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International Relations and Defence Committee House of Lords
Follow its sittingsIndrajit Roy
Thank you, for having me here, and more importantly, thank you to all for the work you're doing. I think it's incredibly important for the reasons that have been, outlined. I am a professor of global development politics at the University of York. I come to this from the perspective of development, especially global and international development, but also the close links between development, security, and international relations more broadly. A lot of my work focuses on what's called the Global South, how the term originated, how the various members of the Global South identify with each other or not, and the role that, Global South countries could play in and are playing, in fact, in shaping, the new world order.
Much of my work looks at the interactions of domestic politics with international politics, in a select number of Global South countries. And I think it's really important to reflect on these linkages as well as how they might, shape, the role that the so called superpowers and the ex superpowers, could be playing. I've been an academic for about fourteen years and prior to that I was a practitioner. I worked in the aid industry and I've been working off and on with colleagues at the FCDO looking at questions of the Global South and their role in shaping ideas of multilateral cooperation.
Speaker 14
Thank you. Thank you very much indeed. Okay. I'll chain claim the chairman's privileges and retrospectively offer the apologies of lord George Robertson who I should have said at the outset, sadly can't be with us today, so he's deputed to me. And the question at first, and I'd like to put it to doctor Slaughter first, but I'll come to the others.
In recent years, a consensus has emerged that the multilateral system and more specifically international are in some form of crisis. Do you agree with this characterization? And if so, what do you see as the main causes? Doctor Slaughter.
Anne-Marie Slaughter
I do agree with the characterization, that it is in crisis and has been for a couple of decades, at least. I think the main causes are that it is unrepresentative and ineffective. Let's start with ineffective. We have had have, two major wars, the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the war between Israel and Gaza and now is The United States, Israel, and Iran, which are all part of the this same larger conflict. And the United Nations has been absent, other than with some of its special organizations, the suborganizations on refugees.
Effectively, the world looks at at what is the global organization to establish peace and security, and it is not establishing peace and security. So I think the ineffectiveness point, it has been a subject for many national parliaments for a long time. Certainly, the US Congress, and it's not to say it's ineffective everywhere, but largely in its main functions, it's ineffective, and it is unrepresentative. It is difficult to say this, in the British parliament, but I would say it in my my own country as well. You cannot run the world in 2045 with the victors of 1945.
And we have known this for quite some time. Secretary general Kovianan tried very hard to reform the Security Council, and it looked like we might get there, but we did not. And when I say we, I say the the members of the Security Council, the permanent members, but also the various global coalitions that tried. And I don't think that you can continue, to have a global order that is based on that lack of representation. And professor Roy, I'm sure, will have more to say about that.
I think I'll stop there.
Okay. Let's go to professor Roy.
Thank you.
Indrajit Roy
Of course, I, agree with the characterization that the multilateral institutions are ineffective and unrepresentative, but they've been like this for a while now. So I'm not sure that we're in a special form of crisis today. In some ways, this has always been a problem with the way in which multilateralism has been organized. Right from 1945, it was the victors of the Second World War rather than the newly independent countries that had any role whatsoever to play in, the in in global governance. I think what we are seeing now, though, is cause for cautious optimism.
So there is crisis, but there is an opportunity as well, and an opportunity for many of the countries that were hitherto unrepresented to now start playing a role. So I would perhaps say, yes, we are in a crisis, but this is a long crisis. And finally, we are starting to see rays of hope, and, opportunity. There is a great deal to be said about the multilateral competition sorry, the multipolar competition that's, sort of, you know, tearing us apart. But
there
Indrajit Roy
There's also what is being called a multiplex integration. That is a whole variety of different institutions, countries, states, nonstate actors who are forced to work together with each other more than ever before. And they're not doing it through the usual, channels of, formal, institutions, but often through informal networks. So I would say crisis, yes, but opportunities, perhaps more so.
Speaker 13
Yeah. I take a bit of a different view. International cooperation and making international organizations, ensuring that they help governments to cooperate is necessarily difficult, and it always has been. You are a sovereign parliament. This is a sovereign government.
It's not been elected by British people in order to give away sovereignty to others. Therefore, the the task of international organizations attempting to bring more than a 190 such sovereign governments together is necessarily difficult. So in a way, the word crisis well, if it's a cry it's always been in crisis. So what I would say is something different. For just three three quick points.
So first, the system that we've seen since 1990 and the end of the Cold War is an anomaly in international history. The idea that you have one power whose vision of its own interests drives a rules based system which all other countries participate in is highly unusual. So what we're seeing now is a normalization of the system with the rise of China and with the rise of revisionist powers who are creating a new a new great power balance, if you like. And in that great power balance, what we're seeing in every UN agency, in every international organization, organization is a competition among the powerful who use three different levers to get control or to in or to expand their leadership of those organizations. And, obviously, The United States and China are first in the queue on this.
And they're using control of the leadership or their ability to coerce the head of an organization to do things. They're using funding. Both The United States and China are refusing to pay dues to the United Nations in order to try to push it to do things. And they're using coalitional politics. They're getting countries they're trying to get countries unconditionally to support their own position in any of these organizations, and there is nothing new in that.
That's what international cooperation and international organizations are like. What has changed and led people to think that we face a crisis right now is a redrawing of interests to a much shorter time horizon. So we talk about a rules based system. It's never been a rules based system. It's been a system driven by the interests of the powerful, The US, but The US interests, you know, have have always been drawn in quite a medium term way.
So the long term interests of The United States are have been to create a world secure enough through its security umbrellas to sustain trade and investment and global supply chains for The United States. Now what president Trump's done is hugely shorten that horizon. So the time horizon sometimes is one day, one deal, one conversation. And that's why unpredictability and unreliability have become an instrument of diplomacy because it's such a short time horizon. I think that will pass, but I do not think that the world that a world after president Trump will snap back to where it was beforehand, nor do I think that all the elements of the president Trump presidency will stay with us.
I think America will necessarily expand its time horizon back to a slightly longer term, and it will become more predictable and more reliable because that's what its businesses, its people, its communities, its economy needs. And there are plenty of voices in The United States still pushing to sustain cooperation to that end. So in short, I think we're seeing a normalization, in international organizations. And what we need really closely to look at, as I said in my introduction, is the role that Britain can play in sustaining those organizations. And the biggest challenge for Britain is that it has, by default, a habit of always lining up with The United States in each international organization.
In my view, The United States needs Britain, together with other countries, to moderate and restrain the more excessive impulses of this moment in American politics, full the interests of a wider range of Americans. And that means for Britain making some difficult choices to prioritize or not to prioritize, but to really double down on other mutual partnerships and coalitions. And last year, I completed a global impact review for the foreign secretary looking at how it is that Britain's different departments are lining up foreign policy, and we can talk about that and what's going to be required in order for Britain to sharpen its foreign policy goals, but even more importantly, to effectively implement them.
Speaker 14
Excellent start. Well, the witnesses, you've not agreed with each other. You've absolutely confirmed the wisdom of our choice on this particular study, and you very much wet our appetite. So, Tariq, lord Armen.
