Subcommittee on Human Rights Ordinary meeting
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DROI European Parliament
Follow its sittingsMichal Wiezik
Let me begin by saying this. Our Parliament has adopted a resolution in November 2025 after the distressing scenes we saw in the aftermath of the general election, condemning the unlawful and excessive use of force by Tanzanian security forces, the mass arrests, the nationwide shutdown of the internet and the detention of the opposition leader Tundu Lissu. Just last week, the Parliament said no to the Commission's funding plans for Tanzania unless the protection of human rights improves. The position of the Parliament is clear. We condemn these acts, we denounce these wrongdoings and we urge for better, for respect for human rights.
I would also like to acknowledge the extraordinary courage of our guests, as they are taking risks for being here.
We know the situation is dire and very critical. We know the situation is dangerous, so I can only thank you for being here to provide us with the important first-hand information on what is happening on the ground in Tanzania. With my colleagues from the delegation to EU-Africa Parliamentary Assembly, we went on mission to Eswatini last month and met with parliamentarians from across the African continent.
The assembly was a moment of open dialogue between our two continents and we found common ground, common ground that is rooted in respect for the rights of all. In Eswatini, we adopted many important recommendations which addressed also human rights, democracy and governance. We call for a closer Africa-EU coordination to defend democratic principles and human rights, as well as strengthening support African-led initiatives. On that topic, I would like to ask Madame Magabe, what is the latest news on your husband?
Have you been able to access him and what are the conditions he is right now in Tanzania? And to Madame Lerdoff too, whether there has been any update on the conditions of Mr. Polpol. And to Mr. Onyala, he will be probably online, thank you for being with us here as well. Amnesty International has recommended that international actors take decisive actions in the face of erosion of fundamental rights and the repression of the Tanzanian people. What do you expect from European and international actors?
What more can those with leverage do in this dire situation? Thank you very much once again for allowing me to have this introduction and I'm really looking forward all of your response.
Thank you once again.
Mounir Satouri
Merci, chers collègues, pour cette intervention. J'ai maintenant l'honneur d'accueillir, vous l'avez un peu dit, des intervenants de tout premier plan pour poursuivre cette importante discussion sur la Tanzanie. Madame Agnès Lerdorf, qui est la sœur de Humphrey Polepole. Ce dernier a occupé les fonctions d'ambassadeur de la Tanzanie au Malawi, puis à Cuba. Vous allez partager avec nous un témoignage personnel et familial concernant l'enlèvement présumé de votre frère à Dar es Salaam en Tanzanie le 6 octobre 2025.
Vous avez, chère madame, la parole pour quatre minutes.
Agnes Polepole Lerdorf
Honorable members of the European Parliament, thank you for allowing me to speak. My name is Agnes Polepole Lerdorf, I'm Tanzanian living in Denmark, and I stand before you today not merely a witness, but as a voice for the voiceless, the terrorized and the exiled. I speak as a sister of a patriot who loved his country too deeply to remain silent. My brother Humphrey Polepole devoted much of his life serving Tanzania. He rose through the ranks of ruling party and later served as Tanzanian's ambassador to Cuba.
He believed deeply in his country and his duty of public service. Yet when he began speaking openly about corruption, injustice, and the growing erosion of democratic freedom, he became a target. The consequences for our family were devastating. My elderly mother was repeatedly harassed. My sister was abducted and brutally assaulted.
We live under constant intimidation. Then on the night of 6th October 2025, my brother was taken. Witnesses have alleged the involvement of state security officials.
Speaker 7
Blood was left behind. Humphrey disappeared. Since that night, we have heard nothing, no answers, no accountability, no justice.
Every day my family lives with the agony of not knowing of fate of our loved one. It is cruelty that family should ever have to endure. Suddenly, Humphrey's case is not an isolated one. Across Tanzania, journalists, opposition figures, Tundu Lissu, human defender, human rights defender, and ordinary citizens have faced intimidation, imprisonment, violence, and enforcement disappearance for exercising rights they should belong to every human being. This is not simply of political issues, it's a human one.
It concerns dignity, liberty, and the rule of law. I respectfully ask this Parliament to call for an independent international investigation into the disappearance of Humphrey Polepole and all reported cases of abduction and enforced disappearance in Tanzania. I ask you to demand accountability from the Tanzanian authorities and to ensure that human rights remain central to the European Union's engagement with Tanzania. And if serious violations continue without investigation consequences, I ask you to consider targeted sanctions against those responsible, not to punish a nation, but to protect its people. The people of Tanzania deserve the same freedom that Europeans cherish: the freedom to speak, to participate in public life, and to live without fear.
Today I ask you to stand with the families who are still waiting for answers, stand with those who have been silenced, stand with those who have loved one in the thousand have been confirmed killed by security organs, stand with those who have disappeared. And above all, stand with the Tanzanian people in their pursuit of justice, dignity and freedom. My brother's fate remain unknown, but silence must not be the final answer until the truth is known, until those responsible has held accountable and until every family can live without fear and struggle continues.
I ask you today, stand on the side of truth, stand on the side of justice, stand with the people of Tanzania. Thank you.
Mounir Satouri
Merci, chère madame, pour ce témoignage. Je crois que tout le monde a ressenti l'émotion que vous avez transmise et écouté le message fort que vous avez exprimé.
Ça vaut ce que ça vaut, mais notre résolution de novembre 2015 a cité le cas de votre frère et nous continuerons d'exiger que toute la lumière soit faite et que les questions que vous posiez ici puissent trouver une réponse. Je vais donner maintenant la parole à Alicia Bosencera, qui est l'épouse de Tandi Lisu. Vous l'avez cité dans votre intervention. Je vous donne la parole, chère madame, pour quatre minutes.
Alicia Bosencera
Ladies and gentlemen of the EU Parliament Subcommittee on Human Rights. Thank you for the opportunity to address you today.
I'm here to express my views about my family experiences. However, I have chosen to focus instead on one family member, my husband, Tundu Lissu. Tundu Lissu is the chairman of Chadema, Tanzania's largest opposition political party.
Tundu is held in remand at the Ukonga prison in the outskirts of Dar es Salaam since 9th April of last year, falsely charged with treason for merely calling for reforms to ensure free and fair elections in Tanzania. If found guilty, if found guilty, he would be sentenced to death.
In the few minutes that I have with you today, I want to underscore the many years of abuses Tundu has endured in his fight for the rule of law, democracy, human rights, and a government that is accountable to its citizens.
I hope you will agree with me that those who fight for the rule of law, human rights, and democracy in Tanzania, as in other countries, need concrete assistance and support from the international community because these are people who work peacefully to promote and protect universally recognized human rights. Tundu, for three decades, worked for people-centered peaceful reforms in Tanzania. With his master's degree in law, he became a senior advocate, a former president of the Tanzanian Bar, a former member of parliament for Singida East for nearly 10 years, a former vice chairman of CHADEMA, and presently the chairman of CHADEMA. His commitment to public service is no doubt unquestionable.
Tundu's entire adult life has been dedicated to improving broken systems and championing progressive change. He has tirelessly fought for legal rights and public policies for the underrepresented and the general public at large. In 2017, his vocal opposition in parliament to regime abuses of power resulted in every family's worst nightmare: assassination attempt.
On 7 September 2017, as Tundu pulled into his driveway of his parliamentary residence in Dodoma, two gunmen followed him, fired 36 shots into his vehicle, and 16 of which hit his body. He was stabilized in Dodoma, airlifted to Nairobi, and then later relocated here in Belgium, where he received treatment for three years.
To date, I do recall how one day while in Nairobi, I was told to pack and leave a premise which was less than 500 meters from the hospital because some social alarm had been raised to the effect that a person believed to have been an abductor had checked into the premise that I was staying. I knew fear then as I have never known fear. To support, with the support of individuals and other organizations, we were able to leave and safely come here.
In 2020, Tundu, being hopeful, he returned to Tanzania and ran for the presidential elections as Chadema party's candidate.
But then soon after the election, again we had to leave and come here because of security concerns. In 2023, Tundu decided to return to Tanzania and continue the fight for democracy, human rights, and accountability of those in power because he believed that Samia Suluhu's government was serious when it said things were going to be different under her regime.
However, this was not the case. He was arrested several times. And in January of last year, he was elected the chairperson of the of the of Chadema. And a few weeks later, on April 9th, he was arrested, transported overnight a distance of about 1000 kilometers from the southern part of Tanzania. And the next day, he was taken to court and charged for treason and other cybercrime offenses.
The case took a very long time to start, but it eventually the trial eventually started in September. The trial has been going on at a rather snail pace.
It, there's been several adjournments, some of them without due reasons.
