Committee on International Trade Ordinary meeting
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INTA European Parliament
Ihren Sitzungen folgenIuliu Winkler
I close the vote. I close the vote. And it is adopted. Now compromise amendment number four. Who is in favor?
Who is against? Who abstains? Adopted. This was a block vote with compromise amendment number five and it is adopted. Now I have a series of amendments withdrawn and the next amendment is amendment 94.
Who is in favor?
Who is against? Abstentions? Rejected. Amendment 95, who is in favor? Who is against?
Abstentions? Rejected. Amendment 96, who is in favor? Who is against? Abstentions?
I would like to check this please. I open the check vote on amendment 96. And I close the vote. And it is rejected.
It is rejected. Amendment 97. Who is in favor? Who is against? Abstentions rejected.
99. Who is in favor? Against? Abstentions adopted. 98.
Who is in favor? Who is against? Abstentions rejected. Compromise amendment number one. It's a block vote with compromise amendment number two.
Who is in favor? Who is against? Abstentions adopted. Compromise amendment number seven.
Who is in favor? Who is against? Abstentions? Adopted. Amendment number 104.
Who is in favor? Against? Abstentions? I would like to check this please. 104.
I open the vote. Now I close the vote. And it is rejected. Compromise amendment number six.
Who is in favor? Who is against? Abstentions? Adopted. Now we go to amendment 108.
Who is in favor? Against? Abstentions? Adopted. Compromise amendment number 3.
Who is in favor? Against? Abstentions? Adopted.
Compromise amendment number 10. Who is in favor? Against? Abstentions? Adopted.
Amendment 130, 1-3-0. Who is in favor? Against? Abstentions? Rejected.
Now we have compromise amendment number eight. This is in block with compromise amendment number nine. Who is in favor? Against? Abstentions?
Adopted.
And we go to amendment 138. Who is in favor? Against? Abstentions? Rejected.
Amendment 142. In favor? Against? Abstentions? Rejected.
Amendment 87. In favor? Against? Abstentions? I would like to check, please, amendment 87.
I open the vote. I close the vote. And it is adopted. So we go to amendment 88. Who is in favor?
Against? Abstention? Check. A check vote on 88.
I open the check vote. And it is adopted. Amendment 143. Who is in favor? Who is against?
Abstentions? Adopted. Amendment number 29. Who is in favor? Who is against?
Abstentions? Adopted.
Amendment number 1. Who is in favor? Who is against? Abstentions? Rejected.
Compromise amendment number 11. Who is in favor? Against? Abstentions? Adopted.
Compromise amendment 32. Amendment number 32. Who is in favor? Who is against? Abstentions?
May we check this please? Amendment 32. I open the vote. I close the vote. And it is rejected clearly.
I'm sorry for wasting your time. Amendment number 5.
Who is in favor? Who is against? Abstentions rejected. Amendment number 6. Who is in favor?
Who is against? Abstentions rejected. Amendment number 36. Who is in favor?
Who is against? Abstentions? Rejected. And now compromise amendment number twelve. Who is in favor?
Against? Abstentions? Adopted. Amendment number eight. Who is in favor?
Who is against? Abstentions? Rejected. Amendment number forty-five. Who is in favor?
Against? Abstentions? Adopted, I think. I would like to check, please, amendment number forty-five.
I open the vote. And I close the vote. And it is adopted. Thank you. Next, amendment number 46.
Who is in favor? Who is against? Abstentions? Adopted. Amendment number 48.
Who is in favor?
Who is against? Abstentions? Adopted. Amendment 50. Who is in favor?
Who is against? Abstentions? Adopted. Amendment 51. In favor?
Against? Abstentions? Rejected. 53 was withdrawn. And so this brings us to compromise amend...
No. What?
Iuliu Winkler
Yes, I'm sorry. We go to amendment number 66. Who is in favor?
Who is against? Abstentions? Rejected. Amendment 67. In favor?
Against? Abstentions? Rejected. Amendment 68. In favor?
Against? Abstentions? Rejected. Amendment 14. In favor?
Against? Abstentions? Rejected. Amendment 70. In favor?
Against? Abstentions? Rejected. Amendment 73. In favor?
Against? Abstentions? Adopted. Amendment 76. In favor?
Against? Abstentions? Rejected.
And so we arrive to the final vote. This is a roll call vote on the proposal as amended, and I open the vote. Adopted. Thank you very much. 27 votes in favor, 4 votes against, and 5 abstentions.
Redner 11
Yeah, no, you could say that. We just wait for one minute while people leave the room. Thanks again, Chair. That was a complicated voting list because there were blocks and linked compromises, huh?
So colleagues, if you allow, I will start.
Iuliu Winkler
We have several monitoring groups and we also have some colleagues who are present and others who could not be today. So I will proceed accordingly. I have in my notes the fact that there should be in the room a group of students from the University of Trier. Are you here? Okay, then you made your presence shown.
I welcome you on behalf of this International Trade Committee.
I think that it's very good that you are interested in our work and I wish you all your success and good luck in your future endeavors. So yes, then we go back to our meeting's to-do list. And first is the monitoring group of Israel. We have no rapporteur present, so I will just inform you, colleagues, that the monitoring group met on 20th of April 2026.
There was an exchange of views with External Action Service on Middle East and Israel, occupied Palestinian territories and Middle East peace process and an exchange of views with DG Trade on bilateral relations with Israel. And the next is monitoring group on Indonesia and I am the rapporteur myself for this monitoring group. So colleagues, I will just inform you that we had a meeting on the 21st of April, which was the sixth meeting of our Indonesia monitoring group. We had an exchange of views with with civil society professional representatives.
We discussed CEPA provisions on trade in services, including related chapters and digital trade. We also discussed, as usual, with our chief negotiator, Mr. Fabian Gehl from DG TRADE, about the services commitment in CEPA, which are similar, very close to the majority of commitments that we have in other FTAs that we are discussing or we have concluded with ASEAN countries. Modes of transport are covered, architects and other urban services and tourism is covered, similarly to the FTA with Australia.
Similarly to the FTA with Australia, there are commitments for manufacturing and agricultural-related services and, of course, trade in services is not subject to custom duties. Key sectors where EU SMEs could gain access are the hardware and software as well as agriculture and digital trade. We discussed on digital trade and we also discussed on investment liberalization included in SEPA.
They are intended to create opportunities and possibilities for EU operators. Indonesia accepted for the first time to open its economy on the EU investors in key sectors, renewable energy, semiconductors, electronics and so on, and also SEPA provisions are going beyond other agreements concluded by Indonesia with other partners. We will go on with our scrutiny work. We have also questions from colleagues in this International Trade Committee about the SEPA implementation and this week we will have the next monitoring group and I invite you colleagues and shadow rapporteurs to be present.
And I move now to the joint INTA-IMCO working group on the forced labor regulation. Mr. Raphaël Glucksmann is rapporteur, but he is not present. So I just inform you that there was an exchange of view on the state of implementation of the regulation dealing with the following issues.
First, risk database, guidelines, the Member States network and the stakeholders expert group, ICSMS and the interconnection with the customs systems, international cooperation and awareness raising activities. Next is the monitoring group on the United States, for which you know that our chair is the rapporteur. He is not present here, so, but you, I think you have all followed the evolutions.
I don't have any comments now to to add to the situation that you know very well. Next monitoring group is on Andean countries. And the monitoring group met on the 4th of May and we have our colleague Juan Ignacio Zoido and I give you the floor, please.
Juan Ignacio Zoido Álvarez
Muchas gracias, presidente. Como muy bien dice, el pasado 4 de mayo el Monitoring Group de los países andinos se reunió para hablar sobre las relaciones comerciales de la Unión Europea y Perú. Contamos con la presencia del embajador peruano, el señor Jorge Chávez, representantes del SEAE y de la Dirección General de Comercio.
El embajador hizo un balance positivo de la relación y señaló que, si bien el comercio bilateral ha crecido en términos nominales, en términos reales lleva años estancado. También insistió en las preocupaciones del Perú frente al reglamento de desforestación y el impacto negativo que puede tener en la política antidroga y los programas de erradicación de cultivos ilícitos en la región. E hizo una invitación a los inversores europeos para que apuesten más por las oportunidades que ofrece el país, concretamente en minerales críticos.
Es un sector con gran potencial, pero donde no hay suficiente capital europeo frente a los potentes flujos financieros de otras grandes economías. Por su parte, la Comisión apuntó a que más de la mitad del comercio entre la Unión Europea y Perú no aprovecha las ventajas del acuerdo, y eso es algo que tenemos que corregir. Finalmente, el Servicio Europeo de Acción Exterior centró su intervención en las recientes elecciones presidenciales peruanas.
Subrayó que la estabilidad política que salga de este proceso será determinante para avanzar en la relación bilateral y en sectores estratégicos como los minerales críticos. La segunda vuelta celebrada el 7 de junio ha dejado un resultado muy ajustado con Keiko Fujimori por delante por un margen estrecho y la proclamación oficial todavía pendiente. Muchas gracias, presidente.
Iuliu Winkler
Thank you very much, and thank you. And the next monitoring group is with the relations on Canada, which met on the 5th of May.
