Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs Ordinary meeting
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ECON European Parliament
Ihren Sitzungen folgenRedner 3
So we have a number of EU tools that member states can use and do use, and we want them to use even more to expand not only the strength of the social dialogue, but also collective bargaining across. And of course, the example of Greece is of a country that needs to do much more on this path. Much more needs to be done. That's clear. They start from a very low position, but I think they are moving in a direction that indicates commitment to strengthen social dialogue.
Thank you.
Li Andersson
Thank you very much, dear Executive Vice-President, Commissioner. Thank you again for this fruitful discussion, which really shows the importance of these dialogues. For EMPL, I want to remind you that we start in the same room as yesterday for Q1 for our committee meeting.
And I will end by giving the floor to my colleague ECON Chair Aurora Lalucq for her closing words.
Thank you. And I would just very quickly thank you, dear Chair, for this meeting. Thank you to Executive Vice-President and to Commissioner. And for the ECON members, we will remain in this room to have an exchange of view on the economic and fiscal implication in Europe of the Middle East crisis.
Aurore Lalucq
Okay, so colleagues, if you can go back to your seat because we've got a voting session at 12:00. So we need to hurry up a little bit. And we will now move to exchange, to the exchange of views on the economic and fiscal implications in Europe of the Middle East crisis. And I would like to warmly welcome our invited expert Philip Lane, member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank. Welcome.
Maarten Verwey, Director General of ECFIN in the European Commission. And Asa Johansson, Director of the Policy Studies Research Branch at the OECD Economics Department. Welcome to the three of you.
The discussion is very timely. Geopolitical tension around the Strait of Hormuz and volatile energy prices have put a lot of pressure on the European economies with lasting effects, despite the fact that recent developments suggest the possibility of a progress toward ending the conflict around the Strait of Hormuz. The consequences are manifold, from implication from growth and inflation prospect to public debt and its spillover effects, up to serious risks for businesses and vulnerable households. Several institutions have produced inflation and growth forecast, which even under the most optimistic scenarios, revised downwards economic prospect at least until 2027. In this context, it is important to discuss about the appropriate response to this crisis and what the role of fiscal and monetary policy should be in that regard.
And today, we are looking forward to hearing from your different perspective about the work carried out by the ECB, the Commission and the OECD to better understand these challenges and their implication for Europe. So, you will have the floor for an opening statement of seven minutes and then there will be a Q&A session with the ECON members. So I will start with Philip Lane. Welcome in the ECON Committee.
Philip LANE
Thank thank you Chair and thank you for the invitation to contribute to this exchange of views. I will focus on the euro area and our in addition to our assessment of of the economic situation, I will also explain our monetary policy response.
So the peace agreement in the Middle East is welcome, but the situation remains fragile with risks of setbacks or re-escalation. The full implications of the war will depend on the intensity and duration of the energy price shock and the scale of indirect and second-round effects. So this slide here maybe illustrates that. So this slide illustrates the different possibilities for the future of oil and gas prices in the years ahead, depending on how the war plays out. So let me turn to our current assessment.
And in Q1 of this year, the euro area economy contracted by 0.2, but this was essentially due to special factors in Ireland. And without Ireland, the euro area economy grew by 0.3%, supported by domestic demand and exports. Public and private consumption contributed positively, while investment and inventories declined. So, um, in the interest of time, I'm going to skip some slides.
But I think that this slide, which is essentially the current indications of sentiment of activity, illustrate the point that the war in the Middle East is weighing on activity. So far, this has been more in services than in manufacturing, because manufacturing has been supported by precautionary inventory accumulation, but already this support is maybe fading out. We do think, however, and very importantly, the labor market, which I don't have a slide for, apologies, the labor market is resilient.
So please remember the unemployment rate is still close to a historic low at 6.3% in April. So the surveys do indicate some cooling in labor demand but in the grand scheme this remains a fairly resilient labor market. We do think the war is weighing on consumer and investor confidence and we do think higher energy costs are reducing real incomes.
However it remains the case that household balance sheets are solid overall and consumption to remain the main driver of growth. In relation to investment again the high energy costs and lower confidence is a drag on investment but please remember also there is a counterweight coming from AI. So we are seeing firms investing more to take advantage of new digital technologies.
We also see the positive impact of higher government spending on defense and infrastructure supporting investment. And these, if you like, provide some cushioning against the fallout from the war. So overall, despite the war, we do think we see the European economy grow by euro area economy grow by 0.8% this year, 1.2% in 2027, and 1.5% in 2028. So lower growth than we had hoped for, but this is still, you know, far above a stagnating economy.
This is still a fair amount of momentum in the euro area economy. Okay, so let me turn to inflation. And what you see here is that inflation has come up and in May it stood at 3.2%. This is mostly, as you can see from the graph here, a lot of this is coming from energy. So energy inflation has increased to 10.8%, so very different compared to before the war.
And non-energy inflation, if you add up food, services and goods inflation, it comes to 2.4.
So non-energy has gone up, you know, to some extent, but the dominant issue remains energy inflation. So far, in fact, most recently, food inflation has come down from 2.4% to 1.9%. Even though we do expect food inflation to increase later on. And we've had some increase in core inflation. And maybe on the graph on the right, what you see here is that we do think inflation will be around 3, a bit above 3% for the rest of this year.
So this is well above our 2% target. But if we focus on the... Let me just spend a second on energy. And maybe also it's important to recognize here.
So far, it's mostly transportation fuel. So far, it's mostly, you know, the price of filling diesel or petrol at the tank at the forecourt. It's not electricity, it's not the use by consumers of gas. So this is a very different energy shock to 21-22. In relation to domestic cost pressures, we do see profits absorbing some of the impact of higher costs, and we have not seen yet a response in terms of wages.
In fact, negotiated wages, the growth rate fell in Q1 from 2.9% in Q4 to 2.5% in Q1. And we think overall compensation per employee is going to grow steadily at 3.2% a year this year, in 27 and 28. The reason why this is relevant is this is ahead of the inflation rate. So unlike the last time, we do expect average worker to improve living standards every year. So with inflation rising to around 3%, this is still more than covered on average by the increase in compensation per employee.
So I'm mindful of the clock, so I'm going to now focus on the monetary policy response we made.
So we think raising the rate two weeks ago was a robust decision. Even in our milder scenario where the fuel prices fell back more quickly and we are seeing some of that already in the last couple of weeks, inflation remaining above 3% for the rest of this year and early next year is a long enough period to require a monetary policy response.
But we accept and highlight that the situation is uncertain and this is why we do not pre-commit in terms of our future decisions. We will follow a data-dependent and meeting-by-meeting approach to determine the appropriate stance. So I think in conclusion, where we are is that the crisis has increased uncertainty and until we have a kind of durable settlement, the uncertainty will continue. We do think it's reducing the growth rate of the European economy, but the growth rate remains still fairly resilient. And we do think it's raising the inflation rate, but again, this is a moderate increase.
