Committee on Fisheries Ordinary meeting
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PECH European Parliament
Ihren Sitzungen folgenVale, gracias.
Carmen Crespo Díaz
De todas formas ya hablaremos con los coordinadores, notificaremos y si hubiera algún problema adicional más complejo, pues nos lo hacen saber. Y si les parece pasamos a la votación. Tienen ustedes las tarjetas preparadas y pasamos a la votación de la modificación del reglamento de la Unión Europea 2023/2124 sobre determinadas disposiciones aplicables a la pesca en la zona del acuerdo de la Comisión General de Pesca del Mediterráneo. La ponente, como saben, es la señora Zoffko del Partido Popular Europeo para este procedimiento legislativo. Y por tanto vamos a proceder a la votación que se va a realizar con roll call vote.
Así que comenzamos, si les parece, abrimos la votación. Cerramos la votación.
No, no, no. Cerramos la votación. No. Podemos volver a la votación de nuevo sin ningún problema, señora Lepin. ¿Tiene usted problema con...?
¿Ya? ¿No? Comenzamos ahora de nuevo sí la votación. Vamos a abrir la votación, como saben estamos votando el reglamento sobre las determinadas disposiciones aplicables a la pesca en la zona de la Comisión General de Pesca del Mediterráneo con la ponente la señora Zofko y comenzamos y abrimos la votación. Ahora sí.
Cerramos la votación ya si se puede. Es aprobado por 23 votos a favor, tres en contra y una abstención. Así que enhorabuena a la señora Zofko y a todo el equipo de Shadows. Pasamos a la siguiente votación que es el reglamento delegado de la Comisión por la que se modifica el reglamento de la Unión Europea 2019/1241 en lo que respecta al establecimiento de las medidas para garantizar el cumplimiento de las medidas de mitigación existentes para reducir las capturas accidentales de la población residente de la marsopa común del Báltico en el mar Báltico. Por tanto comenzamos la votación también electrónica que la vamos a abrir a continuación.
Se comienza la votación. Se cierra la votación. Es rechazada por 13 votos en contra, 13 a favor y una abstención. Pues muchas gracias a todos por las votaciones y si están preparados comenzamos a continuación con la audiencia pública. Señora Zofko usted quería comentar algo al respecto.
Es verdad que por favor que guarden silencio un momentito en la sala. Puede usted comenzar. Guarden silencio por favor y seguimos nuestro comité que tenemos mucho trabajo en el día de hoy y le damos la palabra a la señora Zofko a continuación. Así que por favor guarden silencio. Señora Zofko.
Željana Zovko
Right, thank you Chair. No, I just wanted to, I just wanted to thank because I didn't want to interrupt the vote. I just wanted for this very long time that we invested in negotiating GFCM file, I wanted to thank shadow rapporteurs for their constructive cooperation, excellent joint work throughout this file. This provisional agreement resulting from the inter-institutional negotiations is a balanced compromise ensuring that Union fulfills its international obligation while safeguarding the level playing field for its fleet. The transposition of GFCM recommendations into Union law must ensure that Union operators are not placed at a disadvantage compared to operators from other GFCM contracting parties.
At the same time, EU operators should not be burdened beyond obligations agreed internationally within GFCM framework. From our Parliament position, preserving this balance and ensuring fair competition were key priorities throughout the negotiations. And I thank you once again to colleagues for constructive cooperation and I hope that we will be able to support this compromise in a plenary session as well. Thank you very much.
Carmen Crespo Díaz
Pues muchísimas gracias también a usted y enhorabuena a usted y a todos los Shadows. Creo que es un gran trabajo.
Muchas gracias. Y con ese trabajo y esa alocución, como saben, pasamos a la audiencia pública sobre la lucha contra los delitos relacionados con la pesca y la protección de los pescadores y la pesca de la Unión Europea frente a dichos delitos. Y por tanto, permítanme darle la bienvenida a nuestros cinco oradores. Cada orador tendrá la palabra por ocho minutos, una sesión de preguntas y respuestas que seguirá a las presentaciones. Los cinco oradores ya están aquí y la señora Ian o el señor Ian Urbina está a través de online, pero vamos a comenzar con unas palabras introductorias de la coordinadora del Partido Popular Europeo, que es la señora Le Calennec, que a continuación tiene la palabra por ocho minutos también.
Así que a continuación, señora Le Calennec, puede usted comenzar.
Isabelle Le Callennec
Oui merci Madame la Présidente, merci de votre présence. La pêche illicite, non déclarée et non réglementée reste une menace majeure à la fois environnementale, économique et sécuritaire. Nous savons qu'elle fragilise les écosystèmes marins, elle fausse la concurrence et elle peut être liée à des formes de criminalité organisée. Nous ne sommes pas face à un phénomène marginal. Au niveau mondial, jusqu'à un tiers des captures pourraient être concernées et dans l'Union cela représente environ 500 000 tonnes importées pour plus de 1 milliard d'euros.
L'Union européenne s'est dotée d'un cadre, en particulier le règlement INN de 2008 qui est fondé sur le contrôle de l'accès à notre marché via la certification des captures et le système de cartons, carton rouge, carton jaune. Ce système a permis plusieurs avancées : l'amélioration de la traçabilité, la pression sur les pays tiers, des réformes concrètes dans plusieurs États membres, mais ce dispositif reste insuffisant. La Cour des comptes a conclu à une efficacité seulement partielle du système européen. Les difficultés sont manifestes : les pavillons de complaisance, le reflagging ou encore les contrôles insuffisants de certains États du pavillon qui continuent d'alimenter la pêche INN. L'hétérogénéité des contrôles entre États membres crée des failles qui sont exploitables évidemment dans le marché intérieur.
Le système est encore largement basé sur le papier qui est source de fraude et d'inefficacité malgré l'existence d'outils numériques qui peinent à être généralisés. Enfin les sanctions, pour nous, restent trop disparates et si peu dissuasives, ce qui compromet l'égalité des conditions de concurrence et qui choque à raison les pêcheurs européens.
Dans ce contexte, quelques exemples, la situation en Méditerranée est particulièrement préoccupante. Dans un courrier à l'initiative de mon collègue Fredis Beléris de décembre dernier, nous avons alerté la Commission sur des activités répétées de pêche INN par des flottes de pays tiers, notamment la Turquie, la Tunisie et le Maroc, y compris dans les eaux de l'Union avec des conséquences directes pour nos pêcheurs et pour la sécurité maritime. Ces pratiques entraînent une dégradation des stocks, une concurrence déloyale et des tensions croissantes en mer. La France est elle concernée dans ses outremers. En Guyane, par exemple, on estime que la pêche illégale pratiquée par des ressortissants de pays tiers représente jusqu'à quatre fois la pêche légale.
À travers un rapport sur la pêche INN adopté ici même en 2022, le Parlement européen a mis en lumière les défis posés par certaines flottes, notamment chinoises, au large de l'Afrique ou dans l'océan Indien. L'effort de pêche chinois a augmenté jusqu'à plus de 85 % malgré la baisse des stocks. Alors j'aurais deux questions en avance de phase pour nos nos panélistes. Au-delà des constats, quelles solutions préconisez-vous pour préserver la ressource et la pêche européenne qui est soumise à cette concurrence parfaitement déloyale ? Et comment faire en sorte que les produits de la pêche illégale, parfois fondés sur du travail forcé, ne rentrent plus sur notre territoire européen et ne soient donc plus consommés par les Européens ?
Je vous remercie d'avance de vos réponses. Merci.
Carmen Crespo Díaz
Muchísimas gracias, señora El Kaleneki, yo creo que está ya preparado la audiencia consiste en explicar la primera parte los delitos relacionados con la pesca. Y nuestro primer orador es don Ian Urbina de Outlaw Ocean Project que tiene la palabra a distancia por ocho minutos. Creo que está preparado Ian, ¿no? Pues muchísimas gracias, señor Urbina y a continuación tiene usted la palabra por ocho minutos. Muchísimas gracias por asistir.
Ian Urbina
Thank you Chair Diaz and the rest of the commission for inviting me to speak. It's an honor to be back before you. The last time I was here was in 2024 when the commission asked me to testify about an investigation by my news team, The Outlaw Ocean Project, into China's role in global seafood. That reporting focused on China's more than 6,500 industrial fishing vessels and its hundreds of processing plants. It documented debt bondage, passport confiscation, avoidable deaths, fatal beatings, trafficked workers, illegal fishing, and a state-coordinated program forcing thousands of workers from Xinjiang and North Korea into seafood processing plants.
I'm here today to discuss our current investigation, which will be published in the coming weeks and which examines the global aquaculture industry, including China's role in it. By way of context, seafood is the world's most heavily traded food commodity by value, and aquaculture, or fish farming, is the industry's fastest-growing sector. As of 2022, more than half of all seafood worldwide was farmed rather than caught at sea. In Europe, consumers spent more than 60 billion euros on fishery and aquaculture products in 2024. This growth has been driven in part by a marketing claim that fish farming is sustainable because it reduces pressure on wild fisheries.
The problem is that for much of the industry, that claim is false. Roughly two-thirds of global aquaculture depends on feed made from wild-caught fish in the form of fishmeal and fish oil. Think of seafood people eat most: salmon, shrimp, tilapia, sea bream. In other words, many farmed fish are fed the very wild fish the industry claims it's helping to spare. Not all aquaculture works this way.
Roughly a third of global fish farming focuses on non-fed species such as clams, oysters, mussels.
That form of aquaculture can indeed be sustainable. But most fish farming depends on fed fish. And our investigation found that this segment of the industry prefers to begin the story of sustainability and ethical sourcing at the fish farm. But if you start the story earlier, however, with the feed, a very different picture emerges. Our recent investigation called Food for Feed did just that.
Over the past two years, we mapped and reported on roughly 1400 fishmeal plants worldwide. We boarded and inspected ships supplying them. We traced the farms to which the feed goes and we tracked the resulting seafood. Our goal was to document the hidden costs of fish farming. What were those hidden costs?
Well, in Russia's Far East, we found forced labor on ships, farms, and in factories. In Western Sahara, we revealed the industry helping prop up Morocco's military occupation. In Gambia and Mauritania, we discovered fish that once fed local communities increasingly diverted into fishmeal factories for export, worsening food insecurity. In countries including India and Peru, the industry was tied to at least 80 incidents of civil unrest, some quite violent, often labor strikes and community protests over polluted water or the stench from factories cooking thousands of tons of decomposing fish. These are what economists call externalities, costs pushed out into distant countries and communities while wealthier consumers enjoy the luxury seafood produced as a result.
