International Agreements Committee

20 October 2026

International Agreements Committee Actual start House of Lords

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18:03 - 19:05
Speaker 1
Good, well good afternoon everyone and welcome to our continuing inquiry on trade in a turbulent world.  And I'm extremely pleased to be joined today by three people who I think will allow us to look at trade and trade opportunities from a slightly different angle from simply commercial ones.  So Rosa Crawford, the Head of International at the Trades Union Congress, Tom Wills, the Director of the Trade Justice Movement, and Amrita Saha, who is a Senior Fellow at the Institute of Development Studies.  Thank you very much indeed all three of you for coming.  The International Agreements Committee, I think we have a full complement, maybe we're waiting for one more member to join us online, but this is a great opportunity for us all to inquire from you your views on the work that we're doing. 

Not every question has to be answered by everyone, but please if you feel that something hasn't been said, do do so. 

We have a list of questions which I think you've been sent, but I hope you'll give us the opportunity to ask supplementary questions as well.  With that, are we ready to start?  Lord McDonald, maybe you can ask the first question. 
19:05 - 19:36
Speaker 3
Thank you, Lord Chair.  For the purposes of my question, let's assume that the government has a trade policy, and my question is to all three of you, which is, from your perspective, what have been the principal strengths and weaknesses of the government's trade policy in the areas of labour, development, and the environment to date, and what do you think could be improved?  So, to Rosa first. 
19:36 - 23:06
Speaker 2
Yeah, thanks very much for the question and thank you very much for the opportunity to give evidence.  So, as TUC, we very much welcomed the approach flagged in the trade strategy where the government said it would seek strong labor provisions with trading partners and engage with those trading partners to hold the UK government to those commitments.  It's fundamentally important to trade unions that we have strong enforceable labor commitments in trade agreements to make sure we have fair trade and countries are not gaining an unfair advantage on the basis of exploitation of workers.  With the approach with the UK-EU negotiations and the reset that the government launched, I think we very much see that approach put into action where the government has a trading partner with the EU that upholds very high standards on workers' rights.  And with the UK-EU agreement, we got a pathbreaking commitment, what was called the level playing field commitment, whereby both parties agreed that they would hold workers' rights to the level they were at in 2020 and not regress from those, and if they did regress, there would be a sanctions mechanism levied. 

So that's a very, very welcome approach that was a result of trade union lobbying, I should say, on the UK and EU side for many years.  So that agreement being in place was a huge step forward.  And the fact that the UK government now is in a process of building a closer relationship with the EU is very welcome to the TUC because the government has been clear that closer relationship would be founded on mutual high standards of workers' rights.  And we would want the UK to commit to implement any improvement made in the EU.  So that's been a very welcome approach. 

And also with the UK's trade agreement with Switzerland, that labor provision in that trade agreement was also subject to dispute settlement.  So that has shown that the government is also able to implement sanctions mechanism for labor commitments with a non-EU trading partner. 

It's also been very welcome that the government has engaged closely with trade unions in its approach towards trade negotiations and trade policy, which is an important break from the past.  And we are involved in the UK government's domestic advisory group for the EU-UK Trade and Sustainable Development and also the Trade and Labor Forum.  It should be said that UK trade unions are not yet consulted on the text of trade negotiations, and that's somewhere where we think the government should go further so that we can fully inform the negotiations with the needs of working people.  And we would want there to be a role for Parliament because we know you are all not consulted on the text of trade negotiations either, so we would want that increased scrutiny as well. 

Just to pick up on some areas where we think there isn't enough consistency, though, with the approach flagged in the trade strategy about seeking high standards of labour protection, the Government has concluded trade agreements with partners where we have concerns, in particular the Gulf states and Vietnam, which is one of the CPTPP countries, where independent trade unions are banned.  In Vietnam, independent trade unions are banned, and in half of the Gulf states, independent trade unions are banned.  And we are concerned that in both those trade agreements, CPTPP and the Gulf states agreement, there is no effective enforcement for the labour clause in those agreements.  Also to mention that we have concerns about trade agreements with India and South Korea, where there's also widespread repression of labour rights.  So we think the Government can do more to actually put their commitments into practice. 

And then just to flag that while we very much welcome the approach around steel with the steel strategy, we do have some concerns that good jobs are being undermined by the tariff-free quota that's been set, particularly for India and South Korea and Vietnam, because that's allowing too many cheap imports to come in, and that also undermines good jobs. 

23:06 - 23:57

Rosa Crawford

So we think there's some areas for improvement there. And we also have concerns about investor-state dispute settlement undermining government's ability to act in the public interest and to do things like improve workers' rights, bring public services back into national ownership because, of course, members of the committee will know that ISDS allows for governments to be sued by companies for actions like renationalising public services and is indeed subject to three ISDS cases currently that I'm sure we'll come onto. So we would want ISDS written out of all trade agreements and the commitment made, as Australia has done, that there would be no ISDS in future trade agreements. So there are areas we would want to improve. As I say, there's much better engagement from this government than the previous government with trade unions.

And so we are hoping that we can do more to make that that commitment in the trade strategy around high labor standards a reality.

23:57 - 24:09

McDonald

Thank you. I understand why you concentrated on labor, but can I point the other two panelists to development and environment and go to Amrita next.

24:09 - 28:09

Amrita Saha

Thank you very much for having me here. On development, based on our work at the Institute of Development Studies and University of Sussex, I'd like to talk specifically about how the UK has provided support strengthening developing countries' participation in trade. This has been through UK's Trade and Investment Advocacy Fund, which has been running since 2011.

It provides specifically trade and investment negotiation support to developing countries. As we know that it can be really challenging to negotiate effectively due to costs, practical resource-based operational costs. Many developing countries struggle to play a full role and many have bare-bones operations in Geneva at the WTO. Our research suggests that specifically the negotiations window of the Trade and Investment Advocacy Fund has been effective and has proved good value for money. It has been unique in addressing the imbalance of resources and the imbalance in the influence between developed and developing countries.

It has worked on developing countries' capacity to negotiate and has been most effective in helping solidify negotiating positions. Now we all know that negotiating outcomes are inevitably product of multiple factors, but very specific contributions can be tracked down to negotiating texts that have either maintained or advanced the interests of developing countries. So this is good and we would advocate for this support to continue.

Second, UK trade policy has improved market access or in many cases provided continuity. UK's unilateral preferential market access scheme, or the DCTS, which is Developing Countries Trading Scheme since 2023, has made it easier and cheaper for developing countries to export to the UK. The objective has been to stimulate trade, but with a vision to promote growth, support economic transformation and help reduce poverty. Just to say the DCTS can support developing country exports, however, it can also lower costs for UK businesses. Our research has found early positive signs that DCTS is succeeding in encouraging developing countries to make greater use of these trade preferences, and this translates into higher tariff savings.

Post-Brexit free trade agreements and the economic partnership agreements are also preserving preferential access. My third point is that UK trade policies and programs certainly articulate very strong commitments to inclusion and gender equality. UK supports International Trade Centre's program SheTrades, which works with women entrepreneurs, and this is a very strong, powerful case. Export credit arrangements, for example, UK Export Finance explicitly links its sustainability strategy to positive impacts in developing markets, and there's the UK-New Zealand FTA as well as the UK-India FTA, which has focused on trade and development and labor provisions. However, that's the positive story, but what we find is that there's a lack of coherence.

There's no effective sort of integration of inclusion and sustainability goals. What do I mean by that?

You look at these ambitions often in trade agreements but are they very closely linked with trade and development programs that sometimes run in the same countries? That remains an open question. Sometimes short-term commercial interests can dominate and LDCs receiving enough of sufficient priority as well as the issue of LDC graduation is an important one. More fundamentally, I'd like to argue that commitments alone do not demonstrate improvements in development goals or for that matter inclusive growth. So we need to think very carefully about how funded implementation and meaningful participation by business organizations, worker organizations can go side by side with evaluating distribution outcomes.

So where are the gains and where are the losses? And how can we really connect these trade preferences that are being utilized with very targeted interventions in a context where aid is, you know, has gone down, there are aid cuts?

So how do we make sure that the support that the UK does provide is targeted to our preference users? Thank you.

28:10 - 31:28

Tom Wills

Thank you, and thanks for the invitation to appear today. I think similar to my fellow panelists, the positives have been rhetoric and the area for improvement has been delivery. So in the trade strategy released last year, again as a result of advocacy from charities, trade unions and members of the Trade Justice Movement, the government recognised explicitly for the first time that trade doesn't exist as a kind of set of commercial relations in some kind of vacuum, but rather has important consequences to labour rights, to emissions, to international relations.

A couple of quotes to pick out from the trade strategy that particularly reflected our analysis. The government said that trade can, absent safeguards, blow away important protections regarding the environment, working conditions, or product standards. So recognized that alongside free trade, we need a shared set of fundamental social and environmental standards if we're not going to see trade being used as a kind of engine for pushing rights and standards protections down. Another quote: trade policy is one expression of the UK's international agenda, and the strategy links to environmental protections, labor rights, corporate accountability, and human rights. So all of that's very positive.

We're yet to see how that very strong and mature analysis actually impacts or shapes what appears in UK trade agreements.

And since the trade strategy was published, as Rosa said, we've had flagship free trade agreements announced with India and with the Gulf Cooperation Council. With India, there was a labour chapter, an environment chapter, various provisions. None of them were actually subject to the dispute settlement provisions within the trade agreement. So essentially they are kind of second-class citizens within the structure of the trade agreement and they are, to all intents and purposes, not enforceable. They're warm words.

They perhaps express a direction of travel, but they don't actually have any utility for governments or for campaigners looking to protect rights or the environment.

In the case of the GCC agreement, while we haven't yet seen the full text, the government has released chapter-by-chapter summaries. And in the general collaboration sustainable development chapter, while again there are bits of language covering labor rights, covering environmental protections, covering climate action, none of that is subject to the dispute settlement provisions. And what's more, it also seems to not be subject to not apply at all to the United Arab Emirates, which demonstrates this kind of extraordinary position where the UK on one side is saying that it understands that trade policy is an expression of the UK's international agenda on protecting labor rights, but yet when it comes down to it, is content not to apply even the weakest labor provisions to a country where 88% of the population are migrant workers operating in the kafala system.

