European Commissioner Andrius KUBILIUS in Warsaw, Poland at the Warsaw Security Forum 2026
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European Commission
Follow its sittingsMicael JOHANSSON
I don't think Poland would have selected the submarines either if we hadn't been NATO. So it means a lot, but it's not really about interoperability because that's been the case for a long time. If we, you deliver to NATO, you have to be interoperable. But it means a lot in terms of how do we deepen the interoperability in terms of having systems of systems. That, that part we haven't been involved in.
So it's a huge change for us. And we're just in the beginning of this thing. And now the new cycle of planning has just started, so it will be even more when it comes to the regional aspects of how the forces will join doing things together in the Nordic region. So I can just say that it's, it's a, it's a very important thing of course and, and very good for us as industry, but of course most of all it's good for the deterrence in the Nordic region. So it's a big thing.
Victoria Coates
Excellent, thank you. And then Andreas, I think we last had one of these conversations in Miami six months ago. It seems like six years ago, so much has happened. Hopefully we will reconvene in Miami in six, six months and see how right we were. Just building on what Michael was just saying, Europe's defense industrial base has undergone significant expansion over the past four years.
As this process continues, how are you working to close the gaps between European defense requirements and current defense base capabilities? And how do you try to balance the need to invest in and grow the defense industrial bases of European countries with long-term investment in future capabilities? Balance that with the need for purchasing weapons that currently exist and are needed to fill capability gaps in the short term?
Andrius Kubilius
Well, first of all, thanks a lot. Really a pleasure to be here. And, and just to try to answer your quite a sophisticated question, you know, in a more simplified way. I would say, you know, first of all, really what we need to achieve is to make Europe much stronger in defense capabilities. That is what NATO 3.0 is about.
Europe taking more responsibility, with United States staying with secondary responsibility and nuclear umbrella. So this is our, you know, clear, clear, clear understanding of both what we need to do now and what we need to do, you know, in the longer term. And that comes to, well, we are metaphorically using, you know, if, if NATO has a concept of NATO 3.0, so we on European continent need to have a concept of Europe 3.0. You know, building really all our capabilities, both material ones, but also looking into institutional side, how we shall, you know, better organize ourselves. That is what Commission President spoke in her State of the Union address about European Security Council and things like that.
Now from material point of view, really we have what I call, you know, double task.
From one side, we have NATO capability targets which we need to build up very quickly. We have Defence Readiness 2030 our agenda, and that means that some, you know, we need to look what we can purchase immediately in order to develop those capabilities which were agreed with NATO. And but second, at the same time, we need to look how we are developing our own defence industry, which really has its own systematic problems. It's enough to read Draghi report on fragmentation in order to understand what's, you know, what big, you know, challenges we need to resolve with defragmentation of our defence industry, with development of integrated market and so on and so on. And here comes also, you know, some kind of longer-term issues which we are trying to target with new initiatives which we are now starting to implement.
For example, development and and implementation of so-called European defence projects of common interest. For drone defence, for eastern flank, for anti-ballistic and anti-missile and air defence, also for maritime security and space shield, where we need to learn how to build pan-European projects in defence, which for till now was quite a difficult to achieve with all our, you know, fragmentation environment. So those are in some way several of directions where we're working very intensively, making Europe to become stronger, because that will make NATO stronger, and I absolutely sure that when we shall become stronger, our relations with transatlantic partners also will become stronger. Besides what we're doing here in European Union, let's say, we need to see also very important goal for us to do everything in order to integrate battle-tested Ukrainian capabilities with our capabilities, both with their military experience and also with their industrial development. So those are in short way, you know, some kind of directions where we're working very intensively.
Victoria Coates
Excellent, thank you very much. I may need another finger. Marcin Przydacz. How did I do, how did I do with that?
Victoria Coates
I'm going to keep practicing. Last time we were together was actually on the lawn of Mount Vernon celebrating the United States 250th anniversary. You all might have heard we had a birthday this year. And that was a wonderful, wonderful occasion. So for you, Russia followed up its illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 with its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
Over these past 12 years, Poland's defence spending and military capabilities have both skyrocketed, and today the Polish military is among the most capable and impressive in NATO. How has Poland's role within the alliance changed as Polish spending and capabilities have increased?
