therefore there is a symmetry in relationship between those two amendments. We've obviously decided not to push amendment 62 to the vote, but I think this amendment 61, the need for a digital sovereignty strategy, is more pressing than ever. And if it is pushed to a vote, then I will be supporting it.

04:15:26 - 04:17:16

Speaker 73

My Lords, I apologize for not getting to my feet before our front bench. I was clearly so moved by the eloquence and erudition of Lord Clement-Jones that it slowed my motor function. And the speed of my noble friend Lord Camrose has clearly got his Asics on today. I very much support amendment 61.

There's so much talk about AI sovereignty, data sovereignty, digital sovereignty, with it potentially meaning different things to each speaker of the sovereignty spiel. We need greater clarity across this, and in the bill we have before us, having this comprehensive clause covering what's required when it comes to digital sovereignty for the United Kingdom makes complete sense. Moving to the Computer Misuse Act, Lord Clement-Jones, Lord Arbuthnot, myself, and others have pushed various governments over at least a decade on this issue. It can't be that our cyber professionals, those who do so much to keep us safe, often and understandably in silence and in the shadows, they deserve our support. It can't be that they are still on the wrong side of a statute that is racing towards its 40th birthday.

We should update the Computer Misuse Act. Lord Clement-Jones has offered a pragmatic solution in his clause with a 12-month period to bring this to fruition. Our cyber professionals do so much, they deserve our support. This proportionate amendment should be accepted by the government and put on the face of the bill.

04:17:16 - 04:18:10

Speaker 100

My Lords, may I speak very briefly to Amendment 165 in my name? This amendment was introduced because the scope was quite difficult at committee stage, and the question of end-to-end encryption is so fundamental to cybersecurity that it needed to be discussed. My Lords, any weaknesses or access points that can be exploited by hackers and hostile threats can make us less safe and undermine the whole purpose of this bill. My Lords, it is a difficult one. The government issues technical capability notices, it has backdoors into encryption, but this is an extraordinary issue because we're discussing AI machine learning attacks.

04:18:10 - 04:18:45

Speaker 99

But if systems are vulnerable because the encryption's now broken down, which does happen every time there is a TCN or there is a backdoor, then we have a real problem. And this is not an enough discussed issue, so I wanted to get it onto the discussion of the bill, and hopefully this will be addressed at some future point. The bill simply asks for a level of scrutiny. Is it really necessary to have the backdoor? Can it be scrutinized, for example, by the Intelligence Committee of Parliament?

04:18:45 - 04:19:53

Diana Dido Harding

So that's what the amendment says, and I hope that encryption and end-to-end encryption will be taken seriously as we move ahead.

My Lords, I rise very briefly to support wholeheartedly my noble friend Lord Holmes and the noble Lord Clement-Jones's Amendment 158. I just find it gobsmacking that we've not been able to sort this out, my Lords, and I really hope that the noble lady the Minister can give us some comfort that the government actually intends to give, as the noble Lord Holmes has set out, my noble friend has set out, cyber professionals the comfort that they have been telling successive governments they need in order to do their very valuable work. I'd also like to support my noble friend's Amendments 161 and 166. We must have a cyber action plan and a cyber strategy. Again, it's slightly bizarre, extraordinary, I've run out of words for why we don't have it.

It's clear to me that we have to recognize that there will always be sovereignty risks in our digital strategy as a country. We're simply not large enough to be able to do absolutely everything ourselves, which makes it all the more important that we actually do have a digital sovereignty plan, that we've thought about the risks, that we're strategic in how we protect ourselves, because we're not going to be able to be just an island in the digital world, as in fact the noble lady the minister said in the last grouping.

And then finally, I'd like to just expand a little bit on why I support Amendment 61. The government can't have it both ways. It can't be both a global issue and something that we don't need to have a plan to manage the fact that it's a global issue.