Tariq Ahmad
Yep. First of all, thank you. Quick declaration of interest. I chaired the advisory board of the International Communities Organization, conflict prevention. And some context before I ask my question, I did serve for a long time, as the minister at the FCDO that became, looking after multilateral UN Commonwealth, NATO.
The list continues, and perhaps that's where the challenge also arose that beyond the interjection at these meetings in what was quite a staid and structured process, that the whole multilateral system was very clear. And I agree with the premise, whilst there's been a difference of opinion, that the multilateral system has been under strain and stress in terms of its traditional sense. So I suppose the first question, and perhaps just continuing the theme, professor Woods, if I could come to you, which of those existing structures within the multilateral framework do you think are in need or most urgent attention, if I could put it that way, in terms of the focus? And I particularly would hone in on the point you made about the role of The United Kingdom in that respect.
Ngaire Woods
So I think so the United States administration, president Trump's White House has defined the organizations that they think are most important and stayed in them in spite of everybody thinking they might withdraw, the IMF, the World Bank, the United Nations Security Council, the UNHCR, the humanitarian muscles of the international system. And I think those organizations are important, but equally, it's important that they don't become pawns either of The United States or of China. It's really important that a coalition of other countries really steps up their efforts to support the heads of each of those organizations to take a more multilateral position, to restrain and moderate the goals and ambitions of each of the superpowers, and to take actions which increase the resilience of other countries. I mean, world is now facing three very urgent crises. The crises the crisis in The Straits Of Hormuz and the refineries that create, for example, aviation fuel fuel and diesel.
We're we're we're we're living off rapidly declining stocks in that. Fatih Bural has called it the biggest energy crisis the world has ever known that's in the offing, and he's the head of the International Energy Agency. We're facing a crisis on AI fueled cyber attacks to critical infrastructure, which will which will affect many more countries than one after they've occurred. And and we have an Ebola, outbreak starting in the Democratic Republic Of The Congo, which The United States has defined as a country of absolute strategic priority to it because of its cobalt, which is required for semiconductors and other critical industries. Now those three crises are literally an opportunity to really double down on both new and old kinds of cooperation.
So, yes, we should look at those institutions which are the muscles, but we should also look at the fact that this is an opportunity for The United States to begin reengaging with the World Health Organization, which will be required to manage the Ebola pandemic. It's an opportunity to really think about how we deploy the international financial institutions to deal with the massive energy crisis, which is going to have consequences on the economies of all countries. And it's it's, you know, equally Britain's leadership of the g twenty at a time where we need the g twenty very rapidly to create an expert group to coordinate when the first cyber attack AI fueled cyber attack on critical infrastructure takes place, and that has to happen in the next month or so so that that group knows each other, trusts other, and can shift into action very, very quickly. So so these these are opportunities for us to really focus attention on multilateral cooperation to
deal
Ngaire Woods
With the crises upon us, both using old institutions and using new institutions, and I think that's really important. Just one last thing. My concern for Britain would be that if Britain doesn't have an active policy and use its diplomatic muscles to help build and reinforce coalitions, which really help to preserve Britain's room for maneuver, then the international organizations that we've got can very quickly become the footballs of China and The United States.
Mhmm.
Ngaire Woods
And that will reduce Britain's sovereignty, reduce Britain's choices, and reduce the choices of other countries. I also think it will reduce the time horizon of both China and The United States, and that it's even in their interests that we move to help push that timeline out and sustain the cooperation that's necessary, including for them in dealing with the three crises I've mentioned as well as others. I don't know if that answers the question.
Tariq Ahmad
Thank you for that. And perhaps continuing on that theme, doctor Storter, if I could come to you. We've heard about the existing systems, and you raised earlier the issue of the UN has been absent from the table. I mean, just on transfer, I've shared that view as well. But linked to that, has this been the reason why we've seen an expansion of these other new innovative sort of multilateral groupings that are taking place?
Your reflections in that regard. And what's the role again? I would be specific on The UK within this. Do you think we've been a bystander, or do you think we are part of these new processes? And perhaps with the g twenty presidency around the corner and on the horizon, it presents a new opportunity.
Thank you.
Anne-Marie Slaughter
Yeah. So I should start by saying I am also hopeful for reasons I will explain, that that a new new versions of an order are emerging. And I do think The UK has a a very important role to play. I see this the system differently. I don't think the the traditional system was just The US imposing its will.
I think the it in fact was The US and The UK that created the United Nations. And really, when it has worked and, of course, it has been paralyzed through much of the Cold War, but when it has worked, it has been The US, The UK, France, Europe, and other countries that were able to act collectively. I don't think we are now in a bipolar world. I don't think it's The US and China that are are dictating. The US is not coming back anytime soon.
It for reasons I we can go into, but I won't I won't focus on on now. I think the the the fragmentation is a function in part of global South countries saying, wait a minute. We're not represented, and we have a we need to have a say. That you are seeing the emergence of many different coalitions of the willing. That is not a term that is was popular in multilateralism.
It comes from George w Bush's effort to circumvent the UN, with respect to the Iraq war. But in fact, what it means is different groups of nations coming together, to try to address problems, of immediate concern. So if you look at the Straits Of Hormuz, on the one hand, you see, Saudi Arabia Pakistan and Turkey and Egypt trying to to broker negotiations. Those are not four countries that have that are often pulled together, but they have common interests here. And you see, to come to the the heart of your question, you see The UK being the first convener of the some 40 nations that that include global South and global North nations to figure out how to, in fact, safeguard the Straits Of Hormuz and and stabilize the situation once the immediate fighting has stopped.
The moments aren't there yet, but that to me is a critical role, for The UK. I think, indeed, it is essential that we not see this in traditional bipolar terms where you have to play off the superpowers, but rather that there are different important powers for different issues. And that, in fact, The UK as a convener now between the EU, The US, China, and others, but as a convener, as a catalyst, as a coordinator of action for as many powers as we as can be pulled together for specific crises. So on the Ebola crisis, I hope The US reengages with the WHO. I'm not so positive.
It we're just completely unpredictable, and I I just don't think you can you can count on that. On the other hand, the WHO does have a big role to play, but it'll have to play that role together with the national governments, and the national health establishments of many African countries and as many others, as can be convened. On, again, on different, regions, you may you will work with different regional organizations, but that won't be enough. So the ability of The UK and, I would say that it was Canada who who, with with prime minister Carney's original speech, obviously, wants to play a role, also South Korea, Australia, and and then the the BRICS companies countries without China or Russia, but certainly Brazil, and South Africa, also thinking about Mexico, the Gulf countries. They're gonna be different configurations in many different situations.
It will not be clear what's, you know, the the ultimate shape of what's emerging, but there's a tremendous opportunity, and I agree with Britain's chairing the g twenty, to pull together a combination of large and important middle powers, and then smaller regional powers issue by issue.