And as we speak, he has not been in court for any substantive hearing since February. And we are told that the case will continue again on the 3rd of July, and that on the 6th of July, the Court of Appeal will make a ruling in association to orders that were made in the High Court against which the Director of Public Prosecution has appealed. So that's where we are. That's where we are. So Tundu remains in remand prison.
Yes, they say he has not been sentenced. They say he's not in prison. Tundu Lissu is in prison. He's in remand prison. And in Tanzania, there is a very fine line between somebody who is in a remand center or in a remand prison and somebody who's actually serving a sentence.
The conditions are not substantially different. Tundu has been denied his fundamental rights to having confidential consultation with his lawyers, to meeting friends, and sometimes even to meeting some family members.
So and these are very these are very fundamental rights that are not being observed in Tanzania. Now I ask myself if the leader of the opposition party in Tanzania can be treated this way how about the many thousands of people being held in custody all over the country? How are they being treated? So this is what the families goes families of those detained and arrested go through in Tanzania.
Mounir Satouri
Je pense que le message a été entendu. Des questions vont peut-être avoir réponse. Et je vais donner maintenant la parole à Seifullah Onyala, en ligne, chercheur principal chez Amnesty International pour l'Afrique de l'Est et du Sud. Vous avez la parole pour six minutes. Allez-y.
Sikula Onyala
Thank you very much for the opportunity to speak with you about the deteriorating human rights situation in Tanzania.
Following on three European Parliament resolutions on Tanzania since May 2025, our discussion today is as welcome and as urgently needed as ever. Since the October 2025 post-election crackdown in Tanzania that saw hundreds of people killed, thousands injured, and some 2,000 others arbitrarily arrested and most of them charged with treason, there has been no remarkable improvement in the country's human rights situation. On November 14th, 2025, President Samia Suluhu announced the formation of a commission of inquiry to investigate the killings that occurred during and after the elections. In late April this year, the commission of inquiry's report was handed to the president but was ultimately withheld from the public.
This was a huge blow to transparency and any efforts toward achieving justice. The commission of inquiry report found at least 518 people died of unnatural causes, including from gunshot injuries, at the hands of security forces. The publication of this report is still pending today, even as other violations have continued.
On February 23rd, 2026, Tanzanian human rights defender Mushabaha Mushabaha Hamza survived an abduction in Nairobi by suspected Tanzania security agents in a show of transnational repression conducted by the Tanzanian government. In March 2026, the police teargassed and arrested about 200 women members of the main opposition party's women league while they were on transit to Musoma region to commemorate the International Women's Day. Still in March 2026, the police teargassed and arrested about 200 members of the main opposition, sorry, still in March 2026, four leaders of the second largest opposition party, ACT-Wazalendo, were arbitrarily arrested in Kagera region.
In April this year, Pauline Palangyo, a young Tanzanian activist, was arbitrarily arrested and subjected to incommunicado detention for nine days. On 20th May this year, David Jumbe, the personal assistant to Tanzania's opposition leader Tundu Lissu, was abducted by state security agents in Dar es Salaam, who subjected him to severe beatings which may amount to torture and ill-treatment. Amnesty International is calling on the Tanzanian authorities to finally release the commission of inquiry report to allow victims' families and members of the public to have an opportunity to know the scope of the investigations, procedures followed, its findings, and their factual and legal basis. This will be a crucial step for the authorities to re-establish transparency and work toward accountability.
In follow-up, the Tanzanian government must immediately launch independent, transparent, and effective investigations into the deaths at the hands of the security forces during the electoral period and bring those responsible to account. In the same spirit, we urge the Tanzanian government to end all attacks on opposition party members, real or perceived government critics, human rights defenders, and journalists. This includes releasing those detained.
The government should immediately and unconditionally release Tundu Lissu and clarify the whereabouts and immediately release Ambassador Humphrey Polepole, who disappeared on October 6th, 2025. In parallel, the government must take wider systemic steps to reopen civic space, including ending internet shutdowns and repealing or amending the country's cybercrime and media laws, in particular the 2016 Media Services Act and the 2015 Cybercrimes Act. Crucially, the European Parliament has kept the escalating human rights situation in Tanzania on the agenda over the past year. It is a painful reflection of the wider situation in the country that members of European Parliament were unable to conduct their mission to Tanzania last month due to repeated delays that were tantamount to a refusal of their visit.
We hope the European Parliament will continue to keep the European Union's attention on human rights and accountability for violations in Tanzania at a time of many crises and concerns worldwide. As Amnesty International, we are calling on the European Union and its member states to redouble diplomatic efforts toward the Tanzanian authorities to end this repression immediately and take concrete steps towards accountability for election violence and for ongoing rights violations in Tanzania.
In parallel, the EU and its member states should work toward the release of detained individuals and lend their unequivocal support to Tanzania's embattled human rights defenders, journalists, civil society, and their important work. Just a few days ago, the EU expressed concern about Tanzania at the United Nations Human Rights Council, decrying the lack of accountability for widespread human rights violations in the context of the 2025 general elections, which is essential to ensure guarantees of non-repetition. The EU called for the publication of the Commission of Inquiry report as well as credible implementation of measures leading to accountability for the serious shortcomings it identified. Indeed, the first sign of the Tanzanian government's true commitment to human rights will be the full publication of the Commission of Inquiry report to take a concrete step toward accountability and transparency. Tanzania is at a crossroads after witnessing violence and violations at a scale never seen before.
The human rights and human rights stakes are enormous. We believe there's still an opportunity to create positive change by releasing all those detained for peacefully exercising their rights and ensuring accountability and acting toward justice. Thank you.
Mounir Satouri
Merci beaucoup. Je vais donner la parole maintenant à Jonas Jonsson, chef de la division pour la Corne de l'Afrique et l'Afrique de l'Est au SEAE.
Vous avez la parole pour six minutes.
Jonas Jonsson
Merci, Monsieur le Président. Honorable members of this house, dear colleagues and guests, and also whose testimonies, of course, have been, cannot leave us but very touched today. Thank you for your strong engagement, honorable members of this house, regarding EU's relationship with Tanzania. First, a few words on our relationship between the EU and Tanzania, and then I'll come to the specific issue of EU's response to the human rights situation in Tanzania.
Our relations are based on the EU-OACPS Samoa Agreement that include a common commitment to respect human rights, democracy and good governance, sustainable development and management of natural resources. In the current geopolitical context and within the reinforced EU-Africa relations, Tanzania is one of the countries where the EU certainly is looking for engagement in a broad range of policies. And we share joint objectives notably inclusive economic growth, sustainable development, increasing trade, business and investment opportunities, reducing poverty. All in line with Tanzania's own development goals and in the interest of the youth of the country which wants to have real prospects for the future.
The EU is also a strong development partner for Tanzania, bilaterally through our EU member states, but also at EU level, including through the African Union and international financial bodies. The EU and its member states are also strong investors in Tanzania. On the cooperation side, the Global Gateway strategy and increased engagements with the private sector are supporting the development priorities. Democracy, human rights, the rule of law are core principles for the European Union that guide our partnerships.
These are not only the headline issues but also matters of fundamental freedoms, information integrity, anti-discrimination, etc. And in this way, we would like to build on the past more than 50 years of EU-Tanzania partnership, notably with interest and care for the people of Tanzania and its continuous economic and political development at the heart of our engagement. Regrettably, the conditions for this partnership changed in the run-up to the October 2025 elections and especially after the events on election day.
Our reaction has been clear and public. On the violence surrounding the elections, our EU statement afterwards and the joint statement of 5 December 2025, co-signed by 17 countries, inter alia called for the release of political prisoners, for legal and medical access for detainees, and as well as calling for an independent international inquiry. On the 16th of June, as we have heard in the EU statement at the Human Rights Council, we also called for the publication of the inquiry commission's report, as well as credible implementation of measures leading to accountability.
The EU also encourages Tanzania to engage constructively with human rights mechanisms and continues to stress the importance of developing a fully-fledged multi-party system and of open inclusive dialogue with all stakeholders, in particular opposition parties and civil society. With that in mind, we have been closely following the response of the Tanzania authorities. We have remained engaged with them and expressed our concerns repeatedly and clearly at different levels, both in public and in high-level meetings, including visit of Foreign Minister Kombo to Brussels earlier this year.
It is important for Tanzania to take credible steps to heal the wounds and re-establish trust and social cohesion to achieve real peace and stability in Tanzania. The Tanzanians want a genuine commitment to a process of national reconciliation and a constructive political dialogue with the opposition. And we have called for the release of those still arrested, for transparent and fair trials for those arrested, including political leaders, notably Tundu Lissu. The cases of disappearances, as we have also heard about, need to be investigated and perpetrators need to be brought to justice.
