Committee on the Environment, Climate and Food Safety Ordinary meeting
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ENVI European Parliament
Follow its sittingsThomas Pellerin-Carlin
So let me make eight short points to make sure that we have a factual discussion in the coming month ahead of us. Point number one: the Islamic Republic of Iran is blocking 15% of global oil production. If this continues and it has been continuing for more than three month we will start discussing as experts already do about managing oil shortage.
Second point, as a result of this Islamic Republic of Iran choice to block the Strait of Hormuz, our European citizens, who still rely heavily on petrol cars, are exposed to very expensive oil. A lot of our member states have been spending money subsidizing oil purchases as a result of this, and we now need to fight inflation. We have an inflation crisis again in Europe, provoked by an oil shock as a result of our choice to continue to depend on petrol cars. Third, this may materialize into an energy security crisis. Because we only produce 3% of the oil we consume, while we produce 100% of the electricity we consume.
And therefore, the debate that we have on petrol versus electricity is not only a debate about the future of cars, but about the future of Europe. Do we want to continue to rely on an energy source that we do not have and that is controlled by bullies, or do we want to choose sovereignty, to have cars that run on European energy? Fourth point, we see an increase of the shares of the sales of battery electric cars all over Europe. And I know some of us in this room believe that this is only a wealthy country thing. Obviously, Denmark is leading the way.
In Denmark, 80%, 8-0, 80% of the cars sold today are battery electric cars. But if you look even at poorer countries, Romania has a higher share of battery electric cars than Italy, even if Romania is much poorer than Italy. So we see that increase all over Europe and we need to take into account that new market reality. Point number five, we do need biofuels and e-fuels for our military and for our civilian aviation. And I think as an ENVI committee, but as a parliament, we need to have a strategic discussion and be mindful of the fact that we have a limited feedstock for both biofuel and e-fuel, and we need to make sure that this goes into the strategic sectors.
And everybody, or at least everybody who believes in European freedom, the vast majority of this European Parliament, want to make sure that we have domestic European energy for the military as a strategic priority. Point number six, the future of the car is electric. I would like more people to say that, and I'm really happy that this is not only a social democratic point, this is not only the vision of Renew, this is also the vision of Ursula von der Leyen, the EPP-elected President of the Commission, who said that to us in this parliament last September. She said last September that the future of the car was electric. She's right, and she's still right today.
Point number seven, the car industry has heavily invested in the transformation. And I think in this room we should have a compromise that is built around the idea that we need to reward the people that are the pioneers. We need to reward the people that made the effort. There are a lot of companies, big and small, that have invested in the change towards battery electric cars, and we should not adopt a regulation that would threaten those investments by the people, by the people that make an effort. So any regulatory loophole that threatens this is extremely worrying for us and for the future of our industry.
The last point is that we should not make the same mistake as Donald Trump. We know exactly what it is to have petty politics around cars. That is what happened in the US last year. It led to the US federal government making a U-turn against electric cars, and it led to a destruction of jobs in the US car industry. One major OEM, Stellantis, even lost 6 billion euros, sorry, 6 billion dollars, as a result of the Trump policy against electric cars.
And I hope we can learn from this US mistake, this US choice for the past, and therefore focus on investing in the future.
So to conclude, what we want as social democrats, we want cars that are made in the EU by EU workers and cars that run on European energy. We want a negotiation that leads to regulatory stability, that is making sure that we in this parliament can deliver the type of regulatory predictability that our companies, that our investors, that our workers, that our regions need. And it is in this spirit that we will be working to find a compromise with the platform in order to make sure that we can have a debate that is based on fact, that is based on data and that delivers a democratic support to a compromise that provide regulatory stability for the future of our industry. And here again, the future of the car is electric.
Pierfrancesco Maran
Thank you. Now for Patriots on behalf of Silvia Sardone, we have Viktória Ferenc.
Viktória Ferenc
Thank you chair, I will be speaking Hungarian. Tisztelt kollégák, az autó nem csupán közlekedési eszköz, hanem a szabadság szimbóluma és eszköze is. Szabadságot ad a munkába járáshoz, az utazáshoz és a mindennapi élethez. A szektort, ami ezt lehetővé teszi, most van talán utolsó lehetőségünk megmenteni és versenyképessé tenni. A belső égésű motorok 2035-ös kivezetése irreális cél volt kezdettől fogva, és veszélybe sodorta az európai autóipart, benne magyar munkahelyek ezreit is.
Nem szabad csupán egyetlen technológiát ráerőltetni a szektorra. Az elektromos autók mellett helye van a hibrideknek, a fenntartható bioüzemanyagoknak és más alternatív üzemanyagoknak is. Minden olyan innovatív megoldásnak, amely hozzájárul a kibocsátás csökkentéséhez. Éppen ezért támogatjuk, hogy a karbonsemleges üzemanyagokat használó járművek önálló kategóriaként jelenjenek meg a szabályozásban, és a zéró emissziós járművekkel egyenrangú elbírálásban részesüljenek. Ugyancsak szükségesnek tartjuk, hogy a fenntartható és alternatív üzemanyagok alkalmazását ne korlátozzák mesterséges plafonok.
A bioüzemanyagok nagyobb szerepet kaphatnak az átállásban, ezért a jelenlegi korlátozás nem indokolt. Úgy véljük, hogy a megfelelési időszakot három év helyett ötéves átlagolással kellene számítani, hogy a gyártók kiszámíthatóbb környezetben tudjanak beruházási döntéseket hozni. Továbbá fontosnak tartjuk a szabályozás rendszeres felülvizsgálatát. A technológiai fejlődés és a megfelelő reagálási képesség fenntartásához kétévente értékelni kellene, hogy az előírások továbbra is szolgálják-e a jogszabályban megfogalmazott célokat és az európai autóipar versenyképességét. Támogatjuk a nagyobb rugalmasságot biztosító módosítókat, és készen állunk arra, hogy további javaslatokkal hatékony mentőövet nyújtsunk az európai autóiparnak, megőrizve a munkahelyeket, a versenyképességet és Európa ipari erejét.
Köszönöm.
Alexandr Vondra
Yes, thank you very much. So listening the geopolitical lecture, but I think we need to change our policy to stop feeding the Chinese monstrum, that's what we are doing now. And I think the way forward is not this false assumption that if regulation becomes strict enough, the market will automatically adapt quickly enough, because that's a delusional policy. We need more technological neutrality, we need more fair competition. And I think in this respect, the Salini report is an important course of correction in the light of original Commission proposal.
It reconnects climate policy with industrial reality, technological openness, and economic credibility. It proposes more realistic targets for light commercial vehicles. It recognizes eligible renewable fuels within compliance. And finally, it accelerates access to credits to support investment and avoid distorting the competition between different decarbonization pathways. So this is the kind of thinking Europe needs more of: strategic, industrial, realistic, and not the ideological one.
Because competitiveness is not created through penalties and wishful thinking. It is built through innovation, affordable energy, industrial strength, and technological openness. That is why I also will be tabling amendments focused on enabling realistic compliance pathways, genuine technological neutrality, support for European manufacturing, and the protection of industrial jobs. The report by Massimiliano Salini is not the final destination, but it is a crucial first step in correcting the mistake of the last mandate if we want to avoid just the continuation of feeding of the Chinese monstrum. Thank you very much.
Sigrid Friis
Thank you, thank you for the floor and let me start by maybe being very honest with you. I do not warmly welcome the proposal to lower the reduction target or to divert the course of a very clear political signal that was sent from this house in the last mandate. However, I do recognize that the European car industry is under pressure and that some short-term relief may be needed while still ensuring that we stay on track. But the draft report goes far beyond short-term relief. While Commission proposes a 90% target with some additional flexibilities, the EPP rapporteur brings that down to 73%.
When you combine that with all of the proposed flexibilities, car manufacturers could in practice comply without selling a single battery electric car in 2035. This, colleagues, this is not a helping hand supporting the European car industry in the transition. This is a political choice to move away from electrification and away from decarbonization. If EPP or other political actors want to take road transport off the hook from delivering CO2 emissions reductions, then I think there's a question to be answered: tell us where we should find these emissions reductions instead. Because the EU 2040 or 2050 targets do not disappear.
If we do less on cars and vans, that means we need to do more somewhere else. Where should we do more: farming, industry, production? I'm curious to know. Because road transport is exactly the kind of sector where we should be moving faster, not slower. The technology is already here, electrification is a reality.
We also should stop for a moment and look what's happening outside of this room. Because while we're discussing whether to slow down the transition, Europeans are once again feeling the cost of our dependency on imported fossil fuels at the gas pump stations. At the same time, electric car sales are growing rapidly. The past months the sales have increased by around 40%, so the direction of travel is very clear. And China, as a colleague mentioned, China has understood that the future of cars is electric.
Their scaling technologies and their production capacity is scaling at a speed where we in Europe, we're not yet matching.
European companies are already investing in clean supply chains and charging infrastructure. What they need from us as lawmakers is not mixed signals. They need a clear and credible framework. I hope that we can work together on an ambitious agreement providing the short-term relief for the automotive sector while still clearly signaling that clean European electricity is the future of European mobility. Thank you.
Michael Bloss
Thank you very much, Chair. Thank you very much, Mr. Rapporteur, for presenting this, this draft report. And I also have to say I'm not sure that it is actually capturing what is happening outside there. Because it was already mentioned, what we are seeing is that people are afraid when they go to the fueling station, they see the very high petrol prices. They want to pay less for it, but it's impossible because we are dependent from the outside world.
And that's exactly the reason why we see a growth of 40% of uptake of electric cars, four percentage points more than in the last year and 20 percentage points altogether. That's also the reason why we see, why we see people not buying ICEs anymore. The ICE sales are going down. And what is the most interesting, Mr. Salini, is that we are much, much above the projected pathways of the Commission itself when they presented their report in 2021, much above. So the story that we, that people are buying less e-cars than expected, it's completely not true.
It's almost 10% more than expected. So what does it say to us? It tells us that the market currently is actually more advanced than we are here in the European Parliament and you with your report. With all of those loopholes that you put inside, it could be that in the year 2030 you would only need to reduce emissions by 21%, you would only need to have an uptake of 21%. That's basically where we are right now.
Nothing needs to change. And what does this create? It creates massive uncertainty for investors. It means that all of those who invest into charging infrastructure, electric mobility, they don't know whether their business plans are going to work. And that means less investment.
But there is investment. Investment is happening in China because they are going full speed in this direction. And if we say the future is electric, they will be the rulers if we don't take care. As you said, you referred to a Chinese monster. I don't know whether I will take this as the symbol, but if you have only a dead horse, you will definitely not be able to fight this.
But what you want to do is you need to equip yourself with the most modern technology and this is what we are destroying with this report. I could say a lot of things, just one more thing, or two more things. One is the utility factor. Today we have a report in the German media showing that those German ministers that use plug-in hybrids have much higher emissions than what is, what the plug-in hybrid should be on paper.
That also means they have much higher costs for for for their petrol and their diesel, for their fuel. And maybe if you are a minister, you can afford that. But if you are a normal person, you can't afford that. Plug-in hybrids are more expensive than e-cars. Plug-in hybrids are more expensive than than ICEs.
Plug-in hybrids cost more in operation because they have higher fuel usage. And they cost more because you need to go often more often to mend it. So this is not something that that really helps the people. And you want to or you propose to do some some consumer deception by pretending that a plug-in hybrid would go 80% electric when in reality they maybe not only go 30% electric. But people want to know how much does the car go electric.
They want to know. And if you write it down into the if you write false numbers into the legislation, well, that's Dieselgate 2.0. So what I would like to do is I want, as I said this all the time in this committee, I want to have a majority in the middle and I think we can we can find one. But unfortunately, I have to interpret your report as not seeking for a majority in the middle, but for to give the hands to the right-wing majority. And I this I think this would be worse for the future of the of the industry and also of the future of the of the democracy in Europe.
Thank you very much.
Pierfrancesco Maran
Thank you. Now for the Left, Martin Günther, replacing Jonas Sjöstedt.
Martin Günther
Ja, vielen Dank. Vielen Dank für den Berichterstatter auch. Wir sprechen heute über die Zukunft des Autos. Aus Sicht der Linken gibt es vier zentrale Prioritäten. Erstens sollten wir am bestehenden Ziel einer vollen Emissionsfreiheit bis 2035 festhalten.
Neben dem offensichtlichen Vorteil für den Klimaschutz würde jede Abschwächung dieses Ziels die Wettbewerbsfähigkeit europäischer Produzenten für Elektrofahrzeuge gefährden und dazu führen, dass die EU weiter zurückfällt. Zweitens unterstützen wir die Streichung des vorgeschlagenen Dreijahres-Durchschnittsmechanismus, also statt jedes Jahr klar definierte Ziele zu erreichen, diese über drei Jahre zu strecken. In einer entscheidenden Phase des Übergangs zu batterieelektrischen Fahrzeugen würde diese Maßnahme die Dynamik der Transformation bremsen und sowohl Herstellern als auch Investoren das falsche Signal senden. Drittens sind wir der Auffassung, dass die vorgeschlagene Kraftstoffgutschrift für fortschrittliche Biokraftstoffe gestrichen werden sollte. Auch fortschrittliche Biokraftstoffe können nicht als klimaneutral betrachtet werden, da keiner der in Anhang 5 der Erneuerbare-Energien-Richtlinie aufgeführten Kraftstoffe eine 100-prozentige Reduktion der CO2-Emissionen erreicht.
Diese Kraftstoffe sind zudem eine knappe Ressource und sollten vorrangig in Sektoren eingesetzt werden, in denen eine Elektrifizierung deutlich schwieriger ist, insbesondere in der Luftfahrtindustrie und im Seeverkehr. Die derzeitigen Prognosen zeigen bereits, dass die verfügbare Angebot nicht ausreichen wird, um allein diese Sektoren vollständig zu dekarbonisieren. Viertens sollte jeder Mechanismus zur Anrechnung von emissionsarmem Stahl strikt auf tatsächlich grünen, fossilfreien Stahl beschränkt werden, der innerhalb der Europäischen Union hergestellt wird. Darüber hinaus sind wir besorgt, dass der vom Berichterstatter vorgeschlagene Ansatz die Verbreitung batterieelektrischer Fahrzeuge erheblich verlangsamen würde.
Verfügbaren Analysen zufolge könnte dies dazu führen, dass die Verkaufszahlen von Elektrofahrzeugen im Jahr 2030 lediglich auf dem Niveau auf dem heutigen Niveau liegen und ihre Marktanteile in den kommenden Jahren kaum noch wachsen. Die Vorschläge im Berichtsentwurf würden es den Herstellern außerdem ermöglichen, die Anforderungen für 2023 35, Entschuldigung, überwiegend durch Hybridfahrzeuge und mit Biokraftstoffen betriebene Fahrzeuge zu erfüllen, ohne zwingend vollelektrische Fahrzeuge verkaufen zu müssen. Dies droht die Investitionssicherheit zu schwächen, die die europäische Automobilindustrie dringend benötigt. Die Folgen könnten erheblicher sein, erheblich sein. Hunderte Milliarden Euro geplante Investitionen in Elektromobilität würden gefährdet.
Die Produktion von Batterien und Elektrofahrzeugen in Europa könnte zurückgehen. Die Abhängigkeit von importiertem Öl würde steigen und Europa würde im globalen Wettbewerb um die Elektromobilität weiter zurückfallen. Gleichzeitig hätten europäische Verbraucherinnen und Verbraucher weniger Zugang zu erschwinglichen Elektrofahrzeugen und blieben stärker von teuren Kraftstoffen und Technologien abhängig.
Pierfrancesco Maran
Thank you. If somebody wanna speak in the catch-the-eye can inform us and I leave yes and last shadow is Anja Arndt from ECR.
Anja Arndt
Dankeschön. Werte Kollegen, beim Verbrennerverbot wird getrickst. Erster Trick: Das E-Auto wurde einfach für sauber erklärt. 0 Gramm CO2 wird mit dem E-Auto verbunden. Doch emissionsfreie Mobilität gibt es nicht.
Beim E-Auto entsteht sie bei der Stromerzeugung und in Deutschland sind das rund 70 Gramm CO2 pro Kilometer. Mit welchem Recht fordert die Kommission 0 Gramm für Verbrennerautos? Zweiter Trick: Verbrenner sollen künftig 11 Gramm ausstoßen dürfen, aber nur, wenn sie aus grünem Stahl gebaut sind. Doch grüner Stahl ist in Europa krachend gescheitert. Allein in Deutschland gab es 7 Milliarden Euro Subvention.
Was passierte? Zum Beispiel ArcelorMittal, einer der größten Stahlkonzerne der Welt, gibt 1,3 Milliarden Euro zurück und baut keine Anlage. ThyssenKrupp stoppt sein größtes Projekt und dafür benötigte, weil der dafür benötigte grüne Wasserstoff zu teuer ist. Ein weiterer Großproduzent aus Deutschland verschiebt auch sein Projekt für Grünstahl auf unbestimmte Zeit. Wenn sich die Größten der Branche gleichzeitig zurückziehen, dann können Sie doch der Autoindustrie keinen grünen Stahl vorschreiben.