It is not the scale of the increase we saw in 2022. And very importantly, when we think about the European economy, at the center remains a resilient labor market. At the center remains solid household balance sheets, and also the support from public investment, both through NextGenerationEU and through national programs. So, we will be focusing on delivering the return to 2% target in the medium term. So maybe I'll stop there.
Thank you so much. I will now give the floor to Mr. Verwey from the European Commission.
Maarten Verwey
Thank you, Chair, and good morning, honorable members. Okay, what I'm going to say will not cast a radically different light on the issue compared to Philip. But maybe to start, just recall where we were at the beginning of this year. So when we were looking internally at the economy at the beginning of the year, we felt actually that we were in a relatively, relatively good place. So we had internal projections of around 1.5% growth for this year.
We saw inflation basically on target, unemployment just below 6%.
So overall a pretty favorable picture. Now clearly the war in the Middle East has changed that picture quite dramatically.
And and this was also the the backdrop against which we we had to come out with our spring forecast in on May 21. And in the spring forecast we presented actually a significant downward revision for GDP growth to 1.1% for the for the EU as a whole, 0.9% for for the euro area, so not very far from where the ECB is. And and also an upward revision of inflation for this year to to around 3 3%. And this was all basically driven by by the war in the Middle East and the resulting closure of the Hormuz Strait. So Philip showed already the the slides with with where you could see the that the oil price surged by more than 50% between February and March and remained above $100 per barrel by mid-May.
Gas prices rose to €50, some 60% higher than at the beginning of the year. And also the oil futures, they showed a, and you could see that on the screen, a gradual decline, but for the entire forecast horizon, they were still seen above the levels that we had seen before the war.
Also in our forecast we pointed to extreme high levels of uncertainty, but in thinking about these levels of uncertainty we saw them mostly to the downside, with the risk that, like the ECB, we had also a downside scenario in which a larger and more persistent disruption would not only affect oil and gas markets but also weaken global growth and trade, depress confidence and raise risk premia. All in all, in this downside scenario EU GDP growth would almost half relative to the baseline, while inflation would end up significantly higher, especially in 2027. Now, so if you had asked me two weeks ago, I would probably have put equal probability on those scenarios. So we thought actually we probably our baseline scenario was if anything a bit on the optimistic side.
Now, meanwhile, the US and Iran have announced a deal that would allow a durable ceasefire as well as the resumption of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. Now, clearly we welcome this development. And since this announcement, Brent oil prices have fallen markedly, whilst still remaining above pre-crisis level.
They are on average around 10 dollars below the technical assumption underpinning our European Commission's economic spring forecast for the second quarter of 2024, but the longer-dated oil futures have also moved lower, although a bit less, so still 5% below the technical assumption underpinning our baseline. European gas prices have also eased, but less than oil prices, reflecting vulnerability of gas markets to disruptions to infrastructure caused by the conflict. Now, it's too early to draw firm conclusions as there's still a lot that can go wrong, but if commodity prices were to keep falling in line with the current market expectations, then this would reduce inflationary pressures and would be supportive to economic activity.
Now, the energy shock clearly has a fiscal dimension as well. The fiscal space of member states is more limited today than it was in 2022. And that is due to a combination of factors, including subdued economic activity actually since 2022, high interest rates, and also increased defense expenditure, which was absolutely necessary, but clearly also takes away fiscal space. Moreover, public finances in many member states are still burdened by the legacy of measures adopted in response to the pandemic and the early energy crisis. So some of the measures that were taken back then, they were supposed to be temporary, but they are still in existence today.
So in our baseline forecast we see the aggregate EU deficit going from 3.1% last year to 3.5 3.6% in 27 and as a result we also see the debt levels continue to rise again from 82.8% in 25 to 85.3% in 27.
Maarten Verwey
In this context, the Commission has forcefully cautioned against repeating the mistake of 2022 when massive and untargeted compensation packages were adopted by Member States with massive fiscal costs. And just to remind, this was about all in all in two years around 2.1% of GDP that was spent in that way, which is, to put in context, about the size of the entire grand envelope, RRF grand envelope, which went to mostly untargeted measures with the risk that that also added to inflation rather than detracted from it. So even so, also today we have seen Member States responding with fiscal measures.
Clearly they are under pressure to do so, to help or to cushion the impact of higher energy costs on households and firms. But so far the outlays have remained rather modest. So we estimate now at 0.1% of GDP, but if all these measures were to be extended through the end of 2026, this would rise about to 0.2% of EU GDP.
But again, two-thirds of these measures are untargeted. Then last point to make and looking ahead, the conflict in the Middle East is again a stark reminder that we need to reduce our dependence on fossil fuels. So for the second time in a very short time, in four years' time, the EU economy is experiencing an energy shock. And also today, well, I actually don't know whether the strait is open or closed, and there's no guarantee that it will continue to be open in the future. So this remains a risk.
So it's against this backdrop that the Commission has proposed expanding the scope of the existing national escape clause for defense spending to foster energy security and resilience while preserving the sustainability of public finances. And this reflects the need to, on the one hand, address strategic priorities, but without losing sight of fiscal sustainability. I'll stop here.
Thank you. Thank you so much. Uh, now I will give the floor to Ms. Johansson.
Thank you very much. I have a couple of slides if you can pull them up, please. So, uh, good morning to you all here today.
Åsa JOHANSSON
So I will give you a recap of our recent economic outlook that we published early June and I will also give you some insights from our OECD energy support measure tracker. So as many things that I'll be saying you already heard from my fellow speakers here. But in the recent outlook we highlighted that the conflict in the Middle East has disrupted a solid momentum the global economy had started this year with.
And this momentum was built on strong investment, particularly in AI and digital technologies, easing of trade barriers and favorable financial conditions. So the peace agreement that we are very welcome that we hear about today, but there still remains significant uncertainty, especially about whether trade flows through the Strait of Hormuz, when they will normalize. So there are still downside risks to the outlook. So let me move the slides if I manage. So this chart just shows you the developments in oil prices and gas prices.
And as you can see, the oil prices have increased quite a lot. And since oil is a global commodity, a shock at one choke point can affect every market almost immediately. And that's the same pattern we see for diesel and jet fuels. And that feeds into transport and production costs. So this energy shock is already affected well beyond the energy market.
And since we launched our outlook, oil prices have come down. So they are now below eighty dollars per barrel. And that's very welcome. But there is still a lot of volatility and continued uncertainty, which is affecting investment and consumption. So this, oh, I went too fast here.
So this chart here shows you that not all the countries are equally affected by the shock. So the blue part of the bar shows the direct effect on countries of imports from the Persian Gulf. And this is mostly concentrated among Asian markets. But countries further down the supply chain that depend on importers for their inputs, they will also feel this effect. And that's the part of the green bars.
And this reveals high exposure for several EU countries such as Greece, Italy, and Poland. But there are also other channels of exposures that we talk about in our outlook. And as we know, Gulf countries are key producers of fertilizer and key industrial inputs such as helium used in semiconductors and sulfur used in batteries. So these disruptions can push up food prices and hit high-tech production. So when we launched our economic outlook, we decided to present two different scenarios reflecting the uncertainty about the evolution of the conflict.