Important that freedom of assembly and the right to peaceful demonstrations are respected in accordance with the constitution. We have always been committed to fostering an open and constructive dialogue based on our values, and in this spirit, we have recently held a high-level political dialogue with the Foreign Minister of Tanzania in Dar es Salaam. We agreed that we will continue political discussions, including on human rights, democracy, and the follow-up of the Commission of Inquiry on election-related violence, while continuing the call for the full publication of its report. This situation has resulted in a process of adjusting and recalibrating our relationship with Tanzania, which we will soon hear in this meeting more about.
Regarding the visit of this committee, let me reassure you that it remains on the agenda. We continue to engage with the Tanzanian authorities on the conditions for this visit to take place in the near future. It is important to seek further direct contacts between the European Parliament and the Tanzanian authorities, parliamentarians and beyond. The visit of the DEVE committee last year was such a good example of such an engagement. So to conclude, EU-Tanzania relations are not continuing as before the elections.
It is not business as usual. It is important to underline this and the message has been passed.
We continue to encourage Tanzania to take the necessary steps that will take them back up on a path of stability and economic prosperity ultimately. We are, as we will hear more about, recalibrating our relationship with Tanzania. We are engaging politically and diplomatically in Brussels, in Dar es Salaam and in the capitals of EU member states.
Mounir Satouri
Merci, Monsieur Johnson. Et pour conclure ces prises de parole au nom de la DG INTPA, la cheffe d'unité faisant fonction pour l'Afrique de l'Est et l'Afrique centrale, Madame Virginie de Ruyt. Allez-y. Six minutes.
Virginie de Ruyt
Merci beaucoup. Thank you, Chair, and honorable members, for inviting indeed the European Commission to this meeting and giving us the opportunity to exchange views on the human rights situation in Tanzania. And first, a message of solidarity with the speakers before me, and I admire your bravery for coming and testifying today in Brussels. First, the Commission fully recognizes the gravity of the human rights and democracy situation in Tanzania.
The loss of lives and numerous injuries in the wake of the elections are just terrible. Credible reports from domestic and international organizations show evidence of extrajudicial killings, disappearances, arbitrary arrests, and concealment of dead bodies. It is appalling and it is very disturbing. We fully share Parliament's concerns regarding the deterioration of democracy and human rights before, during, and after the October 2025 elections.
We've seen the lack of a credible and transparent democratic process for the Tanzanian people, the absence of a level playing field for the opposition, post-electoral violence, pressure on the opposition, and shrinking, sorry, civic space. The question for us was how to respond with maximum impact within the orientations provided by the European Council under the Common Foreign and Security Policy, whilst taking fully into consideration the statements and resolutions of the European Parliament and respecting the legal framework of the instruments at the Commission's disposal.
We have therefore since October 25 substantially recalibrated our relationship and cooperation with Tanzania. One. The Commissioner for International Partnerships, Commissioner Urpilainen, has engaged at political level during Foreign Minister Kabo's visit to Brussels at the end of January 26, where this latter also met with the High Representative Vice-President, the Vice-President of the European Parliament and the Political and Security Committee ambassadors.
Earlier in December 25, acting director for Africa in my DG for international partnership has summoned the Tanzanian ambassador to convey and amplify, together with the External Action Service, the EU concerns about Tanzania's situation regarding violence outbreaks and casualties around the elections. Two. Commissioner Sekela decided to suspend budget support. Around 70 million euros in payments have not been disbursed. Moreover, we will no longer use the implementing modality of budget support in the foreseeable future.
This is not symbolic. It is one of the strongest signals available to us and one that matters to the Tanzanian authorities. Three. We have revised our annual action plan for 2026.
Actions will no longer be implemented through the authorities, but directly through other implementing partners. An action plan of the Commission is not in itself sufficient as an instrument of political pressure, but excluding channeling of funds via the government adds again a very clear and strong signal. Our response has therefore been both political and operational. Sustained pressure on the authorities on the one hand and a substantial redesign of cooperation on the other, also in line with the requests of the European Parliament.
At the same time, we don't throw everything overboard. The changes that we have made in this cooperation target direct government support, but not the funding that we provide to NGOs, human rights defenders, journalists, and the wider population. Our revised approach preserves channels that can work with and for civil society, including through indirect management and trusted partners. This matters because support to civic space, accountability actors, journalists, and human rights defenders must remain part of the EU response, especially when democratic space is under pressure.
In addition and beyond the program of 2026, the EU has continued to reinforce substantially our support to Tanzanian civil society organizations.
Under the current multiannual financial framework, that is between 2021 and 2027, we have committed a total amount of 34 million euros through different instruments for CSO support, focusing on human rights and democratic governance, including freedom of expression, assembly and journalism, preserving the rule of law, but also youth engagement, gender equality and socio-economic development with a strong focus on local Tanzanian civil society-led initiatives promoting sustainable development in Tanzania. In conclusion, the deterioration of the rule of law and human rights situation is clear, we've seen it, we recognize it. And the Commission has acted accordingly with the revision of the annual action program, the stop of the budget support and the serious recalibration of our partnership with the country. There should be no misunderstanding here.
There are very few countries where we stop budget support disbursement and decide not to work through government systems. So I want to be explicit on this key point. What we are doing is not business as usual. It is sending a very strong signal. At the same time, staying engaged remains important, both to continue dialogue on key human sorry, human rights-related issues and to avoid harming ordinary Tanzanians more than those responsible for violations.
Thank you.
Mounir Satouri
Merci. Je vais donner la parole au collègue Hans-Olaf. Monsieur Henkel, vous voulez prendre la parole ? Allez-y.
Hans-Olaf Henkel
Thank you very much for sharing your experiences and bearing witness for us when it comes to the collapse of Tanzanian democracy. I feel very strongly when it comes to the future of the country that we should gear not merely to recalibrate anything or tweak anything. That's not the attitude we should have here. It makes me a little bit angry that Commission actually proposes tweaking or confuses pragmatism with spinelessness in these issues.
So we clearly reject and and are against oppose the annual action plan as it stands and and the Commission should understand the ramifications of of that. It is sometimes difficult to listen to such a nuanced language when it comes to a country that has just signed an agreement with Russia on digital sovereignty.
It is a joke that we have to recalibrate things in face of grave human rights violations that are ongoing and also future of the country if nothing is done. As you say, a lot of things have been done, but what I see is message unsent, message that hasn't been received, signaling that is failing. So with that, I will leave it here. Thanks.
Speaker 17
Natural. Thank you. Allow me not to recalibrate my statement on the issue. First, very sorry for your situation.
I would like to express my sympathy for the cruelty you are enduring, you and your families. And the only comfort I would like to express to you, there are people looking for what is happening in the country, there are people worried about the issue and you are not alone because sometimes probably you felt alone. And my main message to you is there are here in Europe many friends taking care of what's happening in your country and in your families. From the internal point of view, it's clear what is the drift of the country away from any kind of democracy.
From the internal point of view, it's clear what is the drift of the country away from any kind of democracy and the proof is clearly stated in the letter that the authorities of Tanzania has conveyed to the Parliament explaining or trying to, to defend the fact that the inquiry commission is not publicizing anything. We don't know even the number of people killed in this event and the explanation for not publicizing the results it's clearly very weak.
If you want really to protect the victims, you simply don't use names. And you can use another way to address the victims, as it happens in many other cases in the international life. Epstein files, you only to get rid of the names, not to put any kind of risk to the witnesses or to the people later apparently being called for the court. And what is the reason for putting people away from home? What is the legal reason for that?
It's another part of the of the of the cruelty that I'm talking about.
Meaning if you consider, it's not my position, it's not the position of the Parliament, it's not the position of the European Union, but if you consider there is a kind of legal responsibility on many people, Mr. Lisov and others, why have you to to to put the people in the most far possible prison? And my message to the authorities is we are following the events closely. And we as a Parliament, we want consequences. We want consequences. And I'm coming back to our internal issues about the recalibration that you both used.
You have to recalibrate.
This is a very, very hiding expression if you want really to appear not doing business as usual. Because you went with this disbursement 156 millions in November. And you have the objections of the parliament. And you came back with the same amount trying to engineer it the way to not to appear, let's say, disregarding completely the role of the parliament. And in the role of the parliament, it was the objection, the rejection of our visit and many other things that we have to take into account.
Are you ignoring the second objection? Are you daring to come back with 156 million with the new way to try to convey the funding in another way? This is my main question to you. Are you able to insist after two objections from the European Parliament?