Die Industrie kann ihn nicht einmal mit Milliarden Subventionen herstellen. Das ist kein Plan, das ist ein weiterer Nagel im Sarg unserer Automobilindustrie. Schon beim heutigen Grenzwert von 93,6 Gramm müssen die Autohersteller in der EU Strafen in Höhe von 15 Milliarden Euro pro Jahr zahlen. Wir von der ESN fordern deshalb: Streichen Sie alle weiteren Absenkungsstufen sofort und bedingungslos. Beenden Sie Ihren scheinheiligen Krieg gegen die Automobilindustrie.
Setzen Sie sich endlich mit den wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnissen über Kohlendioxid auseinander. Sie bekämpfen ein lebensnotwendiges natürliches Gas, welches unserem Leben auf dieser Erde dienlich ist. Geben Sie unserer Automobilindustrie ihr Existenzrecht zurück und den Bürgern ihre Autos und Arbeitsplätze. Und es gibt eine ganz entscheidende Frage und ich bitte Sie da um Unterstützung. Die Verordnung erklärte das E-Auto per Federstrich für emissionsfrei, obwohl es in Deutschland rund 70 Gramm pro Kilometer verursacht.
Die ehrliche Lebenszyklusanalyse, die das und anderes aufdecken würde, muss seit 2023 in diesem Haus vorgelegt werden und hätte spätestens Ende 2025 vorliegen müssen. Wir sollten uns alle dafür einsetzen, dass diese Lebenszyklusanalyse endlich von der Kommission gefertigt und uns vorgestellt wird. Ich danke.
Pierfrancesco Maran
Thank you. Now we leave the floor to the rapporteurs for the opinion. We have here Matej Tonin that is the rapporteur for the opinion from ITRE.
Matej Tonin
Dear Chair, dear rapporteur, dear colleagues, first of all, let me warmly congratulate my colleague Mr. Salini for his excellent work on this highly important and politically sensitive file. As rapporteur for the opinion in the ITRE committee, my position is very much aligned with the overall direction and objectives pursued by Mr. Salini's report in the lead committee. In this regard, I would like to briefly explain the main elements of my ITRE draft opinion and clarify where my contribution slightly differs from the lead committee. First, on the issue of technological neutrality, I strongly believe that decarbonization should remain open to different technological pathways. While the Commission proposal introduces references to renewable fuels and low-carbon steel, I consider that this recognition should be broadened and strengthened.
In particular, I have introduced an additional reference to the low-carbon energy, recognizing its important role in supporting industrial decarbonization and the broader transition of the automotive value chain. Furthermore, while the Commission proposal introduces credits, however, focuses primarily on low-carbon steel, I consider that the transition of the automotive industry depends on a much broader ecosystem of materials. For this reason, I expanded the scope to include all relevant low-carbon strategic materials, recognizing that materials such as aluminum, plastics, glass, and other energy-intensive components also require substantial investment and innovation to decarbonize. Second, in ITRE, I further emphasized the importance of making technological neutrality a practical reality within the regulation and in reaching our climate objectives. Third, I would also like to underline the importance of ensuring realistic implementation conditions.
A successful transition will only happen if consumers and business are able to follow it. We have the presentation of my draft opinion in the ITRE committee tomorrow. The deadline for amendments in ITRE is next week on Tuesday, so a few additional amendments will be still tabled also by me, especially regarding the labeling. So thank you very much for the opportunity.
Pierfrancesco Maran
Thank you. Now we start with the catch the eye. The first speaker will be Peter Liese from remote.
Peter Liese
Yeah, thank you very much, Chair, and thank you to Massimiliano for his work and the presentation of his draft report. One sentence that Massimiliano said was very important to me. He wants to achieve the biggest possible harmony. And to make it very clear, the EPP's intention is to find the majority in the center. That's also the guideline that our group president Manfred Weber gave us.
It is also very clear, we need to deliver. The ban of the combustion engine must be abolished. And I think that must be the starting point of all negotiations. We need to change the legislation. It has shortcomings and we cannot just agree to have it unamended.
So personally, I like the idea of compensation. However, we can discuss and must discuss other kind of compensation than the Commission proposed. However, the green steel must play a role. I think it is a big opportunity and in contrast to what one of the previous speakers said, there are many projects that are still living and ongoing and will deliver the green steel even before 35. And that's why I also agree with Massimiliano that we can include it in the legislation before 35.
But the overall framework must also be that attractive that green steel will really be used. And that's why maybe some fine-tuning is necessary. It is also a big priority, as you know, of the German government to have the quota of 7% really achieved. E-fuels and biofuels must play a role. It's true they are not 100% climate neutral, but their contribution must be accepted as far as they are climate neutral.
And yeah, my main point is everybody needs to move, go away from extreme positions and let's find a good compromise together. Thank you.
Tiemo Wölken
Yeah, thank you very much. So I could mention many points because there is a lot in the proposal which concerns me and I don't have to be as diplomatic as my shadow. But I'll focus on one clear contradiction already between the EPP coordinator and the EPP rapporteur. Peter Liese was pointing out rightly that we need an incentive for European green steel. But unfortunately, with the draft delivered here by the rapporteur, green steel will not play a role in this market because Mr. Salini, you designed the exceptions in a way that it will always be better to use green biofuels or green alternative fuels.
We all know they are not CO2 neutral. They also have a heavy CO2 footprint. You ignored it in your proposal, fine, but we have to be honest about the fact they are not CO2 neutral. And I don't understand, I don't understand why we will not help the important European steel industry. We disregard their needs and we simply support the fossil fuel industry.
And I think this is a strategic mistake and your coordinator agrees. And this is why, and this is why we have to sit down together, work on solutions, but we need to be honest with each other. Everyone has to move. If we don't, if no side moves, we will not find majorities here. And this would be a very bad outcome for the people working in the European car industry.
And I have to say one last sentence to Ms. Arndt. You may not know, but she is living 30 kilometers away from the largest German manufacturing site for electric vehicles. And it's a shame that you don't support the people in your region working in a factory producing European future mobility, ignoring the fact. And I have to say to you here, this is really not good politics. This is slapping the people in your own region in their faces.
Esther Herranz García
Sí, gracias, señor presidente. La verdad es que yo he escuchado hoy aquí hablar ahora de la siderurgia, pero voy a hablarles de otra faceta de este documento. Yo agradezco al señor Salini que haya tenido la sensibilidad de darse de dar forma a una realidad y es que la actividad humana siempre tiene una huella. Siempre, toda actividad humana, sobre todo si es económica o de transporte, tiene una huella. Y está muy bien que la legislatura anterior tuvieran excelentes buenas intenciones y que dibujaran un mundo ideal idealizado, utópico, pero que no es realista, que no se ajusta a la verdad.
Y ha llegado el momento del baño de realidad. Si no tenemos en cuenta el efecto de la rentabilidad de la vida en Europa, es que no vamos a tener ninguna posibilidad de continuar aquí viviendo. Por tanto, no se trata de negar el avance hacia una una huella de carbono o una huella más baja. Se trata de hacerlo razonablemente para poder seguir viviendo y desarrollando nuestra actividad. Y en ese caso, yo creo que las medidas que el señor Salini apuesta son las razonables.
Pero es que voy a ir más allá. ¿Saben qué problema tenemos en Europa? Las islas. ¿Qué va a pasar con esas islas que no van a ser capaces de abastecer de energía eléctrica y menos a un coste cero medioambiental? ¿Qué va a pasar con los territorios con hándicap?
Miren, vengo de España, que es un país que tiene precisamente un hándicap topográfico muy grande. ¿Cómo vamos a conseguir llegar a estos niveles que ustedes piden desde la izquierda? Le digo más, es que en mi país ni siquiera está una infraestructura eléctrica que consiga abastecer, no ya digo en las islas, no, al resto de la península. Recuerden lo que pasó hace un año y el apagón. Por tanto, el señor Salini va en el buen camino y yo le apoyaré y desde luego le colaboraré en aquellos cosas que nos preocupan mucho como es poder alcanzar unos topes mínimos para poder avanzar hacia una neutralidad climática en el futuro.
Heléne Fritzon
Thank you so much chair, I will continue in Swedish. Så tack för möjligheten att diskutera denna viktiga fråga, för när jag såg kommissionens förslag om att riva upp utsläppsmålen 2035 så blev jag inte förvånad, men jag blev besviken. Kommissionen väljer att backa in i framtiden. EU:s konkurrenskraft kommer aldrig att kunna byggas på gammal teknik. Både fossila bränslen och förbränningsmotorer tillhör gårdagen.
Vi vet att konkurrensen i världen är stenhård och vi riskerar att bli omsprungna av andra länder. Titta på Kina, de investerar i batterier, elektrifiering, titta bara hur många kinesiska bilar som kör runt i Europa. Det förslag vi diskuterar nu, det straffar de som ligger i framkant och som har följt EU:s lagstiftning och investerat i ny teknik. Och tyvärr så belönas nu den bakåtsträvande industri som istället har investerat i lobbyism. Och detta, det försvagar både EU:s klimatpolitik och EU:s konkurrenskraft.
Framtidens bilindustri finns ju fortfarande i Europa. Nyligen var jag på plats vid lanseringen av Volvos nya elbil EX60. Så innovationskraften finns här och de som har investerat rätt ska ju inte straffas. Och det är inte konkurrenskraft för som vi har hört i debatten, framtiden för bilen är elektrisk. Så titta på det goda exemplet Danmark, det är precis så vi måste jobba, vi måste möta framtiden.
Tack.
Speaker 22
Thank you very much and thank you Massimiliano for your great report. I have to say I've known you for about two years now and you're moving more and more in a greener direction, that is lovely. And I have to say you are now my ecological friend. So we have to ask ourselves, what does the customers want? Because that is, that is the question here.
And the customers want cheap cars that are cheap to run. That's why they sold so many Chinese cars in Europe and we need to follow up on that. And if we just look at the numbers for a while, in 2025, the first four months of the year, 17% of the sales of cars in Europe were electrical. The first four months this year, 23% of the cars were, were electrical. That means an increase of 5 to 6% a year.
So with 22 as a baseline and we divide, we add that up with 9, we come to around 72, 73% on just the way we are right now. So we need a little bit of push to get over the line with the 90%. And I think that the way you should look at it is what can we do bottom up? What can we do from to help the unions protect this? Because the unions are the real problem in the green transition because they are fighting it because they are afraid that people are laid off, which is true.
They will be, some will be and we need to find a way how to get them other jobs, better jobs, newer jobs, how to educate them. And I think that's the conversation we need to take, not whether the car industry is old or not because the car industry is fine, they're doing very well and they will reach the targets. It's the unions that is the problem and we need to find a way to help the workers get something else to do. Thank you.
Speaker 23
Thank you, I'll speak in Slovenian. Kot prvo naj povem, da se mi zdi poročilo Salinija zelo dobro in da nihče tukaj, niti to poročilo ne prepoveduje električnih vozil. Ljudje jih bodo še vedno lahko kupovali, ni vojna proti električnim vozilom, je pa to dejstvo, da bomo dovolili, da po letu 2035 lahko ljudje kupijo kar si želijo in niso prisiljeni kupiti električnih vozil.
Ampak kljub temu imamo lahko še vedno 100-odstotno električna vozila na cesti kljub temu, da ni prepovedi. In hkrati, če je povpraševanje tako visoko, kot poslušamo danes, bencin tok drag, tehnologija tok boljša, ne razumem zakaj potrebujemo prepoved. Potem bodo avtomatsko ljudje sledili temu brez da imamo. Mi nismo kontinent, ki prepoveduje. Jaz zelo verjamem in močno verjamem v Evropsko unijo in jo podpiram, ampak hkrati se mi zdi smešno, da ko pogledamo Ljudsko republiko Kitajsko, ki ji vlada komunistična partija, nimajo prepovedi, v Evropski uniji, kjer imamo pa demokracijo, svobodo, pa imamo to prepoved.
Tako da mislim, da gre poročilo v absolutno pravo smer. In hkrati absolutno odvisnost od fosilnih goriv je slaba. To smo vidli zdaj in se bo vidlo z vsakim letom bolj. Ampak to ne pomeni, da lahko eno odvisnost zamenjamo z drugo odvisnostjo, v tem primeru od kitajskih baterij pa kritičnih materialov. In tudi izdelava in reciklaža električnih vozil je umazana.
In ko govorimo, se lahko pogovarjamo o tem, kako so umazani pa kako se uporabljajo priključni hibridi ali pa motorji na notranje zgorevanje, ampak potem dejmo vse karte na mizo in se pogovarjajmo tudi o tem, kako se potem kopljejo materiali za baterije. Tako da mislim, da na koncu koncev je poročilo od Salinija točno to, kar Evropska unija potrebuje. Ne kar si mi želimo, ampak kar potrebuje. Okay, now I lost my train of thought, but I was done anyway, so my point is I support Massimiliano Salini in his report.
Speaker 26
Thank you, Chair, and thank you, Mr. Salini, for your work on this file and your draft report. The Commission's proposal is remarkable because it is something that many in this Parliament have long refused to acknowledge. The CO2 regulatory framework for passenger cars and vans is not working. As a result, European manufacturers are under enormous pressure while consumers face rising costs for their mobility, also for electrical vehicles, by the way. The Commission admitted at last that the situation requires correction.
It proposes additional flexibility for manufacturers, lowers the effective target for 2035, acknowledges alternative fuels and also the fact that combustion engines still play a role in the future. These are all steps in the right direction. Under these circumstances right now, Europe should be reducing burdens on industry, not imposing unrealistic mandates any longer. We welcome the stronger recognition of alternative fuels and the principle of technological neutrality. Europe needs policy based on realism, technological openness, competitiveness and affordability.
The Commission's proposal moves in that direction and Mr. Salini's draft report is a further step in this good direction. That's why we will support it. Thank you.
Pierfrancesco Maran
I don't have a request from any other colleague, so we leave the floor to the Commission that is represented by Edoardo Turano from DG CLIMA.
Andrea TURANO
Thank you. Good afternoon. It's a very important legislation for the Commission because of three important objectives. First, the climate objective. You know we have a European Climate Law that set a neutrality target for 2050, a 90% target for 2040, and road transport is a sector which is actually increasing its emission and that's why it's important to reverse this trend.
Second objective, competitiveness for the automotive sector. The transition towards electric vehicles is happening globally. In 2025, one out of four cars sold globally were electric and the International Energy Agency projects that one out of two will be in 2035, while the internal combustion engine sales peaked already in 2017, which means the opportunity for the future of industry is in the electric vehicles and that's also the opportunity for the jobs of the future in the sector. This means that the long-term certainty for the investments in the value chain needs to be set out very clearly in the legislation. Third objective, the energy security.
We import every year in Europe 290 billion euros of oil products. This number was without taking into account recent increase, but this of course is geopolitical exposure for our economy and for our security which we need to fight against. On the other hand, we have recognized the challenges of the automotive sector related to high energy costs, high unfair competition, production overcapacity and therefore the Commission proposal wants to reach the objectives I explained with an approach that balance the long-term certainty for investment with some pragmatism and flexibility for the car industry. Now, we take note that the report introduces more changes and more significant changes to the current framework throughout the timeline, so starting from basically the adoption up to the period post-2035. And the cumulative effect of these changes is likely to determine an outcome that is not actually favorable for the investments in the zero-emission value chain.
And here we refer also to the infrastructure, the battery value chain that are of fundamental importance for the European economy in any case. So, this happens because the cumulative effect of the flexibilities and the changes de facto lower the targets both in period pre-2030 and above. And this happens while it's proven that the target is a strong driver for the BEV. We have seen how in beginning of 2026 the shares have raised to 21% from 14% of 2024 also thanks to the fact that the targets started to apply. Having said that, some more reflection on some of the choices that the Commission made in the proposal.
So, and these about, these are about the elements which are probably more debated at the moment. On the fuels, the Commission proposal enhances the technology neutrality of the legislation proposing some fuel credits but with a cap that takes into account the fact that there is a lack of feedstock, so an availability problem that risk the decarbonization of sectors which are totally dependent on biofuels and RFNBO and also to avoid that again the signal for the investment is weakened. Second, the type of fuels which are incentivized in the Commission proposal are the ones that are incentivized in the Renewable Energy Directive where the fuel policy discussion has happened over the years. So we are referring to advanced biofuels and RFNBO. And this is not only to avoid sustainability concern but also to avoid the creation of a barrier for the development of the advanced biofuel value chain which is the value chain that we will need for the future.
And third, credits are proposed and not cars running exclusively on renewable fuels because there are issues on the implementation and enforcement of such a mechanism that would need to be clearly tackled with the risk of a complex design, so against the objective of simplification.
Second point, on the target of 2035, the Commission proposed a 90% with a compensation, and that's because again we want to ensure climate neutrality by extending the approach from the tailpipe only to recognition of emission reduction elsewhere, so in fuels and in steel. Of course, without the compensation, the overall climate neutrality objective is a bit lost, which means that other sectors would need to compensate for the for these emissions. And of course, going forward, the climate neutrality target makes it challenging for all sectors. Finally, we haven't proposed anything for the period pre-2030, because now we are at the moment where the market really needs to ramp up, and we are seeing the development and good developments already now as I mentioned, so we wouldn't like to stop this. And we have not proposed utility factor freeze because the real-world emissions of the of such cars are really two times more than on the test cycle still today.
So, having said that, in important piece of legislation, we hope of course for a good outcome for the debate and the final agreement later down the line. Thanks a lot.
Pierfrancesco Maran
Thank you. So, we go back to the rapporteur, Mr. Salini, you have the floor.