04:20:18 - 04:27:39

Speaker 101

I thank noble lords for their contributions. And I will begin with the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness Lady Kidron on digital sovereignty and spoken to by the noble lord Lord Clement-Jones and the noble lady Baroness Morgan, the noble lord Lord Holmes of Richmond. I'm hoping I haven't missed any noble lords out. I can assure noble lords that entities in scope of the NIS regime are already required to manage and mitigate the risks posed to their systems which deliver essential services. As set out in the government's response to the Science, Innovation and Technology Select Committee report on science diplomacy in September, this government recognizes and is actively working through the issue of digital and technical sovereignty, but we do not think a fixed statutory public strategy is the appropriate vehicle.

It remains this government's opinion that the rapid development of new technologies means a fixed statutory strategy would reduce our flexibility to respond to new developments and may require the publication of sensitive material, including commercial information. The government does not see digital sovereignty as total independence. It is about capitalizing on our domestic capabilities, achieving strategic resilience and building trusted interdependence. This has been set out in current strategies including the modern industrial strategy and digital technology sector plan of 2025, the Cabinet Office's June 26 procurement policy note 025, which recognizes AI as one of four key sectors critical for national security and outlines new guidance to prioritize contracts with British businesses to protect national security. Actions announced by the Competition and Markets Authority to improve competition in cloud services following last year's investigation.

These will support greater choice for UK businesses and the public sector and include voluntary steps agreed by Microsoft and Amazon. Safeguards to personal data through UK GDPR and legal and regulatory frameworks and continuing to encourage organizations to follow the UK software security code of practice and relevant international standards to manage cyber risks, including those related to open source software components. The current approach remains the most proportionate and effective, providing the government with the flexibility it needs to respond to emerging developments. But most importantly, we need to act to build the UK capabilities, just as we are through investment to grow our domestic capability, including 500 million pounds for the sovereign AI fund, 1.1 billion for the AI hardware plan and support for 2 billion pounds investment in quantum computing. This weekend the Chancellor has announced further investment to boost the UK's ability to build our own chip design and cyber defenses.

By making active choices about how we harness AI, we can ensure this technological revolution benefits our society and economy more fully than the industrial revolution. Turning to the amendment tabled by the noble lords, Lord Clement-Jones, and spoken about by Lord Holmes of Richmond, the noble lord Lord Holmes of Richmond, and the noble lady Baroness Harding, I thank the noble lord for returning to this important subject. I share the view that the UK should have the right legislative framework to tackle cybercriminals. The Home Office have already carefully reviewed the Computer Misuse Act and are proposing to introduce a defense to section one for accredited cybersecurity researchers when carrying out certain cybersecurity activity that would currently be unlawful under section one of the CMA. The Home Office have worked closely with NCSC, law enforcement, and the cybersecurity industry to refine these proposals.

As my noble friend the minister set out during committee, the Home Office recognizes legislating in this area is a priority and will do so as soon as parliamentary time allows. As the noble lord will be aware, the King's speech in May included a commitment to a national security focused bill with measures to update the Computer Misuse Act. This legislation is in development. While I understand the objective behind this amendment, reforms to the Computer Misuse Act extend well beyond the sectors covered by this bill and are better taken forward through this wider program of reform. I thank my noble friend Lord Moylan for his amendment that seeks to create a requirement to assess risks relevant to encryption.

I recognize the intention behind this amendment, but do not consider it necessary. The government supports strong encryption and robust privacy protections. The Investigatory Powers Act 2016 is world-leading legislation which helps keep the public safe while protecting privacy. It contains important and extensive safeguards, oversight, and scrutiny arrangements in relation to the exercise of investigatory powers, I do beg your noble lords' pardon, including powers that may engage encrypted services. Decisions under the act are subject to statutory tests, independent oversight, and where appropriate, approval by judicial commissioners.

This includes duties to consider impacts on privacy and system security. The amendment would duplicate existing considerations of security, privacy, and wider impacts, while creating an additional reporting process alongside the framework established in the Investigatory Powers Act. Creating a parallel statutory assessment regime through this bill would not materially add to the existing and robust safeguards and oversight. Finally, turning to the amendments tabled by the noble Viscount Lord Camrose regarding the National Cyber Action Plan, I can assure the noble lord that the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport is working closely with the Cabinet Office to develop the action plan and that the government remains committed to publishing shortly. We will update Parliament on the publication and implementation of the plan in the usual way.