We have no rapporteur present, but I can tell you that it was an exchange of view with DG Trade on the first round of negotiations on the EU-Canada Digital Trade Agreement. And of course, we have the good news of ratification in Belgium of the CETA, the EU-Canada agreement, long-awaited ratification. Next is monitoring group on Ukraine. We do not have the rapporteur, but the monitoring group met on the 5th of May and held an exchange of view on the state of play of implementation of the Ukraine support loan with DG NEAR and DG ECFIN. We also had, for those interested, a very good exchange of views yesterday on the Ukraine loan facility.
I'm sorry, colleagues. Next one is monitoring group on critical raw materials, and we have colleague Saskia Bricmont, the rapporteur, and I give you the floor, please.
Saskia Bricmont
Thank you very much, Chair. I don't know if it's worth it to debrief because everything is already leaked in Politico. And for that, I would like to apologize also to DG TRADE and GROW because we had open and in-camera exchanges, and it's important to respect that.
The meeting focused on the EU-US plans regarding CRMs, and so it's a quite sensitive topic, you know it. On 24th of April, they announced the conclusion of a bilateral memorandum of understanding and a joint action plan in view of a plurilateral cooperation open to like-minded countries, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, and G7 countries at the same time. We heard two experts and the Commission. As usual, you know it, the European Parliament has no say in any of these arrangements, which is quite problematic because the MOUs are to be seen in the context also the more global context and this one in the context of the Turnberry deal.
The two texts are a consequence of the initiative launched by Rubio in February with a joint press statement EU-US-Japan. And the MOU and the joint action plan deviate from the usual transactional approach from the Trump administration in the sense that they are explicit commitments to international law obligations. It mentions G7 and also there are references to high market standards and sustainability. It covers primary but also secondary raw market circularity and recycling. It could pave the way for joint public procurement.
When it comes to price mechanism, nothing is settled there.
No mechanism has been designed or agreed upon. One of the experts mentioned that in April, China passed two new laws similar to our anti-coercion instrument which could be used against such EU-US initiative which aim at de-risking from China. An expert also warned that what needs to be avoided is the lock-in of super high returns in protective markets because that would play in favor of monopolies.
Another question raised was about the participation on an equal footing of producing countries, and this question is still open. In the course of the exchange, we learned that Zambia has adopted new sustainability standards based on international accounting standards, focusing on general and climate-related disclosures. Starting January 2025, organizations in Zambia must apply these standards for annual reporting, aiming to enhance transparency and align with global best practices.
It is something that would deserve further attention, as it can inspire us in the context of our MOUs and of the future plurilateral cooperation. As you understand, we're not done yet with the EU-US cooperation on CRM, and we will have to follow that closely in the coming months. Thank you.
Iuliu Winkler
Thank you very much for this, and we move to the next monitoring group, which is the monitoring group on Russia. And the rapporteur is Inese Vaidere, but on behalf of her, our EPP group coordinator will speak, Jörgen Warborn, the floor is yours.
Jörgen Warborn
Thank you, Chair. So the inter-monitoring group on Russia focused on imports on fishery products originating from the Russian Federation.
The discussion highlighted the scale of this trade. Each year, the EU imports Russian fishery products worth several hundred million euros, providing an important source of revenue for Russia and indirectly financing its war of aggression against Ukraine.
Although Russian imports currently account for a substantial share of supplies of certain species, alternative sources are available, including from Norway, Iceland, and the United States. INTA has now decided to jointly with PECH to call on the Commission to propose a ban on imports of Russian fish and fishery products, and of course the monitoring group will continue to follow these developments closely. Thank you.
Iuliu Winkler
Thank you very much for this, and the next monitoring group... I never asked if anyone has questions, but of course you can, you can ask questions after the reports, colleagues. But if it's not the case, then the next monitoring group is on Philippines, and I give back the floor to Jörgen Warborn.
Jörgen Warborn
Yes, it's on behalf of myself.
So we had the last monitoring group on the 2nd of June. It is actually the fifth of this legislative term. And as you know, we are currently engaged in the negotiation for a free trade agreement with the Philippines. And we are actually having a very good pace on this.
We have very advanced discussions and hopefully we will conclude an agreement with them during this year. In this context, the members of the committee had already a very interesting and useful exchange of views with Mrs. Dora Correia, director and chief negotiator in DG Trade, on the state of play of the negotiations after the latest round, which took place between 18th and 22nd of May. Those latest discussions represented the sixth round of very friendly and constructive negotiations with the Philippines. It is worth mentioning the context surrounding the negotiations, more precisely the difficult national energy emergency brought about by the war in the Middle East due to the Philippines being 90% dependent on fuel from abroad, which drives the Philippines in their quest to diversify.
During the sixth round, the market access discussions continued and the work on the text advanced. Three chapters, the digital trade chapter, the intellectual property rights chapter, and the final provision chapter, versus 2 to 17.
The level of ambition in the digital trade and IPR chapter seems to be very high, with the text very close to the EU standards, with EU priority being the prohibition of data localization, carve-outs for private data, and respectively the IPR enforcement and precautionary measures. The final provision chapter includes reference to the Paris Agreement, commitments for the protection of human rights, and the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Good progress was made for a few other chapters, such as customs, trade facilitation, or and dispute settlement, and those chapters could be closed in inter-session discussions.
Still open are the market access offers, the AI provisions, and the public procurement chapters. Regarding the agriculture and fishery sector, it was made clear that the EU and Philippine relevant markets are mostly complementary. No new formal round of negotiations is foreseen for the moment, but the two chief negotiators will meet in Brussels next week to try to advance as much as possible the discussions and possibly conclude more chapters. When it comes to the free trade agreement timetable, it looks more and more probable that the negotiations can be concluded in the months to come.
Things will become clearer after the chief negotiators meet next week. Thank you.
Iuliu Winkler
Thank you very much for this briefing. Any questions? If it is not the case, I move on to the monitoring group on e-commerce and our rapporteur is colleague Brando Benifei. Please, you have the floor.
Brando Benifei
Thank you, Chair. Dear colleagues, on June the 2nd, the monitoring group on e-commerce met with DG TRADE to discuss the outcomes of the ministerial conference number 14 of the WTO in Yaoundé and the outlook for the upcoming July General Council in Geneva.
The debrief focused on the multilateral e-commerce agenda and the plurilateral e-commerce agreement. Our discussion primarily focused on the lapsing of the e-commerce moratorium. For the first time since 1998, electronic transmissions are no longer multilaterally shielded from custom duties. The Commission briefed us that certain WTO members ultimately blocked the consensus, preferring a shorter extension over a permanent one, largely due to broader political leverage.
This lapse risks fragmenting digital trade. During the meeting, members raised specific concerns about the European music and audiovisual sectors. Because these sectors are often carved out of our bilateral free trade agreements, they relied heavily on this multilateral safety net. Currently, the Commission is consulting member states on whether the EU should join a US-led plurilateral pledge to voluntarily maintain the duty-free practice. On a more positive note, we discussed the interim implementation of the plurilateral e-commerce agreement.
66 WTO members, covering roughly 70% of global trade, have agreed to move forward with this framework, which establishes baseline rules for digital trade.
The agreement requires 45 ratifications to enter into force. The Commission noted that the EU ratification will count as 27, meaning swift EU action will represent a major step forward. The Commission stressed that while this plurilateral arrangement provides necessary stability for businesses, the ultimate objective remains incorporating these rules into the multilateral WTO framework. Thank you very much.
Iuliu Winkler
Thank you very much for this. If there are supplementary questions.
If it is not the case, then I move on to the monitoring group on China, which took place in the second of June, but we don't have a rapporteur to report on it. So I move on to the monitoring group on India, which met on the third of June, and also they had an exchange of view with the Federation of European Business in India and with DG Trade. Rapporteur cannot be present, so I move to the final monitoring group, and rapporteur here is present because we have the monitoring group of Australia, and I give again the floor to Jörgen Warborn, please.
Jörgen Warborn
Thank you, Chair. So the monitoring group on Australia met on the 3rd of June. And as you all know, negotiations for the free trade agreements were concluded on the 24th of March this year and presented in the INTA committee on the 16th of April. For the meeting of the 3rd of June, I invited two speakers. First, we had an exchange of view with the Australian Ambassador to the EU, Mr. Angus Campbell, to discuss in particular on the EU-Australia FTA.
And secondly, we had a discussion with Christoph Kiener, the EU chief negotiator for the FTA, on the state of play and the next steps. There is no concrete date yet when the official signing of the FTA can take place. And after that, of course, we can expect the formal Council referral requesting the consent of the European Parliament. But in order to gain time on the Parliament side, I plan to already start the analysis of the free trade agreement text in more detail after the summer break.
And I look forward to a good cooperation with the shadow rapporteurs. My plan here is to organize some thematic sessions and analyze more in detail the different chapters with guest speakers from both the Commission and from stakeholders. Thank you.
Iuliu Winkler
Thank you very much. And this concludes our point on the monitoring group activities.
I would like to make two final remarks on the monitoring group activities. My first comment would be that I would like to thank the secretariat of our committee for organizing these meetings, which is always very laborious, and there is an entire story and a drama and a never-ending preparation about finding the rooms and so on and so on and the acceptable dates for these meetings.