Marcin Przydacz
Well, first of all, thank you very much for having me in this panel with such a distinguished presence of of my of my colleagues. The title of the panel is very much, I would say, up to date. I would say we really need to keep Americans in, because the the role of of the US presence when it comes to the security of of Europe is super important. But in order to keep you in, our dear allies from from the States, what we need to do is to upgrade our defence spending, and that's that's what brings me to the to your question.
We as Poland gave a I would say a good example not only after the Crimea, not only after the full-scale invasion, but even before we've been spending quite a lot in order to catch up with regard to the level of having cutting-edge technologies in our military equipment because we do know the history, we do know the geography and the fact that we are just next to Russian Federation, Belarus and and Ukraine which is as for now of course a partner, hopefully maybe one day will be also an ally, but this region is very much far from stability not only because of the recent Russian steps. So we need to invest quite a lot in our in our army. And you ask me about the role of of Poland. Of course we do see the growing role of our country within the region, within the regional formats we've established a couple of years ago, Bucharest Nine, so the eastern flank of of NATO, but also the Three Seas Initiative of thirteen countries of Central Europe. But it's not only Poland's role growing, it's the entire region which is which is growing in terms of GDP and likewise with in terms of military spending because we want to keep the stability of the region and we know what are the threats for this stability.
What is the homework to be done is to how to convince other Western European allies and partners to follow this good example. So then we we come to the third part of the title, how to keep the Europe up. You said European Union, I would rather said Europe because there are many... I actually made that note on my paper. All right.
So I mean I do believe that European Union is a very good project, but it's rather about the trade and economy, not about only security. For security we do have NATO, so there shouldn't be any competition between our two organizations. We are proud members of both and ally within NATO and the partner within the EU. There shouldn't be any competition. Of course EU has a role to play especially when it comes to the hybrid operation and all what is below the threshold of Article 5.
But what is up over the the threshold of Article 5, it's rather the NATO. We don't want NATO to be dissolved, so the US would be rather concentrated on Pacific or there are some isolationist voices also in your beautiful country. We really want you to be in Europe, Europe up with regard to military spending, but not always within the EU. I know that the Commissioner may disagree with me, but I do believe that EU has other task to to work to work on. And the final final thing is of course Russians out.
That is that is the goal of all of us. I mean how to keep them away from the borders of democratic sovereign states of of Europe. And I do believe the best way as for now is to cut off the economic oxygen for for Russia and that is what we are doing through the policy of sanctions. So I'm rather in favor in favor of strengthening the policy on on of sanctions on Russia because that that is what can bring finally hopefully one day Russia to the negotiation table if they will run out of money. No government can continue the war without funds for for that.
So I would I would rather be in favor of of that kind of slogan or saying that let's make sanctions great again. That that would be my what I wanted to finish up with. Thank you.
Victoria Coates
Thank you, Marcin, and that's an excellent segue to my friend Ambassador Whitaker from the politically uninteresting state of Iowa. Yes, we're going into a year where we watch people very closely in the United States and anyone who turns up in Des Moines is running for president. That's how you know. It's an easy, easy test.
Speaker 9
Is there something you'd like to share something? Would you like to share something?
Matt Whitaker
I took SecGen there. It was fun. We had a good trip and it was nice to get him out of sort of the New York DC bubble and into real America.
Victoria Coates
It's important. And there was some speculation after your appointment that you might be the shortest-tenured NATO ambassador in history, but yet here you are well over a year later, still on the job. And this second Trump administration has been vocal about the need for Europe to shoulder a greater defense burden. I mean, this was obviously a major theme for the president in the first term. And I would add that two successive Secretaries General of NATO have both credited President Trump with strengthening the alliance more than any US president in recent memory.
As the US works with our allies to accomplish this, this greater defense expenditure on the part of Europe and increasingly looks towards the Pacific and China, what does the future of American contributions to NATO look like?
Matt Whitaker
Great question and it's great to be here with a very distinguished panel. I think I'm bringing down this panel in distinguished nature. But in all seriousness, I think first of all, I'm going to take the win. I keep hearing that and people saying we're not taking the win. NATO 3.0, a more European NATO, a factory reset, whatever we term it, is working.