The action plan will make clear that cybersecurity is a shared responsibility that requires action from government and business, including in delivering this bill to secure the UK's most critical systems. With those reassurances, I hope noble lords will feel able to withdraw and not move their amendments.

04:27:39 - 04:29:17

Timothy Clement-Jones

My Lords, can I thank the noble Baroness for her cameo appearance today on this group and for having the temerity to give an undertaking on behalf of the Home Office. And I hope that the Home Office will deliver in due course. And so in that respect, my Lords, that was as expected as regards amendment 158. And I very much thank the noble Lord Holmes, noble Baroness Harding, and the noble Viscount Camrose for their support. And we will look forward to that bill when it comes forward with that provision in it, my Lords.

As regards digital sovereignty, I think we're on the same page as regards not believing that this amounts to total independence, my Lords, but it does mean, as the noble Baroness indicated, having resilience across the full stack involved in the development of AI in particular. I think if circumstances were different and we had more time, my Lords, that we might be pressing further on this particular amendment. And I'm certain that if the noble Baroness Kidron was here, she would be wanting to do that, my Lords. But I think we're anxious to move to the next group. So in the meantime, we will be holding the government's feet to the fire in terms of its AI sovereignty strategy in particular, my Lords, but I beg leave to withdraw amendment 61.

04:29:17 - 04:30:26

Speaker 102

Is it your Lordships' pleasure that this amendment be withdrawn? The amendment is by leave withdrawn. Amendment 62, Baroness Morgan, not moved. Amendment 63, Baroness Lloyd, move formally. The question is that amendment 63 be agreed to.

As many as are of that opinion will say content. The contrary not content. The contents have it. Amendment 64, Baroness Northover, not moved. Amendment 65, Lord Clement-Jones, not moved.

Amendment 66, Lord Tarasenko, not moved. Amendment 67, Baroness Kidron, not moved. In clause 30, amendment 68, move formally, Baroness Lloyd. The question is that amendment 68 be agreed to. As many as are of that opinion will say content.

The contrary not content. The contents have it. Amendment 69, Baroness Morgan, not moved. In clause 31, amendments 70 to 76, move formally en bloc, Baroness Lloyd. The question is that amendments 70 to 76 be agreed to en bloc.

As many as are of that opinion will say content. The contrary not content. The contents have it. After clause 35, amendment 77, Viscount Camrose.

04:30:26 - 04:32:46

Francis Nicholas Markham

My Lords, while we're grateful for the way that the noble Baroness, the Minister, has listened and modified the bill on many of the things that we say, I think it's the feeling probably of most noble Lords that the bill is very much piecemeal in nature, or maybe as Viscount Colville said earlier, it's a bit of a whack-a-mole plan in terms of tackling cybersecurity, rather than setting out a comprehensive strategy for cybersecurity. So amendment 77 in my name and my noble friends Viscount Camrose and noble friend Lord Holmes seeks to address this by trying to have a strategic review of which entities should be brought into scope and which shouldn't. And then as ever, the amendment 163 by Lord Bert and also signed by Lord Clement-Jones and Baroness Kidron and myself seeks very much to build on this. As ever, Lord Bert has made some very thoughtful and insightful points, and I know that much work has gone into this. And so by amendment 163, really trying to require a regime-wide effectiveness review, looking at which sectors should...

As ever, Lord Bert has made some very thoughtful and insightful points and I know that much work has gone into this. And so by amendment 163, really trying to require a regime-wide effectiveness review, looking at which sectors should and should not be included, looking at how we can really use our world-class AI Safety Institute to play a crucial role in cybersecurity. So I think in all of this, amendment 163 is critical in building a comprehensive cybersecurity strategy and action plan, or dare I say, a national cyber action plan. Given the noble Baroness the Minister said earlier that DCMS are actually in the process of preparing such a plan, I I hope very much that this is something that the government would be prepared to support. But if it's not, and if it is something that Lord Bert wishes to divide on, then we will be supporting him in testing the opinion of the House.