So I think some really concerning disconnects between rhetoric and delivery that hopefully the government will be able to make good on in the next trade policy steps that it takes.

31:28 - 31:32

Speaker 6

That's a very helpful introduction. Don't you have a follow-up?

31:32 - 31:53

Donald Anderson

You've all emphasized the difference between aspiration and achievement. Is it your view that the agenda, the international climate for the areas that you're all concerned about and ourselves, have darkened in recent years?

31:53 - 35:01

Rosa Crawford

Yeah, I mean, if I could come in on that. We do work through the International Trade Union Confederation that we're a member of and with trade unions in Global South countries around the multilateral trade environment and the WTO in particular. And we know there's really existential challenges facing the WTO.

Obviously the US has been blocking the appellate body for a number of years, but then more recently with the Trump administration, really severe threats posed from them as well. And we know that there's severe reform needed for the WTO. And we think there's potential through that body. We talk to Global South partners and we ask them, do you just want no WTO? And they say, no, there needs to be a global framework, but it has to be a framework that is founded on the principle of fair trade.

And that means for the trade union movement, labour standards need to be embedded within WTO rules. They haven't since the organisation was founded over 30 years ago. And that has meant you have members like China, it's not the only member, but it is one of the most significant members, where independent trade unions are also banned, which means they also gain an unfair competitive advantage because one of the ways they can hold down prices is workers are not legally able to strike for better pay or conditions.

So for us, you need to have binding labour rights commitments within WTO rules. And for us, we also need to see more flexibilities allowed for global south countries to be able to invest in decent jobs. That means flexibilities around the subsidy rules, around the TRIPS rules, and around technology transfer and the rules around special and differential treatment for developing countries too, because global south countries have not been allowed to invest in the industries that they need, the clean industries as well, to have decent jobs. So they need to have the flexibilities that essentially global north countries have been able to have because of power asymmetries.

There's there are other improvements we want to see as well, including a trade and decent work working group set up at the ILO, which involves trade unions, because we've been historically shut out of negotiations at the WTO, which has meant that there haven't been enough initiatives to promote decent work. And on the issue around the e-commerce moratorium, which was a big issue at the last WTO ministerial, we would want an end to that moratorium so that Global South countries in particular can collect the revenue that's often very much needed for the public purse from digital transactions. And just on the issue of public health, which is obviously not just a workers' issue but does affect workers, we would want to see an extension of the suspension of the IP rules that were applied on the COVID vaccines to other vaccines for life-saving medicines, because we need that as an issue of a public health concern. So there are reforms that are needed. And obviously the appellate body, we need to get over that block.

And the UK government, it has shown a leadership role at the WTO and at the last ministerial was taking a leadership role. We would like to see the UK government using that leadership role to press for those changes that the global union movement is calling for around the multilateral trading system and unblock the appellate body so that we can actually make it function again.

35:01 - 35:05

Speaker 1

Please, don't, we do want to move on to the next question, so two quick follow-ups from Sandy and Donald.

35:05 - 35:15

Donald Anderson

Is it your view then that the failure of the March ministerial is capable of being remedied and is likely to be remedied?

35:15 - 35:42

Rosa Crawford

As I say, there is a potential and we have the UK government showing that it wants to be a progressive actor in the trade space, as we have heard from Tom as well about the intentions of the UK government and it wants to work with like-minded partners like Canada or Norway or other EU countries that also want to be progressive actors in this space. But it does require concerted action and action together because it is such a severe challenge that's being faced.

35:42 - 36:33

Speaker 8

Thank you, Lord Chairman. I'm just following up. I do a lot of work across the Global South and one of the issues that they are now becoming alive to is the fact that whilst trade can be all things to all people, if they're not allowed to actually develop the skill sets and the processing within their own countries, it's still a conversation that goes nowhere.

So I'm, it's interesting, I just want to know if you think that there's enough work being done to help being supportive in country in the global south for not just workers, but for the skill sets and for the actual frameworks in which we need to be able to move the dial for them to become much more self-sufficient in processing and developing their own product.

36:33 - 36:36

Speaker 10

Yeah, and just if it's okay to just come back on that.

36:36 - 36:39

Speaker 9

Maybe, Amrita, do you want to answer that question? Would that be more your area?

36:39 - 38:26

Amrita Saha

Yeah, yeah, sorry, I didn't mean to interrupt. But yeah, thank you for the question. I think that's, that's really a critical question because so the, I was, I was talking about the UK's preferential tariff scheme, which is the Developing Country Trading Scheme, and you know, how the UK has facilitated market access. But your point is well taken. Market access is not market participation.

Investments in productive capacity in countries, if that's absent, you know, countries are not going to be able to utilize those preferences. And the reality is that, you know, we can talk about improvement in aggregate utilization of preferences through trade agreements, through trade preference schemes, but the reality is that the distributional outcomes of such liberalization are rarely uniform. If we look across, you know, product and country level and we unpack that, there's much greater variation. So if we think about, for example, you know, textiles and garments, of course there's a concentration, you know, these are heavily imported under the trade preference scheme, for instance Bangladesh. There's also, you know, quite close links with what's happening in the UK with East Midlands businesses, you know, it improves competitive sourcing.

However, to actually expand the possibility to utilize those preferences requires investments and targeted support in building productive capacity in developing countries. So we can further, you know, preferences and we can make those available, but unless those trade agreements are matched up by sort of, you know, meaningful support and targeted assistance at a time when, you know, aid cuts are quite severe, I think the gap will remain and the disconnect will remain. And so how I think the challenge and the goal for development policy for in trade right now is how do we address that disconnect? How do we make sure that we get the bang from our buck which is available through development cooperation?

38:26 - 38:32

Speaker 1

Thank you. We're going to go on to the next question, plenty of opportunities for everyone to speak later. Lord Hannay.

38:32 - 40:17

Alexander David Hugh Hannay

Yes, well, perhaps drawing on the first question too, which I don't think we've had a very full discussion about, the inclusion of environmental provisions. And what I'd like to ask you, Amrita and Rosa, whether you're familiar with the agreement that the European Union has reached with Mercosur, which was the hottest issue was the commitments that the Brazilian government accepted on the environment. For reasons which I think this committee, or some members of this committee, including myself, and actually including the then Minister for Trade, found completely incomprehensible, we have made no attempt to reach an agreement with Mercosur ourselves. But my question to you is, are the provisions in the EU-Mercosur agreement on the environment the sort of thing that you think ought to be in a British-Mercosur agreement if there were one?

And that's, that's, that's one quite specific question. More generally, what should be the UK's priorities in reforming and strengthening the rules-based international trading system in these different areas: development, environment, labour and so on? Bound to be a hot subject in the years ahead. What do you think we should be aiming for in generalities?

40:17 - 43:13

Amrita Saha

I'd like to answer the second question, the more general question, if that's okay, and I'm sure my colleagues might want to come in on your first part of the question. So, just thinking about, you know, the global trading system, I'd just like to start with the point that that is not just the WTO.

It is spread into a series of interconnecting agreements and that's at different levels. So strengthening the global trading system as such, you know, requires building and defending coherence and coordination. Trade agreements need feet on the ground. We have to be at the table to ensure that cooperation then turns them into opportunities. So if you're thinking about the WTO specifically, the UK should certainly prioritize a fair rules-based trading system and this requires, as my colleagues have pointed out, effective WTO dispute settlement.

Through the Trade Advocacy Fund, the UK is already helping developing countries and it is really important that we continue that because negotiating on an equal footing can make the system fairer, yes, but it also helps for the system to run more smoothly.

Helping developing country negotiating partners conduct the right kind of analysis and having informed stances can avert the case where they just say no. Second, the UK should make development a substantive part of the WTO reform, we would argue, and this is with commitments matched by resources. So while developing countries need a voice in negotiations, but the capacity to implement agreements, talking about productive capacity, has to be matched by implementation capacity. So one thing which is really critical in this is the appropriate balance of support at Geneva and country levels. Often we find that Geneva-focused support is economically efficient, but the trade-off is that it can exacerbate a capacity imbalance between Geneva and national capitals, and that could lead to negotiated agreements failing to reflect domestic needs and political realities.

My third point is really just a reality check, which is, yes, and this was a question from before, the ongoing lack of progress, you know, and the likely future geopolitical directions could limit what engagement at the WTO could achieve. So I think we should, of course, continue to take part, not least because, of course, the opportunity costs of not doing so are very high. But it is also, you know, given the challenging context, it is also a chance for us to think what could be done with a constrained budget by spending where it counts to ensure that the UK continues to kind of exert lasting influence. We should see if support may be better directed at specific negotiations alongside the WTO. So this could be the AfCFTA or with ASEAN countries.

And this has been done in previous trade advocacy fund programming.

So identifying very specific areas of support combined with supporting developing countries at the WTO is is quite important because the opportunity for impact might be much greater sometimes in these cases.

43:13 - 45:05

Rosa Crawford

Yeah, and if I might build on on that last point that Amrita made, we think it's very important that the government has increased the funding around the aid for trade and increased that support at the WTO level for trade union or for government capacity in terms of influencing those negotiations. But for us also, as Amrita says, country-level capacity building and capacity building for trade unions specifically is something we would want to see the government have a fund to support, which we had under the previous Labour government up to 2010. The government was funding trade unions to do capacity building, including in the area around influencing trade negotiations.

That funding was cut in 2010 by the coalition government and has not yet been restored, but we are engaging with the government about possibilities for restoring that funding, albeit we know it's a difficult financial climate, but it's not a large amount of money that actually creates a huge outcome when you think about increasing union capacity to influence trade negotiations means you have the concerns and the needs of workers who are going to be affected by this agreement adequately affected in the agreement. And as TUC, we have done self-funded projects with unions to build capacity that's had a real impact, for example in Cameroon on the AfCFTA continental trade agreement. We funded a project which increased their capacity to influence negotiations, and that has meant that labour considerations and the needs of workers in Cameroon have been factored into negotiations to a much greater extent than they would have done if trade unions hadn't had that capacity support.

