Committee on Security and Defence Ordinary meeting
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SEDE European Parliament
Follow its sittingsHarald Rütters
We have two more that we expect by the end of June, which are Bulgaria and Estonia. So that in total will make 14 out of 19 signed. Then there are three that are in preparation to be signed in July: Denmark, Portugal and Spain.
And we are targeting dates early in July ahead of the break. And then there are two with whom the discussions are open: Italy and Hungary. On Hungarian side, you understand that after the change of government, the government took back their plan and are currently still working on it in exchange with the Commission to resubmit the plan and then to be getting that approved and getting in the same process as the other member states.
On the Italian side, the plan had been approved, had also gone through the Council implementing decision and is just awaiting the date of, let's say, agreeing on the loan agreement to be signed. Here we do not know whether that will be happening now still in June or July. We hope so, we have contacts ongoing. Once the loan agreement is signed, we are not yet there because we also have for each member state operational arrangements.
The operational arrangements, like in the RRF, are details where you can find back all of the contracts that are under the plan with the timeline and the actions and the deliverables and the milestones that are leading to those. There we have three which have been signed already: Poland, Lithuania, and Cyprus. And one this week still, Croatia. Two also sent to the member states that have signed: Greece and Romania. This is a normal process because these are documents of hundreds of pages and we are closing on all of those, apart from Hungary where we have not yet a plan submitted.
And I expect that here these operational arrangements will come to signatures during the summer. It can be still in June for the ones that you see here. Others will follow in July and in August. Most of them we have seen to the detail already.
This is just a matter of I would say steps to be taken in a logical process. Once these two are both then done, the loan agreement and the operational arrangements, we get a legal opinion from the country confirming that everything is in order and we can launch the pre-financing. Two have been done so far, Poland and Cyprus, and one is still planned for this week Thursday, Lithuania. It's the next step.
So if you see in fact in the top box where we are for the countries in terms of loan agreements, the other boxes will follow with a slight delay, one or two or three weeks depending a little bit on the operational arrangements and then the pre-financing payment follows in the week after the two have been signed because we then can go to that step. You see the volumes in the in the box on the on the other corner in the down corner. 150 is the overall volume that we initially allocated. We had then received in the plans in November a request for 147. And today we are standing in the now allocation of 98 going up to this 147 to be confirmed.
Why do I spell it out like that?
Because we do expect that, for instance, a country like Hungary that had been allocated 16 billion will be taking a smaller part in the SAFE instrument. So we expect that the overall volume will be around 140 rather than 150. But this is, I think, what is also foreseen in the regulation. The Commission can then still propose to do a second call for interest during 2026 at the latest, not later. And then we have to get to the loan agreements, operational arrangements by July 2027.
If money is not fully consumed, then it will fall back. One important point that I would like to make and on which I would like also to report again to this house when we have then the final signature of all the loan agreements and operational arrangements is a bit more details still on the use of the money in the different capabilities where we are still let's say working on. And I had hoped that we could have reported on that already here in this house in June, but it will be really I think in September only. So the first point I want to make there is that we have at this moment as facts stand, but it is really like to be confirmed when I come back here, is 60% is common procurement and 40% is national procurement at this moment in time.
And that is the end date.
On the national procurements, as per the regulation, they are all requested to be open. So this really means that they are having clauses that they can be opened to other member states. And we do expect, due to the execution over time, that thereby the balance between common and national procurements will go to the, let's say, direction of common procurements. There is no possibility for exemption after the first year.
So we are seeing already this development slowly ongoing as we are past the end of May 2026 deadline that was in the regulation. So if we are at 60 to 40 today, I expect that we will get to 70 to 30 or 80 to 20 by the end of the regulation because we know that there will be actions which will not be executed in time and which can only be replaced by common procurements. So we are working on that with the member states and we thereby see a very positive development.
I think that I need to underline to this committee chair that the procurements that were done for new capabilities in member states were mostly going only to the member state or to the outside to third countries to the extent of something like 20 to 80. If we see here under EDIRPA 60 to 40 or possibly in the end 70 to 30 on the positive balance of common procurements, we see a number of effects that we have not been observing before in Europe. That means that we have many contracts where member states are working together with the industry of the member states. And this I think is the real positive outcome. I cannot report the details either, but on the capabilities that have been defined, all nine capabilities are very well covered.