The investigation also looked at issues at sea. We assessed more than 2400 ships tied to fishmeal production operating in the waters of at least 30 countries. We found that most of these ships do not fully comply with the Global Charter for Fisheries Transparency, a guide created by leading ocean-focused civil society groups detailing accountability standards for industrial fishing fleets. For example, less than 30% of the fleet had publicly available location information. Less than 25% had a unique vessel identification number or ship license plate.
And under 10% were registered with the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization's Global Record of Fishing Vessels. This opacity makes the fleet difficult to police. Illegal fishing is widespread within the global fishmeal fleet. Over 150 of the assessed ships were tied to problems at sea, like fishing in closed or protected areas, violating quotas and rules around bycatch or fishing without licenses. Globally, over 70 fishmeal ships illegally fished in marine protected areas, dozens spoofed or turned off their location transponders, and 50 vessels were caught capturing species or quantities of fish that were illegal.
China is the largest producer, exporter, and consumer of seafood in the world. It was the second largest exporter of seafood to Europe outside of the European Union as of 2024. And its rapidly expanding fish farming, so it does not have to send so many vessels onto the high seas or into foreign waters. China now grows four times as much fish as it catches. And huge quantities of that farmed seafood are exported, including to Europe.
What is striking is where much of this expansion is happening: Xinjiang and Tibet. Fish farming typically takes place along coasts in nearshore cages or pens. But China is expanding it in mountainous and desert regions that are among the most landlocked places on earth.
Our investigation mapped the supply chains of more than 1200 fish farms in Xinjiang and Tibet. We found seafood from these farms going to dozens of countries, including France, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain. Some of these farms in Xinjiang are certified as sustainable by US-based programs such as Best Aquaculture Practices. I do not need to remind this commission that Tibet and Xinjiang are among the most repressive regions in China. In Tibet, the government has relocated roughly half a million people, leveling villages and monasteries for projects including hydroelectric dams and fish farms.
In Xinjiang, more than a million people have been held in detention camps while the government has carried out large-scale land seizures, forced sterilizations, and criminal penalties for speaking native languages. That seafood from these regions is still reaching the European Union shows how much work remains. Seafood from Europe, from European producers, grocers, food service companies and others continue to rely on certification schemes that claim to police sustainability and police against forced labor in places like China where, of course, spot checks at factories, ships or farms are effectively impossible. China is also a place where asking tough questions about Uyghurs or Tibetans or human rights generally can get a company or civil society group or a journalist expelled. Yet the cost savings are so enticing that industry and certifiers and the European Union continue to make that Faustian bargain.
Let's be clear, repression in these regions is one of China's hidden costs. It is the externality that helps produce cheap seafood, it is part of China's competitive advantage, and it helps explain the trade surplus in this commodity. In Europe, the new forced labor regulation would help level that playing field. So could tools like the Global Human Rights Sanction Regime or the EU's IUU carding system, which was also designed to combat illegal fishing and block imports that fail to comply with sustainable fisheries management. The European Union has pressed companies through letters and hearings like this one and scrutinized previous purchasing contracts for EU-funded institutions.
So the bottom line is this: the tools exist, the question now is whether they'll get used. Thank you for your time.
Carmen Crespo Díaz
Eh pues muchísimas gracias, señor Urbina, y a continuación tiene la palabra el señor Julien Daudu de la Fundación de la Justicia Ambiental. Señor Daudu, tiene usted la palabra por ocho minutos también. Muchísimas gracias por estar aquí con nosotros.
Julien Daudu
Madame la Présidente, mesdames et messieurs les députés, chers collègues, effectivement je suis Julien Daudu, représentant principal d'Environmental Justice Foundation, EJF, à Bruxelles, et je vous remercie de cette invitation. EJF est une ONG qui œuvre à la protection de notre environnement. Nous partons du principe que tous les droits fondamentaux reposent sur le droit à un environnement sûr. Au cours des deux décennies écoulées, nous n'avons cessé de démontrer la convergence entre la pêche illicite et d'autres activités illégales. Prise à part, la pêche illégale est en soi un phénomène fascinant, de par l'isolement propre aux activités de pêche, mais aussi de par la complexité des opérations qui impliquent presque systématiquement plusieurs juridictions.
Rien que ces deux aspects en font un terreau fertile pour que d'autres activités illégales s'y ajoutent. C'est ce qui est encore plus fascinant.
Il n'est pas rare que les cas de pêche illégale que nous documentons, comme mon collègue vient de le mentionner également, s'accompagnent d'autres activités criminelles. Alors qu'ai-je rencontré au cours de mes années d'enquête ? Des faux documents en tous genres, des récits multiples de corruption dans certains ports notamment afin de permettre à des captures illégales d'accéder aux marchés internationaux. Des cas de fraude fiscale, les captures déclarées aux autorités d'un pays étaient systématiquement sous-évaluées afin de contourner les taxes en vigueur. Aujourd'hui, ce sur quoi je veux mettre l'accent est sans doute plus tragique encore, le cercle vicieux entre la pêche illégale et le travail forcé.
Nos enquêtes démontrent, et cela vient également d'être dit, qu'il existe des flottes où l'un va parfois de pair avec l'autre. Comme si l'équipage au fond était une variable d'ajustement pour maintenir économiquement actives des flottes de pêche. Alors si vous le permettez, je souhaiterais partager avec vous un court film qui illustrera cette réalité mieux que je ne saurais le faire.
Julien Daudu
Vessels can be tracked by satellite. During routine monitoring in 2020, investigators at EJF noticed two vessels fishing for tuna in the Atlantic without the proper authorization. And when we dug deeper, we discovered behaviors that suggested the vessels and their wider network were attempting to avoid any oversight of their fishing operations. All fishing vessels are required to sail under the flag of a nation and in theory abide by the laws of that state. But for a period of time, the fleet went stateless, illegally sailing under no flag at all.
A ghost fleet, hiding in plain sight on the high seas. To peel back the fleet's cloak of anonymity, EJF located former crew members, interviewing them at their homes in Indonesia.
Redner 11
Masih mengambil itu kalau satu tahun itu selama satu tahun itu pendapatan sirip hiu ya banyak itu. Ini juga hiu putih pernah dapat. Hiu martil pernah dapat. Semuanya sirip. Pernah kapal kita itu mengalami kerusakan ya dalam hari itu juga kita kerja dua hari dua malam.
Tanpa istirahat. Tanpa istirahat. Safety itu kalau menurut bagi saya itu kurang karena setiap tamu ketancap di sepatu kok robek terus airnya masuk tempat tidurnya pun coroknya banyak terus itu terhitung beberapa kamar waktu itu dapat di kamarnya aku itu sempat dilem tapi tetap.
Julien Daudu
While the fleet exploited vulnerable crew, fished illegally and finned sharks, they were able to smuggle high-value catch into some of the most lucrative markets in the world, despite having no authorization and no real flag. As well as near non-existent controls in many of the ports they visited, the opacity of the global fishing industry was also key to the vessel's success. While EJF attempted to raise the alarm, the owners re-registered the vessels under a new flag, switched ID codes mid-voyage, and we also obtained photos clearly showing the bright white paint that had been used to rename the vessels. The fleet also employed illegal transfers of fish at sea to a complex network of collecting vessels, a classic method that illicit operators use to cover their tracks.
Je vous remercie. Je souhaitais peut-être tenter de commencer par, excusez-moi, de tenter de répondre à votre question, Madame Le Calennec, mais si vous me permettez d'abord, le cas que nous venons de voir n'est pas un cas isolé. Malheureusement, c'est sur certaines flottes presque systémique. Pour autant, et c'est là peut-être le début de réponse que je voudrais essayer de vous faire, je crois que nous disposons, pardon, d'outils pour faire face à ces situations, ces situations de pêche illégale et de crimes associés. La transparence, tout d'abord, par des mesures simples comme celles évoquées dans le film ou mentionnées dans une récente déclaration du G7 sous la présidence française.
Mises en œuvre, ces mesures dissuaderaient autant qu'elles décupleraient la capacité à réprimer les activités illégales liées au secteur de la pêche. Par nos partenariats et en montrant l'exemple, je crois que l'UE peut accompagner les pays tiers dans la mise en œuvre de ces mesures. Il y a les dialogues sous carton jaune, il y a aussi les accords, les APPD, les accords de pêche durable pour lesquels le Parlement a un rôle important à jouer. Les clauses de transparence et de non-discrimination en l'occurrence dans ces accords sont souvent peu mises en œuvre. Et enfin, notre marché.
Par notre marché, nous pouvons exiger que les pays se plient à ces mesures, si je puis le dire, et de ce côté-là, les États membres doivent accroître les contrôles. Le système de certification des captures digitalisé aidera et constituera une manne fabuleuse d'informations. De plus, dans quelques jours, comme cela a également été mentionné précédemment, le règlement relatif au travail forcé franchira une nouvelle étape. Ce règlement peut avoir un caractère transformatif, mais il faut en tirer pleinement parti dès le premier jour. Et je pense que la commission de la pêche y sera attentive.
Je vous remercie.
Vanya Vulperhorst
Merci, merci beaucoup Monsieur Dodu. Je donne maintenant la parole à Madame Vanya Vulperhorst, qui est donc, vous avez la parole, et qui est d'Oceana Europe. Merci beaucoup, vous avez à nouveau la parole.
Thank you, Madam Goncortin, and thank you for inviting me today. Indeed, I'm Vanya Vulperhorst from Oceana in Europe. I'm also the vice-chair of the Long Distance Advisory Council. So Oceana is the largest advocacy organization dedicated to ocean conservation.
One billion people a healthy seafood meal a day. But illegal fishing, as also mentioned by my colleagues, undermines this potential of the ocean. It also distorts competition and creates an unlevel playing field for compliant fishers. The global fishing sector, as you heard, is extremely opaque and illegal fishers abuse legal loopholes to avoid accountability. Let me give you an example.
Next slide please. In January 2015, a New Zealand patrol vessel identified three fishing vessels, the Kunlun, the Songhua and the Yongding, fishing illegally in the Southern Ocean. This is an area managed by the Commission for Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, also called CCAMLR. These fishing vessels were actually on CCAMLR's official illegal fishing vessel list since 2023, 2024, 2028 and were fishing illegally for Patagonian toothfish, which was then at the brink of commercial extinction. So how were these vessels to continue fishing illegally while they were being while they were also on the IUU vessel list for almost a decade?
Because of a lack of political will to tackle illegal fishing in international waters, but also because of complex corporate structures that were put in place, including using shell companies and tax havens that allowed the real owners to hide. Vessels also these vessels also frequently change their name and flags, as you heard before, and use flags of convenience. For example, the Kunlun changed its name 26 times and used nine different flags. The profits linked to these vessels are estimated to be 10 million euros one single fishing season and in total over 100 million euros. Next slide please.