Is the so-called EU-Tanzania Partnership for Prosperity happened last October and it's happening in the first months of the coming years? Because if you maintain, despite the two objections of the Parliament, the idea of sending money to the country, and if you maintain this EU-Tanzania Partnership for Prosperity, your recalibration is not in any way a kind of recalibration. You are still on business as usual.
And the Parliament is upset and is fed up that you are always using the same narrative, always using the same obscure rationale to continue doing business with every dictator in the world. And this Parliament deserves another attitude from the executive of the European Union.
And we, our friends from Tanzania, they deserve another attitude from the executive of the European Union. And sometimes you have to cross the Ribellari and smell a little bit what is the impression of this part of the European Union. And you have to convey to our delegation in the country the spirit of the feeling you had in this meeting, in another meetings. I don't know if our delegation did the proper thing to convey to the authorities that to refuse, to refuse to have a commission of this Parliament in the country is not a problem with the Parliament. It's a big, big, big problem with the European Union as a whole, including Member States if needed.
And I would like that you use this session not to insist on recalibration, but really doing things that this Parliament is requesting for you as the legitimate owner of the sovereign rights in the European Union. Thank you.
Mounir Satouri
Merci, Nacho. J'avais en... Il y avait d'autres prises de parole. Monsieur qui... Vous vouliez poser une question ?
Non.
J'avais la même question que Nacho Sanchez. Alors il vous parlait de sortir de la rivière pour sentir la température, moi j'ai même envie de vous dire la température est à son maximum cette semaine. L'ambiance est chaude, le Parlement, je crois que, en tout cas moi j'ai pas connu, je sais pas pour toi Nacho, j'ai pas connu deux objections sur un même dossier deux années d'affilée. Donc le Parlement est vraiment pas content de la manière dont les choses se passent en Tanzanie évidemment, et on a écouté des témoignages forts ici qui nous rappellent la réalité tanzanienne. Et je pense qu'elle doit susciter une réaction au-delà du rééquilibrage.
Je pense qu'il faut sortir de cette tentative de rééquilibrage, les arguments habituels qui nous empêchent de réagir face à des régimes qui dépassent les bornes, et là les bornes elles sont largement dépassées. Mais je crois que là le Parlement est dans une logique forte de dire il n'est pas d'accord, ça peut pas se normaliser et il faut qu'il y ait une réaction de l'exécutif.
Donc deux objections successives sur un même dossier, moi j'ai pas connu. Et pour bien sentir la température ici au Parlement, je crois que nous ne sommes pas prêts à céder. Donc il faut qu'il y ait une réaction à la hauteur, forte de la part de l'exécutif pour qu'il y ait une réaction en Tanzanie. Et je crois que la situation l'exige amplement. Et on a entendu des témoignages au-delà de l'émotion forts qui nécessitent qu'on réagisse.
En tout cas, on ne peut pas, en essayant de jouer les équilibristes, être complice de ce qui se passe en Tanzanie. Moi je l'ai dit de la manière complètement détendue tout à l'heure, très sincèrement, que la Tanzanie empêche notre sous-commission d'aller rencontrer la Cour africaine des droits de l'homme, c'est un scandale. C'est un scandale. C'est une remise en question du multilatéralisme. C'est une insulte pour notre institution.
Qu'ils ne veuillent pas nous rencontrer, à la limite je peux l'entendre. Ce ne sera pas le premier régime. Quoique ici ils nous rencontrent puisque j'ai déjà rencontré à deux reprises l'ambassadeur qui représente la Tanzanie auprès de l'Union européenne.
Qu'ils ne veuillent pas nous accueillir en Tanzanie parce qu'ils ne sont pas contents, OK. Mais nous empêcher de rencontrer la Cour africaine des droits de l'homme, c'est un scandale parce que ça dépasse les prérogatives de la Tanzanie. C'est une remise en cause du partenariat qu'on a avec toute l'Afrique, qu'on a avec cette cour. Et c'est une remise en cause du multilatéralisme et c'est une démonstration de l'autoritarisme de ce régime. Et je le dis aujourd'hui, j'espère que ça sera redit aux autorités.
Notre mission aurait pu être l'occasion qu'on discute et qu'ils nous expliquent leur point de vue. C'est dommage. Mais je ne pensais pas qu'ils iraient jusqu'à nous empêcher de rencontrer la Cour africaine des droits de l'homme. Je vais redonner la parole à nos orateurs et oratrices pour pouvoir répondre aux réactions et aux questions des collègues. Et on fait dans l'ordre du départ.
Et je donne la parole à Agnès Lerdorf pour répondre et réagir aux questions qui ont été posées.
Agnes Polepole Lerdorf
I hope you will take sanction for the government of Tanzania and the people of Tanzania. It's hard. I've already explained, but it's tough. Tanzania is not the same. Tanzania was a beacon of peace in East Africa, but it's no more.
Everybody is scaring.
Speaker 7
The police officer, they kidnap people. Last week we saw Tundu Lissu, Tundu Lissu assistant, he was kidnapped with official police. Suddenly, the good thing, they were two. One of the friend they were together was a soldier. So he tried to call another soldier.
They are kidnapped and they take their car. But they had a gun. They began to shoot the people. They arranged a lot of people following them.
I don't have the picture, but they tortured. They put the, they put the, yes. So please, we ask, we ask the European Parliament, look in deeply. We didn't have election in Tanzania. People were shot, thousand of people killed.
And they buried themselves. Please, look at the beacon of peace area in East Africa is no more peace. Thank you.
Mounir Satouri
Votre message est entendu. Madame Busencera, quelques minutes de réaction s'il vous plaît.
Thank you.
Alicia Bosencera
Without, without concrete, very, very concrete action, I feel that things will perhaps get worse in Tanzania. As all this is going on, already there are threats being made by public officials regarding possible, possible demonstrations on the 7th of July.
Speaker 19
And one of the public officials openly said, "This time, if you dare come out, it shall be as it was in Kosovo." Now, the tone is not changing. Get it, please, the tone in Dar es Salaam or in Dodoma in Tanzania is not changing.
Public officials are making threats without any fear. And then we sit here, we talk about continuing to support a regime that is actually not concerned about fundamental rights and freedom of its own people. I'm disappointed.
I'm disappointed to hear that we will not disburse the funds directly to the government, but we will find ways of disbursing the funds through other, you know, means. You call it this is an operational change.
You know, at the end of the day, EU money is going to Tanzania. Yes, I do understand when you talk about the Tanzanians not suffering more than they should. But I find this, I find this a bit confusing. You're not sending, I feel like you're really not sending the right message to Tanzania. That is, that's how I feel.
Mounir Satouri
Merci.
Et ben Monsieur Onyala en ligne, si vous avez quelques minutes, si vous avez besoin de quelques minutes pour réagir.
Sikula Onyala
Um, thank you very much. I first of all I just want to acknowledge the strength of Ms. Magabe and Ms. Agnes who've spoken so eloquently on the cases of Mr. Tundu Lissu and Ambassador Humphrey Polepole. But getting back to the discussion, as Amnesty International, we are fully supportive to see the strong push by members of the EU Parliament for accountability and progress in human on human rights in Tanzania.
Indeed, the EU and its member states cannot act in this situation in business-as-usual mode, but act robustly, both politically and operationally. That means, you know, going beyond tweaking the partnership, not only supporting HRDs and civil society more in Tanzania, but also increasing diplomatic effort to end the current repression of civil society in Tanzania, where we are seeing arbitrary killings and disappearances and torture of this category of people.
We also urge you to continue pressing for the release of those detained and for the whereabouts of those who've been disappeared. We appreciate and acknowledge your keen attention on achieving justice and accountability, starting with the release of the Commission of Inquiry report and listening closely and consulting the civil society about how the EU should engage with Tanzania. We believe that partnership cannot happen at all costs. It needs to center on human rights, now and in future. Not only when it's expedient to be strong on rights, you will need to remain critical wherever there are violations and justice is delayed or denied, as the case is in Tanzania.
Jonas Jonsson
Thank you very much, Chair. Thanks very much for the interventions and again, I want to pay respect to the witnesses we have heard here today. I mean, we are here to listen, to exchange views and for the interventions by the members of honorable members of Parliament.
And of course, we have also this, this discussion has been very, very intense also with our own 27 member states, both here and, and locally. And again, I, I can repeat that we had great hopes for this country. We, we had seen a country that could be prosperous and stable and project that also to a neighborhood that really needs it in East Africa, the Horn of Africa. But as, as one of our guests have said, Tanzania is, is not the same.
And that's why we have, and I will not repeat all of them, but we have made a long list of very clear asks to the government on justice, on accountability, on human rights, and also in specific relations to the cases we have heard today. So and and we have made that clear at various levels, including at the highest levels and and in both direct conversations publicly, as I try to recall here in the meeting.