The first scenario that is shown here is a time-limited disruption scenario.
And here it assumes that energy trade through the Gulf gradually normalized from the mid of this year. It meaning that the strait reopens and transport bottlenecks and infrastructure damage are gradually resolved. But the higher energy prices that we have already experienced have reduced purchasing power and raised costs for firms. So growth only will recover gradually in this scenario and headline inflation continues to rise through most of 2026. And that is the green line you see in this chart here.
And in this scenario we expect world growth to be of 2.8% this year and 3.1% next year.
It's very sensitive this. So, so but as we, as I already said, there's so much uncertainty around these window scenarios. And in the second scenario, we modeled something that we called a prolonged disruption scenario. And this means that should disruptions persist, growth prospects would be severely downgraded. And this is shown by the red line in these two charts.
So we would have lower growth and higher inflation.
And in this scenario, growth would fall, world growth would fall to 2.1% this year and 1.8% next year, and inflation would rise and stay higher for a longer time. And in both our scenarios, the projections would, we are downgraded our projections to what we would have done pre-conflict, which is the blue line in these two charts. So let me turn to the fiscal situation that countries are facing. And this chart shows that many of our economies are in a tight fiscal position.
This chart shows public debt just before each of the three crises: in 2007 before the financial crisis, 2019 before the pandemic, and 2024 before the energy shocks. What is worth noting here is that in every region, debt-to-GDP is higher every time. Which, and we also have future pressures mounting from aging, defense, and climate change. So the governments are entering each shocks with less room than before. And this time is no exception, as we see from this chart.
So what do we know what countries have responded? So we at the OECD, we have compiled what we call the OECD energy support measure tracker.
And from this tracker we can see that despite the fiscal constraints many countries are facing the measures that have been introduced so far are broad-based measures as they are quicker and easier to implement. And these can see you can see in the left-hand side chart by the part of the bar that is red. And this is also clear if you look at the right-hand chart where we see by the types of different measures that countries have implemented. And most of those are broad-based measures such as price caps or tax reliefs and they are mostly untargeted which is the red part of the bar. These are quick to implement but they are not well suited to reach the most vulnerable households or the firms that are most in need of this.
So what we highlight in our work is that it's important to keep measures that are temporary, targeted, and preserve incentives to save energy. So if we look ahead, if there is a lasting resolution to the conflict and tensions and prices normalize, it's important to phase out these measures to really make them temporary. But in cases if the supply disruptions remain and prices keep high, the governments may face difficult choices as they have limited fiscal space. And in this context, it's even more important that targeted measures will be key to maintain support while maintaining fiscal cost.
So let me just finish with another lesson that we can learn from this energy shock and also from past energy crises, and my fellow colleague has already hinted to this, is that resilience cannot only rely on short-term support measures. So this chart shows that EU has reduced its resilience on fossil fuels since the 1990s, so the orange part of this bar has gone down. But fossil fuels still makes up most of its energy supply today.
And this continued reliance is exactly what leaves the region exposed. So it's important to enhance energy diversification and increasing energy efficiency to strengthen economy's resilience to energy shocks. And we said this before after the last energy shock. And Europe showed the ability to rapidly reduce dependence of Russian energy and that was a very impressive effort. But to improve overall resilience to shock, countries need to reduce resilience on fossil fuels more generally and need to continue moving towards a more diversified energy mix, stronger interconnection across borders and continued investment in electricity grids to strengthen resilience to future shocks.
I stop here. Thank you very much.
Thank you very much. Q and A session, one minute and a half for the question. I give the floor to Luděk Niedermayer for EPP.
Luděk Niedermayer
Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you for great presentations. It seems to me that based on them and also based on the hearing yesterday that the monetary action by ECB and other central bank is well-based and data-depending approach into the future decisions is also fully justified. It also seems to me that the current market situation is consistent with the moderate impact. But let me ask on one thing that really worries me. When the crisis start, it was considered as a huge shock for the supply of oil, natural gas and other important raw materials.
And there were a lot of estimations that unless the crisis will last only for a few weeks, there will be huge impact on prices and on supply. But instead, the crisis is much longer, you know, much, much longer, and still the prices were kept at a reasonably good level. Now, even if we don't know if the traffic is fully restored and what will continue in weeks to come, there is major turnaround in the prices. And again, this is good for the moderate or small impact on the economy, but it's still a little bit puzzling. So my question is, what was the mistake in these assumptions that the impact will be much deeper?
The second what was the role of release of strategic reserve by big countries? And the third how easy it would be in the current circumstances to replenish them?
Maarten Verwey
Happy to start happy to start on on this. I I think indeed we have seen a strong price impact but but not the worst not the worst scenario.
I think there are a number of explanations for that. First, the markets were relatively well supplied at the start, so that was that. Second, quite a lot of the reduction in supply has been cushioned by, well, release of strategic reserves as you mentioned, but also basically companies drawing down reserves.
So that is a second factor that has played. I think also what we see now is that even though we are now more exposed to the world market price of gas than we were before, that still is better than being dependent on really on one partner. So the impact on the gas price has been far less than we have seen in 2022. It's partially because our supply is much more diversified than it was before.
And I think it's also because notably US has stepped up also production on their side. And then I think we, and you asked about mistakes, I think we generally tend to underestimate the ingenuity of people and the possibility to respond to when crises occur. So there are alternative routes that are being found. I think refineries have stepped up, have been able to step up a lot production of jet fuel because we were really concerned about that. So technically simply there was more possible than we thought.
Åsa JOHANSSON
Just to echo a bit what Martin already was saying. So some of the things that we saw earlier on that was a very welcome coordination from the IEA to do stock releases, which has cushioned some of the impact.
When the war or the conflict broke out, there was also some of the oil tankers that were in shipping and they still got through. So there was a bit of delay because I mean shipments were were passing through had left before the conflict and they took a couple weeks before they arrived to where they were supposed to go, so there was some supply still coming out. And of course there's been some some support measures as I already mentioned that some countries have put in place to put price caps on some of the fuels so to protect some of the households and firms. Still the International Energy Agency, they have made estimates on what the shortfall of a close of the Strait of Hormuz would mean. And it's it's significant shortfall in production and capabilities or that coming out from the Strait of Hormuz, which will take time to restore these to the normal level.
So there is still quite a lot of uncertainty around how much of the capabilities have been destroyed in the area, but estimates suggest that it could take some time to repair and go back to normal, so some effects may also come later. Thank you.
Philip LANE
Maybe the only additional point is the fact that there was these loud warnings may have played a role in contributing to people finding new supply routes, reducing demand and so on.
So in other words, I, it may have been quite a useful social service that some of the, those warnings were made, because it triggered a lot of people trying to work hard to adapt. So, you know, maybe it was success, if you like, that the warnings triggered all of the adaptability that was mentioned.
Thank you. For the S and D, Thomas Meszaros.