And the proof is in where we're sitting today here in Poland, spending 4.7% on core defense and leading really the alliance to a stronger, more capable military. And obviously the fundamental task of NATO is to deter and defend the alliance. And I think Poland is what Coach Fry at the University of Iowa would call a bell cow, where the rest of the herd is. And you find, you put the bell on the cow that's with the rest of the herd. And I think Poland is certainly right there leading the way for all of Europe in the way it should be done.
You know, President Trump issued a national security strategy, which followed by a national defense strategy, which prioritizes how the United States is going to focus on security. And number one was the homeland. If you don't get that right, then nothing else matters. Number two was the Western Hemisphere. Obviously, we need to focus on what's closest to us in the United States.
Number three was the Pacific and number four was Europe. And I think that's the way we're processing all of the current security needs of the United States and of our allies. And what I keep telling our European allies, and I have three to my left here, is that the United States isn't stepping back. We're just asking you to step forward and join us, to equalize with the United States, to invest as much as we've invested over the last 77 years and to be credible in your capabilities. And I think one of the things that I admire Mr. Kubilius on this panel, because his project is so important to the overall success of the Europeans, because one of the reasons their economies are not as robust as they probably could have been over the last 20-plus years is that they underspent on defense and security.
And that is a real driver of economic growth and the dual-use technologies and the opportunities that come out of that kind of a robust industry. And I think that they're going to see as they continue to push that flywheel of economic growth through investment in their defense industry, I think they're going to see some great outcomes.
And I and I can already see, I would describe it as some green shoots happening on that front. And I think and I think the United States needs friends with manufacturing capacity. And I think we have as we look at a US that could potentially spend certainly over a trillion dollars on defense, but maybe as much as one and a half trillion dollars on defense, our industrial capacity is largely going to be used to provide, you know, the those requirements for the US military. And then obviously if we have more capable manufacturing here in Europe, if we have a true transatlantic defense industrial base, I think we will see some tremendous growth in that sector and therefore in Europe more more largely. You know, I think I start where I I end where I started, which is, you know, we are taking the victory.
President Trump, his if not the most significant foreign policy victory to date in the second term, one of the most significant foreign policy victories is what we accomplished at The Hague with The Hague defense commitment, the 5% commitment for our allies, which is now the new international standard. That is what the United States is expecting from all of its allies, whether you're in Europe or whether you're in the Pacific or anywhere else in in the world. The United States is saying that that in this modern area of kind of multipolarity, of simultaneity, we have to have capable allies that can join us, be interoperable and and and help the United States and be help us, you know, be credibly credible in deterring our adversaries. And so, you know, we have accomplished a lot. It was reaffirmed in Ankara and I think there was a lot that came out that was good in the defense industry sector.
But, you know, now it is about chopping wood and carrying water. It is about doing the basic stuff well and the basic stuff is increasing capacity of our defense industrial base so that we can supply the huge demand and so that money that's being spent, the additional billions and hundreds of billions of dollars that's being spent in the next year, in the next decade, you're going to see that turn into real capabilities and not just inflation.
Victoria Coates
Well, and hopefully the bill cow won't eat the green shoots. And just one quick housekeeping note, I know everyone will be very eager to get to Prime Minister Tusk's remarks, so we're going to try to wrap up a couple of minutes early. So we're going to make the second round a little bit of a lightning round. But Micael, I wanted to pick up on something you said in your first answer about the submarines. So as I'm sure everyone in the room knows, Saab has recently sold three A26 submarines to Poland.
Could you talk a little bit about how Saab tailors its maritime capabilities to the environment of the Baltic Sea and the role these systems play in deterring Russia?
Micael JOHANSSON
Well, I mean, we have been doing underwater capabilities for a long time and we have focused on the specific environment and and of the Baltic Sea, so to say. I mean, it's it's a shallow water, it's lots of archipelago, it's complicated, it's lots of infrastructure and and huge intensity of transport across the Baltic Sea. So you really need an underwater capability and sort of a hybrid navy, I would say, to both create deterrence because underwater capabilities, even if it's conventional submarines we're talking about, that can stay for a long time submerged, it's something that is a huge deterrence in terms of what they can do.