04:32:46 - 04:33:01

Speaker 102

Amendment proposed, after clause 35, insert the following new clause: assessment of need for further strategically important entities to be brought within scope, as printed on the Marshall list.

04:33:01 - 04:38:02

Lorely Burt

I rise to move amendment 163 in my name and those of the noble Lords Lord Markham and Clement-Jones alongside Baroness Kidron. My Lords, I think the earlier stages of this bill have seen this House on all sides at its very best, with members bringing real-life experience and serious expertise to bear in a considered and non-partisan way on the grievous challenge that the cyber threat presents to our country. And that scrutiny, I would say, my Lords, has demonstrated, I'm afraid, just how limited this bill is in addressing that grievous challenge. It focuses on, and this has almost been forgotten in our debate today, it focuses only on a small fraction of the economy and the public sector, not on the lessons of JLR, M&S, TfL, or the Department for Education. It fails to appreciate the enormous complexity of technology platforms and the origin of their vulnerability.

Just a few days ago, a leading CTO in the midst of negotiating a contract to be supplied with data services by a leading provider read out to me one of the legal conditions of that supply, and I quote: "We shall not be responsible for any damage caused to the customer's computer or to customer data or for any bugs, viruses, Trojan horses, or other destructive code." Extraordinarily, my Lords, and this has been touched on more than once this afternoon, the draft of the bill that reached us did not even mention AI. Can that be believed? It is a bill that creates a multiplicity of cyber regulators, an estimated 18 in all. My Lords, in Northern Ireland, it is the Department of Finance that will be the designated regulator, not just for energy, but also for health, for road and rail, and for drinking water.

How could, my Lords, 18 regulators possibly amass the necessary skills to regulate in this deeply complex and ever-evolving environment?

Week by week as we have considered this bill, the ever-darkening cyber storm clouds gather. Last week as we all will have noticed, the PHP incident affected 70% of the worldwide web, 10 million servers identified as at risk. What our amendment seeks to do, my Lords, is to see this bill as a work in progress and to require the government over the coming 12 months to address the whole of the challenge identified throughout our proceedings and to conduct and to publish a review, inter alia, of the appropriate regulatory framework for cyber, which we manifestly do not have. A review of which organizations have a material impact on the economy and society in both the public and private sectors and should be brought into scope. Of what obligations should be placed on those organizations to promote cyber resilience.

A review, my Lords, of what obligations to provide safe services should be placed on technology suppliers, and remember the quote I've just read out. Of what scale and nature of cyber professionalism the UK needs. Of what incidents should be reported and to whom. And critically, a review of the powers of the AI Security Institute or another regulator in relation to frontier AI systems, a matter that's come up over and over again today, to make AI a safe technology for us all to deploy. Our hope, my Lords, is that this minister will welcome the opportunity that such a review would present, would address all the many questions that have been arisen but not properly answered today, that it would speedily promote further legislation that will enable us to grip this challenge in a way that this bill in its present form simply does not.

04:38:02 - 04:38:06

Speaker 103

My Lords, I beg to move.

04:38:06 - 04:39:32

Speaker 105

My Lord, I rise to support amendment 163 as tabled by my noble friend Lord Burt, and I will be very brief. We debated in committee the need for a single expert regulator for cyber security versus the more fragmented approach in this bill, which involves, as Lord Burt has just pointed out, a whole host of players: departments, centers, agencies, and all 12 existing regulators. I'll avoid another dairy analogy, but just say cooks and broth. I don't want to rehearse those arguments other than to say that a comprehensive 12-month review mechanism, as specified in this amendment, is now absolutely required in such a fast-moving, complex, and costly area. When I say costly, let me remind the House that current estimates are that cyber attacks are costing our economy between 15 to 30 billion pounds per annum and rising.

I think we can all predict that this act will bring unforeseen consequences, but none of us quite know what shape or form they will come in, hence the need for a review such as this.

04:39:32 - 04:43:04

Speaker 90

My Lords, I too rise to speak in support of amendment 163 in the name of my noble friend Lord Burt.