Thomas Bajada
Thank you and good morning, and I would like to thank the coordinator from our end for allowing me to go first due to time constraints. So, unless there is a serious diplomatic breakthrough, we must be realistic. The instability caused by the situation in the Middle East may continue to affect Europe's economy in the longer term.
And we also need to be honest about the limits of the Union's leverage on the ground. That means our economic response to all of this must increasingly focus on protecting citizens, businesses, and regions most exposed to all of this crisis. And we have seen averages on the slides, but we must be clear that the impact is not the same everywhere. Rising energy and transport costs do not affect all regions equally.
Islands like Malta face a particular reality. We are geographically separated from the continent, heavily dependent on maritime and air connectivity, strongly reliant on tourism and import most of our essential goods, including food and energy. So when costs rise, islands feel the pressure earlier and more severely.
So a question to the Commission: can you inform us if the Commission is considering greater flexibility on the longer term on state aid rules and consumer support schemes for islands where the impact of the rising energy and transport costs is clearly disproportionate? And to the ECB: your response to inflation has relied heavily on tighter monetary policy, but much of the inflationary pressure that we are seeing is driven by energy, food, and external supply side shocks. So I am very interested to understand to what extent are higher interest rates the most effective tool? Do the benefits justify the higher borrowing costs for households, for businesses, and for public investments? Thank you.
Ľudovít Ódor
And the question goes to the Commission and ECB. Okay. Who would like to start? Commission, please.
Maarten Verwey
Yep.
I can start. I agree that if this episode has pointed out one thing is that this is something that can happen again. So this region, well, hopefully it will stabilize, but there is a risk that it doesn't and then it will continue to affect us. So the long term, the best long term economic response to that is to make sure that we build back our dependence on imported fossil fuels.
And because the reality is that for it's just a fact of life we don't have that so much in the European European Union. So quite apart from how you think about the climate etc. the reality is as long as we stay on fossil fossil fuels we we are dependent on the outside world and hence vulnerable for for for whatever geopolitical uncertainty that that there is. So so it's for that reason that that we believe that the best route forward is to to continue to invest in the in the decarbonization of the economy point number one.
Now, in the meantime, and that's your concern, in the meantime, households can be affected, businesses can be affected. So from the Commission side, we're not saying you should not do anything for that, but you need to be mindful that this is clearly not costless. This comes with a fiscal cost and if you do too much, you also risk to add actually to demand for fossil fuels. So that's why we say if you give support, Member States, then that should be temporary, targeted, and ideally also transformational in the sense that it contributes to making the problem less in the future.
That brings me to the state aid framework. So there is, even though it's not my area, but there is a temporary relaxation of the state aid framework, providing more opportunities now to provide support to companies.
But to me this is not a long-term this is not a long-term solution. The long-term solution is is really to build back this dependence on on the imported fossil fuels.
Philip LANE
So even though the the trigger is the really big increase in the energy price, I mean the reason why central banks respond is and we did wait we did wait from the end of February until now because our concern would be it broadens out that it affects the overall cost of living. So as you I think also indicated, I mean food is uses a lot of energy and the byproducts. So so we do expect the price of food to go up.
Transportation services, I mean airfares has already happened. Hotels use tourism, you mentioned tourism, tourism is also uses a lot of energy. So what tends to happen is that that cost increase percolates across the economy. And then with the overall cost of living going up, then it's going to be a factor in the next round of wage negotiations. And so if you like, when we anticipate one year from now, we want this to be contained because otherwise, even though people say, oh yeah, this was triggered in spring 2026 by the external factor, at that point, a year into the process, it's going to be just inflation.
And that kind of generic inflation has a risk of becoming persistent if we don't respond. So we're managing, if you like, the kind of aftermath of the original trigger, even if the original trigger is coming from this geopolitical shock. And please remember, I mean, we understand that on its own, the high cost of energy reduces demand and so on. So in calibrating monetary policy, we take a medium-term perspective, we try to take into account the negative effects on the economy, and that's why we're emphasizing we're taking a measured approach. This is not a kind of huge, gigantic response, it's a calibrated response to what we see.
So we do think the worst-case scenario, and we saw it in the 1970s, especially if we don't respond, there's a risk that the initial trigger of the energy shock mutates into an inflation problem, which if we don't fix it early, can really last a long time and would have a lot of costly side effects, especially on lower-income people. So we do think it's a robust decision to have raised rates in this measured way.
Thank you so much. Thank you for coming and for the presentations.
Enikő Győri
It's crystal clear that we have a very limited fiscal space now. And I'm quoting here Commission figures that in order to complete the energy union, it would require around 584 billion in additional investment, euros in additional investments by 2030. My question is where this money could come from.
Private investors continue to face significant regulatory uncertainty, public finances are under increasing pressure, so I don't really see how we can do it. And I would also like to all of you to count with me a bit in the context of the next MFF. 10% approximately should go to interest rate and capital reimbursement for the RRF. Concerning Ukraine, so far the EU has spent around 200 billion. In April, we agreed to an additional 90 billion euro loan.
In the next MFF, Ukraine is expected to receive 366 billion euros.
This is already 656 billion euros more than what you, the Commission, is asking for the completion of the Energy Union. And we haven't mentioned additional plans. Ukraine recovery needs around 800 billion euros, and to be able to continue the war, 700 billion euros. So I really would like to ask the participants how the EU will be able to cope with the energy situation, to complete the Energy Union, to have interconnectivity, to have member states having better chances to get low energy prices, and whether this is the existing most efficient working of using EU money. Thank you.
Thank you.
Enikő Győri
Mostly to the Commission, but I'm interested in the others' opinion as well. Thank you.
Maarten Verwey
Okay, first on the energy question. You're right that massive investments are needed. But indeed, and you pointed already to that, this is not all investments coming from the public sector.
So a very significant part of these investments will have to come from the private sector. And you point to another thing that is extremely important, and that is regulatory certainty. So if we indeed want private investment, we need to make sure that we have a predictable and stable regulatory environment.
And if if we have that, then I'm convinced that these investments will will be there because then there is a business case for for these investments. But but we need to be extremely careful with with going back and forth with with regulatory with our regulatory framework because that makes the investment challenge even even bigger. Second the second point and I need to make the I mean I cannot subscribe to the to the numbers quoted on on Ukraine here. I also want to quite I do not correspond to the numbers that I have, but that's not the key the key point.
But I want to say from the side of the Commission, not supporting Ukraine is not an option. That would, quite apart again how you think about Ukraine and the humanitarian side of it, but letting Ukraine fall poses a direct security risk for ourselves as well. So there is no option but to support, but the numbers you are quoting I cannot subscribe to. Thanks.
Philip LANE
Well, there is clearly a big fiscal challenge for all governments.
This is why the ECB is pretty consistent that essentially both at the country-by-country within the European fiscal framework and then indeed in the context of the MFF and so on, everything has to be wrapped into a sustainability override. And that just really increases the importance of really being rigorous in finding ways to make room for these essential spending programs while not trying to pretend that the overall mandate of having fiscal sustainability, that has to be incorporated. But this is for the political systems to work out answers.