The volumes I can only give perhaps in September, but we have figures already. So, for instance, if I mention one area that is very much debated in Europe today, drones and counter-drones, the amount is quite important and significant, five billion.
You may say this is not that much, but for an area that is quite cost-efficient in comparison to missiles, integrated air missile defense, or also ground combat, then this amount is very well significant and is, I think, showing that there is a good development also on the capability side. And finally, last word from my side and then I conclude. Also, we see a very good cooperation of SAFE with other policies and instruments. First of all, with the capability coalitions that member states are building up under EDIP and the EDPCIs, the European Defense Projects of Common Interest. These are directly supported by the SAFE plans of the member states to a very large extent, and that is very positive.
And we also start to see, now that we are implementing the Ukraine Support Loan, an execution that can go between the two instruments. So that Ukraine can work together with member states also via SAFE, because there are contracts under SAFE that can be filling in the capability needs of Ukraine.
And again on this I would be happy to report. So I think, dear Chair, dear members, indeed we have a slight delay in comparison to our own expectation of being able to report here in June, but it is only a slight delay. And I think given the direction of travel and the volume taken up, we can speak of a very positive travel direction in comparison to where we come from with the member states. I thank you for your attention and I'm available for questions.
Reinis Pozņaks
Thank you very much. We will now move to questions and answers in a ping-pong format.
I will give two minutes for each coordinator's question and then you could reply. And we start with EPP, Helder.
Hélder Sousa Silva
Okay, thank you Chair, thank you Deputy Director-General. I will address you my question in Portuguese today.
Senhor diretor-geral adjunto, agradeço muito a sua vinda a esta comissão e a atualização que nos fez deste importante instrumento que é o SAFE. O SAFE foi, desde o seu início, apresentado como o instrumento que acabaria e contribuiria para acabar com a fragmentação dos estados europeus relativamente a equipamentos e produção de equipamentos de defesa através essencialmente da aquisição conjunta. E este termo é o termo, eu direi, chave do programa SAFE. Mas a derrogação que autoriza compras por um único estado continua ainda em vigor.
E o envelope está praticamente todo comprometido, os 150 mil milhões de euros já foram distribuídos. A pergunta é a seguinte: com os planos nacionais já aprovados, que percentagem concreta dos contratos é de facto multinacional e não compra nacional financiada a juros competitivos? Porque essa modalidade não estava inicialmente prevista nos objetivos do nosso SAFE.
Sem esse número, corremos claramente o risco de ter subsidiado o mesmo de sempre, mas desta vez com uma chancela da União Europeia. E creio ser da opinião minha, mas também de todos os meus colegas, que, apesar de não termos de ser informados sobre matérias classificadas dos projetos específicos em curso, e muito bem, este número é de uma importância vital para o trabalho que desempenhamos nesta casa. E por isso espero claramente que a Comissão, a Comissão Europeia, tenha em conta este grande objetivo, que era diminuir a fragmentação e obrigar a compras conjuntas.
Se cada Estado-membro continua ainda sobre esta autorização especial a adquirir os seus equipamentos isoladamente, o nosso objetivo cai por terra e naturalmente o Parlamento não pode não pode concordar com essa posição. Muito obrigado.
Harald Rütters
Thank you very much, Mr. Sousa Silva, for your question. And I fully concur with you that it is really important that I can report to this house in some detail, even if informations are in many cases classified.
I think I can report, for instance, on the shares of common and national procurement, on the different capabilities covered, to which extent, and on how many member states are in common procurement ongoing. The figures as it stands today, I already indicated, 60% is common procurement, 40 national, with a volume that will go upwards for common procurement, because of the deadline being behind this and us already clearly seeing the direction of travel of amendments that will be needed and the implementation, of course, of these national procurements. It will also be possible to give you, I think, in the future, a good detail on the different capabilities, so that this house also can see, without knowing exactly who ordered what, what would is is the overall, let's say, shares and and where this money is being spent on.
That will also be possible. The plans are classified on the request of member states not of the commission in order for certain informations not to go to those hands that we do not want them to go to and I think I'm quite clear when I'm expressing this.