Tariq Ahmad
Thank you. And, professor Robert, your is is it broken? Can it be fixed, I suppose, is
Indrajit Roy
I mean, I would say I I would sort of be careful about narratives like the international system is broken because for the reasons that have been outlined, it's you know, some would say it's always been like this, but others would say it sort of now opened up new opportunities. But I think I think there's something to be said about the fact that there are new different players who are now playing a much more important role. I think it's very important just to reiterate the point, but I think really hone it in that we don't speak the language of polarities, either unipolar or bipolar or even multipolar, because the inherent in the idea of polarity is it is that the world is divided into camps, and it's not. There is a great deal of and I think the point was made earlier, issue based, conversations, alignments, which crisscross these you know, the thinking about camps. And I think, Britain should especially eschew the language of camps or polarities.
It's tempting to do that, especially when you're part and parcel of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which I'm sure will come to, you know, down the line. But it's it's it's tempting to talk the language of camps and polarities, and I think we should really push back against it. The role of regional banks, in addition to everything else that has been said, the role of regional banks, the role of regional, unions, associations, I think could go a long way to push back against the language of camps, to also speak about what might happen from a bottom up perspective as in to, you know, to for Britain or for for that matter, the international associations to better represent, and to be more responsive to what's going on on the ground, what the real needs are, and how countries that are dealing with some of the crisis already, what they're really doing, and then to support that rather than float in different kinds of solutions which may or may not be relevant. So I would say, well, it's broken with all the caveats that I've said, but there are ways that we can fix it which doesn't need a revolution.
It can do with existing with working creatively through existing institutions. Of course, that sounds revolutionary to a lot of people, but it doesn't have to be.
Thank you. Thank you, Tim.
Speaker 14
Thanks very much. As I move to lord Derek, we're if we're gonna get through our questions, we're gonna have to speed up or process some of the answers. So first speaker to say the most and then complementing remarks from the other two should be the rules of the game. Kip.
Speaker 10
Thank you, chairman. This is a question back on the American angle, but I hope it's slightly different from the ground that you you've already covered. As doctor Slaughter said, the postwar international institutions were largely created with American leadership with a bit of British input. And since then, with some ups and downs, we have seen continued American engagement and stewardship and leadership at times until, at least how it's looked, until the latest US administration, which looks frankly to be disinterested, even disdainful of multilateral multilateral much multilateralism and multinational institutions, and has reduced funding to the UN, but also doesn't really seem to engage with with the UN at all. America First looks like America alone quite a lot of the time.
And if you look at the g seven and g twenty
The US boycotted last year's meeting with the g twenty and left the g seven halfway through. So it's a pretty dismissive attitude. Do you agree with that characterization? Do you think this is a blip or part of a long term trend? And can we possibly have an international structure, international system that is even remotely effective unless you have American leadership as part of it and and full American engagement.
Perhaps doctor Slaughter would be the right place to start on this.
Anne-Marie Slaughter
Again, I I think this is a long term trend in The United States. It is not, as as, professor Wood said, there are many people in The United States, that that certainly want global engagement. The con the sense of The US as hegemon or, you know, one of the the superpowers of the twentieth century and and the responsibilities that The US took upon itself, that I don't think is coming back, for many reasons. And one of them is simply the tremendous demographic change in The United States. Within twenty years, we will be 50% European American and 50% everybody else.
That means tremendous ties to Africa and India and Latin America, so 30% of Americans will be Latin American. You're already seeing that impact as we look much more south because a large proportion of our populations come from, our hemisphere in the South. That has lots of wonderful potential long term implications, but it means that the settled East Coast foreign policy consensus that looked to NATO, that looked to the Transatlantic relationship, and that that was the stabilizer then of and and a block within many international organizations, that is dissolving and has been for some time. And but it isn't just republican versus democrat. It is it is a a sort of much more inchoate search for a new role.
We will be engaged, obviously, through business. I don't think that the the, certainly, these tariffs will survive, although it's worth noting that the Biden administration kept the tariffs on China. And there's a lot there's a lot much more support for protectionism of of various kinds. So I don't think we will play the role that we we did. I think we will engage on specific issues that we care about.
And, again, a democratic administration may come back, but it will not come back the way professor president Biden said, I'm back. It will not come back in the twentieth century way. Can an order survive without The US? I think they're I I agree with professor Roy on the multiplex or multi aligned or multi something, but not just states, and we haven't even talked about nonstate, actors. I think that that there are overlapping groups that can do a great deal, either without the driving of The United States.
On pure military issues, obviously, The United States still plays an absolutely critical role in on many economic issues. But if you took the EU and Britain, and Canada and Switzerland and Norway and Japan, South Korea, and Australia, that's 42% of global GDP. That's a lot. That's enough to do to do various things economically, certainly, and a considerable middle military power as well as the EU also builds its capacity. So I think, absolutely, we can see a global order emerging.
It will be more complex. It will take time to, again, to to have any really formal shape. It will, and I'll I'll conclude here, though, also involve many other US actors. You know, when The US opposed the International Criminal Court in the nineteen nineties, the the prosecutor for the court said to me that they couldn't have survived without US foundations, without you the the American Bar Association. And now you also have US states.
I mean, California and other US states are playing an increasing role themselves, and US mayors working with mayors around the world in ways that will be fundamental for climate, health, and and technology crises. So The US is there, but not in the same way, and
Anne-Marie Slaughter
order will emerge, I think, probably more it will be more resilient, more complex, and more global.
Ngaire Woods
Yes. Sure. I I really like the question. I think it's you know, there's a long standing idea that for international cooperation to work, you need a hegemon, but it always focused just on the hegemon and not on why other countries want cooperation. And, actually, if you look if you focus instead on why other countries need to cooperate with one another, you find all kinds of ways in which they do absence of a hegemon.
So international cooperation can't continue, would be my first point. But I think the the the bigger point that you're alluding to, which is what's really changing, you know, quite apart from the noise and the of president, Trump's administration, what's really changing. And globalization is being rewritten. You know, the the the the shift from a focus on an a global order which makes global supply chains as cheap and easy and efficient as they can be has been replaced, and that started accelerating during COVID with a vision of secure and resilient supply chains. The idea of cheapest production wherever you can do it is being replaced by a sovereign concern for jobs at home.
And these messages are not just in The United States. They're across Europe. They're across most of the world. And that's been presaged by reports that show us that what's happening in so many countries is that people have lost the belief that their children that if they work really hard, their children's lives will be better than theirs. You know, I remember McKinsey Global Institute did a report more than a decade ago called poorer than their poorer poorer than their parents highlighting that this would be a lightning rod for politics around the world.
We're seeing a rise of not just economic security, but also industrial policy in a world that needs to re to build anew an infrastructure that can deliver cheap abundant energy, for example. And a realization in western democracies that the nineteen eighties forward trend of just leaving it all to the market is not going to work. You need serious planning and serious continuity to rise to some of these challenges. So I think the deeper trend is that rewriting of globalization, but it doesn't mean we're heading into a completely uncertain world. Let's not forget that the post world order that doctor Slaughter has referred to was an order of embedded liberalism.