So we would like the government to direct support also to trade union capacity building in its aid spend as a way to reinforce the role of workers to have their voices heard and to influence the multilateral trading rules. I covered quite a lot of the multilateral trading rules in the previous question, and so I might not go into those.

45:05 - 45:07

Speaker 13

Appreciate that. I think Tom wanted to say something.

45:07 - 45:09

Speaker 12

I can touch on Mercosur, but I'd want to give Tom space.

45:09 - 45:15

Alexander David Hugh Hannay

Well, so far you've suffered, you've all two of you so far who've replied have suffered from complete brain fog about Mercosur.

45:15 - 45:17

Speaker 14

I can come in on Mercosur if that's useful.

45:17 - 45:20

Speaker 15

Well, maybe Tom, sorry, maybe Tom, I know wants to come in and could be more specific.

45:20 - 46:25

Tom Wills

Yeah, just briefly, and I'm not going to pretend to be an expert on the environmental provisions of the EU-Mercosur agreement. However, I think it's worth reflecting on the kind of strategic wisdom of focusing on this kind of free trade agreement beyond all else approach to trade policy, which the UK has essentially followed for the last six years. The EU put, I think, more than 25 years into a negotiation with Mercosur, a huge amount of political capital, a huge amount of controversy. The UK has its agreement with India, that is set to add 0.13% to GDP by 2035. With the GCC, the figures are even less impressive.

You know, the disconnect between the kind of political and media noise around FTAs and the actual economic advantage of them is colossal.

And I think putting a huge amount of political capital and perhaps years of negotiating capacity into an agreement with Mercosur, which is likely to deliver pretty unimpressive economic returns, probably isn't the most strategic thing that we could do.

46:25 - 47:31

Alexander David Hugh Hannay

But you are aware, I'm sure, that Mercosur countries are a very, very substantial proportion of the rainforest, remaining rainforest. One competitor in the Sunday's election will probably chop a lot more of it down, and one has said he will preserve it. And my question really is, is it part of Britain's interest? It's hardly, it's really rather difficult to think it's not in Britain's interest to have an agreement with Mercosur. These are countries of extraordinarily important industrial capacity as well.

But what sort of environmental conditions are the ones the EU have negotiated broadly okay if implemented? And none of you know. That's so you're just waiting to be hit by a negotiation and then you'll work out whether the EU provisions are any good.

47:31 - 48:14

Speaker 1

Well maybe David, you can, we do want to move on. If any of you have any thoughts post this meeting, we're not completing our inquiry for another month or so, so we'd be grateful maybe if you to feed that in. I think it is a reasonable point in terms of, you know, your objectives and Britain's trade objectives. I just have a quick supplementary question to Rosa. Do you have a figure of the relevance of unions to our exports in the sense that I don't know how many union members there are in this country?

I'd have thought a lot of them would be public sector rather than manufacturing private sector potentially some services. Do you have a figure that would help me understand the relevance of unions in the export discussions?

48:14 - 49:22

Rosa Crawford

I don't have a specific figure, though I can check and and write to the committee. But I have to say that our manufacturing sector is some of the most unionised sectors in the country and our second largest affiliate Unite represents manufacturing unions and has kept as one of the unions that's kept very strong union recognition. So exports are incredibly important to union members and exports such as steel, automotive, ceramics.

And these are all areas where obviously the EU is an absolute critical market. So as I say, that closer relationship with the EU and removing more barriers to trade. We very much welcome the SPS agreement currently being negotiated, but sectors like pharmaceuticals, automotive, and chemicals, they're still facing a lot of barriers to trade and those are very unionized sectors. So for us, the EU is the critical relationship. And the other trade agreements, as Tom has said, don't really make a huge difference in terms of our export market.

So that's why we really hope that after the summit happening in November with the EU, we can move on and have a more expansive agreement. So it's very important for the union movement to get those through.

49:22 - 49:38

Speaker 1

Thank you for that well-made second point. If you could give us a rough figure, maybe either in, I don't know how you would want to do it, percentage terms, it'd be quite interesting to see that and that's all because it helps us think about, you know, who's being represented in these discussions and things. We're going to move on to the next question, Lord Boateng.

49:38 - 51:34

Paul Boateng

Two questions, but I should first declare my interest as outlined in the register of members' interests. I am a senior independent non-executive director of the Ghana International Bank, which is a major provider of trade finance. The first question really is to you, Ms. Saha. Is, and I wonder if you could answer it in the context of our upcoming leadership of the G20. Is the UK giving sufficient weight to development objectives in its trade policy, and how could trade instruments be used more effectively to support developing countries whilst at the same time advancing the UK's interests?

And, you know, while we're talking about the EU, I'm sure you would agree with me that the EU's economic partnership agreements with Africa and the developing world have not been an unalloyed success in terms of promoting development. So if you could answer that question. And the second one, which I'll put out there whilst you're answering it so that your two colleagues can think about it, is: is there evidence to indicate that the Department for Business and Trade, the FCDO, Treasury, and the relevant public finance institutions are in fact working any more closely together in this area of trade and development than they used to? Because there's precious little evidence in the past, actually, that they've worked effectively together.

And what can we do to create a new institutional framework that might bring trade, development, and investment together?

51:34 - 51:35

Thank you.

51:35 - 51:39

Speaker 1

I mean, if we keep our, sorry, if we can keep our answers quite condensed at this stage, because I'm quite keen to get through all the questions. Thank you.

51:39 - 52:21

Amrita Saha

Thank you. So, I mean, that's, I guess, a complex question, but I think I would like to argue that UK trade policy has improved and in many cases provided continuity in market access for developing country partners. So, thinking back to my example of trade preferences, the unilateral preference scheme of the UK, which is DCTS, as I said, the evidence is that there is greater use of preferential tariffs and this translates to higher tariff savings.

You mentioned the EU, the EPAs, the Economic Partnership Agreements. I think in many cases the UK has continued or rolled over the agreements and continuity is definitely a good starting point to think about.

52:21 - 52:25

Speaker 17

But if they were if they were faulty in the first place, how does it assist?

52:25 - 55:46

Amrita Saha

I was going to add to that to say that, you know, there are also instances which there is a good sort of basis for deeper cooperation. For example, the CARIFORUM-UK EPA, it already includes services, intellectual property and procurement. So while I think there, you know, starting from the point of continuity is good, having the basis for deeper cooperation, I think is is promising. However, I'd like to qualify that saying that, you know, distributional consequences of such liberalization need to be really unpacked. And in this sense, I think there needs to be greater operational weight to development.

I think that's really critical because unless you are connecting evidence generation with accountability, there is a gap. And actually the UK did make some headway on this. A lot of us will remember the Independent Commission of Aid Impact review of UK's aid for trade. As a response to that, the Foreign Commonwealth Development Office announced the Evidence and Innovation Program. Unfortunately, that program was cancelled after one year of being in operation.

That program was meant to provide independent evidence informing the distributional consequences both ex-ante and ex-post of several trade agreements.

So what would be the agenda going forward is, is I think an important one on how we take that evidence generation, because your point about how does the FCDO work together with different departments is an important one, and that's exactly what this program was set out to do in response to the ICAI review which pointed out to these gaps as you have rightly pointed to. The second point I'd just like to say is that, you know, I think in my assessment the UK does give development meaningful recognition in its trade policy, but is there sufficient weight to ensuring that those commitments translate to economic outcomes? I think that's an open question. And in a context where, you know, we are seeing some risks, right? So the UK has cut ODA, overseas development assistance substantively, right?

So bilateral trade aid to Africa has fallen back to 1970s levels, and that might make several African governments less well-disposed to the UK.

So that's a risk to consider. On balance, yes, the UK is seeking out agreements with, you know, so-called middle powers, but, you know, on balance, what's going to happen with these developed countries? I think that's also a very important risk to think about because this will might work against development objectives. On its own, outside the EU, yes, the UK is small and less important in a sense in the overall scheme of things, but it is important and difficult to advance interests either in trade or development without being sort of seen as, you know, in collaboration with the EU. However, just to say that it is important that we connect trade agreements with funded implementation.

The links made to complementary policies, be it investment agreements, I think that's a low-hanging fruit.

That's something that we can do even with, you know, like, um, not too many resources and a program which can generate evidence consistently working with the FCDO, providing links across different departments, I think would speak to your question about how do we make those institutional links. And this would support, you know, a strategy like that would support UK interests by strengthening trade institutions and reducing uncertainty, which would speak for commercial interests, but which would also have development impact.

55:46 - 55:52

Speaker 18

Thank you very much. Tom, do you want to go next? Rosa, anything else? Just briefly would be helpful.

55:52 - 56:58

Rosa Crawford

Yes, so briefly to come in on economic partnership agreements. I absolutely agree on that point that the EU economic partnership agreements have not been a success. The TUC is still a member of the European TUC, and we were a member when the EU was negotiating a number of these agreements, and the ETUC has joint statements with Global South partners being very concerned about these agreements because they allow for more imports from Global North countries which undermine domestic industries and they do not have enforceable commitments around labor and social standards.

So we were very concerned when under the previous government the EU EPAs were rolled over. We as TUC wrote a number of joint positions with trade unions in Global South countries such as Kenya against these rollover EPAs. What we would want to see is unilateral trade preferences to these countries that are receiving EPAs so they can have preferential access to the UK market conditional on upholding fundamental labour standards, but we would not want them to have to open up their markets because obviously there's historical imbalances which mean their industries are at an unfair disadvantage.

56:58 - 58:42

Paul Boateng

Chairman, I wonder with your permission if I could ask this, and I'd rather like to hear from Mr. Wills in response to this. A fundamental weakness of traditional preferential trade arrangements is the assumption that removing tariffs will necessarily, automatically generate exports and improved livelihoods. Now, I am the grandson of a woman who farmed cassava and a man who farmed cocoa in the eastern region of Ghana. And a Ghanaian agriculturalist, a Gambian food processor, a Kenyan textile manufacturer faces immediate obstacles of inadequate electricity and transport, high costs of finance, difficulties meeting international sanitary and technical standards, some of which are set up as obstructors, actually, to trade, insufficient cold chain and storage facilities.