So thank you very much for this. And this brings me to my second comment, which I'm receiving on behalf of the rapporteurs and colleagues coordinating the monitoring groups about the modest presence of our colleagues in the monitoring group activities, which I think is on the detriment of our activity. Because I think that monitoring groups are a good tool and they are also a good way of keeping contact not only with the Commission, DG Trade or External Action Service, but also with our various stakeholders. So I would like to make an appeal here to the coordinators of the political groups. Maybe there is a need of a discussion with the political group members, members in INTA, about their presence in the monitoring groups.
Thank you very much for this.
And now I arrive to point number 13, which is an exchange of view with the Commission representatives on update on export credits, notably the modernization of the of the OECD arrangement on officially supported export credits. Since the last modernization or latest modernization of the OECD arrangement on export credit, which entered into force in July 2023 and was reflected in a previous delegated act, a number of further developments have taken place, which the Commission seeks to reflect in a new delegated act.
The EU is in parallel engaged in the second phase of modernization process aimed at addressing a number of outstanding issues agreed upon in 2020. These aspects are intended to make export credits better suited to today's competitive landscape and also to enhance transparency in the sector. We have a representative of the Commission, Madame Korodima, Deputy Head of Unit, DG Trade, and I give you the floor for around 10 minutes, please.
Korodima
Thank you very much.
Good morning everyone. I'm happy to be here to update you on some recent activities in the area of export credits. As you know, export credit agencies provide financial support to national exporters in the form of guarantees or insurance against political and commercial risks or direct loans. And so they have a key role to play in de-risking and in mobilizing private capital for these transactions. This role is particularly relevant today as EU exporters face increasing competitive pressure in global markets, including of course from China.
We have a number of priorities in this area. The focus of my presentation today will be on the second phase of the modernization of the OECD arrangement on officially supported export credits to enable the participants to the arrangement to better compete in global markets while safeguarding the level playing field among them. And I will also say a few words on our activities in the area of enhanced coordination of our external financial tools, which are important also with a view to the next MFF.
So on what's happening for the arrangement. The aim here is to boost the global competitiveness of the EU, which calls for a set of new rules that better fit, as you said, in today's context. The global landscape for export finance has evolved considerably over the past two decades, and the system that was once largely shaped by the arrangement is since the early 2010s under growing pressure. We have new actors, diverse financing models, and intensifying geostrategic competition.
The successful conclusion of the first phase of modernization in 2023 was a significant milestone. Also to note that the EU has led efforts to launch in 2025 a voluntary transparency report on export credit transactions in the energy sector, following the failure to expand the coal ban to other fossil fuels. Member states are also providing more detailed annual reporting on how climate objectives are taken into account that you will find in the annual review by the Commission. However, there are still urgent challenges facing the arrangement.
So the participants have launched the second phase of modernization at the initiative of the EU in December 2025. The aim here is to have more flexibility in the rules for both concessional and non-concessional finance to be able to better face competition with non-arrangement providers of official export credit support while maintaining a level playing field. And the second aim was to have more transparency among participants on a number of financial products that they are developing that may be outside the scope of the arrangement.
And this, the aim here is to keep trust and level playing field among participants. Maybe also to highlight that there's a strong political push for this work. As the G7 presidency, France created a task force on export finance and modernization also figured very prominently in the finance ministers and central governors' communiqué of May 2026. We also had the ministerial conference of the OECD in early June. And in this context, there was a side event on export credits that was organized under the Finnish presidency.
And both these initiatives provided political impetus and a sense of urgency to the work we are now undertaking. Another development that is interesting to note is that for the last two years we have been working on the revision of the ship sector understanding to define special financing terms and conditions for near-zero and low-emission ships. We have made good progress. Experts are close to reaching agreement in principle on a revised text, and so this could come soon to a successful conclusion.
As it was mentioned, we are also now preparing a delegated act under the terms of Regulation 1233 of 2011 to take into account a number of updates to the arrangement since July 2023. And this relates notably to the aircraft sector understanding. And of course, the aim is to follow the new version of the arrangement that was just published by the OECD in January 2024. And maybe some words on the second important workstream that the Commission has been developing, this enhanced coordination of external financial tools. We have an expert group together with INTPA that is trying to bring together the relevant actors.
So we're talking about export credit agencies, also DFIs, the European Investment Bank. There is a pilot project that is already underway to facilitate trade and investment activities of EU companies in Ukraine.
And there's a lot of work with the European Investment Bank on supporting export credit agencies and EU exports under the Global Gateway, which from which we may learn some lessons in terms of what is feasible under the next MFF. So there is a renewed political attention on all these workstreams expressed in in the Council conclusions of 12th of June, asking for the EU to take the lead in the OECD negotiations, which we are doing, and also reaffirming the commitment of export credit agencies to scale up Global Gateway and supporting efforts towards development of new EU-level financing and guarantee tools tailored to export credit agencies. Thank you very much and happy to take any questions you may have.
Iuliu Winkler
Thank you very much for this presentation and I turn now to our coordinators from the political groups and first for the EPP, Jörgen Warborn, you have the floor.
Jörgen Warborn
Well, thank you very much for the presentation. I have mainly one question and that regards the small and medium-sized enterprises. Because we know that SMEs, they don't export outside of the European Union to the extent that there is a potential. I mean, there are 25.6 million SMEs and only 600,000 of them export outside of the European Union.
And financing of course could be one of the situation where you can see a de-risking situation where you have help from public funding in a sense, from loans. But I have a sense that it is mainly the big corporations that utilize and can utilize the bulk of these money. So my simple question is to the Commission, how do you ensure that a decent bulk of the money is there for SMEs to take the step to export and to invest abroad?
Iuliu Winkler
Thank you very much. And our coordinator for the S&D group is Brando Benifei, please you have the floor.
Brando Benifei
Thank you, Chair. Grazie, Presidente. Ringrazio la Commissione per questo aggiornamento sulla modernizzazione dell'accordo OCSE sui crediti all'esportazione che beneficiano di sostegno pubblico. Dal punto di vista del gruppo S&D, questa discussione è particolarmente importante in una fase in cui l'Europa deve affrontare contemporaneamente le sfide della competitività industriale, della sicurezza economica e della transizione climatica.
Le nostre imprese operano in un contesto internazionale sempre più complesso, nel quale molti concorrenti globali beneficiano di strumenti pubblici di sostegno molto aggressivi. Per questo motivo l'Europa deve assicurarsi che le proprie agenzie di credito all'esportazione dispongano di strumenti adeguati per sostenere investimenti strategici, rafforzare le catene del valore e contribuire alla sicurezza degli approvvigionamenti necessari alla nostra industria. Allo stesso tempo non possiamo accettare che la competizione internazionale si traduca in una corsa al ribasso sugli standard ambientali o in condizioni di concorrenza sleale.
È fondamentale che la seconda fase della modernizzazione dell'accordo persegua un duplice obiettivo: garantire condizioni di parità tra i principali attori globali e accompagnare la progressiva decarbonizzazione delle attività sostenute con fondi pubblici. Vorrei concludere con due domande.
Primo, come intende la Commissione garantire che la modernizzazione dell'accordo OCSE contribuisca sia alla competitività dell'industria europea e alla sicurezza degli approvvigionamenti strategici, sia alla creazione di condizioni di concorrenza eque rispetto ai principali partner e concorrenti internazionali? Secondo punto, alcuni recenti rapporti della società civile hanno sollevato interrogativi sul sostegno fornito dall'agenzia italiana SACE a progetti legati ai combustibili fossili, compreso il possibile sostegno in fase di valutazione a un progetto di espansione delle operazioni di estrazione di gas a Sakarya in Turchia, nonché su aspetti relativi alla trasparenza e alla coerenza con gli impegni climatici assunti dall'Italia. La Commissione ha avuto contatti con le autorità italiane su questi temi e come valuta tali operazioni più in generale nel contesto del processo di modernizzazione dell'accordo OCSE? Grazie.
Iuliu Winkler
Thank you very much. I'm looking for political group representatives, Patriots for Europe, the ECR group, the Renew group. Any other members who would like to have questions or remarks? If it is not the case, I would like myself to to make just one comment or ask a question from the representative of the Commission because it was several well maybe stakeholders have been mentioned, the small and medium enterprise, the decarbonization process. And my question would be, are there any areas where the European Union is seeking to go beyond the OECD arrangement?
And since there are not any other comments, I turn back to the Commission. Madam Colodima, you have the floor again.
Korodima
Yes, thank you very much. Turning to the first question about SMEs. I think as you know, there is a number of measures to support exports by SMEs.
In fact, I mentioned a pilot facility for exports to Ukraine. And this has been developed targeting especially SMEs and small and mid-cap firms that was launched in July 2024 by the European Investment Fund. And this has been targeted to SMEs as it was developed also with DG ENER and DG GROW. There are also other opportunities to develop tools using the EU budget to support activities for SMEs under the future European Competitiveness Fund, as you know. And this will be looked at in that context as well.
Now, in terms of the different objectives we have, both in terms of supporting our activities of export credit agencies, yes, they have been more active also in the area of securing supply chains. So this is not about exports, this is about imports, including imports of critical raw materials.