As to the as to the visit as I've said it is for us very much on the agenda and we are engaging with the authorities in order to make this happening and to to discuss with them on the conditions to make this happening in the in the very near future. So for us there is no doubt about that and and I wanted to make that clear as much as other contexts that we think would be very important that that this house can have with the Tanzanian society. Thank you.
Mounir Satouri
Madame Dorret c'est à vous. Vous avez entendu à la fois la réaction de mes collègues et et de nos invités. Qu'est-ce que vous avez de précis et concret à nous dire ?
Virginie de Ruyt
Merci. Thank you very much and indeed I hear you loud and clear and it is not the first time that we have exchanged.
I can only repeat what we have all witnessed and that we completely align on the diagnostic, on the assessment of what has happened in Tanzania. I know the country very well. I lived there many years. I have many ties. I'm still in contact with many friends in Tanzania.
So I hear you and I hear them, of course, loud and clear. I cannot accept, though, that what I said today was a tweaking of what we are doing in with the cooperation in Tanzania. We are not tweaking.
We are doing something that we have never, or very rarely, done with a partner that was a strong partner until very recently. I heard the honorable Member of Parliament mention also the other partners that Tanzania is engaging with.
And I believe that it is still in the interest of the EU to maintain the dialogue and engagement with Tanzania in view of all our political, economic, cooperation objectives and to uphold democracy and human rights. This matters because the EU engages with values, safeguards and accountability standards when we provide funding to a country, to civil society, to its communities. We not only create jobs, skills, resilience, but disengaging or scaling down our cooperation, we also have to consider that it would not improve human rights. Our assessment is to the contrary, that it would weaken support to the population and create even more space for other actors, Russia was mentioned today, that are advancing their agendas with fewer conditions, lower standards on governance, environment and labor issues, for example. So I think it is indeed not a tweaking, it is something quite unprecedented for us to have stopped all funding going to the government.
There is no funding that will benefit the authorities of Tanzania. We still believe that they will benefit the people of Tanzania in areas that are important to the partnership, but also that are in the hands of implementing partners that can make sure that the funding is used exactly for the purpose of the population's well-being, including, for example, in rural areas.
I'm just stating for those who are not aware that the annual action program that we are talking about has, for example, a very big component on agriculture and is providing support to, would be providing support to a large part of rural disadvantaged populations.
Mounir Satouri
Bon, ben je crois qu'on n'est pas encore au bout de la discussion, qu'on va continuer à avoir nos désaccords. Je ne sais pas comment vous le dire. Enfin, ce qu'on vous demande, c'est pas de demander. C'est de poursuivre le partenariat si vous obtenez. Enfin, on vous demande des choses concrètes.
Et en fait, tant que les mêmes sommes pour soutenir les politiques que veut mettre en place le gouvernement arrivent par des canaux différents, je comprends l'idée de soutenir les gens dans la vraie vie.
Mais en soutenant ces politiques, vous soutenez ce gouvernement. Donc, moi j'adore quand vous nous citez l'exemple de la Russie. Vous auriez pu faire la Chine, c'était la même logique. Mais en fait, si notre action ne montre pas une différence de ce qu'aurait fait la Chine, je ne vois pas à quoi on sert. En fait, tant que les principes qui sont les nôtres existent et que ça doit guider notre politique internationale, on ne peut avoir de lien que si on agit un peu sur la situation.
Et donc on ne peut pas dire : "Ben on ne peut pas se retirer parce que sinon il y a la Russie ou la Chine". Et nous on demande, et comme on a demandé, en fait on ne peut pas culpabiliser.
Ça ne marche pas. Parce qu'en fait la situation se dégrade et que même si vous ne le voulez pas, même si c'est pas direct, même si c'est pas sur le compte du trésor que l'argent arrive, nous continuons à soutenir un régime qui ne respecte pas les droits de l'homme, enferme les opposants et va à l'encontre des principes que nous avons y compris signés avec ce pays pour être en partenariat. On continue à être en partenariat. Donc ce qu'on veut c'est un changement et que nos politiques, l'argent des contribuables européens, fassent levier pour au moins amoindrir la situation.
Et donc quand la situation se dégrade et continue à se dégrader, c'est compliqué pour nous, c'est compliqué pour les gens que vous avez entendus de dire qu'on continue, même si c'est pas ça la volonté ou l'objectif, parce que le résultat à la fin est le même. En tout cas merci d'avoir été là, comme à chaque fois. Merci d'apporter vos réponses, mais on va continuer à être en désaccord là-dessus. Et moi j'espère que le Parlement dans sa grande majorité, comme il l'a fait à deux reprises, va continuer à tenir de manière ferme la position qui est la sienne. Je vous remercie.
On va marquer quelques minutes de pause le temps de pouvoir passer au sujet d'après avec nos nouveaux invités.
Mounir Satouri
Je vous propose qu'on poursuive nos travaux avec donc la présentation de l'étude sur la protection de la souveraineté de l'UE dans l'action extérieure dans le domaine des droits de l'homme et du droit international. Chers collègues, nous avons beaucoup travaillé au cours de cette législature sur la question de la justice internationale, les menaces qui pèsent sur le multilatéralisme et leurs conséquences sur la politique extérieure de l'Union, notamment en matière de protection du droit humain. Les coordinateurs DROIT ont décidé de commander une étude sur la protection de la souveraineté de l'UE dans son action extérieure dans le domaine des droits de l'homme et du droit international.
Cette demande vise à obtenir une perspective académique sur la question et surtout à prendre connaissance de l'analyse et des recommandations des chercheurs. Nous allons prendre en considération cette étude évidemment pour la négociation du rapport DROIT vers une stratégie de l'UE pour la protection et pour renforcer le système judiciaire international, ses institutions, mécanismes et partenaires. Nous discuterons du projet de rapport dans un deuxième temps. Je remercie Monsieur Philippe Damman de l'Université de Louvain, l'auteur de cette étude pour son travail et sa présence parmi nous aujourd'hui.
Monsieur le professeur, vous disposez de huit minutes pour nous présenter votre étude.
Philippe Damman
Merci beaucoup. Chair, honorable members, thank you so much for this opportunity to present the study on the protection of EU sovereignty in the Union's external action on human rights international law. The study starts from a specific understanding of EU sovereignty.
So, in the context of external action, EU sovereignty is defined as the Union's capacity to preserve policy space, legal autonomy, and implementation capacity under conditions of deep interdependence. It is not sovereignty in the classical sense of exclusive state authority. Rather, it concerns the question whether the EU external action on human rights and international law can be sustained when confronted with increasing external pressures given existing internal constraints.
Externally the study covers five main pressures: the use of secondary sanctions that can deter European actors from engaging with sanctioned countries or institutions even where EU law permits such engagement; pressure exerted through control over financial, trade or digital infrastructures; transnational repression targeting dissidents, journalists and human rights defenders residing in Europe; the use of spyware and cyber tools against civil society actors; and finally, dependencies on critical technologies, infrastructures and raw materials that may limit the EU's room for maneuver in its external relations.
Internally, the study highlights three recurring constraints: the difficulty of reaching agreement under CFSP unanimity rules, uneven implementation and enforcement of sanctions and other measures across member states, and credibility problems when human rights clauses, conditionality mechanisms, or accountability tools are applied inconsistently across partners and situations. The impact of these external and internal constraints is often amplified by the Union's financial and digital dependencies, such as the continued reliance on payment infrastructures controlled by third parties for Union support to human rights defenders.
Now, in the face of these challenges, as we know, the Union has developed a series of instruments to help safeguard its sovereignty in external action. The study maps seven categories of such EU instruments. It covers the blocking statute, the anti-coercion instrument, financial resilience initiatives, including efforts to strengthen the international role of the euro, digital resilience and cybersecurity frameworks, such as the NIS2 directive and the DORA, the global human rights sanctions regime, human rights clauses in EU trade cooperation and association agreements with third countries, and finally, external-facing regulatory instruments, such as the CS triple D and the forced labor product ban.
This mapping exercise, I think, shows that the European Union already possesses a substantial toolbox to safeguard its sovereignty in external action. The main challenge therefore lies less in the absence of instruments than in the way that they are connected and deployed in support of human rights, international law, and international justice. Here, I think four main gaps emerge. First is a legal shielding gap. The Blocking Statute, for example, exists, but its activation is lacking and it does not currently provide effective operational protection against over-compliance and exposure to third-country sanctions.
The second is more of a regulatory and normative enforcement gap. Human rights clauses and due diligence instruments, yes, they create leverage, but monitoring benchmarks and follow-up mechanisms are often insufficient. The third is an institutional and operational gap. So unanimity requirements, fragmented sanctions enforcement and uneven national capacities all reduce the speed, the consistency and predictability of EU responses to serious human rights violations.