Massimiliano Salini
Sì, sarà un negoziato complicato, mi pare di capire da questa discussione, non tanto perché non vi siano delle posizioni argomentate, ma perché gli argomenti sono molto spesso legati a a ciò che in passato non ha consentito di attestarci sul vero contenuto della sfida, parlando innanzitutto della sfida per come si sviluppa all'interno dell'Unione Europea. Io direi che abbiamo alcuni mesi di tempo, abbiamo una timeline che è stringente perché ci siamo proposti l'obiettivo di concludere entro la fine dell'anno. È chiaro che per poter rispettare questa timeline dobbiamo lavorare intensamente fin da subito proponendo punti di atterraggio possibili, se le dichiarazioni che sono state fatte reciprocamente sulla disponibilità ad avere un accordo sono reali. Diversamente, in breve tempo potremo anche chiudere più velocemente se se questa disponibilità a trovare un punto di atterraggio comune si rivelerà come come, diciamo, più teorica che pratica. Ringrazio molto i i relatori ombra per la modalità con cui hanno accettato di concepire l'inizio della sfida, meno i loro compagni di gruppo che in alcuni casi si sono rivelati piuttosto, diciamo, disabituati alla logica del compromesso.
Grazie.
Pierfrancesco Maran
Thank you. The deadline for amendments is the 9th of June at 11:00 AM, the vote in ENVI is supposed to be the 4th and 5th November 2026, and the vote in plenary should be in the second plenary in November. So now, the next point on the agenda is the presentation of the report from the Commission on the simplification review on the deforestation regulation. I'm now giving the floor to Director-General Eric Mamer, and I welcome him. Is he stay there or he come?
He come here or not?
So we wait for some seconds that people from the previous point leave the hall. Okay, so we can go on with the next point. So I leave the floor to the Director-General Eric Mamer to present the report about the deforestation regulation. Please, Mr. Mamer.
Eric MAMER
Thank you, dear Chair Maran, dear Pierfrancesco, honorable members. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss with you the implementation of the EU deforestation regulation and to present the latest work undertaken by the Commission. This is the first time that I am addressing your committee, even though I have already met many of you bilaterally. And so I want to start by renewing my determination to continue in close cooperation with Commissioner Roswall and Vice-President Ribeira, the excellent cooperation between DG Environment and your committee at all levels. Now turning to the EU deforestation regulation.
Since its adoption in June 2023, the deforestation regulation has been a game changer in our fight against global deforestation and forest degradation. At least 25 producer countries, including Brazil, Ethiopia, and Indonesia, are implementing government-led initiatives linked to EUDR compliance. This shows that the EU is actually walking the talk, ensuring that products we consume do not contribute to the destruction of the world's forests. And we thereby ensure we also reduce greenhouse gas emissions and protect biodiversity. The economic significance of this regulation should be highlighted.
In 2025 alone, based on the current scope of the regulation, the EU imported around 128 billion euros worth of EUDR regulated products and exported around 114 billion euros worth of EUDR regulated goods. EUDR concerns some 269,000 importers of EUDR relevant goods and around 9.6 million primary producers in the EU, about 99.7% of which are micro and small operators who benefit from the recent simplifications. We have faced challenges, as can be expected from such a groundbreaking law.
But after two revisions, we now have a much simpler regulation. At the request of the co-legislators, the Commission published on 4 May the simplification review of EUDR, a package of measures designed to make implementation more practical, efficient and inclusive. Today I want to walk you through the key elements of this package, but first let me underline two clear messages the Commission is sending with this review. The first is, we have listened. Since EUDR's adoption, we have engaged extensively with businesses, civil society, producing countries, the European Parliament and Member States.
This package reflects the input of all these voices. We took on board concerns about administrative burdens, complexity for small businesses, especially farmers and foresters, and challenges for trade with partner countries. We addressed them with concrete, targeted solutions, solutions that remain within the boundaries of the law. And that brings and that brings me to my second message, which is in which is in line with what Commissioner Roswall said in this committee last January. The Commission will not reopen this law, but is fully committed to supporting stakeholders with its implementation and to making it a success.
We are dedicated to ensuring its smooth entry into application by the end of this year. Now, we need to make the most of the remaining six months to get ready. Regulatory and policy stability are essential to keep up the momentum generated worldwide by the EUDR and to protect investments made, both private and public. Stakeholders have told us repeatedly that guaranteeing legal predictability is critical. Many companies have already invested significantly in compliance systems and are preparing for implementation, they rely on this stable legal framework.
The overall message of the package is therefore clear: stakeholders in the EU and in partner countries need to get ready for the entry, sorry, into application in December 2026, and the Commission is supporting those efforts. So, the package consists of four key components. Firstly, a report to the European Parliament and the Council which serves as the overarching explanation of what we have done. Secondly, updated FAQs and guidance, providing clearer, more practical advice for operators and competent authorities, targeting the issues most frequently raised by stakeholders. Thirdly, a draft delegated act proposing changes to the product scope, accompanied by a staff working document explaining the methodology behind the adjustments.
Notably, this draft act proposes to include in the EUDR scope also soluble coffee, certain palm oil derivatives and frozen cattle tongues. It proposes to exclude hides, skins and leather of cattle as well as retreaded tires. The proposal was open for public feedback until yesterday, 1st of June, and the Commission will adopt a final act taking into consideration the inputs received. Finally, the package contains a draft implementing act on the information system that is being submitted to the comitology procedure before its adoption. Speaking of the IT system, I am happy to inform that on 29 May, the Commission released the technical specifications for the application programming interface, API, enabling private and public sectors to start developing or enhance their interconnections as early as possible.
We are also working actively to integrate in the IT system the new features stemming from the revised EUDR, as well as additional functionalities to respond to stakeholders' requests to support their work. For that, we had to put the system temporarily offline, its reopening is foreseen for the end of June. The simplifications are accompanied by other practical tools, such as updated EUDR supply chain infographics, which provide user-friendly information on various roles in different supply chains. Let me now single out some elements of the report, which as I said is a chapeau of this package and fulfills the obligation set by you, the Parliament, together with the Council in the revised EUDR. The report documents our consultations and the feedback received, and it outlines the measures taken since 2023.
It highlights how these simplifications will reduce expected compliance costs for companies by about 75% compared to the original EUDR requirements. It also shows how the EUDR is already producing measurable results worldwide, as I already illustrated at the beginning of my intervention. The report also announced the launch of two new tools before the entry into application in December 2026, which will facilitate compliance with the EUDR due diligence obligations. First, a repository of relevant legislation of producing countries, helping operators to verify compliance with local laws more easily. And secondly, a repository of certification schemes applicable to EUDR relevant commodities, providing a trusted reference point for due diligence.
Dear Chair, honorable members, the EUDR remains a landmark environmental regulation, and its objective must be matched with effective implementation if we want it to succeed. This simplification package is balanced and it is effective. And building upon the revision of December 2025, it reduces unnecessary burdens while keeping the regulation's core objectives, it supports businesses in meeting the EUDR requirements, and it ensures small companies can comply without being overwhelmed by administrative burden. We are not lowering our standards, we are making them achievable. Thank you.
Pierfrancesco Maran
Thank you so much, Mr. Mammer, we open the floor to the political group representatives starting with EPP, Stefan Köhler, for two minutes.
Stefan Köhler
Thank you Chair and I would like to talk in German. Vielen Dank Herr Mammer für die Vorstellung Ihrer Vorschläge, die EUDR wird auch für die ersten Kleinst- und Kleinunternehmen am 30. Dezember dieses Jahres in Kraft treten. Es ist also entscheidend, dass die Unternehmen Rechtssicherheit bekommen, Sie haben das sehr gut erwähnt. Als EVP stehen wir für einen verantwortungsvollen Umgang mit natürlichen Ressourcen und der Schutz von Wäldern ist ganz zentral für den Schutz unserer Umwelt. Allerdings müssen die Vorschriften verhältnismäßig sein und in der bisherigen Fassung war die EUDR das nicht.
Wir brauchen einen klaren, praktikablen und wirksamen Rechtsrahmen, der gleichzeitig für die Betroffenen umsetzbar bleibt. Denn die Umsetzung der Verordnung ist teuer und kompliziert, sie überfordert insbesondere kleinere Akteure. Daher sind diese Vereinfachungen wichtig und willkommen, auch wenn sie an manchen Stellen noch immer nicht weitreichend genug sind. Ich möchte aber auf einen ganz besonderen Punkt eingehen und Sie haben da auch schon ein paar Punkte gesagt.
Ich selbst muss mich im IT-System registrieren und konnte das gestern immer noch nicht. Und es ist die Frage, obwohl die Verordnung in knapp mehr als einem halben Jahr auch viele Kleinunternehmen angewendet werden soll, ob das überhaupt funktioniert. Sie haben jetzt gesagt, im Juni, Ende Juni soll alles laufen. Aber deswegen möchte ich noch mal genau nachfragen, wie weit die Anpassung des IT-Systems sind, ob es ein bereits anvisiertes Datum für die Inbetriebnahme gibt. Ich bin mir noch nicht so sicher, ob das Ende Juni klappt.
Und ob die anvisierten Vereinfachungen, beispielsweise die vereinfachten Formate für die Sorgfaltserklärungen, die Gruppierungsfunktion für Forstbetriebsgemeinschaften, der Notfallplan bei Nichtverfügbarkeit, ob das alles zeitgerecht verfügbar sein wird, um den Betroffenen genügend Zeit zu geben, sich hier anzupassen. Die Betriebe brauchen, und das haben Sie auch gesagt, Planungs- und Rechtssicherheit. Und ich hoffe, dass frühzeitig das System ans Netz geht, damit die Betriebe sich darauf einstellen können, Schnittstellen organisieren können und ihre Software programmieren. Ich habe große Bedenken, dass wir vielleicht es ein drittes Mal verschieben müssen. Und das würde wirklich nicht das Vertrauen in die EU stärken.
Deswegen meine Bitte, hier wirklich für Planungssicherheit sorgen und frühzeitig das System ans Laufen bringen. Danke.
Delara Burkhardt
Thank you so much. I can just echo that it's important to now walk the talk and focus on implementation. So as S&D, we've been happy not to read about another postponement. But I actually have to dive in a little bit on the proposal to leather, of leather to be removed from the scope of the regulation, where frankly said, the Commission's own staff working document gives the impression that the decision to remove leather has long been made and that this is a political decision and then it was tried to be dressed up with some numbers. But the Commission analysis is very contradictory.
It uses skewed assumptions and applies different standards to different products. One has to be frank about this. This also creates uncertainties with our global partners. So coming on leather, your analysis shows that keeping leather in the scope would generate environmental benefits up to nearly 2 billion annually, while compliance costs would amount to only around 17 million. That is an extraordinary cost-benefit ratio, far stronger than for several products you decided to keep or even added newly into the scope of the regulation.
Your own analysis further estimates that the proposed removals, dominated by leather, correspond to approximately 40,000 hectares of deforestation footprint, while newly included products would only offset 7,000 hectares. This represents a clear net loss of forest protection of the size of 47,000 football pitches. You, in the same analysis, justify adding frozen cattle tongues because otherwise there would be a risk of circumvention, but then you create a massive loophole for leather coming from the very same cow. So I would like to call this the the same cow paradox, where we have beef linked to deforestation in the scope of the regulation, but leather from the same animal would not be. And even in terms of simplification, this is a little bit difficult to understand.
So we should be honest about it. Leather is not a marginal waste product. It is a globally significant co-product worth billions, incentivizing cattle production, including in deforestation-linked regions. So my request would be very simple. Your own evidence does not support the exclusion of leather from the EUDR scope.
Delara Burkhardt
My group urges you to reconsider this decision before adopting the final proposal for the delegated act.
Ondřej Knotek
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, colleagues, and welcome to the committee, Director General. Thank you for your very extremely positive presentation. It was basically like if you won in the lottery, but actually we do not share your happiness here when it comes to this package. Actually, we are quite disappointed with this Commission package, and we do not see real simplification in this package. Our major concern relates to the Annex I, the scope, where you propose to add up to 17 new products, and impact on related economic operators wasn't sufficiently considered, according to us, neither on the capacity of the national authorities to perform according inspections, and we really see increased bureaucracy, really increased.
On the concrete products, we don't see as smart to include products derived from palm oil, like soaps, glycerols, esters, or some forms of acids, etc., because this would negatively hit the European chemical industry. And don't forget that the European chemical industry is already vastly hit by the consequences of some destructive green policies. On the process, that's my, that's my question. Where do you see the legal basis that the Commission has a mandate to add products through the delegated acts as in the Article 34.5? If you can elaborate on this, please.
And my second question, this is a topic that we will never forget until you do it, until you deliver. And I know that on the fourth category, low-risk countries, the Commissioner Vălean repeatedly said that she is not able, but we don't take no as an answer. The Commission must be bold here and find a way how to do it and not come to the Parliament and say, sorry, we don't know how to do it, it will never work. It must work because fourth category is important, it is fair. Thank you very much.
Anna Zalewska
Thank you, I will speak Polish. Bardzo dziękujemy panu dyrektorowi, rzeczywiście cieszymy się, że dokonywane są kolejne uproszczenia i zmiany, choć ja optymizmu pana dyrektora nie podzielam i chcę powiedzieć krótko, a nie mówiłam, bo pracowałam przy tym dokumencie i dokładnie te wszystkie kłopoty zapowiadałam, proponując poprawki, które zostały zlekceważone. Też nie ukrywam, że fakt, że są to wytyczne, budzi obawy przedsiębiorców, dlatego że są one nieostre i będą podlegały różnego rodzaju interpretacjom, dlatego przedsiębiorcy nawet z dobrej czy w dobrej wierze będą przygotowywać różnego rodzaju dokumenty i jakaś instytucja będzie w stanie na podstawie bardzo nieostrych zapisów to zakwestionować i spowodować różnego rodzaju kary. Cieszę się bardzo, że w ogóle zaczynamy rozmawiać o tym, że na przykład tam, gdzie jest niskie ryzyko wylesiania, choć naprawdę Komisja Europejska zrobiła wszystko, żeby ośmieszyć tą niskość i standardowe ryzyko. Brazylia naprawdę, Kolumbia, Peru, Paragwaj mają standardowe ryzyko, bo cały pomysł tego dokumentu był po to, żeby pokazać, że jesteśmy konkurencyjni i będziemy pilnować tego wszystkiego, co do tej Europy będzie wpływać.
Ale dobrze, że o tym dyskutujemy i dobrze, że chcemy określać te poziomy ryzyka, choć tak jak powiedziałam, tu też jest to za mało ostre. Cieszymy się, że po raz kolejny mówimy o kwestii potwierdzania legalności pochodzenia surowców, choć rzeczywiście chcemy to ograniczyć do jednego dokumentu, który później będzie powielany, ale znowu nie wiadomo, jakiego rodzaju to mają być dokumenty. W związku z tym przedsiębiorcy pytają o chociaż kilka przykładów, które będą dla instytucji w krajach członkowskich czy też Komisji Europejskiej wiarygodne i nie będą kwestionowane. No i oczywiście geolokalizacja, która od początku była dyskusyjna, definicje absolutnie niespójne i nic nieznaczące. Szkoda, że utrzymano co do zasady tę geolokalizację, dlatego że w krajach członkowskich są już najprzeróżniejsze systemy, które są w stanie być otwarte, by sięgnąć i żeby potwierdzić, czyja jest to działka i co na tej działce się działo.
Choć dobrze, że pojawia się możliwość, ale ona jest niewystarczająca, tego, żeby podawać adres czy też kod pocztowy, choć do końca nie wiem, w jaki sposób ten, który będzie za to odpowiedzialny, będzie w stanie przeprowadzić śledztwo w Brazylii, Kolumbii, Peru czy Paragwaju, że właśnie dotyczy to tej, a nie innej działki. Myślę, że nie ma takich pieniędzy, a wiemy, że wielokrotnie te kraje oszukiwały, kupowały różnego rodzaju certyfikaty i wiemy, że ten rynek od wielu lat funkcjonuje. No taki korupcyjny rynek jest wyceniany na prawie 240 miliardów dolarów. Dziękuję.
Katri Kulmuni
Thank you, Chair. So, although the latest guidance has aimed to simplify the implementation of the regulation, unfortunately, the result is still partially opposite in some points, and there are still some very key issues to be opened and questioned. Although the topic has been addressed both national and EU level, many practical aspects are still in a legal uncertainty. For example, if one goes into a baseline. For example, in a sawmill, wood comes from different sources and is mixed at different stages of the supply chain.
Now, in the current interpretation, it can lead to a different reporting of the same production stream depending only on the origin of procurement model of the wood. So only on that, how you have bought the wood is questioned, so in the same, same line. And this obviously increases the administrative burden without any sort of benefit in combating the deforestation itself. So risk-basedness, legal certainty, minimization of administrative burden, especially in low-risk countries, would be extremely important. And for example, with the sawmill case, I'd say that such side streams as wood chips, sawdust, or bark should be excluded from the scope of the regulation.
And then a final question I'd like to present to the Commission. We have already in several countries comprehensive monitored systems with forest certification systems. Could Commission assess how national systems like these could complement or partially replace the new requirements, especially in low-risk countries, and whether this would also reduce the administrative burden on operators and the burden to EU IT systems?
Erasmus NOFFELS
Thank you, Chair. Yes, and thank you to the Commission. I have some questions on on the area of leather because it really it makes no sense what what we have seen presented from from the Commission. I mean, leather is a major global industry. Major global industry.