So this figure shows the corporate complexity that I was talking about earlier. Using the information found on the New Zealand patrol vessel, Spanish investigators traced the ownership and multiple entities and jurisdictions, which made it possible to show the scale and the systematic nature of the violations. They discovered Spanish ownership was concealed using shell companies registered in Switzerland, Belize and Panama. In the case of Kunlun and Yongding, ownership was traced to Panamanian shell companies whose listed shareholders and presidents were linked to 3,000 other companies. The ownership percentages in the slide represent the ownership of the other company.
The Spanish investigation ultimately resulted in fines of over 17.8 million euros. I want to be clear why I'm using this Spanish example. This is the result of one of the most elaborate investigations into transnational illegal fishing. It was made possible because Spain has one of the strongest laws in Europe to tackle illegal fishing. Spain is one of the few member states that can tackle illegal fishing even if it happens outside of its waters and on a vessel that's not flying its flag.
The sanctions that were put on these vessels by Spain were main one of the highest to date. It's also one of the rare cases where authorities were quite open and also investigations by journalists led to public information. Next slide please. So I have to be clear that not all instances, as mentioned also by my colleagues, of illegal fishing are criminal. There are cases of fishing with the wrong gear or in protected areas that are illegal fishing, but they are not criminal offenses.
For many fishing offenses, an administrative fine is accurate and deterrent. But the UN Office of Drugs and Crime recognizes that there's two other crimes. So there's crimes associated with the fishing sector. So there's no direct connection with the fishing operations, but they take place on a fishing vessel, like arms or drug smuggling, or crimes in the value chain, as mentioned by my colleague, tax sorry, tax crimes, money laundering and also trafficking in persons. Next slide please.
To facilitate illegal fishing and associated crimes, the use of flags of convenience are essential. So under international maritime law, there has to be a genuine link between the vessel and its flag state.
Regardless of where the owner is based. So for example, you can have a Belizean-flagged vessel that is actually owned in Belgium. These flags of convenience countries offer economic advantages such as lower tax rates or weak labor laws. But for fishing vessels, flags of convenience states also offer weak monitoring and control and also limited political will or capacity to enforce fishing rules. This often creates an environment for illegal fishing.
For example, the Kunlun was registered under five different flags of convenience. Because registration under flags of convenience is easy and oversight is weak, vessels also frequently reflag between various flags of convenience to avoid scrutiny or sanctions. Next slide, please. So in 2026, the European Commission published a study that assesses the drivers and effects associated with open registers and used as flags of convenience. This was actually a broader study than just the fishing sector.
It also looked at shipping and shipbreaking, as was mentioned in the previous presentation. And it found that flags of convenience are linked to poor labor conditions, low safety standards, weak environmental protections, especially in fisheries. It also facilitates illegal fishing, overfishing, smuggling, and money laundering. It allows users of flags of convenience to undercut compliant EU firms and erode national tax bases. Next slide, please.
So Oceana also launched a study in 2026. And we found that 105 vessels that are EU-owned are actually flagged to flags of convenience, yellow-carded countries, or tax havens. This includes countries where the EU has sustainable fisheries partnership agreements, such as Guinea-Bissau or Mauritius. These vessels generally operate with a lack of oversight because the flag state has weak control and enforcement, and member states also are not monitoring the activities of and the profits of these vessels. This creates a risk that actually the profits of the activities, also possibly illegal fishing, flow back to the EU.
So no member state requires its citizens or its companies to register foreign ownership of vessels. This impacts both the level playing field and the EU market. How does it impact the level playing field? So we found, for example, three Belizean-flagged EU-owned vessels fishing in West Africa for small pelagics. EU-flagged vessels also fish in the same area.
But these Belizean-flagged EU-owned vessels, they don't have to meet the same sustainability, labor, or reporting requirements as the EU-flagged vessels do. This allows EU-owned vessels using the Belizean flag to circumvent sustainability requirements and also undermine the EU efforts to actually fish sustainably in partner countries. And how does it impact the market? In fact, we found that 33 of these 105 EU-owned vessels are actually authorized to export to the EU market. In 2024, 10% of the imports into the EU were coming from countries that were flags of convenience, tax havens, or yellow-carded countries.
This increases the risk of illegally caught or unethically obtained seafood entering the EU supply chain. So to also answer your question, Madame Løkkegaard, it is therefore crucial that the European Parliament puts pressure on member states and the European Commission to improve import controls and to also make sure that member states put in place a requirement for citizens and companies to report any links in fishing vessels, especially those flagged to non-EU countries. Also, I'm sorry, next slide, please. To restrict or prohibit EU nationals and companies from owning fishing vessels flagged to flags of convenience. And lastly, to improve traceability and consumer information for all seafood products, including for fishmeal and fish oil, because of the reasons that we just heard from Mr. Ibiña.
So there is a lot that the EU can do. We have the tools at hand. It is really the political will that we need. Thank you.
Stéphanie Yon-Courtin
Merci, merci Madame Bulperos de rappeler que c'est juste maintenant une question de volonté politique pour agir puisqu'on a les outils. Nous allons poursuivre la deuxième partie de cette audition sur la lutte contre les crimes liés à la pêche. Le premier, la première oratrice est Madame Cindy Buckley, agente de renseignement criminel à Interpol. Madame Buckley, vous avez la parole.
Cindy Buckley
Thank you, Chair, honorable members. I'm pleased today to appear on behalf of Interpol. While IUU fishing is often discussed as a fisheries management issue, from an operational perspective, we increasingly see transnational criminal networks exploiting jurisdictional fragmentation and weak information sharing mechanisms. My remarks today will focus on how international law enforcement cooperation can help address those challenges. Next slide, please.
One of the most important points is that IUU fishing is rarely an isolated offense. In many investigations, fisheries violations are linked to broader criminal activity. A vessel involved in illegal fishing may simultaneously be involved in labor exploitation, document fraud, corruption, smuggling, sanctions evasion, or even drug trafficking. These activities generate multiple illicit revenue streams and increase the profitability of criminal operations. Because of the remote nature of maritime environments and the complexity of global supply chains, these crimes can remain undetected for long periods of time.
For this reason, fisheries crime should be approached as part of a wider organized crime picture rather than a standalone regulatory violation. Next slide, please. Investigating fisheries-related crime requires an international perspective. Seafood products routinely move through multiple jurisdictions before reaching consumers. A vessel may be registered in one country, owned through companies in another, crewed by nationals from several other countries, operating in international waters, and landing catch in completely different ports.
These fragmented arrangements create jurisdictional gaps that organized criminal networks actively exploit. Another challenge is ownership. Beneficial ownership is frequently hidden behind shell companies, layered corporate structures, and offshore registrations, making it difficult to identify who ultimately controls a vessel. This is why international law enforcement cooperation is essential. No single country possesses the complete picture.
Through intelligence exchange, Interpol notices, and coordinated operational activity, member countries can connect information that would otherwise remain isolated. Next slide, please. Three structural challenges consistently undermine the effectiveness of enforcement. The first is AIS manipulation. Vessels may disable or falsify their automatic identification system signals, effectively becoming dark vessels and avoiding maritime monitoring systems.
The second is the use of flags of convenience. Registration under jurisdictions with limited oversight can reduce accountability and make enforcement actions more difficult.
And the third challenge is ownership opacity. Criminal actors often use shell companies, nominee directors, and complex corporate arrangements to conceal beneficial owners behind vessels and fishing operations. Together, these factors make investigations resource-intensive and often require cooperation between fisheries authorities, customs, police services, financial investigators, and prosecutors. Next slide, please. This slide highlights the range of support that INTERPOL provides to member countries.
Our work includes operational support teams, coordinated international operations, regional investigative case meetings, and capacity-building activities designed to strengthen national enforcement capabilities. We also facilitate multi-agency collaboration at both national and regional levels, helping agencies work together more effectively across traditional institutional boundaries. A key component of this support is criminal intelligence analysis, which allows investigators to identify network connections and emerging trends that may not otherwise be visible through isolated investigations. Our objective is to help countries move from individual incidents toward targeting the criminal networks responsible. Next slide, please.
This operational model reflects how INTERPOL supports fisheries-related investigations. The approach begins with information sharing and intelligence development, followed by analytical support to identify links between vessels, companies, individuals, and associated criminal activity. These findings can then support coordinated investigations, operational deployments, and international enforcement actions. Importantly, this model is designed to connect environmental enforcement with broader law enforcement tools and capabilities. By treating fisheries-related crime as a transnational criminal issue rather than solely a fisheries management issue, authorities can access a wider range of investigative and prosecutorial options.
Next slide, please. Based on our operational experience, INTERPOL proposes four key action areas. First, strengthen port state measures through effective implementation of Port State Measures Agreement and harmonized inspection protocols. Second is to close ownership loopholes by increasing transparency regarding beneficial ownership of fishing vessels and associated companies. Third is to expand operational support and ensure fisheries-related crime is integrated into national law enforcement structures rather than remaining solely within regulatory frameworks.
Fourth, protect legitimate operators by focusing enforcement efforts on organized criminal networks and repeat offenders who distort markets and undermine sustainable fisheries. These measures would significantly improve the collective ability to detect, investigate, and disrupt criminal activity in the sector. Next slide, please. In closing, fisheries-related crime represents a significant challenge to environmental sustainability, economic stability, and maritime security.
Addressing this threat requires stronger international cooperation, greater transparency, and more effective enforcement coordination across jurisdictions. INTERPOL remains committed to supporting member countries through intelligence sharing, operational coordination, investigative support, and capacity building. By closing enforcement gaps and targeting the criminal networks that profit from fisheries-related crime, we can help protect legitimate operators, safeguard marine resources, and support a more sustainable future for our oceans. Thank you for your attention.
Stéphanie Yon-Courtin
Merci beaucoup Madame Buckley. Notre dernier orateur est Monsieur Henrique Portela Guedes, chercheur et auteur spécialisé dans la piraterie maritime moderne et la sécurité dans le golfe de Guinée. Il est également commandant de la marine portugaise. Monsieur Portela Guedes, vous avez la parole. Obrigado.
Henrique Portela Guedes
Thank you, Madam Chair. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. I am Commander Portela Guedes from the Portuguese Navy. I want to thank you very much for this invitation to be here today in this public audience to talk about the fisheries and the threat of maritime piracy, Gulf of Guinea perspective. Regarding the slides, I would like to ask only to advance them after I have said so.
Thank you. Next slide, please. I will begin with the difference between piracy and armed robbery against ships. Piracy are illegal acts of violence, detention, or depredation committed on the high seas or outside the jurisdiction of any state, beyond twelve nautical miles. Armed robbery against ships are similar acts committed within waters under the jurisdiction of a coastal state, up to twelve nautical miles.