So I can certainly engage, dear Chair, Ms. Sousa Silva, to come back in September and also give at that moment in time, perhaps in some slides, details on the capabilities individually that, due to the slide that I showed you on the state of play where we have signatures ongoing, is not final yet, but which give a very clear picture already. Thank you.
Sven Mikser
Yes, thank you. Thank you for the presentation. I would like to continue with the issue of fragmentation, because when we look at the fragmentation, obviously there are two different angles. One is the standardization and the compatibility of different forces and the ability to fight together. The other one is actually the fragmentation of industry, which I think is even more relevant here.
And how do you assess the, and this has obviously, I mean, very strong implications for national economies.
How do you assess the progress with regard to fighting the fragmentation of industries? And I may have a follow-up to that.
Harald Rütters
Indeed, I think all of us here in this room are aware that the European industry is still quite fragmented, notably also in the harmonization of the different capabilities, their interoperability, and the fact that we have national specifications which are sometimes going to almost handcraft working to the extent that we cannot really ramp up productions and thereby are driving up costs considerably, in particular also afterwards on the MRO, the maintenance, repair, and operations. And we have seen that very clearly in the war in Ukraine, where Ukraine was bitterly complaining on this scatteredness and this non-interoperability of instruments.
So of course we are working on that, but the EDIRPA instrument has there a very positive effect. Because the orderings of 60% of the 150 million in common, you can see that and I will be able to report that there is on those 60% very often many member states then ordering the same product, amplifying and standard setting for the future. We have coalitions which go up to six, seven member states buying the same product. And it has a let's say a spillover effect over time because there is a direction of travel as I said given that will help out. Is this sufficient?
I think it is good for the instrument and for the way we are spending European money.
It may not be sufficient for the overall because the European budgets are just a fraction of what is spent. And so we also need to engage in discussions, and which is ongoing, of course, with NATO, where NATO is responsible through STANAGs for standardization, and whether that can lead to sufficient, let's say, robustness of the markets. We believe that that this is contributing and that we will certainly have to speak again in in the coming years on the standardization, interoperability, and thereby driving down the cost.
Sven Mikser
Yes, my follow-up is this.
I I understand from the expenditure side of the budget this is it is extremely important to to get maximum bang for the buck for for every buck we spend. But then the the additional, sufficient additional funds for defense and for defense industries, they also have an effect on the on the national revenue side of budgets. And and we know that defense industries are not spread evenly across the our Union.
So this enormous additional money, that enormous amount of additional money that is coming to defense industries by way of orders from ESAF, but also other, other, other ways, that, that will not trickle down into the, on the revenue side of the national budgets evenly. And, and this may explain some of the reluctance of spending it first European taxpayers' money in Europe, but also by way of joint procurements, buying and, and trying to consolidate the industrial base and defragment it.
So in order to in order to see less reluctance to doing that, I think it's important also to to to see that that the economic activity and additional GDP produced by that money would be sort of spent equitably among the member states. So what what measures do you foresee for the future in EDIRPA but also beyond EDIRPA to to that effect?
Harald Rütters
EDIRPA is a loan instrument and member states are proposing plans that have to be in in line with the regulation.
The regulation, so there is no prescription there to the extent that there would be something like a distribution key or, I mean, it's really up on the member states to define the needs to ramp up by 2030 their capabilities. As we know, the industrial basis is quite concentrated in a number of member states, but at the same time, we see the development of, let's say, the innovative side due to the war in Ukraine and the rapid development of capabilities that are not, let's say, with the traditional primes, but rather with new startups and with new companies that are not respecting this traditional, let's say, five big producing countries.
So we see also on the safe that there is a more even distribution and there is also a I think an awareness also amongst primes that the distribution across the territory is broader than just the five. We see a lot of subsidiaries of the big primes in many member states and we see also that the whole chain that is below the the very big primes is constituted of thousands of SMEs that are in fact very very essential for components and that sometimes are let's say also then distributed across the entire territory. That's what I can observe in many of the areas of of the nine capabilities. So I think that the picture is more mixed than perhaps we can think it is not only the Leonardos, Rheinmetalls, Indras etc of this world. It is also very much all the SMEs below and the new startups that are growing very fast.