It was an order which in which there was a lot of sovereign control over currencies, over economic planning in this country and others, and it was an order in which the the the international economic interactions were actually relatively controlled. And what I see in a lot of the world is a yearning for not a return to that order, but the possibility that governments can do more to protect jobs, to protect their citizens, to protect, you know, the safety of products, the renewability and abundance of their energy. And that's what we're seeing reemerge. And that will redraw, what we think of as global order.
Indrajit Roy
I would say yes. It is absolutely possible for an effective global order without The United States leading it for the reasons that have been outlined earlier. Also, because you do have the opportunity now for the middle powers or the so called middle powers or the self styled middle powers to work together. And, of course, if they work together, you will see a more effective global order. Now the idea of middle powers working together might be seen as very novel, but it isn't because you've had these visions of the middle powers working together since at least the nineteen fifties.
If you think of the nonaligned movement, for example, it wasn't simply about countries not aligning with the power blocs, but it was about countries that work together in order to provide an alternative order. And I I think those visions are now come to coming to fruition. And it is really to go back to an earlier question, it is really for Britain to sort of identify where it stands and how it works with the with the emerging power configuration. So my answer would be yes. It is very much possible to think about an effective global order without The United States leading it or as the hegemon, as has been said.
Speaker 26
Well, otherwise. Thank you, lord chairman. You've just been talking about, professor Roy, about The United States not being necessarily the lead role. But we have, in the last few days, even seen China playing an increasingly lead role. What do you think China's vision is for for the multilateral order, whether working through international organizations, pressing its influence at the UN,
Speaker 22
To establish new organizations such as the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank. What's China's vision? Does it want to assume the leadership of of whatever new global arrangement, if we don't want to use the word order? Right. Or how do you think they see things?
Indrajit Roy
That's such a fascinating question partly because it's China and partly because of the size of the country. In some ways, what China wants or not is often dealing with what what happens irrespective of what China wants simply because of the size. But it is a big country with a very strong civilizational identity. Some would talk about China not as a rising power, but as a resurging power. There is the idea that China is now finally overcoming or has overcome or is about to overcome what is commonly called within Chinese circles the century of humiliation.
And, of course, historically, China has had ideas of how it's the Middle Kingdom, and there's no reason to believe that those historical memories have disappeared. Disappeared. That said, I think there is some exaggeration about China's vision because there are even though it's a one party state, there are several competing visions within the Chinese Communist Party, And it's possible that the present head of state may be able to push his views, over that of the others, but there has historically been a great deal of competition within the Chinese Communist Party. And there's a lot of academic work which suggests that all these large infrastructure projects such as the Belt and Road Initiative, which are often exemplified as evidence of China's great game or grand strategy, are in effect retrospectively cobbled together, you know, on the basis of what local bureaucrats did or couldn't do. You know, they're often portrayed as blundering sort of individuals who've just sort of got their own interests and no such grand vision.
So, I think we need to be to recognize that there are ideas of Chinese great power nest that exist, but what's more important is whatever China does has an effect on the world whether or not others like it. We that doesn't mean that, other countries should be paralyzed by fear or feel that, well, they're about to be taken over because, there are limits, of course, to China's ability to extend whatever if if so far it may have any hegemonic vision. And the fact that its hegemonic vision is not necessarily, you know, shared by countries in its immediate neighborhood. Vietnam, The Philippines, South Korea, Japan, India, all of these have long standing contradictions, if you will, with China's vision of itself. So whether China has a vision, there surely is a vision in some circles of China of a grand strategy and of China resurging.
Whether we need to be worried about that vision, I don't think so. Whether we should take that seriously, yes, of course, as you would take the visions articulated by any large power, but and work with them in a way that's realistic and reasonable.
Anne-Marie Slaughter
Well, I would agree with professor Roy in in in in his diagnosis. I don't I don't think we need to worry about China replacing the role of The United States in as as hegemon or its own vision. I would say there are are just a couple of differences in the way China does see the world. The biggest one is it wants an international order based on absolute sovereignty. It has absolutely no interest in the parallel evolution of the human rights regime alongside the original concept of the United Nations.
And and as professor Wood said, it was you know, that original conception was much more based on sovereignty, and that is what China wants. Second, I don't think China has any desire to take over any kind of global policeman role, and indeed they've pushed back on the idea that they're going to replace The United States. It's too expensive, and they have too much to do at home. And the final thing I'll just say, watching China in Africa and The United and in Latin America, as we might have watched The United States in the nineteen fifties and earlier, the Chinese often generate their own antibodies on the ground. Right, where they are very active, often national governments push back to be expected.
And I think you see that when it is too assertive with a particular view of what the international order should be. It is a resurgent power in my view. It demands respect. It demands a a role, but I don't think it's it's planning to replace The United States. I don't think anybody will, in that twentieth century role.
Thank you very much. Professor Wood.
Ngaire Woods
Yes. I think, China has, you know, as with all its policies, it sets out very clearly what its vision and goals are. And in 2025, Xi Jinping set out his global governance initiative, which quite clearly outlines for us what the goal of what his goal and the goal of China is in reshaping global governance. And I think that's important to look at, and it's the culmination of a decade of thinking in China as it has increasingly competed for the headships of organizations. It's increased its funding but also the earmarking of its funding.
So it's using exactly the same mechanisms as other other governments have used to try to gain more influence over international organizations. And I agree very much with, you know, both professor Roy and doctor Sauter on the role that other coalitions can play. But at the same time, I think we have to be realistic that there are three very important powers that both China and The United States have. And the first is the control of access to resources and markets which really matter for other countries. Most countries are very dependent on one or the other for trade and investment.
Second, their control of dominant technologies, not just for the economy but also for also for military use. And the third is their control of the rules of the game, their their influence over the rules of the game. Now I'm not saying they control it. I agree with doctor Slaughter. This has always been a competition, and other countries play a role in that competition.
But their role on those three things is indisputably dominant. And that's why it doesn't mean we have a totally bipolar system, but it means that we have to be realistic about their competition for control of those things and the role that multilateral organizations can play in moderating and restraining and shaping that role. So my my view is that The United Kingdom, working with other parts of Europe, can in can work to increase the extent to which each of these multilateral organizations provide an ecosystem for Britain to succeed and for other countries to succeed. And that that's that's the important way to see it. Can I just add one small thing, chairman, which was to lord Auchman's point about UN agencies?
I just wanted to underscore in case there were there was any doubt about this that starting in the nineteen eighties, very many UN agencies had their core budgets cut and began to rely more and more on earmarked funding, on voluntary contributions. So most UN specialized agencies today rely for more than 90% of their funding on earmarked contributions. And that has the unfortunate effect that they become guns for hire. They start looking for funding and doing whatever people are willing to fund them to do. And that means we do have and I know people are uncomfortable voicing this, but we do have international organizations doing things that we don't need UN agencies to do.
But they're doing it because it's the only way they've been able to their coffers. So this is a good moment for us to really think about what are they doing that they don't need to do, and what is it that they're doing that they really what is it that the world needs them uniquely to do because they're multi lateral organizations? And then to commit to funding that rather than using the kind of begging bowl model of funding whichever activities any particular individual country or small group of countries want to fund them to do.