So this is an area where they have been expanding their activity and where of course we are looking at this from at EU level how we can we can support their activities in this area. And in terms of what's happening at the OECD arrangement, yes, there is of course a delicate balance that needs to be, that we need to strike there in terms of both facilitating and supporting the activities of export of EU export credit agencies and EU exporters abroad to face competition from non-participants to the arrangement while at the same time ensuring that we have a level playing field among participants.
So the flexibilities that we may be seeking there need to be seen from that perspective. And also as I said, a very, very important dimension both in terms of what we're trying to do at the OECD under the arrangement and also what we're trying to do at EU level is to have more transparency to a range of transactions that may be going beyond the scope of the arrangement. So we're looking at the OECD level at instruments that ECAs are developing that may not be under the scope of the arrangement, but still where there are issues of competition and we may need to take a closer look.
And also, as you know, within the EU, we're trying to have more transparency as to the activities of export credit agencies. And we're doing this in our annual review where we're looking, taking a closer look at what they're doing, also in the area of decarbonization. Here in relation to the activities of SACE, the Italian export credit agency, it is true that we have been approached with a number of questions that we're looking into together with the Italian authorities and that may be some data that need to be clarified.
As you know under the arrangement, there is a ban on support to coal. We had sought to expand this ban to other fossil fuels.
This was not accepted, but we have launched in parallel this voluntary transparency exercise with some of the participants, not all of them. And as you know, in the current political climate, it's clear that the US would not be willing to go in that direction under the arrangement. But we can do more with others in the area of transparency. And of course, at EU level, we do have our own policies in that respect. Thank you.
Iuliu Winkler
Thank you very much, and this concludes our point of order.
And the next item is item 14, a presentation by the European Commission on the first report of the application on the International Procurement Instrument. And as you remember colleagues, Parliament and Council have adopted in 2022 under the ordinary legislative procedure the International Procurement Instrument, which was a regulation that entered into force in August 2022 and laid down procedures for the European Commission to investigate alleged measures or practices negatively affecting the access of the European Union businesses, goods and services to non-EU procurement markets and consult with the non-EU countries concerned by those measures and impose as a last resort IPI measures to restrict access to the EU public procurement procedures by businesses, goods and services from non-EU countries.
And the Commission submitted last year a first report to the European Parliament on the application of the regulation and the progress made in international negotiations.
We are looking forward now to hear that the IPI regulation had any impact or had an impact in ensuring improved access by EU economic operators on foreign public procurement and concession markets based on reciprocity. And in addition, it is just worth reminding the launch of the by the Commission on its own initiative of an investigation concerning measures and practices by the People's Republic of China resulting in a serious and recurrent impairment of access of Union economic operators, goods and services on China public procurement markets for medical devices.
So we had last year in June the first IPI measure introducing targeted restrictions on access to the EU public procurement market for medical devices originating from China. So we have invited Mrs. Agata Gerba, who is head of unit in DG Trade, and I would like to give you the floor for the next about 10 minutes. Please, you have the floor.
Agata Gerba
Thank you very much. Good morning to everyone.
It's a pleasure to have this opportunity to present our first report on the implementation of the International Procurement Instrument. As it was presented, this report came out last, last summer and is covering the period from the entry into force of IPI regulation, that is the August 2022 to mid-July 2025. So it's not covering the last couple of months, but the good news is that it's still completely up to date, i.e. everything that we have said in this report still is, is relevant and there is not much to add in a way to what we said in the report.
So I will I will summarize what is in the report, which also includes a little bit of update on the on the case that was referred to. So our first IPI case with regard to medical devices coming from from Chinese producers. So the report is structured in four sections. The first outlines the tools the Commission has put in place to support the implementation of the IPI regulation. The second part summarizes the investigation that that was referred to, so concerning practices of China in the public procurement market for medical devices that resulted in the adoption of our first IPI measure.
The first section presents assessment of the Commission on the functioning of the regulation to date and outlook for future action. And there is a short section at the end that draws conclusions.
So maybe just to run quickly through the tools. I'm not going to go into details, but Commission has committed to provide these tools and these tools are available. Tool number one is operational guidelines. And these are guidelines that are supposed to facilitate the application of the regulation, especially for contracting authorities, but also for economic operators.
And that, for example, helps in determining the origin of the economic operator's goods and services, clarify the valuation rules to determine if the value of the contract is below or above the thresholds that are set by the application by the IPI measure, and also include some transparency requirements in public procurement procedures that apply IPI measure. Another tool is an online complaints tool, and that is a tool that helps interested parties and member states to formally submit a substantiated complaint.
There, what is important, except for, you know, how it facilitates submitting such complaint, is that there are very important safeguards to ensure a very high standard of confidentiality and anonymity in the handling of these complaints. I will come back to this later, but that is one of the main concerns of companies when they deal with us with the issues related to access to procurement markets. There is also a guidance for interested parties to submit info during an ongoing investigation, because that is a part of the regulation as well.
And finally we have and we maintain on our pages a tool that is called procurement for buyers as part of access to markets website. And this basically is a website that informs contracting authorities when they must allow or restrict the participation of foreign bidders. So it takes into account our international commitments. It takes into account the application of the IPI measure. And on that basis contracting authorities can verify which third country bidders have guaranteed access to our market and which have not such such access to our market.
So interesting, I think, not only for IPI purposes, but also, of course, has a broader application. Now going to this case that was mentioned, which is our first and so far only case on the basis of the IPI regulation. So it's a case that was started indeed ex officio in 2024 with regard to China and the basically the access of our EU companies to Chinese procurement market for medical devices, where the Commission invited China to submit information through a detailed questionnaire and to also engage in consultations.
That was of course following our preliminary assessment of of the situation on this market. China has not replied to the questionnaire, but has agreed to consultations. We have of course also invited parties interested parties and Member States to provide information. Commission had nine months to conclude investigations. The consultations with China took place in July 2024 and were followed by a number of formal and informal exchanges with Chinese authorities.
On in January 2025, the Commission published the investigation report containing the main findings of the investigation. This report was presented to the European Parliament and the Council on 29th and 30th of January 2025 respectively. And just going very quickly through these key findings to let you know what was stated in this report and confirmed later in the investigation is that China has put in place a system of generalized preferences for the procurement of domestic medical devices to the detriment of EU-based producers of these devices.
That this discriminatory effect is further reinforced by the policy of government of China to support Chinese medical devices through procurement targets. That these measures are generally applicable, recurrent and widely spread across the territory of China and affect all medical devices categories. That there is also a system of so-called volume-based procurement of medical devices that is put in place in China, which leads to abnormally low bids that cannot be sustained by profit-oriented companies. Basically, it's a system where hospitals are buying big volumes of medical devices, but is organized in such ways that results in substantial price cuts.
And by substantial, I mean up to 90%. So basically, completely impossible for our companies to compete with Chinese companies in this situation.
And that of course all is supported by subsidies that are granted to medical devices companies, particularly those that participate in this volume-based tenders that give a competitive advantage to domestic companies. Following this this report on key findings, the Commission assessed all required elements, which is Union in the existence of Union interest, proportionality, availability of alternative sources of supply for the products that are concerned by the IPI measure, and having analyzed all that, decided on the exclusion of Chinese Chinese bidders from from bids that are above 5 million euros net of VAT.
So basically the adopted implementing regulation which was adopted in June 2025 excludes tenders submitted by by economic operators originating in China in all public procurement procedures in the Union that have as their subject matter the procurement of medical devices. There are CPV codes provided and cover a very wide range of medical devices, basically all medical devices. And this concerns this concerns those tenders with the estimated value as I said equal to or above 5 million euro net of VAT and concerns all Union contracting authorities. So that is the case.
I'm sure there will be some questions, so I will leave it for questions to update more on where we are with this case. But maybe to say a little bit more about the functioning of the IPI regulation as presented in this report.
It is still in a way quite early to draw conclusions because we have this one case, a very kind of specific case because it concerns China with a very complex system of privileges and benefits for Chinese operators where of course the removal is not easy because it is not a question of one rule. It is a question of the whole system that works to support these operators. We have of course continued to gather information on restrictive measures and practices in third countries, also working with our industry representatives in different sectors.
And of course we have some indications from this industry that there are also other situations where there is significant economic prejudice to our interests, but so far we have not received a complaint, an IPI complaint from industry. Why? Because I think that's one of the questions, like why this is not coming out. We can only guess of course, but one of the reasons that comes to mind is that of course there is a very strong dependency when it comes to procurement markets because buyers are dealing with public authorities.
And so our companies very often indicate that they they fear retaliation basically and the fact that if they support us or file a complaint they will have they will be consequences and adverse treatment that they will have to deal with in in these countries. There are also maybe situations where we have companies that are active in these third countries and they produce there and sometimes want to actually export products into into EU market. And therefore any any measures that we implement here on the access to EU market can affect them as well like it does with the with the current medical devices case.
So we guess that these are the reasons why we don't have this kind of complaint from industry. And given the variety and complexity of barriers that exist in public procurement, it is very difficult to start a case and to go ahead with the case without support from industry. Because we need data, we need information. It is a known fact that when it comes to public procurement data, there is very scarce public data available. When you look at, when you want to get to data about volume of procurement coming from various countries or our access to procurement in various countries, you don't get it easily.