It's not talk about a smaller byproduct or or something else. This is is a major industry. Leather is a co-product when you're producing other things. So so I find it really difficult to understand why there is this deletion of all the codes related to leather. And I have some questions that I think we need to have answered from the Commission and hopefully what we will see from the Commission is that they they turn back on on this proposal because it really it makes no sense.
But first of all, I want to know a bit about the the evidence because when we look at your own impact assessment, conclude just like my colleague from from S&D said, I mean, that including keeping leather in the EUDR would generate up to 2 billion annual in environmental benefits. So so we know there is is an added value. The cost is rather small. So so what is the the actual explanation? And then how do we make the the policy coherent?
I mean, we we talk about the cattle when it's about meat, it's one thing, even the frozen tongue is counted in, but then the skin, again back to it's a global billion industry, it's huge, that's not counting. So so what is the the policy coherence here? And then also I want to ask about, I mean, aren't we losing out on the traceability we need for leather in the industry? I mean, we don't need to go back on this, we need to move forward so also consumer actually know what they're getting and it's easier for company to work with. So these questions I would like to have answered and then hopefully we will see a turn of of decision from the Commission very swiftly on this decision.
Lynn Boylan
Thank you, Chair, and I think look, after several rocky years, it is a relief to hear that the deforestation regulation will not be reopened. I think it's finally time to let it do its job and for that we need certainty that it will not be undermined again before it is up and running. I mean, other colleagues have raised the issue of leather and I share their concerns on that and the lack of coherence. But the simplification report mentions that the EUDR is already driving reforms of forest governance worldwide, which again I think just shows the importance of EU leadership and why we need the political courage to not stall the EUDR any further. But in relation to this reform of forest governance, did the secondary literature find any indications of parallel improvement in workers' rights, sorry I'll slow down, land rights and the protection of human rights defenders?
I also have a question on the repository of certification schemes. Will you screen the schemes that are included, for example by requiring them to meet the relevant ISO standards for certifiers? And then the final question is just around the progress of the IT scheme or the IT system. In order to avoid a repeat of past issues with the readiness of the IT system, can you commit to keeping Parliament and stakeholders informed about the progress towards its reopening? And apologies to the interpreters.
Danke, Herr Vorsitzender, und danke auch an die Kommission für die Vorstellung. Ja, heute geht es zum x-ten Male um die Entwaldungsverordnung.
Anja Arndt
Sie wurde schon zweimal verschoben, weil sie nicht umsetzbar war. Sie verpflichtet diejenigen, die Kaffee, Kakao, Palmöl, Rindfleisch, Holz, Soja und Kautschuk produzieren, dazu nachzuweisen, dass seit 2020 kein Baum mehr auf den Anbauflächen gerodet wurde. Die von der Entwaldungsverordnung betroffenen Betriebe in der EU haben nun endlich auf eine echte Vereinfachung gewartet. Sie sind aber schwer enttäuscht. Forstverbände fordern seit langem, dass sie eine Sammelsorgfaltserklärung für alle Mitglieder abgeben dürfen.
Doch die Kommission erlaubt das nur, wenn der Verband das Holz erst selbst kauft, erntet und dann wieder verkauft. Das deckt sich aber nicht mit den Abläufen in der Realität. Eine Erleichterung an diese unerfüllbaren Bedingungen zu knüpfen, ist keine Erleichterung und keine Vereinfachung. Sie ist eine Absage und Ignoranz dieses Problems. Zur Georeferenzierung: Statt GPS-Koordinaten soll eine Postanschrift genügen.
Aber nur — und jetzt kommt wieder der Haken — wenn die Geschäftsadresse im Wald liegt. Bei den allermeisten Waldbesitzern ist das aber auch nicht der Fall. Für die Mehrheit der Forstbesitzer läuft auch diese Vereinfachung wieder ins Leere. Auch die Landwirte sind unzufrieden. Diese Verordnung ist ein bürokratisches Misstrauensvotum gegen unsere eigenen Landwirte.
Weite Teile Europas haben seit Jahrzehnten keine Entwaldung, sondern Waldzuwachs. Trotzdem überzieht Brüssel heimische Familienbetriebe mit Geodatenpflichten bis auf die einzelne Parzelle. Unsere Lösungen sind: Erstens, eine echte Null-Risiko-Kategorie für Regionen ohne Entwaldungsproblem. Zweitens, Vollbefreiung von Sorgfaltserklärungen, Georeferenzierung und Meldepflichten in nachweislich entwaldungsfreien Gebieten. Drittens, echte Sammelerklärung durch die Verbände ohne absurde Bedingungen.
Viertens, Risikoeinstufung auf wissenschaftlicher Basis mit fehlerfreien, jährlich aktualisierten Karten. Meine Damen und Herren, diese Verordnung soll Bäume retten. Sie erstickt aber, so wie sie jetzt konzipiert ist, jene, die unseren Wald seit Generationen pflegen. Schaffen wir die Entwaldungsverordnung am besten vollständig ab. Ich glaube nämlich auch nicht mehr daran, dass das irgendwann passend sein wird.
Und setzen wir uns dafür ein, dass keine Bäume mehr für Windkrafträder gefällt werden.
Pierfrancesco Maran
Thank you. Now the catch-the-eye. We start with Iratxe García.
Esther Herranz García
Gracias, presidente. Con respecto a este documento de revisión del reglamento de deforestación, yo tengo que decir que hay una parte que es un avance real y que reconozco como tal en la simplificación, con medidas concretas que reducen la carga al final a quienes han de aplicarla, que son los actores finales y las los pequeños operadores. Pero, sin embargo, creo que las mejoras del sistema de información no son bastantes. Sabemos que asociaciones europeas, diecisiete asociaciones europeas, entre las que está FEDIOL, Tires Europe o el COPA-COGECA o ECA, les han presentado una serie de demandas, sobre todo cinco muy importantes y que no se han alcanzado una perspectiva operativa satisfactoria. Como ha dicho el señor Koller, esperemos que esto funcione, pero es que estamos ya en junio y la verdad es que yo creo que con menos de siete meses para la entrada en vigor de de la aplicación, yo creo que los compromisos de operatividad real del sistema son un riesgo para la implementación fluida de este reglamento.
Creo que se tienen que poner las pilas, se lo ha dicho mi portavoz en este asunto, el señor Koller, y yo creo que tienen que arreglar este asunto y dar seguridad sobre todo a los operadores que a fin de cuentas son los que tienen que sacar adelante este documento. Gracias.
Sander Smit
Yes. Okay. Grazie presidente. Dank u, voorzitter. Ik spreek Nederlands, I'll speak in Dutch.
Veel dank aan de Commissie voor de presentatie waarin vereenvoudigingsmaatregelen voor de ontbossingsverordening worden aangekondigd. Ik ben blij dat de Commissie met deze tweede wijziging en vereenvoudigingen erkent dat de bureaucratie uit de doorgeschoten Green Deal onhaalbaar en onuitvoerbaar was. Ik lees in het rapport dat de Commissie concludeert dat de vereenvoudigingsmaatregelen samen leiden tot de vermindering van de administratieve lasten met ongeveer 75%. Lijkt positief voor boeren, bosbeheerders, bedrijven die al jarenlang waarschuwen bij ons dat de ontbossingsverordening in de praktijk buitengewoon complex is. Juist om die reden wil ik de Europese Commissie vragen waarom pragmatische oplossingen niet vanaf het begin onderdeel van dit voorstel waren.
Hoe kan het nu dat het effect van de oorspronkelijke wetgeving zodanig is onderschat dat nu een vermindering van 75% van die regeldruk nodig blijkt? En wat betekent dit voor de proportionaliteit van de verplichtingen die nog steeds gelden voor bedrijven? Luistert u voldoende naar de Regulatory Scrutiny Board? De Commissie is al sinds 2024 bezig met het verbeteren van deze wetgeving. Hoe haalbaar acht de Commissie gezien het gezegde hier vandaag het om midden juni een delegated act aan te nemen?
Is de Commissie bereid om ook na deze eerste vereenvoudigingsronde te blijven evalueren of bepaalde verplichtingen daadwerkelijk bijdragen aan voorkoming van ontbossing of dat ze vooral administratieve lasten blijven creëren zonder aantoonbare effecten? Het besluit om de wetgeving niet te openen is daarom erg voorbarig. We hebben net gehoord van alle fracties, van EVP tot ECR, dat als het gaat om IT dat er grote zorgen leven en ik ben eigenlijk benieuwd naar hoe de Commissie daarop reflecteert. Dank u wel.
Gerben-Jan Gerbrandy
Thank you, Chair, and thank you, European Commission, for being with us. In these kind of debates, when the focus is a lot on simplification and administrative costs, you quite often forget why we have this piece of legislation at all. Well, the answer is very simple: because deforestation is one of the main causes of biodiversity loss, of climate change, of soil erosion, of flooding, of desertification. So it's extremely, extremely important that we continue with very ambitious deforestation policies. And yes, it will always have administrative costs, but they are relatively limited compared to the positive sides of this piece of legislation.
I have a very concrete question. A lot has been asked already about the leather exclusion. I wonder, cattle is the second biggest cause of deforestation. Why single out leather? Is that just because of the very effective lobby of Italy or are there other good reasons for doing so?
My second question is, in the analysis of earlier postponements of the regulation, we've seen that the member states were quite often very badly prepared for the implementation. Is the Commission now in close contact with the member states in order to make them ready for the implementation this time? Thank you.
Speaker 44
Now for the Green, Kaitatof? No, sorry, I understood. So for the Left, Amafo.
Speaker 45
Merci, Monsieur le Président. L'Europe s'apprête à offrir un cadeau inespéré à une industrie qui repose sur l'exploitation animale, sur la destruction de l'environnement et sur la colonisation. Selon la Banque mondiale, plus de 80 % de la déforestation de l'Amazonie est liée à l'élevage bovin, dont le cuir est un débouché économique majeur. Chaque paire de chaussures, chaque ceinture, chaque siège de voiture en cuir alimente une industrie responsable de 72 % de la déforestation au Brésil. Et derrière chaque produit en cuir, il y a aussi la réalité d'une industrie qui repose sur la violence infligée aux animaux, traités comme de simples marchandises.
Il y a des procédés de tannage énergivores et l'utilisation de substances chimiques qui contaminent l'eau et affectent les communautés locales. L'Union européenne ne peut pas lutter contre la déforestation tout en fermant les yeux sur l'un de ses principaux moteurs. Et elle porte une responsabilité directe. L'année dernière, elle était le deuxième marché d'exportation du cuir brésilien. Plusieurs enquêtes d'ONG ont montré les liens entre certaines chaînes européennes d'approvisionnement en cuir, la déforestation illégale, les violations des droits humains et l'expropriation des peuples autochtones en Amazonie.
Alors que la déforestation ravage l'Amazonie et le Gran Chaco, alors que les scientifiques alertent sur l'accélération de la crise environnementale et climatique, voilà que l'Europe voudrait affaiblir l'une des lois les plus importantes du Pacte vert. Exclure le cuir du règlement est un passe-droit à la fois dangereux et injustifiable accordé aux acteurs de la filière bovine. Pourquoi interdire la viande d'un bovin lié à la déforestation, mais autoriser dans le même temps la commercialisation de sa peau ? Ça ne fait absolument aucun sens. Les forêts, les animaux et le climat ne peuvent pas être sacrifiés pour préserver les profits d'une industrie qui continue de prospérer sur leur destruction.
Si l'Europe veut être crédible dans la lutte contre la déforestation, elle doit résister aux pressions des lobbies et maintenir le cuir dans le champ du règlement. Je vous remercie.
Pierfrancesco Maran
Thank you. Now we go back to the Commission. Mr. Mamara, the floor is yours.
Eric MAMER
Thank you, and let me thank all the members for your very deep interest in the implementation of the EUDR and for your detailed questions. Let me try to address as many of them as I can, and if by any chance I miss one or two, then please do not hesitate to contact us bilaterally so that we can follow up. A number of honorable members mentioned the issue of leather. And of course, nobody disputes that there would be environmental benefits to the inclusion of leather in the scope of EUDR. That is very clear.
But this must be assessed against feasibility and other factors. Now, the current scope of the EUDR, including raw hides and skins but excluding finished products, shoes and other leather goods, creates a structural imbalance between importers of finished leather goods and operators producing leather goods within the EU.
As the regulation stands, leather products such as footwear and handbags could be exported to the EU without being subject to due diligence obligations, as leather is in scope, but leather products are not. However, operators producing leather handbags or shoes within the EU would have due diligence obligations for the leather they import to make those bags or shoes. This structural imbalance could impact global trade flows, thereby not only putting jobs in the European tanning industry at risk, but it could also undermine the environmental benefits because of the risk of relocating rather than eliminating the deforestation risk by importing leather goods from abroad instead of producing them in the EU. In addition, leather has a value chain which is separated from meat products, with specific processing stages and intermediaries in the downstream leather value chain, which weakens the link between leather operators and cattle farmers. Given the low economic value of cattle skins and hides compared to meat, combined with asymmetries in trade flows between meat and hides, economic operators have limited leverage to obtain information required to comply with EUDR.
Keeping leather under the EUDR might therefore represent a high burden on the industry. And the most important thing now is to provide legal certainty as soon as possible for economic operators and ensure a smooth entry into application of the EU deforestation regulation by the end of this year. So, this is the basis on which we want to start now. Let me remind you, there's a review clause in 2030, which will also include the scope of the regulation. This is what I can say on leather.
On the fact that there are no real simplifications, let me remind the honorable member who raised this point that in the previous version of the EUDR regulation, before our draft delegated act, 95 to 99% of the EU's farmers and foresters would have had to make DDSs, so declarations, every time that they put a product on the market or that they exported. Through the modification that we are proposing, all micro and small producers are going to be able to make a single one-off simplified declaration about their activity, which will only need to be modified if basically their operations change significantly. So this is actually going to simplify radically their life. And secondly, not only that, but we are also giving the opportunity for that task to be done not by them, but by cooperatives, for example, who represent them. Or if in a member state there are information systems that contain the relevant data, that member state's IT systems can be hooked up to EUDR and basically replace the work that needs to be done by the micro or small operator.
That is a major simplification. The second major simplification that has been brought is that we have taken out, the co-legislators have taken out all the downstream operators except the very first one from the scope of EUDR. That means that millions of companies in Europe will no longer have to register in the IT system and produce DDSs. This, to be honest, would have been a major hurdle in the functioning of the IT system. And it is, at the same time, a major simplification for the companies concerned.
So I really do believe that the regulation has brought significant simplifications and that the figure that we have brought of 75% less burden reflects this reality. On the question related to the legal basis for adding products, well let me simply refer to you, I will not read it out for you but you can find it very easily, Article 34.1 of the EUDR regulation which foresees that the Commission can modify the scope of products covered, not commodities. We cannot, for example, take out wood or cacao or soy or coffee, but we can, and that is what we have proposed here, add and subtract a number of products that are made based on these commodities. So we are clearly entirely and legitimately in the scope of the regulation. On the variations in the interpretation that one honorable member mentioned as potentially leading to breaches, involuntary breaches of EUDR, let me say that this is precisely why we have updated, based on all the questions and comments we have received from operators, both the guidance and the FAQs.
Now, of course, we are at the beginning of the implementation phase and I am sure that there will continue to be certain areas which require further clarification. And therefore we will continue to stay in touch with all the operators in order to ensure that we capture as many of these uncertainties as possible. We have a multi-stakeholder platform in place. We have had extensive meetings with this multi-stakeholder platform over the past years precisely in order to address all of these questions that are coming from economic operators and Member States. So I think we can feel confident that we have to our best of our ability answered all of the questions received to date and we remain of course available, we will continue to remain available to address new questions.
There was a question on the evaluation of low-risk countries or zones and how we came to this. Now let me remind you that we have based ourselves on a transparent methodology which is based on data provided by the FAO and that the list that you currently have of low-risk countries is included in an implementing act which was unanimously adopted last year by the Member States.
On the question related to the unclarity when for products which are sawmill products which are based on different feeds of wood chips, if I understood the question correctly, we understand that this is indeed a tricky issue and the FAQ, I don't remember exactly which question, but we can come back to you on that, addresses specifically this question, so we believe that it will be clear for operators. On the question related to the postal address, first of all, we believe that in many cases member states have the proper information and therefore that this information can be provided by good cooperation between the operators and the national authorities. Secondly, and apologies, I don't have the English word in my head at the moment, but it's not only the postal address that can be used, but data coming from the cadastre, the land registry, I think that's how you say it in the cadastre or the land registry as you say, I believe, in English. There was a question on the state of IT preparedness. This is an important issue since indeed it is because of our analysis of the risk on the IT system that we actually went through the whole procedure of adopting an amendment to the EUDR regulation.
We have of course used the time since the adoption of the new EUDR regulation to work extensively and intensely on adapting the IT system in order to ensure that it would address the simplifications that have been included in the new version and provide new features that will simplify the life of operators. And this work is still ongoing. Thank you very much to the honorable member who actually went to the system and tried to register. It is an area where further improvements are being worked on. We need this to be as user-friendly as possible.
This is something that I am paying a lot of attention to myself and therefore we are continuing to work on this. The system, as I said, will reopen at the end of June, which will allow operators to start testing the system again and start registering once again, and that is in a very little time now. But in the meantime, we have published, as I said, the API specifications, which means that those operators that will not be inputting data directly on the screens of the EUDR system but connecting their IT systems to the EUDR system can now adapt their APIs to the new characteristics of the system. Lastly, there was a question on member states' capacity to implement the regulation. We have of course been working intensively with member states, both through the multi-stakeholder platform, through dedicated meetings with the member states, in order to help them prepare for this.