I think thereby the picture is is much more distributed. Of course we have no possibility, I think we have no possibility to link it in the way to revenues to member states. I don't think that is the purpose of the exercise. The purpose is to have readiness in time and then to see that we can defend Europe and to a certain extent of safe together with USL, Ukraine. And I have rather the worries on that side than on the distribution of revenue side in order of having the capabilities that are needed.
Pierre-Romain Thionnet
Merci, Madame la Présidente.
Monsieur le Directeur général adjoint, je poserai ma question en français. Simplement pour poursuivre l'échange au sujet de la fragmentation et défragmentation. Je crois qu'il y a aussi des injonctions contradictoires au sein de l'Union européenne puisque dans certains programmes, notamment le Fonds européen de défense ou certains aspects d'EDIP également, il y a plutôt un soutien à la fragmentation supplémentaire où on fait émerger de nouveaux acteurs en obligeant aussi certaines certains programmes conjoints. Donc voilà, je crois qu'il y a aussi des des orientations contradictoires dans les différents programmes européens.
Mais ma question n'est pas sur n'est pas sur cela. Une question, même si vous ne pouvez pas aujourd'hui nous donner des détails sur les volumes ou les les types d'équipement, mais est-ce que de manière générale et sans citer de pays en particulier, est-ce qu'il y a quand même des investissements ou des des programmes sur des secteurs comme la frappe dans la profondeur, la défense aérienne ou également les enjeux de détection et de surveillance de radar ? Ça c'est qui sont des capability gaps assez importants pour les pour les forces armées européennes.
Et deuxième question, y a-t-il un certain nombre de plans nationaux qui ont intégré l'Ukraine dans les acquisitions conjointes ? Je vous remercie.
Harald Rütters
Merci beaucoup pour ces questions et je vais vous répondre en anglais pour la continuité de mes propos. And over the new question, thank you very much for that.
But I can really confirm here to this house that there is a very clear way forward that has been in the instruments of the European Union since a longer time now. Under the EDF and the future ECF and the EDIRPA now in between, the direction of travel is common procurement. And we are prescribing that for instance under the EDF and ECF it is at least three member states have to be participating. Just like in PESCO you have to have common procurement. And this means that there is let's say no faltering from the side of the European Commission on that regard.
We insist on this common way forward and not on a national way forward.
So that's the first point I really would like to stress. Is ECF leading to, or EDF, sorry, and EDIP to a more, let's say, scattered way? What we do under EDF and EDIP and ECF in the future is also to strengthen the innovative base in Europe and the research side of things, which absolutely is needed in the domain of defense. And indeed, it leads to many small and medium enterprises taking up in the area, but which often then afterwards are trying to make the jumpstart to the bigger ones to be in their, let's say, in the order books of ministries of defense.
And the agile program that we will be here also negotiating in the house is specifically meant for those SMEs to to make that jump. So that is absolutely crucial I think to be done. And there is no contradiction there between SAFE and EDF EDEP and ECF for the future. So that is I think a very important first point. One moment.
So the other point, indeed, on Ukraine is also, as I said in my introduction, quite essential. Under the 19 plans that we received, the large majority of them had also foreseen actions with Ukraine under SAFE. In particular, a number of actions of production where they would donate this production to Ukraine. Also the seeking of joint ventures with Ukraine, money is reserved for that. And then setting up joint ventures on their territories, procuring those productions and donating them to Ukraine.
So in total, a volume of around plus 5 billion under the 147 were dedicated to Ukraine in particular.
So, now what we are trying to do is to seek that these actions under SAFE can be combined with the actions under UASL, and we are in fact also seeking that there is a further use of other SAFE contracts where we see that there are gaps in the capabilities, notably on drones, counter-drones, and also missiles and air defense. Thank you very much.
Thank you very much, Willy for the Greens.
Villy Søvndal
Thank you very much for your intervention.
I have a question also following up on Ukraine. When you see, look at the war, the drones are not only drones, they are the whole chain of drones and radar and robots and AI and the whole stuff. Are you also investing in that? Because when we visited Ukraine, they always said they had a lot of unused capacity in their production if they just had the finance. How could you say a bit about how that, how that works?