To some extent, we also have data gaps in the EU where we have tender electronic daily data, but it is only concerning bidders and not goods and services. So we also have on our side, I think, some work to do to have better data. So basically, where we are, just to conclude. We on this case, we continue our discussions with China. And we are open to engage with China on this, on this case.
I didn't mention, but China has retaliated following the IPI measure, and I can explain this in the context of questions.
But China has not offered any, any means to address the issues of the barriers. What China has, has at some point proposed was engaging in negotiations on the procurement agreement between EU and China, but has not really, has not proposed to address the issues that are in the case. We of course monitor the implementation also of this first IPI measure. We are in contact with authorities. There are lots of questions, there are lots of exchanges.
We are doing that. And of course we keep engaging with EU industry on possible new cases. So that's where we are. And we are also preparing for the review of the regulation that is supposed to be done by summer next year.
Iuliu Winkler
Thank you very much for all this information. It would be a good start for a conference, but we don't have now the means of organizing a conference, but I have the means of inviting the the coordinators or their replacements for intervention on this topic. And on behalf of the EPP, I start with our colleague Dan Goting. Please, you have the floor.
Dirk Gotink
Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you to the Commission for that very clear presentation. And I think it is a bit emblematic of other debates we're also having about instruments that we have, like FDI or FSR, where our data position seems dependent not only on the third country, but also on industry. And actually making that, making that into a convincing case is something that is extremely difficult. So at least I can, I can congratulate the Commission that they have tried to do that with the medical devices.
So at least I can congratulate the Commission that they have tried to do that with the medical devices and it seems that it is now obvious that discriminatory practices are basically a policy, like a very assumed and applied policy that they don't even try to deny.
Now for me the question is still then, okay, this is one case in three years, considering that this is not only the policy in the medical devices area, it will exist in many many other sectors because they are nationalizing market share. They are nationalizing profits. And so the the question is a bit, on paper some things can be possible in China, but in practice it mostly isn't. It is a kind of a sand in the machine that that are administrative instructions or maybe even implicit behaviors of public authorities that think that are in line with somehow the party line or with the political guidelines set out in the five-year plan.
Now, how do formal investigations, how does this instrument like IPI, but I guess it also applies to the others, how do they actually capture very implicit behavioral consequences of these of these systems, which are not market economies, just to be clear. They don't function in the same way, just like the businesses can absorb a 90% cost cut, not a single European business could survive something like that. So how how does the instrument look at sort of the hidden barriers to to these to these markets? And then also, I mean, it's clear, it's clear that they're massively harming our industry.
In medical devices now it's on paper and still industry is very, very much hesitant. You've went a bit into your flanking policy in terms of to try to talk to them, but is the fear of retaliation really so big that no European industry wants the European Commission or anyone else to actually pick up this fight for them? Could you please expand on that? Thank you.
Iuliu Winkler
Thank you very much and I turn now to the S&D and Brando Benifei, you have the floor, coordinator.
Brando Benifei
Vorrei innanzitutto ringraziare la Commissione per la presentazione e per questa prima relazione sull'attuazione dello strumento per gli appalti internazionali. Per il nostro gruppo questo strumento rappresenta un tassello fondamentale della nuova agenda europea per un commercio aperto, ma anche equo e reciproco. La prima esperienza concreta, ne ha parlato anche il collega, di questo tema relativa al mercato cinese dei dispositivi medici dimostra chiaramente perché questo strumento sia necessario. Di fronte a pratiche discriminatorie sistematiche che limitano l'accesso delle imprese europee agli appalti pubblici, l'Unione deve essere in grado di reagire. Tuttavia la relazione evidenzia anche alcuni limiti che meritano una riflessione.
Colpisce in particolare l'assenza di denunce formali da parte delle imprese europee o degli Stati membri. La Commissione osserva che molte aziende temono ritorsioni da parte delle autorità pubbliche dei paesi terzi e preferiscono quindi non esporsi, nonostante le garanzie di riservatezza previste dal regolamento.
E dunque credo che sia necessario continuare questa discussione rispetto a come tutelare la riservatezza in modo più efficace ed essere in condizioni di mettere le imprese europee in grado di segnalare le pratiche discriminatorie senza timore di conseguenze commerciali. Sicuramente sarà da ragionare anche su rafforzare le capacità investigative all'interno della DG Trade, considerando la complessità e l'intensità del lavoro in un ambito come questo. Credo anche che questa discussione debba essere inserita in un contesto più ampio. In un mondo caratterizzato da crescente competizione geopolitica e da pratiche commerciali sempre più aggressive, l'Europa deve diventare più assertiva nella difesa delle proprie imprese e dei propri lavoratori.
Questo strumento è uno strumento importante, ma potrà esprimere tutto il suo potenziale soltanto se sarà accompagnato da una più ampia strategia di enforcement e da adeguate risorse amministrative e da una più forte cultura della reciprocità nelle nostre relazioni commerciali a tutti i livelli. Grazie.
Iuliu Winkler
Thank you very much. I'm turning to the political groups: PfE, ECR, Renew. The Greens, Katharina, please, you have the floor.
Catarina Vieira
Thank you very much, Chair, and thank you for the introduction, for the analysis that you shared.
I would have three quick questions. The first one would be, now that we are using more frequently these trade defense instruments, do you, I think you spoke about the possibility of revision, can you tell us a little bit more in detail, do you see momentum for introducing also new trade defense tools and what are the plans to revise this one in this mandate? Secondly, I was wondering how does this news interact with our new free trade agreements in the effect of the non-application of the instruments?
Are the procurement chapters in FTAs meant to prevent situations where IPI would then be used? And then finally, I would like to ask based on the data that you have so far, how long would you say does it take from handling a registered complaint to launching an investigation on unfair procurement practices or has it been very much depending case by case? Can you elaborate a little bit? Thank you.
Iuliu Winkler
Thank you very much. The Left, the ESN, catch the eye, the floor is yours, please.
Jörgen Warborn
Thank you, Chair.
I have two questions. First of all, you mentioned the complaint database. And of course, I understand that that was sensitive and confidential of which company it is. But could you maybe give us more details of the number of reports you get in, the number of complaints, and which countries we have complaints with? Of course, China has been mentioned, but is it only China or is it other countries that we get complaints about?
And then maybe also how you see that, because now we have the medical device issue, so that is, it's more to understand the ratio here.
We have gone forward with one issue, but it would be good to understand how many complaints do we get in and how much do we act, basically. My second question is the access to market database, as you mentioned, that there suppliers can find, you said, all the markets where they have guaranteed access. And quickly I went into the access to market and I found 15, 15 countries. Is that, did I find the right number?
Is that the 15 countries where European suppliers can compete or are there more countries and I didn't really find the right place? Thank you.
Iuliu Winkler
Thank you very much. And maybe on my behalf because there were a lot of questions which complement themselves and I would be very curious. So today's debate, my conclusion is that the IPI instrument will not be an instrument to be used every day or every week or not even every month. We will probably not have a big number of investigations due to the first and foremost reason of the fear of the companies of retaliation coming against them.
And in this case, if this is so, if I'm mistaken, then please correct me at the end of your answers. But if this is the situation, then my question goes: does the IPI instrument give us leverage that we can use and is it worth it? I mean, even if there is not a big frequency of cases and investigations, is that a leverage in trade negotiations, in relations with others, a leverage that is important enough so that it gives also sense, power of this instrument? Thank you very much and I turn now to you back to answer to the questions.
Please, you have the floor.
Agata Gerba
Thank you very much and thank you for these questions. I think on the first one, indeed, I think we always have this problem when it comes to China, but when you look at, there is a reality on paper and then there is also reality on the ground.
I think in terms of of procurement, both realities point to the same direction because we found a lot of real provisions that that give these preferences to Chinese to Chinese operators and to Chinese to Chinese Chinese goods.
So it's very clear that there is a system of the legal system that that gives these preferences. But also we looked at the number of tenders and we have looked through a through many tenders that we could have access to and looked at the at the results on the ground. And and saw that that there were exclusions or other discriminations against EU medical devices in 87% of the of the procedures that we have that we have looked at. But of course this is always difficult to gather evidence and to be able to prove it that on the ground there is this kind of that there is this kind of this kind of situation. But we I think did a quite a good job on on this one for the medical devices.
Why is the industry still hesitant? I think retaliation is one part of it. But one part of it of course is also differing interests of of of industry.
I mean, industry still wants to, some industry, I'm not generalizing, but you will find companies that want to use the access to the Chinese market for as long as it lasts. I think that they realize that it will not last forever because, because Chinese companies are trying, of course, to outcompete us and to get to the production of the same medical devices. We still have an edge when it comes to high-end devices. How long this edge will be maintained, that is, you know, that is to be seen. But of course, some companies prefer even this limited access and having this, but having this access for as long as it is possible.
As I said also, some companies produce in China and then they export back to the EU and therefore do not want to have any kind of measures that limit access of such exports to the EU market. So it is, you know, quite a complex situation and quite a complex set of interests. And it's not only in the area of procurement, but of course, you know, we always are, we are always faced with the same question with China.