How would and how could the UK introduce sector-specific development compacts that would work alongside trade agreements to address some of these issues? Because without it, it's very difficult to see how that agriculturist in rural Ghana or anywhere else in Africa, any of the other groups I've mentioned, would in fact benefit. I mean, have you got any insights on this, Tom Wills?

58:42 - 59:45

Tom Wills

I mean, just to say I completely agree with the kind of spirit of the question and we need to be designing trade and development policies that reflect the realities of the supply chains that you're mentioning. And we also need to make sure that the trade policies that we do have in place, both in terms of EPAs, free trade agreements and rules at the WTO, protect the policy space of countries to pursue their own development pathways. And we're now almost 30 years after the release of Ha-Joon Chang's Kicking Away the Ladder. We understand that the development pathways that have been successful for countries have not been free trade pathways, but have been where you're able to put up tariff barriers, you're able to support and pick the winners in local industries. And now we're seeing over the last, I guess, five or six years, an increasing trend in the global north towards industrial policy as well.

And absolutely, I see those as two parts of the same coin in terms of economic development.

59:45 - 59:46

Thank you.

59:46 - 59:48

Speaker 19

Wonderful. Thank you very much. Baroness Hayman.

59:48 - 01:00:43

Anne Joyce Anelay

Thank you, Chair. Earlier on, much earlier on this year, we had evidence given to us by the then Secretary of State on these matters, Peter Kyle. And he confirmed to us that, I quote him, "We are entering a period where we are moving not just to FTAs, but to other forms of negotiations, agreements, and MOUs." All three of you so far have been referring to different types of agreements. So can you explain your position about whether you think that really matters, that the government goes after one and not a different one?

And also, against the background of that, from what you've seen so far from the government in these two years, have they got that balance right? Perhaps we can start with Tom this time.

01:00:43 - 01:03:28

Tom Wills

Yeah, thank you. And absolutely we're seeing a shift away from these traditional, comprehensive, all-singing, all-dancing free trade agreements towards different types of trade instruments. Um, I guess two things to say on on that trend. One is that where agreements do contain binding provisions on tariffs or quotas or standards, our position is that they should also contain equivalent binding provisions on labor and environmental standards. And that's a kind of core precept of everything that we argue for.

And, you know, ultimately is the way of delivering trade that is sustainable and resilient and values-driven.

There's also a democratic deficit that we're at risk of here as we move away from the processes which in our view were inadequate of understanding, scrutinising and approving free trade agreements, we're moving into a bit of a Wild West. The UK in the last few years has finalised 16 critical minerals agreements with partners around the world, we've finalised three separate agreements with Trump's America, none of those are binding traditional free trade agreements. They are all interesting, important, potentially deeply consequential to our economy and our society, but none have had any kind of scrutiny from parliamentarians, they've not been subject to debate, to amendment, they've not been subject to approval or any vote.

And that seems a huge kind of democratic problem. And I guess the clearest indication of why that's a problem is the UK-US pharmaceutical agreement from last December. That was agreed with Trump, as committee members will know, entailed the NHS making changes to the prices that we were willing to pay for US medicines. And according to some very credible academic analysis, could lead to 229,000 excess deaths by 2035. So that's more than the whole COVID pandemic in the UK.

Um, it was never subject to any kind of parliamentary discussion or debate. And what we're now seeing over the last couple of weeks is six parliamentary committee chairs in the Commons writing to the government, writing to the NAO.

The NAO has started its own investigation into that agreement. So it's taken 11 months, but we're starting to develop some kind of slightly ad hoc processes to hold the government to account for this. That's obviously not a sustainable model for how we should be scrutinizing agreements going forward. And so we do need to update our democratic processes to ensure that where there are relevant agreements, we ensure that they're properly scrutinized by parliamentarians.

01:03:28 - 01:03:38

Speaker 1

Thank you. We're very interested in what you said on the US pharma deal particularly, and couldn't agree with you more about the other points. We'd be keen to hear any follow-up thoughts you have on that. Sorry, Rosa.

01:03:38 - 01:05:22

Rosa Crawford

Yeah, so, I mean, TUC, we share the concerns that TJM has outlined about the lack of scrutiny around the UK-US agreements and also the critical minerals agreements.

For us, the UK-US agreement has created a lot of uncertainty for the unions in the manufacturing sectors that we were talking about earlier. In particular, pharmaceuticals agreement not having a legally binding nature around it means that there is a lot of uncertainty for the members about what that commitment means, and there's also uncertainty in other sectors as well. So I think for us it's quite a worrying trend to be going into this area of kind of non-binding and non-legally binding agreements. So we would want to see legally binding commitments, particularly when it comes to labour standards, but not not just in that area. And on the critical minerals agreements, we are concerned that they haven't been focusing on the appalling labour rights conditions often in the mineral extraction sectors, and they also don't consider the issue that you were looking at earlier about value addition.

And we would want to see those factors in and them being made legally binding and subject to trade union scrutiny.

But I should say, to go back to the earlier point about the UK-EU negotiations, I think that's a completely different approach that the government is taking, where they obviously we will anticipate legislation in Parliament to give legal effect to what is agreed at the UK-EU summit and any future agreement that's made with the EU. And that's been a very comprehensive approach, and as I say, an approach that involves trade unions as well as businesses and other stakeholders. So, and it is our most important trading partner. So I think that that has been a very welcome approach that we as TUC would want the government to be building on more, rather than non-binding agreements which have created more uncertainty and no strong commitments on on labor rights.

01:05:22 - 01:05:46

Anne Joyce Anelay

So before I just I go on, excuse me, just for holding for a moment.

It seems to be that you're saying the trade unions have not with this government been able to make any headway in discussions that they've been having on non-binding or indeed binding commitments. So is that true or have you had a way in kind of feeding in the blood sample into the process?

01:05:46 - 01:06:28

Rosa Crawford

We do engage as TUC with the government and that has been welcome that the government has been open to that engagement. We have a seat on the trade and labor forum which is consulted on trade policy. We also have a seat on the trade and sustainable development domestic advisory group that considers non-EU trade agreements. So there is engagement on non-EU trade policy, but it is something where we want to see the government go further and take more steps because as I say we aren't getting the labor provisions we want to see in the critical minerals agreement. We aren't getting the binding and certainty that we'd want to see in a UK-US trade agreement and we do have trade agreements with partners such as Gulf states that are abusing fundamental labor rights.

So we do need to go further, but there has been engagement, just to be clear.

01:06:28 - 01:06:30

Speaker 21

Thank you.

01:06:30 - 01:07:28

Amrita Saha

I think I'll just add very briefly, if that's okay. I think the form of agreement does matter quite importantly, and my view aligns with my colleagues is that, you know, it affects certainty, enforcement, accountability. But I'd also argue that, you know, just legal status alone does not necessarily determine the effectiveness of an agreement because we can see that, you know, a binding FTA can contain provisions with limited enforcement.

So there's the UK-New Zealand chapter, gender chapter, as well as the UK-India development chapter, which excludes the, as we've discussed, excludes the general dispute settlement. So I think maybe the important question to think about is how could we use the right mix of agreements which, you know, essentially speak to international trade being, and sorry if I'm not going to divert from the topic, but international trade being about honest mutual gain. You know, as I think a general principle, the UK should adopt a do-no-harm policy and work with trading partners to really think about the consequences of our domestic policy for foreign countries.

01:07:28 - 01:07:33

Speaker 22

Thank you very much. Baroness Bonham-Carter.

01:07:33 - 01:08:12

Jane Bonham Carter

Picking up on your mention of democratic, the democratic deficit. I believe you and Rosa Crawford have a concern about trade and investment rules constraining government's ability to oversee labor and environmental standards.

How well do current UK trade agreements strike the balance between promoting trade and investment on the one hand and preserving government ability to regulate in the public interest on the other? And I think you're probably going to be a little bit critical, so what is the way forward?

01:08:12 - 01:11:47

Tom Wills

Yeah, thanks for that question. So, yeah, it won't surprise you to hear me say that I think the balance is currently struck extremely poorly, and that is particularly relevant when it comes to the UK's 80 agreements that contain investor-state dispute settlement.

As Rosa mentioned earlier, ISDS offers investors an avenue to sue their host state for compensation if they're able to convince a tribunal of three private lawyers that public policy decisions made by that state have unfairly damaged the value of their investment. And our position as the Trade Justice Movement is that in privileging the protections given to investors to continue to make a profit over the freedoms afforded to democratic governments to enact policies in the public interest, ISDS really strikes that balance poorly. The UK takes a case-by-case basis position on ISDS, which is a frustration given the arguments in favor of ISDS now seem remarkably defunct. So the arguments in favor of ISDS that have been put forward by government officials and ministers in recent years rotate around two key points. One is that it encourages foreign direct investment.

That might seem to make logical sense, an investment agreement leads to investment, but actually it's not backed up by any academic analysis. And the most exhaustive academic analysis, one of 74 separate studies that was produced in 2022, found that the impact of ISDS on foreign direct investment was so small as to be considered zero. So there is no upside. However, the UK also argued for years that it had never been sued and therefore was only a beneficiary of the ISDS system. That again is now a defunct argument.

Over the last 18 months, the UK now faces three ISDS lawsuits, which kind of between them perfectly demonstrate the kind of absurdity and anti-democratic nature of this system.

One is from the investors behind the proposed coal mine in West Cumbria. That was had its permissions rejected in the High Court and the investors have come back saying that they were unfairly treated, asking for 300 million from the government in compensation for a mine that does not exist and never had the permissions to go ahead. We're facing a ISDS case from a Russian oligarch, Mikhail Fridman, one of the richest men in Russia. And he's contesting the sanctions that were placed on him after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. We don't know how much he's suing the UK state for, but he has a separate claim against Luxembourg for 16 billion US dollars, which is more than his entire net worth and half of that country's national expenditure.