It's not attracted much notice, but the series of incidents in the last few months in which frontier AI models broke into the systems of several organizations is beginning to generate some sort of response amongst the culprits. OpenAI, Anthropic, and Google are reported to be planning to launch their own standards authority for frontier AI, which would establish qualifications for independent auditors of the models and labs. My Lords, we have the best independent auditor in the world in our AI Security Institute, AC. We should not leave it to the frontier AI developers to mark their own homework or decide who audits them. So I welcome the additional 120 million investment in AC announced on Saturday.

The director of AC told us today that it is in fact 120 million over four years and very much needed to keep AC at the forefront of frontier AI evaluation. We should also acknowledge that the government have moved since committee. Their amendment 70 gives the Secretary of State powers where a compromise may be attributable to loss of oversight or control of an AI agent. But as we've already noted, amendment 70 operates after the event, and it does not mention the AI Security Institute. Yet AC is the only body in the UK with the technical capability to determine before a model is deployed whether it can attack the systems that this bill will protect.

Today it has that access because developers choose to give it, and the suspension of that access for three weeks at the request of the US government shows that it can be withdrawn overnight. With frontier AI capability advancing every few months, should our critical national infrastructure rely on goodwill alone? That is the question that subsection 5D in amendment 163 asks. It requires the review to consider whether AC should have powers over frontier AI systems that pose a material risk to our essential services, to audit them before deployment, to set standards, to inspect them, and to require or recommend their suspension. Amendment 163, however, is a review, not new regulation, and I hope therefore the government will not find it too difficult to accept.

But a review is only as good as its conclusions. I would therefore be grateful if the minister could give the House two assurances. First of all, that the government will reach a clear conclusion and not simply keep the matter under review on whether AC should have a statutory role before deployment. Secondly, that the power in clause 29(1), which the government's own amendment 70 now uses for AI, could give it that role without further primary legislation. My Lords, this amendment is critical, and if my noble friend Lord Bert chooses to test the opinion of the House, I shall support him.

04:43:04 - 04:45:12

Timothy Clement-Jones

My Lords, we've had three very persuasive and excellent speeches in support of amendment 163, and I do thank the noble Lord Bert for tabling this extremely comprehensive and cross-party amendment.

And I wonder whether the chair has the details of some of the typos that are in the amendment so that we don't vote on something which will have to be changed at third reading, my Lords. It covers the scope of the bill which is not adequate as has been explained. The food and essential goods supply chain could be under review, local government and democratic infrastructure, advanced manufacturing, software as a service and cloud intermediaries. My Lords, it creates a structured evidence-based review with a mandatory interim report at six months and a comply or explain mechanism requiring the government to state publicly why any excluded sector is not being brought into scope. And as the noble Lord Tarasenko says, crucially, it requires the review to examine the institutional architecture, including whether the AI Security Institute should have formal audit powers over frontier AI systems deployed in essential activities.

My Lords, we risk leaving our primary technical watchdog equipped only with voluntary oversight while the capabilities it is charged with scrutinizing outpace the law. And my Lords, we face an era of persistent cyber warfare. We cannot leave our food supply, our local democracy, and our advanced industries unprotected. If the minister cannot accept this review on the face of the bill, my Lords, on these benches, we will be strongly supporting the noble Lord Bert's amendment.

04:45:12 - 04:49:28

Feryal Clark

Noble Lords, amendments in this group have been laid seeking an early review of various aspects of the legislative and regulatory framework. Amendment 163 would require the government within a year of Royal Assent to undertake and publish extensive reviews of the NIS regime, including its institutional architecture, i.e. what regulator does what and the scope of activities it regulates. This was set out by noble Lords Lord Bert and the noble Lords Lord Lonsbrough and the aspect relating to AC by the noble Lord Lord Tarasenko. I caution noble Lords that this amendment would commit the government to reopening the fundamental basis of how cybersecurity is overseen in the UK on an annual basis. This would create a destabilizing and uncertain regulatory business and investment environment.