And the other question is about foreign investments in Ukraine.
I saw a Danish research group saying that only 20% of the investments in weapon industry in Ukraine comes from Europe. The great part in foreign investors is US. How do you see that in a situation where we want European not independence, but a lot stronger role for Europe?
Could we and should we invest more in Ukraine in the present situation? Thank you.
Harald Rütters
Thank you, Mr. Van Dalen, for those questions. On drones, of course, we can tackle with SAFE the entirety of the whole spectrum, not only the drones, counter-drones, but all types of them, ISR, deep strike, etc. We also, of course, have everything linked to data, to control and command, etc., which are linked to the drone, let's say, operational side, which can be tackled under SAFE and which is tackled under SAFE.
And I think that Member States as I said in my opening statement are quite active in the area that is relatively let's say a new area of work but we see a quite large volume going to this part. Member States are of course also seeking through SAFE as I replied just previously to combine with Ukrainian industrial base to set up joint ventures. We hear from Member States that this is not very easily ongoing right now so we are having discussions with Ukraine to facilitate these setting up of joint ventures which will be the case for instance in the conference in Gdansk this week through so-called drone deals.
We hope that we can make good progress because also the implementation of SAFE money, this five plus billion, are essential to this extent that Ukraine also allows the joint ventures to be set up and to also have the, let's say, the export of the intellectual property there. Under the UASL instrument, we are of course having, let's say, the pendant of SAFE, and the Member States have made available these 60 billion on the defense side of the UASL, of the Ukraine Support Loan, in order for Ukraine to be able to procure from its side. Because so far in the beginning when we started with SAFE last year, there was no budgetary component, no loan component on the Ukrainian side. We only had on the Member State side.
So this let's say fitting together of the two was quite important in that regard. It is not let's say the full story yet because we are still building on the Ukrainian and SAFE components in order to get to useful and effective joint ventures, not only for drones and counter-drones, also missiles. Are there enough investments by the Europeans in Ukraine? There very clearly are investments by the member states through the UASL, but also by the industry who is active in Ukraine and who is also themselves setting up.
This is a, I would say, a still emerging picture where we see bit by bit how new coalitions are built between European industry and Ukrainian industry. If it is sufficient and to what extent, I would be happy to come back when I talk about UASL in this house again.
Okay, so we continue with Nicola.
Nicolás Pascual de la Parte
Thank you very much, Chair. Thank you very much, Pierre.
I wanted probably to dwell upon a question that has been previously to you, but in order to clarify, how do you make sure in the Commission that the ASAP money is consecrated, devoted only to collaborative procurement and not to national procurement? Because it is the philosophy of this loan is to finance the European defense industrial base, not national capabilities as such. For that are the national budgets, but not for ASAP. How do you make sure that you finance those projects submitted to you which meet the requirements retained in ASAP? Thank you very much.
Harald Rütters
As I indicated, the Commission has the regulation at hand.
National procurements were possible only until the 29th of May of this year for contracts that were signed. And we have been very clear to all the member states that the regulation says that all possible efforts have to be made to open up these contracts. So we have had very deep engagement with the member states in a whole series of workshops, conferences, exchanges, that these national procurements that were foreseen by some were offered to all other member states. We have evidence of that.
So those, for instance, that have had national procurements, we have forced them to offer those national procurements to all other member states, forced that, and we have written track of that. They have also been, we have also been working together with the European Defence Agency where there was an interactive website set up for exchanging on those capabilities that were national so that they were made available to others, that they were known to others. And then the final component that I said before, we also have requested the member states on their national procurements that they are defined as open so that others can join those procurements. So that is an essential component for us to be able to accept these national procurements.
The end result of that is 60 towards 40. I expect that to go upwards in the directions of 70/30 or wherever we will end. And with those, I think, very strict approach on, on national procurements, we have been, let's say, interpreting and bending the regulation to the extent possible, but within the regulation, of course.
Nicolás Pascual de la Parte
Okay sorry have you rejected any any programs submitted to the commission by a member state which doesn't meet this criteria or you have not rejected anyone? Thank you.