That has actually caused the EU to take Fridman off the sanctions list. So the threat of an ISDS claim has led to this extraordinary situation in which the EU has rewritten its whole sanctions policy, which demonstrates the kind of power that this system gives to investors over ultimately national security policy in the EU. The third case is a threatened case being brought by the Chinese steel company Jingye relating to the bringing of the Scunthorpe steelworks into public control, and that's reported a billion.

01:11:47 - 01:12:48

Speaker 1

I'm fast-tracking, no, please, because I'm quite interested in this, because investors need to be protected or they won't make investments, and ISDS works both ways. So companies like Vodafone in India is a great example of where a country came out of the ISDS process and then behaved in its own way according to the assets of a corporate entity. Are you suggesting we shouldn't give protections to investors?

Because if you don't have property rights and the rule of law, then you can't have a good investment climate, which means you can't have a good and strong economy. My question to you is, is the ISDS structural process different to normal compensation? I mean, if the government takes my house, I should be given compensation. If it takes my company because it changes the law or decides not to pay a subsidy, then there's clearly financial redress as a contract. Are you seriously saying we should not do that?

And maybe if there's a confusion over the terms, could you clarify why ISDS is different to a normal commercial compensation claim to which most companies would be entitled and the government's being sued all the time? Maybe you could help us understand that.

01:12:48 - 01:13:14

Tom Wills

Absolutely. And we're not saying that investors should not have protection. Investors are able to access protection through domestic legal means. They may take out political risk insurance.

They may access state-to-state dispute settlement mechanisms. What ISDS provides is this kind of extraordinary additional power for investors over the freedom of states to operate in the democratic interest.

01:13:14 - 01:13:42

Speaker 1

Sorry, I don't want to dominate this conversation. The state can clearly do what it likes. It's not prohibited from exercising its democratic interest. What it's prohibited from doing is confiscating someone's assets because the politicians want to do it. All these laws are to protect the investors from a contract undertaken by a government, like a treaty, which then the government changes and has to pay compensation.

And there's something specifically different with ISDS, which may be the case.

01:13:42 - 01:15:14

Tom Wills

ISDS provides kind of extraordinarily broad protections.

So it's not simply something that applies to, for instance, direct expropriation of assets. ISDS treaties contain within them national treatment provisions, fair and equitable treatment provisions, and over the years we've seen those provisions interpreted extremely broadly by tribunals, leading to some absurd outcomes. And for instance, 80 billion dollars of public money has been paid out to fossil fuel companies over the last 10 years. So we're not suggesting that investors should not have some degree of protection, but it's clear that at this point the balance has been struck completely in the wrong direction.

And we are now seeing states increasingly, where they do strike agreements, the majority of those agreements exclude ISDS because states are starting to wake up to the danger of ISDS for their public policy. Over the last 10 years, 300 ISDS agreements have been terminated by states, including by the UK, which withdrew from the Energy Charter Treaty on the basis that remaining a member, and this is a quote from the minister at the time, remaining a member of the Energy Charter Treaty would not support our transition to cleaner, cheaper energy and could even penalise us for our efforts to deliver net zero. So that's, that's a quote from a Conservative minister from three or four years ago, understanding that the protections given to energy companies in that case were not compatible with the kind of policy decisions that the UK wanted to take.

01:15:14 - 01:15:23

Speaker 1

Thank you very much, that's helpful. Do you want to go next, Rosa? Yes, and just we're coming to the end of our session, so if we could keep it brief, I think we've done all the supplementaries.

01:15:23 - 01:16:59

Rosa Crawford

Yes, so just to add that on the UK's relationship with the EU, we do feel the right to regulate is protected because there are specific carve-outs in that agreement. But with the other trade and investment agreements, the ones that Tom has mentioned, also the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership, we're very concerned about ISDS being present because of the threats that Tom has described, where it has undermined abilities for the government to move away from high-carbon industries, to have an active industrial policy, to pursue foreign policy objectives. As I say, in the past ISDS has been used to challenge the renationalisation of public services and also increases in the minimum wage. So we see it as a privileged route to justice which is not available to any domestic investor, worker, any other entity, which has been used in a very dangerous way as Tom has outlined.

But I just want to focus on the CPTPP, because the government is currently reviewing that agreement in light of potential accession of a number of new members, including Indonesia and the Philippines. But we want the government to use that opportunity to also review the ISDS clause in that agreement, because Australia and New Zealand wrote out the ISDS commitments for themselves in that agreement, so they were not bound by it. And as I say, Australia has now committed to not include ISDS in any future trade agreement. We would want the UK government to take the same approach as Australia, New Zealand, negotiate side letters with other CPTPP members and write themselves out of these ISDS commitments, which are posing such a critical threat to workers, to industries, to public services. So we do see an opportunity around ISDS and look forward to engaging with the government on that.

01:16:59 - 01:17:01

Speaker 24

To write ourselves out totally?

01:17:01 - 01:17:04

Speaker 25

Of all the ISDS, of all the ISDS clauses that we are bound by.

01:17:04 - 01:17:22

Speaker 26

Baroness Lawlor has a supplementary. I'm afraid the dreaded mute button is on, Baroness Lawlor. We can't hear you.

Hold on, we can't hear you, Sheila, I'm afraid. That looks good, I can see the microphone has appeared.

01:17:23 - 01:17:25

Speaker 27

That's working, fabulous. Excellent.

01:17:25 - 01:19:25

Margaret Mary Sheila Lawlor

Thank you. It's been a very interesting session. I'd like just to pick up on something Rosa Crawford said before this session closes. Might I ask you to think about pushing for what unions want in respect of Lord Johnson's question about the proportion of the workforce in unions in this country who would be involved in, if you like, the production of tradeable goods?

Given that only 22% of the UK workforce, or 22.4% I think, is in a trade union, and most of them are in the public sector, which doesn't make productive goods. What's at discussion here is really, to my mind, why should certain members of the UK workforce, really rather privileged trade union manufacturing members, push for certain rights in developing countries which may mitigate against working people, many of whom won't belong to unions in parts of the world which we've been discussing, where there are no water supplies or properly can't meet the requirements of trade agreements, and where I think much more useful emphasis for the trade union movement would be to concentrate on providing the kind of help.

And where I think much more useful emphasis for the trade union movement would be to concentrate on providing the kind of help and support in terms of practical support, electrification, digitization, all these things matter. But requiring governments to impose it as part of a trade treaty, to my mind, will mitigate against the very people who we do want to help. So could you take on board that when you're writing in in respect of Lord Johnson's supplementary?

01:19:25 - 01:19:52

Speaker 1

Thank you. We haven't got too much time.

Did you did you did you want to just briefly answer that point, which which some people may be considering in the sense of is it right to have trade deals that include anything other than very straightforward commercial terms? That's what's been presented to us a lot of the time. Your three agendas are obviously a substantial expansion on that, we're using trade as a policy to pursue ambitions. But in about 30 seconds, do you want to come back to Baroness Lawlor on her comments?

01:19:52 - 01:20:50

Rosa Crawford

And just to say, it's fundamental to trade that there is a level playing field and you don't allow unfair advantage to be gained by abuse of labour rights as well as other unfair trade practice, such as unfair subsidies, for example. So for us it's integral to a fair trade and a well-functioning trade system that you do have binding and enforceable labour rights.

Labor rights, and for us it's not an either or in terms of interest of the workers in the UK and interest of workers in developing countries if that if that was the suggestion, but just to say that workers internationally obviously want protection for their fundamental rights and that's why we work closely with Global South trade union partners. And for us it is about manufacturing, but a well-functioning public services is also fundamental to a well-functioning economy, so public sector unions' perspectives are also important in this as well. So for us the all the connection is there between protection for labor rights and a well-functioning trade policy on economic criteria as well.

01:20:50 - 01:20:51

Thank you very much.

01:20:51 - 01:21:33

Margaret Mary Sheila Lawlor

But this is to prefer unionized labor over non-unionized labor, and perhaps at the expense of non-unionized labor for those workforce who can't or don't want to belong to unions. And if you skew trade deals in the interests of one sector, you will see emerging an aristocracy of labor which colors government and is no more than a vested interest arm of government.

And that is a great danger to the real emergence of prosperity and support for people who want to make a go of entrepreneurial activities and be part of a labour market.

01:21:33 - 01:21:45

Speaker 1

Well, I think this is quite a big, quite a big topic. We've, so that the committee, everyone's aware, we've heard from a cross-section of entities. We're hearing from, from you. David, did you want to ask a supplementary to this?

01:21:45 - 01:21:48

Alexander David Hugh Hannay

Just a very short one on an already answered point.

01:21:48 - 01:21:55

Speaker 1

Okay. And then maybe when you answer it, just weave in a bit about the legitimacy of the unions to have such a strong voice in trade policy.

01:21:55 - 01:22:39

Alexander David Hugh Hannay

May I not quote it right, Rosa, but I got the impression that what you were saying about the CPTPP was that those clever Australians and New Zealanders signed up to certain provisions and have now managed to opt out of them, and that was a jolly good thing and we ought to do the same thing. But the government spends its life telling us that the CPTPP is a great and wonderful thing because it provides a level playing field right across not only trade in goods but also quite a lot of trade in services. So if you're going to have an opt-out when you feel like it, there's not much there, is there?

01:22:39 - 01:22:40

Can I go in on that?

01:22:40 - 01:22:42

Speaker 29

Just briefly, if that's all right.

01:22:42 - 01:22:46

Rosa Crawford

Yes. Well, I mean, all trade negotiations and trade agreements are a product of negotiations.

01:22:46 - 01:22:48

Speaker 30

But we signed up to this one.

01:22:48 - 01:23:32

Rosa Crawford

This for us is something where it is a live agreement, as I say, it's under review about accession of future trading partners that might join CPTPP. So we think there is opportunities to change the terms of it, as Australia and New Zealand have done. And it's something we're engaging with the government on the possibilities for that. So we think there's possibilities for the future to change the agreement. And on the question about trade unions and all workers, we stand for the rights of all workers, whether you're unionized or not unionized.