Next slide, please. Here we have a global maritime traffic, a figure taken in twenty-seven May. The source is the Marine Traffic. All these points are ships. The different colors are different kinds of ships.
Next slide, please. Piracy high-risk areas. We have in this moment, I consider four different areas. The Horn of Africa, Somalia, the most dangerous region between two thousand eight and two thousand eleven. Gulf of Guinea, the current epicenter in Africa.
Indian subcontinent, seas of India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka. Southeast Asia, traditionally a fertile area, seas of Indonesia, Malaysia, Straits of Malacca, and Straits of Singapore. Next slide, please. A worldwide overview, two thousand twenty-five. The source is the International Maritime Bureau.
In the top, you can see the figure legend. The four areas that I talked before are in the map, as you can see. Next slide, please. Worldwide evolution of piracy and armed robbery against ships between nineteen ninety-one and two thousand twenty-five. The source is the International Maritime Bureau.
Three significant peaks: year two thousand with four hundred sixty-nine acts, two thousand three and two thousand ten with four hundred forty-five incidents. You can see a decrease in the last years in the number of acts of maritime piracy. Next slide, please. Evolution of piracy and armed robbery against ships in the same period of time in Gulf of Guinea.
You can see a decrease in the last years in the number of acts of maritime piracy. Next slide, please. Evolution of piracy and armed robbery against ships in the same period of time in Gulf of Guinea. Two peaks, significant peaks in 2018 with 82 acts and 2020 with 84 acts of maritime piracy. Next slide, please.
Nigerian pirates. The majority of the pirates in Gulf of Guinea are from Nigeria. You can see the pictures, they are very, very well armed with a variety of machine guns, with rocket-propelled grenades and other other arms. Some of the causes of piracy in Nigeria are poverty, unemployment, lack of social conditions, weak governance, marginalization of coastal communities, vulnerability to recruitment by criminal networks. I think we should have in mind that in Nigeria around 94.7 million people live in extreme poverty, less than three dollars a day.
Is more than the people from the population from Germany, for instance. Next slide, please. Why is maritime piracy a problem for fisheries? Increases human risks, raises operating costs, disrupts local livelihoods, reduces fishing activity and affects coastal economies. In summary, piracy undermine fisheries by making fishing more dangerous, more expensive and less viable, while weakening coastal livelihoods, local economies and the fight against IUU fishing.
Next slide, please. Why piracy persists? There are organized criminal networks, kidnapping for ransom remains profitable, weak maritime governance and law enforcement, pirates continue to enjoy a high degree of impunity and the extended operation reach. To sum it up, piracy endures because criminal groups operate in a permissive maritime environment where weak control, high profits and limited accountability allow attacks to remain viable. Next slide, please.
What needs to be done? Strengthen the investigation, prosecution and conviction of pirates, reinforce the Yaoundé architecture and the regional coordination, improve coast guard surveillance and response capacity, ensure continued international support, training and information sharing, increase the protection of fishing vessels and their crews, improve coastal livelihoods to reduce criminal recruitment. In summary, reducing piracy requires a coordinated maritime security approach that combines stronger law enforcement, regional cooperation, operational capacity, protection of fisheries and better economic alternatives for coastal communities.
Next slide please. To conclude, piracy in the Gulf of Guinea is not only a security and a governance challenge, but also a fisheries issue. It is fueled by poverty, lack of social conditions, unemployment, easy recruitment and weak surveillance. It is necessary to intensify the investigation, prosecution and sentencing of pirates. The growth of maritime trade and fishing activity also increases opportunities for piracy.
And piracy is unlikely to be eradicated, but it can be reduced through sustained political, legal, operational, regional and technological action. To sum it up, piracy in the Gulf of Guinea is a multidimensional problem that directly affects maritime security, governance and fisheries. It is fueled by socioeconomic and institutional fragilities and can only be contained through a sustained, integrated and regional response. And with this I conclude. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
Thank you, honorable members. I look forward for the discussion. Thank you very much.
Stéphanie Yon-Courtin
Obrigado, Monsieur Portela Guedes, et merci à tous pour vos interventions. Maintenant nous allons ouvrir la séance de questions-réponses, au total une cinquantaine de minutes, et donc certains collègues se sont déjà manifestés. Donc on va faire un premier round de questions. Parmi les collègues, nous avons pour le PPE le collègue Nascimento Cabral. Pour les S&D nous avons le collègue Sarriacomo, pour les Patriotes Madame Jamet, pour ECR Madame Juknevičienė, pour les Verts Madame Lövin, pour la Gauche Madame Fourreau et pour ESN Monsieur De Rose.
Et après on aura un autre round de questions puisque je vois que les collègues Le Calennec et Millán Mon veulent poser des questions. Et je vais commencer par donc donner la parole effectivement à notre collègue Nascimento Cabral, obrigado.
Paulo do Nascimento Cabral
Obrigado. Thank you, Madam Chair, I'll speak in Portuguese. Muito bom dia a todos. Antes de mais agradecer a excelente apresentação e em boa hora, como foi referido pela nossa coordenadora Isabelle Le Calennec, foi uma excelente iniciativa esta audição pública para percebermos aquilo que está de facto a acontecer com a pesca em termos globais. Permitam-me também um cumprimento especial ao senhor comandante Portela Guedes por aqui estar connosco de Portugal, que é um grande, um grande gosto e um grande honra tê-lo aqui como o nosso orador.
De facto, há aqui uma dificuldade acrescida. A União Europeia depende de mais de 70% dos produtos de pesca que vêm de fora da União Europeia, ou seja, temos uma alta dependência externa para uma proteína tão importante para a alimentação dos europeus. Segundo, temos acordos de pesca sustentável que muitas vezes, e agora temos sentido, uma certa resistência por parte de países terceiros em continuarem esses acordos de pesca porque têm outros parceiros globais que não fazem perguntas, não fazem controlo, pagam melhor do que a União Europeia e estão lá a competir diretamente com os nossos recursos, mesmo quando nós estamos aqui a promover aquilo que é uma parceria de win-win em que ambas as partes ganham, a prioridade é dada a outros parceiros globais e já falaram aqui da China, já falamos aqui de outros países que de facto não colocam tantas restrições. Depois também há uma responsabilidade que é nossa. Quando nós temos aqui o mecanismo do sistema de quotas tarifárias autónomas que tem o sistema de cartões amarelos e vermelhos e temos países que estão com um cartão amarelo há cerca de 20 anos e nada é feito e continuamos a permitir a importação destes produtos para a União Europeia, isto é uma falha nossa também.
Nós temos que melhorar esta nossa atividade. E a pergunta que eu faço, e aqui também agradecer obviamente a apresentação de todos, mas deixava aqui duas perguntas, uma que tem a ver com, por exemplo, agora a questão do pacto dos oceanos, como é que nós podemos enquadrar a governação global do oceano, com que ferramentas é que nós conseguimos obrigar os países terceiros a cumprirem com aquilo que são os nossos requisitos. Uma segunda questão que tem a ver se não há uma falta de harmonização do controlo dos portos europeus, se não é necessário nós termos um mecanismo mais harmonizado, porque o que nós sentimos é que há diferentes quantidades, diferentes amostragens consoante o porto em que estes produtos são descarregados. E uma terceira questão também aqui para o nosso comandante Portela Geada sobre a pirataria, de facto é também um problema causado pela, é um problema às pescas, mas é um problema causado por fenómenos sociais desses países que são extremamente pobres. E a minha questão também será essa, os acordos de pesca sustentável que nós temos desenvolvido têm uma grande componente de apoio ao setor, de apoio às comunidades locais.
Será que na vossa opinião isto deve ser reforçado? Será que é este o caminho que nós temos de trabalhar ou, porque de facto nós não conseguimos resolver os problemas do mundo, mas ao mesmo tempo nós dependemos dos produtos da pesca. Por isso gostaria de vos ouvir em relação a isso. Muito obrigado, senhor presidente.
Eric Sargiacomo
Merci, madame la présidente. Merci à tous nos interlocuteurs aujourd'hui. Je crois que le panel est d'une excellente qualité et nous montre l'étendue des sujets et l'étendue des dégâts auxquels nous devons absolument réagir. Je tiens tout particulièrement à remercier monsieur Urbina dont je suis les travaux régulièrement et les enquêtes et je trouve que son exposé a été particulièrement instructif et explicite sur nos manquements. Monsieur Urbina, on a la chance de vous avoir ce matin.
Votre travail sur The Outlaw Ocean Project est sans appel. La pêche industrielle mondiale, en particulier asiatique, est devenue un Far West où règne la loi du plus fort. Violation des droits de l'homme, saccage de l'environnement, exploitation humaine, le bilan est bien triste. On se croirait revenu au XIXe siècle. Pour couronner le tout, ce qui est pêché finit dans nos assiettes sans bien sûr qu'on le sache vraiment.
Je m'étonne quand même que malgré nos règlements et nos règles de traçabilité, les autorités des États membres n'arrivent pas à tracer les produits de ce commerce mondial autant que vous. Je me pose la question vis-à-vis aussi de nos propres pêcheurs, comment peuvent-ils réagir à de telles informations. Aussi, j'aurais une question simple, que conseillez-vous pour changer ces choses ? J'ai bien mon idée avec par exemple les mesures miroirs mais cela ne semble pas faire l'unanimité y compris parmi nous. Je crois qu'il faut vraiment que nous nous réveillions car que ça soit les États membres ou la Commission, nous nous rendons bien compte qu'à ignorer ce que vous dites, ce que vous écrivez, ce sur quoi vous avez enquêté, c'est la destruction de notre capacité de pêche à moyen terme voire à court terme dont il est en jeu et donc également l'approvisionnement en termes de produits de la mer de nos concitoyens, un approvisionnement évidemment durable.
Merci.
Isabelle Le Callennec
Merci cher collègue. On assure le relais. Je vais donner la parole à madame Jamet pour les Patriotes.
France Jamet
Oui merci. Alors bien sûr la pêche illégale est un véritable fléau, nous sommes tous d'accord là-dessus. Elle alimente un marché noir mafieux, très complexe comme ça a été parfaitement démontré et expliqué, sophistiqué aussi avec des réseaux de recel et de blanchiment. Mais elle est aussi je crois le fait de la lâcheté de Bruxelles et d'États tiers complaisants avec un impact terrible sur la ressource, sur les écosystèmes avec des techniques de pêche parfaitement nocives et sur nos équilibres socio-économiques ce qui a été aussi développé sur terre et sur mer car nos propres pêcheurs se trouvent eux par contre confrontés à une concurrence déloyale puisqu'ils sont astreints à des normes qui sont beaucoup plus absurdes et plus contraignantes les unes que les autres. Alors j'en parle en toute connaissance de cause parce que mon pays la France est particulièrement touchée en Méditerranée où la ressource est menacée par des flottes turques notamment, en Guyane avec des pêcheurs surinamais qui pillent nos côtes, en Guadeloupe avec notamment des risques sanitaires non négligeables sur le marché parallèle pour les consommateurs et enfin à Mayotte avec des pavillons de complaisance qui prospèrent au détriment de nos petits pêcheurs et où les holothuries sont en voie de disparition menacées par une multitude d'embarcations vietnamiennes.