Speaker 14
Order of monk, forgive me. Can we just, momentarily go out of order? Because we're gonna lose doctor Slaughter at 10:00. And so, if Brianna Schrey's gonna ask her question to doctor Slaughter, who's the lead responder, then we'll come back to you next.
Speaker 1
Thank you. And, actually, it follows on nicely from professor Wood's point that you've you've just made because there's been much talk and much written about the need reform multilateral institutions. But this morning, you've all emphasized the opportunities for international relations and cooperation with newer, flexible groupings, alliances, maybe multiplexes rather than necessarily institutions. And in this context, and specifically actually following on from your point about in the context of restricted funding pots, can there be any meaningful reform of institutions? And if so, given condition
Like the skepticism of The US. How? And will it require a catalyzing event or, you know, potentially such as a massive energy crisis or cyber attacks on critical national infrastructure or a health crisis such as Ebola. So, doctor Slaughter, can I come to you first on that?
Anne-Marie Slaughter
Yes. So I'll I'll start just by saying I very much agree with, professor Wood's analysis of of The US and Chinese control of markets technology and the rules. Rules of the game may be a little less so, but the first two are very important points that we really haven't talked about, technology, enough. But that goes directly to your question. I there are, 80 think tanks, universities, others, creating a network of thinkers, scholars, practitioners, coming up with a blueprint for reform of a lot of these institutions.
I think there will have to be a major crisis. I mean and something one hopes not not a global war, but the you know, either an AI crisis, another pandemic, that is worse, but something really major to create the amount of political will necessary to reform the formal institutions. I think it is important as The UK and Britain did, starting in 1942 to think through what that reform could look like and to try to build support. But you have that plan on the shelf as you do domestically for the for when the moment is right. But it probably won't be just one big one, but we will have to have a big crisis the kind of crisis to change political will.
In the interim, I think you can work through some institutions. Professor Wood's point about the financing is is an important one, but there are also there are institutions that you wouldn't work on refugee issues without UNHCR. But again, UNHCR and the humanitarian machinery also depends critically on the eight big humanitarian NGOs and various other kinds of nonstate organizations. I think there's you you might see a situation in which the general assembly will be kind of reengineered to replace the Security Council. It doesn't have the same status at international law that Security Council resolutions do, but I'm not sure that that is the binding constraint.
So I think you could imagine regional institutions and different global institutions being repurposed or used by a group of key states and then those states working with many important nonstate actors, again, with multinational corporations, with philanthropies, with NGOs, with universities. This is a very messy process, and I don't think that we can begin to see the outcomes. But I think you can work, as I said, on two tracks and imagine real reform of new institutions. Although a new international order will have to be more flexible than the one created. It will have to allow much more room for work with nonstate actors.
But at the same time then, depending on what the issues of the day are, you pull together the states and non state actors that you need. And here again, I would strongly, endorse the role of of The UK. And since my time is limited, I'll leave you with an image. In the in the Financial Times, I wrote about an armadillo order of many overlapping groups. But I think perhaps moving from Texas to Britain, the original international order was more like a French garden, quite formal, quite quite clear what all the divisions and boundaries were.
I think what we're seeing is much closer to a English garden, with an enormous amount of things growing and and quite wild in some some ways and very hard to see exactly how what the final, product will look like, but something to cultivate and to engage, and the The United Kingdom has a very important and special role to play.
Speaker 1
Thank you very much. In fact, I know you've got a hard stop. So just thank you very much for being here with us this morning.
Yeah. It's my pleasure.
Ngaire Woods
Yeah. So my experience is that there are three things that change international organizations for the better. The first is obviously crisis, where it can change existing organizations and lead to new ones. So think about the g seven born out of the collapse of the Bretton Woods system.
Mhmm.
Ngaire Woods
A new crisis committee for the world. And then think about the way that was expanded after the East Asian financial crisis into the g twenty, again, a committee. People then say, well, we should institutionalize it, build a secretary. No, actually. What the world needed was a committee, a crisis committee, and those crisis committees, I think, function quite well.
The second thing that, changes international organizations is competition, And I say this having spent over a decade trying to persuade the IMF and World Bank on behalf of developing countries and emerging economies to begin to change its governance, and the the progress was glacial. But during the East Asian financial crisis, when a Japanese official murmured that they thought it might be time to produce an Asian monetary fund to compete with the IMF, It was an electric lightning rod for reform, and suddenly, the g twenty was formed, and suddenly, there was a far more active pursuit of how do we actually open up the organization and change its governance to be more inclusive of other countries.
Ngaire Woods
the and likewise, I think what we're seeing today in things like China's credit lines to countries is competition both for US credit lines, but also for things like the IMF. Think about the way the Argentinian president campaigned on getting China out of Argentina, but then quickly realized once he was elected that China's 18,000,000,000 credit line to Argentina is vital and used, and that China is Argentina's third largest trade partner, and therefore, an immediate cutoff wasn't wise. Most countries have found that they can't afford to choose between The United States and China. They need both. So the question is how to use both, and international organizations can help them.
The third thing I just wanted to say about international organizations is leadership is really important. And what the world does at the moment is countries compete to try to get their national to be the head of an organization. The minute the person is installed, all countries get on with competing on who's going to get the headship of another organization, and far too little attention is paid on how you hold that person to account. And that's important because leaders, really good leaders of international organizations, can really bring about change. Think about the way the secretary general of the United Nations several decades ago, using his own special offices, created peacekeeping operations, which at the time played a a critical role.
That was the invention of a leader. I have seen heads of international organizations who do their job extraordinarily well, quietly behind the scenes help countries come together to make their case collectively so that the organization can be more responsive. And yet, sadly, I could also give you a list of heads of international organizations who have been forced out because of corruption, terrible behavior, incompetence, etcetera. So so we should pay attention. If we want international organizations to work, we should pay more attention to their leadership and I can send the committee a report that we did with a scorecard of leaders across international organizations and a very simple list of seven things that countries should think about when they start putting nominating candidates.
And that's very important because the world is heading towards selecting a new secretary general.
Speaker 27
Oh, three and a half questions, thirteen minutes, only two witnesses. Lord Lamont. A very long question. Much has been made of the political paralysis of larger international institutions, people, for instance, the UN, the WTO, and we hear talk of smaller new institutions appearing. People refer to BRICS.
BRICS, of course, is a wonderful journalistic acronym invented by a member of this house. I'm not sure to what extent it actually is an organization and actually has become institutionalized or has common objectives, although I know they hold regular meetings together. But do you actually see we're obviously going to have to have opportunistic regional groupings, people getting together on specific issues. But do you actually see new institutions that could seriously challenge the architecture of the so called rules based system? Could it really seriously challenge, as I say, the architecture as opposed to just being ad hoc?
Ngaire Woods
So, the BRICS let me give three examples of where the BRICS plus have acted. And and first, let's note that the BRICS has quite rapidly expand expanded. So a number of countries are saying they want to be part of it, presumably because they see some advantage. The BRICS have created their own contingent credit lines, which are important because otherwise countries rely either on swap lines from The US or from China. The BRICS have created their own development bank, the new development bank, sits in Shanghai and is lending.