Harald Rütters
I think that I can can really say to this room that we have been rejecting many many projects both common and national because you have to reply to the clear requirements of the directive. So if they are if they were not within the boundaries of the regulation we have clearly been rejecting them.
I can give some example, for instance, we had quite a lot of, which I would really say are national projects on, for instance, military mobility, national infrastructure. We have been clearly kicking that out because there was no common dimension to it at all. And even if they then said, but this can be done as a national procurement, we said no, because you cannot open, you cannot open it to others. So any project that could not be opened to others and that was not advertisable to others has been clearly rejected. And this is just one example.
We have been rejecting for some countries a large majority of their plan. And so there have been with many countries iterations, several iterations in order to get to a acceptable plan. And I will be very delighted to present the outcome once we have signed them all.
Tobias Cremer
Yes, thank you very much. I have two quite concrete questions. The first one is a clarification, when you talk about common procurement, where does this definition start?
Is it just two member states or three? Because I think in the other ones it goes from three and that would be important to see for these numbers of 60/40. And the second question I have is quite concretely, I know that you can't give us the details about the specific capabilities, but whether you can give us a broad overview about the proportion of research and development within that. So because we see a lot of the times we are just going for old capabilities and really just like the old wish lists. To what extent do we really invest in innovative projects?
What is research and development? And is it higher than the current 4% that I think is common in Europe compared to 16% in the United States? Thank you.
Harald Rütters
I think that you have given the answer. It's under ESAF 2, but as under EDF, ECF 3. This is the result of a negotiation. But it is two, but there are many projects, I can tell you, which are also three or four or five or six or seven member states in one project, positively. I will report in the detail when the, when it will be signed, all of that.
So, but you see a quite nice distribution.
I don't know how much is two and how much is more. I would just have to be very approximate here and I do not want to be that. With regard to your second question, so under EDIRPA, it's really procurement of products and so it's not so much on research and innovation. Research and innovation is under the EDF, ECF and we have there, I think here, there we have specific budgets for that, Agile, which come to this house as well. In regard of EDIRPA, it is really procurement of capabilities.
And I think that I would still want to twist my answer to you. Yes, as I said, it doesn't go to traditional only.
It doesn't go. In fact, we were quite pleased to see the nine capabilities being covered and not only, let's say, the traditional air missile defense or the traditional ground combat tanks and so on. It is really quite essential in the coverage of the other capabilities. And yeah, I will report, as I said, in September on the exact distribution.
Pekka Toveri
Thank you, Chair. Thank you for your briefing. I'm sorry that I came a little bit late and you might have already answered the question.
But last time we met I voiced my concern about Hungary asking for 16 billion, especially because of Orbán. Well now I'm I'm much more calm about political situation there. But the fact is 16 billion, the Hungarian defense forces use about 1 billion a year for material procurement. That would be for 15 years joint joint procurement. I I've done that in my previous life.
I'm a bit skeptical they keep on the capability to actually deliver.
And those together, Hungary and Italy, I noticed that they are under consideration. They represent 20% of the SAFE applications. So when will the final decisions be made whether they are applicable for SAFE money? And if not, do you have plans to have a second round of applications because there are a lot of good candidates still, I think, waiting. Thank you.
Harald Rütters
Mr. Tovry, thank you for your question. And I'm speaking to a specialist, so I will be very prudent. Indeed, the request by Hungary was by far the biggest in comparison to the annual budget that the country had. So we saw a spread which was going from a half year of investment budget in the lowest country, France, to almost eight years of national budget for Hungary.
So that is indeed an issue which now will be tackled by the new Hungarian government. We have had indications so far that they will submit a new plan for a lower amount. And we will see, of course, the plan, but we will be as strict as for all the other plans. We will make no, let's say, different treatment, of course, equal treatment to all, and see how much that they will be consuming.
I have to tell you that we also have of course a collegial approach, so we have also to look at the excessive debt procedures together with our colleagues from DG ECFIN and see that the loan taken by the country is in sync with the overall budgetary procedures. And thereby we also have some checks and balances that we will put in place. Again, I expect that this will be the subject of finalization during June and July. It could be a quite a considerable bit lower than the 16 billion initially tendered out.