There are fundamental rights that we want all workers to have and protections we want all workers to have. Obviously, we hope more workers will join trade unions, but we don't make a distinction about whether you're a union member or non-union member. We will fight for your rights for dignity and decent pay.

01:23:32 - 01:23:48

Speaker 1

Thank you. And maybe in your written response, if you could take some of Baroness Lawlor's comments, that'd be very helpful because I think people may ask why should the Trades Union Congress have an overweight place at the table? But obviously your feed-in is very relevant. Did you have any supplementaries to your question?

01:23:48 - 01:24:04

Speaker 31

No, I think you've... I do think this is a bit getting a bit out of hand in terms of what we're trying to debate.

The points made, I think, have been extremely well made. They can be amplified in comments. But we're not... we have not decided any of this, and it's not actually germane to what we want to say to the government about their future prospects.

01:24:04 - 01:24:47

Speaker 1

Indeed. Thank you for that point as well. I mean, I think Baroness Lawlor's entitled to her question on this. It isn't unreasonable in my view to hear about the different types of trade policy you can enter into, which is why I think having these three here is a good thing because we've heard only really from commercial entities so far, which is why we were very keen to have a different view in terms of how trade policy can be expanded. I think there's also an assumption that could be made that trade... fundamental free trade deals are a good thing, they should be pursued at all costs.

I think your input in that is very relevant because there are costs to the economy and to other sections of the economy and onto the partners we're doing trade deals with. So, I think that's been very helpful. Any other... any final points?

01:24:47 - 01:24:50

Speaker 32

Only, only this I suppose. Would you agree with me that they are some good examples at a municipal level in terms of economic development North-South, in which chambers of commerce, trade unions, local authorities, and I saw one example of this myself in the link between Durban and Leeds, have come together in order to share good practice around economic development that has benefited both North and South because it's promoted local economies in Leeds and the local economy in Durban, and that we ought to be more innovative in our thinking in this area and not get tied into...

01:25:52 - 01:25:57

Paul Boateng

Do you see some sense in that? Can you share any observations in relation to it?

01:25:57 - 01:26:35

Tom Wills

I'm going to take this one. Yeah, I don't know about the example that you shared, but I, you know, absolutely see international trade as a engine for growth, for development, if it's done on a basis of shared standards and dignity for workers, absolutely.

And I think one of the reflections that we have about the last five or six years of UK trade policy has been the focus on signature of trade agreements and less focus on how those trade agreements actually are used by businesses operating in the UK and in partner countries.

01:26:35 - 01:27:09

Rosa Crawford

Just to say a very good example of exactly that kind of municipal level engagement, the North with the South, just last week our regional secretary of the Northern region, the TUC, was on the government's trade delegation to India where Northern mayors met with our trade union sister centers in India and talked about exactly that sustainable growth, sustainable investment from UK businesses in India and Indian businesses in the North of England. So I think that's a really good example of unions, employers, and politicians getting together, North and South, and as TUC we're very hopeful that we can continue with that engagement with other Global South partners.

01:27:09 - 01:27:11

Speaker 33

Thank you.

01:27:11 - 01:27:12

One last point.

01:27:12 - 01:27:49

Amrita Saha

Last point.

I think that's, that's a very good point because there are clear emerging examples of such cooperation. The UK supported what was called the Strengthening Indian Trade in Africa, which was a triangular cooperation program. So UK with India in Africa, which essentially had that bottom-up approach that you've rightfully explained. And you know, I very much align with my colleagues today that, you know, trade can be an engine of growth and development. And so while of course we're talking about trade policy, which is very macro, connecting up, connecting it up to the micro and more meso levels, I think is, is really powerful in ensuring that trade brings benefits which are more inclusive.

01:27:49 - 01:32:56

Speaker 1

Thank you. Thank you. Wonderful. Thank you very much indeed, Amrita, Rosa, and Tom. Very grateful to have you with us.

A very, very full and varied conversation, which I think we're going to find enormously useful. Please do send in your written thoughts to us, not just on the questions that were asked, but also other thoughts that you think might allow us to get to a good conclusion about working out how we should pursue Britain's best interests in trade. So thank you very much indeed.

Well, thank you very much everyone. Extremely pleased to welcome Maxwell Green, who's a senior trade policy manager at Make UK. Sadly, our other witness, Fionnuala Horrocks-Burns from DHL, was unable to join us on account of travel difficulties, so we're sorry to miss her, but very grateful for Maxwell to be here. We have a sort of variety of different themes to ask you about. I found when I came to a Make UK seminar, which is what led for me to think to suggest you come and talk to our committee, a number of your members just gave some very practical examples of how uncertainty in tariffs, volatility in tariffs as we've seen over the last year or so, affected them and some of the other issues that were more practically applied to them.

So to give you a moment of background, we've done a lot of research into the high-level FTAs, MOUs and so on. But sometimes that doesn't reach down to the reality of someone trying to sell their spectacles from the UK to India and all the different problems that are created around that with customs blockages or digital certification and so on and so forth. So if you could be as practical as possible and give us examples, that would be enormously helpful. But maybe Lord Anderson, you could start with the first topic question.

01:32:56 - 01:33:30

Donald Anderson

Mr. Green, in retrospect, the period after the Second World War appears a sort of golden age in terms of international trade practice, greater emphasis on developing countries, that greater consensus. Now the pattern is more protectionism and so on.

So, given this darkening international context, can you give us any signs of hope?

01:33:30 - 01:36:14

Maxwell Green

Yes, that's a good first question. There's definitely been a lot of instability and volatility in the kind of global marketplace over the last kind of five, ten years, right? So we've had time after time, we've had issues around readjusting to life after leaving the EU. We've had issues with the conflict in the Middle East, US tariffs, most recently the issues with the conflict in Iran. What I would say, though, is businesses are very resilient to some of these changes.

So for example over the last year, or the first half of this year, trade is only actually down 5% given all of the issues in the Middle East. And this is after a huge increase in exports of last year, so actually it's sitting way above where it should be when you look two years ago. Now if you look in the kind of detail of that, in where this is coming and going, looking at individual markets, there's a lot of volatility as you would imagine. This is mostly probably down to trade diversion. So for example in the first half of this year, we've seen US exports dip 38%, but at the same time Chinese exports have increased 30%.

We've got Germany, Netherlands, Hong Kong all up as well, Hong Kong almost doubling from last year. You look on the other side when you're looking at importing into the UK, we're also seeing huge increase of British businesses importing from from the rest of the world. So US is up 11%, China's up 7 and a half, Germany's up 9, Switzerland almost doubling 93% up and Canada's up 88%. So although there are signs that it's slowing down, what we're seeing is manufacturers are actually quite resilient in this in this area. In our last manufacturing outlook survey, we actually found that UK manufacturers, the share of UK manufacturers exporting actually increased by 8%.

And that's also aligned with some of the increased confidence that they're also seeing. But export output still remains quite positive, but overall output as a general sector is actually slightly down at the moment and it's slowed. So I guess the moral of the story is that we are seeing certain signs that it's stable.

There's certain signs that it's slightly going down, but actually at the same time businesses have had to adapt to a lot of things over the last few years and this doesn't come free of a cost. So SMEs, other businesses have had to adapt to shocks in oil prices, energy prices, input prices. So we've adjusted, we're resilient, we have a positive outlook in the next few years.

01:36:14 - 01:36:21

Donald Anderson

What is your perspective on the service sector in this context?

01:36:21 - 01:36:27

Maxwell Green

I am not an expert in the service sector, so if that's okay I might leave that question, maybe come back to you.

01:36:27 - 01:36:31

Speaker 35

We focus predominantly on goods and goods trade.

01:36:31 - 01:37:01

Speaker 8

Could, yes, please do. Can I just ask you, Maxwell, in your own view, which sectors do you think, therefore, have actually done really well? And where have you, where do you feel that the policies that are currently around us deterring other sectors within manufacturing and development?

01:37:01 - 01:38:17

Maxwell Green

Yes, so I think it's important maybe to put it in the context of the global environment, right? So every country is struggling with trade and exports at the moment. So we need to compare those to other countries. So even though, let's say, overall automotive sector exports have decreased slightly, they haven't decreased as much as other areas, for example. What really helped, actually, was the US EPD.

So things such as automotive sector, the beef sector, all this kind of stuff, the exports to the US as our largest single trading market.

Having that comparative advantage against other markets really helped to boost those exports up, specifically in 2025. I know I just said that the US exports are down this year, but actually they're so much further above where they should be. So I think it really depends on FTAs, other trade kind of tools where we're focusing on. US EPD is one example where those sectors have done very well. Aluminium, again, those aluminium products are up, I think, 14% to the US.

Steel's up 9%. So there are definitely sectors where we're seeing a lot more growth. Again, in kind of industrial strategy sectors as well, where we've been focusing for the last few years. We expect kind of those areas to also do well, with they being more of a priority when it comes to kind of future trade tools.

01:38:17 - 01:38:24

Speaker 1

Thank you. Baroness Lawlor. I'm afraid the mic, you need to turn your microphone on. Sorry, maybe we have to do that here.

01:38:24 - 01:38:29

Speaker 41

Hold on a second. Yes, great. It was on, now it's gone off.

01:38:29 - 01:38:32

Speaker 39

Thank you.

01:38:32 - 01:38:34

Speaker 36

You've just turned it off.

01:38:34 - 01:38:36

Speaker 37

It's on.

01:38:36 - 01:39:01

Speaker 1

Oh dear. Sorry, you've just turned it off again. I think someone's, I think you've got two people operating the microphone here. Do we, you haven't got it? Sorry, Sheila, there we go.

It keeps flashing on and off, so let's not touch it on this side and let Sheila turn it on on her side maybe. Yep. So you need to turn your microphone on. No, we haven't, we can't hear you.

01:39:01 - 01:39:04

Speaker 40

Can you hear me? Was it, yeah, okay.