And therefore, we are confident that we have provided all the information that Member States have been requiring from us in order to correctly implement the legislation. Now, it is clear that we will be in a learning process as of the 30th of December as well, and that intensive contacts between the Commission and Member States will continue to be necessary as we see how the deployment of the EUDR regulation and the ICS system develop in real life. I'm sure we will have other opportunities to discuss this. I think I've covered everything or almost everything. If I have forgotten one or the other question, please accept my apologies.
Pierfrancesco Maran
Thank you. Thank you so much. So now we move to the next item. We make a one-minute break before.
Speaker 46
Next, we have the approval of the minutes of the meetings of the 24th and 25th of January. Are there any comments on these minutes? I see no comments, so the minutes are approved. Now, I would like to move on to the chair's announcements. I have several announcements to make.
First, I would like to inform you that the interpretation is available in 22 languages. Second, I would like to remind you that the meeting is being webstreamed. Third, I would like to inform you that the electronic voting system will be used for the votes today. Fourth, I would like to inform you that the deadline for amendments to the draft report on the revision of the EU ETS has been set for the 15th of February at 12:00. Fifth, I would like to inform you that the deadline for amendments to the draft report on the revision of the Effort Sharing Regulation has been set for the 16th of February at 12:00.
Sixth, I would like to inform you that the deadline for amendments to the draft report on the revision of the LULUCF Regulation has been set for the 17th of February at 12:00. Seventh, I would like to inform you that the deadline for amendments to the draft report on the revision of the CO2 emission standards for cars and vans has been set for the 18th of February at 12:00. Eighth, I would like to inform you that the deadline for amendments to the draft report on the revision of the Renewable Energy Directive has been set for the 21st of February at 12:00. Ninth, I would like to inform you that the deadline for amendments to the draft report on the revision of the Energy Efficiency Directive has been set for the 22nd of February at 12:00. Tenth, I would like to inform you that the deadline for amendments to the draft report on the revision of the Alternative Fuels Infrastructure Regulation has been set for the 23rd of February at 12:00.
Eleventh, I would like to inform you that the deadline for amendments to the draft report on the revision of the ReFuelEU Aviation Regulation has been set for the 24th of February at 12:00. Twelfth, I would like to inform you that the deadline for amendments to the draft report on the revision of the FuelEU Maritime Regulation has been set for the 25th of February at 12:00. Thirteenth, I would like to inform you that the deadline for amendments to the draft report on the revision of the Energy Taxation Directive has been set for the 28th of February at 12:00. Fourteenth, I would like to inform you that the deadline for amendments to the draft report on the revision of the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism has been set for the 1st of March at 12:00. Fifteenth, I would like to inform you that the deadline for amendments to the draft report on the revision of the Social Climate Fund has been set for the 2nd of March at 12:00.
Sixteenth, I would like to inform you that the deadline for amendments to the draft report on the revision of the EU ETS for aviation has been set for the 3rd of March at 12:00. Seventeenth, I would like to inform you that the deadline for amendments to the draft report on the revision of the Market Stability Reserve has been set for the 4th of March at 12:00. Eighteenth, I would like to inform you that the deadline for amendments to the draft report on the revision of the EU ETS for maritime transport has been set for the 7th of March at 12:00.
Pierfrancesco Maran
So we we now move to the to the item 14, the presentation and exchange of view with the European Environmental Agency and the European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change on two reports on climate adaptation. We also invite the Commission to complement the insight of the report with his view on how to strengthen adaptation provision in the upcoming legislative revision of the EU climate policy framework. I would like to give the floor first to Leena Ylä-Mononen, Executive Director of the European Environment Agency to present the first report that is called Overheated and Underprepared: Europeans' experience of living with climate change so to present the report and the reflection in view of the future second European Climate Risk Assessment report. You have the floor.
Leena Ylä-Mononen
Thank you, Chair. It's a pleasure to be here and indeed talk about the climate risks and resilience in the context of recent and also upcoming agency's work on this topic. You can move to the next slide, please. We have just emerged from one of the earliest annual heat spikes on record in Western Europe. Very likely there will be more extreme weather over the summer.
So question: how are European citizens experiencing climate change in their lives? In February we published the report titled Overheated and Underprepared: European citizens' experience of living with climate change. This report was developed in collaboration with our sister agency Eurofound. It is based on survey of 27,000 respondents across 27 EU countries and it focuses on impacts already experienced today and and concerns also for the future. The report of course has as always a wealth of detail, but I would like to highlight only a few of its key findings.
So please next slide. Respondents were asked about their experience of climate impacts in the last five years. In this chart you can see some of the results. You can see from the top line more than 80% of the survey respondents reported being affected by at least one climate-related issue: heat, flooding, wildfires, water scarcity, wind, mosquito or tick bites.
And heat was the most commonly reported issue. Nearly half of respondents felt too hot in their home or in their workplace or place of education. Over 60% of respondents reported feeling too hot outside in their neighborhood. Not on this slide, but we also asked about the future outlook. So more than half of the respondents were concerned about extreme high temperature and 48% were concerned about wildfires.
Next slide please. And please click already three times so that okay, so it's not animated, good, stay there. In this graphic, you can see also the inequalities. So there are really inequalities across regions and social groups and and this is really one of the issues to be watched. You can see that much higher proportion of respondents in Central and Eastern Europe were unable to afford to keep their homes cool as compared with their neighbors in the in the Northern Europe.
Also significant inequalities apparent between more or less affluent households. Seven times as many respondents from less affluent households are unable to keep their homes cool. And similar disparities are visible between renters and homeowners and between different age cohorts. Next slide please. In the face of increasing climate impacts, adaptation measures in people's homes are urgently required.
In this graph, the light blue color on the right indicates that the adaptation measure in question is not in place. Dark blue on the left indicates recent implementation of the measure. And those measures include shading, air conditioning or ventilation, flood proofing as well or extreme weather insurance. And as you can see in more than half of the respondents' homes, none of these measures were in place. So this really indicates severe underpreparedness for climate hazards at household level.
Next slide please. So European citizens and society need to be protected against the impacts of extreme weather and other climate impacts. Four key areas need to be addressed with urgency. First, climate adaptation measures in physical infrastructure is needed. This includes things like stormwater management in cities and nature-based solutions, also urban greening.
Second, heat needs to be recognized as the most widespread risk. In a fast-warming Europe, homes and workplaces that are cooled in a sustainable way, hopefully, are vital to protect health and lives. And third, more household-level measures are needed. This includes insurance for extreme weather events, requires also increased availability and affordability of those measures. And finally, some groups are more vulnerable to climate impacts and therefore require really special attention and measures.
Such groups include low-income households and people with health issues. And the survey results also point to other vulnerable groups such as young people. They will live through their lives, I mean, with unprecedented climate change throughout.
Leena Ylä-Mononen
Ah, sorry, okay. Next slide please. I would now move to UCRA. The first European Climate Risk Assessment or UCRA 1, as we call it, was published two years ago in 2024. It delivered the first fast-tracked expert-driven assessment.
It brought together existing data and knowledge from across the EU and it provides now a common reference point for both national and subnational climate risk assessments, helping Member States align their own assessments with a single EU-wide framework. The report identified and assessed 36 major climate risks for Europe, you can see the image on the right.
It highlighted which climate-related hazards are most severe, where they are likely to occur, which societal systems they will affect, and how urgently they must be addressed. The goal was to enable European policymakers to set clear adaptation priorities, allocate resources to the most urgent risks, and design fair policies that also consider existing inequalities. Next slide, please. Our EUCRA-1 report had really a strong influence on EU-level policy priorities, most notably in the Commission's political guidelines. And since its publication, the key message about the urgency of building climate resilience has been further reinforced by many reports and initiatives.
The President Niinistö report on civil and military preparedness, the Draghi report on EU competitiveness, the EU Preparedness Union Strategy, and of course, most recently, the European Water Resilience Strategy. It is also a cornerstone of the evidence base for the EU's upcoming policy package, the Integrated Framework on Climate Risk and Resilience, expected in the third quarter of this year. EUCRA is expected to play a prominent role in this framework, and our agency will align our future work with its key components, such as common trajectories, monitoring, evaluation, just resilience, and digital tools. So in short, EUCRA-1 was widely recognized as a success, sparking strong interest across European Commission services and also EU Member States. Next slide, please.
We are now working on the second EUCRA report. EUCRA-2 expands its policy scope. It will better address areas where climate risks interact with really complex dynamics, such as economic and social policies, or domestic and international security. We will also strengthen the information base underpinning the assessment. This aims to improve the robustness, comparability, and policy relevance of the findings.
There will be an expanded evidence base, improved traceability of risk assessment, and enhanced treatment of high-impact events, including those with low or uncertain probabilities. Very importantly, EUCRA-2 will place a much stronger emphasis on the solutions. It will explore a range of available adaptation options, assessing also their feasibility, identify policy levers for implementation, and examine the role of multi-level governance in enabling effective action. Regarding the process of preparation, EUCRA-2 will significantly enhance stakeholder engagement, building on lessons from EUCRA-1 and also from national climate risk assessments. Engagement will extend more systematically to sectoral stakeholders and a broader range of actors, and of course, today's event is one of those events.
Outreach and engagement activities will progressively expand over the course of the project to support policy relevance and uptake. EUCRA-2 will also feature a new report structure with a more concise executive summary and main report, we know that you are all busy in reading papers, with technical sections included for specific sectoral stakeholders. Next slide, please. Here you can see the indicative timeline for the production of EUCRA-2. Scoping and methodological development are already underway.
Publication is planned for Q3 of 2028, so still time to go, ready to of course inform then the next upcoming policy EU policy cycle, elections in 29. Much of this information is reflected in the background paper you have received. We would very much of course appreciate receiving your feedback, both today and also when moving forwards, to ensure that EUCRA-2 is a useful tool for your work in particular.
Next slide, which is I'm coming to the end. Before I close, I would like just to draw your attention to two new EEA assessments. First, a report on climate resilience in Europe examining the national adaptation policies of the 32 EEA, so our agency member countries. It will point to persistent gaps between planning and implementation. It will also point to significant limitations in the data needed to track whether adaptation efforts are actually reducing risks or not.
Second, we will launch a new interactive platform which examines climate impacts and preparedness in Europe. The image here is taken from its landing page and it explores how we are adapting and what enables or blocks progress towards resilience. Both of these reports will be published next week, 11th June, and you should be receiving links, I hope, to embargoed advanced copies of both reports or both products in your mailbox. I hope that you can treat them confidential until the release date 11th June. I thank you for your attention.
I only have the final ending slide and looking forward to the discussion. Thank you.
Pierfrancesco Maran
Thank you. Now for the second report, that is called Strengthening Resilience to Climate Change, Recommendations for an Effective EU Adaptation Policy Framework, we have Suraje Dessai and I leave him the floor.
Suraje Dessai
Thank you, Chair. Good afternoon, everyone, and thank you for inviting the European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change to present our advice on strengthening resilience across the EU published in February of this year. Next slide, please. Our mandate in the Advisory Board is to provide independent scientific advice grounded in the best available evidence to inform EU policymaking. And you can see in this slide the 15 members that compose the Advisory Board.
And I'm really grateful for this opportunity to exchange views with you on this particular topic. Next slide. Our scientific advice comes in a context where there is increasingly clear climate change is not a distant or abstract risk for Europe. Global five-year average temperatures have risen to around 1.4 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial, with the past 11 years being the warmest on record. In Europe, which is warming faster than the global average, temperatures have reached 2.5 degrees Celsius last year.
And you can see more and more examples of record-breaking temperatures, for example, just in May, I've just come from Portugal, for example, where, you know, another record was broken of above 40 degrees Celsius, for example. This is routinely now felt across the EU as you can see in this slide. These escalating risks, which can compound one another and cascade across the EU's integrated economy and systems, threaten to undermine the ability of the EU to deliver many of its strategic goals. Adaptation action is necessary across sectors to address the systemic risks that threaten the security of critical services: food, water, and energy. To provide the stability needed to invest in a competitive and innovative economy.
And to protect the health of people and ecosystems across the EU, we need to be prepared, but our assessment found that adaptation efforts remain insufficient, fragmented, and often come too late.
Next slide, please. While local and regional action is often best placed to drive adaptation, these levels face persistent barriers and constraints. National adaptation efforts also face barriers, and if taken in isolation, it will be fragmented and lead to an uneven playing field. National EU-level action is necessary as part of the combined and coordinated efforts that are needed. Climate change creates systemic risks that require systemic solutions.
The advisory board finds that this is where the EU can play a key role, providing coherence and scale and long-term direction. Next slide, please. So that brings me to our recommendations for an EU adaptation policy framework that is effective, fair, and transformational. So this slide lays out the five recommendations, and I'll go through them one at a time. So the first one is that the EU should mandate and harmonize climate risk assessments to strengthen adaptation planning.
We've just heard the plans of the EEA to develop UCRA 2, for example, there. Effective adaptation depends on understanding current and future climate risks and taking early action, but this is not always done. To enable this, the EU should establish and mandate the use of common science-based methodological standards and scenarios co-developed with national organizations to ensure consistent, harmonized adaptation planning across all levels, all governance levels and the private sector. Second, the EU should adopt a common reference scenario. I want to stress here that mitigation is about managing risks.
Rapid mitigation remains the best way to limit risks, yet we are already seeing the impacts of climate change, and even in optimistic scenarios, we will still see further warming. So societies need to adapt, and adaptation planning must be based on the actual climate conditions that Europe may face. So in line with the precautionary principle, the EU should prepare for the risks associated with a current emission pathway and more adverse futures that cannot be ruled out as well. So this means adopting a common reference based on what's known as SSP, shared socioeconomic pathway 2-4.5, and prepare for a pathway that gives us roughly 2.8, 3.5 degrees of global warming by the end of the century. And systematically also, we need to use more adverse scenarios to stress test as well.
So thirdly, the EU should set a vision for a climate-resilient EU by 2050 and beyond. The current vision is too general to drive adequate action and to set a policy direction in coherent and aligned with science. This should be supported by sectoral strategies to identify what is needed across sectors and measurable targets to drive progress and ensure accountability. Fourth, the EU should embed fair and just climate resilience in all EU policy and decision-making. Societies need to adapt by design rather than by disaster.
The principle of climate resilience by design should help ensure that policies and measures across the EU strengthen rather than weaken climate resilience across the EU, underpinned by monitoring, evaluation, and learning. It also needs to ensure that policies address unequal impacts, enables meaningful participation, and avoids regressive outcomes.
Our final recommendation is about mobilizing public and private adaptation investment and manage climate costs. This means embedding climate risk management in national economic and fiscal planning. It means improving the contribution to adaptation in the next EU budget and mobilizing private finance with targeted incentives and innovative finance mechanisms. Establishing a coherent approach to managing the costs of climate impacts by addressing the EU's insurance protection gap while strengthening crisis response and recovery instruments. So in summary, these recommendations are intended to support ongoing EU initiatives to help ensure that the EU is prepared for a range of plausible climate futures while safeguarding key strategic priorities such as competitiveness, security and social cohesion.
And so with that, I'll stop here and welcome any of your reflections. Thank you very much, Chair.
Pierfrancesco Maran
Thank you. And now we open the floor to the political group. We start with EPP for two minutes each, Manuela Ripa.
Manuela Ripa
Thank you, thank you Chair, and thank you very much for your presentations. The reports clearly show that climate change is already affecting the daily lives of Europeans through heatwaves, droughts, floods and water scarcity. At the same time, I would like to stress that the climate crisis is also a biodiversity crisis. Healthy ecosystems are our first line of defense against climate impacts. Wetlands reduce flood risks, forests cool our landscapes and store water, and biodiverse forests help stabilize local climates.
Healthy soils increase resilience against droughts, to name just a few. Protecting and restoring nature is therefore not only an environmental objective, it is a key adaptation strategy. At the same time, many municipalities and regions are already struggling with the consequences of climate change. They need practical support, planning certainty and sufficient funding to strengthen their resilience. And resilience also means preparedness.
Citizens increasingly experience climate impacts directly and often don't know what to do. We must ensure that adaptation measures reach also vulnerable groups, rural regions and municipalities that often have fewer resources. Therefore, I would like to ask some questions. Which nature-based solutions currently offer the greatest adaptation benefits, the highest return in terms of resilience and cost-effectiveness at European level and should be prioritized? It is certainly not a long-term solution if all in a city use air conditioning, just think of the urban heat island effect.
How can biodiversity protection and ecosystem restoration be better integrated into the future EU adaptation policy framework, also as a core adaptation tool, rather than treating them as a separate policy areas? Third, what additional instruments would you recommend to help local and regional authorities implement adaptation measures more rapidly and effectively, particularly in areas facing increased droughts and water stress? Thank you very much.
Heléne Fritzon
Thank you Chair, I will continue in Swedish. Jag vill säga tack så mycket för viktiga rapporter och det visar att klimatförändringarna inte bara är något som riskerar att förändra våra liv i framtiden. Tvärtom upplever människor detta i sin vardag och man gör det redan här och nu.