Et alors ce qui n'a pas d'ailleurs empêché l'Union européenne de signer un accord commercial de libre-échange en août 2020 avec le Vietnam, pourtant sous carton jaune et cela en toute connaissance de cause. Donc le système d'avertissement dont on parle aujourd'hui sur la base de cartons jaunes et rouges qui ouvrent simplement sur de simples négociations est non seulement pas efficace mais finalement d'une coupable faiblesse. Et l'inflation de normes imposées ou la transparence que nous appelons tous de nos vœux s'applique à notre filière mais en aucun cas à la contrebande et aux pirates. Alors il en ressort que finalement lorsqu'un pays tiers est soupçonné d'enfreindre nos règles et qu'il fait l'objet d'un carton jaune, et bien cette mesure n'est pas suivie de sanctions alors que ce carton devrait interdire tout arrangement commercial. En fait Bruxelles finalement ne se soucie ni de la biodiversité, ni de nos pêcheurs, ni de notre souveraineté parce que business is business et la pêche se retrouve encore une fois comme la variable d'ajustement de la politique commerciale de l'Union européenne.
Alors je remercie nos interlocuteurs et particulièrement les exposés de la représentante d'Interpol Madame Buckley et surtout le courage de Monsieur Portela parce qu'en fait qu'est-ce qui ressort de tout ça ? Ce n'est pas tant les moyens, ce n'est pas tant le courage finalement qui nous manque, ne serait-ce pas plutôt la volonté politique ? Je vous remercie.
Nora Junco García
Muchas gracias presidente y también quería dar las gracias a los ponentes por traernos y hablarnos de este tema tan importante y en el que estamos todos de acuerdo en que la pesca ilegal no declarada y no reglamentada hay que combatirla. Pero tenemos que hacernos una pregunta incómoda cuando observamos la lista de países con tarjeta roja, principalmente los estados pequeños con capacidades muy limitadas de control. Sabemos que detrás de muchas de estas actividades de pesca ilegal operan redes empresariales complejas con cambios de pabellón, con sociedades pantallas y beneficiarios reales que no siempre están en estos países. Si cogemos por ejemplo Camboya, ¿no?, por ejemplo Camerún es muy reveladora. Se encontraron 14 buques con bandera camerunesa acusados de pesca ilegal o no reglamentada que estaban poseídos o gestionados por empresas con sede en estados miembros de la Unión Europea.
Si queremos luchar contra la pesca ilegal no basta con sancionar la bandera del buque, sino que tenemos que seguir el rastro de quienes organizan, financian y benefician estas prácticas. Por ello, mi pregunta es que además de sancionar a los Estados de de pabellón, ¿qué otras medidas concretas se están adoptando para identificar, perseguir a los beneficiarios reales y a los operadores que se esconden detrás de estas estructuras opacas? Gracias.
Entonces esto es una cuestión también que tenemos que ponerla en relevancia.
Merci, Madame Levin.
Isabella Lövin
Thank you very much, Madam Chair, and thank you so much to all the speakers. Unfortunately, I couldn't attend the first half an hour, so I missed a few of you, but this is really an important topic and I mean, also the the security issue is also affecting geopolitics, I would say, very much of the IUU fishing outside of the Horn of Africa fueled somehow the Al-Shabaab movement once upon a time. So we really all gain if we can stop IUU fishing and especially here focusing also on fragile states and and developing countries. So, but I heard Oceana and I'm quite a little bit shocked by the message that came out there that 105 EU-owned vessels are flagged to flags of convenience countries, yellow-carded countries or tax havens, and that 33 of them are authorized to export to the EU market. I don't know if the Commission would like to comment on that, but this is, I think, totally unacceptable.
And if Oceana can get that information, why can't the Commission get that information? So maybe that's a question to to Oceana as well. 2017, we adopted the regulation on the sustainable management of external fleets, which should be kind of giving the responsibility to Member States to make sure that all EU vessels operating outside of EU waters should be known to the Member States, should be authorized, and somehow, yeah, I would like to have a comment. How has the SMEF regulation worked in practice? And as far as I remember, it's only about the EU-flagged vessels and not the other ones that are flagged to flags to countries which provide flags of convenience.
So maybe give us the answer: how can we make sure that EU vessels are not going with flags of convenience and and create these loopholes? To Interpol, I mean, and Oceana, everyone is pointing to the problem of flags of convenience and also the the beneficial ownership thing, which is also linked to tax havens. So in my mind, the EU needs to work really hard to convince these countries that provide flags of convenience to stop doing it. So this is really a question, open question: how can we do that and why isn't this prioritized? Because it can lead to a real distrust in the EU if we say very beautiful words and then EU vessels flagged under flags of convenience are behaving in a totally unacceptable way and even contributing to the to Al-Shabaab and and these types of criminal groups that feed on on distrust.
Thank you.
Madame Fourest.
Redner 27
Merci. Merci beaucoup aux différents intervenants. Merci en particulier à Ian Urbina pour cette présentation édifiante sur les farines de poisson et les liens avec la pêche illégale en Afrique de l'Ouest, menaçant à la fois les droits humains, les communautés côtières, les travailleurs de la mer et les écosystèmes. C'est un sujet récurrent et pourtant l'Union européenne continue d'importer massivement ces produits pour nourrir la pisciculture et les autres animaux d'élevage. Est-ce que The Outlaw Ocean Project a retracé les flux de farines de poisson issus de la pêche illégale qui entrent dans l'Union européenne ?
Vous dites également que les outils existent et que maintenant la question est de savoir s'ils seront utilisés. Pourquoi selon vous ces outils ne sont pas utilisés aujourd'hui ? Et j'ai également une question pour Madame Vülperhorst. Vous avez mentionné le besoin de renforcer la traçabilité des farines et des huiles de poisson. Par quelles mesures cela est-il envisageable ?
Et également, vous avez mentionné la pratique du changement de pavillon, une pratique qui est répandue dans le monde pour bénéficier de règles moins disantes et pêcher illégalement. Est-ce qu'on sait si ça concerne beaucoup de bénéficiaires basés dans l'Union européenne et au vu du manque de transparence, est-ce qu'on arrive à avoir des estimations ? Et enfin, vous avez aussi mentionné des navires qui ont pêché illégalement dans l'Antarctique et ont changé de pavillon. Aujourd'hui on voit que la pêche au krill est en expansion et menace les écosystèmes antarctiques. Est-ce qu'on sait où est-ce qu'on en est aujourd'hui concernant la pêche illégale dans l'océan Austral et est-ce qu'elle a toujours lieu ?
Je vous remercie.
Siegbert Frank Droese
Yeah, thank you Chair, I will speak in German. Ich bedanke mich auch für die Information. Also ich bin jetzt, hatte jetzt nicht viel erwartet und das hat, die Ausführungen haben auch meine Erwartungen bestätigt. Also dass es eben hier, es wird eben sehr viel geredet und die Ergebnisse sind doch relativ übersichtlich. Jetzt zwischen nur mal so ein paar Zahlen zum Anfang, zwischen 2020 und 23 wurden lediglich 0,29 % der Fangzertifikate aus Nicht-EU-Ländern bei den Flaggenstaaten verifiziert und nur 0,01 % der Importe wurden abgelehnt.
Das ist für mich sehr sonderbar, weil ja eigentlich global gesehen ein Fünftel der weltweiten Meeresfrüchtefänge aus illegaler, nicht gemeldeter, unregulierter Fischerei, also sogenannter IUU-Fischerei stammen. Das digitale System CATCH zur Verwaltung der Fangzertifikate sollte diese Probleme durch die Echtzeit-Datenverifizierung lösen und bestehende Lücken schließen. Also ich sehe hier ehrlich gesagt noch keinen richtigen Fortschritt. Stattdessen hat CATCH den Verwaltungsaufwand erhöht. Dies hat zu mehr Zurückhaltung, Verzögerung bei legitimen Importen mit geringem IUU-Risiko geführt.
Für mich ist das CATCH-System eine typische europäische Lösung der Kommission, sozusagen etwas zugespitzt zugegeben, das inzestuöse Kind der EU-Kommission und der von ihr finanzierten NGOs. Leider ist es auch unwahrscheinlich, dass dieses System die IUU-Fischerei eindämmen wird. Es führt lediglich zu mehr Bürokratie und Wettbewerbsnachteilen gerade für unsere schon gebeutelten europäischen Fischer. Nenne ich mal noch ein Beispiel. Drittländer können nämlich weiterhin Papierzertifikate mit gefälschten Daten einreichen.
Dies liegt daran, dass die Nutzung des digitalen CATCH-Systems für Exporteure aus Drittländern freiwillig ist. Die EU-Importeure wiederum sind dann dafür verantwortlich, hunderte von Datenfeldern aus Papieraufzeichnungen in das System einzugeben, ein Vorgang, der mehrere Stunden dauern und eben ganz klar zu erheblichen Wettbewerbsnachteilen führt für unsere Fischerei. Ich habe wirklich sehr gut gelauscht der Dame, Frau Buckley von dem Interpol und dort habe ich Fragen. Frau Buckley, wie fließen denn die Interpol-Ermittlungen oder Untersuchungen in das CATCH-System ein?
Und können Sie einen Zusammenhang zwischen Ihren Ermittlungen und den Exporteuren, deren Produkte in diesem System erfasst sind, sind Sie in der Lage, bestimmte Exporteure zu markieren, also die Auffälligkeiten haben? Und mich würde mal grundsätzlich interessieren, sind Sie denn eigentlich zu Beginn oder in der Entwicklungsphase des Catch-Systems überhaupt konsultiert worden? Vielen Dank.
Isabelle Le Callennec
Merci. Comme il n'y a que deux membres inscrits pour de nouvelles questions, Monsieur Millán Mon et moi-même, je vous propose de terminer le round avec vous et ensuite nous passerons la parole aux intervenants. Monsieur Millán Mon.