The fourth and final one is more of a material and infrastructural gap. So EU external action continues to rely on payment systems, on cloud infrastructures, on data environments, on supply chains that are often subject to third-party or third-country jurisdiction, private actor control and limited EU visibility. And this makes the Union ultimately vulnerable to external pressure. Now, to illustrate all these dynamics, the study includes a mini-case on the International Criminal Court.
As you are well aware, the EU consistently presents the ICC as a cornerstone of international justice, but recent experience of course shows how its support for the court can be constrained in practice. So when sanctions were imposed on ICC officials, concerns immediately arose about whether private actors might restrict dealings with the court out of fear of legal or commercial exposure. At the same time, the court has faced significant cyberattacks, highlighting the vulnerability of international justice institutions to digital disruption. A further challenge concerns implementation.
So while the EU strongly supports the ICC's mandate, cooperation with arrest warrants and other obligations ultimately depends on member states, and practice here has not always been fully consistent. So this case shows, I think, that EU sovereignty is constantly being challenged through legal pressure, financial disruption, digital vulnerability, and uneven implementation. And the study therefore concludes with a series of recommendations to better protect the EU sovereignty in external action on human rights, international law, and international justice against these pressures. The study groups them into four clusters because it connects them with the four main gaps that I just described and we identified in this mapping exercise for existing EU instruments.
So the first cluster of recommendations concerns the defensive legal architecture of the EU. A key recommendation here is to recast the blocking statute as a more operational legal shield. The current instrument affirms EU legal autonomy, but it remains limited in addressing over-compliance, so the study recommends moving towards a more targeted mechanism that can be activated more rapidly against specific foreign measures that would undermine EU public interests.
Closely linked to this is recommendation to strengthen legal and financial protection for ICC-related activities. The Commission and Council should assess whether relevant foreign measures targeting the ICC should be added to the blocking statute annex and should develop practical safeguards relating to payments, banking access, and contractual continuity for ICC officials and cooperating actors based in the EU. The same cluster also recommends operationalizing the anti-coercion instrument in situations involving human rights-related coercion and strengthening sanctions enforcement through improved coordination, circumvention analysis, and support for implementation of the sanctions enforcement directive. The second cluster concerns regulatory and normative integration.
So, the study here recommends strengthening and standardizing human rights clauses in external agreements. These clauses should include country-specific benchmarks, monitoring indicators and graduated response mechanisms. I notice my time is up, can I conclude with the recommendations?
Philippe Damman
Okay.
It also recommends expanding opportunities for civil society scrutiny through complaints mechanisms that allow stakeholders to more directly raise concerns regarding human rights, labor, raw material, and sustainability commitments. Thirdly, the Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime should be adapted to address emerging patterns of abuse, including transnational repression, technology-enabled persecution, and serious corruption linked to systemic human rights violations. In addition, human rights safeguards should be integrated more systematically into geoeconomic instruments, including the CSDDD, forced labor product ban, but also Global Gateway. One objective here is to avoid the so-called de-risking paradox, so where companies ultimately disengage from difficult environments rather than using their leverage to improve conditions.
Third cluster concerns institutional agility and scrutiny. So here, the study recommends targeted use of existing CFSP flexibility mechanisms for human rights and sanctions decisions, including further consideration of the passerelle clause in Article 31(3) of the Treaty on European Union. It also proposes a Team Europe shield for international justice and human rights defenders. So that would bring together EU delegations and member states' embassies around activities such as trial monitoring, emergency support, visas, relocation, diplomatic protection, and so forth. Another recommendation is to integrate sovereignty impact assessments into external agreements.
Another recommendation is to integrate sovereignty impact assessments into external agreements, so that would basically help identify where and whether trade, raw material or strategic partnership agreements could create dependencies that would later constrain EU human rights diplomacy.
The study also recommends an EU coordination mechanism on transnational repression, linking incident reporting, sanctions analysis, visa and relocation tools, cybersecurity support and cooperation with national authorities. Then there's a final cluster, a fourth one that concerns material and infrastructural resilience. So these are mainly some supporting recommendations that I think nevertheless are important, which address the financial and digital implementation conditions discussed in the study, such as better supply chain visibility, stronger euro-denominated safe assets and so forth. I won't go into details on that here, but I refer to the study and the annexes for a more technical discussion. So I think my time is more than up.
Thank you so much for your attention and I welcome any questions, including maybe issues that I haven't been able to cover in my presentation that were in the study. Thank you.
Mounir Satouri
Merci à vous, professeur.
Moi, je partage évidemment une très grande partie des recommandations ainsi que le postulat de départ. L'Union européenne dispose d'un certain nombre de leviers. Il y a des choses à préciser, à adapter, mais on a besoin d'une approche globale, coordonnée et de volonté politique pour que nous puissions mieux défendre notre souveraineté sur ces sujets-là. Je suis persuadé que votre étude va nous être utile dans le cadre de nos travaux sur le rapport. Donc merci beaucoup pour cela, et je vais tout de suite donner la parole à mes collègues.
On commence par Chloé ? Chloé, Chloé Ridel.
Chloé Ridel
Merci beaucoup, Monsieur le Président, cher Mounir, et merci Monsieur pour votre intervention.
Moi j'ai plusieurs questions concernant le règlement de blocage. Vous dites en fait que ce règlement il est jugé peu efficace parce que les entreprises européennes craignent davantage les sanctions américaines que les pénalités que l'Union européenne pourrait leur appliquer. Donc comment faire en fait pour que ce soit l'inverse et qu'elles craignent davantage les pénalités européennes que les sanctions américaines ? Est-ce que c'est possible ?
Parce que quand on lit ça, on peut se poser la question de est-ce que c'est possible d'arriver à ce résultat? Ensuite, vous parlez toujours sur le règlement de blocage du fait d'en faire un outil opérationnel plus rapide, déjà d'y inclure explicitement les activités de la SEPI, je pense que c'est très bien. Mais comment est-ce qu'on pourrait concrètement faire en sorte que le déclenchement soit plus rapide? Parce que là, nous, ça fait un an qu'on le demande et on n'obtient rien. Et enfin, l'utilisation de l'instrument anti-coercition, est-ce que ce ne serait pas finalement plus efficace?
Marta Temido
Obrigada pela presença e pelo relatório que é muito útil para o nosso trabalho neste momento relativamente ao reforço da justiça penal internacional. A minha pergunta vai na sequência daquelas que a colega Chloe já colocou.
Quando estamos agora a trabalhar numa estratégia da União Europeia para proteger e reforçar o sistema internacional de justiça e as suas instituições, podemos ser tentados a dizer que o estatuto de bloqueio não é suficiente e precisa de ser reformulado, precisa de ser reforçado, porque vemos que ele não está a ser utilizado como gostaríamos que fosse. A pergunta que fica é: é o estatuto de bloqueio que precisa de ser melhorado ou é a vontade política que falta? E como reagir então se precisamos de proteger a justiça penal internacional em termos de outros estatutos que não estejam aqui, de outros mecanismos que não estejam aqui previstos? Obrigada.
Speaker 17
Thank you, thank you, professor, for your insight.
I would like to express my fear, my concern about the use of the rationale of the study that could be used as an alibi not to exercise the political will. Meaning, the instruments are not well-designed, they have to be refined. And this is the excuse, because with this exactly setting, with this legal framework, we can do immensely more than we do. And that's for the reason I would like to, I know that you did it, but what we have to do as politicians is the setting is perfect. Just use it.
Use it with the political will to use. We have had now this debate about Tanzania.
The only thing we need is to really exercise our power. And we decided not to do, we decided to recalibrate, and we decided to, and then my fear is, okay, the first thing is to use the framework as it is.
And then maybe it could be improved, it could be better, but not, we are not using this framework because it's failing and then we need to refine or to recalibrate or to reshape or to redo before acting. And this is my fear about the rational. And not, for sure, I'm not saying that you are responsible of that, but we as a politician has to, has to be aware of that not to, not to be used in the sense of an alibi not to act. Thank you.
Mounir Satouri
Oh, Nacho vient de lancer un grand débat. Donc je vais vous donner la parole pour répondre.
Philippe Damman
Thank you very much. So, I'm glad to hear I'm not responsible for everything that's going wrong. So, I hopefully can add something to the discussion. I think the first couple of questions were about, well, what would really this, this recasting of the blocking statute look like? How can we make it actually more operational?
And that's before going into the comments that I received about, well, do we really need to change what we actually have?