Redner 25
Yes, thank you, Chair, and thanks to our guest speakers for being here. Whenever there's a problem, the answer in Brussels is always to suspend the fiscal rules.
We saw it during the COVID crisis, more recently through the defense exemptions introduced under REPowerEU, and now with the chaos in the Strait of Hormuz and the tensions there, we see it again with the talk of green exemptions. And this will not be the last challenge we face. Every new challenge, however, appears to come with another exemption. My concern is that fiscal rules are gradually becoming optional. Fiscal rules are only meaningful if they not only apply in good times, but especially when they become politically inconvenient.
If member states know that the rules will be relaxed whenever pressure mounts, what incentive remains to consolidate public finances and build buffers when economic conditions are favorable?
So, my question is this: if every crisis justifies another exemption, are we not sending the message that fiscal discipline is optional? And if that is the case, how can we expect Member States to make the difficult choices needed to put their finances in order before the next crisis is here? Thank you.
Maarten Verwey
I guess that one is for me. Yeah, well, let me be also clear on this. Fiscal discipline is not optional, and it's quite apart from our fiscal rule.
If you neglect fiscal discipline, then sooner or later you will pay the price for it. So I share completely your concern on the need to maintain fiscal discipline. But I would not say that at the moment the fiscal rules are suspended again.
And and I think there is actually a big difference to the situation that we we have today with the situation that we were facing in 2022. So so in 22 indeed the fiscal fiscal rules were truly suspended. And what what and the implication of of that which was uncomfortable also for the Commission was okay we could give a lot of advice on what and what not to do but we had absolutely no tools to to to to encourage member states actually to to follow follow that that advice. And that that is I think one of the reasons why at least from my perspective the the the it got out of hand in 22 and 23 when it comes to to the compensatory measures.
We're not fortunately we're not at all in that that scenario scenario today. And so we decided or the Commission decided a little while ago to to trigger the the national escape clause for allow triggering of national escape clause for defense. I think I would say this is not just one one crisis.
This was an imminent danger that was was facing us and and it's for that that reason that you you need to yeah, that's one risk weighing against another. What we're doing now or what we're proposing now is is not to provide more flexibility on top of that, but is that within the within this this defense neck for defense to give a little bit extra room to to for also measures that are good for energy energy security. And the logic here is that well, defense is important for your security, but but your energy security is too.
So it's it's it sits a bit in the same same same quadrant. And but overall we're not providing more fiscal leeway than than already was there with the net defense. Thanks.
Åsa JOHANSSON
Yeah just a short remark from our side is that OECD we are pointing out that it's important to keep an eye on longer term debt sustainability and because debt is rising in many countries as I showed and there's a lot of fiscal pressure coming from various aspects aging defense and the green transition. So for what we often say it's very important to think about how your spending and your tax composition there may be maybe some needs to rethink how what you spend on and how you tax for example thinking about looking over tax exemptions broadening tax bases to raise more revenues.
And also we pointed to the importance of having good fiscal frameworks with medium-term plans for your fiscal path. So this is something that we highlight that keep an eye on long-term debt sustainability. Thank you.
Catarina Martins
Thank you, Chair. I'll speak in Portuguese. Eu tenho perguntas diferentes para a Comissão e para o BCE. Queria começar pela Comissão Europeia com duas perguntas.
Uma porque estamos aqui a analisar os efeitos económicos na crise do Médio Oriente e todos sabemos que as agressões de Israel e dos Estados Unidos da América ao Irão só tornaram toda a situação muito mais complicada. Estamos hoje numa situação muito pior do que estávamos antes e, na verdade, todos aqui reconhecem também que a situação permanece muito instável. O que eu não vejo ninguém a reconhecer, e acho estranho, é o papel da própria União Europeia no que está a acontecer.
Nós não assistimos simplesmente, somos parte, até porque a União Europeia mantém um acordo de associação com Israel, que faz de nós o seu principal parceiro comercial e, portanto, também faz de nós contribuintes líquidos para a guerra e para o genocídio que está em curso. E, portanto, a primeira pergunta que tenho para a Comissão é se não está na altura de suspender o acordo de associação com Israel e ter sanções para aquele que é, na verdade, um dos maiores culpados da desestabilização e, portanto, também da crise económica que estamos aqui a debater. Em segundo lugar, perguntar-lhe se as crises se sucedem e se a cada crise as regras orçamentais da União Europeia se provam incapazes, não está na altura de nós percebermos que essas ordens, que essas regras orçamentais têm dois problemas: um, impedem a União Europeia dos investimentos que precisa para não ter crises; dois, não nos deixam responder às crises. Regras económicas que nunca servem não devem existir.
Tenho agora uma pergunta para o Banco Central Europeu. Ouvi o comentário de que a evolução dos salários acompanhou a inflação. Mas isso é para todos os rendimentos? Muito rapidamente. É para todos os rendimentos?
Porque, como sabe, nesta crise os rendimentos mais baixos são mais afetados.
A subida dos rendimentos mais baixos compensou a inflação. E muito sinceramente, neste cenário, acho muito difícil justificar a subida dos juros que coloca mais pressão ainda na crise, sobretudo para os países em que, como Portugal, a crise da habitação é tão pesada. E perguntar-lhe se tenciona repetir o erro ou se vai parar.
Aurore Lalucq
Obrigada. Obrigada. Ok, então uma pergunta para a Comissão, a outra para o BCE. Começaremos com a Comissão.
Maarten Verwey
Sim, eu acho que a primeira pergunta, na verdade, vai um pouco além do que um simples economista pode responder. Então, eu acho que vou, quero dizer, é uma declaração, é uma posição. Não acho que seria apropriado para mim comentar sobre isso.
Maybe before turning it to Philip, let me just say one thing on the fiscal rules, that they don't help, they don't exist. I think in a monetary union, it's very hard to run without fiscal coordination.
And I think what is often overlooked is that actually fiscal rules give you, since they they instill confidence with financial markets, actually they give you more fiscal space than than in the absence of of having no having no fiscal rules. So so if in the if the market today would think, okay, we're going to abandon all fiscal rules, rather than creating more fiscal space for for to do things that you want to do for for people, I can guarantee you that you would have less fiscal space because the markets would refuse to finance. Thanks.
Philip LANE
So so I I think it's very important that that we all recognize, and we do at the ECB, that those on the lowest incomes spend the highest share of their income on energy and food. So we do recognize the the impact is is largest at the lower income groups.
So first of all, of course, many people are not in the workforce, so you have to think about how their social payments are keeping up with inflation or not. But in relation to those who are earning wage income, you know, in many countries in recent years, the minimum wage has gone up quite a lot. So there has been a priority, if you like, to increase the minimum wage more than maybe average wages. So that effort, I think, has been made and continues to be made.