Francisco José Millán Mon
Gracias, presidenta. Y gracias a los ponentes por sus muy interesantes contribuciones. En fin, una de las principales amenazas para la sostenibilidad del océano como para la competitividad de nuestros pescadores, los pescadores europeos, es la pesca ilegal. Nuestra flota opera bajo exigentes normas de control, sostenibilidad, trazabilidad y otros operadores, sin embargo, no siguen las mismas normas y pueden acceder al mercado europeo en condiciones distintas y en algunas ocasiones con producto ilegal. En este contexto, quiero señalar mi preocupación por unos artículos publicados hace unos meses por el diario Faro de Vigo, que apuntaban a importantes lagunas en los controles de importación europeos y a la presencia en nuestro mercado de productos procedentes de buques vinculados a actividades de pesca ilegal.
En fin, la Unión Europea tiene un reglamento de pesca ilegal o para luchar contra ella. Me gustaría conocer la opinión de los panelistas sobre este sistema europeo de tarjetas amarillas y rojas. ¿Consideran que este mecanismo está siendo eficaz? ¿Creen que podría sustituirse por algún sistema más efectivo? Otra cuestión es el sistema CATCH, que se ha mencionado repetidamente hoy.
Yo creo que puede convertirse en una herramienta importante para reforzar la trazabilidad y evitar la entrada de productos procedentes de la pesca ilegal en el mercado europeo. Cierto es, sin embargo, que llevamos casi cinco meses después de su implantación ya y estamos recibiendo numerosas quejas sobre problemas operativos, retrasos, dificultades técnicas, etc., que generan costes adicionales para los puertos europeos. En fin, y una falta de armonización entre el funcionamiento de los controles porque este sistema está funcionando mal y hay países en los que se hacen los controles de otra forma y al final no se está utilizando el sistema IT CATCH, parece, en alguno de los puertos. Me quería concentrarme en el señor Guedes. Le agradezco su información sobre la importancia de garantizar la seguridad marítima en el Golfo de Guinea.
Es una zona en la que desde luego confluyen múltiples amenazas: narcotráfico, pesca ilegal, tráficos ilícitos, piratería, como él ha subrayado. Yo siempre he defendido la necesidad de reforzar la presencia de la Unión Europea en el Golfo. La inseguridad en la zona afecta también directamente a intereses europeos muy concretos, incluida la seguridad de nuestros pescadores. Recuerdo que en el 21, en el año 21, perdón, esto era una preocupación muy grande para los pescadores de atún europeos que faenaban en la región. Es cierto que los datos, y ahora nos lo confirma el señor Portela Guedes, que los datos sobre piratería marítima en el Golfo demuestran una evolución muy positiva en los últimos años.
Han bajado mucho los incidentes y esto parece que demostrar que la presencia europea y los esfuerzos de coordinación están dando resultados. Pero siguen existiendo desafíos importantes, sobre todo el tema del narcotráfico, la creciente utilización de la fachada atlántica africana como zona de tránsito de las rutas de drogas que parten de América Latina y tienen como destino final los puertos europeos y que en ocasiones utilizan incluso a barcos pesqueros para ese tráfico de drogas.
Por tanto, creo que es imprescindible reforzar la coordinación a lo largo de toda la fachada atlántica, desde América Latina hasta África Occidental y Europa. Confío en que el acuerdo Mercosur de la Unión Europea y Mercosur también contribuya a esa lucha coordinada. Señor Guedes, y termino, le agradecería que nos profundizara en cómo ve actualmente la situación en el Golfo de Guinea y qué margen existe para mejorar la acción de la Unión Europea en la región, en particular en materia de tráficos ilícitos. Gracias.
Isabelle Le Callennec
Merci. Merci d'avoir commencé à nous expliquer quelles pourraient être aujourd'hui les solutions. J'ai été intéressée par ce que vous avez dit sur le règlement sur le travail forcé parce qu'effectivement on a là une opportunité à saisir et sur l'exigence des contrôles. Moi en fait, j'aimerais m'adresser à la Commission européenne parce qu'on a les uns et les autres à plusieurs reprises évoqué en fait son travail et tout à l'heure peut-être que la DG MARE pourra nous éclairer sur ce qui est fait parce que quand on écoute les collègues, la grande question c'est mais pourquoi la situation perdure ? Et vous l'avez dit à plusieurs reprises, la responsabilité n'est pas seulement celle de l'Union européenne mais aussi celle des États membres.
Et donc ma question est de savoir si on a bien identifié qui est responsable de quoi pour agir. Et ça c'est très important et d'ailleurs dans toutes les politiques que l'on mène. Moi je me pose la question aussi de savoir pourquoi il n'y a pas plus de sanctions. Parce que les règles existent. Est-ce que vous avez pu analyser les raisons qui font que on ne sanctionne pas alors qu'on fait aujourd'hui des constats et pourquoi finalement les préconisations qui sont les vôtres, qui sont celles des rapports de la Cour des comptes, qui sont aussi celles d'autres institutions, je pense au Conseil consultatif de la pêche lointaine, du Conseil consultatif des marchés, on a, on sait, on a des recommandations et nous ce qui nous interpelle c'est pourquoi il ne se passe, je ne vais pas dire rien, mais en tous les cas que le phénomène persiste voire s'amplifie.
Merci pour vos réponses. Et nous allons donner la parole dans le même ordre que celui que nous avons eu pour la présentation. Donc je donne la parole à Ian Urbina pour cinq minutes parce que nous avons le temps. Merci beaucoup.
Ian Urbina
I think I will try to stay at a high altitude and I'll also try to speak a little slower than I did before to help the translators. It seems like one of the cross-cutting topics that is a common denominator for many of the lawmakers is that there's a variety of different problems, you know, Turkish fishers in the Mediterranean, piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, abuse of crew, Indonesian crew on Chinese tuna vessels, shark finning, port state measures. We're jumping around to a lot of different places in the discussion. For me, the thing that connects it all is to simplify it as a look at a singular product. The product is largely seafood.
It's coming out of the oceans and it's following down a long and intricate path, a supply chain to consumers, in this case European consumers. Along the way, there are lots of stops from the ship to the transshipment vessel to the port to the processing plant to the exporter to the importer. There are all these different places where there could be pressure applied. The one thing I haven't heard is where in that chain are the biggest beneficiaries, who's making the most money.
And if you look at that chain and you look at where actually there's revenue to be made, it's at the end of the chain and it's usually the sellers of the seafood. Okay, so think about that a little bit, whether you're worried about overfishing or piracy or forced labor, whether it's on land at the farms or on the ships. Regardless of your worry, the end beneficiary are us as consumers who eat the seafood and those who sell it to us, the retailers. To me, that's where the pressure could be applied and hasn't been brought up as much in this discussion. Import controls gets us somewhat there, but applying a lot of the burden on the retailers who sell seafood and insisting that they are the ones who track their supply chains because they're the ones who are profiting from the sale of the seafood in the end and requiring them to decide and show that it's safe for them to use ships that are involved with flags of convenience or it's safe for them to use Chinese processing plants.
Putting the pressure back on those market players is something that the EU could actually do a lot better. And furthermore, if you look historically at other movements that are supply chain focused movements, let's think about them: sweatshop garment, conflict diamonds, dolphin-free tuna, fair trade coffee. Okay, these are all products that had their historical reckoning when lots of journalists and lawmakers and NGOs said there are bad things, child labor, environmental harm in these products and we need to fix it. If you look at how those things played out, you see that it was a lot of the retailers that were pressured by lawmakers to do a better job at showing their supply chains and policing their supply chains and using market pressure to basically say, look, no more of these products can come into the EU market unless you retailers can prove which ships, which plants are being used and you can show us them and you can also prove that no forced labor or IUU is infiltrating that supply chain. So that's I suppose the place that I would encourage you to put more attention if possible.
Julien Daudu
Merci beaucoup Madame la députée. Je vais peut-être tâcher de répondre d'abord à la question du député Millán Mon sur les cartons, le système de cartons. Vous avez demandé si ce système est efficace, s'il doit être remplacé par un autre système. Je ne crois pas qu'il doive être remplacé et je pense oui qu'il est efficace. Nous l'avons vu, nous avons des bureaux en Thaïlande, en Corée du Sud, nous avons vu ces effets transformatifs et nous avons vu qu'ils se traduisent dans des changements concrets des politiques de ces pays mais aussi dans l'incidence de la pêche illégale dans les flottes de ces pays.
Néanmoins, c'est un travail sans fin. Travail sans fin parce que les réformes d'un jour peuvent être détricotées le lendemain. C'est aussi un travail sans fin parce que nous l'avons vu, un navire peut tout simplement changer de pavillon et du coup la Commission, les États membres doivent mettre leurs efforts ailleurs. Pour moi ça implique trois choses. Ça implique que la Commission et les États membres aient des ressources nécessaires pour mener leur travail.
Ça implique aussi de traiter la question des bénéficiaires effectifs parce que oui on peut courir après les navires mais les navires sont des objets.
Ce que l'on veut atteindre, c'est au final les individus derrière et peut-être ma collègue Vanya développera par rapport à cela. Et enfin, ça implique des mesures commerciales. Je crois fondamentalement que le règlement INN n'est crédible vis-à-vis des pays tiers et ne peut réaliser son plein potentiel que si nous avons un contrôle suffisant au niveau des États membres. Comment peut-on demander à la Chine de réformer par exemple son système si au cours des trois, cinq dernières années, il y a eu au final 0,04 % de vérification ou 0,4 % de vérification, vous m'excusez, et deux refus, neuf refus, ça se compte sur les doigts de deux mains. Pouvons-nous être crédibles ?
Je n'en suis pas sûr. Et c'est là où je pense que la Commission doit jouer son rôle de gardienne des traités auprès des États membres en exigeant un renforcement des contrôles. Des mesures ont été prises, je crois qu'il y a eu une procédure d'infraction vis-à-vis du Portugal notamment, il y a des mesures aussi vis-à-vis des Pays-Bas sur ces questions-là, donc nous encourageons à aller beaucoup plus loin. Et tout ça, ça se lie également à la question des accords commerciaux où il faut une meilleure cohérence entre les accords commerciaux et la politique IUU et les autres politiques. On peut réfléchir à les chapitres TSD, Trade and Sustainable Chapter dans les accords.
Est-ce qu'ils sont réellement mis en œuvre ? Faut-il les mettre en œuvre de façon plus stricte ? Il y a aussi le système de préférences généralisées plus où les États qui bénéficient de ce système, de ces tarifs réduits ou nuls, doivent respecter un certain nombre de conventions. Je crois que dans ces conventions, il n'y a pas les conventions de base sur la mer, il n'y a pas la convention par exemple sur le travail forcé, la C188. Alors je pense que peut-être c'est encore en négociation ce sujet, je dois reconnaître que je ne le suis pas au jour le jour, mais ça pose effectivement une question sur ces outils commerciaux.