Although it's right that we consider how best the NIS regime can be used to protect the cybersecurity of the UK's most essential services, I'm concerned about conducting this kind of wide-ranging and comprehensive review as envisaged by this amendment within a year of the bill's passing and every single year thereafter. I'm deeply concerned this would be a distraction to the effective implementation of the changes that this bill introduces and the reviews of scope that noble Lords and I have discussed during passage. The imperative once this bill passes should be to focus on working with regulators and regulated sectors to ensure that the updated regime delivers its objective of improving the cybersecurity and resilience of the UK's essential services. These are risks we see every day. To the question asked by the noble Lord Lord Tarasenko, in as set out as I set out in response to the earlier group, the government is not supportive of giving AC some of the roles he described.

What we want to focus on is working to deliver the security and resilience requirements in secondary legislation and partnering with regulators to ensure that they have the capability needed to enforce the updated regime.

I strongly believe that we should allow time for these changes to be introduced and bed in before we undertake such a wide-ranging review of their effectiveness. I do recognize the strength of feeling expressed by peers in this debate and in previous debates about the importance of critical services not currently in scope of this bill having adequate cyber security defenses. Building on previous discussions, I can today commit that within 12 months of this bill passing, the Secretary of State will lay a statement setting out where future CNI activity should be brought into scope of the NIS regulations. As set out in the bill, for something to be defined as a new essential activity, the Secretary of State must be satisfied the activity is essential to the economy or day-to-day functioning of society in all or part of the UK. A 12-month review of scope will allow the Secretary of State to conduct an evidence-based assessment, as mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, of whether they consider other sectors would meet this test and the suitability of bringing them in scope of the regime.

Once the review is completed and the statement laid, the government could then consult on which of those sectors could be added. To ensure the focus on the areas where the impact of a cyber incident would be greatest, the review will focus on the CNI sectors not currently in scope of the NIS or this bill. For instance, this will include government and the food sector. I believe this approach, focusing on the implementation of this bill with a targeted review of whether UK's most critical services should be brought into scope, will best enable us to deliver our objectives ahead of a comprehensive post-implementation review within three years of Royal Assent. I can reassure noble Lords that under the bill's current provisions, such a post-implementation review will be able to consider the effectiveness of the regime's institutional architecture.

I hope that noble Lords are reassured by this approach and these amendments will be withdrawn.

04:49:28 - 04:50:41

Lorely Burt

I thank noble Lords who've spoken in support of these amendments, my colleagues on these benches, Lord Lansborough and Lord Triesman, and Lord Clement-Jones. I have to admit to real despondency to hear the minister's response. I have said before I'm not a technologist, but for 30 years I've been involved in major institutions in the public and the private sector. For the whole of that time, without any pause, and I've been involved in technology challenges throughout that time. And I can promise the minister, and perhaps she'd like to listen to what I'm saying, I promise the minister that this bill is simply not the, doesn't reflect the real world that I have inhabited and do inhabit.

It simply doesn't measure up at all to the scale of the challenge that we face. And I deeply regret that I want to take the opinion of the house.

04:50:41 - 04:50:52

Speaker 102

Lords, I'll get to amendment 163 when it comes in its place in the marshaled list. In the meantime, does Lord Markham wish to withdraw amendment 77?

04:50:53 - 04:55:17

Speaker 102

Is it your Lordship's pleasure this amendment be withdrawn? The amendment is by leave withdrawn. Amendment 78, Viscount Camrose, not moved. Amendment 79, Lord Clement-Jones, not moved. In clause 37, amendment 80, Baroness Lloyd, move formally.

The question is that amendment 80 be agreed to. As many as are of that opinion will say content. The contrary not content, the contents have it. Amendment 81, Baroness Northover, not moved.

In clause 40, amendment 82, Baroness Lloyd, move formally. The question is that amendment 82 be agreed to. As many as are of that opinion will say content. The contrary not content. The contents have it.

Amendment 83, Lord Clement-Jones, not moved. Amendment 84, Baroness Northover, not moved. Amendment 85, Baroness Lloyd, move formally. The question is that amendment 85 be agreed to. As many as are of that opinion will say content.

The contrary not content. The contents have it. Amendment 86, Viscount Camrose, not moved. In clause 42, amendments 87 to 89, Baroness Lloyd of Effra, move formally en bloc. The question is that amendments 87 to 89 be agreed to.