So it's an important capability, and of course we share that Baltic Sea with Poland, and we're really appreciative of the fact that they selected the same capability, which will mean that we will have support on both sides of the Baltic Sea, capabilities in the Polish industry and also on the Swedish side in the Swedish industry. You can do training together, and it's a NATO asset, of course, that will be very important to the region. But this is not only about submarines, I think. I think we need to take it further to autonomous systems as well, and create some sort of a hybrid navy because of all the things that's happening in the Baltic Sea. But it's a capability that can be used elsewhere as well within the NATO context, so to say, of course.
But it's really tailorized to the Baltic Sea, and it is a difficult type of sea because of the salt and sweet type of water, and you have to have specific torpedoes and what have you to make it really sort of a deterrence capability. We're happy to see that they've selected this, and we will work diligently to deliver this as quickly as possible to Poland, of course. So I'm happy to see this.
Victoria Coates
Excellent, thank you. And if we can go from underwater to outer space, putting on your hat as the Space Commissioner, space has been an increasing security priority for Russia, China, and the United States. How is the EU adapting to this increased importance of space, and how do you view space within the broader European security structure? And I'd like to emphasize is how do we navigate this literal space with Russia in the picture, and how will we make sure the United States and EU priorities are maintained?
Andrius Kubilius
Well, thanks a lot for the question. Definitely, when we are talking about what capabilities we need to develop, having in mind also quite a clear United States position on NATO 3.0, which is, I understand that position in a very simple way. It's not like, you know, that Americans are saying, "Well, we don't love you anymore, Europeans, you should do your own job."
We still love you.
Andrius Kubilius
Yes, that's my point, you know. And because we need to understand very simply the logic, and the best way that logic was explained to me, and I hope that maybe we shall hear again today from Sigur, from Alexis Grinkewich, when he said, "Look, there is possibility to have major military threats at the same time in two global sides, you know, one here by Russia, another by China." And in that case, the question will be very simple, you know, do we have enough of capabilities to deter at the same time two of those major conflicts? And that is why Europe needs to take responsibility in our hands, and that is why we need to be very practical, because if Americans really, because of that development, will shift their resources into Indo-Pacific, we need to be ready to replace what we call strategic enablers, what Americans now are providing to Europe, including space capabilities. And that is why we are developing very rapidly, in 2029 we hope we shall have the first operations of what we call IRIS², which is European Starlink type, secure satellite communication with new technologies, with quantum technologies and so on.
Second, what we are looking also how to build our capabilities, very much needed for our defense people, is to have what is called officially and bureaucratically Earth Observation Governmental Service, which is, in a human way to explain, it's eyes in the skies to see, really to have geo-intelligence data with very high rate of repetition to see the same spot.
Those those things we are developing. Our big challenge, you know, really is also to have capabilities to build those systems using our launching systems. Because that is where we are quite heavily, you know, behind. And that is what, you know, will be our priority. I will go for what we call launching tour visiting all the European launching pads and also our industries which are building our launching means.
Those are very clear priority areas where we need to build our capabilities in order really to be ready for NATO 3.0 and for what I call Europe 3.0.
Andrius Kubilius
Well, perhaps he knows very well and and we know, you know, and Starlink really is a great technology. But definitely, you know, we need to have our capabilities and that what what we are doing, what we are building. Both on EU level, but also we see a lot of activities on national level because definitely member states which now are increasing defense spending, they are shifting quite substantial amounts of those money also into development of their space capabilities, space for defense capabilities.
Victoria Coates
Excellent, that's actually also a good segue to the next question. Marcin, I wanted to ask you following up on the on the first one about the very successful increase of Polish defense investment. Of course, when you do increase defense investment, that means you face other challenges and choices. And certainly a lot of the current events we're seeing across Europe, notably in Paris, suggest that that can cause some significant unrest. So I wanted to ask you, you know, as the United States encourages European allies to increase their expenditures for defense, what are the key hurdles that you face in terms of balancing your budget, in terms of satisfying your population as you try to assume a greater responsibility for defense?