It's not really a matter of actually activating it. I think, let's say, a couple of small changes that could be made to the existing instruments that would make it more operational include first of all, let's say, transitioning to some kind of a specific order model, I guess, in terms of the blocking statute.
So the core here is that we would shift from, um, let's say, a more kind of a general automatic prohibition on compliance to a model where the prohibition is triggered by specific orders that are issued by EU authorities. So, rather than saying firms are being theoretically barred from complying with all of these foreign listed laws, what the Commission could do is to issue more binding instructions that require firms to resist only very specific measures that undermine EU public interest.
And I think that's, let's say, more in line with the requirement to not really change anything at the heart of the regulation, but more making it more clear for the actual companies that that really are at risk of overcompliance when and how they should comply with the rules of the EU rather than a third country rules. I think that kind of ties in with the second element of this this recasting of the blocking statute, which is that implementation in practice would be supported easily, I think, by a more robust administrative framework within the Commission in general. So that's essentially referring to the need for additional Commission guidance, right?
Right, so supporting this legal blocking shield with detailed guidance notes and templates to help operators really navigate the conflicts between foreign law and EU rules that we want them to adhere to. That can be assisted by the Commission providing more tailored instructions to firms that are maybe entangled in foreign proceedings because of their non-compliance with foreign countries' laws, potentially including direct involvement in foreign courts to support EU companies. And obviously, I think that's part of, let's say, the entire discussion. I think when it looks, when it comes to, let's say, a rapid activation of the existing rules, a couple of steps can be taken. So that would mean specifically when it comes to operationalizing it for the International Criminal Court, which is I think a very clear-cut case where the blocking statute has not been but could be activated.
That would entail of course amending, yes, the annex. So the primary mechanism of course is essentially the Commission exercising its power to amend the annex of regulation, which would then rather than just list, let's say, rules adopted by certain countries or laws promulgated by certain countries, anything that is touching upon, for example, the workings of the ICC. So that it's very clear that it's not just a couple of countries or a couple of laws that we're targeting, but essentially anything that is related to the ICC because that would ultimately affect EU interests. So I think also it's key that the statute would be used to protect EU nationals, right?
So, I think a key driver here for urgency is that many targeted ICC officials are ultimately EU nationals. And activation of the statute would really, would technically and legally bar foreign administrative access to their data, to their assets, and it kind of provides them with kind of a, let's say, a clawback right to recover damages in European courts.
The broader, of course, discussion is to what extent we actually really, really need to make changes to the existing instruments, and that's what I think the last two comments were about. I think what the study has tried to show is that, yes, there is a complex, let's say, series of measures and regulations already in existence, and I do definitely agree that it's more a matter of political will to exercise the powers that the European Union already has under this set of rules.
But in a lot of cases, I think it's really a matter of providing additional guidance. And when I say that we have to maybe, or the European Union maybe has to change the instruments to make them more, let's say, powerful, it doesn't require necessarily changing instruments fundamentally in how they have been set up, but rather providing additional guidance, as I've hopefully explained with respect to the blocking statute, in order to make it clearer when they will apply, so that they also are not applied selectively, but really are applied more consistently, and that it's clearer for those that actually have to follow the rules, like private actors within the European Union, how they can actually comply with them. Because I think in a lot of cases, there's a balancing exercise that has to be made between, let's say, complying with foreign countries' rules and rules of the European Union, where the balance can be easily shifted simply by providing additional legal certainty and clarity for the actors operating in that, let's say, complex framework.
Mounir Satouri
Moi j'ai une question. L'une de vos recommandations est de mieux utiliser le régime mondial de sanctions droits de l'homme.
Est-ce que vous pouvez nous expliquer plus en détail cette proposition et comment est-ce que ça s'appliquerait dans le cadre de la CPI ?
Philippe Damman
Yes, thank you for your question. So, are you referring to the let's say the human rights clauses in external agreements or which part of the study are you exactly referring to?
Speaker 31
Can you be clarified that? Okay. And when it comes to the let's say in terms of the human rights sanctions regime I think the main let's say findings or recommendations of the of the study was that in a lot of cases the the exceptional let's say crimes that are ultimately the foundation for the activation of this regime are insufficiently linked to emerging patterns of human rights abuses where we understand and we know that in a certain country let's say the human rights situation is deteriorating where there's a lot of transnational repression as well affecting also human rights actors residing in the European Union that often times the activation of this sanctions regime is made more let's say complex and ultimately dependent on political will because the sanctions regime itself is not sufficiently clear in linking those let's say widespread international
Speaker 32
And I think that's where, again, providing this operational clarity would do a lot to help more consistent and less selective application of the sanctions regime.
Speaker 34
Et ben merci beaucoup. Donc on va attendre quelques minutes avant de reprendre pour le point d'après et le petit bruit que vous entendez, on me dit que c'est un ventilateur, donc soyez pas surpris, rien de très grave.
Speaker 35
Oli, ouais, ok. Ouais, regarde, chez lui ça marche pas. C'est pour tous les, tous les...
Mounir Satouri
Prenez place. Nous allons reprendre nos travaux avec le deuxième et dernier point. Alors, notre dernier point public dans notre ordre du jour avec l'examen du projet de rapport vers une stratégie de l'UE pour protéger et renforcer le système judiciaire international et ses institutions, mécanismes et partenaires.
Vous avez reçu, chers collègues, le rapport que je vais présenter ici. L'ordre international moderne repose depuis l'adoption de la Charte des Nations Unies de 1945 sur le droit plutôt que sur la force. Si le droit international a souvent été appliqué de manière inégale, sa remise en cause n'avait jamais été revendiquée ouvertement. Aujourd'hui, la montée des mouvements nationalistes et populistes conduit à des attaques assumées contre l'État de droit, la justice internationale et l'universalité des droits de l'homme.
Les enquêtes de la Cour pénale internationale ont notamment conduit à des sanctions visant les juges, les fonctionnaires, experts de l'ONU et organisations contribuant à documenter ces crimes. L'Union européenne doit protéger le système judiciaire international face à ces pressions. Comme on vient de l'entendre dans la présentation de l'étude, les mesures coercitives étrangères contre les institutions judiciaires et leurs partenaires ont des effets directs en Europe : fermeture de comptes bancaires, restrictions financières, perte d'accès à des services technologiques essentiels et menaces contre les organisations de la société civile.
Elles fragilisent les enquêtes, favorisent l'impunité et révèlent les vulnérabilités financières et technologiques de l'Union. Finalement, ils éloignent la perspective de la justice pour les victimes des atrocités. Ce rapport appelle donc à une stratégie européenne globale visant à renforcer la justice internationale et à protéger les acteurs qui y contribuent.
Il réaffirme l'attachement de l'Union européenne au statut de Rome, aux droits humains, à la lutte contre l'impunité, tout en préconisant des mesures concrètes : activation du statut de blocage européen, coopération renforcée avec la CPI et développement d'infrastructures financières et numériques souveraines capables de préserver l'autonomie de l'Union et l'intégrité de l'ordre judiciaire international. Je m'attends à une coopération fructueuse avec les groupes pour un travail collectif de soutien à la Cour pénale internationale. Je rappelle qu'un avis de la commission JURI est en préparation. On attendra que cet avis soit voté pour commencer les négociations et vous rappelle que le délai pour le dépôt des amendements est fixé au 2 juillet.
Marta Temido
Merci beaucoup par le rapport. Il est très important, on le considère très important. On sait que pendant les nous je vais changer pour le portugais. Sabemos que ao longo dos últimos dos últimos meses a subcomissão DROI ouviu numerosos relatos de ataques contra a justiça internacional.
Recordo os testemunhos da presidente do TPI, a senhora Tomoko Akane, e mais recentemente do juiz Nicolas Guillou, apenas como exemplos. E apesar dos inúmeros apelos feitos pelo Parlamento Europeu, apesar dos compromissos de defesa da lei internacional e dos seus magistrados que o Conselho Europeu ainda na semana passada voltou a reiterar, nenhuma ação concreta foi tomada contra a suspensão de direitos básicos impostos, por exemplo, por impossibilidade de acesso aos sistemas bancários pelos colaboradores do Tribunal Penal Internacional, contra os incumprimentos de ordens do Tribunal Penal Internacional por alguns Estados-Membros também da União Europeia.
E sabemos que quando a justiça penal internacional é posta em causa, são os nossos tribunais e a nossa soberania que são atacados porque o Estatuto de Roma estabelece que a sua ação é complementar. Por isso, este relatório é não só oportuno como é essencial. Parece-nos que o trabalho realizado e organizado em torno de três grandes eixos: proteger uma estratégia europeia para proteger a justiça internacional, reforçar os mecanismos e instrumentos de atuação da justiça internacional e proteger todos os envolvidos no sistema de justiça internacional são os três eixos em que temos que trabalhar.