Et enfin, je crois, parce qu'il est aussi question de travail forcé, je crois que ce que l'on voit, c'est que le règlement INN, en tout cas nous, nous le soutenons pleinement et nous en voyons les effets positifs, mais nous voyons aussi qu'il a pris un certain temps avant de produire ses effets et d'être opérationnel. Et c'est là où je crois qu'il est très important que le règlement pour le travail forcé et les unités en charge de sa mise en œuvre, pardon, apprennent de l'expérience du règlement INN, s'inspirent de l'expérience du règlement INN pour ne pas d'une certaine manière reproduire les mêmes erreurs, si tant est qu'on puisse utiliser le mot erreur, et que celui-ci soit opérationnel dès le premier jour. Voilà, je vous remercie.
Isabelle LE CALLENNEC
Merci beaucoup, c'est très clair. Vanya, vous avez la parole.
Vanya Vulperhorst
Yes, thank you for the very interesting questions. I really appreciate it, also your interest. So to first indeed come to some of the questions of Mr. Cabral, what can we do, how can we use the Ocean Pact, but also Mr. Giacommo, what can we do also for our fishers and our market. So I think here it's we shouldn't underestimate the power of the EU market. So indeed we can use that to better control what's coming in and to make sure that EU consumers are not having seafood on their plate that's unethically fished or possibly illegally fished.
So really here it's also key that there's better information and better traceability. So there is no consumer information for 50% of the seafood that is consumed in Europe. So either processed products or in restaurants. This can be changed by changing the Common Market Organisation regulation. This is also being evaluated currently.
And as Oceana, we recommend a targeted revision of this regulation so that consumers have the information.
Consumers can see in the supermarket, my fish is actually being caught in by Russian vessel and actually I don't want to eat this this seafood because of of geopolitical considerations. And so this is really a key thing that the EU can do relatively fast. They can require this. It's already required for frozen and fresh products and it's something that that can be done. Indeed also to use the the trade agreements that are being done better as as Julian also said.
We need to make sure that what's coming into the EU market is actually meeting the standards of the EU because we want the EU operators to be able to survive in the future. They have to meet very high standards in terms of control, in terms of sustainability, so let's ask and also let's make their life possible and their livelihood possible by asking at least imports to do the same. So also here to respectfully disagree with Mr. Dröge to say that the catch import system and the digital system wouldn't work and actually negatively affect fishers. I disagree because here it would be actually helpful for them to stop illegally caught fishing products and to help small-scale fishers make a living and actually not be undercut by prices that have been able to put on the market because they're actually using forced labor on board. And similarly to what Mr. Millán Mon said, the the worries are there about the catch certificate the catch system and the the operationalization of it.
But here again, it is about stopping illegal fish coming into the EU market, which benefits EU operators. We all want the European fleet and European importers to have sustainable and not illegally caught fish. So I think here it is about operationalizing, making sure it happens and it works for operators, but really it is the system that can help. And so also to to come back to the question of Madame Fourau on the fishmeal and fish oil. So there is currently no requirement for fishmeal products coming into the EU.
So as I mentioned, for frozen or fresh products, there is an information requirement for consumers. This is not the case for fishmeal fish oil. They also don't need to have a catch certificate. So whereas other products need to have a catch certificate, this is not the case for fishmeal products. So these are again things that that operators need to and decision-makers need to look at.
What is going on in the in the Southern Ocean, I think also because of the efforts of Interpol and the coordination between members of CAMLR for the Patagonian toothfish, the illegal fishing has decreased. On krill fishing, I'm not the expert, but I know that on Patagonian toothfish with the international cooperation that took decades as I as I explained, it has put the spotlight on illegal fishing there. Also on on the question of European-owned vessels and flags of convenience, indeed there we found 105 EU-owned vessels using a database called Lloyd's List Intelligence. This is something that is a paid subscription and that I think the EU authorities also have access to. So this is information that we unfortunately need to pay for.
It should be actually publicly available because this is something that non-EU countries, small-scale fishers actually would like to have, the information of the real ownership of a vessel. Because this avoids to have monopolies of fishing rights, big companies that own fishing vessels everywhere in the world and that perhaps block small-scale fishers from getting access. And also it blocks authorities from being able to investigate who actually owns these these vessels. So we call on member states to start collecting the data. That is one of the key problems.
Member states are not collecting data for EU-flagged vessels, there's not necessarily beneficial ownership information being collected, but member states are definitely not collecting it for EU-owned vessels. So the examples I was saying like Belize-flagged, Belgium-owned, there's no database in any member state that is collecting information on these EU-owned vessels that are foreign-flagged.
That's the first step that needs to happen. Again, European Commission should also have the oversight here. This is something that is undermining the credibility of the EU internationally. It's undermining the level playing field of the EU operators who have to send their VMS every two hours, who send their logbook every day, and they're operating within the measures that exist within EU-flagged vessels. They're being undercut by EU-owned vessels that are sending their profits back to the EU.
Then also going, oh sorry, I'm overspilling my time. One last point, the Long Distance Advisory Council has recommendations how to measure, how to manage joint ventures better. Again, it's about making an EU register for joint ventures, and this is also linked to how we can improve this SMEF. Thank you.
Cindy Buckley
Thank you, Chair, and thank you for the thoughtful questions and comments. Can I see the next slide, please? I think I can field the questions involving prosecuting criminals, Interpol's investigative stream, drug trafficking, human rights abuses, and greater national security concerns, as well as what we can do together to tackle these crimes. So, as the slide depicts, the way Interpol works is we have our member countries who are our customers, and more specifically the national fisheries authorities, customs agencies, the national police, and environmental protection agencies. They can communicate with us through our national central bureaus.
We have a secure information system called I-24/7 where these entities can make requests to us for help. They can also provide data and information that we can then take into our Interpol criminal information system. This can further be brought up to our unit's criminal analysis file where we can look at it and cross-reference it with open source information, information we already have on file, and information from other international organizations. We then can take that enhanced information and produce intelligence products and analytical reports back to those initial requesters. And then we can make recommendations as far as what capabilities might be best suited to meet their request.
We can coordinate multilateral meetings. We can conduct live mentoring during operations, classroom instruction, support to cases on the ground from start to finish, ushering those right to the prosecutor's office, as well as support to operations. Next slide. So I talked about our operational cycle and that model that we think is really well suited to tackle these issues. It involves a platform vessel, a security team, an Interpol expert team for operational support, and then ship riders from member countries for authority and jurisdiction.
This vessel was boarded during one such operation. It was boarded because of intelligence that we helped enhance and provide back to our member countries. It's a fishing vessel, and it looks like a fishing vessel, right? Only in this case there were no fish and there was no fishing equipment on board. Next slide.
Instead, nearly six tons of cocaine were seized, seven individuals were arrested, the vessel was also seized. Lucky for us, there were 12 electronic devices which we were able to exploit and extract the information from to help outline a criminal organization. And from there we were able to notify several other countries of this investigation and get them involved.
Next slide. This is another case, a boarding, intelligence-driven law enforcement boarding. This is obviously also a fishing vessel. In this case it did have fish and fishing equipment. Next slide.
But there were other problems. There was fraudulent documentation, lack of documentation, no safety equipment or standards, but probably the most problematic was that there was three undocumented crew members, which clearly poses a greater national security issue when these individuals are freely moving in and out of ports. When they were later identified, one of these individuals was found to have a criminal history involving IUU fishing. Next slide. And lastly I would just like to make mention of this tool, our Interpol notices.
It's a great tool for information sharing between our member countries. We have our red notices of course like you see in the movies for wanted persons, but we also have blue notices where we can locate individuals and find out more information, green notices for warnings and intelligence, purple notices for modus operandi and our new silver notice where we can trace criminal assets. And in fact we have two silver notices right now involving IUU fishing cases. And with that, again I think these examples demonstrate how international cooperation, intelligence exchange and coordinated enforcement are really essential to addressing fisheries-related crime and the broader criminal networks that profit from it. And again thank you for your time and attention today.
Chair.
Henrique Portela Guedes
Eu vou portanto responder em português. Muito obrigado pelas questões que foram colocadas e pelos comentários que foram aqui feitos. Eu iria começar pela questão colocada pelo senhor Nascimento em relação às condições sociais e no fundo fatores que contribuem para a existência de pirataria. Como eu disse no início na minha apresentação, essencialmente a pirataria na região do Golfo da Guiné provém de piratas nigerianos. Há um conjunto de situações que posso elencar como fracas condições sociais, nomeadamente os piratas provêm da zona do Delta do Rio Níger, são sete estados que constituem essa área.
É uma zona pobre, de facto as condições sociais lá são baixas, são pequenas em termos de acesso ao ensino, acesso à saúde, acesso à habitação, à eletricidade, à água, etc. O que é que isso resulta? Resulta que de facto há muito desemprego, há muita pobreza. Não podemos esquecer que cerca de 70 milhões de nigerianos têm entre os 20 e os 40 anos, portanto podem ver que é fácil até certo ponto perante estas condições sociais de haver recrutamento não só para a pirataria como para outro tipo de crimes que também foram aqui falados. Portanto é de facto um assunto que a Nigéria, o governo nigeriano tem que resolver.
Eles estão a fazer um esforço só que as coisas levam normalmente tempo mas nota-se alguma melhoria. Depois temos também que no caso dos piratas existe uma grande impunidade. Ao longo destes últimos anos tem-se estado a melhorar. Os países do Golfo da Guiné normalmente não tinham leis apropriadas ao combate à pirataria marítima. A maioria dos estados neste momento já tem.
Tem havido uma grande pressão da comunidade internacional e nomeadamente da União Europeia nesse sentido e de facto nota-se que já há um conjunto de países com legislação antipirataria, umas são mais robustas, outras são menos robustas.
Contudo, é assim, não basta só capturar os piratas, é preciso depois fazer todo o processo e por vezes também se falha logo no início que é na recolha de prova. Captura os piratas, mas não se faz a recolha de prova suficiente para depois haver um julgamento e uma condenação. Continua a ser rentável, é outra das coisas que leva a que a pirataria continue a existir. É rentável, posso-vos dizer que a captura normalmente o modus operandi nesta região funciona em sequestrar elementos das tripulações para depois obter resgate. O resgate de um pescador, de um tripulante, de um comandante, de um engenheiro de uma embarcação ou de um mestre no caso de uma embarcação de pesca pode render à volta de 40 mil dólares.