And the BRICS, in the wake of The US tariffs over the last year, very rapidly moved to redirect agricultural exports to China in a coordinated way, which gave them some leverage. So so I think they it's not just an acronym. It's it is actually an example of a coalition of countries moving together. I think the other thing I would say is that we've learned in the last eighteen months how difficult it is for countries to hold together in a coalition if there's any defection risk. And the particular the particular way in which the White House is unfolding foreign policy makes countries very aware of the defection risk because they can be individually singled out for increased tariffs, for example.
And that's why we see, for example, the countries of Europe and The United Kingdom, it took much more than just tariffs against these countries to get a collective response. It took literally the the rumor of a threat of force to take Greenland to get European countries to come together using some of the mechanisms of the anti coercion instrument to put a huge retaliatory package, together, which did change the The US's statements and at least short term intent. And I think that's important. It tells us two things about coalitions. It says for them to get over the defection risk, they have to share a truly imminent threat and an equal perception of the intensity of that threat.
And second, they do need some preexisting mechanism to collectivize their action. And that so to your comment about bricks, Lord of Mont, it's the bricks do actually have some apparatus now for taking collective action. And I think so, of course, does wider Europe, the European Union, with The United Kingdom and and and Norway and Switzerland and and others. And so having the institutions and then being able to face down an imminent threat is is gonna be pretty important.
Okay. It's alright.
Indrajit Roy
Thank you. I think the BRICS is an incredibly useful example of a group that seemed to be going nowhere when it started out, and yet it has cohered. Not only has it cohered, it has also expanded. It's also a good example of what countries can do as a coalition, but not in a military alignment or a military alliance. Remember, the BRICS is made up of countries that are otherwise at each other's throats.
China and India, for instance, even as they're fighting, even as their troops are facing off each other, are having agreements and discussions in the BRICS summits. Iran and The UAE both were, recently, joined the expanded BRICS. They're also not on the best of terms. Likewise, Egypt and Ethiopia. So I think it's a very good example of, of an interest based coalition that may look opportunistic, and indeed, some people have called it a coalition of the of coalition of convenience or something.
But the point remains that it is interest based, and it's heavily so. It may not be principles based or values based, although there can be questions on that as well. Some would say it is values based because it's pushing back against a one, unipolar dominant order. But the point remains that it is a coalition of countries that is trying to set up alternative institutions. Now when I say alternative institutions, these are not necessarily competing or seeking to undermine existing institutions.
In fact, if you look at the language of the new development bank, which the BRICS countries took, you know, put together, a lot of their guidance, a lot of their, justifications for supporting projects are drawn from the UN. So in some ways, could say the BRICS paradoxically strengthens the UN because it's a group outside of the UN that still pushes for the UN, sort of supported, ideas. A third misconception about the BRICS is that, you know, there's a tendency to think of the BRICS as an extension of China's policy or China's outreach policy. Nothing can be further from the truth. If you just look at how the BRICS came into being, the BRICS was preceded by a trilateral agreement between India, Brazil, and South Africa, what used to be called Ipsa, and then they realized that bringing China and Russia will just get you more attention, which, of course, it did.
And I think it's it's therefore important to think about the internal dynamics within the BRICS. And to go back to the question that has been asked, you know, what can The UK do? Instead of being suspicious of the BRICS and think of it as a China led intervention, I think it's useful to recognize the internal dynamics within the BRICS and work with the BRICS rather than against it. The BRICS is not a military alliance, and it does not intend to be because, of course, of the reasons I mentioned. So it is here to stay, but not in a way that is easily recognizable as coherent to others.
Speaker 24
Okay. Well, Grokopf, with a supplementary from lord Bruce and then a final question, from Baroness Blackstone. Yes. Quite a quite a bit of this material about the global South you talked about already. If I can just perhaps put it in this context that I think it was professor Woods who said mentioned early on about the numbers of states that there are now, 190 odd.
And if you're looking at the broad picture, that it's just a colossal difference from, the 50 odd that set up the UN in the first place. If if you were taking a view, that that is a terrific change. And to me, it speaks to just the enduring strength and popularity of the nation state despite all the criticisms I know are made made about it. And and also a contrast between the received wisdom I don't know how long this goes back, but the received wisdom has always been, you know, globalism is inevitable. I think Tony Blair once said about, you know, moaning about it.
It's a bit like moaning about winter coming or something. You know, it's gonna happen whether you like it or not. Whereas it seems to me the reality on the ground is quite reverse. I mean, there are lots of separatist movements around to point to towards even more nation states, and I can I I racked my brain to think of this? It's very difficult to think of any state mergers since the second world war.
I'm talking about Tanganyika and Zanzibar or Canada and Newfoundland, you could say, and I think it was they tried one between Egypt and Syria. So all the all the trends is towards more and more nation states. And I I just wonder what implication that has for the subject of our inquiry, multilateralism. Does it make it more difficult or easier? Does it to what extent does the does the word say anything useful any longer?
Because, as I say, the reality is different to the perception in in many cases. I'm I'd just like your sort of thoughts on that. It's a bit bit broad, but I think it's I think it's relevant to our inquiry. So
Indrajit Roy
I mean, of course, the number of states, you know, in the sis in in the in the international state system has increased. Many of these increases you do see in the global South, and there are I think it's it's tempting to think of the global South as somewhat of a homogenous entity. That's that's something to be guarded against. There is a great deal of divergence within the global South. There is what, a lot of us would call the poor South and the power South, as in Southern countries that have rapidly increased their economic and technological advances, others that have not done so, you know, as as quickly.
And there's a lot of, dynamics and contentions within the within the Global South, between the poor South and the power South. That does make multilateral cooperation that involves the Global South as an entity a little more tricky, and it's therefore, you know, tempting to say, oh, well, let's just stick to the existing arrangements. But as I've said, I think the fact that you have many more, entities and many more, sorts of tensions within and between the global South is actually an opportunity for learning from them, learning from Global South countries on how to work best together. The BRICS, again, is a great example. You have opposing entities or in in the examples that you would give, states that may have fought secessionist wars, emerged independently, as independent nations, but they still have to work together.
And, they've got to be brought to the table. So they could have their domestic or border issues or quarrels, as indeed China and India do, even though they didn't didn't emerge from the safe system, but you get the point, or or India and Pakistan do, for for instance, or other neighboring countries with, problems, do.
But that doesn't mean that they cannot be brought to the table. And I think there's a lot of learning to be done from those countries that are in conflict with one another along certain issues, but are willing to talk to each other and collaborate along other issues. And I think taking an issue based approach is what these examples would really help us and also get us to, you know, as the point that has been made, not think about the world order in as as as if it's organized in a way that it isn't. That's how I would respond.
Thank you.