Vi ska såklart göra allt vi kan för att minska utsläppen och hålla den globala uppvärmningen nere. Men vi måste också förbereda oss för en värld som präglas av ett förändrat klimat. Och då måste vi göra det så att det inte drabbar vissa grupper mer. Ingen ska hamna efter. Jag tänker på de med lägst inkomst och unga personer.
Så mina frågor till er är den första. Det finns många exempel de senaste åren på platser i EU som har drabbats hårt av extremväder, både skyfall och torka. Men finns det goda exempel på länder och regioner som ligger i framkant i sitt anpassningsarbete som vi kan dra lärdom av? Min andra fråga handlar om de risker som vi politiker ofta diskuterar och känner till och där vi jobbar med till exempel vattenavrinning i många kommuner mot översvämningar. Men vilka är de största utmaningarna som vi politiker tenderar att underskatta?
Och min sista fråga handlar om att vi vet att långsiktiga behov ibland trängs undan av kortsiktiga perspektiv. Så hur kan vi bli bättre på att använda vetenskapen för att på ett bra sätt både förebygga och anpassa efter ett förändrat klimat? Tack för ordet.
Marie-Luce Brasier-Clain
Merci Monsieur le Président. Merci aux intervenants de leur présentation. Il faut tout d'abord se réjouir que les scénarios les plus alarmistes du GIEC ne soient plus d'actualité avec une hypothèse de réchauffement autour de 3 degrés d'ici 2100 au lieu de 5. Mais ce potentiel est tout de même très élevé et inquiétant sachant que l'Europe se réchauffe plus vite. Or, l'UE s'est engagée dans une trajectoire de 1,5 à 2 degrés.
Si elle planifie son adaptation sur 3 degrés, c'est l'aveu implicite que les objectifs de l'Accord de Paris ne sont pas atteints et que le Pacte vert est insuffisant. Et cela me rend très dubitatif sur les objectifs de planification que vous proposez, notamment l'obligation pour les États de définir des trajectoires d'adaptation. J'aimerais réagir sur deux points. Vous mentionnez les puits naturels et leur déclin préoccupant, mais pas le recours aux technologies de capture du carbone alors que la Commission les considère comme stratégiques. Est-ce qu'il faut en déduire que selon vous ces technologies n'ont pas d'avenir ?
Et enfin, la climatisation n'est mentionnée qu'une seule fois dans le rapport et comme exemple de mauvaise adaptation puisqu'elle consomme de l'énergie et augmente les émissions de gaz à effet de serre. Or, cela est moins vrai dans les pays dotés de mix électriques décarbonés, sachant aussi que les normes sur les fluides réfrigérants sont de plus en plus strictes. On peut difficilement se passer d'une mesure efficace pour lutter contre les milliers de décès liés à la chaleur, 24 000 en 2025. Est-ce que vous prenez en considération dans vos projections une généralisation de la climatisation dans nos sociétés ? Je vous remercie.
Alexandr Vondra
Thank you, Chair. So for years I have been proposing to focus our attention less to mitigation and more to adaptation measures, achievable within one's lifespan, calculable with a clear value for money ratio.
That is why I welcome this initiative. At the same time, I regret to say that some outcomes of these recommendations bears all mark of highly political and ideological undertone. Here are my three comments to the recommendation proposed by the European Scientific Advisory. Firstly, Brussels should not dictate how member states manage their own risk. Climate risk and adaptations are local and regional matters.
The topography, economic structure, the agriculture base and infrastructure of member states differ. I argue that mandating harmonized climate risk assessment, common scenarios and EU-wide adaptation targets remove the flexibility that member states needs to respond to their own specific circumstances. Adaptation planning should be driven by national governments and regional authorities who understand their vulnerabilities. Secondly, locking policy into contested model is fiscally irresponsible. Recommendation to use projections of warming by 2100.
I would challenge the proposal to commit vast public resources to investment frameworks and regulatory obligation coming from models that are subject to continuous revision. And finally, the adaptation mandates will accelerate deindustrialization. Recommendations four and five would systematically redirect private capital away from productive investment. At the moment when European industry is already under severe pressure from energy cost and Chinese overcapacity, mandatory climate risk disclosure add yet another layer of bureaucracy burden that American and Asian competitors simply do not face. I would propose to replace this architecture with targeted voluntary incentives for the most vulnerable sectors and regions.
Thanks.
Gerben-Jan Gerbrandy
I was okay with the other order as well, but anyhow. Thank you and many thanks for both the agency and the scientific board for presenting their studies. I'm a bit puzzled by the two previous speakers. Focusing only on adaptation without mitigation is like mopping with the tap running. I don't think that's a very intellectually wise thing to do, but anyhow.
My question is the following. You're coming up with recommendations how to deal with this changing climate and you advise us to map the risks, etc., etc. But obviously there are also sectors that in the near future are simply impossible in certain areas of Europe, like tourism in high summer in areas where it's simply too hot. I know that many Dutch people don't go to the south of Europe anymore during the summer, but they either go to Scandinavia or they are changing their vacation behavior from summertime to springtime. So that will obviously have huge consequences, also economic consequences for the tourism sector in southern Europe.
I think about agriculture, certain crops might not grow anymore. You can decide to grow other crops, but I assume that certain areas are simply impossible for agriculture in the in the near future. The insurance sector, houses, other areas that are simply not insurable anymore because the costs are too high. Are you in your analysis, are you also taking that into account? Because it could also mean that we should not invest in certain sectors anymore, in certain regions, because it is simply not feasible anymore to do so.
And what are your, well, I I assume quite strong conclusions then. Thank you.
Kai Tegethoff
Yes, thanks a lot. So the message that you deliver is quite clear. People are already living with this crisis. And the the one report title also says it all: Overheated, Underprepared. Citizens are anxious about the future, feel powerless, too few know what adaptation measures actually exist.
That is a failure of governance and it must be a public responsibility. The scientific advisory board is right to call our current approach fragmented and incoherent. We have 27 patchworks of national plans, often underfunded, rarely binding and disconnected from the climate neutrality agenda. And we know risks do not respect borders. A drought in the Rhine basin or a wildfire in the Mediterranean or a flooding in the Oder region, these are shared European risks that demand shared European action.
So thank you for your two presentations. But we have this exchange also in the light of the upcoming European climate resilience framework. So let me be very clear about what we expect from the upcoming proposal. This would be first, binding adaptation targets, not only voluntary ambitions. Second, a dedicated and ring-fenced financing so that adaptation is no longer the poor cousin of mitigation.
And third, nature-based solutions at the heart of the framework. Restored wetlands that absorb floodwater or urban green spaces that cool our cities and protect the most vulnerable or healthy forests and rivers that build resilience while delivering for biodiversity, these are not luxuries, these are the most cost-effective insurances we have. So I have only one question and this is more to Commission. The scientific advisory board has called our current approach fragmented and incoherent and this is the good assessment of the current situation. And we have the clear explicit recommendation of binding adaptation targets.
So what can we actually expect from your upcoming proposal? Will it contain binding targets? Will it contain ring-fenced financing for adaptation or how will you address those demands and current needs? Thank you.
Lynn Boylan
Thank you, Chair, and thanks to the the representatives from the European Environment Agency and the scientific advisory board for joining us today to to discuss climate resilience and the upcoming climate risk assessment report.
I know that you asked in advance of this meeting for our views around policy gaps that related to to climate risk. And on the EU's digitalization goals, I do believe that there is a gap about the impact of AI and data centers. For example, data centers could be undermined by water shortages, but also directly exacerbate water shortages during periods of of drought. So I would be interested to hear how you are addressing the physical impact of digitalization in the risk assessment. And also just given their level of electricity demand that's required to power them, I'm particularly looking at Ireland where 15% of electricity demand in the Dublin region goes to data centers.
Um, that that certainly runs contrary to any mitigation plans and the ability to displace fossil fuels. And then as to information that can best support our our work on resilience, right now we're looking at a new EU budget. It doesn't appear to have any ring-fenced funding for nature. So I think we need as much supporting evidence as as possible about the importance of nature-based solutions for climate adaptation and resilience and the concrete ways that we can support nature to do the work that it does best. So we need analysis of how short-minded thinking on biodiversity risks long-term negative impacts on our resilience.
And I'd be interested to hear your thoughts on both of those topics today. Thank you.
Marc Jongen
Yes, thank you, Chair. I'm going to speak in German. Vielen Dank an die Referenten. Zunächst müssen wir die Unabhängigkeit der beiden Berichte in Frage stellen. Die Europäische Umweltagentur wird vom selben System finanziert, dessen Politik sie bewerten soll.
Und auch der wissenschaftliche Beirat zum Klimawandel wurde durch das EU-Klimagesetz geschaffen, um genau die EU-Klimapolitik zu stützen. Das ist offenbar keine ergebnisoffene Wissenschaft, sondern der Versuch, die bereits gescheiterte Klimapolitik durch tendenziöse Studien wissenschaftlich zu legitimieren. Der Vorsitzende des Beirats, Ottmar Edenhofer, sagte übrigens 2010 in einem Interview, ich zitiere: "Wir verteilen durch die Klimapolitik de facto das Weltvermögen um, man muss sich von der Illusion frei machen, dass internationale Klimapolitik Umweltpolitik ist", Zitatende. Also so viel zum Thema Unabhängigkeit. Der Bericht "Overheated and Underprepared" liefert denn auch genau das gewünschte Narrativ.
Er stützt sich auf eine Online-Umfrage mit 27.000 Teilnehmern, die der Bericht selbst als nicht repräsentativ einstuft. Es geht vor allem um subjektive Gefühle, es fühlte sich zu heiß an und so weiter. Und oh Wunder, im Süden ist es heißer als in Nordeuropa. Im Grunde erntet die Umfrage genau die Alarmpropaganda, die die EU selbst jahrelang gesät hat. Bjørn Lomborg hat demgegenüber vorgerechnet, dass die Zahl der Todesopfer durch klimabezogene Katastrophen in den letzten 100 Jahren um 99 % gesunken ist.
Kälte tötet weltweit mehr Menschen als Hitze. Wer wirklich Resilienz will, muss bezahlbare Energie, robuste Infrastrukturen, funktionierenden Katastrophenschutz in den Mittelpunkt stellen, nicht Alarmismus und neue Berichtspflichten. Aber auf der zweifelhaften Datengrundlage fordert nun der zweite Bericht des wissenschaftlichen Beirats ein European Integrated Framework for Climate Resilience mit messbaren EU-Zielen, Monitoring und so weiter. Unter dem Deckmantel des Klimaschutzes soll der systematische Aufbau einer neuen EU-Governance betrieben werden, die nationale Haushalts- und Wirtschaftspolitik klimapolitisch überformt. Und dabei bleibt anscheinend unberücksichtigt, dass der IPCC selbst das extreme Alarmszenario RCP 8.5 inzwischen fallen gelassen hat.
Und daher meine Frage: Berücksichtigen Sie solche neueren Entwicklungen in der ja auch offiziellen Wissenschaft? Oder auf welchen Klimaszenarien fußen Ihre Empfehlungen? Die Frage an beide Referenten, vor allem an den wissenschaftlichen Beirat. Vielen Dank.
Thank you. Now for the catch-the-eye, we start with César Luena.
César Luena
Muchas gracias, presidente, y gracias a las dos instituciones que han venido aquí amablemente, que hacen un trabajo encomiable y que, bueno, que se dedican a la ciencia, a la ciencia, por supuesto, rigurosa, independiente, como solo puede ser la ciencia. Así que muchas gracias. Me han dejado preocupado porque creo que estamos en unos niveles todavía bastante bajos de adaptación. Creo que necesitamos más ambición, pero bueno, ustedes ya han visto que esta legislatura no va a ser una legislatura muy propicia para desarrollar la gran política de adaptación que necesita el mundo y que necesita la Unión Europea. No va a ser una legislatura propicia.
Ustedes ven que aquí hay mucho negacionista suelto y el problema es que ha habido tres negacionistas más o menos, ¿no?, que hemos escuchado, que después cuando se alían con el Partido Popular Europeo, que no debiera serlo, pues bloquean la legislación. Eso es bueno también que ustedes vean la situación que tenemos en esta casa y cómo la ruptura del cordón sanitario provoca eso. Pero bien, tres cosas rápidas. Una, ¿están ustedes trabajando con la Comisión Europea en el futuro marco? A mí me interesa porque nos han explicado, nos han hecho sus informes, nos han explicado los consejos, pero me gustaría que pudieran decirnos qué elementos consideran imprescindibles para que la futura legislación de verdad sea un éxito y nos permita recuperar todo el tiempo perdido que llevamos en las políticas de resiliencia y adaptación.
Porque es evidente que necesitamos cambiar el paradigma. Mitigación, reducción de emisiones, sí, por supuesto, pero tenemos que ponernos las pilas, si me permiten la expresión coloquial, con la adaptación. Y las otras dos cosas son, una, estamos inmersos en un debate presupuestario. Les invito a que sigan el marco financiero plurianual, a que escudriñen, a que lo estudien. Si ustedes encuentran la suficiente financiación para las políticas de adaptación, por favor me llaman y me lo dicen.
Yo todavía no lo he encontrado. Es un reto que les pongo más que una pregunta. Y por último, la cohesión. Sí, la cohesión, porque la adaptación no va a ser igual en todos los sitios, pero fundamentalmente yo estoy pensando en clases sociales y, por tanto, para que esta política sea un éxito necesitamos que vaya acompañada de una política adecuada de cohesión. Y ustedes dirán, nosotros somos dos agencias, dos instituciones que se dedican a investigar.
Les pido, por favor, han hecho avances esta tarde, que también hagan una, se puede decir, investigación aplicada concreta sobre los costes sociales y, por tanto, no lo veamos en costes sociales sino y, por tanto, de la necesidad de políticas públicas que aseguren la cohesión en esas políticas de adaptación. Gracias por su trabajo, gracias por venir esta tarde aquí. Hace falta una política ambiciosa de adaptación en la Unión Europea y la tenemos que hacer de la mano de ustedes. Espero que la Comisión, si no les ha contactado, lo haga y espero vernos en el trabajo legislativo próximo. Gracias por ser tan generoso, presidente.
Martin Günther
Thank you. For the Left, Martin Günther.
Ja, ich werde auch Deutsch sprechen. Vielen Dank zunächst für die eindrucksvollen Berichte und dass Sie heute hier sind. Nicht nur die verheerende Überschwemmung im Ahrtal hat uns in Deutschland neben dem unendlichen menschlichen Leid auch vor Augen geführt, welche Folgen, wirtschaftlichen Folgen Klimakatastrophen haben. Der Klimawandel sollte nicht nur als Umweltproblem, sondern auch als zentrales wirtschafts- und haushaltspolitisches Thema betrachtet werden.
In der Praxis bedeutet dies, dass Regierungen die Kosten von Überschwemmungen, Dürren, Hitzewellen bei Entscheidungen über öffentliche Ausgaben, Kreditaufnahmen und langfristige Investitionen endlich konsequent berücksichtigen müssen. So ist es beispielsweise meist günstiger, heute in Hochwasserschutz zu investieren, als nach Naturkatastrophen immer wieder die Kosten für den Wiederaufbau tragen zu müssen. So in etwa stellt es auch der Bericht des europäischen wissenschaftlichen Beirats zum Klimawandel ja fest. Der Bericht hebt zudem die hohen Kosten des Nichthandelns hervor und kommt zu dem Schluss, dass die Vorteile einer frühzeitigen und vorausschauenden Anpassung die damit verbundenen Kosten häufig übersteigen. Der Bericht argumentiert allerdings auch, dass öffentliche Mittel allein nicht ausreichen werden und fordert deshalb eine stärkere Rolle privater Finanzakteure.
Meine Sorge ist, dass dieser Ansatz zwar zusätzliche Finanzmittel mobilisieren könnte, gleichzeitig aber auch neue Ungleichheiten schaffen könnte. Privates Kapital fließt in der Regel dorthin, wo die höchste Rendite erzielt werden kann und nicht unbedingt dorthin, wo die Klimarisiken am größten sind. Wie kann die EU sicherstellen, dass die Anpassung an den Klimawandel ein öffentliches Gut bleibt, das auf Solidarität und Klimagerechtigkeit basiert, anstatt von der Zahlungsfähigkeit von Regionen, Haushalten und Investoren abhängig zu werden? Das würde mich sehr interessieren, insbesondere an den wissenschaftlichen Beirat.
Thomas Pellerin-Carlin
Thank you, last speaker Thomas Pellerin-Carlin.
Merci Monsieur le Président. La semaine dernière, la France a connu sa vague de chaleur la plus précoce de toute l'histoire de notre pays. Au moins sept Français sont morts des conséquences de cette vague de chaleur qui a eu lieu au mois de mai. Une vague de chaleur qui a été évidemment intensifiée par le dérèglement climatique. Alors Monsieur le Président, vous imaginez ma colère lorsque j'entends le Rassemblement National et ses alliés de l'extrême droite allemande nier encore la réalité que viennent de nous expliquer les scientifiques qui sont venus nous parler aujourd'hui.
Alors revenons à la réalité. Les premières victimes des vagues de chaleur sont les travailleurs. Les ouvriers du bâtiment, les agriculteurs, mais aussi les ouvriers de notre industrie. J'étais la semaine dernière sur le site de Renault Cléon en Normandie pour justement écouter plusieurs de ces ouvriers. C'est un site qui fabrique des moteurs, les moteurs électriques des Renault.