That money will fall back into the instrument, which would then have a positive, let's say, remainder of budget of around perhaps 10 billion that would be tendered out in the second call for interest. That is still to be discussed. It's a little bit early, but it is certainly within the regulation that the Commission would make a second call for interest before the end of 2026. And we can also make that perhaps targeted, but to be confirmed later on. Thank you.
Marta Wcisło
Thank you. I will be speaking Polish.
Pani przewodnicząca, panie dyrektorze generalny. Jestem z Polski. Polska jest największym beneficjentem programu ASAP, wszyscy to wiemy. 43,7 miliona euro inwestujemy w bezpieczeństwo wschodniej flanki Unii Europejskiej, w wozy bojowe, w armatohaubice, w moździerze, w amunicję 155 milimetrów, w drony. Ten program wzmacnia cały europejski system obrony, małe, a także małe i średnie przedsiębiorstwa.
Mam dwa pytania w związku z tym. Po pierwsze, czy inwestycje w systemy antydronowe na wschodniej flance Unii Europejskiej, w tym w regionach przygranicznych, przyfrontowych całej Unii Europejskiej, będą traktowane jako wyraźny priorytet we wdrażaniu programu ASAP?
I drugie pytanie. Powiedział pan, panie dyrektorze generalny, że państwa członkowskie decydują o zakupach i wykorzystaniu tych środków z programu SAFE, że zakupy krajowe miały miejsce do 29 maja, a następnie będą wspólne zakupy.
Ja mam w związku z tym pytanie w odniesieniu do pana słów, a mianowicie połączeniu programów SAFE z EDIP-em jako głównych narzędzi wzmacniających bezpieczeństwo Unii Europejskiej. W związku ze szczególną sytuacją w moim kraju, a mianowicie program SAFE, jak wszyscy wiemy, został zawetowany przez Prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej i tym samym ograniczył pewne narzędzia, które mógł rząd wykorzystać w aspekcie wzmocnienia bezpieczeństwa i odporności naszego kraju, a tym samym całej Unii Europejskiej.
Jak pan widzi, jak pan wyjaśni te wspólne zakupy, które mamy realizować w kontekście między innymi też innych programów i narzędzi, które są w programie SAFE, w odniesieniu do tego, że w moim kraju można program SAFE wykorzystywać tylko i wyłącznie na wojsko, na armię? Dziękuję.
Reinis Pozņaks
It's okay if you make a photo, but no movie please, okay? And not, okay, so please continue.
Harald Rütters
Thank you very much. Thank you for your question.
Indeed, Poland has taken a very important share of the SAFE program. And we are very happy that we could conclude with Poland as the first member state, because Poland being on the eastern flank is one of the, let's say, exposed countries very much, let's say, in the first line, together with the Baltic states, Finland, up to Romania, Bulgaria. So we are happy that Poland was a first signature, that we had operational arrangements signed, and that we could already make a pre-financing available to Poland.
Now of course with regards to the national plan that was submitted by Poland on SAFE, there have been many exchanges as I exposed before to get that plan being in sync with the regulation. The intervention that there was also on the Polish side in order to have investments only addressing the defense matters and not certain others was a matter that was on the Polish side and in the end a good solution I believe was found in order to conclude.
Whether Poland can come back with other let's say matters that were not covered are not covered by SAFE, yes of course Poland can participate under EDIP and can participate and is participating in the EDIRP's and we are quite let's say grateful for that effort that Poland is making which would allow Poland to indeed address a number of things that cannot be addressed under SAFE. But I would like to stress from my side the very positive cooperation with Poland, the fact that we could conclude the entire volume foreseen and that Poland was in the end very let's say agile in submitting a program that was fully in line with the regulation and for which a first payment has been made.
So I conclude from my side that the cooperation there on the eastern flank is thereby strengthened and that efforts are made also under the other programs to make sure that the eastern flank is well observed and is not, I would say, in a situation of underrepresented attention from the Commission's side.
Reinis Pozņaks
Thank you, colleagues. Any other questions? No, so we will continue in September. Thank you very much, it's really very, very interesting, we're looking forward to what's going on and good luck. And it sounds not bad.
Okay, I mean, so we will continue at 12:00 with the Chief of Defense, General Clancy.
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