Portanto, se generalizarem isso para que numa embarcação possam ser sequestrados dois, três elementos podem ver quanto é que só uma embarcação pode vir a render aos piratas. Portanto, continua a ser um tipo de atividade que tem ganhos por parte dos piratas. Fraca vigilância, o mar como sabem é muito extenso e é difícil por mais que as marinhas estejam apetrechadas e posso-vos dizer tem havido também fruto de muitos apoios financeiros, em recursos humanos e materiais da União Europeia, tem havido de facto um grande reforço das marinhas quer na aquisição de meios, quer de recursos humanos pelos próprios países em no fundo recrutar mais elementos para as marinhas para de facto fazer face a esta situação. A Nigéria tem alguns programas a decorrer como o Deep Blue, por exemplo, o Falcon Eye que são programas que também muitos financiados por entidades externas que têm feito com que se esteja a mitigar neste momento o número de atos de pirataria marítima que vêm a ocorrer normalmente desde 2020. Portanto, há aqui de facto um conjunto de sinergias que têm sido gastas no sentido de minimizar esta situação.
Portanto, os números falam por si, há menos atos de pirataria marítima desde 2020 e eu penso que há que dar continuidade a estes projetos. Apenas isso, não é preciso à partida novos projetos. Em relação à questão que foi colocada pelo senhor Francisco, em relação no fundo como é que se pode mitigar isto. Eu gostaria de andar um bocadinho para trás no tempo. A pirataria marítima existe desde os primórdios da navegação marítima.
Quando começaram a existir as primeiras trocas comerciais por mar começou a haver pirataria marítima. Logo é algo que eu defendo desde há muitos anos, eu já estudo este assunto há cerca de duas décadas, jamais se conseguirá erradicar com a pirataria marítima. Conseguiremos é minimizar o número de atos, ou seja, mitigar. Houve um acordo muito importante em 2013 no que respeita à parte africana que foi o código de conduta de Yaoundé que reuniu 25 chefes de estados da Comissão Económica da África Central, da África Ocidental e da Comissão do Golfo da Guiné. Isto para dizer que daí resultou a arquitetura de Yaoundé na qual existem vários centros de coordenação, nomeadamente oito, em que o objetivo principal é de facto a troca de informação.
Esses centros também receberam muito apoio da União Europeia e de facto neste momento já funcionam praticamente em pleno. Tem algumas limitações, mas já vão conseguindo atingir o objetivo. Isso tem ajudado muito também na troca de informação nos estados da portanto do neste caso do Golfo da Guiné. Outra coisa que também tem acontecido aqui tem havido muitos exercícios nomeadamente desde 2010 com o Obangame Express portanto coordenado pelos Estados Unidos anualmente, o exercício francês o Grand African NEMO e um brasileiro também que têm contado já com mais de 30 estados.
Também se tem refletido bastante na capacitação dos estados do Golfo da Guiné. Há vários exercícios navais também a decorrer, às vezes realizados entre marinhas de alguns países e os países do Golfo da Guiné. E há também o grupo conjunto de patrulhas marítimas coordenadas, e eu vou tentar ser breve, que também tem ajudado muito a, no fundo, mitigar essas situações. O que é que pode acontecer, e um bocadinho o que estava aqui o senhor Francisco a dizer, pode acontecer é aqui: o combate à pirataria marítima começar a ser, de facto, feito de uma forma que a capacidade de manobra dos piratas é menor e poder haver uma transição desses piratas para outro tipo de atividades: tráfico de droga, tráfico de armas, tráfico de seres humanos com a utilização das suas embarcações e mesmo dos próprios piratas, porque a gente já sabe, aqui não há espaços vazios, se eles começarem a ser muito controlados na área da pirataria, poderão dedicar-se a outras áreas. Mas isso realmente só o futuro saberá, mas para já o que interessa aqui focar é que de facto a pirataria tem reduzido bastante.
Muito obrigado.
Isabelle Le Callennec
Merci infiniment. Merci, merci à tous pour vos analyses, vos conseils, vos recommandations. Je pense qu'il peut être utile à ce stade peut-être de donner la parole à la représentante de la DG MARE, Adela Rey, que je remercie de sa présence, pour nous éclairer en fait sur les actions qui sont concrètement mises en œuvre et puis la coordination qui est nécessaire avec les États membres. Est-ce que c'est possible? Merci à vous, merci, après avoir entendu à la fois nos intervenants mais aussi les questions des députés.
Merci.
Your microphone please. Thank you.
Adela Rey Aneiros
Thank you. Good morning. I would like to maybe focus on a couple of issues mentioned here this morning, very interesting discussion and productive for us. I would refer to the IUU dialogues and to Catch. Through the IUU dialogues, be it contacts formally, informally, we are in contact with all 93 third countries that are exporting to the EU.
And we have seen, and thank you to Mr. Dadu for acknowledging it, the successes and the changes in third countries through the years of efforts put by the European Commission in revamping these third countries' systems, overall in control and enforcement. And we are working with most of the flag of convenience countries, identified internationally or commonly understood as flag of convenience. Let me clarify that being a flag of convenience is not per se illegal. Therefore, it would be easier for us if it was a clear avenue for us to tackle this element through the IUU regulation, being it illegal, but we have to focus on the illegalities behind the concept of the flag of convenience.
And we have seen as well these changes in third countries under dialogue where entire fleets leave this registry of this country we are in dialogue with to go to another country. Same way that the reduction on port entries for certain fleets, we are seeing it when we enter in a dialogue with a third country and the country is, the third country is revamping the system. If there are EU nationals involved, they will see the revamping of the system, they will see the enforcement system, the control system reinforced, a better management in that third country. So that's what we can do, let's say, through the avenue of that flag state third country where our EU nationals can legally have a vessel flagged. But also we have transmitted all the information we receive, we have transmitted to our member states on any potential links to red carded countries, ownership, beneficial ownership, etc.
And we are really attentive to this. And we, every time we come across a potential crime, be it labor, tax, money laundering, etc., we are in close contact with the competent services. We work with Interpol closely, but also we have seen during years investigations by OLAF that we have initiated, let's say, that are not public and known, but they are happening, even currently there are some with the public prosecutor that we cannot, of course, disclose anything, but this happens and we are, I mean, the intelligence we gather, we communicate to the competent authorities, FISMA, TAXUD, and we investigate. The same happens, I mean, the example mentioned of Thailand, for instance, where we reacted and involved our colleagues, and we are in close contact, and I will, if you allow me, pass the floor to my colleagues in DG TRADE and GROW who are dealing with the forced labor regulation, we are going to be in close contact for sure in the future. And regarding CATCH, CATCH is a jewel.
So we cannot put it at risk. It's painful, our operators are complaining, yes, our member states are complaining, yes, because it's painful, because it was easier with a paper that can be forged. Now we have seen since January more verifications, rejections, etc., than in years because we gather a lot of intelligence and the controls are better carried out by our member states. Now it's working, but we have to go through a period of adjustment. And of course, I mean, we are putting our best on this, we are 15, let me remind you, and our member states might not have devoted to these services to the control of the catch certificates so many resources in the past, but they need to do it now.
We do our best with the system, with the communications, we are dealing with the communications with all third countries, oh, I have gone overtime, with, we're working with third countries pushing for them to use directly use CATCH or being it interoperable, but it's the way forward for sure.
The intelligence we're gathering and we're that it allow, it will allow us to work with third countries is huge. Well, thank you. And yeah, I don't know if I may, yeah, briefly to our colleagues on forced labor. Thank you.
Isabelle Le Callennec
Oui, merci beaucoup, merci de compléter effectivement sur le travail forcé et dire à mes collègues qu'il nous restera peut-être quelques minutes si vous souhaitez reposer une ou deux questions, mais quelques minutes après. Mais la parole est à vous, merci beaucoup.
Ana Peña
Thank you, Chair. Ana Peña for DG GROW, policy officer at the forced labor team. So we are together with the trade colleagues in charge of overseeing the implementation of the forced labor regulation. Just to inform that the forced labor regulation will enter into application as of 14th December 2027. So for the time being, we are carrying out the preparatory work and getting ready for the implementation and adopting the necessary tools, at the same time as entering into dialogue with all the Directorate-Generals that in a way or another will be involved also in our investigations, like it is the case of DG MARE for the fishing sector.
Just to mention that as of 14th December 2027, we will have in place a forced labor portal where there will be the possibility of submit complaints about forced labor through the single information submission point that will be available for any legal entity, citizen, worker or victim that have evidence of any possible forced labor happening in products that have a link with the EU market. So we will investigate always those products and economic operators with a link to the EU market. And well, for more info, we can provide if needed more information. We are very grateful for the all the presentations received here and we think that all the investigations that have been carried out by the different actors will be also very useful to inform the investigations that the Commission will will carry out. Also just to mention that there is a division of labor regarding investigations on forced labor.
So the Commission, DG GROW, will take over the investigations that are happening in third countries outside the European Union and the European Union member states' competent authorities will take over of all those cases of forced labor that are happening within EU territory or within EU member states. Thank you so much.
Isabelle Le Callennec
Merci beaucoup et merci d'être là finalement toutes les trois parce que c'est vrai que c'est un travail qui est à mener avec les différentes DG, donc c'est important pour nous de savoir aussi que vous travaillez ensemble. Est-ce que nos collègues députés ont une ou deux autres questions à poser ou est-ce qu'on considère que nous avons suffisamment d'éléments pour essayer d'avancer tous ensemble ? Merci infiniment de vos présentations très utiles, très concrètes. On a beaucoup de travail à faire pour améliorer la situation. Je crois qu'il y a une volonté politique clairement affirmée, que ce travail doit se faire évidemment au niveau européen, mais aussi, et vous avez beaucoup insisté là-dessus, au niveau de nos États membres, donc chacun doit balayer aussi devant sa porte.
Donc merci infiniment, le travail doit se poursuivre et merci vraiment à tous pour votre implication et votre engagement. C'est aussi important pour nous de faire savoir à nos citoyens qu'il est important de savoir d'où provient en fait ou d'où proviennent les produits de la mer qu'ils consomment.
Donc je crois qu'on doit continuer aussi à communiquer sur la réalité de ce qui se passe. On sait que la pêche européenne est parmi les plus contrôlées au monde et que ce n'est pas forcément le cas de toutes les pêcheries. Mais il faut que le consommateur, ça a été très bien dit par notre premier interlocuteur, que le consommateur soit bien au courant et que celui qui vend au bout du bout sache d'où provient effectivement la marchandise entre guillemets. Merci infiniment. C'est quelque part rassurant de savoir tout ce qui se met en place mais malgré tout il faut vraiment continuer les efforts.
Merci à tous. Et je crois que c'était le dernier point et que chers collègues nous redémarrons à 14h30 avec une audition très importante de notre commissaire Costas Kadis à la pêche et aux océans sur l'évaluation de la politique commune de la pêche. Merci à vous.
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