But the cost increase is also biggest for that group. So in my slides this morning, I focused on the overall. And maybe again, when I started, my starting point was unemployment in Europe now, in the euro area, is the lowest in 40 years. What it means is that there is, I think, some momentum in wages. And so for the average worker, we do think this year compensation per worker will go up by 3.2%, which should be ahead of inflation.
But I think we don't have perfect data on the lower income groups.
We will find out if you like with a lag with a delay as those kind of specialized studies get made. But you know maybe I can follow up with you later because we can share what we have done in the past. But it's I think it's an important question to look at that. And then of course going to what has already been said this is why you know some fiscal response is appropriate.
But this is where it being targeted and tailored so that those on the lowest incomes and most vulnerable, and again it's not just workers, it could be retired people, people outside the workforce, do receive the targeted subsidies to be able to absorb this very high energy price we're seeing. So I think a mix of the wage increase and then the fiscal response is important for that group.
Thank you. For EPP, Kinga Gál.
Kinga Kollár
Thank you, Chair, and thank you for the presentation. I think it very much showed us that how dependent all European economies are on external energy supplies. And I would like to add a structural dimension to this question.
So these energy external energy shocks do not hit the member states uniformly. Member states differ significantly in their energy mix and import dependency. A member state with higher energy import dependency faces not only larger inflationary pressure, but also more severe hits to its fiscal position because of higher subsidy costs, lower growth, and wider spreads. And those are often precisely the member states with the least fiscal space to absorb it. So large external shocks do not just stress individual economies, but they pull the EU apart.
So I would have a question to Mr. Ferri.
So do you see structural energy vulnerability as a dimension of fiscal risk? And if so, is there a case for reflecting this more explicitly in country-specific fiscal assessments under the economic governance framework? And I would have also a question to the OECD, to Mr. Johansson. You mentioned that the best type of measures are those that are limited, targeted, and that incentivize energy savings. My question is, would you have a specific example, you know, a best practice for such a measure, as I saw that you presented those in summary?
Thank you.
Åsa JOHANSSON
Thank you for your question. Yeah, indeed, we point to the fact that it's important to have targeted, temporary, and time-limited measures. Across EU countries, in our energy tracker, what we see is around 70% of the measures are temporary, 45% are targeted, and 31% is both temporary and targeted among the measures that we've been tracking.
And there are different ways of doing this targeting mechanism and also temporary. So for example, targeted, you can think about you having some you target certain types of group and you can do it, for example, with one-off payments linked to electricity bills. That's some countries have done that. It's important that it's not it's not like you maintain the price signal, so you have lump sum transfers rather than to incentivize energy savings because energy savings is extremely important in when you have an energy supply shock. So that is that's a factor to take into account.
And for example, it's important to build in sunset clauses. So for example, some countries have said that these measures will be in place for a certain amount of time.
Others have said that these measures will be withdrawn if prices go below a certain threshold. So there are good examples and I can share more with you from our energy tracker, because it's an online tool, so I can give you the link and I can give you more explicit examples. Thank you.
Maarten Verwey
You're quite right to point to the geographical differences in how the energy shock affects the economies.
And indeed, generally speaking, the higher the dependence on imported fossil fuels, the bigger obviously the impact is. And there is indeed also a link, well, it's not a one-on-one relation, but some of the countries that are relatively hard hit by the energy shock are also the countries that do not have a lot of fiscal space. So I think you're very right in pointing out this link.
Clearly already today and for a long time already the we we give recommendations to member states to decarbonize their economy. Also a lot of union instruments have been targeted on that, the RRF but the InvestEU, the but also the cohesion funds. So so there's a lot what what actually can be done from from funds coming from from Europe as well.
And it's also an expla- one again goes back to to why we we crafted the the the neck the national escape clause addition as we have done is that we much rather have those countries to invest now in in reducing their their dependence for the future and to avoid that they become less vulnerable to the shocks rather than every time doling out money that they don't have actually. That's thanks.
Thank you S and D Jonas Fernandez.
Jonás Fernández
Muchas gracias Chair hablaré en castellano.
Y mi pregunta va dirigida a Philip Lane. Decía mi colega Thomas Bajada en la primera ronda que estos shocks energéticos solo hacían que, en fin, confirmar el proceso de transición verde en el que está la economía europea, que contribuyó o va a contribuir también a reducir estas vulnerabilidades en la medida en que no los los combustibles fósiles pues siempre vienen de terceras de terceras jurisdicciones. Pero mi pregunta es, y en este caso es evidente que esa reducción de las vulnerabilidades externas van a contribuir también a reducir los niveles de precios o reducir la inflación.
Es decir, reducir estas vulnerabilidades nos reduciría la volatilidad de los shocks externos y a medio plazo también reduciría los precios energéticos. Ahora bien, hemos visto también otros shocks en estos últimos años, la crisis de Ucrania, la COVID, que ha consolidado un consenso bastante amplio en las instituciones políticas sobre la necesidad de reducir estas externalidades, ¿no?, que viene a ser la autonomía estratégica de la Unión Europea. Ahora bien, la implementación de la autonomía estratégica en algunos aspectos pudiera tener algunos efectos sobre los niveles de precios en la economía europea.
En el caso, como digo, de la descarbonización es obvio que el efecto sería positivo, pero quizá en otras discusiones más vinculadas a la política comercial con algunas jurisdicciones o, en fin, o algunos objetivos de producir localmente bienes y servicios que ahora compramos fuera con elevada volatilidad. Pero me gustaría preguntar si el ECB va a hacer o tiene pensado hacer algún tipo de análisis sobre el impacto en precios de la autonomía estratégica que ayude a tomar decisiones. Sorry.
Philip Lane.
Philip LANE
So, I share and I think the ECB shares a lot of what you say.
So in fact in in our monetary policy statement since the war began, we have emphasized it really reinforces the importance of reducing our dependence on fossil fuel imports. So let me say first of all, we see it already between now and 2022. So even in four or five years, the increased renewables in the overall energy mix, including and especially in Spain, has meant that I mean because in my chart if you remember, I said this time there's a big effect on transportation fuel.
There's much less effect on electricity production because of the fact renewables are a much bigger share. And this reinforces the more we can do this, the more we will have indeed that autonomy. We won't be hostage to fossil fuel imports. And indeed, as you mentioned with volatility, we expect energy prices to be a lot less volatile because with renewables, okay, there's still a weather factor, but there isn't the geopolitical risk factor there is now. And the history of inflation in Europe and around the world since the 1970s, a lot of it has to do with big swings in the price of oil in the 1970s, 1980s, 2000s, and now again.
So this does mean, I think, when we look forward, it'll be a very different economy. It'll be a very different economy if we have a lot of renewables, much less volatility, and much less vulnerability. And so we're working on this. I had myself, I put together a lot of the ECB work into a speech at the start of May called Climate Change and Monetary Policy. But more generally, it was about energy economics and monetary policy.