That that, you know, do we want to use or do our companies want to use the time that they have, knowing that there are lots of risks related, for example, to technology transfer, you know, losing losing their technologies, losing their IP and so on. Do you still want to do this business and get as much as you can taking into account these risks, or are you willing to to stop doing doing business there? And I think that is that is part of where we are. I mean, now, of course, we also think that the problem is much bigger than just the medical devices, because even in this investigation, part of this investigation concerns provisions of general application.
So not only provisions that only apply to medical devices, but also provisions that, that are of more general application. And can we, could we have other cases? I guess we could. I think that is, that is possible that we could have other cases against China. But we need to think first of all to which extent it is supported by our industry.
And I think that's number one. Number one, because it is the question of data, but it is a question also of the consequences and effect on the market. And, and if we don't have our industry with us, it is not easy to take a decision that we should go ahead with, with this kind of case and also to have all the information and, and data that, that we need.
So I mean we are following this very closely. We we have already we we know of problems in various places. It is not only China to to answer the question, but it is most mostly China. Of course the Chinese market is number one market.
And the procurement volume is so huge in China that of course this is the market that is the most interesting for our for our for our companies. Now, in the context of this review that is supposed to be finalized by mid next next year, well, a bit more than next year, in 2027, let's say it like this. We are we will be launching a consultation. We already have reached to member states, contracting authorities, but also will be launching consultation more widely to ask for assessment of of the regulation. But of course that will include also probably the assessment of of how the measure, this first measure, how it applies and what are the consequences.
So on that basis we will then assess. On that basis and also on the basis of where we are in general with our trade and procurement policy.
Because of course, we have to look also at the number of other instruments that are currently being proposed by the European Commission. And you probably noticed that there is a whole host of instruments that include provisions on procurement, whether it's Industrial Accelerator, the AI and Cloud Act, and most importantly, the act that we are waiting for now, which is the review of public procurement directives.
So all of this will have to be taken into account because of course this changes also legislative environment. And this we also have to take into account looking as to what instruments, what measures we can use going forward, to which extent review, for example, of IPI regulation would be effective or would be something that would could help in launching more cases. So of course it is not, it is a possibility. I mean, one of the objectives of the review is to assess whether some changes to the regulation would be required.
For example, one of the things, one of the issues that have been raised from the very beginning, in discussions in the Council and so on, is the question of thresholds. Is the threshold of five million euro not too high? And, and therefore the scope of application not too narrow. So I'm sure that this question of, of threshold will come up in this, in these, in these consultations. Our free trade, free trade agreements, there was a question about this.
We of course use the fact that there is an IPI measure, IPI regulation in our free trade agreements because it is a, an instrument that we can use in the area where there are no commitments.
So the IPI regulation applies to the so-called non-covered procurement, i.e. where we are not committed to any third country. Where we have commitments under free trade agreements in the area of procurements, if there are any problems with access, because of course the fact that you have an agreement does not necessarily mean that there are no problems with access, but if there are problems with access which fall within the scope of the commitments, then we follow the track under the free trade agreement. So we can have a possibility of consultations, dispute settlement and so on and so on under the free trade agreement.
IPI regulation is reserved for the area where we have no commitments towards the third country. So that's why it is used to countries like China or other countries where we don't have an FTA and who are also not parties to the government procurement agreement at the WTO, where we would have also some commitments with these with these countries. I mean, there was a question how long it takes from launching a complaint to actually starting an investigation. I mean, we didn't have this experience yet under the IPI regulation because we have not received a complaint to be to be dealt with.
Of course it depends whether this complaint would come in the area where we have already followed the situation so we already know a lot and the complaint is just adding to the to the information that we already have and and have assessed or whether this would bring a very new information and a new situation to our to our attention. But I mean we are willing to go fast to go as fast as possible. This procedure on medical devices and colleagues who are sitting here were the ones who were who were working on this. I mean they've done a tremendous work on this and gone really fast and maintained the the investigation within the nine months which is the nine months that you have as the commission to to complete. And I think going presenting a very convincing case on on medical devices.
So we are we are able and willing to go fast but of course it depends on on the character of the case. So yeah unfortunately we don't you know we don't have complaints. We don't have any information any formal complaints from industry. We have informal discussions. We have information coming from from such sources but in our database no no formal complaints.
When it comes to countries that we have guaranteed access to procurement this is more than 15 countries.
I don't want to now lie, but I think it is with over 40 countries that we have commitments, mutual commitments on procurement. Important though to take this into account, because there is a lot of discussion sometimes on reciprocity in procurement, is to understand that the way commitments in procurement in our free trade agreements work is not product per product, service per service. To a large extent, yes, but it doesn't necessarily go this way, because of course sometimes as the EU we are interested in access to certain sectors in a country, let's say Australia, and Australia is interested in different sectors when it comes to access to our procurement market.
So it is always a balance of negotiations. It is not that it is one-to-one when it comes to when it comes to access to procurement markets. But my colleague is showing me that in GPA we have 27 parties. So already GPA is more than 15, and then if you add if you add FTAs, I think it's around 43, 45, something like this, but I don't want to I don't want to mislead you. Now, is IPI, so the final question, does it give us leverage?
Is it worth it?
It does, I mean, one thing that happens is that in every discussion now that we have with the Chinese, IPI is on the table. We have now relaunched the new mechanism also on trade and investment with consultations with China, and IPI is part of these discussions. So certainly it has made an impression on China and it is not something that is forgotten and is completely not a subject. It is a subject. Also we have other partners that question us about IPI, want to know how it works, when it will be applied and so on.
So it has been noticed by partners around the world. As you said, this is not an instrument to be exercised every day or every month. It is always supposed to be something that we can in such cases when there is no other way exercise and use as a kind of leverage. Whether this is sufficient, you know, to be seen. I think we have to see how we will go with this case.
We'll have to see whether there will be cases in other countries.
Again, China of course is very specific. It's a very specific market. And judging only the IPI by application to Chinese market probably is not completely fully justifiable.
I think that we need a little, a little more. But we need to see also where we end up with also the review of the procurement directives and seeing how the whole system can work to give us leverage. And IPI is one, one element of this system. Thank you.
Iuliu Winkler
Dear Madam Garba, dear colleagues, thank you very much for this very interesting discussion. This concludes the topic and I'm moving towards point 15 on our agenda, which is the conclusion of the negotiations of an enhanced economic partnership agreement between the European Union and the Eastern and Southern African states. On the 10th of June, Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles concluded negotiations on an enhanced EPA to build on the interim agreement that has been applied provisionally since 2012.
This enhanced EPA sets an important benchmark for EU-Africa economic relations. It moves beyond an agreement on trade in goods and development cooperation and provides a framework and some rules on services and investment, public procurement, intellectual property, digital trade, sustainability, and also has a good potential of allowing the parts to work together on upholding the rules-based international order.
So very good thing, congratulations to Commission, to DG Trade. And I welcome Madame Cristina Miranda Gozalves, the chief negotiator for the Commission in these negotiations. And I would like you to present a little bit the topic. You have up to 10 minutes for this. Thank you.
You have the floor.
Cristina MIRANDA
Thank you very much, Chairman, honorable members.
Thank you for giving me the opportunity to brief you today on the conclusion of the negotiations of the enhanced Economic Partnership Agreement between the European Union and four Eastern and Southern African states, namely Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, and Seychelles. And indeed, on the 10th of June 2026, the European Union and these four partners concluded the negotiations to deepen the existing Economic Partnership Agreement, which is now the European Union's first modern and comprehensive free trade agreement with partners in sub-Saharan Africa.
This is an important milestone both substantially and also strategically. It is important substantially because it brings our partnership beyond trade in goods, and it is important strategically because it demonstrates that even in a more volatile geopolitical context, the European Union is still able to invest in rules-based trade, regional partnerships, and sustainable development. Our partnership with the ESA 4 countries already rests on a very solid foundation because we have the interim economic partnership agreement, which is in place, provisionally applied since May 2012.
Under this interim EPA, the exports from the ESA 4 countries to the EU have benefited from duty-free quota-free access to the European Union market for all originating products, except for arms and ammunition. Over time, the ESA partners themselves have also liberalized most imports from the European Union, with Mauritius and Seychelles having completed their tariff liberalization schedule already in 2022, Madagascar completed it in 2023, and Comoros is still to implement the final measures. This framework has delivered tangible results.
In 2024, total EU-ESA4 trade in goods and services reached 9.7 billion euros, including 5.2 billion in EU imports and 4.5 billion in EU exports. The European Union is ESA4's largest trading partner in goods, accounting for 24% of the region's total trade and the leading export destination for the region. We are also the main investor, with EU foreign direct investment stock in ESA4 reaching up to 20 billion euros in 2024, which is an increase of 24% compared to the level in 2020. So this agreement is not starting from zero. As I said, it builds on an existing relationship that has already shown its value.
What changes now with this deepened EPA is its scope and the ambition.
The enhanced EPA transforms the interim one into a more modern and comprehensive trade framework aligned with the levels of ambition reflected in the EU's more recent trade agreements.