As many as are of that opinion will say content. The contrary not content. The contents have it. Amendment 90, Baroness Northover, not moved. In before clause 43, amendments 91 to 104, Baroness Lloyd, move formally en bloc.

The question is that amendments 91 to 104 be agreed to en bloc. As many as are of that opinion will say content. The contrary not content. The contents have it. Amendment 105, Lord Clement-Jones, not moved.

Amendment 106, Baroness Lloyd, move formally. The question is that amendment 106 be agreed to. As many as are of that opinion will say content. The contrary not content. The contents have it.

Amendment 107, Baroness Northover, not moved. In clause 44, amendments 108 to 116, Baroness Lloyd, move formally en bloc. The question is that amendments 108 to 116 be agreed to en bloc. As many as are of that opinion will say content. The contrary not content.

The contents have it. After clause 44, amendments 117 to 119, Lord Clement-Jones, not moved. In clause 65, amendments 120 to 144, Baroness Lloyd, move formally en bloc. The question is that amendments 120 to 144 be agreed to en bloc. As many as are of that opinion will say content.

The contrary not content. The contents have it. Amendments 145 to 147, Lord Clement-Jones, not moved. In clause 55, amendments 148 to 157, Baroness Lloyd, move formally en bloc. The question is that amendments 148 to 157 be agreed to.

As many as are of that opinion will say content. The contrary not content. The contents have it. Amendment 158, Lord Clement-Jones, not moved. Amendment 159, Lord Clement-Jones, not moved.

160, Viscount Camrose, not moved. Amendment 161, Viscount Camrose, not moved. And 162, not moved. Before I call amendment 163, I do indeed have a few words to read out. My Lords, there are three cross-referencing errors in the marshalled list.

In the amendment in subsection 9, the cross-reference to subsection 10 should instead read subsection 8. In subsection 10, the second cross-reference to subsection 8 should instead read subsection 7. And also in subsection 10, the cross-reference to subsection 10 should instead read subsection 8. I hope that is clear. Amendment 163, Lord Burt.

04:55:17 - 04:55:22

Speaker 106

Nothing to add to what I've said before, I'd like to test the opinion of the House.

04:55:22 - 04:59:13

Speaker 102

The question is that amendment 163 be agreed to. As many as are of that opinion will say content. The contrary not content. The question will be decided by a division and I will advise the House when voting is open. My Lords, voting is now open, clear the bar.

My Lords, the question is that amendment 163 be agreed to. The question is that amendment 163 be agreed to. As many as are of that opinion will say content. The contrary not content. Contents will go to the right by the throne and the not contents to the left by the bar.

05:03:45 - 05:06:56

Speaker 107

My Lords, the question is that amendment 163 be agreed to. My Lords, there have voted contents 202, not contents 155, so the contents have it. Amendment 164 by Lord Markham.

05:06:56 - 05:07:08

Francis Nicholas Markham

My Lords, we believe it's vital to the cyber security of the United Kingdom that we do keep a register of hostile foreign actors and we would like to test the opinion of the house.

05:07:08 - 05:07:26

Speaker 102

Question is that amendment 164 be agreed to. As many as are of that opinion will say content. The contrary not content. The question will be decided by a division and I will advise the house when voting is open.

05:07:26 - 05:10:36

Speaker 108

My Lords, voting is now open. Clear the bar. My Lords, the question is that amendment 164 be agreed to. As many as are of that opinion will say content. The contrary not content.

The contents will go to the right by the throne and the not contents to the left by the bar.

05:15:30 - 05:17:56

Speaker 109

My Lords, the question is that amendment 164 be agreed to. My Lords, there have voted contents 194, not contents 155, so the contents have it. Amendment 165, Lord Murray, not moved. Amendment 166, Viscount Camrose, not moved. And amendment 167, Lord Clement-Jones, not moved.

05:17:56 - 05:18:04

Speaker 102

My Lords, that concludes the report stage of the Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill.

05:18:04 - 05:18:09

Speaker 101

My Lords, I beg to move that the House do now adjourn.

05:18:09 - 05:18:09

That the House do now adjourn.