So I think that's important. What I would say, I think as you recognize, whether it's energy or other elements, part of that autonomy is a certain amount of redundancy and resilience. So as you know, with renewables, you do have to also have redundancy in the energy mix for the days when the sun doesn't shine and the wind doesn't blow. And so some costs, if you like, the fixed costs in energy production may go up, but the marginal cost of production, I think, goes down.
So I think we have identified in our overall monetary policy strategy that this decade we're going through a lot of big structural changes. And this is an interesting intersection between geopolitical change and the green transition, very important. And so this intersection, I do think we're working a lot on, but I mean, all of what you said, I think we agree with. Thank you.
Thank you. Last speaker, Ludovit Odor, for 1 minute.
Ľudovít Ódor
Thank you. Thank you very much. I have a complementary question because that's an important issue that we have not only a more complexity in the global economy, but a lot of policy uncertainty. Has there been any impact on private investment structurally? That is my question.
And what can we do with it? Because we are talking about the strategic autonomy, but a lot less about risk-sharing mechanism, either public or private. Because if there's a world where there's a lot of uncertainty, a lot more than 10 years ago, it can have a sizeable, it would have a sizeable impact on private investment. And therefore, there can be a role also governments can play or the European Union can play to, you know, counteract a bit either the trade uncertainty, energy price uncertainty, or policy uncertainty in general.
And my question goes to Philip and to the OECD. Thank you.
Åsa JOHANSSON
Thank you for your question.
Not in this Economic Outlook, but in the two outlooks ago, we had a special chapter where we did a deep dig into trying to understand investment patterns, because we've seen a decline in business investment since the global financial crisis. So there's been a trend decline in business investment. And we looked into this to try to get a handle on what is driving this weak business investment. Is it structural or cyclical factors? So we did some empirical estimates and we did find that, of course, there is an uncertainty playing a role.
The business cycle matters for business investment, but there is also a large part of business investment that cannot be explained by cyclical factors and uncertainty, which goes to structural settings. So in here we mean things like how easy it is to start up a business, for example. Is it complicated, because that can hold back firm investment? Is it regulatory uncertainty that you mentioned yourself?
In the area of green investment, do we have clear price signals for where this is going to go so firms feel that they can make this longer-term commitment investment? So this is an area where we're looking quite a lot at what happens in private investment. One factor that we have seen very recently is that there has been quite a lot of investment in AI technologies and data centers, particularly in the US and some other economies. So that's something that we're trying to see where this is going and how that can affect the business investment going forward. But it's a very good point that to for firms to invest, we need to have a stable climate, good framework conditions to make business want to invest.
Thank you.
Philip LANE
So you mean you're correct that uncertainty as such is a encourages firms to delay investment until the uncertainty comes down. One response is to make sure the policy framework is very predictable, so it doesn't add to uncertainty. I do think having a clear policy direction, so for example, the green transition, a lot of people, even though there's a lot of uncertainty, they know there's an urgency.
But the urgency of investing in the green transition is not helped if you believe some of the transition policies might get reversed over the years. Let me mention again with AI. AI is happening despite the investment, the huge uncertainty, and this is where the overall competitive environment matters. I think interesting work is indicating one of the motivations to invest is fear that your competitors are already investing and you will lose your position.
So it's very important to recognize uncertainty can sometimes trigger investment, but for fear of basically becoming irrelevant if you don't invest. So I do think we are seeing more business investment in Europe right now, maybe as a response to that kind of existential uncertainty in some ways.
Thank you. Any request for the floor? No. Well, thank you so much for this exchange of views. It was very useful and important for us.
And we'll be back in ten minutes for the voting session. Thank you to the three of you again.
Redner 37
It's time to go back to your seat. Okay, so we will start our voting session with a test vote.
Redner 38
The vote is open. Test vote. Interesting numbers. Okay, so I close the vote. It's working well.
We will begin with the retail investment strategy by rapporteur Stéphanie Yon-Courtin. Also this is a package of two measures, we will vote on each text individually and I've been informed that the rapporteur would like to take the floor.
So Stéphanie, the floor is yours for one minute.
Stéphanie Yon-Courtin
Merci, merci Madame la Présidente. Chers collègues, aujourd'hui nous votons la stratégie d'investissement de détail. C'est la première pierre de l'Union de l'épargne et de l'investissement. Notre objectif est que chaque Européen puisse prendre des décisions financières éclairées pour mieux préparer son avenir et contribuer à financer l'Europe de demain. Cet accord de trilogue leur en donne les moyens car dans ce texte nous renforçons la protection des épargnants en ligne, hors ligne pour mieux mettre fin aux pratiques trompeuses qui touchent les jeunes investisseurs.
Pour la première fois en Europe nous encadrons les influenceurs financiers et la promotion de produits financiers en ligne.
Ensuite, nous prévoyons un conseil simplifié, plus rapide pour les produits simples au bénéfice des entreprises et des consommateurs. Et puis nous donnons plus d'outils aux superviseurs pour identifier et sanctionner les acteurs qui violent les règles. Également, nous facilitons l'accès des investisseurs professionnels à des produits finançant l'innovation européenne. Et enfin, nous renforçons la transparence et l'éducation financière.
À l'initiative du Parlement, nous invitons la Commission à mettre en place un comparateur européen de produits financiers. Je remercie les collègues sur qui j'ai pu compter pour négocier ce texte majeur. Mais je regrette, je regrette, chers collègues, que certains groupes continuent à jouer des jeux politiques jusqu'à la fin, alors qu'il est temps, plus que temps, de passer des paroles aux actes pour la souveraineté économique, pour l'Europe. Merci.
Aurore Lalucq
Merci, Madame la Rapporteure. So, first we will hold a vote on the provisional agreement resulting from inter-institutional negotiation on the amending regulation. By roll call, I open the vote. And I close the vote.
And it is adopted with 33 in favor, 21 against, 4 abstentions. Second, we will vote on the provisional agreement resulting from inter-institutional negotiation on the Omnibus Directive, and I open the vote by roll call. And I close the vote. It is adopted with 33 in favor, 23 against, and 2 abstentions.
Congratulations to the rapporteur. We now pass on to agenda item 10 regarding the three votes on the COD files of the single currency package for which the rapporteur is Fernando Navarrette for EPP.
We will first vote on the report on the regulation on the establishment of the digital euro. We will start with a block vote on amendment 282, 283, 284 and 285 proposing to reject the Commission proposal. This is a final vote in the event that this proposal is adopted. I will therefore take that vote by roll call vote. Please note that if the amendment for rejection are not adopted, the result of the roll call vote will not be used.
I open the vote. And I close the vote.
And it is rejected. We now proceed to the vote following the voting list. We have, you have to listen to me on this. Every time, but specifically on this, because it's a little tough, okay? So we have 15 compromise amendment by the rapporteur, 11 alternative compromise amendment tabled by PFE members, and three alternative compromise amendment tabled by ECR members.
So according to rule 190, we will order the votes starting by the compromise amendment departing the furthest from the original text. This will be, when it is the case, PfE alternative compromise first, followed by ECR alternative compromise and then the rapporteur compromise. Okay, I will give you every time some indication. So, by showing of hands, we will start with alternative compromise AA from PfE. Who is in favor?