In addition to goods and development cooperation, the deepened EPA adds disciplines on trade in services, investment liberalization, digital trade, public procurement transparency, competition, subsidy transparency, state-owned enterprises, intellectual property, trade and sustainable development, and further trade-related disciplines such as customs and trade facilitation, technical barriers to trade, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, and modernized rules of origin. So in practical terms, the deepened EPA means more opportunities, more predictability, and fairer conditions for businesses on both sides. Let me explain the different chapters and the disciplines included in all those. So on services, the agreement will make it easier and more predictable for EU firms to operate in ESA markets, including in professional and business services, telecommunications, maritime transport, and financial services.
It also includes advanced provisions on the temporary movement of professionals for business purposes. At the same time, it fully preserves governments' right to regulate in the public interest and does not require privatization or deregulation of public services.
On investment, the agreement creates a clearer and more non-discriminatory framework for investors, so EU investors in the ESA 4 countries and ESA investors in the EU will benefit from treatment no less favorable than that granted to investors from third countries, and in most cases, from treatment equivalent to domestic investors. Importantly, the agreement contains a facilitation of investment and trade in services chapter, which largely reflects the far-reaching commitments in the WTO investment facilitation for development, for non-services, and in the WTO agreement on domestic regulation for services. This will strengthen legal certainty and support productive investments in the ESA countries seeking to attract foreign direct investments.
The agreement does not, however, include provisions on the protection of existing investments. On digital trade, the agreement addresses unjustified barriers to cross-border digital activity. It prohibits custom duties on electronic transmissions and bans unjustified data localization requirements while fully preserving the EU policy space on personal data protection. This is an important balance. It facilitates digital trade while safeguards trust and high standards.
On public procurement, the agreement does not create full market commitments, but it does significantly improve transparency. ESA four states commit to transparent and predictable procurement rules and to the electronic publication of high-value contract notices and contract award information.
This will make it easier for EU firms to identify business opportunities and compete on a better informed basis. On competition policy, subsidies and state-owned enterprises, the agreement promotes transparency, fair competition and a level playing field. At the same time, it takes into account the public policy objectives, public services and development needs of ESA states. On intellectual property, the agreement establishes a modern framework in Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles, covering copyright, trademarks, designs, trade secrets, geographical indications and plant variety rights.
This will provide greater legal certainty to businesses and support innovation, branding, and value addition. It also establishes protection over time for 135 EU geographical indications in those three countries, while allowing further geographical indications to be added in the future. Comoros is not covered by this chapter because it is a party to the regional Bangui Agreement, which is incompatible with the EPA.
For trade in goods, market access itself was not renegotiated because it was already covered in the interim EPA, but the enhanced agreement modernizes the rules of origin and simplifies procedures. These updated rules are more closely aligned with recent EU agreements and include provisions such as self-certification and flexibilities that are especially relevant for ACP countries, including the single transformation rule for clothing. This should make the preferences easier to use in practice, especially for small businesses. The agreement also strengthens key regulatory disciplines. The customs and trade facilitation chapter is designed to simplify procedures, improve transparency, and reduce delays at the border.
The technical barriers to trade chapter also promotes the use of international standards and includes practical steps to facilitate compliance in sectors such as electronics, machinery, and energy-related products. On the SPS chapter, there is a reinforced cooperation while fully upholding to the EU high food safety, animal health, and plant standards. So let me underline that nothing in the agreement changes the EU standards. So the EU food safety and SPS rules remain fully in place. The agreement does not weaken the EU legislation and it reaffirms the precautionary principle.
There is a specific area of cooperation on agriculture and fisheries given the importance it has for the economy of the region.
The agreement provides for an agricultural partnership combining policy dialogue, development cooperation and investment promotion in support of more sustainable production, processing and regional trade. Sustainability is another core pillar of the agreement. So the agreement contains a robust, comprehensive and enforceable chapter on trade and sustainable development. It includes binding commitment on labor rights, gender equality, environment protection, climate action and responsible business conduct. Both parties commit not to weaken or fail to enforce domestic labor or environmental laws in order to attract trade or investment.
Let me go more in detail on on each area. On labor, the agreement requires respect for core International Labor Organization principles, including freedom of association, collective bargaining, the elimination of child and forced labor, non-discrimination and a safe and healthy working environment. It also includes commitments on decent work, labor inspection and social dialogue. On gender equality, the agreement contains a dedicated article and commits the parties to implement the relevant UN and ILO conventions, improving women's availability to benefit from trade opportunities.
On climate and environment, the parties commit to effectively implement the Paris climate agreement and other multilateral environmental agreements. This, importantly, these sustainability commitments are not just aspirational language alone in the agreement. They are legally binding and enforceable through the agreement's dispute settlement mechanism with the possibility of trade remedies and withdrawal of preferences as a last resort.
Allow me to particularly refer to the role of civil society, which has a very specific role to play in the implementation through the establishment of the domestic advisory groups and the joint forum that brings together independent economic, social, and environmental stakeholders. Let me conclude by referring to the development dimension, which is a key aspect of the economic partnership agreement. So the enhanced EPA is not only about opening markets. It is also designed to support structural transformation, stronger supply capacity, and diversification and competitiveness and regional integration in Africa, including through the African Continental Free Trade Area. So the cooperation is broad in scope.
It covers all areas of the agreement and it will be delivered through technical assistance, capacity building, programs and projects, and as well as blending and guarantees instruments, particularly under the Global Gateway approach. So let me also say a word about the regional openness, and this is a very important aspect. The enhanced EPA remains open for accession of other ESA states in the future. So negotiations with Zimbabwe, who was part of the negotiations from the beginning, are still ongoing. This agreement is concluded with four ESA states for the time being, but it remains anchored in a broader regional regional logic.
Honorable members, my time is out, so I just wanted to underline that the agreement matters because it reflects the kind of trade policy the European Union wants to pursue. So it is an open agreement, but it's not naive. It promotes market opportunities, but also legal certainty, transparency, and fair competition. It supports development cooperation, but it is not an afterthought, it is a central objective of the EPA. So it recognizes that trade policy must also help partners build capacity, diversify their economies, and integrate more deeply into regional and global value chains.
With this, honorable members, I remain available for further questions, and I really thank you for congratulating the Commission for the conclusion of the negotiations.
Iuliu Winkler
Thank you very much, Madam Miranda Gonçalves. Yes, we need more trade agreements, and I think that also speed, as you have also touched upon it, has to be, has to be a little bit increased. Of course, there is no speed above substance, but we need both, speed and substance also.
So thank you for the presentation. Our rapporteur is Mr. Emmanouil Fragkos from the ECR, whom I do not see, so I turn to the groups or shadow rapporteurs for the EPP. Yes, please, Jörgen Warborn, you have the floor.
Jörgen Warborn
Thank you, Chair. I'm replacing Martine Kemp on this one and she says that EPP welcomes the conclusion of the negotiations on the enhanced Economic Partnership Agreement with the Eastern and Southern African states. At a time of growing protectionism, this agreement demonstrates that the European Union continues to stand for open, fair, and rules-based trade.
EPAs are tools for development and long-term partnerships. By improving market access and creating a more predictable business environment, this agreement can strengthen local industries and create jobs. It also modernizes our partnership by opening cooperation in new areas such as services, investment, digital trade, intellectual property, and geographical indications, creating new opportunities for businesses and consumers on both sides.
Trade should help our African partners move up the value chain, create opportunities for their young populations, and support sustainable economic growth. At the same time, this EPA must remain fully compatible with the African Continental Free Trade Area and support Africa's own regional integration ambitions. This agreement also reflects what makes the European approach different: partnership rather than dependency and shared prosperity rather than short-term transactions. Thank you.
Iuliu Winkler
Thank you very much. S&D, I do not see, but I see our colleague Mr. Pimpi from the PfE group. Please, you have the floor.
Pierre Pimpie
Je précise que c'est en français que je vais faire ce propos. Alors donc pour ce qui nous concerne, donc c'est un accord qui nous, enfin je pense qu'il ne présente rien de choquant.
Donc je pense que l'accord donc va dans un bon sens. Donc il reste néanmoins des réserves sur quelques aspects. Donc en ce qui concerne le premier, donc il s'agit de la clause sur la vie privée, donc il nous semble que ce n'est pas vraiment présenté comme étant une règle et que ça reste un petit peu fragile. Donc on a une réserve vis-à-vis de ça, on voudrait être sûr donc que la vie privée n'est pas en jeu.
Donc il y a un point aussi, une réserve qui concerne les subventions. Alors certes, donc c'est un point qui est pris en charge, mais je relève que pour les États donc qui ne respectent pas cette règle, donc il n'y a pas vraiment de sanctions prévues. Donc je ne vois pas de façon concrète comment donc cela serait vu.
Et puis donc il reste une réserve donc sur les cas donc s'il y a une crise dans un secteur. Eh bien en fait je ne vois pas comment donc il serait possible sur un temps précis de mettre les choses un peu en suspens. Donc si une filière donc était en risque chez nous, bon, et en fait je pense qu'il faut être quand même prudent vis-à-vis de ça. Il faut aussi que l'on prévoie ce genre de cas. Voilà.
Donc vite fait ce sont un petit peu les réserves que je verrais. Je vous remercie.