Pela nossa parte, vamos procurar contribuir com três níveis de contributos. Em primeiro lugar, as referências ao Blocking Statute Regulation, procurando torná-lo mais operativo e mais eficaz.
Acreditamos que foi pela economia de texto que não foi possível fazer referências mais assertivas e vamos procurar ajudar nessa matéria. Por outro lado, como ainda agora na audição anterior ouvimos, incluindo provavelmente uma menção àquilo que é a possibilidade de ter guidelines, boas práticas definidas pela Comissão e pelos Estados-Membros para, ou mesmo de ter ainda um National Focal Point para ajudar as empresas, as companhias que são alvo de medidas extraterritoriais.
E por outro lado ainda, com o reforço da ideia de que os parceiros da sociedade civil são essenciais na operação da justiça internacional e que não os podemos deixar cair. E para sermos coerentes, temos que os apoiar, designadamente em termos de financiamento de uma forma mais permanente. Obrigada.
Merci beaucoup et merci pour ce rapport qui est vraiment un très bon rapport, je trouve, nécessaire dans la période que nous traversons, qui rappelle que soutenir le système de justice internationale, ça doit être un pilier de l'action extérieure de l'Union européenne, prioritaire, que les sanctions américaines en l'occurrence qui frappent la Cour pénale internationale sont illégales.
Chloé Ridel
Et donc je crois que cela fait du bien de rappeler cela et toutes les recommandations qui sont contenues dans le rapport sur l'inclusion explicite du statut de Rome dans l'acquis communautaire, la demande d'activer le blocking statute, de limiter aussi le sur-respect l'overcompliance des entreprises européennes aux sanctions américaines, même aussi de mettre à jour le mandat d'Europol pour l'exécution automatique des mandats de la CPI, c'est vraiment de très très bonnes propositions et j'espère qu'elles pourront trouver une majorité dans ce Parlement, on sait que c'est pas forcément simple.
Mais en fait, si on ne fait rien et si on laisse faire, demain ce sera pas uniquement les juges de la Cour pénale internationale, mais ce seront aussi pourquoi pas des fonctionnaires de la Commission européenne chargés d'appliquer le droit européen ou des juges nationaux, tout un tas de gens que les États-Unis auraient intérêt à frapper puisqu'ils auront bien vu que nous sommes bien incapables de nous défendre et de faire respecter notre propre droit. Donc en Europe, on a cette fâcheuse tendance à adopter beaucoup de législation et à ne jamais les faire respecter. Il faudrait peut-être commencer à faire le contraire.
Donc moi je soutiens vraiment ce travail, je m'en réjouis et j'espère qu'il pourra trouver une majorité quand on voit voilà l'absence de certains collègues aujourd'hui. En tout cas, j'espère que peut-être Monsieur le Président, vous pouvez nous dire ce qui ressort des négociations autour du rapport jusqu'à présent et ce que vous pensez qu'il pourra réunir une majorité autour de lui tel qu'il est actuellement.
Mounir Satouri
Bon merci Chloé. D'abord merci à Martin et merci pour son sérieux en tant que shadow sur ce rapport. Merci évidemment à Chloé pour son implication sur le sujet depuis le début de la mandature. Les négociations n'ont pas encore commencé.
Les amendements devront être déposés comme je l'ai dit tout à l'heure d'ici le 2 juillet et on attend également le... les préconisations de la commission JURI, l'opinion de la commission JURI pour commencer les discussions. Moi j'ai eu des contacts avec plusieurs shadows avant même que le rapport soit envoyé pour être à l'écoute. On a eu des réunions communes auxquelles plusieurs shadows ont participé. J'espère que l'absence de certains aujourd'hui relève du calendrier et de mobilisations parce qu'on a modifié nos jours de réunion. D'habitude on se réunit le mardi et le mercredi mais pour des impératifs organisationnels et à la demande d'ailleurs d'un groupe, on a commencé plutôt le lundi que le mardi.
Donc j'espère que c'est des questions de calendrier et rien d'autre. Et je suis à la disposition évidemment et je le serai des shadows pour discuter jusqu'au dépôt des amendements. Et évidemment je jouerai comme à mon habitude de manière équilibrée, loyale le jeu des discussions pour que tous les groupes, pour qu'un majorité de groupes se retrouvent là-dedans. Il y a eu plusieurs, c'est un sujet qu'on évoque, je l'ai dit tout à l'heure avant de commencer l'étude, c'est un sujet de préoccupation de notre sous-commission depuis le début de la mandature. Et des personnes qui peuvent politiquement penser des choses différentes ont fini par converger pour rappeler l'importance et l'intérêt qu'était la Cour pénale et la justice internationale.
Donc j'ai bon espoir qu'on puisse rassembler une majorité pour non seulement voter le texte mais même l'améliorer. Et c'est toute l'alchimie de l'élaboration parlementaire dans cette maison, mais on verra bien. Donc je ne donnerai pas la parole aux collègues qui ne sont pas là aujourd'hui. Et je ne donnerai pas la parole non plus à la Commission. Puisque j'avais invité la Commission FISMA, enfin la DG FISMA de la Commission qui est la commission en charge du statut de blocage.
Alors malheureusement sa DG n'a trouvé personne de disponible, ils étaient trop occupés pour être présents aujourd'hui, de disponible pour être parmi nous. Et nous ont fait savoir que leur position sur le Blocking Statute n'a pas changé.
C'est en tout cas à mes yeux pas une excuse pour ne pas être là. Parce que même si l'avis n'a pas changé, moi je considère que nos auditions, nos réunions et nos rapports sont la manière concrète pour nous d'exercer notre mandat de parlementaire européen que nous octroient les traités fondateurs de l'Union européenne et notre mandat de contrôle de l'exécutif. Et à chaque fois que nos partenaires de la Commission s'absentent, ça me met dans un état que vous connaissez. Donc moi je n'accepte pas cet argument.
Leur job quand ils sont invités et suffisamment longtemps pour qu'ils puissent s'organiser, c'est de trouver quelqu'un pour pouvoir être là et répondre aux questions des députés membres de cette belle institution. Donc du coup je vais saluer de manière appuyée la présence de la représentante du SEAE, Madame Elena Boslavá, chef adjointe de la division Droits. C'est pas la première fois que je salue votre présence et de manière insistante. Merci beaucoup d'être là. Merci pour le partenariat.
Et je vais vous donner la parole pour un trois minutes prévu au départ, mais comme vos collègues de la Commission n'ont pas jugé utile et intéressant d'être là, si vous débordez, je ne vous en voudrai pas.
Elena BOSLAVÁ
Merci Monsieur le Président et merci de nous avoir invités. Et c'est avec plaisir que nous acceptons évidemment cette invitation.
Let me continue in English. The fight against impunity and ensuring accountability for international crimes and for violations of international law are priorities for the EU foreign policy, irrespective of where war or conflict occurs.
There can be no doubt as to the EU's unwavering support for the International Criminal Court in its mission to ensure accountability for the most serious crimes under international law, as well as for the other international and regional mechanisms working on human rights promotion and protection and monitoring and accountability. The EU has consistently called upon all states to ensure full cooperation with the ICC, to comply with their obligations under international law and as state parties to the Rome Statute, including by the prompt execution of outstanding arrest warrants and to protect the court's impartiality and independence in the pursuit of accountability around the world. Yet, as you have amply documented in your report, the court is the target of unprecedented attacks.
Attacks or threats against the court, elected officials, personnel and those cooperating with the court, including UN mandate holders and representatives of the civil society, are not acceptable. We are aware of the impact of the sanctions on the functioning of the court and we are exploring together with our partners possible mitigating measures. We are also conscious that the court must have sufficient means to carry out its mandate. It needs adequate and sustainable resources.
Since the year 2000, the EU has supported the ICC through direct funding for outreach activities, global civil society campaigns and projects to promote the ratification of the Rome Statute, as well as through training and capacity building. The EU will continue to cooperate with the ICC in the framework of our agreement on cooperation and assistance, including pursuant to article 6 of this agreement by adopting initiatives to promote the dissemination of the principles, values and provisions of the statute. Thank you very much.
Mounir Satouri
Merci, et ben on a fini un peu plus tôt que prévu l'échange sur ce point.
Je vous rappelle que le point suivant et dernier point de l'ordre du jour d'aujourd'hui se passe à huis clos. Donc je demande à toutes les personnes non prévues dans notre dispositif de réunion à huis clos de prendre leurs dispositions pour quitter la salle, et on commencera la réunion quand nos invités seront là.
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