Who is against? Who abstains? Rejected.
Compromise A by the rapporteur. Who is in favor? Who is against? Who abstains? Adopted.
Compromise BA alternative from PFE. Who is in favor? Who is against? Who abstains? Rejected.
Compromise B from the rapporteur. Who is in favor? Who is against? Who abstains? It is adopted.
Compromise alternative CA from PFE. Who is in favor? Who is against? Who abstains? Rejected.
Compromise C from the rapporteur. Who is in favor? Who is against? Who abstains?
It is adopted. Compromise D from the rapporteur, who is in favor? Who is against? Who abstains? Adopted.
Alternative compromise HA from PfE, who is in favor? Who is against? Who abstains? It is rejected. Compromise alternative HB from ECR, who is in favor?
Who is against? Who abstains? It is rejected. Compromise H from the rapporteur, who is in favor? Who is against?
Who abstains? It is adopted.
Compromise G from the rapporteur. Who is in favor? Who is against? Who abstains? It is adopted.
Compromise FA alternative one from PFE. Who is in favor? Who is against? Who abstains? It is rejected.
Compromise alternative one also FB from ECR. Who is in favor? Who is against? Who abstains? It is rejected.
Compromise F from the rapporteur. Who is in favor? Who is against? Who abstains? It is adopted.
Compromise I from the rapporteur. Who is in favor? Who is against? Who abstains? It is adopted.
Compromise JA alternative one from PfE. Who is in favor? Who is against? Who abstains? Rejected.
Compromise J from the rapporteur. Who is in favor? Who is against? Who abstains? It is adopted.
Alternative compromise from PfE KA. Who is in favor? Who is against? Who abstains? It is rejected.
Compromise K from the rapporteur. Who is in favor? Who is against? Who abstains?
It is adopted. Compromise alternative LA from PFE, who is in favor? Who is against? Who abstains? It is rejected.
Compromise L from the rapporteur, who is in favor? Who is against? Who abstains? It is adopted. Compromise MA alternative compromise from PFE, who is in favor?
Who is against? Who abstains? It is rejected. Compromise M from the rapporteur, who is in favor?
Who is against? Who abstain? Adopted compromise NA alternative one from PFE who is in favor? Who is against? Who abstain?
It is rejected compromise N from the rapporteur who is in favor? Who is against? Who abstain? It is adopted alternative compromise from PFE OA who is in favor? Who is against?
Who abstain? It is rejected alternative compromise OB from ECR who is in favor?
Who is against? Who abstain? It is adopted. And we go to the final vote by roll call. I open the vote.
And I close the vote. And it is adopted. Digital euro is adopted.
Now we vote on the decision to enter into interinstitutional negotiations by roll call vote in accordance with rule 72. The required majority is 31 members. I open the vote. And I close the vote. And it is adopted.
Congratulations to the negotiating team, to the rapporteur. This is a necessary step for Europe. Yes, someone from ESN wants to take the floor.
Siegbert Frank Droese
Thank you, Chair. I would like to request the floor under rule 56.4 for a minority position.
I will speak in German. Wir haben gegen diesen Bericht gestimmt, nicht nur aus den bekannten politischen Gründen gestimmt, die uns zu einer Ablehnung des digitalen Euro veranlassen. Darüber hinaus sind wir der Auffassung, dass mehrere Elemente der vorgeschlagenen Verordnung erhebliche Zweifel daran aufwerfen, ob Artikel 133 AEUV alleine hierfür eine ausreichende Rechtsgrundlage bietet.
Während Artikel 133 AEUV Maßnahmen erlaubt, die für die Verwendung des Euro als einheitliche Währung erforderlich sind, geht die Verordnung zunehmend über klassische währungspolitische Maßnahmen hinaus. Die Gesamtheit der Regelungen zu Zahlungsmarktstrukturen, zentralen Infrastrukturen, Zugangsmechanismen und kommerziellen Bedingungen zwischen Zahlungsdienstleistern wirft Fragen hinsichtlich der Kompetenzgrenzen und der Verhältnismäßigkeit auf. Wir sind der Auffassung, dass die vorgeschlagene Verordnung auf einer Auslegung des Artikel 133 AEUV beruht, die den Umfang der unionsrechtlichen Währungskompetenz über die in den Verträgen vorgesehenen Grenzen hinaus ausdehnen würde. Diese Bedenken wurden im Gesetzgebungsverfahren nicht hinreichend berücksichtigt.
Aus diesen Gründen können wir den Bericht in seiner derzeitigen Fassung nicht unterstützen und wir bitten das zu Protokoll zu nehmen. Vielen Dank.
Aurore Lalucq
Thank you. So you have to submit a written declaration of not more than 200 words to the committee secretariat within two hours from now. And we will now continue with the vote on the second file, the report on the provision of digital euro services by payment services providers incorporated in Member States whose currency is not the euro and amending Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council. We will now proceed to the following voting list by showing of hands. Compromise A, who's in favor?
Who's against? Who abstains? Adopted. Compromise B, who's in favor? Who's against?
Who abstains? Adopted.
Final vote by roll-call vote. I open the vote. I close the vote. And it is adopted. Okay, we will now vote on the mandate.
I open the vote. And I close the vote.
And it is adopted. We will now continue with the vote on the third file, the report on the legal tender of the euro banknotes and coins by Stefan Berger. Compromise A, who's in favor? Who's against? Adopted.
Final vote by roll-call vote, I open the vote.
I close the vote. And it is adopted. We will now vote on the mandate. I open the vote. And I close the vote.
And it is adopted. Congratulations to the rapporteur, to the negotiating team. Digital Euro is adopted.
Thank you so much.
Aurore Lalucq
Okay, we now pass on to agenda item 11 regarding the vote on the report digital asset challenges for the competitiveness and integrity of the EU's financial system by rapporteur Johan Van Overtveldt. So, we will start with by showing of hands. Compromise A who's in favor? Who's against? Who abstains?
Compromise C who's in favor? Who's against? Who abstains? Adopted. Compromise D who's in favor?
Who's against? Who abstains? Okay, check.
I open the vote. And I close the vote. And it is adopted. Compromise E, who's in favor? Who's against?
Who abstains? Adopted. Compromise F, who's in favor? Who's against? Who abstains?
Adopted. Compromise G, who's in favor? Who's against? Who abstains? Adopted.
Final vote by roll call vote.
I open the vote. And I close the vote. And it is adopted. Sorry.
We now pass on to agenda item 12 regarding the vote on the ECON opinion on the regulation establishing a budget expenditure tracking and performance framework and other horizontal rules for the Union program and activities. We will proceed to the vote following the voting list. Compromise A, who is in favor? Who is against? Who abstains?
Let me check this compromise A. Okay, I close the vote. And it is adopted. Final vote by roll call vote.
I open the vote. I close the vote. And it is adopted. Thank you so much. And see you in the afternoon for the debate on the global role of Euro.
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