Iuliu Winkler
Thank you very much, Renew Group and Greens Group, colleague Mazubanez, you have the floor please.
Vicent Marzà Ibáñez
Gracias.
Gracias, señor presidente. Gracias al representante de la Comisión por la explicación que ha hecho de este IPA. Y queríamos poner en valor una cuestión que para nosotros es importante, y es que reconocemos que se avanza respecto a acuerdos anteriores con las referencias, por ejemplo, al Acuerdo de París o a los derechos fundamentales reconocidos por la OIT, que se protegen mucho mejor y, por lo tanto, forman, empiezan a formar parte del mecanismo general de resolución de disputas. Creemos que eso es un avance y que esto nos puede ayudar a reconocer y a mejorar las condiciones de vida también en este caso en Comoras, Madagascar, Mauricio o Seychelles, ¿no?
Sí que es verdad que tenemos dudas de cómo se van a aplicar estas medidas en caso de incumplimiento. Nos gustaría saber cómo piensan que las pueden activar. Y sobre todo, nosotros tenemos las dudas, por eso somos prudentes ante este, ante este acuerdo, ante este iPA, porque vemos que tiene los mismos problemas estructurales que otros iPAs, y es que ponemos, liberalizamos economías entre economías que son profundamente desiguales.
Y por lo tanto, esa reciprocidad en la liberalización puede generar, como ha generado en otros espacios, en otros EPAs, presiones sobre las economías locales, los contextos locales, que son difícilmente de afrontar. Y nos gustaría trabajar mejores o pensamos que la experiencia que hemos visto en otros EPAs no nos gusta de esas presiones que acaban sufriendo pues los campesinos, los trabajadores de determinados sectores de terceros países. Por eso pensamos que disponemos de otros mecanismos mejores y de acción exterior para promover un comercio mucho más justo y un desarrollo mucho más sostenible. Más allá de eso, me gustaría lanzarle dos preguntas concretas a la Comisión.
La primera, ¿qué sectores de los países terceros implicados en este acuerdo cree que se van a beneficiar más del acceso al mercado único europeo y cuál cree que ha sido su motivación para alcanzar este acuerdo? Y la segunda muy específica, miren, unas organizaciones campesinas de Madagascar escribieron una carta el 5 de junio advirtiendo de que el capítulo de propiedad intelectual del IPA podría conducir a la privatización de las semillas tradicionales de la zona y generar un impacto potencialmente devastador sobre la seguridad alimentaria de su población.
Por lo tanto, nos gustaría saber qué impactos prevé la Comisión en este sentido y cómo pretende evitar que esto que ya nos anuncian que va a pasar o que es posible que pase y es muy preocupante se pueda evitar. Gracias.
Iuliu Winkler
Thank you very much. I do not see any other questions. Maybe I would have on my behalf just two remarks. First one about the future situation of Zimbabwe. Is there any special issue for which they are not included yet?
What was the exact situation? And so negotiations are ongoing, they will probably foreseeably join the agreement. And then it is open also for other countries. Are there discussions with other countries?
That would be one question on my behalf. And the second one it would be that how when do you foresee that we will have the agreement for for consent? Which is the timeframe that that you foresee for it? Those would be my questions. And now I turn back to you, Madame Miranda Gonzalves, and you have the floor to answer the questions that have been formulated.
Thank you.
Cristina MIRANDA
Thank you very much honorable members chairman. I will refer first to how will these measures be implemented particularly the TSD chapter which let me recall the level of ambition of the TSD chapter is a very robust one and it is fully in line with the original proposal that was submitted to you to the Council and to INTA at the very beginning of the negotiations. So it really sets a very good reference in future negotiations that we can conduct in Africa.
So let me refer how these provisions will be enforced. As I explained, these, the provisions under the TSD chapter are enforceable and are legally binding, and it will be enforced through the dispute settlement mechanism. So in practice, it means that if a party lodges a complaint, an independent panel of experts will rule on the case and will establish the facts and decide whether there has been a violation of the FTA. So the parties will act upon this and implement corrective measures as required.
As a last resort, if one of the parties is not satisfied with the corrective measures put in place, we can apply trade remedies, particularly in case of the material breach of the Paris Climate Agreement or if there are serious violations of the fundamental ILO principles. So this is a very significant achievement. Just let me recall that in the in the EPA that we concluded with with Kenya, we didn't have the trade remedies. So this is a very particular value addition under the deepened EPA with the with the ESA region.
On your questions regarding the concerns of Madagascar, yes, we are very much aware of these concerns that were expressed through a letter sent to our ambassador in Madagascar, a letter signed by a group of NGOs. And here I would like to clarify that there are a lot of misunderstandings regarding the protection of plant varieties. This is not only for this EPA, it has happened in other negotiations.
So let me underline that the agreement reflects the decision of both parties to protect plant varieties, providing legal certainty to the breeders, but also supporting farmers locally by facilitating their access to improved, more resilient and locally adapted varieties. So the EPA does not require ESA countries to join the International Convention on New Varieties, the UPOV 1991. It only asks countries to align with the plant protection provisions of this agreement. And it also foresees the possibility to apply the original exception, which is in Article 15.2 of the 1991 UPOV Act, that allows national authority to take account of local agricultural conditions and development needs. It means that neither the EPA, neither the UPOV have any effect on traditional varieties.
It means that neither the EPA, neither the UPOV have any effect on traditional varieties, and this is where I think the sensitivity relies. It's about the traditional varieties. Neither the EPA or the UPOV Convention concerns the traditional varieties. The UPOV Convention and the references made in the EPA only apply to the protected varieties. So we are preparing a draft reply to this letter to clarify these misconceptions because we think that the concerns are not justified.
On the question on the openness for other countries, this is very important.
Particularly let me underline that we are fully engaged in facilitating the accession of Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe participated in the concluding ceremony as observers and we took advantage of their presence to have a bilateral discussion with them to still discuss the outstanding issues. We have seven outstanding issues. Not all of them are really very substantive. I would say the most important one is access to mining, performance requirements and provisions on subsidies transparency.
Immediately after the concluding ceremony we sent an email to Zimbabwe with counterproposals in order to continue the engagement and the discussions.
So we are doing our best to have Zimbabwe on board. And generally speaking this agreement is open for other ESA countries to join but so far we don't have any evidence of any imminent interest from any other ESA country in the region. In terms of timing, well it is difficult for me to give you an exact timeframe. What we are going to do now is to consolidate the text of all provisionally concluded chapters and join it to the trade in goods text which we didn't touch. It is the one that is contained in the interim EPA.
So we are going to now bring both together. We will start with the legal scrubbing, so the technical work to be done between the lawyers from us and from the ESA countries, and we will then prepare the relevant decisions for concluding and signing the agreement that will be submitted to the EPA, sorry, to the European Parliament and the Council. Just to indicate that we think the legal scrubbing could take at least seven months.
With this, I cannot reply to your questions regarding, because I didn't understand whether it was particularly focusing on the TSD provisions or it was on the private life, so it's probably about data protection. So let me look at it bilaterally and come to you with a reply which is solid. So with this, I think I didn't forget any question, Chairman. If I did...
Indeed, there were also some questions regarding the different level of developments and the sectors where we see there is a potential for development. So this is a very important remark indeed. One of the challenges of this negotiation was the difference in in the level of development of these countries and the differences the different in interests they had. Not to forget that well out of the five countries with whom we started the negotiation three of them are least developed countries. Then there is Mauritius which is upper middle income country and Seychelles a high level income country.
So the their interests and sensitivities were very different indeed. So the way the the provisions have been drafted takes into account this difference in in the level of development.
And of course, in the market access schedule, these sensitivities are fully reflected. If I may give a very short hint on the sectors where we see a potential for development, it's basically agriculture and fisheries.
Agriculture for Madagascar, Comoros and well, I will not mention Zimbabwe because they are not part of it. So agriculture, fisheries, particularly for Mauritius and Seychelles, also in the long term for Madagascar. And the financial sector. So Mauritius, who has played the role of facilitator and the one that coordinated the ESA group, where they were very keen on concluding this EPA, particularly because they see themselves as the financial hub in the Indian Ocean. So I could mention these three sectors as the most, the ones with more potential.
And of course, just to recall once more, as I mentioned in my presentation, that the EPA comes with cooperation assistance. It has an economic and development cooperation chapter, which is very robust and that includes specific provisions and ways to support the implementation of the EPA to seize the opportunities that these countries will have through the implementation of this modern FTA.
Iuliu Winkler
So thank you very much chief negotiator. Any need of comeback question from yes. So thank you for the other comprehensive answers.
Thank you for this topic and this concludes point number 15 on our agenda and we have any other business on the point 16. If it is the case, I don't see something like that and we have point number 17, date of next meeting, more exactly next meetings. 6th of July we will have in Strasbourg a very brief voting session in evening at 19 hours 15 minutes and then 13 and 14 of July the meeting to conclude our our activity before the summer break. Thank you very much for all your cooperation and participation. Have a nice afternoon.
Thanks. Thank you for the interpreters and all the colleagues who have made possible our work together. Thank you very much, goodbye.
Redner 35
Ouais, ouais, je te vois. C'est juste que c'est le second. Ouais, c'est bon.
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