Marcin Przydacz
Yeah. I have to tell you that I really like this exchange about the love between the US and and the Europe, between the representative of the Trump administration and the and the representative of the EU establishment. And I like it very very much. I think it's we're it's very important, I mean, to to show that we are the members of the same family, we are the members of the same civilization on both sides on the of the of the pond. But our relationship should not rely only on on emotions and a positive sentiment.
It's not only about love, it's also about delivering, about fulfilling the commitment. And that's brings me again to the to your question. We in Poland are doing our utmost in order to deliver what we promised. And we promised 2% in the Newport 2014, 2% of GDP on military spending, and we delivered. We promised basically all of us, all NATO allies promised in the Hague 5% and we we delivered, although it's quite painful for us to be honest.
Of course, for politicians, for members of the government, there are so many other options to spend money on: healthcare system, education, infrastructure, anything.
But we decided to spend this money on our military budget because we know that security is prior to anything. I mean, we can have the best highways, but if we'll be attacked by the foreign superpower, those highways won't be serving us, but someone else. Napoleon, I think, once said that if you don't want to spend money on your own army, then you will have probably in the future have to spend the money on foreign superpower money. So that's what we learned from the history. But it is quite painful.
It's quite unfortunately natural. That's why we are advocating and we are encouraging our Western European allies not to take free rides because we are keeping the stability of the eastern flank not only for us. It's not only about the security of Poland or Lithuania or Czechia and Slovakia. It's about the entire stability of the continent, right? And I'd dare to say that the goal for Russia, as I've heard Mr. Putin saying that he's going to be the next Peter the Great, that, you know, the biggest geopolitical tragedy of the 20th century was the collapse of the Soviet Union.
So he's quite ambitious, I would say. So his goal is to reshape the entire global security architecture. So by doing this, what we are doing, we are keeping the global security architecture as it is. And we shouldn't be alone in this task. I know that there are some countries trying to catch up, but come on, it's taking just too long and too little.
So that's why we agree with our American friends, not only with the Trump's administration, because even Biden, even Obama has been sending this signal: please, European allies, you need to do more. You are wealthy enough to spend a bit more on your own security. It shouldn't be only on the American taxpayer this burden. We took it seriously, although it's, you know, it's not easy. What helps us is that our economy has been doing quite well in recent three decades.
So, you know, year by year, we have progress in terms of our GDP. So it is a bit easier. But what is the cost? The cost is that our people, they need to wake up early in the morning and they work till the very end of the day. Probably they would love to spend some more free time, but they do know, my dear compatriots, that we need to really work hard in order to be secure and in order to be wealthy.
Victoria Coates
Well, thank you. And we call that in the United States knowing what time it is. But I would point out that today is actually a holiday in the United States, so Matt and I are getting overtime, but we won't pay tax on it. We won't have to pay tax on it. So, Matt, I wanted to ask you the question that I know is probably on a lot of minds in this room, certainly with the proposed Fort Trump for Poland, which we are very supportive of.
I believe Wilson, it was our number one recommendation in our NATO paper. And then also the contributions Lithuania has made.
Marcin Przydacz
Wilson is very well prepared. I've read his analysis and he even knows which regiment should be deployed to Poland. So Heritage has done a great, great job. Thank you, Victoria, for that.
Victoria Coates
Well, thank you. Thank you very much. The check is in the mail. And obviously I got to tour the base that Lithuania has provided for our troops. I actually wanted to live there.
It's incredible. But the US is in the midst of conducting a six-month force posture review of its European forces. As this continues, how have you navigated your relationships with NATO's European states as US commitments to the continent have evolved? And would you like to preview?
Matt Whitaker
No, I don't want to preview it because it's, you know, it's not ready. Ultimately, the United States under an America First foreign policy is going to look at what are our interests are. I think Europeans are going to look at what their interests are. And, you know, we continue to, I think, make great progress in a more capable Europe and therefore a more credible NATO. You know, the United States has global demands for security.
We have a lot of allies that would love more US flag shoulder patches on their territory. And, you know, we, if you study history, you know that, you know, superpowers and great global powers have mostly had challenges when they get overextended. So I think President Trump and his administration is making sure that we don't get overextended, that our allies are capable and not dependent. And that's, you know, we've had great success here in Europe. In Poland, I point to that example as what's important.