Speaker 28
Yes. I wonder if you can help us with our inquiry because and that's on the issue of definition that with most select committee inquiries, they they end up mushrooming and getting wider and wider and less and less focused, basically. And given that not only are there an awful lot of international organizations, for the reason I said in the earlier question, that there there are likely be more and more and more of them, can you give us are there categories of these organizations that are talked about in academic circles? You know, are there four main types? Or I'm trying to anticipate what we might do and how we might focus our inquiry now because it would be greatly helpful if we could think in terms of, well, these are the four categories we're looking at and these are their distinctive characteristics.
So I'm asking you to write the report, basically.
Ngaire Woods
Well, I think one of one of the first things I I would do if I were in your shoes is uncover the multilateral effectiveness reviews that were done by DFID because they do exactly that. They set out all the major international organizations. They say which ones are vital for The United Kingdom? How well do they do? Why?
How? What? So that work is done and it's sitting you know, it was done by diff what was then diffid. And I I I think, it's worth dusting off that work. That would really that would give you a good grounding on that.
The other thing I I did want to say is your question's a very deep one about sovereignty and why sovereignty matters and how do states use their sovereignty and strengthen it. And often it's people think, well, there's sovereignty and then there's international relations. Well, actually, in the international relations of governments can reinforce and strengthen their sovereignty. And I think one of the things this committee needs to look at or could look at when it thinks about The United Kingdom and multilaterals is I think that one of the big surprises when I was doing the global impact review of the FCDO was how much foreign policy has mushroomed across every department of the British government. So it was a surprise to discover that there were some 600 people in the cabinet office doing foreign policy, that there's a whole unit in the home office doing foreign policy, that there are many different parts of The UK doing foreign policy.
Because whether you're a small, poor country, as Indrajit was saying, or whether you're, you know, a powerful country, your ability to influence multilaterals comes very much from how cohesively and in a unified way you push your case. And one of the reasons that Britain was always seen to punch above its weight in the past was because other countries saw it working very cohesively. They knew that if one part of the British government showed up at this organization with this policy, that it would be reinforced by other parts of the same British government in other organizations and in head heads of government meetings. It didn't always feel like that in London, I'm sure. But that was the perception, and that's what was felt by other countries.
And it saddens me that that has disappeared to some degree because and and this is really important for the g twenty leadership by the United Kingdom government, is to find a way to knit the government back together. You know, it's partly because it's been a, let's say, dynamic time politically. There over a period of four years, in the last decade, in four years, there were 34 different ministers in the cabinet office. We're on our eighth or ninth foreign secretary in just as many years. So politically dynamic, but also for the civil servants, there's been huge change among our civil servants on foreign policy.
The Brexit debate led to a huge increase in staff. COVID led to another. All these things have to be worked through, but I think a powerful push from your committee about what it's going to take to bat as one team and to do that powerfully across the multilateral organizations would be very useful.
Thanks very much. Yeah.
Speaker 14
Can I just test the, stress test the the witnesses? Lord Grogolt's question took seven of the available five minutes.
Good question.
Speaker 9
Are you still alright for few more minute? Are you both alright to stay maybe as as long as half past, and then we can get in the final two? That's very kind. Lord Bruce, you had a supplementary on this one, and then I'll come to you.
You're muted.
Speaker 12
You now you're muted, Bruce lord Bruce. I think he's question I think he's saying he doesn't need to ask it.
He's on
He's waving a
hat. Yeah.
Speaker 7
Can you hear me? Yes. Yep. Sorry. You had to unmute me.
I couldn't do it myself. Thank you. First of all, can I say this has been a fantastic session and really, really helpful to the committee? I just wanted to focus on The UK's convening role in this changing world when we are, I thought what, doctor Woods was saying was very interesting about cross government participation on foreign policy. We're in the process of cutting one third of the staff of our foreign office.
In other words, we're dismantling our diplomatic capacity, and we're we're we've slashed our aid budget. So my concern is how does The UK use its influence across the world as a convener to make things happen in a much different dynamic way when we've destroyed most of the levers which we previously used? Just a comment we got from the state department when on our previous inquiry we were in Washington was to be told that The UK's imperial legacy meant that we had influence and reach across the world in ways and places that The United States didn't actually always appreciate and valued our participation. How can we use our convening power, and what role should we have in engaging particularly with African countries rather than just the bigger powers? Because they're the ones who tend to think that this debate is all about the big guys discussing their influence, and they're just sitting on the outside looking in.
How can we best use our convening power to actually change these things? I wonder, professor Roy.
Indrajit Roy
So it is tragic that so many colleagues who knew the dynamics that you know, of a postcolonial world and had actually studied or, you know, worked with colleagues in Africa, Asia, and elsewhere are part of this reshuffling and rejigging that you you've you've been mentioning. And there's a great, loss of institutional knowledge, I think, that, you know, you will suffer from. I don't think talking about imperial legacies helps anyone, to be really honest, and to put put that, you know, upfront and bluntly. I think what does, help is, to reemphasize the way in which Britain really, wants to learn from as well as contribute to a a changing world order. Britain should think of itself perhaps not as, you know, as a legality of an imperial power, but as an emerging middle power, which really does have at heart the best interests of well, you don't want to say former colonies, but at least, you know, the the countries that you've had historical relations with at at the at the very least.
Obviously, I cannot comment on the way in which the government has restructured itself, but I think what Britain does or could benefit from is, the network of alumna alumnus alumni that you have who've sort of, you know, emerged from British universities, gone back to, know, their own countries, taken up, you know, professional roles there. And perhaps this committee or, you know, others could convene, some sort of, an input workshop or something which, you know, gets which is able to reach out to, policymakers from those countries, with a specific view on, you know, how Britain might leverage its, role in the g twenty. But I do I don't think speaking about imperial legacies will help. What will help is to recognize and be upfront about Britain being an emerging middle power, and, you know, doing what it can to work with others, both, you know, superpowers, middle powers. And don't forget, as we've been saying, the the ones who are neither superpowers or middle powers, the the the so called the poorer countries of the world as well.
Of course, the g 20 is a more limited forum, but you could use that to, you know, highlight Britain's global role. Sorry. I hope that answers your question, at least.
Speaker 19
Yeah. Sorry. Point about the imperial thing was not me. It was a comment that was made
Yes. Yes. In the course of
Ngaire Woods
My global impact review, interviewing a lot of Britain's potential partners abroad, current and Britain. As Indrajit said, I I there there wasn't a huge nostalgia for an imperial Britain, I have to say. But but I think that the serious point I found was that there was some perplexity felt by other countries as to what Britain actually wants. So in the words of one foreign minister, we know that Britain always wants to lead, to convene, and to hold the pen, but we honestly don't know why. We don't know what Britain wants, and and this leads countries to project on Britain all kinds of different motives.
Now what I think is the case is that The United Kingdom today doesn't always know what it wants. And so we need to ask the question, what does it take to know what you want in your international relations? And it takes a carefully orchestrated and planned consultation and voice of your businesses across the country, of your other interests across the country. It takes cohesion across government, and it takes a genuine plan. And I think there's space for development, as we say when we teach, the space for development for The UK on that.