01:39:04 - 01:39:07

Speaker 38

Don't touch any buttons. We're going to manage it from here.

01:39:07 - 01:39:09

Speaker 42

Right, excellent. Sorry.

01:39:09 - 01:39:58

Margaret Mary Sheila Lawlor

Maxwell, thank you very much. I'm very interested in what you've just said about the resilience of the groups, the trade groups you represent in Make UK. You've spoken about automotive, you've spoken about steel, and you've spoken about those industries which have benefited from the EPD. Now the EPD isn't a, isn't a FTA. It's an understanding really, but it's not legally binding.

Would you like to elaborate on the sorts of agreements, whether they're binding or non-binding, which your members have done well out of?

Now, you've mentioned the US partnership agreement, but what about others, and what about other sectors that you represent?

01:39:58 - 01:43:07

Maxwell Green

Yes, definitely. So, UK manufacturers generally favor kind of more binding agreements because they provide kind of long-term certainty. They can look at investment opportunities much longer into the into the future. However, there's an increasingly, obviously, as we all know, fast-moving global environment. And actually, by the time it takes to start negotiating an FTA and then implement the FTA, things have moved on.

So, they all play a really, really important part. I would say that the binding FTAs, we can't understate the importance of them. For example, they they give well, they they open up market access on a much wider a much wider scale. If we look at something like the the new India FTA that's just gone into force, our members are very excited around some of the new opportunities that that that brings in a wide range of sectors. I mean, straight away, you're already looking at tariff reductions in in things like alcohol, in in in medical devices, in aerospace, all that kind of stuff.

But it's also an agreement that will get better over time. So each year we're going to have more market access on a range of, a range of products as well. CPTPP is obviously quite a useful agreement that we're, we're looking into as well. This also opens up markets in some of those fast, fast-growing markets of places in Asia and all those kind of things. And the best thing about this is it kind of, it keeps developing, so it keeps expanding.

So we, we're on the ground, we're on the ground floor of that as well. You know, we're really looking forward to the, the inclusion potentially of Indonesia and the Philippines in, in that agreement as well. When you look at other kind of FTAs, we have a big focus on the Australia and New Zealand FTAs.

These were obviously the first FTAs that came into force after the UK left the European Union. What's great about Australia is it took incredibly fast to negotiate, which was a lot of relief for manufacturers. You know, the India FTA took four and a half years from the start of negotiations till implementation earlier this year. Australia took three, for example. We hope that things like CPTPP as well could also be that quick.

I think it took the UK three and a half years from starting, but it'll get faster as the accession process kind of comes more into a more familiar, I guess, with the block. In terms of the kind of other agreements we could be looking into, obviously FTAs aren't the answer for everything. So we had the negotiations to update the UK-Canadian FTA a few years ago, obviously stalled on the issue of food standards.

But there is an opportunity again to use more sector-specific agreements. So, for example, if we can't get over across the line because there's a red line in in food standards, we can look at critical minerals or an agreement on energy, specifically with things going on in the Middle East, could be quite could be quite useful. With Canada, we're also very similar partners, same with Australia. So it would take hopefully a lot quicker to negotiate something than it is for somewhere like India or or even the GCC.

01:43:07 - 01:43:23

Margaret Mary Sheila Lawlor

Well, thank you very much. Can you just comment on what exactly does well with Australia, New Zealand, given that you're involved at production and goods?

Is transport a problem and what sort of goods do you export?

01:43:23 - 01:43:36

Maxwell Green

I can definitely get you a list of the trade stats and what products we are exporting lots of to drill down into the details. But I think the UK and Australia markets are very similar. That's probably why they're doing quite well.

01:43:36 - 01:43:45

Speaker 1

I think when we looked at the recent facts, physical exports, manufactured good exports to Australia was down since we signed the deal. I don't know if you've got any...

01:43:45 - 01:43:48

Maxwell Green

So yes, if you look in certain sectors, oh sorry, if you look at an overall picture...

01:43:48 - 01:43:56

Speaker 1

Services are up, but actually goods were down, not much, but maybe by a few percent. I don't know if any colleagues remember that. I was a bit surprised by that. Why is that the case?

01:43:56 - 01:44:39

Maxwell Green

So there's certain, there's obviously certain sectors which are doing much better. Overall, it's looking quite flat. But there's definitely sectors which are looking a lot more positive.

I couldn't give you the details of why it's down overall. I think we've got a lot of work to do around implementation of the deals, which actually have gone a lot better since the Australia and New Zealand deals have been signed. It's doing a lot better on the other way as well. So products coming in from Australia and New Zealand into the UK, I think that's up quite substantially actually. And that obviously, those inputs will go into our manufacturing to then go into re-export somewhere else as well.

So it's not just a one-way ticket. So for example, it's not just exporting to Australia, it's also the imports as well we need to focus on.

01:44:39 - 01:44:44

Speaker 1

Thank you very much. Next question. Oh sorry, Sheila, do you have a supplementary you want to ask?

01:44:44 - 01:45:06

Margaret Mary Sheila Lawlor

Just a supplementary. To what extent, when you talk about these lags, you mentioned one with the US about two years ago and one on Australia. To what extent do we have to factor in the world economic situation during and post-COVID when supply chains were getting back to normal? Did you find that?

01:45:06 - 01:45:11

Maxwell Green

Can you repeat that question just in a slightly different way, sorry?

I'm not sure I fully understand.

01:45:11 - 01:45:32

Margaret Mary Sheila Lawlor

Sorry. You have spoken about dips in trade post-2021. To what extent are these to be expected after the COVID shutdown, not only here but of supply chains the world over, as well as the recent wars which you did mention?

01:45:32 - 01:46:41

Maxwell Green

Yeah, I think manufacturers obviously have a lag in, you know, there's obviously things that we need to adapt to. So, for example, issues in, let's say, Eastern Europe over the last two years, we've had to adapt different supply chains.

So moving our imports from, you know, Ukraine and Russia were quite a large supply of raw materials, so we have to find new partners, for example, to bring those in, as well as kind of domestic issues around energy prices. We're going to have a slight lag in the fact that it's going to take a while for those things to sink into manufacturers to adapt to those changes. So I think it's obvious that we're going to have some kind of push, and we're kind of seeing that with the US at the moment, where when the US put in their more protectionist policies around the US tariffs last year, we actually saw a huge surge in exports to the US. And this is mostly due to the fact that the UK had a much lower preferential tariff than, not preferential, but tariff than other markets. And now the effects of the tariffs are starting to sink into manufacturers.

US are starting to look at different, more domestic supplies instead of overseas, for example.

So it's taken a little bit of time, but it will it will slowly filter into into into the trade statistics and what's happening.

01:46:41 - 01:46:43

Speaker 43

Thank you.

01:46:43 - 01:46:44

Maxwell Green

Thank you, Lord Simpson.

01:46:44 - 01:47:15

Speaker 31

You've you've spoken very well about the the various trade agreements that have been signed and the the different types of trade agreements that benefit your your members. But behind all that, presumably, there is a an overarching question about what does the trade policy does? What what is the government setting out as being the objectives? It'd be interesting your thoughts on the on the relationship between the two, but in particular, have you any ideas that we could we could take on about how that trade policy itself could change, which would benefit?

01:47:15 - 01:52:03

Maxwell Green

Definitely. So, of course, the the actual policy which is being implemented and what's being created is fantastic.

We think that the market access obviously matters a lot, and whether it's an FTA or whether it's a sector agreement, it's massively helpful. But if businesses aren't aware or able to understand what these things are, and we also have lower, maybe have lower competitiveness than our fellow competitors around Europe or North America, then they can't fully be utilized. So therefore, there are some areas which we think that policy could be used to help exports grow. So the first one would be around improving FTA utilization. So this would be around trying to work with industry and government collaboratively to try and increase the awareness of FTAs, awareness of other trade tools.

A lot of businesses are still unaware of some of the advantages that they have, or there's complexity with the customs or the documentation. We also think that the guidance that they they they get from from the government is is firstly fantastic, but also it comes too late, it comes in entry into force. If we had it six months before or three months before, because we we're aware it's going to come into force that date, or soon, businesses can start to look at exporting from from day one and that may that may help with the kind of lag that you have after signing an FTA, which takes a while for those effects to fully come into, or sorry, it fully into come into effect. We also think another big barrier in the kind of export support is is access to finance, so that's why we're very supportive of the UK Export Finance and potentially looking at increasing their their lending capacity as well. I think so signing agreement in in kind of conclusion on that, signing agreement should be viewed as kind of the start of the implementation process rather than the end of it.

We also think that, you know, we need to look not just at trade policy but also domestic policy, because they're they're very interlinked.

So we can't look at trade policy through a single lens. So trade agreements improve market access but actually if the domestic policy doesn't support manufacturing and support the competitiveness of manufacturing then they won't be able to take advantage of those opportunities. For example the the UK has the the highest energy industrial energy prices in the G7 caused by obviously a lot of other factors externally but also internally. So the UK funds environmental and social levies through electricity bills rather than general taxation so adding around 20% to the costs of electricity for manufacturers. So this increase in energy prices for manufacturers and it hurts competition and this has led to the UK having on average a 46% higher energy industrial energy cost than advanced economies.

We believe these costs should be funded through general taxation to reduce energy bills and support industry. So although trade agreements can create the opportunities abroad, we need to make sure that businesses remain competitive at home so we can remain competitive abroad as well. I think thirdly, the stability and predictability is one of the most important things for manufacturers. You can look at US, you know, changing their trade policy every few months, but actually, oh sorry, you can look at the higher tariffs the US have put in onto their market, but actually what businesses need is predictability and stability so we can get that long-term investment, long-term plans going forward.

And what we find that's really good with these is free trade agreements because they they put on paper binding, you know, 10 to 20 years time we can look at some of the some of the areas we can invest or businesses can invest in. There's other unilateral measures that the UK could follow, so a review of the global tariff would also be helpful. So without importing, a lot of a lot of businesses can't export. Obviously the UK doesn't produce everything in the world and we can't due to climate or or anything like that. So reducing the or just looking again at the global the UK global tariff will help us potentially make inputs more competitive and then leading to more competitive exports.