I think you also see on a force posture and basing review, we have to look at things like ABO to make sure that those are updated and modern. We have to look at SOFAs to make sure that those are updated and modern so that our troops are having everything they need and their families have everything they need as they're forward deployed. But we also have to reconcile, I mean, sort of, we can't look at NATO 1.0 and the fuel supply chain that ends in old NATO and our bases that somehow are, look like they really aren't addressed to confront any threats. And the military mobility, which Mr. Kubilius and I have had many conversations about and his colleagues at the EU, in moving things from the west to the east where we would expect any future conflict. But, you know, I go back to the point of my friend from Poland, and that is that ultimately, you know, we do have a shared history, a shared common heritage that is worth acknowledging and worth talking about continually.
And I think you've seen Secretary Rubio give two great speeches on the continent, one at Munich last year, actually this year, earlier this year, and one recently in Athens in the shadow of the Parthenon. And I think you can see the broad swath. And there is a time to decide. And, you know, I mean, the United States has obviously chosen a direction. We're urging our European allies to choose that same direction with us.
And they seem to be moving with us in concert. And that's good news. And but it's, you know, it's a constant daily challenge. So the conversations that I'm having at NATO in the background of this force posture and basing review is ultimately you need to not backslide. You need to keep moving out.
You know, I was just in the Czech Republic delivering very strong message to their political leadership because, you know, they're not keeping pace.
They're not committed to the Hague trajectory, which is, you know, sort of the incremental year-over-year growth of defense spending. And those are, you know, would I rather deliver a different message? Sure. But the message that President Trump has clearly told our allies that you have to step up, you have to join us, you have to equalize. And I think Secretary General Rutte has done a fantastic job, you know, putting that in your European speak because it is, you know, there's a nuance to it and there are, you know, there's a convention to it that maybe is lost on sort of our our blunt nature as Americans.
And the Dutch kind of understand it because they're a little more blunt than many Europeans. But that's just the cultural differences that are unique to each country. And we we do not lose sight of the fact. And I think what I want to impress upon this this audience because, you know, I have so many conversations with our Polish friends and allies, I have so many conversations all across the 31 other countries and I've I've been to most of them and those that I haven't been to I'm going to be to very soon. And that is, you know, the history of Europe is obviously conflict.
We we believe after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and I say we, I mean I think a lot of Europeans believed that when the Soviet Union collapsed that we were somehow postmodern, we were sort of post-human nature and that the sort of the awfulness of of the bygone years were were in the dustbin of history. And I think what we've realized when we have people quoting, you know, sort of going back and thinking about Peter the Great, I think we we have to understand that we have not overcome our human nature, we have not overcome history. And that, you know, Europe has got to be prepared for conflict because I mean as as President Washington reminded us, you know, and as the Romans reminded us, the most effective way to ensure peace is to be prepared for war. And Europe wasn't prepared for war and I'm glad to see that they're quickly moving as fast as they possibly can to prepare for war. But we are a long way away from a a truly capable Europe.
And I think the Commissioner points this out and in what the Europeans have to, you know, get for capabilities. And it is it is lift for both space and it is lift for moving troops across the continent. It is submarines, it is hard capabilities. But you also, and I and I want to mention this because it's important, you have to learn the right lessons from the current battle in Ukraine and you have to learn the right lessons from Epic Fury. And and I think what we what we realize is we have to be able to be dynamic, to be capable and not fight the last war because, you know, that is always what happens is we fight the last war and we have to prepare for modern warfare and a future war that has a lot of uncertainty.
Victoria Coates
Well thank you, thank you Matt and thank you also for mentioning Secretary Rubio's historic speech in in Athens. As I posted on X for those of you who know my eccentric background, it was a great day for the art historians to have the Parthenon so prominently featured. And so I know we are all eager to get to the Prime Minister's remarks. I'd just like to conclude by thanking you all for your very thoughtful comments. You all illuminated a different aspect I think of NATO 3.0.
I'd like to see this as the continuation of an ongoing discussion and invite you all to join us in the United States at Heritage's Miami Security Forum, which will take place in March of next year at the Trump Doral, a location chosen at random. So that we had very fruitful discussions last year, we're very excited about our next iteration and appreciate our hosts here in Warsaw so much. Thank you all.