Je parlais avec William ou plutôt j'écoutais William qui travaille dans la fonderie. Et je vous laisse imaginer les conditions de travail qu'il y a en règle générale lorsqu'on travaille dans une fonderie, mais à quel point ces conditions de travail sont aggravées lorsque dehors il fait 30, 32, 34, 36 degrés dès le mois de mai. C'est pas on parle pas d'une chose qui arrive une fois, un jour tous les 10 ans. On parle d'une nouvelle réalité qui impacte nos travailleurs pour des jours et des semaines plusieurs fois, plusieurs mois par an. Alors du coup ma question elle est sur les conditions de travail.
Qu'est-ce que l'Union européenne peut faire ou plutôt comment l'Union européenne doit améliorer ses lois sur les conditions de travail afin d'enfin protéger les travailleurs face à toutes les catastrophes climatiques et aux vagues de chaleur en particulier ? Merci.
Pierfrancesco Maran
Thank you to all the colleagues. So we go back to our guest. We start with Mrs. Leena Ylä-Mononen. You have the floor for the answer.
Leena Ylä-Mononen
Thank you and thank you for all the questions and comments and messages that you you sent. I try to respond to the questions explicitly addressed to to more to our direction and then leave some of them to to the advisory board.
Which nature-based solutions could be could be really I mean cost-effective and and useful? I think we have many examples and we have the Climate-ADAPT database or platform where also we are promoting the national and local regional examples of already already working measures. Greening the cities is is definitely having also multiple benefits. Slowing the flow of the rivers I mean to to avoid the the disastrous flood events. All these are really nature-based solutions and they indeed have to be in the center of of the actions.
Which specific measures are we also looking at the when the water stress and droughts referring to MEP Ripas's questions? We are at the early stage of course but we have also production I mean reports on the water scarcity and water stress and this is of course applying to all sectors as well. I mean so cannot go into details on on that at the moment. On MEP Fritzon's question yes as said we have good examples. I think the Climate-ADAPT platform is a really a genuine source of inspiration and of course especially for the local and regional authorities who need to also really and who have been stepping up to to take these challenges seriously.
Where are the biggest challenges? This is a difficult question. I think we have many but of course I mean the the implementation getting from plans to implementation to to really get the financing right is is really a systemic challenge. The short-termism yes it's a it's a danger so also to finding quick solutions like I have to say the air conditioning as a quick fix technical fix is not going to solve the bigger issues. And of course as many of you pointed out the mitigation measures have to be seriously going on at the same time.
So although I didn't mention that I of course it it is given that we have to be doing our utmost to avoid the the most disastrous scenarios. So indeed I mean I will leave some of the questions to to my colleague. Direct questions maybe maybe I'm not picking picking all of them now but we I mean there was a towards the end Cesar Luena you asked whether we are working with the Commission. Yes we are I mean trying to support with our data and knowledge their incoming policy package to the extent that we can. And yes if of course the MFF negotiations we have no no stake there in the in the on the table where these negotiations are ongoing but of course this is really really important what is happening overall and also to the nature financing which was mentioned mentioned by some of you.
Really this is about really complex issues and sometimes really so complex that it is challenging to describe them in a in a coherent manner. Already the EUCRA 1 was looking at indeed 36 different risks climate risks which are very often interlinked and compounding and now we are even expanding the scope. And this is of course yes we need also partnering with the several other institutions and and sectors and data providers in order to to bring you then the best possible evidence base for the for the measures in the future. I'm looking at my colleagues whether I should especially address some of the other questions noting that I still do have time. We are also indeed I mean looking at the social groups differences between the between the different social groups.
The work on the with the we have done with the Eurofound although being only a survey I think is is the direction that we also need to need to look. We already from the from the first EUCRA we have pointed to the vulnerabilities which can be regional I mean indeed age groups or specifically I mean people with illnesses or other other let's say also handicaps etc.
So this is this is really crucial. But of course this is also what was pointed out then by by Gerbrandy, I mean that there may be sectors that are really really in difficulties in some regions or even countries. Tourism is evidently one of them. Agriculture in the southern Europe is already struggling immensely, I mean with the water scarcity but also the extreme heat. And indeed, as some of you pointed, it's also really a labor protection issue.
So the workers that need to are in exposed to extreme heat, of course need to be need to be really targeted. So just that all sectors, all economic sectors, businesses, they will be affected. And if they have not already woken up, I hope they will soon because indeed typically also their investment cycles need to take seriously into account what kind of climate we have when their investments are are really up and coming. We as said are also focusing a lot overall in the in the EUCRA 2 on solutions. So really trying to build on the already existing evidence, trying to also see the the what is blocking from then applying these solutions where we have seen that are working at least in some some places.
And and then trying to to provide the best possible means to spread that information and knowledge. And very often indeed it is local and regional actors who need to take action, or the sectors themselves, or like in the case of the heated household, the households they have to also be prepared. So really this risk ownership, which was also a topic in the EUCRA 1, is really a complex issue as well, but it is not that EU is taking over. I think there is really room for for ownership and and empowerment at all levels and in all sectors. So basically everybody is needed to to prepare for this new new climate.
It is also indeed, I mean already well noted that this is linked to the security, to the resilience of our societies, so these broader issues, which is really important that we link between the different also policy sectors. Now, I I have finished my time, so I hope I answered at least some of questions.
Suraje Dessai
Yep. Thanks Chair. Thanks for the for the many thoughtful questions. I'm going to try to address some of them through some of the overarching points. So first on on nature-based solutions, protecting and and restoring ecosystems is amongst the most cost-effective adaptation measures available.
Healthy forests, soils, wetlands, rivers and urban green spaces can reduce flood risk, alleviate heat stress, improve water retention and support biodiversity at the same time. However, there isn't a single solution that works everywhere. So context is going to be very important across the the EU. So adaptation really needs to be tailored to local circumstances, which is why we emphasize risk assessments and place-based approaches. Second topic of questions was around governance and and flexibility.
So our recommendations don't seek to replace Member State responsibility for adaptation. It's it's clear that climate risk is very different across Europe and so adaptation measures do need to reflect national and regional contexts. But we are what we are recommending is a more coherent framework for assessing risks, sharing information, and coordinating action because many climate risks, droughts, floods, energy disruptions, don't stop at national borders. And I think this is quite important. So many of these risks are transboundary and this is why, you know, the EU has a particularly important role in managing transboundary risks.
You can think about water resources that your countries share. You can think about electricity transmission that your, you know, Member States share and so on and so forth, nature. The list goes on and on there. There was an interesting question about that I'd like to emphasize, you know, what risks are we undervaluing actually? And I think both UCRA and and our own report talk quite a bit about, for example, cascading risks, right, compounding risks, and you can even think about systemic risks as well.
And I think this is our governance systems are not very well adapted to to dealing with these things because we have our, you know, ministries of transport and ministries of energy and water. And, you know, when a an extreme weather event happens, it very often compounds and and affects. And we've we've got lots of lessons in history. So yeah, just to go, you know, I think that's maybe one where we really need to think how do we govern that and also how do we govern risks that are coming from outside the EU, right? We import a lot of risks through supply chains, you know, food and and many other areas as well.
So that's really important. There was some questions around, you know, uncertainty and science. So I mean uncertainty should not be a reason for inaction. Climate projections will continue to evolve, but the direction of change is is already quite clear. So science can really help identify robust measures and try to make sense of this, you know, what are the possible futures that actually helps avoid maladaptation.
So that's another really important area. The fourth one that I want to mention was around investment and financing. There were also some questions there. Adaptation really should not be seen as a burden on growth. I mean there's increasing evidence that shows that the cost of inaction, and some of you mentioned it already, are often far higher than the cost of preparedness.
So public investment remains really essential here, particularly to protect the most vulnerable groups and ensure fairness while private financing also has an important role to play where appropriate. Fifth, on on difficult choices. So some activities, so a colleague was talking about some of the limits, right? And I think there's clearly going to be limits to how much we can adapt in in tourism, in in agriculture. And so one key message I think that our report has is, you know, mitigation is absolutely critical, right?
I mean we really need to rapidly decarbonize society so we can limit global warming to, you know, as as little as possible. But even within that, there will be limits, no doubt. And so we are going to have to adaptation planning is therefore really important to to figure out how do we support those industries and sectors in in trying to anticipate those challenges and also seek alternative opportunities as well. There there will be some opportunities associated with a with a changing climate. And then finally several speakers also asked about the social impacts on health, workers, cities, rural areas, data centers, and vulnerable groups.
So one of the key messages from our report is that adaptation is not only an environmental issue, but also an economic, social, health, and security issue. So successful adaptation requires integrating these three dimensions into decision-making, ensuring that no regional or social group is left behind. So overall, our recommendations are guided by simple principle that adaptation needs to become more anticipatory, more coordinated, and more integrated into public and private decision-making across Europe. Thank you.
Pierfrancesco Maran
Thank you. Now the floor go to the Commission. We have Elina Bardram, Director from the Climate Resilience and Information Management.
Elina Bardram
Thank you, Mr. Chair, honorable members. It's a pleasure to be here to share with you some reflections regarding the integrated framework for climate resilience and risk management, which is currently under preparation by the Commission. I'd like to take the opportunity to thank our important partners, both the Scientific Advisory Board and the EEA for all their work. It's absolutely fundamental that our work in the Commission is based on the latest science that's independent and makes our policies defendable and robust at face of the challenge that we see. Already the first EUCRA, the first risk assessment that came forward in 2024, revealed that our policies in the Union are not keeping pace with the accelerating climate change.
This is a fundamental problem to the Union because we cannot conduct our policies as if we were in the 1990s. We really need to be able to anticipate and project our policies to the physical realities in which they need to deliver the impact that's desired. It is quite inevitable and scientists already converge on it that 1.5 degrees will be surpassed more permanently in the coming years at the global level. For the EU, that translates to twice as high temperatures as we are heating twice the average global speed. Climate-related damages are already amounting to some 40 to 50 billion per annum at EU level, and this is a serious macro-fiscal challenge because it is often the governments that are the insurers of the final resort when the climate protection gap for the assets exposed remains at the level of some 75% at EU level.
Our framework will be proposed in the fourth quarter of 2026. It will be a lean and impact-oriented intended to support Member States fully aligning with the subsidiarity principle. The central values, central principles will be that of climate resilience by design, which means embedding climate resilience in all EU policies and investments, from agriculture to transport to tourism to defense industry, because it is the efficiency of these policies that can be compromised unless they are calibrated according to the physical climate reality. A common EU reference warming trajectory, as also recommended by the Scientific Advisory Board, will be encompassed in our framework. In the open public consultation, we had some 70% of the respondents supporting such trajectory, and in the discussions at ministerial level, we have had a significant support for having a common baseline for planning at the Union level.
Obviously, this will have to be contextualized according to the Member State specific circumstances for it to become practicable and operational.
We also want to be clear in assigning risk ownership across the exposed sectors. Climate risk management can no longer be a responsibility for environment ministries. It has to be genuinely embedded into the sector policies in order to prepare more resilient approaches. The risk ownership assignment also enjoys some 70% of support from the open public consultation respondents. In addition to providing the framework of legal and non-legal elements, we want to avail open access digital climate tools, putting data in the hands of mayors, farmers, industry, and the public authorities so that they are better empowered and equipped to take the decisions regarding the acceptable level of residual risk, which will inevitably still remain.
We want to have EU-level cooperation strengthened so that it will be beneficial to all, bringing about efficiencies of scale rather than creating a red tape. I'd like to use the last 20 seconds to just reflect on climate resilience services and technologies as an area for new opportunity for competitiveness. This market is estimated to be some 4 trillion euros worth by 2050. It's a significant opportunity for EU industry that has some of the most advanced sensor tools in terms of metallic sheets for coastal protection, some very advanced precision farming, and coastal water management and flood management that is unprecedented at a global level. This market should be exploited and made into a EU strength.
We need to ensure that our companies don't just survive climate change, but are also in a position to compete in the increasing resilience markets. I will stop here, and I thank the honorable members and you, Mr. Chair. Thank you.
Pierfrancesco Maran
Thank you so much, and now we make a quick break before starting with the next item. Thank you.
Speaker 65
We have also stepped up work on wildfire risk management and a broader climate resilience. Our preparedness union strategy is a cornerstone of our work. It is making Europe safer. One year after its adoption, it is already helping us respond to faster and more complex risks, from cyberattacks and sabotage to pandemics, disinformation, supply chain disruption and extreme weather. And we are working closely with Member States, the private sector and civil society to turn this strategy into action.
The three areas of progress stand out. First, preparedness by design. We have embedded it into EU policy making and funding, including the current budget allowing Member States to direct cohesion funds to civil preparedness, dual-use and defense-related projects. And in the next MFF, we are proposing even a stronger investment. But this only works if preparedness is backed politically and funded properly.
Second, strategic stockpiling. Through the EU stockpiling strategy, we are building coordinated reserves of critical supplies. This will strengthen our strategic autonomy in times of crisis. Reinforcing rescEU and expanding its capacity will also require adequate funding in the next European budget. And third, turning risk awareness into operational readiness.
We are developing a comprehensive risk and threat assessment, the first to bring climate, security, health and technology risks into a coherent picture. We will present it later this year. And we are developing EU minimum preparedness requirements, concrete prioritized targets that strengthen civil-military cooperation and protect critical infrastructure. Member States will play a central role in shaping them while ensuring coherence with NATO and existing EU framework. Honorable members, preparedness is not only about institutions.
It's about people. We are raising awareness and strengthening citizens' ability to respond to crisis, promoting a minimum of 72 hours of self-sufficiency, integrated preparedness into education, supporting youth engagement through the European Solidarity Corps. Our citizens' panel make sure that citizens' voices contribute to our efforts. And in June, we will launch the first EU-supported exchange for young firefighters. We are also deepening cooperation with the private sector because resilience cannot be built by government alone.
Our task force on preparedness will strengthen this cooperation. Negotiations continue with both the Council and the Parliament on the proposal for a regulation on the Union Civil Protection Mechanism and Union support for health emergency preparedness and response. This proposal introduces a stronger health emergency dimension, improved cross-sectoral crisis coordination through ERCC 2.0, an augmented center of emergency response or a coordination hub, call it wherever you want, reinforced civil-military cooperation and stronger response capacity.
We have proposed a budget of 10.7 billion euros with the flexibility to act fast when crisis strike. Two elements are key: better coordination across sectors so we can spot risks earlier, prepare better and respond faster through a dedicated crisis coordination hub or ERCC adapted to today's threats. And closer cooperation with the military also, whose expertise and capabilities can make a real difference when crisis hits. I'm confident that we can reach an agreement soon and I count for that on your support. Now let me turn very briefly on earth.
Climate change is not only an environmental challenge, it is a public health challenge. Europe is the fastest warming continent. We are already seeing the consequences: heatwaves, floods and the growing spread of disease. Last year we saw record numbers of mosquito-borne infections. Through our medical countermeasures strategy we are strengthening our ability to detect, prevent and respond: better control of vector-borne diseases, more investment in antimicrobial resistance and new treatments for diseases like dengue.
This is our one health approach: human, animal and environmental health are inseparable and our preparedness strategy treats them that way. Adequate and flexible funding is essential to make these initiatives a reality. Your support and especially in the next long-term EU budget will be crucial. Let me also say a word about climate resilience. Europe is not yet ready for the climate risks ahead.
Even under the most optimistic scenarios, those risks will grow. Our infrastructure, our economy and our communities remain exposed. That is why the Commission will present a new European climate resilience framework later this year to embed resilience across EU policies, improve risk awareness and support smarter planning. Our water resilience strategy adopted last year sets out over 50 concrete actions and we are already putting it into action. And finally, a word about wildfires.
Yesterday, together with Commissioner Roswall, I presented the wildfire communication to this committee. The communication puts forward a comprehensive approach to tackling wildfires, from stronger governance and better land management to research and preparedness at all levels. And earlier this month we adopted a proposal for a Council recommendation to maintain the political momentum and support Member States across the full disaster risk cycle. The outlook for this summer is really concerning. Forecasts show above average temperatures across much of Europe.
Our civil protection mechanism has already been activated twice this year, earlier than ever before. And we are ready. We have prepositioned 770 firefighters in high-risk region, deployed a rescue aircraft fleet and reinforced real-time monitoring through the Emergency Response Coordination Centre. Honorable members, we are stepping up to meet today's more complex challenges. Preparedness is no longer a niche issue, it is strategic necessity for our security, our prosperity and the safety of our citizens.
We have made real progress, but we must do more together: European institutions, Member States, private sector and our citizens. We cannot prevent every crisis, but we can see risks coming, prepare together, reduce their impact and recover faster. That is Europe we are building together. Thank you.
Pierfrancesco Maran
Thank you, Commissioner.
So we leave now the floor to the political group representative. I don't see any request from EPP, so we go to S&D, Vigenin.
Kristian Vigenin
Thank you, Chair. Thank you, Commissioner, for being with us. Honestly, I don't understand the empty room today, but okay, at least we are here and we'll discuss the important things. Thank you for your presentation and you touched upon some of the topics that I was planning to raise, but still I'd like to make some comments regarding the fact that Europe is no longer facing isolated climate disasters. You mentioned that we talk about floods, wildfires, storms are becoming a structural reality.