I think the last thing, sorry, I know that's a lot, is more of a general one around increasing diversification. So we can use all the trade tools within our disposal, FTAs, non-binding agreements, sector-specific agreements as well to try and increase diversification not just on the exporting but also the importing.

And obviously things like CPTPP is vital to that as that's going to keep expanding as well. So just for the UK to keep an active role in looking at other markets, other issues that we could be addressing through not necessarily FTAs but sector-specific agreements, etc.

01:52:03 - 01:52:05

Speaker 44

Thank you very much. Sandy, you had a...

01:52:05 - 01:52:39

Speaker 8

Yeah, just a very quick one. You mentioned earlier about the lag of the information reaching the manufacturers and the businesses.

And do you think that's because the discussions across Whitehall departments isn't consistent? Maybe as an organisation you'll know better who works better with you and who doesn't, and maybe that's where the difficulties lie. So the lag can actually be reduced dramatically if all the departments are aligned.

01:52:39 - 01:53:30

Maxwell Green

I'm not entirely sure if that is the reason. What I would say is the lag comes because there is the awareness of FTAs and the awareness of new trade agreements is not fully known. Whether that is a problem within the civil service around linking up, I'm not too sure. I would say there's also an opportunity to sector-specific market access guys. So I know that the BEIS and DEFRA have already started looking at this.

So if a market is really important for food exports, then they might want to bring DEFRA in.

So I'm not sure around the politics and interaction between government departments, but what I will say is there is definitely an opportunity for them to work closer together on sector-specific agreements or maybe an FTA which is really going to benefit one sector.

01:53:30 - 01:53:34

Speaker 45

Thank you very much. We have one last question, Lord German, your last question.

01:53:34 - 01:54:33

German

I don't suppose that your members wake up in the morning and say, "Oh, I wonder what's happened to the World Trade Organization, and how it's getting on?" But yet we have to have some basis for understanding how we all are going to work together in this world.

And we've had, I think, a total ascent of evidence that though the WTO has enormous difficulties and has big problems, we couldn't live without it. So if you were to explain to your members as they wake up in the morning, this really is an important issue, what would you think they would want, given you've said already that business is looking for certainty, stability, and predictability? So what does the WTO bring to that table and what would you say to them anyway if you were trying to convince them it was a good idea or a bad idea to work with it?

01:54:33 - 01:55:26

Maxwell Green

Yes, so I think it's no secret that the WTO is becoming under scrutiny and a little bit of threat. However, historically, and I know that members know this and ourselves, but it's helped bring kind of smaller countries into the trading environment. It's given regular rules across, well, the whole trading environment as well, and it also has reduced barriers.

I think it's important to note that although in the public eye it looks like the WTO isn't doing what it should be doing, there's a lot of behind-the-scenes forums, meetings that actually go on, working groups and things like that. So I do think they do a lot more behind the scenes, and maybe it's a case of bringing that out, of what they're doing in their working groups towards creating common trade rules or reducing common trade barriers across global markets.

01:55:26 - 01:56:15

German

Do you think there's some, what it does now, that people say, this is really helpful to us, we need to make sure those remain in place?

Have you got any examples of what you think your members would be wanting to ensure was not just retained but also promoted? It may not be that the headline of the whole organisation and how you reform it and how you get agreement may be beyond the reach of your reply, but in the undergrowth which you talked about, there's an awful lot of things going on. What is it that people value and what sort of tools are they using that makes it good for your manufacturers?

01:56:15 - 01:56:44

Maxwell Green

Yeah, I think the WTO is probably the most important thing it does is just create certainty, normal shared trading rules. I think stability is the most important part for our members when it comes to international trade.

So even if, like I said before, if there's a huge tariff, as long as we know what's going to happen and the WTO can help regulate and help kind of push a normal norm across all member states.

01:56:44 - 01:57:34

German

There was the, what this, the wonderful report that we got from the International Chamber of Commerce and Oxford Economics, which says that if we dissolve the WTO, that would lower GDP for developing countries as a group by 5.1% by 2030. Now, that's a hard issue to try and get people to understand.

In terms of the people that who are, you know, going to be at the sharp end of trade, how do you, what message do you give to them about this this body which has been based in Geneva, which has all this all this background and stuff? How would you say to them, look, this is what really matters here and how they help us?

01:57:34 - 01:58:15

Maxwell Green

Well exactly, and I think, you know, even developing countries, they have a huge potential to then future on to, in the future to have more more of an impact into world trade and we can increase the sourcing opportunities. I don't have a straightforward answer for you on how how we kind of promote that message. Potentially it's just making sure that the WTO is a lot more publicly visible when it comes to what they're doing, especially when it comes to them producing a regular rules around trade that we can look and say that they're being, you know, this this is improving stability across the global trade market. I'm sorry I can't give you a straightforward answer.

01:58:15 - 01:58:32

German

No, that's very helpful. Just wanted to know if they if they are as accessible to the end user as they might be. Sorry.

Sorry, are they as accessible to the end user, your companies, as they could be? I mean, are they seen as distant or could they be more...

01:58:32 - 01:58:48

Maxwell Green

There's definitely more they can do, there's definitely more everyone can do to be more transparent, right? So I think the WTO is a fantastic organisation, but there is definitely more that they can do to try and promote what they're doing to everyone.

01:58:48 - 02:00:22

Paul Boateng

More than 20 years ago, I mean when dinosaurs ruled the earth, I think it was about 2002. You were there. I was there.

In about 2002, I attended an international conference in Belfast at the convention centre of Chambers of Commerce. And one of the things that struck me then, and indeed has struck me subsequently in various other jobs I've done, is a sense that in relation to small and medium-sized enterprises, often represented in Chambers of Commerce in the manufacturing sector, there's some other countries, and Italy is a prime example, that do rather better than us in terms of promoting them internationally and making those SMEs more aware of international opportunity arising from trade agreements and the like than ourselves.

So I wonder if in your experience and that of Make UK, you can give us some examples of best practice internationally that you think our government would benefit from hearing about and learning from and indeed implementing.

02:00:22 - 02:02:32

Maxwell Green

Yeah, so for example, I mentioned earlier around the UK-Australia FTA. Australia has done fantastic when it comes to promoting their free trade agreement with the UK. You've already seen that with the huge increase in exports over the last few years. They've got a fantastic online website which looks at everything that you could possibly want to know about Australia-UK trade, which manufacturers or anyone can go onto and see what the opportunities are, for example.

And actually, to be fair to the UK civil service and BIS, they've also been really good at trying to look at export guides as well. What we're missing, though, is we're looking at the import aspect. There's no guidance for manufacturers to import from these markets as well. I think they've started doing small sections, but there's so much more we could be doing. And like I said before, without imports, a lot of the time there aren't exports.

The EU also have a very good online system where they're looking at specific markets and some opportunities that they could have. So when a business is looking to export, there's, you know, so many options out there. There's so many different FTAs. What actually, which FTA would be more useful for them? What are they making?

The EU have these sector-specific guides with each market. So it even looks at the UK and says, "We really like, you know, in the UK they consume a lot of this."

So actually something like that would help businesses look, you know, would help them decide which market is best for them. In terms of other ones, we've got within CPTPP, the Canadians are very good at trying to separate some of the they separate the the benefits of an FTA bilaterally with the benefits that they get under CPTPP. I know BIS have also done this, but the Canadians are a lot more in-depth, shall we say. So we could learn from that to try and get a little bit more, you know, clarity of if if we want to export to Canada or Mexico, both under CPTPP and bilaterally, which route do we take? Do we take the CPTPP one or do we take the bilateral?

So it's quite important because the tariff might be the same, but actually the other procedures and other provisions could be different.

02:02:32 - 02:03:17

Paul Boateng

If I'm a specialist cheesemaker, are there specific websites I can go to that will help me understand the geography of UK trade agreements so as to get a better handle on how I can get my cheese into that market? Because this committee has heard on previous occasions that there've been issues, particularly around cheese, specifically in some of these agreements. Is there a way in which I can, I mean, I've just got a small farm here in rural England or Scotland or wherever, and I want to get my cheese into one of the markets which we've recently opened up?

02:03:17 - 02:05:02

Maxwell Green

Yeah, so at the moment there's not a specific guide or like I said market guides, but what there is, there is a BIS ask a question function. So you can ask the question online and BIS will get back to you. However, it's obviously a case of having to ask questions instead of just having it straight in front of you straight away. So there is definitely more work to do to try and bring the opportunities that we might not even see yet to front. I think just something else probably worth mentioning, kind on the same lines but not.

We're looking at a lot of guides that look at highlighting sectors which already do well in a market. So for example, you could look at there's a market access guide on Canada and you could say that they're very big importers of cars, they have a big car sector.

But actually what we need to be doing is looking at sectors which have been growing massively over the last 10 years but maybe still at that lower level because that's the future opportunity that we can look at. So it'd be good it'd be good to kind of focus more on the sectors which are up and coming rather than the ones that are already established because those are the ones we already have established trade in. For example, for the UK-GCC we we looked at products and we looked at reducing tariff quite rightly so on products that we already have a large trade flow with. Now if we looked at some other some other products which maybe are 10 years away from being huge, they might not have got the tariff reduction that they needed they needed and they won't continue to grow as fast as the others because they won't have that tariff reduction or they won't have the provisions to help them to help them export. So similar to your question but also not focusing on kind of emerging trends in in international in international markets and the consumption in different markets.

02:05:02 - 02:05:09

Speaker 47

Thank you very much. Thank you very much. I think we will any other questions or comments from my colleagues? No?

02:05:09 - 02:05:36

Speaker 1

That's great. Well, thank you very much indeed, that was enormously helpful. Any follow-up comments, do please send them in. I think there were some follow-up comments asked of you. We'd be grateful to get them.

We've got a few more weeks before we close our sort of report up. But Make UK is a very important group in terms of how you represent your members. So the more information you can send us would be extremely well received. And thank you very much for coming and spending your time with us this afternoon.

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