It hasn't been helped by the merger of the FCO and DFID because all mergers take very careful planning. When you bring two companies together, when you bring two agencies together, to get the best of each instead of defaulting to the worst of each takes real planning and organization and serious, you know, change management. The FCO and DFID were simply slammed together. And finally, you mentioned the shedding of 30% of the workforce. I think it's worth understanding that if you took the full staff of the FCO and the full start of of DFID when they were merged, the staffing today of the FCDO is 30% more than the total staff of both.
And I don't think there's a single person in the FCDO that thinks that they've become 30% more effective, more efficient, and more focused. So there is a job to be done, and it's not the fault of the people who work in the FCDO, but it is a really serious task to ensure that Britain's apparatus for taking forward its foreign policy, for defining what Britain wants and needs, and taking that forward needs very serious attention. And it's not just the FCDO. It is certainly the FCDO, but it's also the other parts of government who have, exploded their not exploded. They have greatly increased their foreign policy capabilities as well, but but there's not a lot that's bringing them all together.
Thank you very much. Thank you.
Speaker 14
That's brilliant. Some of it answers Baroness Blackstone's question, but restate the question and then some pithy instructions to the committee about how we go forward and structure our review.
Tessa Blackstone
Thank you very much. It does indeed part partly answer the question I want to put. And in fact, what you both said in the last one and a half hours touches on this question, which is what should this committee be telling the government to do, in terms of its involvement in multilateral organizations around the world? And I absolutely want to endorse what you've just said, professor Woods, on the need to bring together different government departments. So the advice that you would be given would not just be to the foreign secretary, but it has to be to a number of senior ministers, nearly all of whom have quite a lot of work to do in relation to the wider world and multilateral organizations.
So if you could both rather succinctly give us some bullet points beyond your last bit of advice to to government, which is to get organized on how you determine what your foreign policy is across government, because many departments are involved in it. What are the four or five key things that the UK government should should do? So starting with you, professor Woodson, then then on to professor Roy.
Ngaire Woods
It's it's hard not to fall into the usual, you know, get government working together, clarify the goals, the strategic and operational goals of of of Britain foreign policy. Look again at the multilateral effectiveness reviews. Define what which ones Britain really both wants and can shape because those are are sort of slightly can't recommendations. And the question for government is always how when there are so many different competing priorities and when the government is itself in a state of, you know, some uncertainty and flux. So first, I would use the opportunity of leading the g twenty to do two things.
One is internal, to get the British government working as one together. And two, to use the preparatory process to reach out to other future partners, other countries, to engage them in the process as a way of strengthening Britain's partnerships with other countries. Britain actually hasn't entirely shared its imperial legacy. It goes to other countries with a sense of this is what we're going to offer you, and not always a sense of this is actually what you could be offering us. It actually needs, in that sense, to be more focused on practical mutual partnerships and and and less on leadership and offering something to the rest of the world.
Second thing is to so use the g 20 to do those two things. And then if you take the issue of energy, just as an example of a high priority, we're in the midst we're, you know, we're heading towards what Faita B. Roll has called the greatest energy crisis of all time, and Britain has its own energy problem, which is an energy price for industry, which is much higher than competitors. There is a need for cheap and abundant and renewable energy in this country, and there are several different government departments which each have something to say about that. So so that would be an example of where that needs to come together, and you you literally need a plan.
And planning is something that since the nineteen eighties, western democracies stopped doing. Governments became the facilitators of markets, and as a result, there's very few planning muscles left. When I've talked to the CEOs who got engaged in various attempts in the last decade of industrial strategy, they felt that huge amounts of their time were wasted on a process that was then casually dropped by whichever politician was in charge, and then the next would then announce another. And and that use of the extremely scarce and valuable time of Britain's business leaders is not good. But they do need to be engaged, as do other groups in Britain, in a serious strategy that's both economic and international for the country.
So I think focusing on a couple of the issues we've talked today about energy, technology, and global health. Those are three areas which could really serve to illuminate some of what this country needs to do both internal internally and externally, and which multilateral organizations could help in that. And third, I I can't stress enough how important it is for a Britain that rest of the world sees as a country that's defined the countries it doesn't want close partnerships with post Brexit, etcetera, and then with the changing relationship with China, and now, you know, the the the the the the need to be managing the relationship with The United States. But it's not seen as a country that's really clearly defined which countries it wants to be close to and partner with and to what end. I think it's beginning to do that.
I think the Britain's accession into the TPCPP, the Trans Pacific Trade Partnership, although it's geographically a little perplexing to be part of the Pacific, but, you know, Britain's membership of that is, you know and the the Japan, Italy, UK defense agreement. You know, these are really important steps as our other partnerships that the FCDO and other parts of government are taking forward. But it's to really start thinking, what do those you know, what's the mutuality in this? What do we need? Do we need to learn better flood management from Pakistan?
Probably, yes. And what is it that Pakistan wants from us, and what does that look like? And where is it we need to work with our European partners if other countries primarily want two things, security and access to markets and investment? Then where how is it that we work with our European partners? Perhaps to extend the umbrella of an expanded anti coercion instrument so that there's a competitive offering to that which China and The United States are offering.
How do we work with them to give a really bonanza kind of market and investment access that's predictable reliable and slightly less tough than some of the alternatives. So I think there's those are the things I would I would focus on. But start with the multilateral effectiveness review. There are really things at the nuts and bolts side of things that Britain could
Ngaire Woods
Improve international organizations and therefore international cooperation on. Thank you all.
Indrajit Roy
Thanks. I think there is a great deal of room to recognize the opportunities opportunities rather than only focus on the crisis element. So I think there is room for cautious optimism, and that has to reflect in the vocabulary, the language we use. Secondly, I think we do need to, you know, Britain does need to be willing to talk to, its potential and actual partners in terms of what they're looking at the at in terms of reforming the multilateral system. You do have to talk to the Indias, the Turkeys, the Brazils, the Indonesias, other countries that you're interested in developing your partnerships with.
Be willing to, build alliances beyond your traditional alliances in the North Atlantic. Look out for alignments. Work with a variety of different, actors, and that there's been a lot of talk about the Indo Pacific, but the Indo Pacific strategies tends to latch on to what The US does rather than what Britain itself might bring to the table. And, I mean, I have to say this as a member of the university, perhaps think about investing in higher education that, generates the sort of knowledge that will ultimately feed back to you. Not see that as a drain on resources, but actually as an investment, that will help answer some of these questions.
Sorry, I couldn't beat what Nairi had said, so I thought it would be useful to close on that. But thank you very much for this opportunity.
Speaker 17
Thank you very much. Well, thank you very much. I think I just wrote down to myself that that it's a delight to be inspired by the prospect of a review rather than be thrown into a sense of imminent and prolonged despair. But I think what our witnesses today have absolutely done is I often say to some of my friends that the the the pleasure and the and the privileges of serving on this committee is like a sort of a slow moving m fill in international relations, and I come away much wiser. And and we can now embark on this with the prospect of a hugely enjoyable and informative review, which we hope, thanks to you, will have the right impact on the recommendations we can subsequently make.
So in closing this particular session, can we thank you very much indeed and wish you well? Thank you.
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