And the recent years have shown that extreme weather events increasingly overwhelm national response capacities and create major economic, environmental and public health consequences. So in your preparedness union strategy, rightly was recognized that preparedness must become a core component of EU policy-making, moving from a reactive to a preventive approach. One current issue, we see scientific forecasts that indicate the possible return of a strong El Niño cycle this year, which could further intensify global temperature records and increase the likelihood of extreme weather patterns affecting Europe. Against this backdrop, preparedness cannot remain a secondary expenditure item. The next multiannual financial framework should ensure that climate adaptation, disaster resilience and civil protection are treated as strategic investments in Europe's security and competitiveness.
So, taking into account that the preparedness union strategy speaks about the preparedness by design approach across EU policies, how do you intend to ensure that the next MFF systematically integrates flood resilience and disaster preparedness across cohesion, agriculture, infrastructure and regional development funding? I know it's a very general question, but still we discuss these issues right now in different committees. And my second question: will the Commission propose measurable preparedness benchmarks for Member States linked to EU funding to ensure that investments translate into real resilience on the ground? Thank you.
Judit Varga
Thank you. And thank you, Commissioner, for your time. I really welcome the Commission's proposal to fund crisis response and health emergency preparedness and response. At the same time, I know we have different opinion regarding specific allocations of of this fund. And as the European Commission's dedicated service for health preparedness, it is essential that UCPM provides adequate funding to enable DG HERA to remain sufficient resourced, sufficiently resourced and play an active and adaptive role in responsive to any health threats which the EU might face.
As the recent outbreaks of Hantavirus and Ebola have shown, HERA needs to be agile enough to adapt at moment's notice.
Commissioner, how can the European Commission ensure that negotiations on the UCPM ensure sufficient funding for HERA and preparedness and response more generally, I mean especially health field? What actions does the European Commission foresee in ensuring that HERA remains ready to respond to a constantly evolving threat landscape and how will it ensure that these actions are adequately funded under the next MFF? Thank you very much.
Tilly Metz
Thank you very much, dear chair, and thank you Commissioner. Let me start by saying that I really welcome your work on strengthening Europe's preparedness and crisis response. The reality we are facing in Europe today is that climate-driven disasters are no longer exceptional events, they are becoming the new normal. The recent heatwave we all experienced across large parts of our continent is only the latest reminder of this shift. So, in that context, the Union Civil Protection Mechanism is one of the most concrete expressions of European solidarity.
It is also one of the clearest examples of added value at EU level. No Member State can respond alone to the scale and frequency of extreme weather events that we are now experiencing. So, we very much support the direction of travel towards reinforcing and upgrading this instrument. But we also need to be honest, the pressure on the system is increasing faster than our capacity is currently evolving. What used to be extraordinary activation is now becoming recurrent deployment.
This raises then the questions not only about coordination, but about strategic capacity, preparedness and whether our current tools are sufficient to respond to future crises. Every degree of warming we avoid, every ecosystem we restore, every prevention measure we invest in directly reduces the burden on civil protection systems. So, my question is the following: as you look at the future of the Union Civil Protection Mechanism, where do you see the balance between reinforcing rapid response capacity on the one hand and investing more strongly at the EU level in prevention and climate-resilient preparedness on the other? And how can the Parliament also best support you in making that shift operational, not only just strategic on paper? Thank you.
Catarina Martins
Obrigada, senhor presidente. Obrigada, senhora comissária, vou falar em português. Quando os fogos chegam, as populações ainda não recuperaram das tempestades do inverno. Eu não deixo de registar que mesmo assim a direita não achou importante estar neste debate. A preparação da União Europeia, sabemos, não pode ser para tempestades que acontecem de 50 em 50 anos.
Esse mundo já não existe e é a própria comissária que tem vindo a pedir a prontidão das populações para um mundo em que os fenómenos climáticos extremos são cada vez mais comuns. O que eu registo é que pede essa preparação à população, mas as instituições não estão preparadas. Nós não temos investimento relevante na proteção civil, não temos um investimento novo relevante para assegurar cadeias de abastecimento, não temos capacidade nova de investimento nas infraestruturas críticas.
E, portanto, dá a ideia de que as instituições europeias estão a pedir à população aquilo que não é capaz de fazer quando olhamos para o seu orçamento. Em Portugal, a tempestade Kristen deixou quase um milhão de pessoas sem eletricidade e comunicações. Quatro meses depois, a rede ainda não foi totalmente reposta. Para uma família em pobreza energética, ficar sem luz durante meses é risco de vida e estas pessoas não têm dinheiro para arranjar um gerador. Além disso, com a sucessão de tempestades, foram destruídas as colheitas e travado o abastecimento, fazendo disparar o preço dos alimentos.
Nenhuma crise, como sabe, é socialmente neutra e quem já estava mais vulnerável sofre mais. Sendo a senhora comissária responsável pela gestão de crises e pela igualdade também, queria perguntar-lhe se não acha que no âmbito da nova estratégia de armazenamento da União Europeia não é suficiente pensar em medicamentos e temos também de começar a ter verdadeiras reservas de emergência de bens alimentares para acolher às populações isoladas. E sobre as infraestruturas básicas, se não acha que é tempo de os fundos europeus financiarem diretamente painéis solares e sistemas de energia autónomos para populações vulneráveis, unidades de saúde e outros equipamentos críticos. E, senhora comissária, não diga que há aqui um problema de recursos na União Europeia ou nos Estados-Membros, porque bem sei que se optou por aumentar os gastos onde o orçamento já era milionário, na defesa, enquanto a proteção civil continua bastante sufocada. Obrigada.
Pierfrancesco Maran
Okay, now we go to the catch-the-eye. I will keep together the two parts. We start with Heléne Fritzon, S&D.
Heléne Fritzon
Thank you so much and welcome to Commissioner Lenarčič and thanks for your introduction. I will continue in Swedish. Och jag vill ta upp frågan om det pågående ebolautbrottet, för vi vet att virus känner inga gränser. Och vi vet också att vi inte kan förlita oss på att varje medlemsstat agerar med olika riktlinjer, kampanjer eller åtgärder. Och vi har alla i minne hur samordning saknades i inledningen av covidpandemin och vi får inte göra om dessa misstag.
Jag oroas över att det råder osäkerhet kring medlemsstaternas kapacitet att snabbt identifiera, testa och hantera misstänkta fall. Och detta samtidigt som vi vet att det saknas vaccin för den senaste varianten av ebola. Det är positivt att ECDC redan bidrar med riskbedömningar och expertstöd, men det räcker inte. Europas medborgare förväntar sig att EU är förberett innan detta virus eller en annan kris når våra gränser. Och det räcker inte att agera först när krisen är ett faktum.
Vi vet nu att EU:s hälsoministrar träffas på fredag och min fråga till vår kommissionär och till kommissionen är: när ska kommissionen presentera en konkret, tydlig och samordnad kris- och beredskapsplan för ett eventuellt ebolautbrott också inom EU? Och hur ska ni säkerställa att samtliga medlemsstater har testkapacitet och rätt åtgärder om det värsta skulle hända? Tack.
Pär Holmgren
Thank you, Chair, and thank you, Commissioner, for being with us today. And actually, when I looked up your portfolio, I found the phrase "strengthening the international cooperation dimension of civil protection and disaster risk management and boosting efforts on humanitarian diplomacy on the global stage." And my question is very much related to what Bas Eickhout already pointed out, that we are seeing more extreme weather events all over the globe. And right now, the World Meteorological Organization is not yet sure whether we will see a so-called super El Niño building up in the Pacific Ocean. Right now, the stakes are at about 50-50, and we will know more in, let's say, four weeks' time.
But if this event is going to happen, then we can expect a lot of extreme weather, especially on the southern half of the globe, leading to famines, leading to land loss, leading to people becoming homeless, and maybe also leading to more migration. I have serious doubts whether the so-called centers in third countries to bring people back to their homes is the right answer to this kind of challenge. But that's not in your portfolio. But what is in your portfolio: how are you exchanging with your counterparts in the Global South? What is the role of the EU, or could be the role of the EU, in this upcoming event, which will of course affect a lot of people?
Thank you.
Pierfrancesco Maran
Thank you. The last speaker is Lynn Boylan. I don't have any further requests. Okay, please.
Lynn Boylan
Thank you, Chair, and thank you, Commissioner, for being with us today. I'd like to just ask a question about the Union Civil Protection Mechanism, specifically about Britain's potential association with that mechanism. Despite Brexit, Britain and the North of Ireland could have remained covered under the mechanism like the other non-EU participating states. However, the British government decided in their wisdom not to, with potentially severe consequences for Ireland. And as it stands, the North of Ireland cannot receive the support of the Union Civil Protection Mechanism in times of natural disasters.
And we know that Ireland benefited from the UCPM after Storm Ophelia last year, but the expertise of our European partners was unavailable to the six counties. So, Commissioner, could you perhaps provide us with an update on talks with the British government about them potentially rejoining the UCPM?
Speaker 65
Thank you, first of all, very much for all your very interesting questions that allow me to go deeper. When it comes to how can we be sure that Member States are investing in preparedness and prepare for all kind of hazards, I would say that we are working closely with Member States to strengthen disaster prevention and preparedness using instruments very different like Cohesion Funds to support national efforts and UCPM funding for specific gaps also in their civil protection. And we are also with the Civil EU Protection Mechanism coordinates best practices, training, enabling seamless collaboration between national teams in emergencies.
Today we just launched the wildfire seasons and I announced that we will have around 800 firefighters prepositioned in six countries. To give you something to compare with, in 2022 we had only 200 firefighters prepositioned in one country, it was Greece only, so it seems that we are adapting and adapting our response. And we have also established a EU Earth observation governmental services which will notably provide secure, reliable, timely, persistent and targeted satellite sensing, reinforcing existing and planned capacities and building on the long experience of using also Copernicus system satellite in support of emergency management and security. And you know that Commissioner Kyriakides is in the lead. And the upcoming European integrated framework for climate resilience will also support our effort to strengthen prevention and prevention vis-à-vis climate and environmental risk.
And we have an all-hazard approach following the strategy that we presented last year. And so we are not going to undermine health emergencies, that's why we presented a UCPM-HERA because it's important to have everything, any kind of hazard on mind. And also I would like to underline the fact that Member States can dedicate 1.5% of their GDP on the 5% target, NATO target. So it means that 1.5 GDP resources can be dedicated to their own preparedness and civil protection. So we need of course this flexibility, that's why we proposed a UCPM-HERA because we don't want to separate the thing.
We need to be agile and to react faster without, you know, dedicated and not flexible funding. Yes, Honorable Tillemet, the system is really extremely under pressure and that's why we are constantly adapting our capacities. We are waiting for 12 Canadairs, amphibian airplanes that will be ready in 2028. It's a long term, I know, but we already received one helicopter, for instance, in Romania. And so, and we have also our European pool capacities.
I just went to Luxembourg encouraging them to put their own flights in the pool, the European pool. And yes, it's a lot of money to invest in preparedness. It goes with a strategy, but also we need a budget to implement this strategy. But the World Bank shows that every euro expended in prevention, preparedness is 10 euros that we can save. And it saves lives.
It's taxpayer money, but it's also about saving lives, which is very important. So I think that it's important also to have in mind that we need to do both things. When it comes to your specific question, I think that prevention and response must go hand in hand. And I presented a new communication promoting an integrated approach yesterday with Commissioner Wojciechowski on wildfire risk management.
And this approach combines environmental protection, forest management, and preparedness response. So later this year, the Commission will present a new framework for climate resilience to exactly strengthen our capacity to adapt and prevent climate risks through a cross-sectoral approach. It's our adaptation plan to climate change that will be presented by Commissioner Hoekstra later this year. Yeah, when it comes to the question of the risks, we are preparing a risks and threats assessment that will be ready soon following what happened in the Middle East with yes, all kind of yes, risks on our supply chain, be it energy, but also fertilizers and so on. So we will deliver what we call this CORTHAL.
It's a risks and threats assessment and it will go with minimum requirements that we will communicate with the to the Member States. And that's why also the first deliverable of our preparedness strategy was a stockpiling strategy. And later, not later than yesterday, I think on the 28th, we had and we will have another meeting to to exchange the best practices with Member States and experts to know what need to be stockpiled. And it goes with a strategy that include also the private sector. So they are the first at in the supply chain.
And and that's why we want to integrate them. And in some countries, in the Nordic countries, the Baltic countries like Sweden, Denmark, they already have a strategy that include the the private sector. So we need to develop these capacities everywhere in Europe. And it will reinforce our resilience. And of course, in every Member State, we have to remind that every Member States are the first responder.
The European Union is acting as an umbrella. We can provide a lot of advice, strategies, support, but only if there is the political will behind and only when it comes to the preparedness strategy and the UCPM if they are they activate the the mechanism. When it comes to the Ebola, Ebola outbreak, you know, it is thanks to our financed and our support to Africa CDC that they had the capacity to detect at a very early stage the the strain. This new, it's not new by the way, the Bundibugyo Ebola virus already occurred three times in the region. And the first time it was in 2007 in Bundibugyo.
And that's why it has this name.
And so it means that we are active with our partners. We are working in close cooperation with Africa CDC. We reinforced our cooperation with 6 million to to launch um uh to be sure that we will have a vaccine soon. And uh we work with CEPI, the the coordination uh I don't know exactly what is this acronym, but it is coalition uh to be sure that we have the good vaccines available uh everywhere in the world. And with WHO as well.
And the good news is that uh thanks to this good cooperation, we were able also to uh to transport more than 100 tons of humanitarian supplies, medical countermeasures, tents, equipment, first aid with UNICEF. That this uh support is already in pla- in place. And we also uh allocate uh in emergency uh 15 million euros on humanitarian aid. And when it comes to the plan for Europe, it is thanks to our support that we were able to to test and to uh I mean detect this strain of Ebola. So I'm quite confident that if it comes to Europe, we will have this capacity.
And the good news is that six patients recovered from Ebola Budibugyo. It means that you know, yes, we can recover from this uh disease or this virus because if you have the good medicines that allow us to reduce the temperature because it's mainly fever with uh yeah um hemorrhagic fever. If you can stop the fever, if you can avoid hemorrhage, you can also provide uh I mean uh water and so on to the patient, then he can recover because the mortality rate is around 30% to 50%. But if it's detect at a very early stage and you provide the basic medicines to the patients, the chance the the are even uh are more. And uh yeah, when it comes to the climate change and the natural extreme weather, I totally agree with you that it is worrisome to know that we might face uh yes uh a period of extreme weather in the near future.
We have to prepare for that. That's why we presented uh this strategy. That's why we are preparing also uh new stockpiling, risk and threat assessment. And the good news is also that the UCPM is can be activated worldwide. So no matter uh where it happened.
You know, I was uh in Colombia. We have administrative agreement with Latin American countries, with India for instance. We just signed uh a couple of months ago an administrative agreement. It means exchange of best practices, support with really remote areas. And last year I was also in uh following the Melissa hurricane.
I was in the Caribbean region where we supported them with Copernicus satellite and uh an early warning systems and so on that allow us to save lives.
And finally, why if we are negotiating with the UK for the reintegration on the UCPM, talks are on, we are talking on administrative agreement for the moment, but the UK can activate the mechanism of course, because if the Caribbean countries, you can imagine that the UK can do so, but we are negotiating, the talks are ongoing for an administrative agreement with them.
Pierfrancesco Maran
So thank you, Commissioner. Now we will close our meeting. The next one will take place...
Yes, maybe I may conclude.
Speaker 65
Sorry, so if there is no more question, I would like just to thank you for sharing your insights, your questions, your proposals. And we all agree, I think, that it is urgent to face this new reality: fires burning earlier, floods hitting harder and threats multiplying faster. So our institutions must do more than talk together, we must really act together. A family preparing an emergency kit, a firefighter prepositioned ahead of a wildfire season like it's happening right now, and a doctor tracking a new outbreak, so they are all counting on us to get this right. And that is the standard we must meet.
And I leave this house today with one clear commitment: to keep strengthening our preparedness and our resilience and to build the widest possible consensus in doing so. We may not always agree maybe on how, but we are united on why. And the issues at the heart of this committee's work and of my portfolio go to the core of what Europe stands for: the well-being of our citizens and the protection of what we share. We carry, I think, an important responsibility that goes far beyond the present. We owe it to our children, our grandchildren, for a Europe that is safe, united and built to last.
Together, I think we will live up to that. Thank you very much.
Pierfrancesco Maran
Thank you, Commissioner. The next meeting of the ENVI Committee will take place in Strasbourg the 15th of June, but tomorrow morning at 9:00 we will have a joint committee with TRAN. See you tomorrow.
Speaker 75
Good morning, everyone. I'd like to welcome you to this meeting of the Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety. I'd like to start by reminding you that the meeting is being webstreamed and that the ENVI committee's profile on the European Parliament's website contains all the relevant documents. I'd also like to remind you that the meeting is being held in a hybrid format, with some members participating in person and others remotely. We have a very full agenda today, so I'd like to get started right away.
The first item on our agenda is the adoption of the agenda. Are there any comments or objections to the agenda as it has been circulated? I see no objections, so the agenda is adopted. The next item is the approval of the minutes of our previous meetings. The minutes of the meetings of the 13th and 14th of January 2022 have been circulated.
Are there any comments or corrections to these minutes? I see no comments, so the minutes are approved. I'd now like to move on to the Chair's announcements. I have a few announcements to make. First, I'd like to inform you that the next meeting of the ENVI committee will take place on the 10th of February 2022.
Second, I'd like to remind you that the deadline for submitting amendments to the draft report on the revision of the EU Emissions Trading System is the 15th of February 2022.
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